Attest preserved Linux full runtime with three native passive samples
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s

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2026-11-14 19:07:58 +01:00
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review.
No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval.
Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent
stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install.
"""
import argparse
import base64
import hashlib
import inspect
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import uuid
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9'
if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA:
raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed')
import script_console_bootstrap as pre
support = pre.support
CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd'
STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation'
DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n'
def require(value, code):
if not value:
raise RuntimeError(code)
def vm(payload):
"""Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification."""
import contextlib
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
import stat
import subprocess
import base64
import time
read_transactions={}
require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case')
intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id'])
state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper')
def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()
def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024):
m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0
and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence')
return path.read_bytes()
require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent')
old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024))
old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json'))
original_report=protected(before/'report.json')
historical=json.loads(original_report)
require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation')
continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json'))
require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case')
first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp')
require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot')
observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat()
processes={}
for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)):
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID'])
require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active')
proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]
status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines()
uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))
image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256']
require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected
and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image')
processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image)
for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'):
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines())
require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed')
for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))):
raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024)
require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes']
and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode')
prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)]
require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved')
for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items():
if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue
path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path)))
require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities')
full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True)
config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json')
require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration')
pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640
and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin')
ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')}
ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')}
require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes')
for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)),
(Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))):
require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes')
# Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync;
# every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness.
current_paths=set()
for root in (state,helper):
for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]:
if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required')
m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type')
current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path))
require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path')
value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns]
require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved')
require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained')
@contextlib.contextmanager
def database(name):
path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1
and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode')
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars')
# Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or
# running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget
# limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee.
started=time.monotonic()
with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db:
db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000)
try:
db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN')
require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal')
yield db
finally:
db.rollback()
elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000)
timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0))
timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed)
require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read')
def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row]))
journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes())
require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding')
key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key')
verified={}
def signed(decision_id):
if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id]
with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone()
require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision')
response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0<len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded original Ed25519 response')
descriptors=[]
try:
for value in (bytes.fromhex('302a300506032b6570032100')+key,raw,signature):
fd=os.memfd_create('rmm-readonly-public-verification',os.MFD_CLOEXEC);descriptors.append(fd)
require(os.write(fd,value)==len(value),'complete public verification input');os.lseek(fd,0,0)
result=subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/openssl','pkeyutl','-verify','-pubin','-keyform','DER','-inkey','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[0]),'-rawin','-in','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[1]),'-sigfile','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[2])],pass_fds=tuple(descriptors),capture_output=True,timeout=5)
require(result.returncode==0,'original signed decision verifies')
finally:
for fd in descriptors:os.close(fd)
d=json.loads(raw)
require(d['decision_id']==decision_id and d['domain']=='rmm.reconciliation-decision' and d['schema_version']==1
and d['key_id']==sha(key) and all(d[k]==public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'signed domain/key/device/generations')
def varint(v):
out=bytearray()
while v>=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7
out.append(v);return bytes(out)
wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature
with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone()
require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes')
original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']
verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original)
return verified[decision_id]
def original_rows(name,table,count):
# There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes
# before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer.
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
last=None;remaining=count
while remaining:
size=min(16,remaining)
with database(name) as db:
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained')
for row in page:
require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal')
last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row
old_candidates=[]
# Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response
# BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below.
total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None
while len(old_candidates)<total_original:
with database(ledger) as db:
size=min(16,total_original-len(old_candidates))
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained')
old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0]
old_candidates.reverse()
reference_changes=[];summary={}
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
with database(name) as db:
schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema')
counts={}
for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items():
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
counts[table]=count
require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained')
if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap')
if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue
if table=='counter':
with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall()
require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue
if table in ('pending','job_events'):
require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue
for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))):
old_hash=old_hashes[index]
if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue
if table=='reconcile_requests':
require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill')
with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]]))
require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request')
signed(candidates[0][0])
continue
require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed')
# Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its
# reference to an independently applied signed decision renews.
original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None)
require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness')
old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart')
selected=[]
for proof in (old,new):
found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]]
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0])
require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome')
a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal')
reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1]))
summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts,
original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()})
# Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive
# captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed.
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
if table in previous['rows']:
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts')
with database(ledger) as db:
roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall()
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots}
require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows')
with database(journal) as db:
require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job')
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None
require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision']
and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id']
and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage')
ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')}
require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment')
proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)
issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
require(issued<=now<until and 0<(until-issued).total_seconds()<=60 and decision['ready'] is True and decision['helper_ready'] is True
and decision['boot_id']==intent['preflight']['boot_id'] and decision['connection_generation']==agent_meta['generation']
and decision['journal_id']==agent_meta['journal_id'] and decision['helper_journal_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'current bounded normal applied signed Sync')
original_basis=next((signed(d)['decision'] for d in old_candidates if signed(d)['original']),None)
require(original_basis is not None and original_basis['journal_id']==decision['journal_id']
and original_basis['helper_journal_id']==decision['helper_journal_id']
and all(decision[k]>=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation')
# Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue;
# this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame.
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
inventory_ack=None
if inventory is not None:
require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued')
inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False)
require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged')
return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes,
boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0,
verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes,
agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')},
decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')},
full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0,read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
def server(payload):
"""Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes."""
