diff --git a/deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py b/deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea579f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py @@ -0,0 +1,443 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review. + +No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval. +Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent +stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install. +""" +import argparse +import base64 +import hashlib +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import uuid + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9' +if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA: + raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed') +import script_console_bootstrap as pre +support = pre.support +CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd' +STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation' +DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n' + + +def require(value, code): + if not value: + raise RuntimeError(code) + + +def vm(payload): + """Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification.""" + import contextlib + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import sqlite3 + import stat + import subprocess + import base64 + import time + read_transactions={} + require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case') + intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id']) + state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper') + def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() + def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode() + def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024): + m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0 + and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence') + return path.read_bytes() + require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent') + old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024)) + old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json')) + original_report=protected(before/'report.json') + historical=json.loads(original_report) + require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation') + continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json')) + require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case') + first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00')) + require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp') + require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot') + observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat() + processes={} + for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)): + raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout + unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID']) + require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active') + proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19] + status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines() + uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:')) + image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256'] + require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected + and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image') + processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image) + for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'): + raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout + unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines()) + require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed') + for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))): + raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024) + require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes'] + and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode') + prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)] + require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved') + for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items(): + if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue + path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path))) + require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities') + full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True) + config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json') + require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration') + pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640 + and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin') + ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')} + ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')} + require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes') + for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)), + (Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))): + require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes') + # Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync; + # every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness. + current_paths=set() + for root in (state,helper): + for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]: + if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required') + m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type') + current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path)) + require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path') + value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns] + require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved') + require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained') + @contextlib.contextmanager + def database(name): + path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1 + and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode') + require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars') + # Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or + # running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget + # limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee. + started=time.monotonic() + with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db: + db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000) + try: + db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN') + require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal') + yield db + finally: + db.rollback() + elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000) + timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0)) + timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed) + require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read') + def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row])) + journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes()) + require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding') + key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key') + verified={} + def signed(decision_id): + if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id] + with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone() + require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision') + response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7 + out.append(v);return bytes(out) + wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature + with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone() + require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes') + original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions'] + verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original) + return verified[decision_id] + def original_rows(name,table,count): + # There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes + # before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer. + require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier') + last=None;remaining=count + while remaining: + size=min(16,remaining) + with database(name) as db: + if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall() + else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall() + require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained') + for row in page: + require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal') + last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row + old_candidates=[] + # Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response + # BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below. + total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None + while len(old_candidates)? