Attest preserved Linux full runtime with three native passive samples
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
This commit is contained in:
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review.
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No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval.
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Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent
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stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install.
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"""
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import argparse
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import inspect
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import uuid
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ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9'
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if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA:
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raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed')
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import script_console_bootstrap as pre
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support = pre.support
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CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd'
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STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation'
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DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n'
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def require(value, code):
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if not value:
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raise RuntimeError(code)
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def vm(payload):
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"""Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification."""
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import contextlib
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import datetime as dt
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import sqlite3
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import stat
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import subprocess
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import base64
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import time
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read_transactions={}
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require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case')
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intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id'])
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state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper')
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def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
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def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()
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def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024):
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m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0
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and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence')
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return path.read_bytes()
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require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent')
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old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024))
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old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json'))
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original_report=protected(before/'report.json')
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historical=json.loads(original_report)
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require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation')
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continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json'))
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require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case')
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first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
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require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp')
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require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot')
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observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat()
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processes={}
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for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)):
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raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
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unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID'])
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require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active')
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proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]
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status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines()
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uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))
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image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256']
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require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected
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and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image')
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processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image)
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for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'):
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raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
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unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines())
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require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed')
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for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))):
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raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024)
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require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes']
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and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode')
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prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)]
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require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved')
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for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items():
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if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue
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path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path)))
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require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities')
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full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True)
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config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json')
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require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration')
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pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640
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and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin')
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ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')}
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ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')}
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require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes')
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for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)),
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(Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))):
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require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes')
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# Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync;
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# every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness.
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current_paths=set()
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for root in (state,helper):
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for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]:
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if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required')
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m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type')
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current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path))
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require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path')
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value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns]
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require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved')
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require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained')
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@contextlib.contextmanager
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def database(name):
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path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1
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and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode')
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require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars')
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# Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or
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# running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget
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# limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee.
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started=time.monotonic()
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with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db:
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db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000)
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try:
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db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN')
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require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal')
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yield db
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finally:
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db.rollback()
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elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000)
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timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0))
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timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed)
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require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read')
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def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row]))
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journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes())
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require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding')
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key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key')
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verified={}
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def signed(decision_id):
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if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id]
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with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone()
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require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision')
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response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0<len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded original Ed25519 response')
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descriptors=[]
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try:
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for value in (bytes.fromhex('302a300506032b6570032100')+key,raw,signature):
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fd=os.memfd_create('rmm-readonly-public-verification',os.MFD_CLOEXEC);descriptors.append(fd)
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require(os.write(fd,value)==len(value),'complete public verification input');os.lseek(fd,0,0)
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result=subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/openssl','pkeyutl','-verify','-pubin','-keyform','DER','-inkey','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[0]),'-rawin','-in','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[1]),'-sigfile','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[2])],pass_fds=tuple(descriptors),capture_output=True,timeout=5)
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require(result.returncode==0,'original signed decision verifies')
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finally:
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for fd in descriptors:os.close(fd)
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d=json.loads(raw)
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require(d['decision_id']==decision_id and d['domain']=='rmm.reconciliation-decision' and d['schema_version']==1
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and d['key_id']==sha(key) and all(d[k]==public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'signed domain/key/device/generations')
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def varint(v):
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out=bytearray()
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while v>=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7
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out.append(v);return bytes(out)
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wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature
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with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone()
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require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes')
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original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']
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verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original)
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return verified[decision_id]
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def original_rows(name,table,count):
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# There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes
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# before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer.
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require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
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last=None;remaining=count
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while remaining:
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size=min(16,remaining)
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with database(name) as db:
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if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
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else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
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require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained')
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for row in page:
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require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal')
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last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row
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old_candidates=[]
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# Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response
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# BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below.
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total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None
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while len(old_candidates)<total_original:
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with database(ledger) as db:
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size=min(16,total_original-len(old_candidates))
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if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
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else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
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require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained')
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old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0]
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old_candidates.reverse()
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reference_changes=[];summary={}
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for name,previous in old_sql.items():
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with database(name) as db:
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schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema')
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counts={}
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for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items():
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require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
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with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
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counts[table]=count
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require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained')
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if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
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require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap')
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if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue
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if table=='counter':
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with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall()
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require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue
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if table in ('pending','job_events'):
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require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue
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for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))):
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old_hash=old_hashes[index]
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if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue
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if table=='reconcile_requests':
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require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill')
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with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]]))
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require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request')
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signed(candidates[0][0])
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continue
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require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed')
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# Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its
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# reference to an independently applied signed decision renews.
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original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None)
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require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness')
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old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart')
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selected=[]
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for proof in (old,new):
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found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]]
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require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0])
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require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome')
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a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal')
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reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1]))
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summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts,
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original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()})
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# Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive
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# captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed.
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for name,previous in old_sql.items():
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for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
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if table in previous['rows']:
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with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
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require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts')
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with database(ledger) as db:
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roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall()
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names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
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exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots}
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require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows')
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with database(journal) as db:
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require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job')
|
||||
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
|
||||
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
|
||||
inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None
|
||||
require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision']
|
||||
and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id']
|
||||
and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage')
|
||||
ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')}
|
||||
require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment')
|
||||
proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)
|
||||
issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
|
||||
require(issued<=now<until and 0<(until-issued).total_seconds()<=60 and decision['ready'] is True and decision['helper_ready'] is True
|
||||
and decision['boot_id']==intent['preflight']['boot_id'] and decision['connection_generation']==agent_meta['generation']
|
||||
and decision['journal_id']==agent_meta['journal_id'] and decision['helper_journal_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'current bounded normal applied signed Sync')
|
||||
original_basis=next((signed(d)['decision'] for d in old_candidates if signed(d)['original']),None)
|
||||
require(original_basis is not None and original_basis['journal_id']==decision['journal_id']
|
||||
and original_basis['helper_journal_id']==decision['helper_journal_id']
|
||||
and all(decision[k]>=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation')
|
||||
# Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue;
|
||||
# this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame.
|
||||
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
|
||||
inventory_ack=None
|
||||
if inventory is not None:
|
||||
require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued')
|
||||
inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False)
|
||||
require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged')
|
||||
return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes,
|
||||
boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0,
|
||||
verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes,
|
||||
agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')},
|
||||
decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')},
|
||||
full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0,read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def server(payload):
|
||||
"""Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes."""
