fix: prove offline packet filtering with positive controls around bounded denials
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-13 20:33:14 +01:00
parent c3e93caab1
commit 8bf8a114d0
2 changed files with 75 additions and 23 deletions
+57 -20
View File
@@ -84,8 +84,36 @@ def vm_network(payload):
require(json.loads((state/'identity.json').read_text())['agent_id'] == payload['agent_id'], 'fixed Cloud identity') require(json.loads((state/'identity.json').read_text())['agent_id'] == payload['agent_id'], 'fixed Cloud identity')
require(hashlib.sha256(Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote').read_bytes()).hexdigest() == payload['binary_sha256'], 'reviewed current agent binary') require(hashlib.sha256(Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote').read_bytes()).hexdigest() == payload['binary_sha256'], 'reviewed current agent binary')
def properties(): def properties():
raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode() raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','NRestarts','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow','-p','IPAddressDeny'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode()
return dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.splitlines()) return dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.splitlines())
def inside_probe():
service = properties()
require(service['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(service['MainPID']) > 0, 'active agent for same-unit transport control')
group = service['ControlGroup']
require(group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service', 'actual fixed agent cgroup')
cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs'
require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required')
probe = ('import os,socket,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nstage="cgroup_move"\n'
'try:\n Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n'
' stage="drop_privilege";os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n'
' stage="connect";s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close()\n'
' result={"stage":stage,"connected":True,"timeout":False,"errno":None}\n'
'except OSError as e:result={"stage":stage,"connected":False,"timeout":isinstance(e,TimeoutError),"errno":e.errno}\n'
'result.update(uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid(),cgroup=Path("/proc/self/cgroup").read_text().strip())\n'
'print(json.dumps(result))\n')
answer = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4)
require(len(answer.stdout) <= 1024, 'bounded control probe result')
result = json.loads(answer.stdout)
require(result['stage'] == 'connect' and result['uid'] == account.pw_uid and result['gid'] == account.pw_gid
and result['cgroup'] == '0::'+group and type(result['connected']) is bool
and type(result['timeout']) is bool and (result['errno'] is None or type(result['errno']) is int), 'actual same-cgroup unprivileged TCP control')
return result
def outside_positive():
memberships = Path('/proc/self/cgroup').read_text().splitlines()
require(not any(line == '0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service'
or line.startswith('0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/') for line in memberships), 'outside control must be outside agent cgroup')
with socket.create_connection(('88.99.80.202',443),2): pass
return dict(connected=True,outside_agent_cgroup=True)
@contextlib.contextmanager @contextlib.contextmanager
def agent_read(path): def agent_read(path):
require(path in (state/'journal.sqlite',state/'consumption.sqlite') and not path.is_symlink(), 'fixed agent database') require(path in (state/'journal.sqlite',state/'consumption.sqlite') and not path.is_symlink(), 'fixed agent database')
@@ -167,19 +195,27 @@ def vm_network(payload):
subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15) subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15)
subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20) subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20)
subprocess.run(['systemctl','stop',timer+'.timer'],capture_output=True,timeout=10) subprocess.run(['systemctl','stop',timer+'.timer'],capture_output=True,timeout=10)
return dict(restored=True,after=snapshot()) restored = snapshot()
require(not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] and not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'original unrestricted transport restored')
positive = inside_probe()
require(positive['connected'] is True and not positive['timeout'] and positive['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control after restoration')
require(restored['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved through transport restoration')
return dict(restored=True,positive_after=positive,after=restored)
# State reads and cleanup of our exact transport fault remain possible # State reads and cleanup of our exact transport fault remain possible
# after an unknown result. They never clear a journal fence or job state. # after an unknown result. They never clear a journal fence or job state.