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall() + require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained') + old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0] + old_candidates.reverse() + reference_changes=[];summary={} + for name,previous in old_sql.items(): + with database(name) as db: + schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema') + counts={} + for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items(): + require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier') + with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0] + counts[table]=count + require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained') + if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'): + require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap') + if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue + if table=='counter': + with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall() + require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue + if table in ('pending','job_events'): + require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue + for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))): + old_hash=old_hashes[index] + if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue + if table=='reconcile_requests': + require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill') + with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]])) + require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request') + signed(candidates[0][0]) + continue + require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed') + # Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its + # reference to an independently applied signed decision renews. + original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None) + require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness') + old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart') + selected=[] + for proof in (old,new): + found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]] + require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0]) + require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome') + a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal') + reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1])) + summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts, + original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()}) + # Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive + # captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed. + for name,previous in old_sql.items(): + for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'): + if table in previous['rows']: + with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0] + require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts') + with database(ledger) as db: + roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall() + names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone())) + exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots} + require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows') + with database(journal) as db: + require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job') + names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone())) + inventory=payload.get('inventory') + inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None + require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision'] + and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id'] + and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage') + ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')} + require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment') + proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) + issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00')) + require(issued<=now=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation') + # Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue; + # this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame. + inventory=payload.get('inventory') + inventory_ack=None + if inventory is not None: + require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued') + inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False) + require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged') + return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes, + boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0, + verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes, + agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')}, + decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}, + full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0,read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False) + + +def server(payload): + """Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes.""" + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import json + from pathlib import Path + import subprocess + import uuid + tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id'])) + agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id'])) + require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant') + foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222' + scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'" + query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now()," + "'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id," + "'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at," + "'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256," + "'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready," + "'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+")," + "'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+")," + "'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation," + "encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x)," + "'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x)," + "'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x)," + "'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")," + "'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;") + root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery') + cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm'] + result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout) + require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26 + and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts') + policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes() + require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600 + and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256'] + and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed') + for row in result['decisions']: + raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw) + require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision') + row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest() + row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')} + denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; " + "SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')," + "'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')," + "'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;") + denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout) + require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial') + result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False) + return result + + +def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder): + code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(function) + code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__)))\n' + return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240) + + +def server_prefix(): + cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf') + require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport') + return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202'] + + +def parse_stored_time(value): + """PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate.""" + import datetime as dt + import re + require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string') + matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value) + require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp') + fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else '' + zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3] + return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone) + + +def compare_samples(samples): + import datetime as dt + require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples') + baseline=samples[0];last=baseline + for sample in samples: + current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision'] + require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True + and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof') + require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False + and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0) + and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http' + and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes') + require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation'] + and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id'] + and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation') + require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True + and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required')) + and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel') + found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']] + require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper') + caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin'] + require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script', + 'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability') + require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged') + inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence') + inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']] + require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256'] + and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base' + and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity') + contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at']) + require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']) + and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start') + if sample is not baseline: + require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at']) + and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances') + last=sample + return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2, + specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True, + tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False) + + +def main(): + parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish')) + parser.add_argument('--id') + args=parser.parse_args() + os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True) + manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path) + require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA + and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof') + if