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Root-helper APT transaction provider / explicit first native acceptance

Latest 2026-11-13: The separately WebUI-approved configure-only attempt 33775478… reached APT 0 and completely installed fixture 1.0, but old provider 5ff260… rejected acceptance on the actual host reboot flag. Its private worker reported false; the historical job had no HOST-before sample. It remains unknown (FIXTURE_UNEXPECTED_REBOOT_REQUIRED), with no acceptance record, Root scope closed and APT endpoint stopped. No before measurement or successful acceptance is inferred retrospectively.

New source implements an original-bound readonly failed-effect classification and a parent-namespace host-before/after contract for future jobs, matching Spec 1.13. Ambient true/true is reported honestly; changed host flags, private worker flags or changed boot reject acceptance. All 81 Python tests passed in the readonly unprivileged offline container, including actual APT argument regressions with guarded fake effects and unchanged real/copied status. Native classification/new-runtime 1.1 acceptance remain pending. See HELPER-CONTRACT.md for the exact versioned contract.

Earlier 2026-11-13: The Cloud fixture retry reached armed hook and APT exit 0, leaving fixture 1.0 unpacked/unconfigured. An original-bound readonly proof and normal signed RootSync now classified that original attempt as failed (APT_PARTIAL_UNCONFIGURED_VERIFIED), preserving all histories/tombstones. No native acceptance record or package repair exists. Root test policy remains closed. Detailed real evidence: ../../docs/implementation-status.md.

The configure-only recovery path, requiring its own new fixed WebUI approval, is implemented in source (schema 4 manifest, transaction schema 2), with a dedicated passive recovery projection and separate immutable recovery records. Its qualified runtime is now installed and its actual Cloud copied-database sandbox readiness probe passed, preserving original state. No configure-only package effect or native package acceptance has yet run. All 75 Python tests passed in the offline readonly unprivileged container, including actual APT 2.6.2 configure-only protocol and guarded fake-dpkg arguments with unchanged real/copied status. See HELPER-CONTRACT.md for the precise recovery boundary.

Source configuration now disables APT's dpkg::selection::remove::approved rewrite, retaining the exact package's Configure operation while both pending modes remain disabled and hook-pinned. Upstream explanation: APT 2.7.14 dpkgpm.cc. Local actual APT 2.6.2 regression in an offline readonly unprivileged container proved unpack + exact --configure rmm-mvp-test:all, no --pending or foreign target; independent dpkg guard simulated effects, real/copied status unchanged. 67 Python tests passed with this opt-in regression. This correction is now installed and sandbox-probed on the Cloud VM; its native package effect remains unaccepted. No automatic repair, marker reset or implicit unknown-resolution is introduced. Older sections below describe historical increments; current operational status is the linked log.

Reproduce that local configure regression using the existing development image with APT 2.6.2 (no host APT command):

docker run --rm --read-only --network none --user 1000:1000 \
  --tmpfs /tmp:rw,exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=1777 \
  --tmpfs /tmp/opencode:rw,exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=1777 \
  -v "$PWD/tools/apt-transaction:/src/tools/apt-transaction:ro" \
  -v "$PWD/tests/apt_transaction:/src/tests/apt_transaction:ro" \
  -v "$PWD/deploy/linux:/src/deploy/linux:ro" -w /src \
  -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e RMM_APT_ARGUMENT_REGRESSION=1 \
  rust-discovery-dev-build:local \
  python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -q

Current dedicated runner/probe/profile/agent integration and executed local checks: ../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md. The general helper unit remains unchanged; actual native VM measurements are still required. Readiness alone advertises no accepted package capability.

Helper integration contract update: HELPER-CONTRACT.md defines the implemented Rust helper bridge, root installation/store layout, schema-2 embedded manifest and exact remaining additive domain fields. It supersedes the older standalone signed helper-action example below: signed-action.json must now contain the full original JobPayload bytes, with action.apt_manifest, including exact transaction_bytes. No detached/unsigned manifest is accepted. No agent capability or native acceptance follows from this bridge build.