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id']))
|
||||
agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id']))
|
||||
require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant')
|
||||
foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
|
||||
scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'"
|
||||
query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now(),"
|
||||
"'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id,"
|
||||
"'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at,"
|
||||
"'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256,"
|
||||
"'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready,"
|
||||
"'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+"),"
|
||||
"'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+"),"
|
||||
"'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation,"
|
||||
"encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
|
||||
"'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
|
||||
"'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x),"
|
||||
"'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+"),"
|
||||
"'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;")
|
||||
root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery')
|
||||
cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm']
|
||||
result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
|
||||
require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26
|
||||
and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts')
|
||||
policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes()
|
||||
require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600
|
||||
and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256']
|
||||
and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed')
|
||||
for row in result['decisions']:
|
||||
raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw)
|
||||
require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision')
|
||||
row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest()
|
||||
row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}
|
||||
denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; "
|
||||
"SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
|
||||
"'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
|
||||
"'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;")
|
||||
denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
|
||||
require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial')
|
||||
result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder):
|
||||
code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(function)
|
||||
code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__)))\n'
|
||||
return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def server_prefix():
|
||||
cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf')
|
||||
require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport')
|
||||
return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202']
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_stored_time(value):
|
||||
"""PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate."""
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
import re
|
||||
require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string')
|
||||
matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value)
|
||||
require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp')
|
||||
fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else ''
|
||||
zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3]
|
||||
return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def compare_samples(samples):
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples')
|
||||
baseline=samples[0];last=baseline
|
||||
for sample in samples:
|
||||
current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision']
|
||||
require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True
|
||||
and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof')
|
||||
require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False
|
||||
and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0)
|
||||
and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http'
|
||||
and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes')
|
||||
require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation']
|
||||
and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id']
|
||||
and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation')
|
||||
require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True
|
||||
and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required'))
|
||||
and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel')
|
||||
found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']]
|
||||
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper')
|
||||
caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin']
|
||||
require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script',
|
||||
'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability')
|
||||
require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged')
|
||||
inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence')
|
||||
inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']]
|
||||
require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256']
|
||||
and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base'
|
||||
and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity')
|
||||
contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at'])
|
||||
require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before'])
|
||||
and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start')
|
||||
if sample is not baseline:
|
||||
require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at'])
|
||||
and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances')
|
||||
last=sample
|
||||
return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2,
|
||||
specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True,
|
||||
tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||
parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish'))
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--id')
|
||||
args=parser.parse_args()
|
||||
os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True)
|
||||
manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path)
|
||||
require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA
|
||||
and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof')
|
||||
if args.mode=='prepare-local':
|
||||
require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only')
|
||||
install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path)
|
||||
require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance')
|
||||
folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE,
|
||||
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install,
|
||||
dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case')
|
||||
folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json')
|
||||
require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent')
|
||||
require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained')
|
||||
if args.mode=='observe':
|
||||
number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only')
|
||||
sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True))
|
||||
linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux')
|
||||
initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder)
|
||||
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base'
|
||||
and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])]
|
||||
require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete')
|
||||
current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder)
|
||||
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
|
||||
support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]
|
||||
result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE,
|
||||
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]))
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review.
|
||||
|
||||
No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval.
|
||||
Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent
|
||||
stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import ast
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
||||
PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9'
|
||||
if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed')
|
||||
import script_console_bootstrap as pre
|
||||
support = pre.support
|
||||
CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd'
|
||||
STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation'
|
||||
DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n'
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require(value, code):
|
||||
if not value:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(code)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def vm(payload):
|
||||
"""Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification."""
|
||||
import contextlib
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import time
|
||||
read_transactions={}
|
||||
require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case')
|
||||
intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id'])
|
||||
state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper')
|
||||
def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
|
||||
def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()
|
||||
def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024):
|
||||
m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0
|
||||
and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence')
|
||||
return path.read_bytes()
|
||||
require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent')
|
||||
old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024))
|
||||
old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json'))
|
||||
original_report=protected(before/'report.json')
|
||||
historical=json.loads(original_report)
|
||||
require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation')
|
||||
continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json'))
|
||||
require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case')
|
||||
first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
|
||||
require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp')
|
||||
require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot')
|
||||
observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
||||
processes={}
|
||||
for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)):
|
||||
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
|
||||
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID'])
|
||||
require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active')
|
||||
proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]
|
||||
status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines()
|
||||
uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))
|
||||
image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256']
|
||||
require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected
|
||||
and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image')
|
||||
processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image)
|
||||
for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'):
|
||||
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
|
||||
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines())
|
||||
require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed')
|
||||
for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))):
|
||||
raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024)
|
||||
require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes']
|
||||
and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode')
|
||||
prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)]
|
||||
require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved')
|
||||
for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items():
|
||||
if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue
|
||||
path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path)))
|
||||
require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities')
|
||||
full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True)
|
||||
config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json')
|
||||
require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration')
|
||||
pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640
|
||||
and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin')
|
||||
ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')}
|
||||
ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')}
|
||||
require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes')
|
||||
for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)),
|
||||
(Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))):
|
||||
require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes')
|
||||
# Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync;