args.mode=='prepare-local': + require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only') + install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path) + require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance') + folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) + support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE, + runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install, + dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True)) + else: + require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case') + folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json') + require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent') + require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained') + if args.mode=='observe': + number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only') + sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True)) + linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux') + initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder) + stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder) + import datetime as dt + fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base' + and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])] + require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete') + current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder) + stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder) + support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored)) + else: + samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)] + result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE, + runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)])) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False))) + + +if __name__=='__main__': + main() diff --git a/deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py b/deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4828843 --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Read-only post-start evidence; Root executes after a separate source review. + +No target writes, service commands, helper IPC, enrollment, jobs or approval. +Three separate observe invocations are required: baseline and two subsequent +stored heartbeat advances. Missing evidence fails closed; never retry an install. +""" +import argparse +import ast +import base64 +import hashlib +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import uuid + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +PREFLIGHT_SHA = '0e210b857d3f25e0ff228bbbd4a6533dadd91c9d21dbcba5923b26c2fe72eec9' +if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest() != PREFLIGHT_SHA: + raise RuntimeError('Reviewed preflight source changed') +import script_console_bootstrap as pre +support = pre.support +CASE = '2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd' +STATE = ROOT/'devstate/script-console-post-attestation' +DROPIN = b'[Service]\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper-maintenance/control.sock\nEnvironment=RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE=/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json\n' + + +def require(value, code): + if not value: + raise RuntimeError(code) + + +def vm(payload): + """Only fixed file/SQLite reads, process metadata and public-key verification.""" + import contextlib + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import sqlite3 + import stat + import subprocess + import base64 + import time + read_transactions={} + require(os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='x86_64' and payload['case_id']=='2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd', 'fixed root read-only case') + intent=payload['install']; before=Path('/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/script-console-v1-'+payload['case_id']) + state=Path('/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote'); helper=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper') + def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() + def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode() + def protected(path,limit=8*1024*1024): + m=path.lstat();require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0 + and not m.st_mode&0o022 and m.st_nlink==1 and m.st_size<=limit,'protected bounded public/control evidence') + return path.read_bytes() + require(protected(before/'intent.json')==encode(intent),'original immutable installation intent') + old_sql=json.loads(protected(before/'sql-before.json',64*1024*1024)) + old_files=json.loads(protected(before/'files-before.json')) + original_report=protected(before/'report.json') + historical=json.loads(original_report) + require(historical['preserved_before_restart'] is True and historical['full_pin']['helper_binary_sha256']==intent['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], 'original preserved file installation') + continuation=json.loads(protected(before/'continuation-start-intent.json')) + require(continuation['original_case']==payload['case_id'],'same original first-start case') + first_start=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(continuation['first_start_not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00')) + require(first_start.tzinfo is not None,'explicit durable first-start timestamp') + require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==intent['preflight']['boot_id'],'same boot') + observed_from=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc).isoformat() + processes={} + for name,key,uid in (('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993),('rmm-helper-cloud.service','general',0),('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','full',0)): + raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout + unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines());pid=int(unit['MainPID']) + require(unit['ActiveState']=='active' and pid>1,'all three actual services active') + proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));ticks=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19] + status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines() + uids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'));gids=next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:')) + image=sha((proc/'exe').read_bytes());expected=intent['artifacts']['agent' if key=='agent' else 'helper']['sha256'] + require(uids==[str(uid)]*4 and gids==['984']*4 and image==expected + and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ',1)[1].split()[19]==ticks,'actual same process birth/account/image') + processes[key]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=ticks,uids=uids,gids=gids,sha256=image) + for name in ('rmm-apt-helper.service','rmm-agent.service','rmm-helper-dev-test.service'): + raw=subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','ActiveState','-p','UnitFileState'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15).stdout + unit=dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.decode().splitlines()) + require(unit['ActiveState']=='inactive' and unit['UnitFileState']=='disabled','APT/legacy remain closed') + for key,path in (('agent',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote')),('helper',Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper'))): + raw=protected(path,256*1024*1024) + require(sha(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] and len(raw)==intent['artifacts'][key]['bytes'] + and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o755,'qualified installed executable bytes/mode') + prior=before/(key+'-previous');m=prior.lstat();old=intent['baseline']['controls'][str(path)] + require(dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(prior,256*1024*1024)))==old,'original binary backup identities/code preserved') + for path,old in intent['baseline']['controls'].items(): + if path.startswith('/usr/local/libexec/'):continue + path=Path(path);m=path.lstat();actual=dict(device=m.st_dev,inode=m.st_ino,mode=stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode),uid=m.st_uid,gid=m.st_gid,bytes=m.st_size,sha256=sha(protected(path))) + require(actual==old,'unchanged General/APT/package control bytes and identities') + full=base64.b64decode(intent['baseline']['full_config_candidate']['bytes_b64'],validate=True) + config=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json');pinpath=Path('/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json') + require(protected(config)==full and stat.S_IMODE(config.lstat().st_mode)==0o600 and config.