Add typed updater handoff and preserving Linux Full renderer
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s

Keep release verifier and native drivers unchanged. Independently reviewed as an isolated contract after provisioned-file-key correction; eight local release contracts and format/clippy checks pass. Runtime persistence, approvals, service ownership, apply and rollback remain unimplemented.
This commit is contained in:
2026-11-14 19:27:52 +01:00
parent 3543e07779
commit a2efb7990b
8 changed files with 1888 additions and 1 deletions
Generated
+13
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@@ -2377,6 +2377,19 @@ dependencies = [
"uuid",
]
[[package]]
name = "rmm-updater-handoff"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"ed25519-dalek",
"hex",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2 0.10.9",
"uuid",
]
[[package]]
name = "rsa"
version = "0.9.10"
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
[workspace]
resolver = "2"
exclude = ["crates/oidc-auth"]
members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-core", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper", "crates/updater"]
members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-core", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper", "crates/updater", "crates/updater-handoff"]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.1.0"
+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
[package]
name = "rmm-updater-handoff"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
anyhow.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek = "=2.2.0"
hex.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
sha2.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
+713
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@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
//! Draft, effect-free helper/updater handoff contract. No approval, grant,
//! service operation, lock acquisition, persistence or general start lease.
//!
//! A platform adapter must authenticate the original request, atomically store
//! consumption + its exact existing start witness + the handoff in the SAME
//! helper ledger, and durably append each event before performing its action.
//! This module validates retained bytes and sequencing; it cannot attest OS
//! observations or make an uncommitted in-memory event durable.
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use uuid::Uuid;
mod linux_full;
pub use linux_full::{LinuxFullTransition, LinuxFullTransitionProof, render_linux_full};
pub const MAX_RECORD_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
pub const MAX_EVENT_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
pub const MAX_EVENTS: usize = 16;
pub const HEALTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rmm.agent-update-health.v1\0";
/// All fields below are untrusted wire data, never authorization capabilities.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AttemptBinding {
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
pub asset_id: Uuid,
pub agent_id: Uuid,
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
pub assignment_version: u64,
pub plan_id: Uuid,
pub plan_sha256: String,
pub job_id: Uuid,
pub attempt_id: Uuid,
pub job_payload_sha256: String,
pub grant_id: Uuid,
pub authorization_id: Uuid,
pub original_request_sha256: String,
pub original_start_witness_sha256: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct CodePair {
pub manifest_sha256: String,
pub agent_sha256: String,
pub helper_sha256: String,
pub pin_sha256: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum Service {
LinuxAgent,
LinuxGeneralHelper,
LinuxAptHelper,
LinuxFullHelper,
WindowsAgent,
WindowsHelper,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum PinTransition {
UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1,
LinuxGeneralFullV1,
WindowsCodePairV1,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum FileRole {
AgentBinary,
HelperBinary,
LinuxFullConfig,
LinuxFullPin,
WindowsSettings,
WindowsPin,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct FileTransition {
pub role: FileRole,
pub old_sha256: String,
pub new_sha256: String,
}
/// Hashes bind the retained, authenticated baseline; they are not substitutes
/// for reading original rows/signatures/inodes through pinned OS handles.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Handoff {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub attempt: AttemptBinding,
pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
pub helper_checkpoint: u64,
pub previous_decision_id: Uuid,
pub boot_id: Uuid,
pub connection_generation: u64,
pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
pub updater_sha256: String,
pub updater_policy_sha256: String,
pub predecessor_record_sha256: String,
pub retained_state_sha256: String,
pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
pub staged_files_sha256: String,
pub predecessor: CodePair,
pub target: CodePair,
pub pin_transition: PinTransition,
pub pin_transition_sha256: String,
pub files: Vec<FileTransition>,
/// Exact provisioned order. All installed helper profiles must be present.
pub stop_set: Vec<Service>,
pub consumed_at: u64,
pub finish_before: u64,
}
impl Handoff {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(self.schema_version == 1, "HANDOFF_SCHEMA");
for id in [
self.attempt.tenant_id,
self.attempt.asset_id,
self.attempt.agent_id,
self.attempt.plan_id,
self.attempt.job_id,
self.attempt.attempt_id,
self.attempt.grant_id,
self.attempt.authorization_id,
self.agent_journal_id,
self.helper_journal_id,
self.previous_decision_id,
self.boot_id,
self.owner_nonce,
] {
ensure!(!id.is_nil(), "HANDOFF_NIL_ID");
}
ensure!(
self.attempt.enrollment_generation > 0
&& self.attempt.assignment_version > 0
&& self.connection_generation > 0,
"HANDOFF_GENERATION"
);
for hash in [
&self.attempt.plan_sha256,
&self.attempt.job_payload_sha256,
&self.attempt.original_request_sha256,
&self.attempt.original_start_witness_sha256,
&self.updater_sha256,
&self.updater_policy_sha256,
&self.predecessor_record_sha256,
&self.retained_state_sha256,
&self.ledger_identity_sha256,
&self.staged_files_sha256,
&self.pin_transition_sha256,
] {
digest(hash)?;
}
for pair in [&self.predecessor, &self.target] {
for hash in [
&pair.manifest_sha256,
&pair.agent_sha256,
&pair.helper_sha256,
&pair.pin_sha256,
] {
digest(hash)?;
}
}
ensure!(
self.predecessor.manifest_sha256 != self.target.manifest_sha256,
"HANDOFF_SAME_RELEASE"
);
ensure!(
self.consumed_at > 0
&& self.finish_before > self.consumed_at
&& self.finish_before - self.consumed_at <= 600,
"HANDOFF_DEADLINE"
);
let roles: Vec<_> = self.files.iter().map(|file| file.role).collect();
let expected_roles = match self.pin_transition {
PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
vec![FileRole::AgentBinary, FileRole::HelperBinary]
}
PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => vec![
FileRole::AgentBinary,
FileRole::HelperBinary,
FileRole::LinuxFullConfig,
FileRole::LinuxFullPin,
],
PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => vec![
FileRole::AgentBinary,
FileRole::HelperBinary,
FileRole::WindowsSettings,
FileRole::WindowsPin,
],
};
ensure!(roles == expected_roles, "HANDOFF_FILE_SET");
for file in &self.files {
digest(&file.old_sha256)?;
digest(&file.new_sha256)?;
}
ensure!(
self.files[0].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.agent_sha256
&& self.files[0].new_sha256 == self.target.agent_sha256
&& self.files[1].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.helper_sha256
&& self.files[1].new_sha256 == self.target.helper_sha256,
"HANDOFF_FILE_IMAGE_BINDING"
);
if self.files.len() == 4 {
ensure!(
self.files[3].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.pin_sha256
&& self.files[3].new_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
"HANDOFF_FILE_PIN_BINDING"
);
}
match self.pin_transition {
PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
ensure!(
self.stop_set == [Service::LinuxAgent, Service::LinuxGeneralHelper]
|| self.stop_set
== [
Service::LinuxAgent,
Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
Service::LinuxAptHelper
],
"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
);
ensure!(
self.predecessor.pin_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
"HANDOFF_LINUX_PIN_CHANGED"
);
}
PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => ensure!(
self.stop_set
== [
Service::LinuxAgent,
Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
Service::LinuxFullHelper
]
|| self.stop_set
== [
Service::LinuxAgent,
Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
Service::LinuxFullHelper,
Service::LinuxAptHelper
],
"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
),
PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => ensure!(
self.stop_set == [Service::WindowsAgent, Service::WindowsHelper],
"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
),
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
self.validate()?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(self)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_RECORD_BYTES, "HANDOFF_TOO_LARGE");
Ok(bytes)
}
}
/// Concrete process birth, not an unqualified PID or a service's Running flag.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Process {
pub pid: u32,
pub birth: u64,
pub image_sha256: String,
}
impl Process {
fn validate(&self, expected_image: &str) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.pid > 0 && self.birth > 0 && self.image_sha256 == expected_image,
"HANDOFF_PROCESS_BINDING"
);
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct StartedService {
pub service: Service,
pub process: Process,
}
/// The server signs evidence only. `ready` MUST be false while the original
/// handoff remains inflight; this receipt is never an ExecutionPermit.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct HealthReceipt {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub handoff_sha256: String,
pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
pub boot_id: Uuid,
pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
pub connection_generation: u64,
pub service_processes: Vec<StartedService>,
pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
pub signed_sync_decision_id: Uuid,
pub signed_sync_request_sha256: String,
pub signed_sync_response_sha256: String,
pub signed_sync_applied_at: u64,
pub ready: bool,
pub inventory_message_id: Uuid,
pub inventory_received_at: u64,
pub inventory_ack_sha256: String,
pub issued_at: u64,
pub valid_until: u64,
}
/// Already decoded, bounded input; a network adapter must also bound encoding.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SignedHealth {
pub payload: Vec<u8>,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "phase", rename_all = "snake_case", deny_unknown_fields)]
pub enum Evidence {
StopIntent,
AllStopped {
observation_sha256: String,
},
UpdaterOwnsLedger {
process: Process,
ledger_identity_sha256: String,
},
ReplaceIntent {
role: FileRole,
},
Replaced {
role: FileRole,
observed_sha256: String,
},
PairVerified {
pair: CodePair,
retained_state_sha256: String,
},
/// This append must be flushed under the updater guard; the guard is then
/// dropped BEFORE starting the new helper, which reacquires the SAME lock.