|
||||
# every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness.
|
||||
known_databases={str(state/'journal.sqlite'),str(state/'consumption.sqlite'),str(helper/'consumption.sqlite')}
|
||||
require(set(old_sql)==known_databases,'exact three known DELETE-mode databases')
|
||||
known_journals={name+'-journal':name for name in known_databases}
|
||||
journal_observations=[]
|
||||
def await_known_delete_journal(name):
|
||||
require(name in known_databases,'only known DELETE rollback journal paths')
|
||||
started=time.monotonic_ns();observed=False
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm')),'WAL/SHM sidecars always denied')
|
||||
journal=Path(name+'-journal')
|
||||
if not os.path.lexists(journal):
|
||||
elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started
|
||||
require(not observed or elapsed<=250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal absent within250ms')
|
||||
if observed:journal_observations.append(dict(database=name,wait_ns=elapsed,observed_naturally_absent=True))
|
||||
return
|
||||
observed=True
|
||||
try:m=journal.lstat()
|
||||
except FileNotFoundError:continue
|
||||
owner=old_files[name]
|
||||
require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not journal.is_symlink() and m.st_nlink==1
|
||||
and m.st_uid==owner[2] and m.st_gid==owner[3] and not m.st_mode&0o022,'known regular protected DELETE rollback journal only')
|
||||
elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started
|
||||
require(elapsed<250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal remained250ms')
|
||||
time.sleep(min(0.005,(250_000_000-elapsed)/1_000_000_000))
|
||||
current_paths=set()
|
||||
for root in (state,helper):
|
||||
for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]:
|
||||
if str(path) in known_journals:
|
||||
await_known_delete_journal(known_journals[str(path)])
|
||||
require(not os.path.lexists(path),'known DELETE rollback journal still absent before state-path exclusion')
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required')
|
||||
m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type')
|
||||
current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path))
|
||||
require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path')
|
||||
value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns]
|
||||
require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved')
|
||||
require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained')
|
||||
@contextlib.contextmanager
|
||||
def database(name):
|
||||
path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1
|
||||
and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode')
|
||||
await_known_delete_journal(name)
|
||||
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars')
|
||||
# Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or
|
||||
# running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget
|
||||
# limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee.
|
||||
started=time.monotonic()
|
||||
with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db:
|
||||
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars before any SQL after readonly open')
|
||||
db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN')
|
||||
require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal')
|
||||
yield db
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
db.rollback()
|
||||
elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000)
|
||||
timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0))
|
||||
timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed)
|
||||
require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read')
|
||||
def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row]))
|
||||
journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes())
|
||||
require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding')
|
||||
key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key')
|
||||
verified={}
|
||||
def signed(decision_id):
|
||||
if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id]
|
||||
with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone()
|
||||
require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision')
|
||||
response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0<len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded original Ed25519 response')
|
||||
descriptors=[]
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for value in (bytes.fromhex('302a300506032b6570032100')+key,raw,signature):
|
||||
fd=os.memfd_create('rmm-readonly-public-verification',os.MFD_CLOEXEC);descriptors.append(fd)
|
||||
require(os.write(fd,value)==len(value),'complete public verification input');os.lseek(fd,0,0)
|
||||
result=subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/openssl','pkeyutl','-verify','-pubin','-keyform','DER','-inkey','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[0]),'-rawin','-in','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[1]),'-sigfile','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[2])],pass_fds=tuple(descriptors),capture_output=True,timeout=5)
|
||||
require(result.returncode==0,'original signed decision verifies')
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
for fd in descriptors:os.close(fd)
|
||||
d=json.loads(raw)
|
||||
require(d['decision_id']==decision_id and d['domain']=='rmm.reconciliation-decision' and d['schema_version']==1
|
||||
and d['key_id']==sha(key) and all(d[k]==public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'signed domain/key/device/generations')
|
||||
def varint(v):
|
||||
out=bytearray()
|
||||
while v>=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7
|
||||
out.append(v);return bytes(out)
|
||||
wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature
|
||||
with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone()
|
||||
require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes')
|
||||
original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']
|
||||
verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original)
|
||||
return verified[decision_id]
|
||||
def original_rows(name,table,count):
|
||||
# There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes
|
||||
# before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer.
|
||||
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
|
||||
last=None;remaining=count
|
||||
while remaining:
|
||||
size=min(16,remaining)
|
||||
with database(name) as db:
|
||||
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
|
||||
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
|
||||
require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained')
|
||||
for row in page:
|
||||
require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal')
|
||||
last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row
|
||||
old_candidates=[]
|
||||
# Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response
|
||||
# BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below.
|
||||
total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None
|
||||
while len(old_candidates)<total_original:
|
||||
with database(ledger) as db:
|
||||
size=min(16,total_original-len(old_candidates))
|
||||
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
|
||||
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
|
||||
require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained')
|
||||
old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0]
|
||||
old_candidates.reverse()
|
||||
reference_changes=[];summary={}
|
||||
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
|
||||
with database(name) as db:
|
||||
schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema')
|
||||
counts={}
|
||||
for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items():
|
||||
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
|
||||
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
|
||||
counts[table]=count
|
||||
require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained')
|
||||
if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
|
||||
require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap')
|
||||
if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue
|
||||
if table=='counter':
|
||||
with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall()
|
||||
require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue
|
||||
if table in ('pending','job_events'):
|
||||
require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue
|
||||
for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))):
|
||||
old_hash=old_hashes[index]
|
||||
if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue
|
||||
if table=='reconcile_requests':
|
||||
require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill')
|
||||
with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]]))
|
||||
require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request')
|
||||
signed(candidates[0][0])
|
||||
continue
|
||||
require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed')
|
||||
# Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its
|
||||
# reference to an independently applied signed decision renews.
|
||||
original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None)
|
||||
require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness')
|
||||
old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart')
|
||||
selected=[]
|
||||
for proof in (old,new):
|
||||
found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]]
|
||||
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0])
|
||||
require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome')
|
||||
a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal')
|
||||
reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1]))
|
||||
summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts,
|
||||
original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()})
|
||||
# Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive
|
||||
# captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed.
|
||||
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
|
||||
for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
|
||||
if table in previous['rows']:
|
||||
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
|
||||
require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts')
|
||||
with database(ledger) as db:
|
||||
roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall()
|
||||
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
|
||||
exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots}
|
||||
require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows')
|
||||
with database(journal) as db:
|
||||
require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job')
|
||||
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
|
||||
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
|
||||
inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None
|
||||
require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision']
|
||||
and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id']
|
||||
and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage')
|
||||
ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')}
|
||||
require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment')
|
||||
proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)
|
||||
issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
|
||||
require(issued<=now<until and 0<(until-issued).total_seconds()<=60 and decision['ready'] is True and decision['helper_ready'] is True
|
||||
and decision['boot_id']==intent['preflight']['boot_id'] and decision['connection_generation']==agent_meta['generation']
|
||||
and decision['journal_id']==agent_meta['journal_id'] and decision['helper_journal_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'current bounded normal applied signed Sync')
|
||||
original_basis=next((signed(d)['decision'] for d in old_candidates if signed(d)['original']),None)
|
||||
require(original_basis is not None and original_basis['journal_id']==decision['journal_id']
|
||||
and original_basis['helper_journal_id']==decision['helper_journal_id']
|
||||
and all(decision[k]>=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation')
|
||||
# Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue;
