89 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
89 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# Finite journal capacity during the final Cloud reboot acceptance
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On 2026-11-13 the original approved Cloud-VM reboot had already happened, but
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normal reconciliation stopped before producing a new Agent SyncRequest. The
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Root database occupied 268,414,976 bytes: 65,531 pages of 4,096 bytes, against
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the helper's 65,536-page limit. Helper checkpoint 1378 and both journals stayed
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fault-free; generic transport/dependency errors did not identify the cause.
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The VM still had approximately 21.6 GB of filesystem space available, so the
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configured SQLite limit was distinct from disk exhaustion.
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The helper persists a capture before the Agent constructs its SyncRequest.
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That transaction inserts the complete bound snapshot and advances the helper
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checkpoint together. The configured limit prevented the insert, explaining
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the unchanged helper checkpoint and absence of a new request. Historical
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captures, signed responses and consumption tombstones intentionally remain
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durable; this change deletes or rewrites none of them.
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## Actual copied-database proof
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The bootstrap adapter made a consistent private SQLite backup of the actual
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Root database. On that copy, the old 65,536-page limit rejected a 524,288-byte
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test insertion with **SQLITE_FULL, code 13**. After rollback, the exact same
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insertion succeeded at the new finite limit of **262,144 pages / 1 GiB**.
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It was rolled back again. The original database's bytes and inode remained
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unchanged, and both copies of the schema/row fingerprint matched. No package
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effect, RMM job or reboot was involved in this proof.
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## Preserving runtime maintenance and normal completion
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The shared `bounded_journal_capacity` now enforces 1 GiB on both Agent and
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helper, still refusing unexpected page sizes. The Agent uses this same routine
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when opening its journal, so both binaries were rebuilt. Qualified Bookworm
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builds, **126 affected Rust tests**, formatting and warning-denying Clippy
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passed. The existing capacity tests verify the new limit while retaining the
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original consumed grant, start evidence, sequence and replay protection.
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The native maintenance versioned only the two binaries. It preserved all
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18 Root consumptions, the original unresolved reboot, old signed histories,
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device identity, database inodes, General policy/pin, provider and all APT
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attempt/acceptance files. The helper was started first while the Agent remained
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stopped for independent receipt verification. The qualified binaries are:
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- Agent: `9e9f323075f44e02e3900267b846f124303179171476a23d023708fc8339f9b4`
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- Helper: `d6fbfc25263243475c50e703c014772c359533548bccc3f09ff91072b0e8b929`
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- Unchanged provider: `1dc0237dd8df9c9d22568bb1f6b047ede73bc2a5fca5c7fcedb7f24ab2a58b1e`
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After the normal Agent resumed, the **same** original reboot grant
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`25a4bf3f-772c-487d-825d-73bcbbc418fd` completed through signed RootSync.
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The actual Root ledger then contained **18 consumed, 0 unresolved, 0 faults**;
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the old 17 Root rows and database inodes remained unchanged. No second reboot,
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new grant, direct outcome update or journal reset was used. The verified final
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reboot result and restored non-reboot General policy are separate native
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receipts in the original session.
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Protected witnesses, excluded from Git, are under
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`devstate/cloud-reboot/d015c3ef-f3aa-4522-a3c2-fcb6099df17b/`:
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- `capacity-copy.json`: actual SQLite error 13 and unchanged original database.
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- `capacity-runtime.json`: completed preserving binary maintenance.
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- `capacity-upgrade.json`: bound index of actual runtime and build receipts.
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- `result.json`: verified completion of the original single reboot.
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- `closed.json`: verified restoration of the original non-reboot policy.
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The APT endpoint remained disabled throughout. Because runtime measurement
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includes the helper binary, its earlier closed APT pin becomes historical after
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this replacement. A separate post-reboot tool remeasures the unchanged provider
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and performs only the existing copied-database readiness probe after all
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18 Root attempts are closed. It does not create a new package acceptance or
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change any historical acceptance record.
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The initial post-reboot readiness run failed before launching the Python probe.
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The bootstrap had incorrectly added three measurement fields to installation
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metadata, whose Rust parser permits exactly four fields. Independent readback
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confirmed the seven current keys, the exact original four-field backup and
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unchanged values for those original fields. The failed report and all original
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backups remain retained. A narrowly bound source correction restores a copy of
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the original four-field bytes while separately versioning the invalid file;
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it leaves the already correct runtime config/proof unchanged. This recovery
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requires the original reboot to be closed and does not repeat any package job.
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Its native completion must be recorded separately from the earlier failure.
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## Follow-up after the MVP
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The 1 GiB limit is finite reserve, not permanent retention management. Durable
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capture/decision history continues to grow and another exhausted limit must
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fail closed. Investigate measured growth, storage visibility and a separately
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specified safe archival policy after the MVP; do not add deletion, compaction
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or automatic limit increases to this acceptance fix.
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