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import uuid
tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id']))
agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id']))
require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant')
foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'"
query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now(),"
"'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id,"
"'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at,"
"'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256,"
"'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready,"
"'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+"),"
"'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+"),"
"'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation,"
"encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
"'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
"'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x),"
"'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+"),"
"'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;")
root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery')
cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm']
result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26
and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts')
policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes()
require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600
and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256']
and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed')
for row in result['decisions']:
raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw)
require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision')
row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest()
row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}
denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; "
"SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
"'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
"'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;")
denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial')
result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
return result
def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder):
code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(function)
code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__)))\n'
return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240)
def server_prefix():
cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf')
require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport')
return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202']
def parse_stored_time(value):
"""PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate."""
import datetime as dt
import re
require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string')
matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value)
require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp')
fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else ''
zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3]
return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone)
def compare_samples(samples):
import datetime as dt
require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples')
baseline=samples[0];last=baseline
for sample in samples:
current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision']
require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True
and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof')
require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False
and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0)
and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http'
and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes')
require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation']
and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id']
and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation')
require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True
and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required'))
and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel')
found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']]
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper')
caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin']
require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script',
'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability')
require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged')
inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence')
inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']]
require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256']
and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base'
and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity')
contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at'])
require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before'])
and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start')
if sample is not baseline:
require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at'])
and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances')
last=sample
return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2,
specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True,
tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False)
def main():
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish'))
parser.add_argument('--id')
args=parser.parse_args()
os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True)
manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path)
require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA
and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof')
if args.mode=='prepare-local':
require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only')
install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path)
require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance')
folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE,
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install,
dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True))
else:
require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case')
folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json')
require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent')
require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained')
if args.mode=='observe':
number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only')
sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True))
linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux')
initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder)
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
import datetime as dt
fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base'
and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])]
require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete')
current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder)
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored))
else:
samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]
result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE,
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]))
print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)))
if __name__=='__main__':
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review.
No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval.
Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent
stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install.
"""
import argparse
import ast
import base64
import hashlib
import inspect
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import uuid
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9'
if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA:
raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed')
import script_console_bootstrap as pre
support = pre.support
CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd'
STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation'
DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n'
def require(value, code):
if not value:
raise RuntimeError(code)
def vm(payload):
"""Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification."""
import contextlib
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import sqlite3
import stat
import subprocess
import base64
import time
read_transactions={}
require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case')
intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id'])
state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper')
def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode()
def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024):
m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0
and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence')
return path.read_bytes()
require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent')
old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024))
old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json'))
original_report=protected(before/'report.json')
historical=json.loads(original_report)
require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation')
continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json'))
require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case')
first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp')
require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot')
observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat()
processes={}
for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)):
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID'])
require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active')
proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]
status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines()
uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))
image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256']
require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected
and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image')
processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image)
for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'):
raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout
unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines())
require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed')
for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))):
raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024)
require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes']
and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode')
prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)]
require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved')
for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items():
if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue
path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path)))
require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities')
full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True)
config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json')
require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration')
pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640
and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin')
ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')}
ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')}
require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes')
for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)),
(Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))):
require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes')
# Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync;
# every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness.
known_databases={str(state/'journal.sqlite'),str(state/'consumption.sqlite'),str(helper/'consumption.sqlite')}
require(set(old_sql)==known_databases,'exact three known DELETE-mode databases')
known_journals={name+'-journal':name for name in known_databases}
journal_observations=[]
def await_known_delete_journal(name):
require(name in known_databases,'only known DELETE rollback journal paths')
started=time.monotonic_ns();observed=False
while True:
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm')),'WAL/SHM sidecars always denied')
journal=Path(name+'-journal')
if not os.path.lexists(journal):
elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started
require(not observed or elapsed<=250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal absent within250ms')
if observed:journal_observations.append(dict(database=name,wait_ns=elapsed,observed_naturally_absent=True))
return
observed=True
try:m=journal.lstat()
except FileNotFoundError:continue
owner=old_files[name]
require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not journal.is_symlink() and m.st_nlink==1
and m.st_uid==owner[2] and m.st_gid==owner[3] and not m.st_mode&0o022,'known regular protected DELETE rollback journal only')
elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started
require(elapsed<250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal remained250ms')
time.sleep(min(0.005,(250_000_000-elapsed)/1_000_000_000))
current_paths=set()
for root in (state,helper):
for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]:
if str(path) in known_journals:
await_known_delete_journal(known_journals[str(path)])
require(not os.path.lexists(path),'known DELETE rollback journal still absent before state-path exclusion')
continue
if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required')
m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type')
current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path))
require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path')
value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns]
require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved')
require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained')
@contextlib.contextmanager
def database(name):
path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1
and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode')
await_known_delete_journal(name)
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars')
# Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or
# running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget
# limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee.
started=time.monotonic()
with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db:
require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars before any SQL after readonly open')
db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000)
try:
db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN')
require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal')
yield db
finally:
db.rollback()
elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000)
timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0))
timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed)
require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read')
def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row]))
journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes())
require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding')
key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key')
verified={}
def signed(decision_id):
if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id]
with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone()
require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision')
response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0<len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded original Ed25519 response')
descriptors=[]
try:
for value in (bytes.fromhex('302a300506032b6570032100')+key,raw,signature):
fd=os.memfd_create('rmm-readonly-public-verification',os.MFD_CLOEXEC);descriptors.append(fd)
require(os.write(fd,value)==len(value),'complete public verification input');os.lseek(fd,0,0)
result=subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/openssl','pkeyutl','-verify','-pubin','-keyform','DER','-inkey','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[0]),'-rawin','-in','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[1]),'-sigfile','/proc/self/fd/'+str(descriptors[2])],pass_fds=tuple(descriptors),capture_output=True,timeout=5)
require(result.returncode==0,'original signed decision verifies')
finally:
for fd in descriptors:os.close(fd)
d=json.loads(raw)
require(d['decision_id']==decision_id and d['domain']=='rmm.reconciliation-decision' and d['schema_version']==1
and d['key_id']==sha(key) and all(d[k]==public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'signed domain/key/device/generations')
def varint(v):
out=bytearray()
while v>=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7
out.append(v);return bytes(out)
wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature
with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone()
require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes')
original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']
verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original)
return verified[decision_id]
def original_rows(name,table,count):
# There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes
# before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer.
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
last=None;remaining=count
while remaining:
size=min(16,remaining)
with database(name) as db:
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained')
for row in page:
require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal')
last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row
old_candidates=[]
# Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response
# BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below.
total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None
while len(old_candidates)<total_original:
with database(ledger) as db:
size=min(16,total_original-len(old_candidates))
if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall()
else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall()
require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained')
old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0]
old_candidates.reverse()
reference_changes=[];summary={}
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
with database(name) as db:
schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema')
counts={}
for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items():
require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier')
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
counts[table]=count
require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained')
if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap')
if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue
if table=='counter':
with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall()
require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue
if table in ('pending','job_events'):
require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue
for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))):
old_hash=old_hashes[index]
if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue
if table=='reconcile_requests':
require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill')
with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]]))
require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request')
signed(candidates[0][0])
continue
require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed')
# Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its
# reference to an independently applied signed decision renews.
original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None)
require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness')
old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart')
selected=[]
for proof in (old,new):
found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]]
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0])
require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome')
a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal')
reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1]))
summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts,
original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()})
# Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive
# captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed.
for name,previous in old_sql.items():
for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'):
if table in previous['rows']:
with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0]
require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts')
with database(ledger) as db:
roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall()
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots}
require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows')
with database(journal) as db:
require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job')
names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone()))
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None
require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision']
and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id']
and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage')
ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')}
require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment')
proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)
issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
require(issued<=now<until and 0<(until-issued).total_seconds()<=60 and decision['ready'] is True and decision['helper_ready'] is True
and decision['boot_id']==intent['preflight']['boot_id'] and decision['connection_generation']==agent_meta['generation']
and decision['journal_id']==agent_meta['journal_id'] and decision['helper_journal_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'current bounded normal applied signed Sync')
original_basis=next((signed(d)['decision'] for d in old_candidates if signed(d)['original']),None)
require(original_basis is not None and original_basis['journal_id']==decision['journal_id']
and original_basis['helper_journal_id']==decision['helper_journal_id']
and all(decision[k]>=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation')
# Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue;
# this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame.
inventory=payload.get('inventory')
inventory_ack=None
if inventory is not None:
require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued')
inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False)
require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged')
return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes,
boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0,
verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes,
agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')},
decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')},
full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0,
transient_delete_journal_observations=journal_observations,rollback_journal_observation_budget_ms=250,
read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
def server(payload):
"""Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes."""