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full configuration') + pin=json.loads(protected(pinpath));require(pin==historical['full_pin'] and stat.S_IMODE(pinpath.lstat().st_mode)==0o640 + and pinpath.lstat().st_gid==984,'exact protected Full policy/image/identity pin') + ordered_pin={k:pin[k] for k in ('schema_version','profile','identity','policy_sha256','helper_binary_sha256')} + ordered_pin['identity']={k:pin['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','signing_key_id')} + require(protected(pinpath)==json.dumps(ordered_pin,separators=(',',':')).encode(),'exact original inspector pin bytes') + for path,raw in ((Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'),base64.b64decode(intent['unit_bytes_b64'],validate=True)), + (Path('/etc/systemd/system/rmm-agent-remote.service.d/60-full-maintenance.conf'),base64.b64decode(payload['dropin_b64'],validate=True))): + require(protected(path)==raw and stat.S_IMODE(path.lstat().st_mode)==0o644 and path.lstat().st_gid==0,'exact Full unit and additive agent dropin bytes/modes') + # Do not open a private key. Database bytes legitimately change under Sync; + # every preexisting non-DB file retains its complete metadata witness. + known_databases={str(state/'journal.sqlite'),str(state/'consumption.sqlite'),str(helper/'consumption.sqlite')} + require(set(old_sql)==known_databases,'exact three known DELETE-mode databases') + known_journals={name+'-journal':name for name in known_databases} + journal_observations=[] + def await_known_delete_journal(name): + require(name in known_databases,'only known DELETE rollback journal paths') + started=time.monotonic_ns();observed=False + while True: + require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm')),'WAL/SHM sidecars always denied') + journal=Path(name+'-journal') + if not os.path.lexists(journal): + elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started + require(not observed or elapsed<=250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal absent within250ms') + if observed:journal_observations.append(dict(database=name,wait_ns=elapsed,observed_naturally_absent=True)) + return + observed=True + try:m=journal.lstat() + except FileNotFoundError:continue + owner=old_files[name] + require(stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and not journal.is_symlink() and m.st_nlink==1 + and m.st_uid==owner[2] and m.st_gid==owner[3] and not m.st_mode&0o022,'known regular protected DELETE rollback journal only') + elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started + require(elapsed<250_000_000,'known DELETE rollback journal remained250ms') + time.sleep(min(0.005,(250_000_000-elapsed)/1_000_000_000)) + current_paths=set() + for root in (state,helper): + for path in [root,*sorted(root.rglob('*'))]: + if str(path) in known_journals: + await_known_delete_journal(known_journals[str(path)]) + require(not os.path.lexists(path),'known DELETE rollback journal still absent before state-path exclusion') + continue + if str(path).endswith(('-wal','-shm','-journal')):raise RuntimeError('Settled DELETE-mode snapshot required') + m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) or stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)),'retained state object type') + current_paths.add(str(path));old=old_files.get(str(path)) + require(old is not None,'no unexplained new state path') + value=[m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_mode,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns] + require(value[:5]==old[:5] if str(path) in old_sql or stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) else value==old,'state/PKI/key metadata and inodes preserved') + require(current_paths==set(old_files),'all old state paths retained') + @contextlib.contextmanager + def database(name): + path=Path(name);m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1 + and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'same actual SQLite inode') + await_known_delete_journal(name) + require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars') + # Never hold a shared DELETE-mode read lock while hashing rows or + # running OpenSSL. A cooperative one-second SQLite progress budget + # limits reads; this is not a hard real-time OS/I/O guarantee. + started=time.monotonic() + with contextlib.closing(sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25)) as db: + require(all(not os.path.lexists(name+s) for s in ('-wal','-shm','-journal')),'no SQLite sidecars before any SQL after readonly open') + db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic()-started>1.0),1000) + try: + db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN') + require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified DELETE journal') + yield db + finally: + db.rollback() + elapsed=int((time.monotonic()-started)*1000) + timing=read_transactions.setdefault(name,dict(count=0,total_ms=0,max_ms=0)) + timing['count']+=1;timing['total_ms']+=elapsed;timing['max_ms']=max(timing['max_ms'],elapsed) + require([path.stat().st_dev,path.stat().st_ino]==old_sql[name]['identity'],'SQLite inode unchanged through read') + def row_hash(row):return sha(encode([dict(blob_sha256=sha(v),bytes=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row])) + journal=str(state/'journal.sqlite');ledger=str(helper/'consumption.sqlite');public=json.loads((state/'binding.json').read_bytes()) + require(all(public[k]==intent['general_pin']['identity'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')),'retained enrollment/binding') + key=bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']);require(len(key)==32 and sha(key)==pin['identity']['signing_key_id'],'same public signing key') + verified={} + def signed(decision_id): + if decision_id in verified:return verified[decision_id] + with database(ledger) as db:row=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?',[decision_id]).fetchone() + require(row is not None,'retained helper-applied signed decision') + response=json.loads(row[3]);raw=bytes(response['decision_bytes']);signature=bytes(response['signature']);require(0=128:out.append((v&127)|128);v>>=7 + out.append(v);return bytes(out) + wire=b'\x0a'+varint(len(raw))+raw+b'\x12\x40'+signature + with database(journal) as db:req=db.execute('SELECT request,generation,response FROM reconcile_requests WHERE id=?',[d['request_id']]).fetchone() + require(req is not None and req[0]==row[4] and sha(req[0])==d['request_hash'] and req[1]==d['connection_generation'] and req[2]==wire,'same agent/helper-applied request and signed response bytes') + original=row_hash(row) in old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions'] + verified[decision_id]=dict(decision=d,payload_sha256=sha(raw),signature_sha256=sha(signature),original=original) + return verified[decision_id] + def original_rows(name,table,count): + # There is deliberately no encompassing transaction. Each page closes + # before yield, so hashing/crypto cannot block a DELETE-mode writer. + require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier') + last=None;remaining=count + while remaining: + size=min(16,remaining) + with database(name) as db: + if last is None:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[size]).fetchall() + else:page=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM "'+table+'" WHERE rowid>? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall() + require(len(page)==size,'all original SQL prefix rows retained') + for row in page: + require(last is None or row[0]>last,'monotonic original SQLite rowid traversal') + last=row[0];remaining-=1;yield row + old_candidates=[] + # Only original IDs are materialized, never all historical request/response + # BLOBs or new append-only Sync rows. Their full hashes are checked below. + total_original=len(old_sql[ledger]['rows']['helper_sync_decisions']);last=None + while len(old_candidates)? ORDER BY rowid LIMIT ?',[last,size]).fetchall() + require(len(page)==size,'all original signed decision IDs retained') + old_candidates.extend(row[1] for row in page);last=page[-1][0] + old_candidates.reverse() + reference_changes=[];summary={} + for name,previous in old_sql.items(): + with database(name) as db: + schema=dict(db.execute("SELECT name,sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' ORDER BY name"));require(schema==previous['schema'],'exact unchanged SQL schema') + counts={} + for table,old_hashes in previous['rows'].items(): + require(table.replace('_','').isalnum(),'fixed SQLite identifier') + with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0] + counts[table]=count + require(count>=len(old_hashes),'all original SQL rows retained') + if table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'): + require(count==len(old_hashes),'no new job/effect/history rows during bootstrap') + if table in ('reconcile_meta','helper_sync_meta'):continue + if table=='counter': + with database(name) as db:current=db.execute('SELECT rowid,* FROM counter ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 2').fetchall() + require(len(current)==len(old_hashes)==1 and any(row_hash((1,1,n))==old_hashes[0] for n in range(max(0,current[0][2]-4096),current[0][2]+1)),'monotonic counter reconstructed against exact old hash within4096 bound');continue + if table in ('pending','job_events'): + require(not old_hashes,'no ambiguous preexisting queued messages');continue + for index,row in enumerate(original_rows(name,table,len(old_hashes))): + old_hash=old_hashes[index] + if row_hash(row)==old_hash:continue + if table=='reconcile_requests': + require(row[-1] is not None and row_hash((*row[:-1],None))==old_hash,'only original NULL response may fill') + with database(ledger) as helper_db:candidates=list(helper_db.execute('SELECT decision_id FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE request=?',[row[2]])) + require(len(candidates)==1,'filled response has independent helper-applied original request') + signed(candidates[0][0]) + continue + require(table=='reconcile_outcomes' and name==journal,'immutable original SQL row changed') + # Keep original rowid/job/attempt/outcome bytes; only its + # reference to an independently applied signed decision renews. + original_id=next((d for d in old_candidates if row_hash((*row[:-1],d))==old_hash),None) + require(original_id is not None,'exact old complete outcome-row witness') + old=signed(original_id);new=signed(row[-1]);require(old['original'],'original decision existed before restart') + selected=[] + for proof in (old,new): + found=[a for a in proof['decision']['attempts'] if a['job_id']==row[1] and a['attempt_id']==row[2]] + require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['outcome_sha256']==sha(row[3]) and (not found[0]['outcome_bytes'] or bytes(found[0]['outcome_bytes'])==row[3]),'original signed outcome bytes');selected.append(found[0]) + require(all(selected[0][k]==selected[1][k] for k in ('job_payload_hash','grant_id','authorization_id','plan_hash','action','execution_identity','outcome_state','outcome_sha256','original_boot_id')),'same exact authorized outcome') + a=old['decision'];b=new['decision'];require(a['journal_id']==b['journal_id'] and a['helper_journal_id']==b['helper_journal_id'] and b['checkpoint']>=a['checkpoint'] and b['helper_checkpoint']>=a['helper_checkpoint'] and