LedgerReturnIntent,
ServicesStarted {
services: Vec<StartedService>,
ledger_identity_sha256: String,
observation_sha256: String,
},
HealthVerified {
receipt: SignedHealth,
},
/// Only the new helper's existing outcome-CAS may persist this outcome.
/// It must still reject any pre-existing definitive Unknown/outcome.
OutcomePersisted {
outcome_sha256: String,
},
Unknown {
reason: UnknownReason,
},
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum UnknownReason {
OwnerLost,
BootChanged,
DeadlineExpired,
StopUncertain,
ReplaceUncertain,
StartUncertain,
StateChanged,
HealthUnproven,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Event {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub handoff_sha256: String,
pub sequence: u32,
pub previous_sha256: String,
pub observed_at: u64,
pub boot_id: Uuid,
pub evidence: Evidence,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Phase {
HandoffConsumed,
StopIntent,
AllStopped,
UpdaterOwnsLedger,
ReplaceIntent,
Replaced,
PairVerified,
LedgerReturnIntent,
ServicesStarted,
HealthVerified,
OutcomePersisted,
Unknown,
}
/// Retained journal view. No method returns a start grant, ready flag, retry,
/// rollback or instruction to perform a service/file operation after a crash.
pub struct Journal {
handoff: Handoff,
handoff_hash: String,
head_hash: String,
count: u32,
phase: Phase,
replaced: usize,
observed_at: u64,
started: Option<(Vec<StartedService>, u64)>,
health_key: VerifyingKey,
}
impl Journal {
/// The caller independently verifies this record against the ORIGINAL
/// consumed row/start witness, participant policy and retained state.
pub fn open(record: &[u8], health_public_key: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self> {
let handoff: Handoff = canonical(record, MAX_RECORD_BYTES)?;
handoff.validate()?;
let health_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&health_public_key)?;
ensure!(!health_key.is_weak(), "HANDOFF_WEAK_HEALTH_KEY");
let handoff_hash = sha256(record);
Ok(Self {
observed_at: handoff.consumed_at,
handoff,
head_hash: handoff_hash.clone(),
handoff_hash,
count: 0,
phase: Phase::HandoffConsumed,
replaced: 0,
started: None,
health_key,
})
}
pub fn phase(&self) -> Phase {
self.phase
}
pub fn head_sha256(&self) -> &str {
&self.head_hash
}
pub fn handoff_sha256(&self) -> &str {
&self.handoff_hash
}
/// Prepare exact bytes for a bounded append-only CAS transaction against
/// `head_sha256`. Returning bytes is NOT proof that this transaction ran.
pub fn prepare(&self, observed_at: u64, evidence: Evidence) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let event = Event {
schema_version: 1,
handoff_sha256: self.handoff_hash.clone(),
sequence: self.count + 1,
previous_sha256: self.head_hash.clone(),
observed_at,
boot_id: self.handoff.boot_id,
evidence,
};
self.validate_event(&event)?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&event)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_EVENT_BYTES, "HANDOFF_EVENT_TOO_LARGE");
Ok(bytes)
}
/// Strict historical replay. The platform must check durable head/rowcount,
/// inode/FileID and original ledger lineage to detect omitted suffixes.
pub fn replay(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let event: Event = canonical(bytes, MAX_EVENT_BYTES)?;
let next = self.validate_event(&event)?;
if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Replaced { .. }) {
self.replaced += 1;
}
if let Evidence::ServicesStarted { services, .. } = event.evidence {
self.started = Some((services, event.observed_at));
}
self.phase = next;
self.observed_at = event.observed_at;
self.count = event.sequence;
self.head_hash = sha256(bytes);
Ok(())
}
fn validate_event(&self, event: &Event) -> Result<Phase> {
ensure!(
event.schema_version == 1
&& event.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
&& event.sequence == self.count + 1
&& (event.sequence as usize) <= MAX_EVENTS
&& event.previous_sha256 == self.head_hash,
"HANDOFF_EVENT_CHAIN"
);
ensure!(
!matches!(self.phase, Phase::Unknown | Phase::OutcomePersisted),
"HANDOFF_TERMINAL"
);
ensure!(
event.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id && event.observed_at >= self.observed_at,
"HANDOFF_BOOT_OR_CLOCK"
);
if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Unknown { .. }) {
return Ok(Phase::Unknown);
}
ensure!(
event.observed_at < self.handoff.finish_before,
"HANDOFF_EXPIRED"
);
let next = match (&self.phase, &event.evidence) {
(Phase::HandoffConsumed, Evidence::StopIntent) => Phase::StopIntent,
(Phase::StopIntent, Evidence::AllStopped { observation_sha256 }) => {
digest(observation_sha256)?;
Phase::AllStopped
}
(
Phase::AllStopped,
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
process,
ledger_identity_sha256,
},
) => {
process.validate(&self.handoff.updater_sha256)?;
ensure!(
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
);
Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger
}
(Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger | Phase::Replaced, Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role }) => {
ensure!(
self.handoff
.files
.get(self.replaced)
.is_some_and(|file| file.role == *role),
"HANDOFF_REPLACE_ORDER"
);
Phase::ReplaceIntent
}
(
Phase::ReplaceIntent,
Evidence::Replaced {
role,
observed_sha256,
},
) => {
ensure!(
self.handoff.files.get(self.replaced).is_some_and(
|file| file.role == *role && file.new_sha256 == *observed_sha256
),
"HANDOFF_REPLACEMENT_BINDING"
);
Phase::Replaced
}
(
Phase::Replaced,
Evidence::PairVerified {
pair,
retained_state_sha256,
},
) => {
ensure!(
self.replaced == self.handoff.files.len(),
"HANDOFF_PAIR_INCOMPLETE"
);
ensure!(
pair == &self.handoff.target
&& retained_state_sha256 == &self.handoff.retained_state_sha256,
"HANDOFF_PAIR_OR_STATE_CHANGED"
);
Phase::PairVerified
}
(Phase::PairVerified, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent) => Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
(
Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
services,
ledger_identity_sha256,
observation_sha256,
},
) => {
ensure!(
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
);
let expected: Vec<_> = self
.handoff
.stop_set
.iter()
.copied()
.filter(|service| *service != Service::LinuxAptHelper)
.collect();
ensure!(
services.len() == expected.len(),
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
);
for (index, service) in services.iter().enumerate() {
ensure!(
service.service == expected[index],
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
);
let image =
if matches!(service.service, Service::LinuxAgent | Service::WindowsAgent) {
&self.handoff.target.agent_sha256
} else {
&self.handoff.target.helper_sha256
};
service.process.validate(image)?;
ensure!(
!services[..index]
.iter()
.any(|prior| prior.process.pid == service.process.pid),
"HANDOFF_PROCESS_REUSE"
);
}
digest(observation_sha256)?;
Phase::ServicesStarted
}
