Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Keep release verifier and native drivers unchanged. Independently reviewed as an isolated contract after provisioned-file-key correction; eight local release contracts and format/clippy checks pass. Runtime persistence, approvals, service ownership, apply and rollback remain unimplemented.
714 lines
24 KiB
Rust
714 lines
24 KiB
Rust
//! Draft, effect-free helper/updater handoff contract. No approval, grant,
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//! service operation, lock acquisition, persistence or general start lease.
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//!
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//! A platform adapter must authenticate the original request, atomically store
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//! consumption + its exact existing start witness + the handoff in the SAME
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//! helper ledger, and durably append each event before performing its action.
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//! This module validates retained bytes and sequencing; it cannot attest OS
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//! observations or make an uncommitted in-memory event durable.
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use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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mod linux_full;
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pub use linux_full::{LinuxFullTransition, LinuxFullTransitionProof, render_linux_full};
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pub const MAX_RECORD_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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pub const MAX_EVENT_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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pub const MAX_EVENTS: usize = 16;
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pub const HEALTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rmm.agent-update-health.v1\0";
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/// All fields below are untrusted wire data, never authorization capabilities.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct AttemptBinding {
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pub tenant_id: Uuid,
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pub asset_id: Uuid,
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pub agent_id: Uuid,
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pub enrollment_generation: u64,
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pub assignment_version: u64,
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pub plan_id: Uuid,
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pub plan_sha256: String,
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pub job_id: Uuid,
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pub attempt_id: Uuid,
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pub job_payload_sha256: String,
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pub grant_id: Uuid,
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pub authorization_id: Uuid,
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pub original_request_sha256: String,
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pub original_start_witness_sha256: String,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct CodePair {
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pub manifest_sha256: String,
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pub agent_sha256: String,
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pub helper_sha256: String,
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pub pin_sha256: String,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum Service {
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LinuxAgent,
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LinuxGeneralHelper,
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LinuxAptHelper,
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LinuxFullHelper,
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WindowsAgent,
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WindowsHelper,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum PinTransition {
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UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1,
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LinuxGeneralFullV1,
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WindowsCodePairV1,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum FileRole {
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AgentBinary,
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HelperBinary,
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LinuxFullConfig,
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LinuxFullPin,
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WindowsSettings,
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WindowsPin,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct FileTransition {
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pub role: FileRole,
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pub old_sha256: String,
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pub new_sha256: String,
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}
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/// Hashes bind the retained, authenticated baseline; they are not substitutes
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/// for reading original rows/signatures/inodes through pinned OS handles.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Handoff {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub attempt: AttemptBinding,
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pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_checkpoint: u64,
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pub previous_decision_id: Uuid,
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
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pub connection_generation: u64,
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pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
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pub updater_sha256: String,
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pub updater_policy_sha256: String,
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pub predecessor_record_sha256: String,
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pub retained_state_sha256: String,
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pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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pub staged_files_sha256: String,
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pub predecessor: CodePair,
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pub target: CodePair,
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pub pin_transition: PinTransition,
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pub pin_transition_sha256: String,
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pub files: Vec<FileTransition>,
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/// Exact provisioned order. All installed helper profiles must be present.