|
||||
# this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame.
|
||||
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
|
||||
inventory_ack=None
|
||||
if inventory is not None:
|
||||
require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued')
|
||||
inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False)
|
||||
require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged')
|
||||
return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes,
|
||||
boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0,
|
||||
verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes,
|
||||
agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')},
|
||||
decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')},
|
||||
full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0,
|
||||
transient_delete_journal_observations=journal_observations,rollback_journal_observation_budget_ms=250,
|
||||
read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def server(payload):
|
||||
"""Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes."""
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id']))
|
||||
agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id']))
|
||||
require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant')
|
||||
foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
|
||||
scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'"
|
||||
query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now(),"
|
||||
"'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id,"
|
||||
"'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at,"
|
||||
"'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256,"
|
||||
"'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready,"
|
||||
"'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+"),"
|
||||
"'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+"),"
|
||||
"'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation,"
|
||||
"encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
|
||||
"'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
|
||||
"'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x),"
|
||||
"'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+"),"
|
||||
"'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;")
|
||||
root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery')
|
||||
cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm']
|
||||
result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
|
||||
require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26
|
||||
and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts')
|
||||
policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes()
|
||||
require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600
|
||||
and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256']
|
||||
and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed')
|
||||
for row in result['decisions']:
|
||||
raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw)
|
||||
require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision')
|
||||
row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest()
|
||||
row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}
|
||||
denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; "
|
||||
"SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
|
||||
"'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
|
||||
"'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;")
|
||||
denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
|
||||
require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial')
|
||||
result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder):
|
||||
source=inspect.getsource(function);labels=set()
|
||||
for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(source)):
|
||||
if not isinstance(node,ast.Call) or not isinstance(node.func,ast.Name):continue
|
||||
index=1 if node.func.id=='require' else 0 if node.func.id=='RuntimeError' else None
|
||||
if index is not None and len(node.args)>index and isinstance(node.args[index],ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.args[index].value,str):labels.add(node.args[index].value)
|
||||
code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+source
|
||||
code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n import traceback\n label=str(e) if isinstance(e,RuntimeError) and str(e) in '+repr(sorted(labels))+' else None\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__,guard_code=label,frames=[dict(function=f.name,line=f.lineno) for f in traceback.extract_tb(e.__traceback__)],sqlite_errorcode=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorcode",None),sqlite_errorname=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorname",None))))\n'
|
||||
return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def server_prefix():
|
||||
cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf')
|
||||
require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport')
|
||||
return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202']
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_stored_time(value):
|
||||
"""PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate."""
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
import re
|
||||
require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string')
|
||||
matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value)
|
||||
require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp')
|
||||
fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else ''
|
||||
zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3]
|
||||
return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def compare_samples(samples):
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples')
|
||||
baseline=samples[0];last=baseline
|
||||
for sample in samples:
|
||||
current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision']
|
||||
require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True
|
||||
and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof')
|
||||
require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False
|
||||
and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0)
|
||||
and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http'
|
||||
and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes')
|
||||
require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation']
|
||||
and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id']
|
||||
and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation')
|
||||
require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True
|
||||
and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required'))
|
||||
and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel')
|
||||
found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']]
|
||||
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper')
|
||||
caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin']
|
||||
require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script',
|
||||
'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability')
|
||||
require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged')
|
||||
inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence')
|
||||
inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']]
|
||||
require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256']
|
||||
and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base'
|
||||
and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity')
|
||||
contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at'])
|
||||
require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before'])
|
||||
and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start')
|
||||
if sample is not baseline:
|
||||
require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at'])
|
||||
and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances')
|
||||
last=sample
|
||||
return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2,
|
||||
specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True,
|
||||
tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||
parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish'))
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--id')
|
||||
args=parser.parse_args()
|
||||
os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True)
|
||||
manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path)
|
||||
require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA
|
||||
and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof')
|
||||
if args.mode=='prepare-local':
|
||||
require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only')
|
||||
install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path)
|
||||
require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance')
|
||||
folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE,
|
||||
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install,
|
||||
dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case')
|
||||
folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json')
|
||||
require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent')
|
||||
require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained')
|
||||
if args.mode=='observe':
|
||||
number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only')
|
||||
sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True))
|
||||
linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux')
|
||||
initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder)
|
||||
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
|
||||
import datetime as dt
|
||||
fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base'
|
||||
and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])]
|
||||
require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete')
|
||||
current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder)
|
||||
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
|
||||
support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]
|
||||
result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE,
|
||||
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]))
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
|
||||
# Enger lesender Observer für kurzlebige DELETE-Rollbackjournale
|
||||
|
||||
Stand: lokale Opsvorbereitung, kein nativer V2-Aufruf und noch kein neuer
|
||||
Abnahmeintent. `deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py` ist eine getrennte
|
||||
Quelle; die ursprüngliche Datei `script_console_post_attestation.py` bleibt
|
||||
bytegleich SHA256
|
||||
`076e1c22c1849c20827317e3cbec7a3769f14f5fd9fc7691ab2e0f0cb80fa1dc`.
|
||||
Alle ursprünglichen Belege des Falls
|
||||
`3319e212-2188-4b00-bb82-e13173a3b6b2` bleiben unverändert. Zusätzlich wurden
|
||||
Quelle und sämtliche 34 zu diesem Zeitpunkt vorhandenen Fallbelege create-only
|
||||
unter `devstate/source-history/postattn-076-ff0606b7-4740-4dab-9a26-d7679e8d630d/`
|
||||
archiviert; Manifest-SHA256
|
||||
`46d922abd242c56887752ad193343e717292eb4040013c8ca1c69fa4b9f60280`.