(Phase::ServicesStarted, Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt }) => {
self.verify_health(receipt, event.observed_at)?;
Phase::HealthVerified
}
(Phase::HealthVerified, Evidence::OutcomePersisted { outcome_sha256 }) => {
digest(outcome_sha256)?;
Phase::OutcomePersisted
}
_ => anyhow::bail!("HANDOFF_PHASE_ORDER"),
};
Ok(next)
}
fn verify_health(&self, signed: &SignedHealth, at: u64) -> Result<()> {
let receipt: HealthReceipt = canonical(&signed.payload, 4096)?;
let signature =
Signature::from_slice(&signed.signature).context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE_LENGTH")?;
let mut message = HEALTH_DOMAIN.to_vec();
message.extend_from_slice(&signed.payload);
self.health_key
.verify_strict(&message, &signature)
.context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE")?;
let (services, started_at) = self.started.as_ref().context("HANDOFF_START_MISSING")?;
ensure!(
receipt.schema_version == 1
&& receipt.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
&& receipt.owner_nonce == self.handoff.owner_nonce
&& receipt.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id
&& receipt.helper_journal_id == self.handoff.helper_journal_id
&& receipt.agent_journal_id == self.handoff.agent_journal_id
&& receipt.connection_generation > self.handoff.connection_generation
&& receipt.service_processes == *services
&& receipt.ledger_identity_sha256 == self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256
&& !receipt.ready,
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
!receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.is_nil() && !receipt.inventory_message_id.is_nil(),
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_ID"
);
for hash in [
&receipt.signed_sync_request_sha256,
&receipt.signed_sync_response_sha256,
&receipt.inventory_ack_sha256,
] {
digest(hash)?;
}
ensure!(
receipt.signed_sync_applied_at >= *started_at
&& receipt.inventory_received_at >= *started_at
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.signed_sync_applied_at
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.inventory_received_at
&& receipt.issued_at <= at
&& at < receipt.valid_until
&& receipt.valid_until <= self.handoff.finish_before
&& at.checked_sub(*started_at).is_some_and(|age| age < 180),
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_NOT_FRESH"
);
Ok(())
}
}
pub fn sha256(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
}
fn digest(hash: &str) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
hash.len() == 64
&& hash
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)),
"HANDOFF_DIGEST"
);
Ok(())
}
fn canonical<T: DeserializeOwned + Serialize>(bytes: &[u8], limit: usize) -> Result<T> {
ensure!(
!bytes.is_empty() && bytes.len() <= limit,
"HANDOFF_BYTE_LIMIT"
);
let value = serde_json::from_slice::<T>(bytes)?;
ensure!(serde_json::to_vec(&value)? == bytes, "HANDOFF_NONCANONICAL");
Ok(value)
}
+309
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@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
//! Closed renderer for the existing Linux Full helper Config -> Policy ->
//! GeneralPin schema2. Definitions are deliberately a versioned snapshot until
//! integration can use the reviewed runtime types. No arbitrary JSON patch,
//! paths, key loading, permission migration, service operation or publication.
use crate::{digest, sha256};
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::value::RawValue;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid,
asset_id: Uuid,
agent_id: Uuid,
enrollment_generation: u64,
assignment_version: u64,
public_key_hex: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Identity {
tenant_id: Uuid,
asset_id: Uuid,
agent_id: Uuid,
enrollment_generation: u64,
assignment_version: u64,
signing_key_id: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
enum FullProfile {
#[serde(rename = "full_maintenance_v1")]
FullMaintenanceV1,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Config {
profile: FullProfile,
binding: Binding,
#[serde(default)]
signing_key_file: Option<String>,
agent_uid: u32,
socket_gid: u32,
socket: String,
state: String,
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
allow_reboot: bool,
allow_root_scripts: bool,
allowed_script_profiles: Vec<FullProfile>,
helper_binary_sha256: String,
/// Full Config forbids an APT provider; any non-null value is rejected.
#[serde(default)]
apt_provider: Option<()>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Policy {
schema_version: u32,
profile: FullProfile,
identity: Identity,
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
allow_root_scripts: bool,
allow_reboot: bool,
allowed_script_profiles: Vec<FullProfile>,
helper_binary_sha256: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Pin {
schema_version: u32,
profile: FullProfile,
identity: Identity,
policy_sha256: String,
helper_binary_sha256: String,
}
/// Only value spans of these named TOP-LEVEL fields are selected. Full typed
/// decoding first rejects unknown/duplicate fields, including nested objects.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ConfigSpans<'a> {
#[serde(borrow)]
helper_binary_sha256: &'a RawValue,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct PinSpans<'a> {
#[serde(borrow)]
policy_sha256: &'a RawValue,
#[serde(borrow)]
helper_binary_sha256: &'a RawValue,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub struct LinuxFullTransitionProof {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub old_config_sha256: String,
pub new_config_sha256: String,
pub old_pin_sha256: String,
pub new_pin_sha256: String,
pub old_policy_sha256: String,
pub new_policy_sha256: String,
pub old_helper_sha256: String,
pub new_helper_sha256: String,
pub effective_signing_key_id: String,
}
/// Private construction preserves correspondence between rendered bytes and
/// their fixed proof. Wire proof fields remain untrusted once transported.
pub struct LinuxFullTransition {
proof: LinuxFullTransitionProof,
new_config: Vec<u8>,
new_pin: Vec<u8>,
}
impl LinuxFullTransition {
pub fn proof(&self) -> &LinuxFullTransitionProof {
&self.proof
}
pub fn new_config_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.new_config
}
pub fn new_pin_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.new_pin
}
pub fn sha256(&self) -> Result<String> {
Ok(sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&self.proof)?))
}
}
/// The adapter must compare old bytes to the exact protected deployed files,
/// bind BOTH returned raw-file hashes in the immutable job before approval,
/// and independently recheck the same closed transition before/after swap.
/// General/APT bytes and central rights/scopes are never rendered or changed.
/// `provisioned_signing_key` must be independently authenticated from the
/// already provisioned public-key record/pinned identity by the adapter.
/// Parsing a VerifyingKey alone does NOT authenticate its provisioning.