require(before['agent_fault'] is None and before['helper_fault'] is None and before['helper_unresolved'] == 0 and before['other_unresolved'] == 0, 'unrelated or unknown work remains fenced') require(before['agent_fault'] is None and before['helper_fault'] is None and before['helper_unresolved'] == 0 and before['other_unresolved'] == 0, 'unrelated or unknown work remains fenced')
if payload.get('helper_ledger_sha256'): if payload.get('helper_ledger_sha256'):
require(before['helper_ledger_sha256'] == payload['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'existing Root ledger changed') require(before['helper_ledger_sha256'] == payload['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'existing Root ledger changed')
require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'clean active unit and no allow override') require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active'
and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'] and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'], 'clean active unit and no address override')
require(before['count'] is None and not before['consumed'], 'no prior effect/consumption') require(before['count'] is None and not before['consumed'], 'no prior effect/consumption')
if phase == 'window': if phase == 'window':
start = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00')) start = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start-dt.timedelta(seconds=60) and before['attempts'] == [dict(state='accepted',grant_id='')], 'fixed future accepted attempt with zero grant') require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start-dt.timedelta(seconds=60) and before['attempts'] == [dict(state='accepted',grant_id='')], 'fixed future accepted attempt with zero grant')
else: else:
require(not payload.get('job_id'), 'preflight has no job') require(not payload.get('job_id'), 'preflight has no job')
positive_before = inside_probe()
require(positive_before['connected'] is True and not positive_before['timeout'] and positive_before['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control before deny')
# Arm bounded automatic transport rollback before creating the deny rule. # Arm bounded automatic transport rollback before creating the deny rule.
# The timer can remove only these exact bytes and never touches job state. # The timer can remove only these exact bytes and never touches job state.
rollback_dir = Path('/var/lib/rmm-offline-bootstrap') rollback_dir = Path('/var/lib/rmm-offline-bootstrap')
@@ -205,25 +241,20 @@ def vm_network(payload):
subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15) subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15)
subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20) subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20)
after = snapshot(); require(after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(after['agent_service']['MainPID']) > 0 and after['count'] is None and not after['consumed'], 'active offline agent and zero effect') after = snapshot(); require(after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(after['agent_service']['MainPID']) > 0 and after['count'] is None and not after['consumed'], 'active offline agent and zero effect')
service_pid = after['agent_service']['MainPID']; service_restarts = after['agent_service']['NRestarts']
if phase == 'window': require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start, 'agent must be active offline before earliest start') if phase == 'window': require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start, 'agent must be active offline before earliest start')
group = after['agent_service']['ControlGroup'] require(after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'exact effective fixed-address packet deny')
require((group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service' or group.startswith('/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/')) and '..' not in group, 'actual agent cgroup') outside = outside_positive()
cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs' blocked = [inside_probe(),inside_probe()]
require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required') require(all(p['connected'] is False and (p['timeout'] or p['errno'] in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM)) for p in blocked), 'two bounded inner denials plus positive outside control required')
# This separate bootstrap child moves ONLY ITS OWN PID, drops privilege and
# attempts TCP only. No agent credential, TLS override or appdata is used.
probe = ('import os,socket,errno,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\n'
'Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n'
'os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n'
'try:\n s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close();result={"connected":True}\n'
'except OSError as e: result={"connected":False,"errno":e.errno}\n'
'print(json.dumps(result))\n')
result = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4)
blocked = json.loads(result.stdout)
require(blocked.get('connected') is False and blocked.get('errno') in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM), 'actual same-cgroup BPF denial must be EACCES/EPERM; timeout is not proof')