|
||||
|
||||
Ein konkreter angereicherter Read-only-Fehlerbeleg identifiziert den verweigerten
|
||||
Guard `no SQLite sidecars` im Pfad `vm → original_rows → database`:
|
||||
`transport-88f45793-8bb2-4c31-9804-1efb740e8071.json`, SHA256
|
||||
`b7db1bfce80d6cb8ed3eea678c0f102b2f6b7d45e7e7cd97f95bb10343a906f5`.
|
||||
Das belegt diese eine Sidecarverweigerung. Es belegt weder eine Runtime-/
|
||||
Historybeschädigung noch die Ursache sämtlicher früherer RuntimeErrors ohne
|
||||
Guardnamen. Zwei zusätzliche ausdrücklich autorisierte lesende Diagnosen mit
|
||||
unveränderter 076-VMfunktion bestanden, auch der vorhandene Server→Inventar→VM-
|
||||
Pfad; sie wurden nicht zu Abnahmesamples oder einem finalen Attest hochgestuft.
|
||||
|
||||
V2 verändert ausschließlich die Beobachtung der drei exakt bekannten
|
||||
SQLite-DELETE-Datenbanken: Agentjournal, Agentverbrauchsledger und gemeinsames
|
||||
Rootverbrauchsledger. Für genau deren drei `-journal`-Pfade beobachtet der
|
||||
Observer höchstens 250 ms, ob ein reguläres, passend geschütztes Rollbackjournal
|
||||
natürlich verschwindet. Während es vorhanden ist, öffnet dieser Wartepfad keine
|
||||
Datenbank, führt keine SQL-Abfrage aus und verändert keine Datei. Der Observer
|
||||
löscht, benennt, repariert oder recovered nichts. Ein länger vorhandenes Journal,
|
||||
falscher Objekttyp oder fremder Eigentümer verweigert den Nachweis. WAL und SHM
|
||||
werden weiterhin sofort verweigert, ebenso jeder unbekannte Suffixpfad.
|
||||
|
||||
Im Zustandsverzeichnis dürfen ausschließlich diese drei transienten
|
||||
Rollbackjournalpfade nach konkret beobachteter Abwesenheit aus dem Dateipfadzeugen
|
||||
ausgelassen werden. Es gibt keine allgemeine Suffixausnahme. Alle ursprünglichen
|
||||
PKI-/Zustandspfade, Metadaten, Inodes und Raw-Rowhashes bleiben unverändert
|
||||
gefordert. Vor jedem DB-Open bleibt der ursprüngliche Sidecarguard aktiv; direkt
|
||||
nach dem Read-only-Open wird vor jeder SQL-Anweisung nochmals geprüft. Eine
|
||||
erneute Sidecarentstehung verweigert die Beobachtung, statt sie zu ignorieren.
|
||||
Eine atomare Dateisystem-/Datenbankaufnahme wird nicht behauptet.
|
||||
|
||||
`mode=ro`, `query_only`, tatsächlicher DELETE-Journalmodus, 250-ms-Busy-Timeout,
|
||||
kooperatives einsekündiges Lesebudget und das Schließen jeder Leseperiode vor
|
||||
Rowhashing/Signaturprüfung bleiben bestehen. Signed-Decision-, Server-,
|
||||
Schema-/Rowhash- und abschließende Agent-/Helper-Metaguards werden nicht gelockert.
|
||||
Der Sourcevergleich bestätigt unveränderte ASTs der bestehenden Funktionen
|
||||
`signed`, `original_rows`, `row_hash`, `server`, `compare_samples` und
|
||||
`parse_stored_time`. Es gibt weder `immutable=1`, unbegrenztes Busy-Warten,
|
||||
Helper-IPC, Diensteingriff, Job, Approval, Rechte- noch Policyänderung.
|
||||
|
||||
Auf Fehlern liefert der neue Formatter ausschließlich Fehlerklasse, einen im
|
||||
Quelltext enthaltenen statischen RuntimeError-Guardnamen, Funktions-/Zeilenframes
|
||||
und SQLite-Fehlercodes. Er exportiert weder Exceptionlocals noch SQL-stdout,
|
||||
Token- oder Schlüsselwerte. Normale fehlgeschlagene Rohtransportbelege bleiben
|
||||
erhalten. Ein solcher Fehler wird niemals als erfolgreicher Sample behandelt.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich lokal geprüft, ausschließlich mit temporären Testdatenbanken und
|
||||
den unveränderten echten V2-Helper-/Dateipfadwalk-Funktionen: Ein SQLitewriter
|
||||
hielt sein Rollbackjournal kurz offen und schloss es selbst durch Commit; nach
|
||||
rund 42 ms beobachtete der Observer das natürliche Verschwinden, danach war der
|
||||
Read-only-Read zulässig. Ein persistierendes Journal wurde nach rund 250 ms
|
||||
verweigert und blieb erhalten. WAL, SHM und ein unbekannter Journal-Suffixpfad
|
||||
wurden verweigert und blieben erhalten. Der Observer führte keine Mutation aus.
|
||||
Python-Syntax bestand; Produktinputs und alle archivierten Originalbelege blieben
|
||||
unverändert. Das ist kein neuer nativer Drei-Sample-Nachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
**Geplant, nicht ausgeführt:** Erst nach gesondertem Rootreview einen neuen
|
||||
lokalen Intent mit dem V2-Quellhash erzeugen und drei neue tatsächliche
|
||||
Beobachtungen samt abschließendem Vergleich durchführen. Die beiden ursprünglichen
|
||||
076-Samples werden nicht umetikettiert oder mit einem V2-Sample zu einem neuen
|
||||
Attest zusammengemischt. Die tatsächliche WebUI-Jobgenehmigung bleibt ein
|
||||
getrennter späterer Schritt.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächliche dreiteilige Cloud-Abnahme
|
||||
|
||||
Root hat nach Quellreview einen neuen ausschließlich lesenden Fall
|
||||
`4c425416-5a04-426a-a23a-f5801968f02d` vorbereitet und drei getrennte Beobachtungen
|
||||
auf der tatsächlichen Cloud-Linux-VM und dem festgelegten Server ausgeführt.