/// This pure function never opens `signing_key_file` or modifies inline keys.
pub fn render_linux_full(
config_bytes: &[u8],
pin_bytes: &[u8],
target_helper: &str,
provisioned_signing_key: &VerifyingKey,
) -> Result<LinuxFullTransition> {
ensure!(
!config_bytes.is_empty()
&& config_bytes.len() <= 16384
&& !pin_bytes.is_empty()
&& pin_bytes.len() <= 8192,
"FULL_RENDER_LIMIT"
);
digest(target_helper)?;
let config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(config_bytes)?;
let pin: Pin = serde_json::from_slice(pin_bytes)?;
digest(&config.helper_binary_sha256)?;
ensure!(
!provisioned_signing_key.is_weak(),
"FULL_RENDER_WEAK_SIGNING_KEY"
);
let effective_public_key = hex::encode(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes());
if let Some(path) = &config.signing_key_file {
ensure!(path.starts_with('/'), "FULL_RENDER_KEY_PATH_ABSOLUTE");
ensure!(
config.binding.public_key_hex.is_empty()
|| config.binding.public_key_hex == effective_public_key,
"FULL_RENDER_PROVISIONED_KEY_MISMATCH"
);
} else {
ensure!(
config.binding.public_key_hex == effective_public_key,
"FULL_RENDER_INLINE_KEY_REQUIRED"
);
}
ensure!(
config.helper_binary_sha256 != target_helper,
"FULL_RENDER_SAME_IMAGE"
);
ensure!(
!config.binding.tenant_id.is_nil()
&& !config.binding.asset_id.is_nil()
&& !config.binding.agent_id.is_nil()
&& config.binding.enrollment_generation > 0
&& config.binding.assignment_version > 0,
"FULL_RENDER_IDENTITY"
);
ensure!(
config.allowed_services.is_empty()
&& !config.allow_reboot
&& config.allow_root_scripts
&& config.allowed_script_profiles == [FullProfile::FullMaintenanceV1]
&& config.apt_provider.is_none()
&& config.state == "/var/lib/rmm-helper"
&& config.socket.starts_with('/')
&& config.socket != "/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock"
&& config.agent_uid > 0
&& config.socket_gid > 0,
"FULL_RENDER_PROFILE"
);
let identity = Identity {
tenant_id: config.binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: config.binding.asset_id,
agent_id: config.binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: config.binding.enrollment_generation,
assignment_version: config.binding.assignment_version,
signing_key_id: sha256(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes()),
};
let mut policy = Policy {
schema_version: 2,
profile: FullProfile::FullMaintenanceV1,
identity,
allowed_services: config.allowed_services.clone(),
allow_root_scripts: config.allow_root_scripts,
allow_reboot: config.allow_reboot,
allowed_script_profiles: config.allowed_script_profiles.clone(),
helper_binary_sha256: config.helper_binary_sha256.clone(),
};
let old_policy_sha256 = sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&policy)?);
ensure!(
pin.schema_version == 2
&& pin.identity == policy.identity
&& pin.helper_binary_sha256 == config.helper_binary_sha256
&& pin.policy_sha256 == old_policy_sha256,
"FULL_RENDER_PIN_BINDING"
);
policy.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
let new_policy_sha256 = sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&policy)?);
let config_spans: ConfigSpans<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(config_bytes)?;
let pin_spans: PinSpans<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(pin_bytes)?;
let new_config = replace_spans(
config_bytes,
vec![(config_spans.helper_binary_sha256, target_helper)],
)?;
let new_pin = replace_spans(
pin_bytes,
vec![
(pin_spans.helper_binary_sha256, target_helper),
(pin_spans.policy_sha256, &new_policy_sha256),
],
)?;
let rendered_config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(&new_config)?;
let rendered_pin: Pin = serde_json::from_slice(&new_pin)?;
let mut expected_config = config.clone();
expected_config.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
let mut expected_pin = pin;
expected_pin.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
expected_pin.policy_sha256.clone_from(&new_policy_sha256);
ensure!(
rendered_config == expected_config && rendered_pin == expected_pin,
"FULL_RENDER_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE"
);
Ok(LinuxFullTransition {
proof: LinuxFullTransitionProof {
schema_version: 1,
old_config_sha256: sha256(config_bytes),
new_config_sha256: sha256(&new_config),
old_pin_sha256: sha256(pin_bytes),
new_pin_sha256: sha256(&new_pin),
old_policy_sha256,
new_policy_sha256,
old_helper_sha256: config.helper_binary_sha256,
new_helper_sha256: target_helper.into(),
effective_signing_key_id: sha256(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes()),
},
new_config,
new_pin,
})
}
fn replace_spans(bytes: &[u8], values: Vec<(&RawValue, &str)>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut spans = Vec::new();
for (raw, replacement) in values {
let raw = raw.get();
let start = (raw.as_ptr() as usize)
.checked_sub(bytes.as_ptr() as usize)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("FULL_RENDER_SPAN"))?;
let end = start
.checked_add(raw.len())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("FULL_RENDER_SPAN"))?;
ensure!(
bytes.get(start..end) == Some(raw.as_bytes())
&& raw.len() == 66
&& raw.starts_with('"')
&& raw.ends_with('"'),
"FULL_RENDER_HASH_ENCODING"
);
digest(&raw[1..65])?;
spans.push((start, end, format!("\"{replacement}\"")));
}
spans.sort_by_key(|span| span.0);
ensure!(
spans.windows(2).all(|p| p[0].1 <= p[1].0),
"FULL_RENDER_SPAN_OVERLAP"
);
let mut rendered = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
let mut cursor = 0;
for (start, end, replacement) in spans {
rendered.extend_from_slice(&bytes[cursor..start]);
rendered.extend_from_slice(replacement.as_bytes());
cursor = end;
}
rendered.extend_from_slice(&bytes[cursor..]);
Ok(rendered)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,639 @@
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
use rmm_updater_handoff::*;
use serde_json::{Value, json};
use uuid::Uuid;
fn id(n: u128) -> Uuid {
Uuid::from_u128(n)
}
fn h(n: u8) -> String {
format!("{n:02x}").repeat(32)
}
fn process(pid: u32, image: &str) -> Process {
Process {
pid,
birth: u64::from(pid) + 1000,
image_sha256: image.into(),
}
}
fn handoff() -> Handoff {
Handoff {
schema_version: 1,
attempt: AttemptBinding {
tenant_id: id(1),
asset_id: id(2),
agent_id: id(3),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 2,
plan_id: id(4),
plan_sha256: h(1),
job_id: id(5),
attempt_id: id(6),
job_payload_sha256: h(2),
grant_id: id(7),
authorization_id: id(8),
original_request_sha256: h(3),
original_start_witness_sha256: h(4),
},
agent_journal_id: id(9),
helper_journal_id: id(10),
helper_checkpoint: 7,
previous_decision_id: id(11),
boot_id: id(12),
connection_generation: 20,
owner_nonce: id(13),
updater_sha256: h(5),
updater_policy_sha256: h(6),
predecessor_record_sha256: h(7),
retained_state_sha256: h(8),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
staged_files_sha256: h(9),
predecessor: CodePair {
manifest_sha256: h(10),
agent_sha256: h(11),
helper_sha256: h(12),
pin_sha256: h(13),
},
target: CodePair {
manifest_sha256: h(14),
agent_sha256: h(15),
helper_sha256: h(16),
pin_sha256: h(17),
},
pin_transition: PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1,
pin_transition_sha256: h(18),
files: vec![
FileTransition {
role: FileRole::AgentBinary,
old_sha256: h(11),
new_sha256: h(15),
},
FileTransition {
role: FileRole::HelperBinary,
old_sha256: h(12),
new_sha256: h(16),
},
FileTransition {
role: FileRole::LinuxFullConfig,
old_sha256: h(19),
new_sha256: h(20),
},
FileTransition {
role: FileRole::LinuxFullPin,
old_sha256: h(13),
new_sha256: h(17),
},
],
stop_set: vec![
Service::LinuxAgent,
Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
Service::LinuxFullHelper,
],
consumed_at: 100,
finish_before: 700,
}
}
fn key() -> SigningKey {
SigningKey::from_bytes(&[73; 32])
}
fn open(handoff: &Handoff) -> Journal {
Journal::open(&handoff.bytes().unwrap(), key().verifying_key().to_bytes()).unwrap()
}
fn append(journal: &mut Journal, at: u64, evidence: Evidence) -> Vec<u8> {
let bytes = journal.prepare(at, evidence).unwrap();
journal.replay(&bytes).unwrap();
bytes
}
fn services(handoff: &Handoff) -> Vec<StartedService> {
handoff
.stop_set
.iter()
.filter(|s| **s != Service::LinuxAptHelper)
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, service)| StartedService {
service: *service,
process: process(
50 + i as u32,
if *service == Service::LinuxAgent {
&handoff.target.agent_sha256
} else {
&handoff.target.helper_sha256
},
),
})
.collect()
}
fn until_started(journal: &mut Journal, handoff: &Handoff) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
let mut events = vec![
