fix: prove offline packet filtering with positive controls around bounded denials
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
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@@ -84,8 +84,36 @@ def vm_network(payload):
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require(json.loads((state/'identity.json').read_text())['agent_id'] == payload['agent_id'], 'fixed Cloud identity')
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require(hashlib.sha256(Path('/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent-remote').read_bytes()).hexdigest() == payload['binary_sha256'], 'reviewed current agent binary')
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def properties():
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raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode()
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raw = subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',unit,'-p','ActiveState','-p','MainPID','-p','NRestarts','-p','ControlGroup','-p','IPAddressAllow','-p','IPAddressDeny'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode()
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return dict(line.split('=',1) for line in raw.splitlines())
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def inside_probe():
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service = properties()
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require(service['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(service['MainPID']) > 0, 'active agent for same-unit transport control')
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group = service['ControlGroup']
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require(group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service', 'actual fixed agent cgroup')
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cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs'
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require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required')
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probe = ('import os,socket,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nstage="cgroup_move"\n'
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'try:\n Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n'
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' stage="drop_privilege";os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n'
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' stage="connect";s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close()\n'
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' result={"stage":stage,"connected":True,"timeout":False,"errno":None}\n'
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'except OSError as e:result={"stage":stage,"connected":False,"timeout":isinstance(e,TimeoutError),"errno":e.errno}\n'
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'result.update(uid=os.getuid(),gid=os.getgid(),cgroup=Path("/proc/self/cgroup").read_text().strip())\n'
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'print(json.dumps(result))\n')
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answer = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4)
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require(len(answer.stdout) <= 1024, 'bounded control probe result')
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result = json.loads(answer.stdout)
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require(result['stage'] == 'connect' and result['uid'] == account.pw_uid and result['gid'] == account.pw_gid
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and result['cgroup'] == '0::'+group and type(result['connected']) is bool
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and type(result['timeout']) is bool and (result['errno'] is None or type(result['errno']) is int), 'actual same-cgroup unprivileged TCP control')
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return result
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def outside_positive():
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memberships = Path('/proc/self/cgroup').read_text().splitlines()
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require(not any(line == '0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service'
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or line.startswith('0::/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/') for line in memberships), 'outside control must be outside agent cgroup')
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with socket.create_connection(('88.99.80.202',443),2): pass
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return dict(connected=True,outside_agent_cgroup=True)
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@contextlib.contextmanager
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def agent_read(path):
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require(path in (state/'journal.sqlite',state/'consumption.sqlite') and not path.is_symlink(), 'fixed agent database')
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@@ -167,19 +195,27 @@ def vm_network(payload):
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subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15)
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subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20)
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subprocess.run(['systemctl','stop',timer+'.timer'],capture_output=True,timeout=10)
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return dict(restored=True,after=snapshot())
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restored = snapshot()
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require(not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] and not restored['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'original unrestricted transport restored')
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positive = inside_probe()
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require(positive['connected'] is True and not positive['timeout'] and positive['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control after restoration')
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require(restored['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved through transport restoration')
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return dict(restored=True,positive_after=positive,after=restored)
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# State reads and cleanup of our exact transport fault remain possible
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# after an unknown result. They never clear a journal fence or job state.
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require(before['agent_fault'] is None and before['helper_fault'] is None and before['helper_unresolved'] == 0 and before['other_unresolved'] == 0, 'unrelated or unknown work remains fenced')
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if payload.get('helper_ledger_sha256'):
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require(before['helper_ledger_sha256'] == payload['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'existing Root ledger changed')
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require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'clean active unit and no allow override')
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require(not dropin.exists() and before['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active'
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and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'] and not before['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'], 'clean active unit and no address override')
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require(before['count'] is None and not before['consumed'], 'no prior effect/consumption')
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if phase == 'window':
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start = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['not_before'].replace('Z','+00:00'))
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require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start-dt.timedelta(seconds=60) and before['attempts'] == [dict(state='accepted',grant_id='')], 'fixed future accepted attempt with zero grant')
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else:
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require(not payload.get('job_id'), 'preflight has no job')
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positive_before = inside_probe()
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require(positive_before['connected'] is True and not positive_before['timeout'] and positive_before['errno'] is None, 'positive same-cgroup TCP control before deny')
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# Arm bounded automatic transport rollback before creating the deny rule.
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# The timer can remove only these exact bytes and never touches job state.
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rollback_dir = Path('/var/lib/rmm-offline-bootstrap')
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@@ -205,25 +241,20 @@ def vm_network(payload):
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subprocess.run(['systemctl','daemon-reload'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=15)
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subprocess.run(['systemctl','restart',unit],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=20)
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after = snapshot(); require(after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active' and int(after['agent_service']['MainPID']) > 0 and after['count'] is None and not after['consumed'], 'active offline agent and zero effect')
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service_pid = after['agent_service']['MainPID']; service_restarts = after['agent_service']['NRestarts']
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if phase == 'window': require(dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < start, 'agent must be active offline before earliest start')
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group = after['agent_service']['ControlGroup']
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require((group == '/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service' or group.startswith('/system.slice/rmm-agent-remote.service/')) and '..' not in group, 'actual agent cgroup')
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cgroup = Path('/sys/fs/cgroup'+group)/'cgroup.procs'
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require(cgroup.is_file(), 'unified cgroup transport enforcement required')
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# This separate bootstrap child moves ONLY ITS OWN PID, drops privilege and
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# attempts TCP only. No agent credential, TLS override or appdata is used.