b['connection_generation']>=a['connection_generation'],'monotonic signed reference renewal') + reference_changes.append(dict(rowid=row[0],original_sha256=old_hash,old_decision_id=original_id,new_decision_id=row[-1])) + summary[name]=dict(identity=previous['identity'],schema_preserved=True,initial_row_counts=counts, + original_row_counts={t:len(v) for t,v in previous['rows'].items()}) + # Recheck fixed effect/job counts after the whole paged witness. New passive + # captures may append throughout; a cross-table snapshot is not claimed. + for name,previous in old_sql.items(): + for table in ('job_attempts','consumed','execution_evidence','reconcile_outcomes'): + if table in previous['rows']: + with database(name) as db:count=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM "'+table+'"').fetchone()[0] + require(count==len(previous['rows'][table]),'final exact no-new-effect/job row counts') + with database(ledger) as db: + roots=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ORDER BY grant_id LIMIT 19').fetchall() + names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(helper_sync_meta)')];helper_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM helper_sync_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone())) + exact={r[0]:sha(json.dumps([dict(sha256=sha(v),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in r],separators=(',',':')).encode()) for r in roots} + require(exact==intent['preflight']['root_rows'] and len(exact)==18 and all(r[5] is not None for r in roots),'final exact original18Root request/grant/signature/start/outcome rows') + with database(journal) as db: + require(db.execute("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state NOT IN ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired')").fetchone()[0]==0,'no unfinished agent job') + names=[r[1] for r in db.execute('PRAGMA table_info(reconcile_meta)')];agent_meta=dict(zip(names,db.execute('SELECT * FROM reconcile_meta WHERE id=1').fetchone())) + inventory=payload.get('inventory') + inventory_queued=bool(db.execute('SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM job_events WHERE id=?)',[inventory['message_id']]).fetchone()[0]) if inventory is not None else None + require(agent_meta['fault'] is None and helper_meta['fault'] is None and agent_meta['last_decision']==helper_meta['last_decision'] + and agent_meta['generation']==helper_meta['generation'] and agent_meta['journal_id']==helper_meta['agent_journal_id'] + and agent_meta['helper_id']==helper_meta['journal_id'],'fault-free shared current applied decision and journal lineage') + ordered_binding={k:public[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','public_key_hex')} + require(helper_meta['binding_sha256']==sha(json.dumps(ordered_binding,separators=(',',':')).encode()),'helper ledger independently bound to exact same enrollment') + proof=signed(agent_meta['last_decision']);decision=proof['decision'];now=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) + issued=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['issued_at'].replace('Z','+00:00'));until=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(decision['valid_until'].replace('Z','+00:00')) + require(issued<=now=original_basis[k] for k in ('checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','connection_generation')),'original signed journal lineage retained with monotonic checkpoint/generation') + # Specific server-persisted inventory must have left the durable local queue; + # this is code-bound queue convergence, not a captured network ACK frame. + inventory=payload.get('inventory') + inventory_ack=None + if inventory is not None: + require(inventory_queued is False and inventory['boot_id']==decision['boot_id'],'specific stored inventory no longer queued') + inventory_ack=dict(message_id=inventory['message_id'],server_payload_sha256=inventory['payload_sha256'],local_queue_absent=True,wire_ack_captured=False) + require(protected(before/'report.json')==original_report,'original interrupted report retained unchanged') + return dict(case_id=payload['case_id'],observed_from=observed_from,observed_until=now.isoformat(),processes=processes, + boot_id=decision['boot_id'],generation=decision['connection_generation'],first_start_not_before=first_start.isoformat(),root_consumed=18,root_unresolved=0, + verified_state_preservation=True,snapshot_consistency='per_page_then_final_same_decision_and_fixed_effect_counts',sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False,database_witness=summary,verified_outcome_reference_changes=reference_changes, + agent_meta=agent_meta,helper_meta=helper_meta,signed_sync={k:proof[k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')}, + decision={k:decision[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')}, + full_pin=pin,inventory_queue_convergence=inventory_ack,read_transactions=read_transactions,read_transaction_budget_seconds=1.0, + transient_delete_journal_observations=journal_observations,rollback_journal_observation_budget_ms=250, + read_only=True,product_state_writes=False,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False) + + +def server(payload): + """Stored server state and RLS denial only; no HTTP/live collection or writes.""" + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import json + from pathlib import Path + import subprocess + import uuid + tenant=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['tenant_id'])) + agent=str(uuid.UUID(payload['install']['target']['agent_id'])) + require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111','fixed development tenant') + foreign='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222' + scope="tenant_id='"+tenant+"' AND agent_id='"+agent+"'" + query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SELECT json_build_object('observed_at',now()," + "'installation',(SELECT json_build_object('connection_generation',connection_generation,'connection_boot_id',connection_boot_id," + "'last_contact_at',last_contact_at,'last_sequence',last_sequence,'last_authenticated_at',last_authenticated_at," + "'certificate_sha256',certificate_sha256,'last_authenticated_certificate_sha256',last_authenticated_certificate_sha256," + "'revoked_at',revoked_at,'capabilities',capabilities,'sync_ready',sync_ready,'helper_sync_ready',helper_sync_ready," + "'restore_blocked',restore_blocked,'sequence_regressed',sequence_regressed,'sync_recovery_required',sync_recovery_required) FROM agent_installations WHERE "+scope+")," + "'head',(SELECT row_to_json(s) FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE "+scope+")," + "'decisions',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT decision_id,request_id,request_hash,connection_generation," + "encode(payload,'hex') AS payload_hex,encode(signature,'hex') AS signature_hex FROM sync_checkpoints WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY created_at DESC,decision_id DESC LIMIT 16) x)," + "'inventories',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT message_id,boot_id,sequence,observed_at,received_at,source_id,payload_sha256 FROM observations WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY received_at DESC LIMIT 16) x)," + "'jobs',(SELECT COALESCE(json_agg(x),'[]'::json) FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,state,encode(sha256(convert_to(to_jsonb(j)::text,'UTF8')),'hex') AS row_sha256 FROM jobs j WHERE "+scope+" ORDER BY job_id,attempt_id LIMIT 31) x)," + "'outbox_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox o JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")," + "'permit_count',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits e JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) WHERE "+scope.replace('tenant_id=','j.tenant_id=').replace('agent_id=','j.agent_id=')+")); COMMIT;") + root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery') + cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm'] + result=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=query.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout) + require(len(result['jobs'])==30 and result['outbox_count']==30 and result['permit_count']==26 + and all(j['state'] in ('succeeded','failed','cancelled','expired') for j in result['jobs']),'same closed30/30/26 central job counts') + policy=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=policy.lstat();raw=policy.read_bytes() + require(not policy.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and m.st_mode&0o777==0o600 + and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==payload['install']['central_policy_sha256'] + and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(raw)['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'central Root scope remains protected and closed') + for row in result['decisions']: + raw=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('payload_hex'));signature=bytes.fromhex(row.pop('signature_hex'));d=json.loads(raw) + require(len(raw)<=512*1024 and len(signature)==64,'bounded stored signed decision') + row['payload_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest();row['signature_sha256']=hashlib.sha256(signature).hexdigest() + row['decision']={k:d[k] for k in ('decision_id','request_id','request_hash','connection_generation','boot_id','journal_id','helper_journal_id','checkpoint','helper_checkpoint','issued_at','valid_until','ready','helper_ready')} + denial=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL ROLE rmm_app; SET LOCAL app.tenant_id='"+foreign+"'; " + "SELECT json_build_object('installations',(SELECT count(*) FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')," + "'observations',(SELECT count(*) FROM observations WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')," + "'jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE agent_id='"+agent+"')); COMMIT;") + denied=json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd,input=denial.encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25).stdout) + require(denied==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0),'actual foreign-tenant application-role stored-data denial') + result.update(tenant_denial=denied,tenant_denial_scope='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http',central_root_scope_closed=True,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False) + return result + + +def rpc(prefix,function,payload,folder): + source=inspect.getsource(function);labels=set() + for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(source)): + if not isinstance(node,ast.Call) or not isinstance(node.func,ast.Name):continue + index=1 if node.func.id=='require' else 0 if node.func.id=='RuntimeError' else None + if index is not None and len(node.args)>index and isinstance(node.args[index],ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.args[index].value,str):labels.add(node.args[index].value) + code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+source + code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps('+function.