append(journal, 101, Evidence::StopIntent),
append(
journal,
102,
Evidence::AllStopped {
observation_sha256: h(21),
},
),
append(
journal,
103,
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
},
),
];
for file in &handoff.files {
events.push(append(
journal,
104,
Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role: file.role },
));
events.push(append(
journal,
104,
Evidence::Replaced {
role: file.role,
observed_sha256: file.new_sha256.clone(),
},
));
}
events.push(append(
journal,
105,
Evidence::PairVerified {
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone(),
},
));
events.push(append(journal, 106, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent));
events.push(append(
journal,
107,
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
services: services(handoff),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
observation_sha256: h(23),
},
));
events
}
fn receipt(journal: &Journal, handoff: &Handoff) -> HealthReceipt {
HealthReceipt {
schema_version: 1,
handoff_sha256: journal.handoff_sha256().into(),
owner_nonce: handoff.owner_nonce,
boot_id: handoff.boot_id,
helper_journal_id: handoff.helper_journal_id,
agent_journal_id: handoff.agent_journal_id,
connection_generation: 21,
service_processes: services(handoff),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
signed_sync_decision_id: id(14),
signed_sync_request_sha256: h(24),
signed_sync_response_sha256: h(25),
signed_sync_applied_at: 108,
ready: false,
inventory_message_id: id(15),
inventory_received_at: 108,
inventory_ack_sha256: h(26),
issued_at: 109,
valid_until: 200,
}
}
fn signed(receipt: &HealthReceipt, domain: &[u8], key: &SigningKey) -> SignedHealth {
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(receipt).unwrap();
let mut bytes = domain.to_vec();
bytes.extend_from_slice(&payload);
SignedHealth {
payload,
signature: key.sign(&bytes).to_bytes().to_vec(),
}
}
#[test]
fn full_linux_three_service_handoff_replays_exactly_sixteen_events() {
let handoff = handoff();
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
let mut events = until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
let receipt = signed(&receipt(&journal, &handoff), HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key());
events.push(append(
&mut journal,
110,
Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt },
));
events.push(append(
&mut journal,
111,
Evidence::OutcomePersisted {
outcome_sha256: h(27),
},
));
assert_eq!(events.len(), MAX_EVENTS);
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::OutcomePersisted);
let mut reopened = open(&handoff);
for event in events {
reopened.replay(&event).unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(journal.head_sha256(), reopened.head_sha256());
assert_eq!(reopened.phase(), Phase::OutcomePersisted);
assert!(reopened.prepare(112, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn no_ownership_before_stop_no_partial_pair_no_start_before_return() {
let handoff = handoff();
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
101,
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22)
}
)
.is_err()
);
append(&mut journal, 101, Evidence::StopIntent);
append(
&mut journal,
102,
Evidence::AllStopped {
observation_sha256: h(21),
},
);
append(
&mut journal,
103,
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
},
);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
104,
Evidence::PairVerified {
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone()
}
)
.is_err()
);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
104,
Evidence::ReplaceIntent {
role: FileRole::HelperBinary
}
)
.is_err()
);
for file in &handoff.files {
append(
&mut journal,
104,
Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role: file.role },
);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
104,
Evidence::Replaced {
role: file.role,
observed_sha256: h(99)
}
)
.is_err()
);
append(
&mut journal,
104,
Evidence::Replaced {
role: file.role,
observed_sha256: file.new_sha256.clone(),
},
);
}
append(
&mut journal,
105,
Evidence::PairVerified {
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone(),
},
);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
106,
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
services: services(&handoff),
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
observation_sha256: h(23)
}
)
.is_err()
);
append(&mut journal, 106, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent);
let mut incomplete = services(&handoff);
incomplete.pop();
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
107,
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
services: incomplete,
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
observation_sha256: h(23)
}
)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn event_chain_clock_limits_and_canonical_bytes_fail_closed() {
let handoff = handoff();
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
let event = journal.prepare(101, Evidence::StopIntent).unwrap();
for field in [
"handoff_sha256",
"previous_sha256",
"boot_id",
"sequence",
"observed_at",
] {
let mut value: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&event).unwrap();
value[field] = match field {
"sequence" => json!(2),
"observed_at" => json!(99),
"boot_id" => json!(id(99)),
_ => json!(h(99)),
};
let parsed: Event = serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap();
assert!(
journal
.replay(&serde_json::to_vec(&parsed).unwrap())
.is_err(),
"{field}"
);
}
let mut whitespace = event.clone();
whitespace.push(b' ');
assert!(journal.replay(&whitespace).is_err());
assert!(journal.replay(&vec![b' '; MAX_EVENT_BYTES + 1]).is_err());
assert!(journal.prepare(700, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
journal.replay(&event).unwrap();
assert!(journal.replay(&event).is_err());
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::StopIntent);
}
#[test]
fn health_is_domain_bound_fresh_evidence_and_never_opens_ready() {
let handoff = handoff();
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
let baseline = receipt(&journal, &handoff);
for change in 0..11 {
let mut receipt = baseline.clone();
match change {
0 => receipt.ready = true,
1 => receipt.owner_nonce = id(99),
2 => receipt.boot_id = id(99),
3 => receipt.helper_journal_id = id(99),
4 => receipt.connection_generation = 20,
5 => receipt.signed_sync_applied_at = 106,
6 => receipt.inventory_received_at = 106,
7 => receipt.service_processes[1].process.birth += 1,
8 => receipt.valid_until = 110,
9 => receipt.handoff_sha256 = h(99),
_ => receipt.issued_at = 111,
}
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
110,
Evidence::HealthVerified {
receipt: signed(&receipt, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
}
)
.is_err(),
"change {change}"
);
}
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
110,
Evidence::HealthVerified {
receipt: signed(&baseline, b"rmm.execution-permit.v1\0", &key())
}
)
.is_err()
);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
110,
Evidence::HealthVerified {
receipt: signed(&baseline, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &SigningKey::from_bytes(&[74; 32]))
}
)
.is_err()
);
let mut late = baseline;
late.issued_at = 287;
late.valid_until = 400;
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
287,
Evidence::HealthVerified {
receipt: signed(&late, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
}
)
.is_err()
);
append(
&mut journal,
701,
Evidence::Unknown {
reason: UnknownReason::DeadlineExpired,
},
);
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::Unknown);
assert!(
journal
.prepare(
702,
Evidence::HealthVerified {
receipt: signed(&late, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
}
)
.is_err()
);
assert!(journal.prepare(702, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn closed_service_sets_reject_omitted_full_and_apt_restart() {
let mut handoff = handoff();
handoff.stop_set.pop();
assert!(handoff.bytes().is_err());
handoff.stop_set.push(Service::LinuxFullHelper);
handoff.stop_set.push(Service::LinuxAptHelper);
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::ServicesStarted);
handoff.files[3].new_sha256 = h(99);
assert!(handoff.bytes().is_err());
}
fn full_files() -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
let public_key = hex::encode(key().verifying_key().as_bytes());
let identity = json!({"tenant_id":id(1),"asset_id":id(2),"agent_id":id(3),
"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":2,"signing_key_id":sha256(&hex::decode(&public_key).unwrap())});
// Exact Policy codec order copied from runtime control::Policy schema2.