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
from pathlib import Path
import subprocess
import uuid
tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id']))
agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id']))
require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant')
foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'"
query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now(),"
"'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id,"
"'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at,"
"'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256,"
"'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready,"
"'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+"),"
"'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+"),"
"'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation,"
"encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
"'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x),"
"'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x),"
"'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+"),"
"'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;")
root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery')
cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm']
result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26
and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts')
policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes()
require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600
and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256']
and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed')
for row in result['decisions']:
raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw)
require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision')
row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest()
row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}
denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; "
"SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
"'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"'),"
"'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;")
denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout)
require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial')
result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)
return result
def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder):
source=inspect.getsource(function);labels=set()
for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(source)):
if not isinstance(node,ast.Call) or not isinstance(node.func,ast.Name):continue
index=1 if node.func.id=='require' else 0 if node.func.id=='RuntimeError' else None
if index is not None and len(node.args)>index and isinstance(node.args[index],ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.args[index].value,str):labels.add(node.args[index].value)
code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+source
code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n import traceback\n label=str(e) if isinstance(e,RuntimeError) and str(e) in '+repr(sorted(labels))+' else None\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__,guard_code=label,frames=[dict(function=f.name,line=f.lineno) for f in traceback.extract_tb(e.__traceback__)],sqlite_errorcode=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorcode",None),sqlite_errorname=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorname",None))))\n'
return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240)
def server_prefix():
cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf')
require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport')
return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202']
def parse_stored_time(value):
"""PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate."""
import datetime as dt
import re
require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string')
matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value)
require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp')
fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else ''
zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3]
return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone)
def compare_samples(samples):
import datetime as dt
require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples')
baseline=samples[0];last=baseline
for sample in samples:
current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision']
require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True
and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof')
require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False
and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0)
and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http'
and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes')
require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation']
and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id']
and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation')
require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True
and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required'))
and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel')
found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']]
require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper')
caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin']
require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script',
'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability')
require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged')
inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence')
inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']]
require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256']
and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base'
and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity')
contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at'])
require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before'])
and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start')
if sample is not baseline:
require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at'])
and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances')
last=sample
return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2,
specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True,
tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False)
def main():
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish'))
parser.add_argument('--id')
args=parser.parse_args()
os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True)
manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path)
require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA
and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof')
if args.mode=='prepare-local':
require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only')
install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path)
require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance')
folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE,
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install,
dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True))
else:
require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case')
folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json')
require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent')
require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained')
if args.mode=='observe':
number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only')
sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True))
linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux')
initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder)
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
import datetime as dt
fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base'
and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])]
require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete')
current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder)
stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder)
support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored))
else:
samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]
result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE,
runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)]))
print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False)))
if __name__=='__main__':
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# Enger lesender Observer für kurzlebige DELETE-Rollbackjournale
Stand: lokale Opsvorbereitung, kein nativer V2-Aufruf und noch kein neuer
Abnahmeintent. `deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py` ist eine getrennte
Quelle; die ursprüngliche Datei `script_console_post_attestation.py` bleibt
bytegleich SHA256
`076e1c22c1849c20827317e3cbec7a3769f14f5fd9fc7691ab2e0f0cb80fa1dc`.
Alle ursprünglichen Belege des Falls
`3319e212-2188-4b00-bb82-e13173a3b6b2` bleiben unverändert. Zusätzlich wurden
Quelle und sämtliche 34 zu diesem Zeitpunkt vorhandenen Fallbelege create-only
unter `devstate/source-history/postattn-076-ff0606b7-4740-4dab-9a26-d7679e8d630d/`
archiviert; Manifest-SHA256
`46d922abd242c56887752ad193343e717292eb4040013c8ca1c69fa4b9f60280`.
Ein konkreter angereicherter Read-only-Fehlerbeleg identifiziert den verweigerten
Guard `no SQLite sidecars` im Pfad `vm → original_rows → database`:
`transport-88f45793-8bb2-4c31-9804-1efb740e8071.json`, SHA256
`b7db1bfce80d6cb8ed3eea678c0f102b2f6b7d45e7e7cd97f95bb10343a906f5`.
Das belegt diese eine Sidecarverweigerung. Es belegt weder eine Runtime-/
Historybeschädigung noch die Ursache sämtlicher früherer RuntimeErrors ohne
Guardnamen. Zwei zusätzliche ausdrücklich autorisierte lesende Diagnosen mit
unveränderter 076-VMfunktion bestanden, auch der vorhandene Server→Inventar→VM-
Pfad; sie wurden nicht zu Abnahmesamples oder einem finalen Attest hochgestuft.
V2 verändert ausschließlich die Beobachtung der drei exakt bekannten
SQLite-DELETE-Datenbanken: Agentjournal, Agentverbrauchsledger und gemeinsames
Rootverbrauchsledger. Für genau deren drei `-journal`-Pfade beobachtet der
Observer höchstens 250 ms, ob ein reguläres, passend geschütztes Rollbackjournal
natürlich verschwindet. Während es vorhanden ist, öffnet dieser Wartepfad keine
Datenbank, führt keine SQL-Abfrage aus und verändert keine Datei. Der Observer
löscht, benennt, repariert oder recovered nichts. Ein länger vorhandenes Journal,
falscher Objekttyp oder fremder Eigentümer verweigert den Nachweis. WAL und SHM
werden weiterhin sofort verweigert, ebenso jeder unbekannte Suffixpfad.