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pub stop_set: Vec<Service>,
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pub consumed_at: u64,
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pub finish_before: u64,
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}
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impl Handoff {
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pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(self.schema_version == 1, "HANDOFF_SCHEMA");
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for id in [
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self.attempt.tenant_id,
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self.attempt.asset_id,
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self.attempt.agent_id,
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self.attempt.plan_id,
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self.attempt.job_id,
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self.attempt.attempt_id,
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self.attempt.grant_id,
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self.attempt.authorization_id,
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self.agent_journal_id,
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self.helper_journal_id,
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self.previous_decision_id,
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self.boot_id,
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self.owner_nonce,
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] {
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ensure!(!id.is_nil(), "HANDOFF_NIL_ID");
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}
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ensure!(
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self.attempt.enrollment_generation > 0
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&& self.attempt.assignment_version > 0
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&& self.connection_generation > 0,
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"HANDOFF_GENERATION"
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);
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for hash in [
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&self.attempt.plan_sha256,
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&self.attempt.job_payload_sha256,
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&self.attempt.original_request_sha256,
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&self.attempt.original_start_witness_sha256,
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&self.updater_sha256,
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&self.updater_policy_sha256,
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&self.predecessor_record_sha256,
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&self.retained_state_sha256,
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&self.ledger_identity_sha256,
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&self.staged_files_sha256,
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&self.pin_transition_sha256,
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] {
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digest(hash)?;
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}
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for pair in [&self.predecessor, &self.target] {
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for hash in [
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&pair.manifest_sha256,
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&pair.agent_sha256,
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&pair.helper_sha256,
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&pair.pin_sha256,
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] {
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digest(hash)?;
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}
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}
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ensure!(
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self.predecessor.manifest_sha256 != self.target.manifest_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_SAME_RELEASE"
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);
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ensure!(
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self.consumed_at > 0
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&& self.finish_before > self.consumed_at
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&& self.finish_before - self.consumed_at <= 600,
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"HANDOFF_DEADLINE"
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);
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let roles: Vec<_> = self.files.iter().map(|file| file.role).collect();
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let expected_roles = match self.pin_transition {
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PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
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vec![FileRole::AgentBinary, FileRole::HelperBinary]
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}
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PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => vec![
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FileRole::AgentBinary,
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FileRole::HelperBinary,
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FileRole::LinuxFullConfig,
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FileRole::LinuxFullPin,
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],
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PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => vec![
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FileRole::AgentBinary,
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FileRole::HelperBinary,
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FileRole::WindowsSettings,
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FileRole::WindowsPin,
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],
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};
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ensure!(roles == expected_roles, "HANDOFF_FILE_SET");
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for file in &self.files {
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digest(&file.old_sha256)?;
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digest(&file.new_sha256)?;
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}
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ensure!(
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self.files[0].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.agent_sha256
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&& self.files[0].new_sha256 == self.target.agent_sha256
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&& self.files[1].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.helper_sha256
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&& self.files[1].new_sha256 == self.target.helper_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_FILE_IMAGE_BINDING"
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);
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if self.files.len() == 4 {
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ensure!(
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self.files[3].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.pin_sha256
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&& self.files[3].new_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_FILE_PIN_BINDING"
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);
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}
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match self.pin_transition {
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PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
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ensure!(
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self.stop_set == [Service::LinuxAgent, Service::LinuxGeneralHelper]
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|| self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxAptHelper
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],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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);
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ensure!(
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self.predecessor.pin_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_LINUX_PIN_CHANGED"
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);
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}
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PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => ensure!(
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self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxFullHelper
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]
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|| self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxFullHelper,
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Service::LinuxAptHelper
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],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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),
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PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => ensure!(
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self.stop_set == [Service::WindowsAgent, Service::WindowsHelper],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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),
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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self.validate()?;
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let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(self)?;
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_RECORD_BYTES, "HANDOFF_TOO_LARGE");
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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}
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/// Concrete process birth, not an unqualified PID or a service's Running flag.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Process {
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pub pid: u32,
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pub birth: u64,
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pub image_sha256: String,
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}
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impl Process {
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fn validate(&self, expected_image: &str) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(
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self.pid > 0 && self.birth > 0 && self.image_sha256 == expected_image,
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"HANDOFF_PROCESS_BINDING"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct StartedService {
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pub service: Service,
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pub process: Process,
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}
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/// The server signs evidence only. `ready` MUST be false while the original
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/// handoff remains inflight; this receipt is never an ExecutionPermit.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct HealthReceipt {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub handoff_sha256: String,
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pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub connection_generation: u64,
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pub service_processes: Vec<StartedService>,
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pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_decision_id: Uuid,
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pub signed_sync_request_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_response_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_applied_at: u64,
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pub ready: bool,
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pub inventory_message_id: Uuid,
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pub inventory_received_at: u64,
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pub inventory_ack_sha256: String,
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pub issued_at: u64,
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pub valid_until: u64,
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}
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/// Already decoded, bounded input; a network adapter must also bound encoding.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct SignedHealth {
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pub payload: Vec<u8>,
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pub signature: Vec<u8>,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(tag = "phase", rename_all = "snake_case", deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub enum Evidence {
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StopIntent,
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AllStopped {
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observation_sha256: String,
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},
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UpdaterOwnsLedger {
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process: Process,
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ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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},
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ReplaceIntent {
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role: FileRole,
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},
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Replaced {
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role: FileRole,
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observed_sha256: String,
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},
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PairVerified {
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pair: CodePair,
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retained_state_sha256: String,
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},
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/// This append must be flushed under the updater guard; the guard is then
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/// dropped BEFORE starting the new helper, which reacquires the SAME lock.