let policy = format!(
"{{\"schema_version\":2,\"profile\":\"full_maintenance_v1\",\"identity\":{{\"tenant_id\":\"{}\",\"asset_id\":\"{}\",\"agent_id\":\"{}\",\"enrollment_generation\":1,\"assignment_version\":2,\"signing_key_id\":\"{}\"}},\"allowed_services\":[],\"allow_root_scripts\":true,\"allow_reboot\":false,\"allowed_script_profiles\":[\"full_maintenance_v1\"],\"helper_binary_sha256\":\"{}\"}}",
id(1),
id(2),
id(3),
identity["signing_key_id"].as_str().unwrap(),
h(12)
);
let config = json!({"profile":"full_maintenance_v1", "binding":{"tenant_id":id(1),"asset_id":id(2),
"agent_id":id(3),"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":2,"public_key_hex":public_key},
"signing_key_file":format!("/etc/rmm/{}/public-key.json",h(12)),"agent_uid":993,"socket_gid":984,
"socket":"/run/rmm-full-helper/helper.sock","state":"/var/lib/rmm-helper","allowed_services":[],
"allow_reboot":false,"allow_root_scripts":true,"allowed_script_profiles":["full_maintenance_v1"],
"helper_binary_sha256":h(12)});
let pin = json!({"schema_version":2,"profile":"full_maintenance_v1","identity":identity,
"policy_sha256":sha256(policy.as_bytes()),"helper_binary_sha256":h(12)});
(
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&config).unwrap(),
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&pin).unwrap(),
)
}
fn render_linux_full(
config: &[u8],
pin: &[u8],
target: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<LinuxFullTransition> {
rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(config, pin, target, &key().verifying_key())
}
#[test]
fn full_renderer_binds_provisioned_file_key_without_inserting_it_into_raw_config() {
let (inline_config, pin) = full_files();
let mut file_config: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&inline_config).unwrap();
file_config["binding"]["public_key_hex"] = json!("");
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&file_config).unwrap();
let transition = render_linux_full(&bytes, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
let actual: Value = serde_json::from_slice(transition.new_config_bytes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(actual["binding"]["public_key_hex"], "");
assert_eq!(actual["signing_key_file"], file_config["signing_key_file"]);
assert_eq!(
transition.proof().effective_signing_key_id,
sha256(key().verifying_key().as_bytes())
);
let expected = String::from_utf8(bytes.clone()).unwrap().replace(
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12)),
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)),
);
assert_eq!(transition.new_config_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
let inline = render_linux_full(&inline_config, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
transition.proof().new_policy_sha256,
inline.proof().new_policy_sha256
);
assert_eq!(transition.new_pin_bytes(), inline.new_pin_bytes());
let foreign_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[74; 32]).verifying_key();
assert!(rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(&bytes, &pin, &h(16), &foreign_key).is_err());
assert!(
rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(&inline_config, &pin, &h(16), &foreign_key).is_err()
);
file_config
.as_object_mut()
.unwrap()
.remove("signing_key_file");
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&file_config).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
file_config["signing_key_file"] = json!("relative-key.json");
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&file_config).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn full_renderer_changes_only_named_hash_spans_preserving_all_other_raw_bytes() {
let (config, pin) = full_files();
let transition = render_linux_full(&config, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(transition.proof().old_config_sha256, sha256(&config));
let before: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
let after: Value = serde_json::from_slice(transition.new_config_bytes()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(before["signing_key_file"], after["signing_key_file"]);
assert!(after["signing_key_file"].as_str().unwrap().contains(&h(12)));
let needle = format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12));
let expected = String::from_utf8(config)
.unwrap()
.replace(&needle, &format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)));
assert_eq!(transition.new_config_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
let old_pin = String::from_utf8(pin).unwrap();
let expected = old_pin
.replace(&needle, &format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)))
.replace(
&transition.proof().old_policy_sha256,
&transition.proof().new_policy_sha256,
);
assert_eq!(transition.new_pin_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
assert_eq!(transition.sha256().unwrap().len(), 64);
assert!(
render_linux_full(
transition.new_config_bytes(),
transition.new_pin_bytes(),
&h(17)
)
.is_ok()
);
}
#[test]
fn full_renderer_rejects_foreign_pins_unknown_duplicate_escaped_and_privilege_changes() {
let (config, pin) = full_files();
for field in [
"allow_reboot",
"allowed_services",
"allowed_script_profiles",
"profile",
"apt_provider",
] {
let mut value: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
value[field] = match field {
"allow_reboot" => json!(true),
"allowed_services" => json!(["other.service"]),
"allowed_script_profiles" => Value::Null,
"profile" => json!("general"),
_ => json!({}),
};
assert!(
render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&value).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err(),
"{field}"
);
}
let mut foreign: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&pin).unwrap();
foreign["identity"]["agent_id"] = json!(id(99));
assert!(render_linux_full(&config, &serde_json::to_vec(&foreign).unwrap(), &h(16)).is_err());
let mut unknown: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
unknown["binding"]["new_field"] = json!(true);
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&unknown).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
let text = String::from_utf8(config).unwrap();
let duplicate = text.replacen("{", "{\"helper_binary_sha256\":\"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",",1);
assert!(render_linux_full(duplicate.as_bytes(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
let escaped = text.replace(
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12)),
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"\\u0030{}\"", &h(12)[1..]),
);
assert!(render_linux_full(escaped.as_bytes(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
}
+190
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
# Reviewstand: erhaltene Helper-/Updater-Übergabe
2026-11-14. **Isolierter Quellvertrag, keine Produktnorm oder Applyruntime.**
Basis: vollständige Spezifikation1.19, vollständige1.20-/PD-Ergänzung des
Skriptconsole-Worktrees und [bisheriger Vorschlag](agent-updater-proposal.md).
Root hat den engen Kernel und den Fullrenderer zur Ausarbeitung beauftragt;
Runtimeintegration, Zielaktionen und Veröffentlichung erfolgen erst nach
dessen Koordination. Linux-first und die tatsächliche WebUI-Grenze gelten.
Die neue Crate `rmm-updater-handoff` verändert weder den qualifizierten
Releaseverifier noch die beiden vorhandenen nativen Verifier-Abnahmerunner.