__name__+'('+repr(payload)+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n import traceback\n label=str(e) if isinstance(e,RuntimeError) and str(e) in '+repr(sorted(labels))+' else None\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__,guard_code=label,frames=[dict(function=f.name,line=f.lineno) for f in traceback.extract_tb(e.__traceback__)],sqlite_errorcode=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorcode",None),sqlite_errorname=getattr(e,"sqlite_errorname",None))))\n' + return support.transport(prefix,'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=240) + + +def server_prefix(): + cfg=support.access.load_config(pre.ACCESS_ROOT/'credentials/server.conf') + require(cfg['address']=='88.99.80.202' and cfg['username']=='root' and cfg.get('port','22')=='22' and cfg.get('ssh_key_path'),'fixed existing server bootstrap transport') + return ['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),'root@88.99.80.202'] + + +def parse_stored_time(value): + """PostgreSQL RFC3339 at microsecond precision; pad, never round/truncate.""" + import datetime as dt + import re + require(isinstance(value,str),'stored UTC timestamp string') + matched=re.fullmatch(r'(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})(?:\.(\d{1,6}))?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:\d{2})',value) + require(matched is not None,'exact bounded PostgreSQL RFC3339 timestamp') + fraction=('.'+matched[2].ljust(6,'0')) if matched[2] else '' + zone='+00:00' if matched[3]=='Z' else matched[3] + return dt.datetime.fromisoformat(matched[1]+fraction+zone) + + +def compare_samples(samples): + import datetime as dt + require(len(samples)==3,'exact baseline and two subsequent passive samples') + baseline=samples[0];last=baseline + for sample in samples: + current=sample['vm'];stored=sample['server'];installation=stored['installation'];d=current['decision'] + require(current['read_only'] is True and current['verified_state_preservation'] is True + and current['product_state_writes'] is False and current['rmm_jobs'] is False and current['approvals'] is False,'every native VM preservation proof') + require(stored['read_only'] is True and stored['rmm_jobs'] is False and stored['approvals'] is False + and stored['central_root_scope_closed'] is True and stored['tenant_denial']==dict(installations=0,observations=0,jobs=0) + and stored['tenant_denial_scope']=='postgres_rmm_app_rls_not_http' + and len(stored['jobs'])==30 and stored['outbox_count']==30 and stored['permit_count']==26,'actual stored closed server/tenant-denial probes') + require(installation['connection_generation']==current['generation']==baseline['vm']['generation'] + and installation['connection_boot_id']==current['boot_id']==baseline['vm']['boot_id'] + and current['processes']==baseline['vm']['processes'],'stable actual new process pair/Full helper and connection generation') + require(installation['sync_ready'] is True and installation['helper_sync_ready'] is True + and all(installation[k] is False for k in ('restore_blocked','sequence_regressed','sync_recovery_required')) + and installation['revoked_at'] is None and installation['certificate_sha256']==installation['last_authenticated_certificate_sha256'],'stored authenticated current ready channel') + found=[r for r in stored['decisions'] if r['decision_id']==d['decision_id']] + require(len(found)==1 and found[0]['decision']==d and all(found[0][k]==current['signed_sync'][k] for k in ('payload_sha256','signature_sha256')),'same original signed decision retained at server/agent/helper') + caps=installation['capabilities'];pin=current['full_pin'] + require(all(c in caps for c in ('rmm.sync.v1','script.full_maintenance/1','root:run_script', + 'helper.policy.sha256:'+pin['policy_sha256'],'helper.binary.sha256:'+pin['helper_binary_sha256'])),'normal fresh agent publication of authenticated Full peer/policy/image capability') + require(stored['jobs']==baseline['server']['jobs'],'all existing server job state/row hashes unchanged') + inventory=current['inventory_queue_convergence'];require(inventory is not None,'specific persisted inventory and local queue convergence') + inventories=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['message_id']==inventory['message_id']] + require(len(inventories)==1 and inventories[0]['payload_sha256']==inventory['server_payload_sha256'] + and inventories[0]['boot_id']==current['boot_id'] and inventories[0]['source_id']=='linux.base' + and parse_stored_time(inventories[0]['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']),'concrete fresh passive stored inventory identity') + contact=parse_stored_time(installation['last_contact_at']) + require(contact>=parse_stored_time(current['first_start_not_before']) + and 0<=(parse_stored_time(stored['observed_at'])-contact).total_seconds()<=45,'fresh stored heartbeat after first start') + if sample is not baseline: + require(contact>parse_stored_time(last['server']['installation']['last_contact_at']) + and installation['last_sequence']>last['server']['installation']['last_sequence'],'two distinct subsequent stored heartbeat advances') + last=sample + return dict(verified_preservation=True,verified_normal_signed_sync=True,stored_heartbeat_advances=2, + specific_inventory_queue_convergence=True,wire_inventory_ack_captured=False,tenant_rls_denial=True, + tenant_http_denial_tested=False,read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False,full_job_accepted=False) + + +def main(): + parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('mode',choices=('prepare-local','observe','finish')) + parser.add_argument('--id') + args=parser.parse_args() + os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);support.private(STATE,True) + manifest_path=pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json';manifest=support.load(manifest_path) + require(support.sha(manifest_path)==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA and support.sha(pre.NATIVE)==pre.NATIVE_SHA + and all(support.sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in manifest['source_files'].items()),'unchanged frozen158 inputs and original Linux-first native proof') + if args.mode=='prepare-local': + require(args.id is None,'new local evidence intent only') + install_path=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json';install=support.load(install_path) + require(install['id']==CASE and install['preflight_source_sha256']==PREFLIGHT_SHA and install['manifest_sha256']==pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA,'exact reviewed installation provenance') + folder=STATE/str(uuid.uuid4());folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) + support.save(folder/'intent.json',dict(type='rmm.script-console.read-only-post-attestation-v1',case_id=CASE, + runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),install_intent_sha256=support.sha(install_path),install=install, + dropin_b64=base64.b64encode(DROPIN).decode(),read_only_target_calls=True)) + else: + require(args.id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.id))==args.id,'canonical original local evidence case') + folder=STATE/args.id;intent=support.load(folder/'intent.json') + require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) and intent['case_id']==CASE,'original same-source observation intent') + require(support.sha(ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install'/CASE/'intent.json')==intent['install_intent_sha256'],'original local installation intent retained') + if args.mode=='observe': + number=len(list(folder.glob('sample-*.json')));require(number<3,'three distinct passive samples only') + sample_id=str(uuid.uuid4());support.save(folder/('read-intent-'+sample_id+'.json'),dict(read_only=True)) + linux=support.access_settings(pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux') + initial=rpc(linux,vm,intent,folder) + stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder) + import datetime as dt + fresh=[i for i in stored['inventories'] if i['boot_id']==initial['boot_id'] and i['source_id']=='linux.base' + and parse_stored_time(i['received_at'])>=parse_stored_time(initial['first_start_not_before'])] + require(fresh,'no fresh startup inventory stored yet; read-only evidence incomplete') + current=rpc(linux,vm,dict(intent,inventory=fresh[0]),folder) + stored=rpc(server_prefix(),server,intent,folder) + support.save(folder/('sample-'+str(number)+'.json'),dict(vm=current,server=stored)) + else: + samples=[support.load(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)] + result=compare_samples(samples);support.save(folder/'attested.json',dict(result,case_id=CASE, + runner_sha256=support.sha(__file__),sample_sha256=[support.sha(folder/('sample-'+str(i)+'.json')) for i in range(3)])) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=folder.name,intent=str(folder/'intent.json'),mode=args.mode,target_called=args.mode=='observe',read_only=True,rmm_jobs=False,approvals=False))) + + +if __name__=='__main__': + main() diff --git a/docs/script-console-post-attestation-v2.md b/docs/script-console-post-attestation-v2.