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LedgerReturnIntent,
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ServicesStarted {
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services: Vec<StartedService>,
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ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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observation_sha256: String,
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},
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HealthVerified {
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receipt: SignedHealth,
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},
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/// Only the new helper's existing outcome-CAS may persist this outcome.
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/// It must still reject any pre-existing definitive Unknown/outcome.
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OutcomePersisted {
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outcome_sha256: String,
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},
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Unknown {
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reason: UnknownReason,
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},
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum UnknownReason {
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OwnerLost,
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BootChanged,
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DeadlineExpired,
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StopUncertain,
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ReplaceUncertain,
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StartUncertain,
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StateChanged,
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HealthUnproven,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Event {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub handoff_sha256: String,
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pub sequence: u32,
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pub previous_sha256: String,
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pub observed_at: u64,
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
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pub evidence: Evidence,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum Phase {
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HandoffConsumed,
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StopIntent,
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AllStopped,
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UpdaterOwnsLedger,
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ReplaceIntent,
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Replaced,
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PairVerified,
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LedgerReturnIntent,
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ServicesStarted,
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HealthVerified,
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OutcomePersisted,
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Unknown,
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}
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/// Retained journal view. No method returns a start grant, ready flag, retry,
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/// rollback or instruction to perform a service/file operation after a crash.
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pub struct Journal {
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handoff: Handoff,
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handoff_hash: String,
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head_hash: String,
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count: u32,
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phase: Phase,
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replaced: usize,
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observed_at: u64,
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started: Option<(Vec<StartedService>, u64)>,
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health_key: VerifyingKey,
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}
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impl Journal {
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/// The caller independently verifies this record against the ORIGINAL
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/// consumed row/start witness, participant policy and retained state.
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pub fn open(record: &[u8], health_public_key: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self> {
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let handoff: Handoff = canonical(record, MAX_RECORD_BYTES)?;
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handoff.validate()?;
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let health_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&health_public_key)?;
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ensure!(!health_key.is_weak(), "HANDOFF_WEAK_HEALTH_KEY");
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let handoff_hash = sha256(record);
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Ok(Self {
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observed_at: handoff.consumed_at,
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handoff,
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head_hash: handoff_hash.clone(),
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handoff_hash,
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count: 0,
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phase: Phase::HandoffConsumed,
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replaced: 0,
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started: None,
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health_key,
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})
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}
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pub fn phase(&self) -> Phase {
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self.phase
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}
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pub fn head_sha256(&self) -> &str {
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&self.head_hash
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}
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pub fn handoff_sha256(&self) -> &str {
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&self.handoff_hash
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}
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/// Prepare exact bytes for a bounded append-only CAS transaction against
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/// `head_sha256`. Returning bytes is NOT proof that this transaction ran.
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pub fn prepare(&self, observed_at: u64, evidence: Evidence) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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let event = Event {
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schema_version: 1,
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handoff_sha256: self.handoff_hash.clone(),
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sequence: self.count + 1,
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previous_sha256: self.head_hash.clone(),
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observed_at,
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boot_id: self.handoff.boot_id,
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evidence,
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};
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self.validate_event(&event)?;
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let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&event)?;
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_EVENT_BYTES, "HANDOFF_EVENT_TOO_LARGE");
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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/// Strict historical replay. The platform must check durable head/rowcount,
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/// inode/FileID and original ledger lineage to detect omitted suffixes.