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probe = ('import os,socket,errno,json\nfrom pathlib import Path\n'
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'Path('+repr(str(cgroup))+').write_text(str(os.getpid()))\n'
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'os.setgroups([]);os.setgid('+str(account.pw_gid)+');os.setuid('+str(account.pw_uid)+')\n'
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'try:\n s=socket.create_connection(("88.99.80.202",443),2);s.close();result={"connected":True}\n'
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'except OSError as e: result={"connected":False,"errno":e.errno}\n'
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'print(json.dumps(result))\n')
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result = subprocess.run(['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',probe],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=4)
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blocked = json.loads(result.stdout)
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require(blocked.get('connected') is False and blocked.get('errno') in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM), 'actual same-cgroup BPF denial must be EACCES/EPERM; timeout is not proof')
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require(after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'exact effective fixed-address packet deny')
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outside = outside_positive()
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blocked = [inside_probe(),inside_probe()]
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require(all(p['connected'] is False and (p['timeout'] or p['errno'] in (errno.EACCES,errno.EPERM)) for p in blocked), 'two bounded inner denials plus positive outside control required')
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after = snapshot()
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require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256'], 'Root ledger preserved during network bootstrap')
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return dict(blocked=True,probe=blocked,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443)
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require(after['helper_ledger_sha256'] == before['helper_ledger_sha256']
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and after['agent_service']['ActiveState'] == 'active'
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and after['agent_service']['MainPID'] == service_pid
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and after['agent_service']['NRestarts'] == service_restarts
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and after['agent_service']['IPAddressDeny'] == '88.99.80.202/32' and not after['agent_service']['IPAddressAllow'], 'active stable agent, exact deny and preserved Root ledger during controls')
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return dict(blocked=True,positive_before=positive_before,outside_positive=outside,inner_denials=blocked,
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controlled_denial_verified=True,after=after,rollback_after_seconds=420,unit=unit,server_ip='88.99.80.202',port=443)
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def main():
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@@ -258,6 +289,12 @@ def main():
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ledger_sha = initial['helper_ledger_sha256']; checkpoint['initial_native'] = initial;save()
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checkpoint['network_preflight'] = native('block','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save()
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checkpoint['preflight_restored'] = native('restore','preflight',helper_ledger_sha256=ledger_sha);save()
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require(checkpoint['network_preflight']['controlled_denial_verified'] is True
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and checkpoint['network_preflight']['positive_before']['connected'] is True
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and checkpoint['network_preflight']['outside_positive']['connected'] is True
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and len(checkpoint['network_preflight']['inner_denials']) == 2
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and checkpoint['preflight_restored']['positive_after']['connected'] is True,
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'complete positive/denied/positive transport controls required before planning')
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checkpoint['healthy_before_plan'] = healthy(checkpoint['initial_channel']['connection_generation'])
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start = cloud.contract.now()+dt.timedelta(seconds=150); end = start+dt.timedelta(seconds=130)
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request = cloud.contract.case_input('hello',settings,start=start)
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@@ -77,11 +77,26 @@ dem ersten Job die tatsächliche systemd-BPF-Funktion: Nur für
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gesperrt. Ein separater Bootstrap-Prozess verschiebt ausschließlich seine
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eigene PID in die tatsächliche Cgroup dieses Dienstes, wechselt zur festen
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Agent-UID993 und primären GID der benannten Gruppe `rmm-agent`
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und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port 443. Ausschließlich
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`EACCES` oder `EPERM` bestätigt die Sperre; ein Timeout genügt nicht. Der Probe
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liest keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und sendet keine Anwendungsdaten.
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und versucht nur einen TCP-Verbindungsaufbau zu Port443. Vor jedem neuen Plan
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muss dieselbe Unit mit tatsächlicher Agent-UID/GID zunächst erfolgreich
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verbinden, unter exakt wirksamer Sperre zweimal begrenzt scheitern und nach
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Entfernen der Regel wieder erfolgreich verbinden. Während der Sperre muss
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eine Kontrolle außerhalb der Agent-Cgroup erfolgreich sein; der Agent bleibt
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aktiv, mit unveränderter PID/Restartzahl und unverändertem Rootledger.
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`EACCES`/`EPERM` oder zwei Timeouts zählen nur zusammen mit diesen Kontrollen.
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Ein isolierter Timeout genügt nicht. Das spätere Jobfenster prüft dieselbe
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Regel erneut mit Außenkontrolle und zwei inneren Proben; Wiederherstellung
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verlangt erneut eine erfolgreiche innere Verbindung. Die Proben
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lesen keine Agentenidentität oder Zugangsdaten und senden keine Anwendungsdaten.
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Die TLS-Prüfungen des echten Agenten bleiben erhalten.
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Tatsächlich beobachtet wurde bei aktivem Agent ohne Neustarts unter der
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Paketregel ein TCP-Timeout ohne Errno. Die frühere Forderung ausschließlich
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nach`EACCES`/`EPERM` war für diesen nativen Pfad falsch; daraus wird keine
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erfolgreiche Offlineabnahme abgeleitet. Systemd255 beschreibt
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`IPAddressDeny` als Ein-/Ausgangs-Paketfilter und verspricht keinen bestimmten
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Connect-Errno. Quelle: [systemd255 resource-control](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/255/systemd.resource-control.html).
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Nach der dauerhaften Jobannahme werden vor der Sperre erneut null Grants,
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Consumption-Einträge und Wirkungen geprüft. Während des Offlinefensters muss
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der Agent aktiv bleiben, seine Reconnect-Versuche dauerhaft zählen und auch
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