Im Zustandsverzeichnis dürfen ausschließlich diese drei transienten
Rollbackjournalpfade nach konkret beobachteter Abwesenheit aus dem Dateipfadzeugen
ausgelassen werden. Es gibt keine allgemeine Suffixausnahme. Alle ursprünglichen
PKI-/Zustandspfade, Metadaten, Inodes und Raw-Rowhashes bleiben unverändert
gefordert. Vor jedem DB-Open bleibt der ursprüngliche Sidecarguard aktiv; direkt
nach dem Read-only-Open wird vor jeder SQL-Anweisung nochmals geprüft. Eine
erneute Sidecarentstehung verweigert die Beobachtung, statt sie zu ignorieren.
Eine atomare Dateisystem-/Datenbankaufnahme wird nicht behauptet.
`mode=ro`, `query_only`, tatsächlicher DELETE-Journalmodus, 250-ms-Busy-Timeout,
kooperatives einsekündiges Lesebudget und das Schließen jeder Leseperiode vor
Rowhashing/Signaturprüfung bleiben bestehen. Signed-Decision-, Server-,
Schema-/Rowhash- und abschließende Agent-/Helper-Metaguards werden nicht gelockert.
Der Sourcevergleich bestätigt unveränderte ASTs der bestehenden Funktionen
`signed`, `original_rows`, `row_hash`, `server`, `compare_samples` und
`parse_stored_time`. Es gibt weder `immutable=1`, unbegrenztes Busy-Warten,
Helper-IPC, Diensteingriff, Job, Approval, Rechte- noch Policyänderung.
Auf Fehlern liefert der neue Formatter ausschließlich Fehlerklasse, einen im
Quelltext enthaltenen statischen RuntimeError-Guardnamen, Funktions-/Zeilenframes
und SQLite-Fehlercodes. Er exportiert weder Exceptionlocals noch SQL-stdout,
Token- oder Schlüsselwerte. Normale fehlgeschlagene Rohtransportbelege bleiben
erhalten. Ein solcher Fehler wird niemals als erfolgreicher Sample behandelt.
Tatsächlich lokal geprüft, ausschließlich mit temporären Testdatenbanken und
den unveränderten echten V2-Helper-/Dateipfadwalk-Funktionen: Ein SQLitewriter
hielt sein Rollbackjournal kurz offen und schloss es selbst durch Commit; nach
rund 42 ms beobachtete der Observer das natürliche Verschwinden, danach war der
Read-only-Read zulässig. Ein persistierendes Journal wurde nach rund 250 ms
verweigert und blieb erhalten. WAL, SHM und ein unbekannter Journal-Suffixpfad
wurden verweigert und blieben erhalten. Der Observer führte keine Mutation aus.
Python-Syntax bestand; Produktinputs und alle archivierten Originalbelege blieben
unverändert. Das ist kein neuer nativer Drei-Sample-Nachweis.
**Geplant, nicht ausgeführt:** Erst nach gesondertem Rootreview einen neuen
lokalen Intent mit dem V2-Quellhash erzeugen und drei neue tatsächliche
Beobachtungen samt abschließendem Vergleich durchführen. Die beiden ursprünglichen
076-Samples werden nicht umetikettiert oder mit einem V2-Sample zu einem neuen
Attest zusammengemischt. Die tatsächliche WebUI-Jobgenehmigung bleibt ein
getrennter späterer Schritt.
## Tatsächliche dreiteilige Cloud-Abnahme
Root hat nach Quellreview einen neuen ausschließlich lesenden Fall
`4c425416-5a04-426a-a23a-f5801968f02d` vorbereitet und drei getrennte Beobachtungen
auf der tatsächlichen Cloud-Linux-VM und dem festgelegten Server ausgeführt.
Anschließender lokaler Vergleich: **bestanden**. Finaler geschützter Beleg
`attested.json`, SHA256
`594fdf94261aa882df7ea771dda3f04779533dfdac768cf4a63c83448e1f27d7`.
Erhaltung der ursprünglichen Geräte-/Boot-/PKI-/DB-Inodes/Root18-Rohbytes,
tatsächliche neue Agent-/General-/Fullimages und Konten sowie aktueller gemeinsam
angewandter kryptografisch geprüfter signierter Sync wurden nachgewiesen.
Zwei gespeicherte Kontakt-/Sequenzfortschritte, konkrete neue Inventar-ID mit
quellgebundenem Queueabschluss und RLS-Tenantverweigerung bestanden. Unveränderte
30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits, ungeklärt0; keine neuen Jobs oder Freigaben.
Die Aussage bleibt seitenweise Erhaltung über das Beobachtungsintervall mit
abschließendem SameDecision-/Effektzahlcheck, kein atomarer Gesamtsnapshot oder
neuer Vollintegritätsscan. Kein mitgeschnittener Wire-ACK und kein neuer
HTTP-Tenantnachweis; diese Grenzen sind im Ergebnis explizitfalse. Die Full-
Skriptwirkung bleibt separat WebUI-genehmigungspflichtig und noch offen.