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pub fn replay(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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let event: Event = canonical(bytes, MAX_EVENT_BYTES)?;
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let next = self.validate_event(&event)?;
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if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Replaced { .. }) {
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self.replaced += 1;
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}
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if let Evidence::ServicesStarted { services, .. } = event.evidence {
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self.started = Some((services, event.observed_at));
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}
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self.phase = next;
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self.observed_at = event.observed_at;
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self.count = event.sequence;
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self.head_hash = sha256(bytes);
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Ok(())
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}
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fn validate_event(&self, event: &Event) -> Result<Phase> {
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ensure!(
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event.schema_version == 1
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&& event.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
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&& event.sequence == self.count + 1
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&& (event.sequence as usize) <= MAX_EVENTS
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&& event.previous_sha256 == self.head_hash,
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"HANDOFF_EVENT_CHAIN"
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);
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ensure!(
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!matches!(self.phase, Phase::Unknown | Phase::OutcomePersisted),
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"HANDOFF_TERMINAL"
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);
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ensure!(
|
|
event.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id && event.observed_at >= self.observed_at,
|
|
"HANDOFF_BOOT_OR_CLOCK"
|
|
);
|
|
if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Unknown { .. }) {
|
|
return Ok(Phase::Unknown);
|
|
}
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
event.observed_at < self.handoff.finish_before,
|
|
"HANDOFF_EXPIRED"
|
|
);
|
|
let next = match (&self.phase, &event.evidence) {
|
|
(Phase::HandoffConsumed, Evidence::StopIntent) => Phase::StopIntent,
|
|
(Phase::StopIntent, Evidence::AllStopped { observation_sha256 }) => {
|
|
digest(observation_sha256)?;
|
|
Phase::AllStopped
|
|
}
|
|
(
|
|
Phase::AllStopped,
|
|
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
|
process,
|
|
ledger_identity_sha256,
|
|
},
|
|
) => {
|
|
process.validate(&self.handoff.updater_sha256)?;
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
|
|
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
|
|
);
|
|
Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger
|
|
}
|
|
(Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger | Phase::Replaced, Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role }) => {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
self.handoff
|
|
.files
|
|
.get(self.replaced)
|
|
.is_some_and(|file| file.role == *role),
|
|
"HANDOFF_REPLACE_ORDER"
|
|
);
|
|
Phase::ReplaceIntent
|
|
}
|
|
(
|
|
Phase::ReplaceIntent,
|
|
Evidence::Replaced {
|
|
role,
|
|
observed_sha256,
|
|
},
|
|
) => {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
self.handoff.files.get(self.replaced).is_some_and(
|
|
|file| file.role == *role && file.new_sha256 == *observed_sha256
|
|
),
|
|
"HANDOFF_REPLACEMENT_BINDING"
|
|
);
|
|
Phase::Replaced
|
|
}
|
|
(
|
|
Phase::Replaced,
|
|
Evidence::PairVerified {
|
|
pair,
|
|
retained_state_sha256,
|
|
},
|
|
) => {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
self.replaced == self.handoff.files.len(),
|
|
"HANDOFF_PAIR_INCOMPLETE"
|
|
);
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
pair == &self.handoff.target
|
|
&& retained_state_sha256 == &self.handoff.retained_state_sha256,
|
|
"HANDOFF_PAIR_OR_STATE_CHANGED"
|
|
);
|
|
Phase::PairVerified
|
|
}
|
|
(Phase::PairVerified, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent) => Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
|
|
(
|
|
Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
