From 8bf8a114d0a11ce7029ffa8f9fe8a148cc555dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Janssen Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 20:33:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] fix: prove offline packet filtering with positive controls around bounded denials --- deploy/cloud_offline_acceptance.py | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- docs/cloud-offline-acceptance.md | 21 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/deploy/cloud_offline_acceptance.py b/deploy/cloud_offline_acceptance.py index fb339ca..3c20ea4 100644 --- a/deploy/cloud_offline_acceptance.py +++ b/deploy/cloud_offline_acceptance.py @@ -84,8 +84,36 @@ def vm_network(payload): require(json.loads((state/'identity.json').read_text())['agent_id'] == payload['agent_id'], 'fixed Cloud identity') require(hashlib.sha256(Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote').read_bytes()).hexdigest() == payload['binary_sha256'], 'reviewed current agent binary') def properties(): - raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode() + raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','NRestarts','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow','-p','IPAddressDeny'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode() return dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.splitlines()) + def inside_probe(): + service = properties() + require(service['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(service['MainPID']) > 0, 'active agent for same-unit transport control') + group = service['ControlGroup'] + require(group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service', 'actual fixed agent cgroup') + cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs' + require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required') + probe = ('import os,socket,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nstage="cgroup_move"\n' + 'try:\n Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n' + ' stage="drop_privilege";os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n' + ' stage="connect";s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close()\n' + ' result={"stage":stage,"connected":True,"timeout":False,"errno":None}\n' + 'except OSError as e:result={"stage":stage,"connected":False,"timeout":isinstance(e,TimeoutError),"errno":e.errno}\n' + 'result.update(uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid(),cgroup=Path("/proc/self/cgroup").read_text().strip())\n' + 'print(json.dumps(result))\n') + answer = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4) + require(len(answer.stdout) <= 1024, 'bounded control probe result') + result = json.loads(answer.stdout) + require(result['stage'] == 'connect' and result['uid'] == account.pw_uid and result['gid'] == account.pw_gid + and result['cgroup'] == '0::'+group and type(result['connected']) is bool + and type(result['timeout']) is bool and (result['errno'] is None or type(result['errno']) is int), 'actual same-cgroup unprivileged TCP control') + return result + def outside_positive(): + memberships = Path('/proc/self/cgroup').read_text().splitlines() + require(not any(line == '0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service' + or line.startswith('0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/') for line in memberships), 'outside control must be outside agent cgroup') + with socket.create_connection(('88.99.80.202',443),2): pass + return dict(connected=True,outside_agent_cgroup=True) @contextlib.contextmanager def agent_read(path): require(path in (state/'journal.sqlite',state/'consumption.sqlite') and not path.is_symlink(), 'fixed agent database') @@ -167,19 +195,27 @@ def vm_network(payload): subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15) subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20) subprocess.run(['systemctl','stop',timer+'.timer'],capture_output=True,timeout=10) - return dict(restored=True,after=snapshot()) + restored = snapshot() + require(not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] and not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'original unrestricted transport restored') + positive = inside_probe() + require(positive['connected'] is True and not positive['timeout'] and positive['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control after restoration') + require(restored['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved through transport restoration') + return dict(restored=True,positive_after=positive,after=restored) # State reads and cleanup of our exact transport fault remain possible # after an unknown result. They never clear a journal fence or job state. require(before['agent_fault'] is None and before['helper_fault'] is None and before['helper_unresolved'] == 0 and before['other_unresolved'] == 0, 'unrelated or unknown work remains fenced') if payload.get('helper_ledger_sha256'): require(before['helper_ledger_sha256'] == payload['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'existing Root ledger changed') - require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'clean active unit and no allow override') + require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' + and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'] and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'], 'clean active unit and no address override') require(before['count'] is None and not before['consumed'], 'no prior effect/consumption') if phase == 'window': start = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00')) require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start-dt.timedelta(seconds=60) and before['attempts'] == [dict(state='accepted',grant_id='')], 'fixed future accepted attempt with zero grant') else: require(not payload.get('job_id'), 'preflight has no job') + positive_before = inside_probe() + require(positive_before['connected'] is True and not positive_before['timeout'] and positive_before['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control before deny') # Arm bounded automatic transport rollback before creating the deny rule. # The timer can remove only these exact bytes and never touches job state. rollback_dir = Path('/var/lib/rmm-offline-bootstrap') @@ -205,25 +241,20 @@ def vm_network(payload): subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15) subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20) after = snapshot(); require(after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(after['agent_service']['MainPID']) > 0 and after['count'] is None and not after['consumed'], 'active offline agent and zero effect') + service_pid = after['agent_service']['MainPID']; service_restarts = after['agent_service']['NRestarts'] if phase == 'window': require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start, 'agent must be active offline before earliest start') - group = after['agent_service']['ControlGroup'] - require((group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service' or group.startswith('/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/')) and '..' not in group, 'actual agent cgroup') - cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs' - require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required') - # This separate bootstrap child moves ONLY ITS OWN PID, drops privilege and - # attempts TCP only. No agent credential, TLS override or appdata is used. - probe = ('import os,socket,errno,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\n' - 'Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n' - 'os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n' - 'try:\n s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close();result={"connected":True}\n' - 'except OSError as e: result={"connected":False,"errno":e.errno}\n' - 'print(json.dumps(result))\n') - result = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4) - blocked = json.loads(result.stdout) - require(blocked.get('connected') is False and blocked.get('errno') in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM), 'actual same-cgroup BPF denial must be EACCES/EPERM; timeout is not proof') + require(after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'exact effective fixed-address packet deny') + outside = outside_positive() + blocked = [inside_probe(),inside_probe()] + require(all(p['connected'] is False and (p['timeout'] or p['errno'] in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM)) for p in blocked), 'two bounded inner denials plus positive outside control required') after = snapshot() - require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved during network bootstrap') - return dict(blocked=True,probe=blocked,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443) + require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'] + and after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' + and after['agent_service']['MainPID'] == service_pid + and after['agent_service']['NRestarts'] == service_restarts + and after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'active stable agent, exact deny and preserved Root ledger during controls') + return dict(blocked=True,positive_before=positive_before,outside_positive=outside,inner_denials=blocked, + controlled_denial_verified=True,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443) def main(): @@ -258,6 +289,12 @@ def main(): ledger_sha = initial['helper_ledger_sha256']; checkpoint['initial_native'] = initial;save() checkpoint['network_preflight'] = native('block','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save() checkpoint['preflight_restored'] = native('restore','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save() + require(checkpoint['network_preflight']['controlled_denial_verified'] is True + and checkpoint['network_preflight']['positive_before']['connected'] is True + and checkpoint['network_preflight']['outside_positive']['connected'] is True + and len(checkpoint['network_preflight']['inner_denials']) == 2 + and checkpoint['preflight_restored']['positive_after']['connected'] is True, + 'complete positive/denied/positive transport controls required before planning') checkpoint['healthy_before_plan'] = healthy(checkpoint['initial_channel']['connection_generation']) start = cloud.contract.now()+dt.timedelta(seconds=150); end = start+dt.timedelta(seconds=130) request = cloud.contract.case_input('hello',settings,start=start) diff --git a/docs/cloud-offline-acceptance.md b/docs/cloud-offline-acceptance.md index 6c4fbb8..4f27a95 100644 --- a/docs/cloud-offline-acceptance.md +++ b/docs/cloud-offline-acceptance.md @@ -77,11 +77,26 @@ dem ersten Job die tatsächliche systemd-BPF-Funktion: Nur für gesperrt. Ein separater Bootstrap-Prozess verschiebt ausschließlich seine eigene PID in die tatsächliche Cgroup dieses Dienstes, wechselt zur festen Agent-UID993 und primären GID der benannten Gruppe `rmm-agent` -und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port 443. Ausschließlich -`EACCES` oder `EPERM` bestätigt die Sperre; ein Timeout genügt nicht. Der Probe -liest keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und sendet keine Anwendungsdaten. +und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port443. Vor jedem neuen Plan +muss dieselbe Unit mit tatsächlicher Agent-UID/GID zunächst erfolgreich +verbinden, unter exakt wirksamer Sperre zweimal begrenzt scheitern und nach +Entfernen der Regel wieder erfolgreich verbinden. Während der Sperre muss +eine Kontrolle außerhalb der Agent-Cgroup erfolgreich sein; der Agent bleibt +aktiv, mit unveränderter PID/Restartzahl und unverändertem Rootledger. +`EACCES`/`EPERM` oder zwei Timeouts zählen nur zusammen mit diesen Kontrollen. +Ein isolierter Timeout genügt nicht. Das spätere Jobfenster prüft dieselbe +Regel erneut mit Außenkontrolle und zwei inneren Proben; Wiederherstellung +verlangt erneut eine erfolgreiche innere Verbindung. Die Proben +lesen keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und senden keine Anwendungsdaten. Die TLS-Prüfungen des echten Agenten bleiben erhalten. +Tatsächlich beobachtet wurde bei aktivem Agent ohne Neustarts unter der +Paketregel ein TCP-Timeout ohne Errno. Die frühere Forderung ausschließlich +nach`EACCES`/`EPERM` war für diesen nativen Pfad falsch; daraus wird keine +erfolgreiche Offlineabnahme abgeleitet. Systemd255 beschreibt +`IPAddressDeny` als Ein-/Ausgangs-Paketfilter und verspricht keinen bestimmten +Connect-Errno. Quelle: [systemd255 resource-control](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/255/systemd.resource-control.html). + Nach der dauerhaften Jobannahme werden vor der Sperre erneut null Grants, Consumption-Einträge und Wirkungen geprüft. Während des Offlinefensters muss der Agent aktiv bleiben, seine Reconnect-Versuche dauerhaft zählen und auch