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92073f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/script-console-post-attestation-v2.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +# Enger lesender Observer für kurzlebige DELETE-Rollbackjournale + +Stand: lokale Opsvorbereitung, kein nativer V2-Aufruf und noch kein neuer +Abnahmeintent. `deploy/script_console_post_attestation_v2.py` ist eine getrennte +Quelle; die ursprüngliche Datei `script_console_post_attestation.py` bleibt +bytegleich SHA256 +`076e1c22c1849c20827317e3cbec7a3769f14f5fd9fc7691ab2e0f0cb80fa1dc`. +Alle ursprünglichen Belege des Falls +`3319e212-2188-4b00-bb82-e13173a3b6b2` bleiben unverändert. Zusätzlich wurden +Quelle und sämtliche 34 zu diesem Zeitpunkt vorhandenen Fallbelege create-only +unter `devstate/source-history/postattn-076-ff0606b7-4740-4dab-9a26-d7679e8d630d/` +archiviert; Manifest-SHA256 +`46d922abd242c56887752ad193343e717292eb4040013c8ca1c69fa4b9f60280`. + +Ein konkreter angereicherter Read-only-Fehlerbeleg identifiziert den verweigerten +Guard `no SQLite sidecars` im Pfad `vm → original_rows → database`: +`transport-88f45793-8bb2-4c31-9804-1efb740e8071.json`, SHA256 +`b7db1bfce80d6cb8ed3eea678c0f102b2f6b7d45e7e7cd97f95bb10343a906f5`. +Das belegt diese eine Sidecarverweigerung. Es belegt weder eine Runtime-/ +Historybeschädigung noch die Ursache sämtlicher früherer RuntimeErrors ohne +Guardnamen. Zwei zusätzliche ausdrücklich autorisierte lesende Diagnosen mit +unveränderter 076-VMfunktion bestanden, auch der vorhandene Server→Inventar→VM- +Pfad; sie wurden nicht zu Abnahmesamples oder einem finalen Attest hochgestuft. + +V2 verändert ausschließlich die Beobachtung der drei exakt bekannten +SQLite-DELETE-Datenbanken: Agentjournal, Agentverbrauchsledger und gemeinsames +Rootverbrauchsledger. Für genau deren drei `-journal`-Pfade beobachtet der +Observer höchstens 250 ms, ob ein reguläres, passend geschütztes Rollbackjournal +natürlich verschwindet. Während es vorhanden ist, öffnet dieser Wartepfad keine +Datenbank, führt keine SQL-Abfrage aus und verändert keine Datei. Der Observer +löscht, benennt, repariert oder recovered nichts. Ein länger vorhandenes Journal, +falscher Objekttyp oder fremder Eigentümer verweigert den Nachweis. WAL und SHM +werden weiterhin sofort verweigert, ebenso jeder unbekannte Suffixpfad. + +Im Zustandsverzeichnis dürfen ausschließlich diese drei transienten +Rollbackjournalpfade nach konkret beobachteter Abwesenheit aus dem Dateipfadzeugen +ausgelassen werden. Es gibt keine allgemeine Suffixausnahme. Alle ursprünglichen +PKI-/Zustandspfade, Metadaten, Inodes und Raw-Rowhashes bleiben unverändert +gefordert. Vor jedem DB-Open bleibt der ursprüngliche Sidecarguard aktiv; direkt +nach dem Read-only-Open wird vor jeder SQL-Anweisung nochmals geprüft. Eine +erneute Sidecarentstehung verweigert die Beobachtung, statt sie zu ignorieren. +Eine atomare Dateisystem-/Datenbankaufnahme wird nicht behauptet. + +`mode=ro`, `query_only`, tatsächlicher DELETE-Journalmodus, 250-ms-Busy-Timeout, +kooperatives einsekündiges Lesebudget und das Schließen jeder Leseperiode vor +Rowhashing/Signaturprüfung bleiben bestehen. Signed-Decision-, Server-, +Schema-/Rowhash- und abschließende Agent-/Helper-Metaguards werden nicht gelockert. +Der Sourcevergleich bestätigt unveränderte ASTs der bestehenden Funktionen +`signed`, `original_rows`, `row_hash`, `server`, `compare_samples` und +`parse_stored_time`. Es gibt weder `immutable=1`, unbegrenztes Busy-Warten, +Helper-IPC, Diensteingriff, Job, Approval, Rechte- noch Policyänderung. + +Auf Fehlern liefert der neue Formatter ausschließlich Fehlerklasse, einen im +Quelltext enthaltenen statischen RuntimeError-Guardnamen, Funktions-/Zeilenframes +und SQLite-Fehlercodes. Er exportiert weder Exceptionlocals noch SQL-stdout, +Token- oder Schlüsselwerte. Normale fehlgeschlagene Rohtransportbelege bleiben +erhalten. Ein solcher Fehler wird niemals als erfolgreicher Sample behandelt. + +Tatsächlich lokal geprüft, ausschließlich mit temporären Testdatenbanken und +den unveränderten echten V2-Helper-/Dateipfadwalk-Funktionen: Ein SQLitewriter +hielt sein Rollbackjournal kurz offen und schloss es selbst durch Commit; nach +rund 42 ms beobachtete der Observer das natürliche Verschwinden, danach war der +Read-only-Read zulässig. Ein persistierendes Journal wurde nach rund 250 ms +verweigert und blieb erhalten. WAL, SHM und ein unbekannter Journal-Suffixpfad +wurden verweigert und blieben erhalten. Der Observer führte keine Mutation aus. +Python-Syntax bestand; Produktinputs und alle archivierten Originalbelege blieben +unverändert. Das ist kein neuer nativer Drei-Sample-Nachweis. + +**Geplant, nicht ausgeführt:** Erst nach gesondertem Rootreview einen neuen +lokalen Intent mit dem V2-Quellhash erzeugen und drei neue tatsächliche +Beobachtungen samt abschließendem Vergleich durchführen. Die beiden ursprünglichen +076-Samples werden nicht umetikettiert oder mit einem V2-Sample zu einem neuen +Attest zusammengemischt. Die tatsächliche WebUI-Jobgenehmigung bleibt ein +getrennter späterer Schritt. + + +## Tatsächliche dreiteilige Cloud-Abnahme + +Root hat nach Quellreview einen neuen ausschließlich lesenden Fall +`4c425416-5a04-426a-a23a-f5801968f02d` vorbereitet und drei getrennte Beobachtungen +auf der tatsächlichen Cloud-Linux-VM und dem festgelegten Server ausgeführt. +Anschließender lokaler Vergleich: **bestanden**. Finaler geschützter Beleg +`attested.json`, SHA256 +`594fdf94261aa882df7ea771dda3f04779533dfdac768cf4a63c83448e1f27d7`. + +Erhaltung der ursprünglichen Geräte-/Boot-/PKI-/DB-Inodes/Root18-Rohbytes, +tatsächliche neue Agent-/General-/Fullimages und Konten sowie aktueller gemeinsam +angewandter kryptografisch geprüfter signierter Sync wurden nachgewiesen. +Zwei gespeicherte Kontakt-/Sequenzfortschritte, konkrete neue Inventar-ID mit +quellgebundenem Queueabschluss und RLS-Tenantverweigerung bestanden. Unveränderte +30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits, ungeklärt0; keine neuen Jobs oder Freigaben. + +Die Aussage bleibt seitenweise Erhaltung über das Beobachtungsintervall mit +abschließendem SameDecision-/Effektzahlcheck, kein atomarer Gesamtsnapshot oder +neuer Vollintegritätsscan. Kein mitgeschnittener Wire-ACK und kein neuer +HTTP-Tenantnachweis; diese Grenzen sind im Ergebnis explizitfalse. Die Full- +Skriptwirkung bleibt separat WebUI-genehmigungspflichtig und noch offen. diff --git a/docs/script-console-post-attestation.md b/docs/script-console-post-attestation.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54d27f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/script-console-post-attestation.md @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +# Lesender Nachweis nach dem ersten Skriptkonsolen-Dienststart + +Stand2026-11-14: neue reviewbare Quelle +`deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py`; durch ihren Ersteller **kein +Zielaufruf ausgeführt**. Keine Änderung der158 eingefrorenen Produktinputs. +Installationsfall `2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd` und dessen ursprünglicher +Fehlerbericht bleiben unverändert. Die separate eng geprüfte Fortsetzung startet +die bereits ausgetauschten Dienste; dieser Nachweis darf das nicht übernehmen. + +## Feste Proben und Erhaltungsgrenzen + +Der VM-Reader öffnet ausschließlich vorhandene feste Kontroll-/Metadatendateien +und die drei ursprünglichen SQLite-Dateien im URI-Modus `mode=ro` mit +`query_only` und Lesetransaktion. Er erzeugt keine Zielpfade, keine temporären +Dateien und keine SQLite-Sidecars. Vorgefundene WAL/SHM/Journaldateien verweigern +die Probe; keine Bereinigung. systemctl wird ausschließlich mit `show` benutzt. +Die zusätzliche OpenSSL-Prüfung verwendet öffentliche Signaturdaten in anonymen +memfd-Dateideskriptoren, keine privaten Schlüssel. Kein Helper-IPC und keine +neue Clock-/Inventory-/Jobanforderung. + +Geprüft werden alle drei tatsächlichen Agent-/General-/Full-Prozessimages, +UID/GID, Startticks, unveränderte Boot-ID, installierte Codehashes und erhaltene +alte Binärinodes/-bytes. Alle General-/APT-/Paketkontrollen des ursprünglichen +Preflightzeugen bleiben exakt; APT und alte Dienste bleiben disabled/inactive. +Fullkonfiguration, ursprüngliche Inspector-Pinbytes, Unit und additives +Agentdropin müssen den geprüften ursprünglichen Bytes/Modes entsprechen. + +Alle ursprünglichen Zustandsobjekte bleiben vorhanden; private Schlüssel werden +nicht geöffnet. Nicht-DB-Dateien behalten vollständige Inode-/Besitz-/Mode-/ +Größen-/Zeitmetadaten. Für Datenbanken dürfen Inhalt und Größe fortschreiten; +ihre Inodes/Besitzer/Modes bleiben. Bei Zustandsverzeichnissen dürfen Größe und +Änderungszeit wegen normaler DELETE-SQLite-Journalerzeugung fortschreiten; +Identität/Besitz/Modes bleiben. Unbekannte neue persistente Zustandsobjekte +werden verweigert. + +`sql-before.json` enthält vollständige geordnete Rowhashlisten einschließlich +rowid. Die Quelle erhält jedes alte Schema und jeden alten Historienhash. +Neue Job-/Verbrauchs-/Wirkungs-/Outcomereihen sind ausgeschlossen. Nur feste +passive Sync-Ausnahmen gelten: Metazeilen, monotoner Sequenzzähler, eine zuvor +NULL gewesene und anschließend unabhängig signiert angewandte Antwort sowie +eine erneuerte Outcome-Entscheidungsreferenz. Letztere verlangt den vollständigen +alten Rowhash, erhaltene exakt gleiche Job-/Versuch-/Outcomebytes und beide +ursprünglich signierten, Agent-/Helper-gebundenen Entscheidungen mit monotoner +Lineage. Keine pauschale Freigabe veränderter Historientabellen. Alte Queuezeilen +müssen im Vorherzeugen fehlen; eine mehrdeutige alte Queue verweigert diese +Quelle. Der ursprüngliche Zähler wird aus seinem Hash in einem höchstens4096 +Sequenzschritte umfassenden Bereich bis zum aktuellen Wert rekonstruiert. Reicht +das nicht, fehlt der Nachweis; kein Quellenfallback und keine Zielreparatur. + +Alle18 ursprünglichen Rootrequests/-grants/-signaturen/-starts/-outcomes bleiben +exakt gleich. Aktuelle Agent-/Helper-Metadaten müssen faultfrei dieselbe +angewandte Entscheidung, Generation, Journalbindung und unveränderte öffentliche +Bindingidentität belegen. Die tatsächliche Ed25519-Signatur und die originalen +Request-/Protobufantwortbytes werden unabhängig geprüft. Die neue Entscheidung +muss innerhalb ihrer ursprünglichen höchstens60s-Lease liegen und eine +ursprüngliche vor dem Bootstrap erhaltene signierte Journal-Lineage fortsetzen. +Das belegt normale NativeClock-/Peer-/Applyprüfungen der gepinnten Runtime; +der Reader erzeugt keine neue Probe und erteilt keine Jobstartberechtigung. + +## Passive Serverkontakte und konkrete Nachweisgrenzen + +Der Serverreader führt ausschließlich gespeicherte Datenabfragen in +Read-only-Transaktionen aus. Er liest keine Anmeldetokens oder privaten +Umgebungs-/PKI-Dateien. Rootpolicyhash und geschlossener Ablauf bleiben gebunden; +30Jobs/30Outbox/26Permits/keine offenen Jobs bleiben erhalten. Die30 vollständigen +Jobzeilenfingerprints müssen über alle drei Beobachtungen gleich bleiben. +Die alte Jobsammlung ist zusätzlich durch die VM-Vorherhistorie gebunden; dieser +neue Reader rekonstruiert keinen früher nicht vorhandenen Server-Rowsnapshot. + +Jede Beobachtung bindet dieselbe tatsächlich gespeicherte signierte Entscheidung +an Server, Agent und Helper sowie die normal veröffentlichte Full-Policy-/ +Binärcapability. Ein RLS-Aufruf als `rmm_app` im anderen Testtenant muss für das +feste Gerät, dessen Inventar und Jobs jeweils null Zeilen liefern. Das ist ein +echter gespeicherter Datenbank-RLS-Nachweis, **keine neue HTTP-/MCP-Authabnahme**. + +Drei ausdrücklich getrennte `observe`-Aufrufe liefern Baseline und zwei danach +streng fortgeschrittene gespeicherte Heartbeatzeitpunkte samt Sequenz. Prozesse, +Boot und Verbindungsgeneration müssen über alle drei Reads gleich bleiben; +der aktuelle Kontakt darf beim Read höchstens45s alt sein. Frische Kontakte und +Inventar werden an den dauerhaften `first_start_not_before`-Zeitpunkt der +separaten `continuation-start-intent.json` gebunden. Kein Sleep, Agentneustart +oder angeforderter Refresh zur Erzeugung dieser Daten. + +Ein konkreter neuer `linux.base`-Inventar-Message-ID-/Boot-/Payloadbeleg muss +serverseitig vorliegen und denselben lokalen dauerhaften Queueeintrag beendet +haben. Die Quelle bezeichnet dies ausdrücklich als **quellgebundenen +Queueabschluss**, `wire_inventory_ack_captured=false`: Der bestehende Agent +speichert rohe ACKframes nicht dauerhaft. Aus dieser Probe darf kein angeblich +mitgeschnittener ACKframe entstehen. Der normale ACK-/signierte Sync-ACK-Pfad +der gepinnten Runtime entfernt den Eintrag; der Reader löscht nichts. + +## Geplante Bedienung, nicht ausgeführt + +Nach Rootreview und erfolgreicher separater erster Dienststartfortsetzung: + +```text +python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py prepare-local +python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE +python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE +python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py observe --id POSTCASE +python3 deploy/script_console_post_attestation.py finish --id POSTCASE +``` + +Die Beobachtungen zeitlich über zwei normale Heartbeats verteilen. Unveränderte +Kontakte oder unvollständige Signatur-/Queue-/Readinessbelege ergeben kein PASS. +`finish` liest ausschließlich die lokalen drei erhaltenen Belege; seine Aussage +betrifft diesen erhaltenden Runtime-/Sync-/Passivnachweis. Keine RMM-Jobs, +Genehmigungen, Paketwirkung oder Reboots. Der eigentliche FullMaintenancejob +bleibt ein separat unveränderlich beantragter und WebUI-genehmigter Plan. + +## Tatsächliche lokale Prüfung und offene Zielnachweise + +Python-AST der neuen Quelle ist geprüft. Die tatsächliche lokale Vergleichs- +funktion bestand zunächst eine ausdrücklich synthetische Dreierbaseline und +zwölf unabhängige Manipulationsverweigerungen; nach Ergänzung der ausdrücklichen +Serverbelegpflicht bestand dieselbe tatsächliche Funktion eine neue synthetische +Dreierbaseline und15 unabhängige Verweigerungen. Keine VM-Daten wurden hierfür +erzeugt. Die tatsächliche Serverreaderfunktion wurde zusätzlich mit gemockten +Datei-/Subprozessgrenzen auf genau zwei Read-only-Abfragen einschließlich +`rmm_app`-RLSkontext geprüft; kein echtes PostgreSQL wurde aufgerufen. +Das ist keine native Abnahme. +Ziel-SQL, SSH, OpenSSL auf der VM, reale Signatur-/Erhaltungs-/Heartbeat-/ +Inventar-/RLSbelege sind durch diesen Subagenten nicht ausgeführt. + +## Getrennter Transport-/Leselock-Nachfolger + +Root hat mit dem ursprünglichen Runner89121b42 im Fall77d0b7c1 tatsächlich einen +VM-Erhaltungs-/SignedSyncread bestanden; die anschließende Serververbindung +scheiterte an einem für den DNSnamen fehlenden SSH-Hosteintrag. Daraus entsteht +kein vollständiger Server-/Passivnachweis. Originalquelle und alle vier +ursprünglichen Case-/Transportdateien bleiben unverändert; die Quelle liegt +zusätzlich create-only in `devstate/script-console-post-attestation-source-history/`. +Der Nachfolger verwendet dieselbe bereits verifizierte Server-IP und dieselbe +strikte Hostprüfung wie die vorhandenen Deploymentwerkzeuge. Keine neuen +Hostschlüssel oder Änderungen an known_hosts. + +Der Review der ursprünglich14s dauernden VM-Probe fand einen vermeidbaren +Leselock: Rowhash-/Referenzsuche und externe Signaturprüfung lagen im äußeren +SQLite-Lesekontext. Der erste Nachfolger materialisierte die ursprünglichen +Zeugen innerhalb einer Lesetransaktion und schloss sie vor Hash-/Signaturarbeit. +Die echte nachfolgende Root-Probe mit Runner1e172625 und lokalem Fall5a53ced7 +verweigerte beim Materialisieren unter dem1s-Limit mit `OperationalError`; das +ist kein PASS. Auch diese Originalquelle und ihre sieben ursprünglichen +Casedateien bleiben create-only archiviert beziehungsweise am Originalort. + +Der zweite Nachfolger liest deshalb **höchstens16 ursprüngliche Zeilen pro +Lesetransaktion**, nach rowid geordnet. Jede Seite schließt vor Hash-, +Referenzsuche oder Signaturprüfung. Ursprüngliche Hashprefixe werden vollständig +geprüft; neu angehängte Sync-BLOBs werden nicht vollständig eingelesen. Nur die +ursprünglichen Entscheidungs-IDs werden zusätzlich als kleine Metadatenliste +gehalten. Anfangsanzahlen/Schema und abschließend feste Job-/Wirkungsanzahlen, +Root18-Originalbytes und frische gleiche Agent-/Helperentscheidung werden +separat geprüft. Dies ist ein seitenweiser Erhaltungsbeleg über das berichtete +Beobachtungsintervall, **kein tabellenübergreifender atomarer Snapshot**. +Ein neuer vollständiger SQLite-Integritätsscan wird nicht behauptet +(`sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=false`); Schema und alle ursprünglichen +Zeilenbytes werden unabhängig erhalten und die normale signierte Runtime- +Lineage bleibt zwingend. Keine pauschale Ausnahme für historische Tabellen. + +Zusätzliche einzelne Signaturreferenzabfragen haben eigene kurze Lesekontexte. +Ein kooperatives +SQLite-Progressbudget von1s und0,25s Busytimeout begrenzen die Abfragen; das ist +keine harte Echtzeitgarantie für blockierendes Betriebssystem-I/O. Ein Timeout +bricht den Nachweis ab und schließt/rollt ausschließlich die eigene Lesetransaktion +zurück; keine Produktzeile wird geändert oder ignoriert. + +Tatsächlich lokal mit der extrahierten neuen Lesekontextfunktion geprüft: +2000 synthetische Zeilen materialisiert, anschließend sofortiger Writercommit +in0,93ms; eine absichtlich lange reine SELECT-Rekursion wurde nach1000,13ms +unterbrochen, danach Writercommit erfolgreich. AST-Prüfung belegt keine +Rowhash-/Signatur-/Subprozessarbeit innerhalb eines `database`-Kontexts. Das +ist ein lokaler SQLite-Guard, kein neuer VM- oder Produktions-Locknachweis. + +Der tatsächliche zusätzliche lokale Pagingguard materialisierte50 ursprüngliche +Zeilen mit je64KiB über vier kurze Seiten, während zwischen den geschlossenen +Seiten zusätzliche passive Testzeilen angehängt wurden. Neue Anhänge wurden +nicht mitmaterialisiert; Writercommits zwischen den Seiten dauerten höchstens +0,94ms. Die SELECT-Budgetprobe unterbrach nach1000,10ms und ließ danach einen +weiteren Writercommit zu. Auch dies ist ausschließlich ein synthetischer lokaler +SQLite-Nachweis; kein weiterer Zielaufruf durch diesen Subagenten. + + +## Lokaler Zeitparser und aktueller Prüfzwischenstand + +Der erste Nachfolger2786c218 las nativ VM und Server, scheiterte anschließend +im lokalen Python3.10-Parser an einem gültigen PostgreSQL-RFC3339-Wert mit vier +Nachkommastellen. Eine lokale Korrektur akzeptiert SQL-Zeitstempel mit0–6 +Nachkommastellen und füllt ausschließlich fehlende Nullen auf; keine Rundung, +Trunkierung oder Änderung von VM-/Serverdaten. Ursprüngliche Quelle und Case8614 +wurden create-only erhalten. Quelle076e1c22 verwendet dieselben unveränderten +VM-/Serverreader und einen neuen rein lesenden Fall3319e212. + +Zwei vollständige zeitversetzte Beobachtungen dieses Falls sind tatsächlich +bestanden (Generation131, unveränderte18Rootverbräuche). Der dritte Beleg ist +noch offen. Zusätzliche Fehlerformatierung ließ alle Prüfbedingungen und +Ergebnisdaten unverändert und exportierte ausschließlich statischen Guardcode, +Frames und SQLitecode. Damit ist für eine konkrete Verweigerung +`no SQLite sidecars` nachgewiesen; welche Prüfbedingung die älteren generischen +RuntimeError-Belege auslöste, wird nicht nachträglich erfunden. Separate lesende +Kontrollaufrufe bestätigten weiterhin Erhaltung/SignedSync und konkrete +Inventar-Queuekonvergenz. Bisher kein dreiteiliger Gesamt-PASS und kein Job.