|
|
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
|
|
services,
|
|
ledger_identity_sha256,
|
|
observation_sha256,
|
|
},
|
|
) => {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
|
|
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
|
|
);
|
|
let expected: Vec<_> = self
|
|
.handoff
|
|
.stop_set
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.copied()
|
|
.filter(|service| *service != Service::LinuxAptHelper)
|
|
.collect();
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
services.len() == expected.len(),
|
|
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
|
|
);
|
|
for (index, service) in services.iter().enumerate() {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
service.service == expected[index],
|
|
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
|
|
);
|
|
let image =
|
|
if matches!(service.service, Service::LinuxAgent | Service::WindowsAgent) {
|
|
&self.handoff.target.agent_sha256
|
|
} else {
|
|
&self.handoff.target.helper_sha256
|
|
};
|
|
service.process.validate(image)?;
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
!services[..index]
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.any(|prior| prior.process.pid == service.process.pid),
|
|
"HANDOFF_PROCESS_REUSE"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
digest(observation_sha256)?;
|
|
Phase::ServicesStarted
|
|
}
|
|
(Phase::ServicesStarted, Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt }) => {
|
|
self.verify_health(receipt, event.observed_at)?;
|
|
Phase::HealthVerified
|
|
}
|
|
(Phase::HealthVerified, Evidence::OutcomePersisted { outcome_sha256 }) => {
|
|
digest(outcome_sha256)?;
|
|
Phase::OutcomePersisted
|
|
}
|
|
_ => anyhow::bail!("HANDOFF_PHASE_ORDER"),
|
|
};
|
|
Ok(next)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn verify_health(&self, signed: &SignedHealth, at: u64) -> Result<()> {
|
|
let receipt: HealthReceipt = canonical(&signed.payload, 4096)?;
|
|
let signature =
|
|
Signature::from_slice(&signed.signature).context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE_LENGTH")?;
|
|
let mut message = HEALTH_DOMAIN.to_vec();
|
|
message.extend_from_slice(&signed.payload);
|
|
self.health_key
|
|
.verify_strict(&message, &signature)
|
|
.context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE")?;
|
|
let (services, started_at) = self.started.as_ref().context("HANDOFF_START_MISSING")?;
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
receipt.schema_version == 1
|
|
&& receipt.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
|
|
&& receipt.owner_nonce == self.handoff.owner_nonce
|
|
&& receipt.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id
|
|
&& receipt.helper_journal_id == self.handoff.helper_journal_id
|
|
&& receipt.agent_journal_id == self.handoff.agent_journal_id
|
|
&& receipt.connection_generation > self.handoff.connection_generation
|
|
&& receipt.service_processes == *services
|
|
&& receipt.ledger_identity_sha256 == self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256
|
|
&& !receipt.ready,
|
|
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_BINDING"
|
|
);
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
!receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.is_nil() && !receipt.inventory_message_id.is_nil(),
|
|
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_ID"
|
|
);
|
|
for hash in [
|
|
&receipt.signed_sync_request_sha256,
|
|
&receipt.signed_sync_response_sha256,
|
|
&receipt.inventory_ack_sha256,
|
|
] {
|
|
digest(hash)?;
|
|
}
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
receipt.signed_sync_applied_at >= *started_at
|
|
&& receipt.inventory_received_at >= *started_at
|
|
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.signed_sync_applied_at
|
|
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.inventory_received_at
|
|
&& receipt.issued_at <= at
|
|
&& at < receipt.valid_until
|
|
&& receipt.valid_until <= self.handoff.finish_before
|
|
&& at.checked_sub(*started_at).is_some_and(|age| age < 180),
|
|
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_NOT_FRESH"
|
|
);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn sha256(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
|
|
hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn digest(hash: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
hash.len() == 64
|
|
&& hash
|
|
.bytes()
|
|
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)),
|
|
"HANDOFF_DIGEST"
|
|
);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn canonical<T: DeserializeOwned + Serialize>(bytes: &[u8], limit: usize) -> Result<T> {
|
|
ensure!(
|
|
!bytes.is_empty() && bytes.len() <= limit,
|
|
"HANDOFF_BYTE_LIMIT"
|
|
);
|
|
let value = serde_json::from_slice::<T>(bytes)?;
|
|
ensure!(serde_json::to_vec(&value)? == bytes, "HANDOFF_NONCANONICAL");
|
|
Ok(value)
|
|
}
|