|
||||
Anschließender lokaler Vergleich: **bestanden**. Finaler geschützter Beleg
|
||||
`attested.json`, SHA256
|
||||
`594fdf94261aa882df7ea771dda3f04779533dfdac768cf4a63c83448e1f27d7`.
|
||||
|
||||
Erhaltung der ursprünglichen Geräte-/Boot-/PKI-/DB-Inodes/Root18-Rohbytes,
|
||||
tatsächliche neue Agent-/General-/Fullimages und Konten sowie aktueller gemeinsam
|
||||
angewandter kryptografisch geprüfter signierter Sync wurden nachgewiesen.
|
||||
Zwei gespeicherte Kontakt-/Sequenzfortschritte, konkrete neue Inventar-ID mit
|
||||
quellgebundenem Queueabschluss und RLS-Tenantverweigerung bestanden. Unveränderte
|
||||
30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits, ungeklärt0; keine neuen Jobs oder Freigaben.
|
||||
|
||||
Die Aussage bleibt seitenweise Erhaltung über das Beobachtungsintervall mit
|
||||
abschließendem SameDecision-/Effektzahlcheck, kein atomarer Gesamtsnapshot oder
|
||||
neuer Vollintegritätsscan. Kein mitgeschnittener Wire-ACK und kein neuer
|
||||
HTTP-Tenantnachweis; diese Grenzen sind im Ergebnis explizitfalse. Die Full-
|
||||
Skriptwirkung bleibt separat WebUI-genehmigungspflichtig und noch offen.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
|
||||
# Lesender Nachweis nach dem ersten Skriptkonsolen-Dienststart
|
||||
|
||||
Stand2026-11-14: neue reviewbare Quelle
|
||||
`deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py`; durch ihren Ersteller **kein
|
||||
Zielaufruf ausgeführt**. Keine Änderung der158 eingefrorenen Produktinputs.
|
||||
Installationsfall `2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd` und dessen ursprünglicher
|
||||
Fehlerbericht bleiben unverändert. Die separate eng geprüfte Fortsetzung startet
|
||||
die bereits ausgetauschten Dienste; dieser Nachweis darf das nicht übernehmen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Feste Proben und Erhaltungsgrenzen
|
||||
|
||||
Der VM-Reader öffnet ausschließlich vorhandene feste Kontroll-/Metadatendateien
|
||||
und die drei ursprünglichen SQLite-Dateien im URI-Modus `mode=ro` mit
|
||||
`query_only` und Lesetransaktion. Er erzeugt keine Zielpfade, keine temporären
|
||||
Dateien und keine SQLite-Sidecars. Vorgefundene WAL/SHM/Journaldateien verweigern
|
||||
die Probe; keine Bereinigung. systemctl wird ausschließlich mit `show` benutzt.
|
||||
Die zusätzliche OpenSSL-Prüfung verwendet öffentliche Signaturdaten in anonymen
|
||||
memfd-Dateideskriptoren, keine privaten Schlüssel. Kein Helper-IPC und keine
|
||||
neue Clock-/Inventory-/Jobanforderung.
|
||||
|
||||
Geprüft werden alle drei tatsächlichen Agent-/General-/Full-Prozessimages,
|
||||
UID/GID, Startticks, unveränderte Boot-ID, installierte Codehashes und erhaltene
|
||||
alte Binärinodes/-bytes. Alle General-/APT-/Paketkontrollen des ursprünglichen
|
||||
Preflightzeugen bleiben exakt; APT und alte Dienste bleiben disabled/inactive.
|
||||
Fullkonfiguration, ursprüngliche Inspector-Pinbytes, Unit und additives
|
||||
Agentdropin müssen den geprüften ursprünglichen Bytes/Modes entsprechen.
|
||||
|
||||
Alle ursprünglichen Zustandsobjekte bleiben vorhanden; private Schlüssel werden
|
||||
nicht geöffnet. Nicht-DB-Dateien behalten vollständige Inode-/Besitz-/Mode-/
|
||||
Größen-/Zeitmetadaten. Für Datenbanken dürfen Inhalt und Größe fortschreiten;
|
||||
ihre Inodes/Besitzer/Modes bleiben. Bei Zustandsverzeichnissen dürfen Größe und
|
||||
Änderungszeit wegen normaler DELETE-SQLite-Journalerzeugung fortschreiten;
|
||||
Identität/Besitz/Modes bleiben. Unbekannte neue persistente Zustandsobjekte
|
||||
werden verweigert.
|
||||
|
||||
`sql-before.json` enthält vollständige geordnete Rowhashlisten einschließlich
|
||||
rowid. Die Quelle erhält jedes alte Schema und jeden alten Historienhash.
|
||||
Neue Job-/Verbrauchs-/Wirkungs-/Outcomereihen sind ausgeschlossen. Nur feste
|
||||
passive Sync-Ausnahmen gelten: Metazeilen, monotoner Sequenzzähler, eine zuvor
|
||||
NULL gewesene und anschließend unabhängig signiert angewandte Antwort sowie
|
||||
eine erneuerte Outcome-Entscheidungsreferenz. Letztere verlangt den vollständigen
|
||||
alten Rowhash, erhaltene exakt gleiche Job-/Versuch-/Outcomebytes und beide
|
||||
ursprünglich signierten, Agent-/Helper-gebundenen Entscheidungen mit monotoner
|
||||
Lineage. Keine pauschale Freigabe veränderter Historientabellen. Alte Queuezeilen
|
||||
müssen im Vorherzeugen fehlen; eine mehrdeutige alte Queue verweigert diese
|
||||
Quelle. Der ursprüngliche Zähler wird aus seinem Hash in einem höchstens4096
|
||||
Sequenzschritte umfassenden Bereich bis zum aktuellen Wert rekonstruiert. Reicht
|
||||
das nicht, fehlt der Nachweis; kein Quellenfallback und keine Zielreparatur.