+201
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
# Lesender Nachweis nach dem ersten Skriptkonsolen-Dienststart
Stand2026-11-14: neue reviewbare Quelle
`deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py`; durch ihren Ersteller **kein
Zielaufruf ausgeführt**. Keine Änderung der158 eingefrorenen Produktinputs.
Installationsfall `2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd` und dessen ursprünglicher
Fehlerbericht bleiben unverändert. Die separate eng geprüfte Fortsetzung startet
die bereits ausgetauschten Dienste; dieser Nachweis darf das nicht übernehmen.
## Feste Proben und Erhaltungsgrenzen
Der VM-Reader öffnet ausschließlich vorhandene feste Kontroll-/Metadatendateien
und die drei ursprünglichen SQLite-Dateien im URI-Modus `mode=ro` mit
`query_only` und Lesetransaktion. Er erzeugt keine Zielpfade, keine temporären
Dateien und keine SQLite-Sidecars. Vorgefundene WAL/SHM/Journaldateien verweigern
die Probe; keine Bereinigung. systemctl wird ausschließlich mit `show` benutzt.
Die zusätzliche OpenSSL-Prüfung verwendet öffentliche Signaturdaten in anonymen
memfd-Dateideskriptoren, keine privaten Schlüssel. Kein Helper-IPC und keine
neue Clock-/Inventory-/Jobanforderung.
Geprüft werden alle drei tatsächlichen Agent-/General-/Full-Prozessimages,
UID/GID, Startticks, unveränderte Boot-ID, installierte Codehashes und erhaltene
alte Binärinodes/-bytes. Alle General-/APT-/Paketkontrollen des ursprünglichen
Preflightzeugen bleiben exakt; APT und alte Dienste bleiben disabled/inactive.
Fullkonfiguration, ursprüngliche Inspector-Pinbytes, Unit und additives
Agentdropin müssen den geprüften ursprünglichen Bytes/Modes entsprechen.
Alle ursprünglichen Zustandsobjekte bleiben vorhanden; private Schlüssel werden
nicht geöffnet. Nicht-DB-Dateien behalten vollständige Inode-/Besitz-/Mode-/
Größen-/Zeitmetadaten. Für Datenbanken dürfen Inhalt und Größe fortschreiten;
ihre Inodes/Besitzer/Modes bleiben. Bei Zustandsverzeichnissen dürfen Größe und
Änderungszeit wegen normaler DELETE-SQLite-Journalerzeugung fortschreiten;
Identität/Besitz/Modes bleiben. Unbekannte neue persistente Zustandsobjekte
werden verweigert.
`sql-before.json` enthält vollständige geordnete Rowhashlisten einschließlich
rowid. Die Quelle erhält jedes alte Schema und jeden alten Historienhash.
Neue Job-/Verbrauchs-/Wirkungs-/Outcomereihen sind ausgeschlossen. Nur feste
passive Sync-Ausnahmen gelten: Metazeilen, monotoner Sequenzzähler, eine zuvor
NULL gewesene und anschließend unabhängig signiert angewandte Antwort sowie
eine erneuerte Outcome-Entscheidungsreferenz. Letztere verlangt den vollständigen
alten Rowhash, erhaltene exakt gleiche Job-/Versuch-/Outcomebytes und beide
ursprünglich signierten, Agent-/Helper-gebundenen Entscheidungen mit monotoner
Lineage. Keine pauschale Freigabe veränderter Historientabellen. Alte Queuezeilen
müssen im Vorherzeugen fehlen; eine mehrdeutige alte Queue verweigert diese
Quelle. Der ursprüngliche Zähler wird aus seinem Hash in einem höchstens4096
Sequenzschritte umfassenden Bereich bis zum aktuellen Wert rekonstruiert. Reicht
das nicht, fehlt der Nachweis; kein Quellenfallback und keine Zielreparatur.
Alle18 ursprünglichen Rootrequests/-grants/-signaturen/-starts/-outcomes bleiben
exakt gleich. Aktuelle Agent-/Helper-Metadaten müssen faultfrei dieselbe
angewandte Entscheidung, Generation, Journalbindung und unveränderte öffentliche
Bindingidentität belegen. Die tatsächliche Ed25519-Signatur und die originalen
Request-/Protobufantwortbytes werden unabhängig geprüft. Die neue Entscheidung
muss innerhalb ihrer ursprünglichen höchstens60s-Lease liegen und eine
ursprüngliche vor dem Bootstrap erhaltene signierte Journal-Lineage fortsetzen.
Das belegt normale NativeClock-/Peer-/Applyprüfungen der gepinnten Runtime;
der Reader erzeugt keine neue Probe und erteilt keine Jobstartberechtigung.
## Passive Serverkontakte und konkrete Nachweisgrenzen
Der Serverreader führt ausschließlich gespeicherte Datenabfragen in
Read-only-Transaktionen aus. Er liest keine Anmeldetokens oder privaten
Umgebungs-/PKI-Dateien. Rootpolicyhash und geschlossener Ablauf bleiben gebunden;
30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits/keine offenen Jobs bleiben erhalten. Die30 vollständigen
Jobzeilenfingerprints müssen über alle drei Beobachtungen gleich bleiben.