Sie enthält keinen Installer, Dateischreiber, Dienststart, IPC-Server,
Netzwerkclient, SQLiteadapter, Approver oder neuen Server-Journalslot.
Aus einem gültigen Handoff oder Healthreceipt entsteht keine Startberechtigung.
## Konkreter Vorwärtsvertrag
`Handoff` bindet ursprünglichen Tenant/Asset/Agent, beide Generationen,
Plan-/Job-/Versuchs-/Grant-/Authorization-IDs, exakte Originalrequest- und
Startzeugenhashes, beide vorhandenen Journal-IDs, Helpercheckpoint und letzten
signierten Entscheid, Boot, ursprüngliche Verbindungsgeneration, einmalige
Ownernonce, stabilen Updater-/Policyhash, Vorgängerrecord, erhaltene Zustands-
und Stagingzeugen sowie Vorgänger-/Zielcodepaar. Der Rendererbeleg und alle
benannten alten/neuen Dateihashes sind unveränderlicher Bestandteil.
Die Helperintegration muss Verbrauch, bestehenden exakten Startzeugen und
Handoff **in derselben vorhandenen Ledgertransaktion** persistieren. Eine
zusätzliche Transaktion nach `ledger::begin_execution` wäre unzureichend:
ein Crash könnte einen Verbrauch ohne bestimmbaren Owner hinterlassen.
Jeder andere offene/Unknown-Versuch verweigert die Übergabe. Das Handoff
ersetzt weder den Originaljob/-grant noch dessen unabhängige Prüfung.
Die Writergrenze ist ausdrücklich Bestandteil dieses Vertrags: Der alte
Helper persistiert auch den Stopintent vor der Übergabeantwort. Solange er
seinen lebenslangen Windowsguard hält, schreibt der Updater kein Event in
den gemeinsamen Ledger. Nach Stop/Guardübernahme kann der Updater All-stopped
und Ownership zusammen transaktional anhängen. Nach dauerhaftem Rückgabeintent
und tatsächlicher Guardabgabe stammen die weiteren Start-/Health-/Outcome-
Events ausschließlich vom neuen Helper unter dessen Guard. Der Updater
erhält nur die eng typisierte lokale Bridge; kein freies Ledger-Schreibrecht
parallel zum neuen Helper. Ein einheitlicher Ledger-/Lock-Inode-/FileID-Hash
ist vor Übergabe fest gebunden und wird bei Übernahme, neuem Servicepeer und
Health erneut verglichen; bloß ein gleichnamiger Dateipfad reicht nicht.
Der begrenzte Journalcodec prüft kanonische Bytes, Hashvorgänger, monotone
Sequenz/Zeit und höchstens16Events. Für Linux Full sind dies genau:
1. Stopintent, unabhängiger All-stopped-Zeuge, bestätigter Besitz des gleichen
Helperledgers durch den konkreten stabilen Updaterprozess.
2. Jeweils ein Intent und ein bestätigter Nachhash für Agent, Helper,
Fullconfig und Fullpin; keine neue Dienstgeneration vor vollständigem Paar.
3. Neues Code-/Pinpaar und erhaltener Zustandszeuge vollständig bestätigt.
4. Dauerhafter Ledger-Rückgabeintent unter gehaltenem Guard, danach Guard
tatsächlich abgeben; erst anschließend darf der neue Helper denselben
Guard erwerben und starten.
5. Konkrete neue Serviceprozesse mit Imagehash, PID und Prozessgeburt,
anschließend signierter Healthbeleg und ursprüngliches Outcome-CAS.
Der Codec nimmt nur Beobachtungen entgegen. `prepare` liefert Bytes für ein
append-only CAS gegen den bestehenden Head, **keinen Haltbarkeitsnachweis**.
Der Plattformadapter muss Flush/Commit vor Wirkung, echte Service-/Peer-
und Guardbeobachtungen, Dateihandles/ACLs sowie ursprüngliche SQLrows und
Signaturen prüfen. Historischer Replay allein erkennt keinen abgeschnittenen
Suffix; er muss gegen den erhaltenen dauerhaften Head, Rowcount und
Ledger-/Inode-/FileID-/Kontrollkettenbeleg geprüft werden. Ein unbekannter
Stop/Teilwechsel/Start bleibt lesend zu diagnostizieren, kein erneuter Execute.
Ein expliziter Unknown ist im neuen Updatekernel terminal und wird durch
spätere Health nicht geheilt. Bestehende allgemeine Outcome-CAS-Regeln bleiben.
## Fullhelper bleibt Teil des ersten Linux-Applyziels
Die tatsächliche Zieltopologie hat General, Full und Agent aktiv. Daher ist
Full kein pauschaler Ausschluss. `linux_general_full_v1` erhält ein geschlossenes
Stopset Agent/General/Full; ein bereits installierter APT-Reader kann zusätzlich
als vierter Dienst im Stopset stehen, **nie im Startset**. Alle tatsächlich
installierten Shared-Ledger-Reader müssen vor Austausch erkannt und gestoppt
sein. Unbekannte Profile und ausgelassene Fullservices verweigern den Schnitt.
Agent/General/Full erhalten dieselbe neue Codepaargeneration vor Restart.
Die alte APT-Unqualifikation/-Deaktivierung bleibt bestehen; kein alter
Acceptancebeleg wird umgeschrieben oder auf die neue Helperdatei übertragen.
Zukünftiger APT-Start benötigt eine gesonderte passende Qualifikation.
`render_linux_full` akzeptiert ausschließlich das bekannte Full-Configschema,
die daraus in fester Feldreihenfolge abgeleitete `control::Policy` Schema2
und den zugehörigen `GeneralPin` Schema2. Alte Binär-/Policy-/Identitybindungen
werden vorher geprüft. Die Rendererdefinitionen sind eine explizite
Schemamomentaufnahme; Integration muss sie gegen die tatsächlichen Typen aus
dem1.20-Quellstand vergleichen, bevor sie Runtime werden.
Der unabhängige Quellenreview fand einen echten Kompatibilitätsfehler des
ersten Entwurfs: Die aktuelle Full-Rawconfig enthält einen leeren Inlinekey
und einen `signing_key_file`-Pfad; die Runtime ergänzt den effektiven öffentlichen
Key vor der Policyhashbildung. Der reine Renderer erhält deshalb jetzt den
bereits provisionierten, **extern authentisierten** öffentlichen Signierkey
als expliziten Parameter. Er öffnet keine Datei. Bei vorhandenem absolutem
Keypfad darf der Raw-Inlinekey leer oder genau gleich sein; ohne Keypfad ist
der gleiche Inlinekey Pflicht. Effektive Policy und Pin werden wie in der
Runtime aus diesem Key abgeleitet; Raw-Inlinekey und Pfad bleiben unverändert.
Der Transitionbeleg bindet zusätzlich `effective_signing_key_id`. Ein bloß
geparstes `VerifyingKey`-Objekt authentisiert keine Provisionierung; der spätere
Adapter muss den Input unabhängig gegen die vorhandene geschützte Keydatei
und die gebundene öffentliche Identität prüfen. Eine neue lokale Vertragsprobe
belegt den Filekeyfall und gleiche Policy-/Pinbytes zum Inlinefall. Dies ist
weiterhin kein Lesen der realen Keydatei oder nativer Renderer-Nachweis.
Der Renderer ändert nur benannte Top-Level-Wertspans:
- Config: `helper_binary_sha256`.
- Pin: `helper_binary_sha256` und daraus exakt neu berechnetes `policy_sha256`.