|
||||
|
||||
Alle18 ursprünglichen Rootrequests/-grants/-signaturen/-starts/-outcomes bleiben
|
||||
exakt gleich. Aktuelle Agent-/Helper-Metadaten müssen faultfrei dieselbe
|
||||
angewandte Entscheidung, Generation, Journalbindung und unveränderte öffentliche
|
||||
Bindingidentität belegen. Die tatsächliche Ed25519-Signatur und die originalen
|
||||
Request-/Protobufantwortbytes werden unabhängig geprüft. Die neue Entscheidung
|
||||
muss innerhalb ihrer ursprünglichen höchstens60s-Lease liegen und eine
|
||||
ursprüngliche vor dem Bootstrap erhaltene signierte Journal-Lineage fortsetzen.
|
||||
Das belegt normale NativeClock-/Peer-/Applyprüfungen der gepinnten Runtime;
|
||||
der Reader erzeugt keine neue Probe und erteilt keine Jobstartberechtigung.
|
||||
|
||||
## Passive Serverkontakte und konkrete Nachweisgrenzen
|
||||
|
||||
Der Serverreader führt ausschließlich gespeicherte Datenabfragen in
|
||||
Read-only-Transaktionen aus. Er liest keine Anmeldetokens oder privaten
|
||||
Umgebungs-/PKI-Dateien. Rootpolicyhash und geschlossener Ablauf bleiben gebunden;
|
||||
30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits/keine offenen Jobs bleiben erhalten. Die30 vollständigen
|
||||
Jobzeilenfingerprints müssen über alle drei Beobachtungen gleich bleiben.
|
||||
Die alte Jobsammlung ist zusätzlich durch die VM-Vorherhistorie gebunden; dieser
|
||||
neue Reader rekonstruiert keinen früher nicht vorhandenen Server-Rowsnapshot.
|
||||
|
||||
Jede Beobachtung bindet dieselbe tatsächlich gespeicherte signierte Entscheidung
|
||||
an Server, Agent und Helper sowie die normal veröffentlichte Full-Policy-/
|
||||
Binärcapability. Ein RLS-Aufruf als `rmm_app` im anderen Testtenant muss für das
|
||||
feste Gerät, dessen Inventar und Jobs jeweils null Zeilen liefern. Das ist ein
|
||||
echter gespeicherter Datenbank-RLS-Nachweis, **keine neue HTTP-/MCP-Authabnahme**.
|
||||
|
||||
Drei ausdrücklich getrennte `observe`-Aufrufe liefern Baseline und zwei danach
|
||||
streng fortgeschrittene gespeicherte Heartbeatzeitpunkte samt Sequenz. Prozesse,
|
||||
Boot und Verbindungsgeneration müssen über alle drei Reads gleich bleiben;
|
||||
der aktuelle Kontakt darf beim Read höchstens45s alt sein. Frische Kontakte und
|
||||
Inventar werden an den dauerhaften `first_start_not_before`-Zeitpunkt der
|
||||
separaten `continuation-start-intent.json` gebunden. Kein Sleep, Agentneustart
|
||||
oder angeforderter Refresh zur Erzeugung dieser Daten.
|
||||
|
||||
Ein konkreter neuer `linux.base`-Inventar-Message-ID-/Boot-/Payloadbeleg muss
|
||||
serverseitig vorliegen und denselben lokalen dauerhaften Queueeintrag beendet
|
||||
haben. Die Quelle bezeichnet dies ausdrücklich als **quellgebundenen
|
||||
Queueabschluss**, `wire_inventory_ack_captured=false`: Der bestehende Agent
|
||||
speichert rohe ACKframes nicht dauerhaft. Aus dieser Probe darf kein angeblich
|
||||
mitgeschnittener ACKframe entstehen. Der normale ACK-/signierte Sync-ACK-Pfad
|
||||
der gepinnten Runtime entfernt den Eintrag; der Reader löscht nichts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Geplante Bedienung, nicht ausgeführt
|
||||
|
||||
Nach Rootreview und erfolgreicher separater erster Dienststartfortsetzung:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py prepare-local
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py finish --id POSTCASE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Die Beobachtungen zeitlich über zwei normale Heartbeats verteilen. Unveränderte
|
||||
Kontakte oder unvollständige Signatur-/Queue-/Readinessbelege ergeben kein PASS.
|
||||
`finish` liest ausschließlich die lokalen drei erhaltenen Belege; seine Aussage
|
||||
betrifft diesen erhaltenden Runtime-/Sync-/Passivnachweis. Keine RMM-Jobs,
|
||||
Genehmigungen, Paketwirkung oder Reboots. Der eigentliche FullMaintenancejob
|
||||
bleibt ein separat unveränderlich beantragter und WebUI-genehmigter Plan.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächliche lokale Prüfung und offene Zielnachweise
|
||||
|
||||
Python-AST der neuen Quelle ist geprüft. Die tatsächliche lokale Vergleichs-
|
||||
funktion bestand zunächst eine ausdrücklich synthetische Dreierbaseline und
|
||||
zwölf unabhängige Manipulationsverweigerungen; nach Ergänzung der ausdrücklichen
|
||||
Serverbelegpflicht bestand dieselbe tatsächliche Funktion eine neue synthetische
|
||||
Dreierbaseline und15 unabhängige Verweigerungen. Keine VM-Daten wurden hierfür
|
||||
erzeugt. Die tatsächliche Serverreaderfunktion wurde zusätzlich mit gemockten
|
||||
Datei-/Subprozessgrenzen auf genau zwei Read-only-Abfragen einschließlich
|
||||
`rmm_app`-RLSkontext geprüft; kein echtes PostgreSQL wurde aufgerufen.
|
||||
Das ist keine native Abnahme.
|
||||
Ziel-SQL, SSH, OpenSSL auf der VM, reale Signatur-/Erhaltungs-/Heartbeat-/
|
||||
Inventar-/RLSbelege sind durch diesen Subagenten nicht ausgeführt.
|
||||
|
||||
## Getrennter Transport-/Leselock-Nachfolger
|
||||
|
||||
Root hat mit dem ursprünglichen Runner89121b42 im Fall77d0b7c1 tatsächlich einen
|
||||
VM-Erhaltungs-/SignedSyncread bestanden; die anschließende Serververbindung
|
||||
scheiterte an einem für den DNSnamen fehlenden SSH-Hosteintrag. Daraus entsteht
|
||||
kein vollständiger Server-/Passivnachweis. Originalquelle und alle vier
|
||||
ursprünglichen Case-/Transportdateien bleiben unverändert; die Quelle liegt
|
||||
zusätzlich create-only in `devstate/script-console-post-attestation-source-history/`.