Die alte Jobsammlung ist zusätzlich durch die VM-Vorherhistorie gebunden; dieser
neue Reader rekonstruiert keinen früher nicht vorhandenen Server-Rowsnapshot.
Jede Beobachtung bindet dieselbe tatsächlich gespeicherte signierte Entscheidung
an Server, Agent und Helper sowie die normal veröffentlichte Full-Policy-/
Binärcapability. Ein RLS-Aufruf als `rmm_app` im anderen Testtenant muss für das
feste Gerät, dessen Inventar und Jobs jeweils null Zeilen liefern. Das ist ein
echter gespeicherter Datenbank-RLS-Nachweis, **keine neue HTTP-/MCP-Authabnahme**.
Drei ausdrücklich getrennte `observe`-Aufrufe liefern Baseline und zwei danach
streng fortgeschrittene gespeicherte Heartbeatzeitpunkte samt Sequenz. Prozesse,
Boot und Verbindungsgeneration müssen über alle drei Reads gleich bleiben;
der aktuelle Kontakt darf beim Read höchstens45s alt sein. Frische Kontakte und
Inventar werden an den dauerhaften `first_start_not_before`-Zeitpunkt der
separaten `continuation-start-intent.json` gebunden. Kein Sleep, Agentneustart
oder angeforderter Refresh zur Erzeugung dieser Daten.
Ein konkreter neuer `linux.base`-Inventar-Message-ID-/Boot-/Payloadbeleg muss
serverseitig vorliegen und denselben lokalen dauerhaften Queueeintrag beendet
haben. Die Quelle bezeichnet dies ausdrücklich als **quellgebundenen
Queueabschluss**, `wire_inventory_ack_captured=false`: Der bestehende Agent
speichert rohe ACKframes nicht dauerhaft. Aus dieser Probe darf kein angeblich
mitgeschnittener ACKframe entstehen. Der normale ACK-/signierte Sync-ACK-Pfad
der gepinnten Runtime entfernt den Eintrag; der Reader löscht nichts.
## Geplante Bedienung, nicht ausgeführt
Nach Rootreview und erfolgreicher separater erster Dienststartfortsetzung:
```text
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py prepare-local
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE
python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py finish --id POSTCASE
```
Die Beobachtungen zeitlich über zwei normale Heartbeats verteilen. Unveränderte
Kontakte oder unvollständige Signatur-/Queue-/Readinessbelege ergeben kein PASS.
`finish` liest ausschließlich die lokalen drei erhaltenen Belege; seine Aussage
betrifft diesen erhaltenden Runtime-/Sync-/Passivnachweis. Keine RMM-Jobs,
Genehmigungen, Paketwirkung oder Reboots. Der eigentliche FullMaintenancejob
bleibt ein separat unveränderlich beantragter und WebUI-genehmigter Plan.
## Tatsächliche lokale Prüfung und offene Zielnachweise
Python-AST der neuen Quelle ist geprüft. Die tatsächliche lokale Vergleichs-
funktion bestand zunächst eine ausdrücklich synthetische Dreierbaseline und
zwölf unabhängige Manipulationsverweigerungen; nach Ergänzung der ausdrücklichen
Serverbelegpflicht bestand dieselbe tatsächliche Funktion eine neue synthetische
Dreierbaseline und15 unabhängige Verweigerungen. Keine VM-Daten wurden hierfür
erzeugt. Die tatsächliche Serverreaderfunktion wurde zusätzlich mit gemockten
Datei-/Subprozessgrenzen auf genau zwei Read-only-Abfragen einschließlich
`rmm_app`-RLSkontext geprüft; kein echtes PostgreSQL wurde aufgerufen.
Das ist keine native Abnahme.
Ziel-SQL, SSH, OpenSSL auf der VM, reale Signatur-/Erhaltungs-/Heartbeat-/
Inventar-/RLSbelege sind durch diesen Subagenten nicht ausgeführt.
## Getrennter Transport-/Leselock-Nachfolger
Root hat mit dem ursprünglichen Runner89121b42 im Fall77d0b7c1 tatsächlich einen
VM-Erhaltungs-/SignedSyncread bestanden; die anschließende Serververbindung
scheiterte an einem für den DNSnamen fehlenden SSH-Hosteintrag. Daraus entsteht
kein vollständiger Server-/Passivnachweis. Originalquelle und alle vier
ursprünglichen Case-/Transportdateien bleiben unverändert; die Quelle liegt
zusätzlich create-only in `devstate/script-console-post-attestation-source-history/`.
Der Nachfolger verwendet dieselbe bereits verifizierte Server-IP und dieselbe
strikte Hostprüfung wie die vorhandenen Deploymentwerkzeuge. Keine neuen
Hostschlüssel oder Änderungen an known_hosts.