Alle anderen **rohen Config-/Pinbytes** bleiben erhalten, einschließlich
Formatierung, Identity, öffentlicher Schlüssel, Keypfad, UID/GID, Socket,
Statepfad und Rechtefelder. Er nutzt begrenzte typisierte Deserialisierung
und geborgte `RawValue`-Spans; keine globale Stringersetzung, kein JSONpatch.
Ein gleicher Hash innerhalb eines anderen Feldes bleibt erhalten.
Unbekannte/duplizierte Felder, abweichende Policy, zusätzliche Profile/Services,
fremde Identität und escaped Hashwerte werden verweigert.
Der `LinuxFullTransition` bindet alte/neue Rawconfig-, Rawpin-, Policy- und
Helperhashes. Exakte Zielbytes samt Beleg müssen vor der WebUI-Genehmigung im
festen Plan aufgelöst und später unabhängig erneut geprüft werden. General-
und APT-Konfigurationen werden nicht gerendert. Die zentrale Fullscope wird
**nicht migriert**; künftige Fulljobs bleiben ohne neue konkrete Scopebindung
deny. Ein Codewechsel erteilt keine neuen Rechte.
## Enger Health- und Syncanschluss
Die eigene offene Updatezeile darf **keinen allgemeinen Readyzustand** erzeugen.
`HealthReceipt` ist separat domänengebunden (`rmm.agent-update-health.v1\0`),
mit strengem Ed25519 geprüft und an den gesamten Handoffhash, Ownernonce,
Boot, beide erhaltenen Journale, neue Verbindungsgeneration und sämtliche
konkreten neuen Agent-/Helperprozesse gebunden. Er enthält exakte Hashes des
tatsächlich angewandten SignedSync-Requests/-Responses, Decision-ID und
frisches Inventar samt ACK-Hash. `ready=true` wird ausdrücklich verweigert.
Sync und Inventarempfang müssen nach den bestätigten neuen Dienststarts
liegen. Health ist nur innerhalb180Sekunden gültig, Gesamtfrist höchstens600;
kein Receipt verlängert sie. Der öffentliche Verifikationsschlüssel wird
extern vertrauenswürdig provisioniert, nie aus dem Receipt übernommen.
Noch vor Integration normativ zu bestätigen:
| Anschluss | Erforderliche enge Änderung |
|---|---|
| `ledger::begin_execution` | Additive atomare Handoffanlage mit Originalverbrauch/-start im selben Ledger; keine Ersatzzeilen und kein Reset |
| Helper-/Agent-Startup | Nur exakt vollständiges, lebendes, gleichbootiges, fristgebundenes Updatehandoff als `inflight` erkennen; vorhandenes Unknown niemals umschreiben |
| `HelperSync`/Server-Sync | Typed Inflightdatensatz desselben Versuchs bei weiterhin geschlossenem Ready abgleichen; Originalkontrollkette erhalten |
| `ClientSync::confirm_helper` | Bestehende allgemeine Unresolved-Sperre erhalten; neuer expliziter read-only Updatekontrollpfad darf keine Startlease setzen |
| Lokales IPC | Eigener fest provisionierter Updaterparticipant mit Dienst-/UID/SID-/PID-/Geburts-/Imagebindung; Root/SYSTEM allein reicht nicht |
| Healthroute | Tatsächlich gespeicherter neuer Geräte-mTLS-/Inventory-/Syncbeleg; lokale aktuelle Peer-/Code-/Stateprüfung plus exaktes Receipt vergleichen |
| Finalisierung | Neuer Helper speichert ausschließlich das noch fehlende Originaloutcome per unverändertem CAS; danach bestehende Spiegelung/normaler Sync |
Keine dieser Runtimeänderungen ist durch den isolierten Kernel implementiert.
Insbesondere ist ein Hash im Receipt kein Ersatz für die unabhängige Prüfung
des zugehörigen aktuellen lokalen Kontroll-/Inventarbelegs. Rotation/Revoke-
und Trustprovisionierung müssen den aktuellen sowie historischen Prüfkontext
beibehalten; der Kernel implementiert keinen neuen Trustdienst.
Offen bleiben außerdem genehmigte typisierte Action/Plan/Grant-/UI-/MCP-
Integration, Updatekatalog und begrenzter eigener Streamingpfad, OSstaging,
stabiler Updaterbootstrap, Dienst-/Dateiaustausch, einmaliger zulässiger
Vorgängercode-Rollback, tatsächliche Linux-Abnahme und danach Windows.
Windows-Codepaar-/Settingsrenderer und Rollbackzustände sind hier **nicht**
implementiert. Der ursprüngliche reine Linux9-/Windows9-Verifiernachweis
bleibt unverändert; diese neuen Verträge haben noch keinen VM-Nachweis.
## Tatsächlich ausgeführte lokale Prüfungen
Offlinecontainer aus vorhandenem Image
`sha256:9a76ad3744ebfdddae96ca10001ce8291c1b332fb54c8df5eea0e8e999ac6fc6`.
Kein Server oder Agent auf dem Notebook gestartet, keine Ziel-/Policyaktion.
```text
cargo check --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff
cargo fmt --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml -p rmm-updater-handoff
cargo test --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --locked --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff --all-targets --release
cargo clippy --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --locked --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff --all-targets -- -D warnings
```
Bestanden: Check, Formatierung, Clippy ohne Warnungen und acht gezielte
Vertragsprüfungen ohne Skip. Diese prüfen den vollständigen16-Event-Fullpfad,
Originalketten-/Clock-/Limitgrenzen, Stop-/Lock-/Austausch-/Restartreihenfolge,
fehlende Fullprozesse/APT-Ausschluss, echte getrennte Healthsignaturen,
stale/fremde/ready-Health und terminalen Unknown sowie Rawbyteerhaltung,
extern gebundene File-/Inline-Signierkeys und feindliche Fullrenderer-Eingaben.
Nur lokale Vertragsnachweise; kein
Bootstrapping, dauerhafter SQLite-Commit, nativer Dienst-/Apply-/Rollback-
oder Produktionsnachweis. Der erste Formatbefehl scheiterte vor Cargo an
einem nicht überschriebenen Image-Entrypoint; mit `--entrypoint cargo`
anschließend tatsächlich ausgeführt. Keine Tests als Folge dieses Fehlers
erfunden oder Zielaktion wiederholt.
+9
View File
@@ -272,6 +272,15 @@ Serverintegration und tatsächlicher genehmigter Codewechsel bleiben
offen. Kein Installer, keine Dienständerung, keine Freigabe und kein RMM-Job
durch diesen reinen Prüfkern; der Subagent führte keine eigene VM-Aktion aus.
Zusätzlicher lokaler Reviewstand nach1.20: ein isolierter typisierter
Handoff-/Healthkernel und geschlossener Linux-Fullrenderer sind implementiert,
ohne den qualifizierten Verifier oder Runtime zu ändern. Die tatsächliche
Linuxzieltopologie General+Full+Agent wird ausdrücklich berücksichtigt;
Full bleibt kein pauschaler Ausschluss. Konkreter Vertrag, acht lokale
Prüfungen, notwendige Reviewentscheidungen und weiterhin fehlende Integration:
[Erhaltende Handoffgrenze](agent-updater-handoff.md). Dies ist keine neue
Produktnorm, Zielinstallation oder native Applyabnahme.
## Nächster Integrationsschnitt zur Freigabe: fester Codepaar-Updatejob
Die folgende Änderungsliste ist **nur Entwurf, nicht implementiert**. Sie