|
||||
Der Nachfolger verwendet dieselbe bereits verifizierte Server-IP und dieselbe
|
||||
strikte Hostprüfung wie die vorhandenen Deploymentwerkzeuge. Keine neuen
|
||||
Hostschlüssel oder Änderungen an known_hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Review der ursprünglich14s dauernden VM-Probe fand einen vermeidbaren
|
||||
Leselock: Rowhash-/Referenzsuche und externe Signaturprüfung lagen im äußeren
|
||||
SQLite-Lesekontext. Der erste Nachfolger materialisierte die ursprünglichen
|
||||
Zeugen innerhalb einer Lesetransaktion und schloss sie vor Hash-/Signaturarbeit.
|
||||
Die echte nachfolgende Root-Probe mit Runner1e172625 und lokalem Fall5a53ced7
|
||||
verweigerte beim Materialisieren unter dem1s-Limit mit `OperationalError`; das
|
||||
ist kein PASS. Auch diese Originalquelle und ihre sieben ursprünglichen
|
||||
Casedateien bleiben create-only archiviert beziehungsweise am Originalort.
|
||||
|
||||
Der zweite Nachfolger liest deshalb **höchstens16 ursprüngliche Zeilen pro
|
||||
Lesetransaktion**, nach rowid geordnet. Jede Seite schließt vor Hash-,
|
||||
Referenzsuche oder Signaturprüfung. Ursprüngliche Hashprefixe werden vollständig
|
||||
geprüft; neu angehängte Sync-BLOBs werden nicht vollständig eingelesen. Nur die
|
||||
ursprünglichen Entscheidungs-IDs werden zusätzlich als kleine Metadatenliste
|
||||
gehalten. Anfangsanzahlen/Schema und abschließend feste Job-/Wirkungsanzahlen,
|
||||
Root18-Originalbytes und frische gleiche Agent-/Helperentscheidung werden
|
||||
separat geprüft. Dies ist ein seitenweiser Erhaltungsbeleg über das berichtete
|
||||
Beobachtungsintervall, **kein tabellenübergreifender atomarer Snapshot**.
|
||||
Ein neuer vollständiger SQLite-Integritätsscan wird nicht behauptet
|
||||
(`sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=false`); Schema und alle ursprünglichen
|
||||
Zeilenbytes werden unabhängig erhalten und die normale signierte Runtime-
|
||||
Lineage bleibt zwingend. Keine pauschale Ausnahme für historische Tabellen.
|
||||
|
||||
Zusätzliche einzelne Signaturreferenzabfragen haben eigene kurze Lesekontexte.
|
||||
Ein kooperatives
|
||||
SQLite-Progressbudget von1s und0,25s Busytimeout begrenzen die Abfragen; das ist
|
||||
keine harte Echtzeitgarantie für blockierendes Betriebssystem-I/O. Ein Timeout
|
||||
bricht den Nachweis ab und schließt/rollt ausschließlich die eigene Lesetransaktion
|
||||
zurück; keine Produktzeile wird geändert oder ignoriert.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich lokal mit der extrahierten neuen Lesekontextfunktion geprüft:
|
||||
2000 synthetische Zeilen materialisiert, anschließend sofortiger Writercommit
|
||||
in0,93ms; eine absichtlich lange reine SELECT-Rekursion wurde nach1000,13ms
|
||||
unterbrochen, danach Writercommit erfolgreich. AST-Prüfung belegt keine
|
||||
Rowhash-/Signatur-/Subprozessarbeit innerhalb eines `database`-Kontexts. Das
|
||||
ist ein lokaler SQLite-Guard, kein neuer VM- oder Produktions-Locknachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
Der tatsächliche zusätzliche lokale Pagingguard materialisierte50 ursprüngliche
|
||||
Zeilen mit je64KiB über vier kurze Seiten, während zwischen den geschlossenen
|
||||
Seiten zusätzliche passive Testzeilen angehängt wurden. Neue Anhänge wurden
|
||||
nicht mitmaterialisiert; Writercommits zwischen den Seiten dauerten höchstens
|
||||
0,94ms. Die SELECT-Budgetprobe unterbrach nach1000,10ms und ließ danach einen
|
||||
weiteren Writercommit zu. Auch dies ist ausschließlich ein synthetischer lokaler
|
||||
SQLite-Nachweis; kein weiterer Zielaufruf durch diesen Subagenten.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Lokaler Zeitparser und aktueller Prüfzwischenstand
|
||||
|
||||
Der erste Nachfolger2786c218 las nativ VM und Server, scheiterte anschließend
|
||||
im lokalen Python3.10-Parser an einem gültigen PostgreSQL-RFC3339-Wert mit vier
|
||||
Nachkommastellen. Eine lokale Korrektur akzeptiert SQL-Zeitstempel mit0–6
|
||||
Nachkommastellen und füllt ausschließlich fehlende Nullen auf; keine Rundung,
|
||||
Trunkierung oder Änderung von VM-/Serverdaten. Ursprüngliche Quelle und Case8614
|
||||
wurden create-only erhalten. Quelle076e1c22 verwendet dieselben unveränderten
|
||||
VM-/Serverreader und einen neuen rein lesenden Fall3319e212.
|
||||
|
||||
Zwei vollständige zeitversetzte Beobachtungen dieses Falls sind tatsächlich
|
||||
bestanden (Generation131, unveränderte18Rootverbräuche). Der dritte Beleg ist
|
||||
noch offen. Zusätzliche Fehlerformatierung ließ alle Prüfbedingungen und
|
||||
Ergebnisdaten unverändert und exportierte ausschließlich statischen Guardcode,
|
||||
Frames und SQLitecode. Damit ist für eine konkrete Verweigerung
|
||||
`no SQLite sidecars` nachgewiesen; welche Prüfbedingung die älteren generischen
|
||||
RuntimeError-Belege auslöste, wird nicht nachträglich erfunden. Separate lesende
|
||||
Kontrollaufrufe bestätigten weiterhin Erhaltung/SignedSync und konkrete
|
||||
Inventar-Queuekonvergenz. Bisher kein dreiteiliger Gesamt-PASS und kein Job.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user