Der Review der ursprünglich14s dauernden VM-Probe fand einen vermeidbaren
Leselock: Rowhash-/Referenzsuche und externe Signaturprüfung lagen im äußeren
SQLite-Lesekontext. Der erste Nachfolger materialisierte die ursprünglichen
Zeugen innerhalb einer Lesetransaktion und schloss sie vor Hash-/Signaturarbeit.
Die echte nachfolgende Root-Probe mit Runner1e172625 und lokalem Fall5a53ced7
verweigerte beim Materialisieren unter dem1s-Limit mit `OperationalError`; das
ist kein PASS. Auch diese Originalquelle und ihre sieben ursprünglichen
Casedateien bleiben create-only archiviert beziehungsweise am Originalort.
Der zweite Nachfolger liest deshalb **höchstens16 ursprüngliche Zeilen pro
Lesetransaktion**, nach rowid geordnet. Jede Seite schließt vor Hash-,
Referenzsuche oder Signaturprüfung. Ursprüngliche Hashprefixe werden vollständig
geprüft; neu angehängte Sync-BLOBs werden nicht vollständig eingelesen. Nur die
ursprünglichen Entscheidungs-IDs werden zusätzlich als kleine Metadatenliste
gehalten. Anfangsanzahlen/Schema und abschließend feste Job-/Wirkungsanzahlen,
Root18-Originalbytes und frische gleiche Agent-/Helperentscheidung werden
separat geprüft. Dies ist ein seitenweiser Erhaltungsbeleg über das berichtete
Beobachtungsintervall, **kein tabellenübergreifender atomarer Snapshot**.
Ein neuer vollständiger SQLite-Integritätsscan wird nicht behauptet
(`sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=false`); Schema und alle ursprünglichen
Zeilenbytes werden unabhängig erhalten und die normale signierte Runtime-
Lineage bleibt zwingend. Keine pauschale Ausnahme für historische Tabellen.
Zusätzliche einzelne Signaturreferenzabfragen haben eigene kurze Lesekontexte.
Ein kooperatives
SQLite-Progressbudget von1s und0,25s Busytimeout begrenzen die Abfragen; das ist
keine harte Echtzeitgarantie für blockierendes Betriebssystem-I/O. Ein Timeout
bricht den Nachweis ab und schließt/rollt ausschließlich die eigene Lesetransaktion
zurück; keine Produktzeile wird geändert oder ignoriert.
Tatsächlich lokal mit der extrahierten neuen Lesekontextfunktion geprüft:
2000 synthetische Zeilen materialisiert, anschließend sofortiger Writercommit
in0,93ms; eine absichtlich lange reine SELECT-Rekursion wurde nach1000,13ms
unterbrochen, danach Writercommit erfolgreich. AST-Prüfung belegt keine
Rowhash-/Signatur-/Subprozessarbeit innerhalb eines `database`-Kontexts. Das
ist ein lokaler SQLite-Guard, kein neuer VM- oder Produktions-Locknachweis.
Der tatsächliche zusätzliche lokale Pagingguard materialisierte50 ursprüngliche
Zeilen mit je64KiB über vier kurze Seiten, während zwischen den geschlossenen
Seiten zusätzliche passive Testzeilen angehängt wurden. Neue Anhänge wurden
nicht mitmaterialisiert; Writercommits zwischen den Seiten dauerten höchstens
0,94ms. Die SELECT-Budgetprobe unterbrach nach1000,10ms und ließ danach einen
weiteren Writercommit zu. Auch dies ist ausschließlich ein synthetischer lokaler
SQLite-Nachweis; kein weiterer Zielaufruf durch diesen Subagenten.
## Lokaler Zeitparser und aktueller Prüfzwischenstand
Der erste Nachfolger2786c218 las nativ VM und Server, scheiterte anschließend
im lokalen Python3.10-Parser an einem gültigen PostgreSQL-RFC3339-Wert mit vier
Nachkommastellen. Eine lokale Korrektur akzeptiert SQL-Zeitstempel mit0–6
Nachkommastellen und füllt ausschließlich fehlende Nullen auf; keine Rundung,
Trunkierung oder Änderung von VM-/Serverdaten. Ursprüngliche Quelle und Case8614
wurden create-only erhalten. Quelle076e1c22 verwendet dieselben unveränderten
VM-/Serverreader und einen neuen rein lesenden Fall3319e212.
Zwei vollständige zeitversetzte Beobachtungen dieses Falls sind tatsächlich
bestanden (Generation131, unveränderte18Rootverbräuche). Der dritte Beleg ist
noch offen. Zusätzliche Fehlerformatierung ließ alle Prüfbedingungen und
Ergebnisdaten unverändert und exportierte ausschließlich statischen Guardcode,
Frames und SQLitecode. Damit ist für eine konkrete Verweigerung
`no SQLite sidecars` nachgewiesen; welche Prüfbedingung die älteren generischen
RuntimeError-Belege auslöste, wird nicht nachträglich erfunden. Separate lesende
Kontrollaufrufe bestätigten weiterhin Erhaltung/SignedSync und konkrete
Inventar-Queuekonvergenz. Bisher kein dreiteiliger Gesamt-PASS und kein Job.