Implemented, locally tested; NOT integrated or VM-tested. No host package installation, VM access, real native acceptance, production evidence, grant issuance or WebUI approval has been performed here. The native process path is real code (unshare/mount/capabilities/seccomp/APT/dpkg), not merely a parser; its root/native execution is still unverified. Local root/installer execution in tests is explicitly mocked. No real acceptance record was created.

Python >=3.9, standard library; OS dependencies: APT/dpkg, util-linux unshare/mount, libseccomp.so.2, Linux x86-64 namespaces/seccomp/capabilities. Only Ubuntu 24.04 amd64 is eligible; this is not a support/acceptance claim. No Rust API, Cargo workspace changes, network endpoint, signature verifier, grant service or automatic retry is included.

The circular gate is replaced, not bypassed

There are now two distinct helper-only CLI operations:

/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py native-acceptance
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py execute
  • native-acceptance: dedicated dev-test action, exactly one code-pinned fixture install OR upgrade, its own fixed job/attempt and actual WebUI approval. It permits only absence of a previous native record for that fixture recipe. It uses the same signed binding, archives, native sandbox, hooks, locks, deadlines and independent verification as normal execution. No force/insecure/ skip-validation flag exists.
  • execute: requires an existing matching record and a freshly verified, separately UI-approved normal job/startgrant. An acceptance record never substitutes for any signature or authorization.

Scope matrix: records produced here authorize only their exact fixture recipe, package closure, runtime identity and dev-test profile. Production is rejected (PRODUCTION_ACCEPTANCE_REQUIRED), even for a test record. General catalog packages are rejected (FIXTURE_RECIPE); the bootstrap does not certify arbitrary packages or widen provider support. Supporting those needs a separate reviewed native-acceptance policy/provider revision, not relabelling this record. The legacy unsigned administrator-created native-acceptance.json schema 1 is no longer used. Old helper contexts (schema 1) are rejected as well.

Each of these is a separate, one-time bootstrap recipe (recipe_version 1):

recipe_id exact transition architecture origin
rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0 absent -> 1.0 all rmm-test
rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1 1.0 -> 1.1 all rmm-test

Exactly one package, rmm-mvp-test, no dependencies/scripts/triggers. One job never installs both versions. Upgrade requires another fixed UI-approved job. Pinned deterministic Debian ar/USTAR archives, 20,672 bytes each:

1.0  74036ae81223deab3aae994fd2a2a695af408741777e1ce17dcb4e32f1235867
1.1  ef67c9fe0ba1443fcfe465768e1204763063c369a2a1da04af6027d8a9c00491

build_fixture.py EXISTING_PRIVATE_OUTPUT_DIR creates those exact bytes with fixed metadata. It refuses overwrites and never installs/imports/publishes. Real local dpkg-deb control/payload inspection confirms the only installed file is /usr/share/rmm-mvp-test/version, with the selected version plus newline. The builder now uses deterministic stdlib ar/USTAR construction, not the previous timestamp-dependent dpkg-deb --build output. Older built archives do not qualify for bootstrap; import these pinned bytes manually into the approved catalog, verify and seal them before requesting the final 60-second grant.

Mandatory signed-action and verified-helper contract

This module does not verify signatures. The root helper is the trust boundary. Before writing any handoff files or invoking either mode, it MUST independently:

  1. Verify the signed grant type/schema/algorithm/key, online validity and actual human WebUI authorization (or explicitly labelled allowed dev-test UI simulation), tenant/asset/agent identity and generation/assignment bindings.
  2. Verify plan hash, job payload hash of exact bytes, fixed job/attempt, action, execution profile, recipe/version, code/hook/config/runtime hashes, exact complete resolved transaction and deadlines against that signed grant.
  3. Enforce an explicit helper operation allowlist: apt-native-acceptance only from the dedicated dev-test fixture-bootstrap action, never a generic diagnostic/shell/API request. apt-execute must not invoke bootstrap mode.
  4. Recheck trusted clocks/current rights and durably consume the grant and attempt in its parent journal BEFORE spawning. Reject previous/uncertain attempts. Unprivileged network/MCP callers cannot write these files or invoke an unrestricted privileged subprocess API. Preserve peer-credential checks.