after = snapshot() after = snapshot()
require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved during network bootstrap') require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256']
return dict(blocked=True,probe=blocked,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443) and after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active'
and after['agent_service']['MainPID'] == service_pid
and after['agent_service']['NRestarts'] == service_restarts
and after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'active stable agent, exact deny and preserved Root ledger during controls')
return dict(blocked=True,positive_before=positive_before,outside_positive=outside,inner_denials=blocked,
controlled_denial_verified=True,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443)
def main(): def main():
@@ -258,6 +289,12 @@ def main():
ledger_sha = initial['helper_ledger_sha256']; checkpoint['initial_native'] = initial;save() ledger_sha = initial['helper_ledger_sha256']; checkpoint['initial_native'] = initial;save()
checkpoint['network_preflight'] = native('block','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save() checkpoint['network_preflight'] = native('block','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save()
checkpoint['preflight_restored'] = native('restore','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save() checkpoint['preflight_restored'] = native('restore','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save()
require(checkpoint['network_preflight']['controlled_denial_verified'] is True
and checkpoint['network_preflight']['positive_before']['connected'] is True
and checkpoint['network_preflight']['outside_positive']['connected'] is True
and len(checkpoint['network_preflight']['inner_denials']) == 2
and checkpoint['preflight_restored']['positive_after']['connected'] is True,
'complete positive/denied/positive transport controls required before planning')
checkpoint['healthy_before_plan'] = healthy(checkpoint['initial_channel']['connection_generation']) checkpoint['healthy_before_plan'] = healthy(checkpoint['initial_channel']['connection_generation'])
start = cloud.contract.now()+dt.timedelta(seconds=150); end = start+dt.timedelta(seconds=130) start = cloud.contract.now()+dt.timedelta(seconds=150); end = start+dt.timedelta(seconds=130)
request = cloud.contract.case_input('hello',settings,start=start) request = cloud.contract.case_input('hello',settings,start=start)
+18 -3
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@@ -77,11 +77,26 @@ dem ersten Job die tatsächliche systemd-BPF-Funktion: Nur für
gesperrt. Ein separater Bootstrap-Prozess verschiebt ausschließlich seine gesperrt. Ein separater Bootstrap-Prozess verschiebt ausschließlich seine
eigene PID in die tatsächliche Cgroup dieses Dienstes, wechselt zur festen eigene PID in die tatsächliche Cgroup dieses Dienstes, wechselt zur festen
Agent-UID993 und primären GID der benannten Gruppe `rmm-agent` Agent-UID993 und primären GID der benannten Gruppe `rmm-agent`
und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port 443. Ausschließlich und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port443. Vor jedem neuen Plan
`EACCES` oder `EPERM` bestätigt die Sperre; ein Timeout genügt nicht. Der Probe muss dieselbe Unit mit tatsächlicher Agent-UID/GID zunächst erfolgreich
liest keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und sendet keine Anwendungsdaten. verbinden, unter exakt wirksamer Sperre zweimal begrenzt scheitern und nach
Entfernen der Regel wieder erfolgreich verbinden. Während der Sperre muss
eine Kontrolle außerhalb der Agent-Cgroup erfolgreich sein; der Agent bleibt
aktiv, mit unveränderter PID/Restartzahl und unverändertem Rootledger.
`EACCES`/`EPERM` oder zwei Timeouts zählen nur zusammen mit diesen Kontrollen.
Ein isolierter Timeout genügt nicht. Das spätere Jobfenster prüft dieselbe
Regel erneut mit Außenkontrolle und zwei inneren Proben; Wiederherstellung
verlangt erneut eine erfolgreiche innere Verbindung. Die Proben
lesen keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und senden keine Anwendungsdaten.
Die TLS-Prüfungen des echten Agenten bleiben erhalten. Die TLS-Prüfungen des echten Agenten bleiben erhalten.
Tatsächlich beobachtet wurde bei aktivem Agent ohne Neustarts unter der
Paketregel ein TCP-Timeout ohne Errno. Die frühere Forderung ausschließlich
nach`EACCES`/`EPERM` war für diesen nativen Pfad falsch; daraus wird keine
erfolgreiche Offlineabnahme abgeleitet. Systemd255 beschreibt
`IPAddressDeny` als Ein-/Ausgangs-Paketfilter und verspricht keinen bestimmten
Connect-Errno. Quelle: [systemd255 resource-control](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/255/systemd.resource-control.html).
Nach der dauerhaften Jobannahme werden vor der Sperre erneut null Grants, Nach der dauerhaften Jobannahme werden vor der Sperre erneut null Grants,
Consumption-Einträge und Wirkungen geprüft. Während des Offlinefensters muss Consumption-Einträge und Wirkungen geprüft. Während des Offlinefensters muss
der Agent aktiv bleiben, seine Reconnect-Versuche dauerhaft zählen und auch der Agent aktiv bleiben, seine Reconnect-Versuche dauerhaft zählen und auch