Signed job payload: exact schema 1

The following object itself is the signed/grant-hash-bound job payload, stored unchanged as active/signed-action.json; it is NOT an extra unsigned root manifest or a caller's verified: true assertion. Fields are mandatory:

{
  "type": "rmm.apt.helper-action",
  "schema_version": 1,
  "action": "apt-native-acceptance",
  "execution_profile": "dev-test",
  "transaction_sha256": "<SHA256 of exact expectation.json bytes>",
  "resolved_apt_transaction": "<complete OBJECT defined below, not a string/reference>",
  "provider_sha256": "<installed apt_transaction.py SHA256>",
  "hook_sha256": "<fixed installed hook SHA256>",
  "apt_config_sha256": "<apt_config() bytes SHA256>",
  "runtime_sha256": "<canonical runtime_identity() SHA256>",
  "test_result_id": "<fixed acceptance evidence ID>"
}

The string placeholder for resolved_apt_transaction above MUST be replaced with the complete nested object in actual payloads. Normal mode uses action apt-execute. Production is a recognized profile but cannot use these test records. The helper must verify the signed action, not merely trust ownership of a separately supplied hash. The provider rechecks exact signed-payload hash, type/schema/action/profile, nested transaction equality and code/config/runtime bindings; it relies on the helper for cryptography and grant consumption.

ResolvedAptTransaction schema 1

All fields mandatory; unknown fields/types and duplicate JSON keys are rejected:

schema_version: integer = 1
recipe_id: one exact fixture recipe above
recipe_version: "1"
platform: "ubuntu-24.04-amd64"
resolver_config_version: "rmm-apt-local-v1"
no_reboot: true
status_fingerprint: 64 lowercase hex characters
baseline_sha256: 64 lowercase hex characters
packages: [PackageArchive]  # exactly one for this accepted scope

PackageArchive exact fields:

name: "rmm-mvp-test"
architecture: "all"
old_version: null for install, "1.0" for update
new_version: "1.0" for install, "1.1" for update
origin: "rmm-test"
sha256: corresponding code-pinned hash above
size: 20672
archive_path: "/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/archives/<same sha256>.deb"

The general parser still understands up to 128 package changes / 1 MiB, but that does not authorize a broader execution scope. Frozen dataclasses/tuple closure; strict Debian version ordering via read-only typed dpkg --compare-versions. Status fingerprint hashes raw status/architecture/extended_states and trigger database state. Dirty dpkg updates, pending triggers, repair, reinstall, downgrade, removal, crossgrade and core/kernel/boot packages are unsupported.

active/baseline.json is the complete canonical all-package snapshot from installed_snapshot() (dpkg-query), not just the changed package:

{"package:architecture":{"version":"<version>","status":"install ok installed"}}

Its canonical byte SHA256 binds baseline_sha256. A new install requires actual absence, not leftover config-files. Existing consistent noninstalled entries may be present for other packages. Fingerprint/baseline are rechecked in the native hook, not accepted from simulation as authorization.

VerifiedHelperContext schema 2

Root helper writes active/context.json only after the checks/consumption above:

{
  "schema_version": 2,
  "transaction_sha256": "<exact expectation.json bytes SHA256>",
  "job_payload_sha256": "<exact signed-action.json bytes SHA256>",
  "action": "apt-native-acceptance",
  "execution_profile": "dev-test",
  "effect_armed_ledger_id": "<stable parent journal row>",
  "grant_id": "<verified grant ID>",
  "job_id": "<fixed job ID>",
  "attempt_id": "<fixed attempt ID>",
  "authorization_id": "<UI authorization ID>",
  "plan_sha256": "<verified plan hash>",
  "not_before_ms": 1794484800000,
  "start_before_ms": 1794484860000,
  "boot_id": "<current boot UUID>",
  "monotonic_start_before_ns": 123456789000
}

UTC integer milliseconds; start window <=60,000ms, exclusive upper deadline. Helper translates that same verified deadline to same-boot CLOCK_MONOTONIC ns; never grants another fresh window. Both clocks/boot are checked after expensive verification, before native launch and at the final hook gate. An installation validly started is not aborted merely because its start deadline later expires.

Deployment / exact invocation

Planned, not deployed here. Root helper/operator installs reviewed files:

  • apt_transaction.py -> /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py, 0644
  • fixed hook -> /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/hook, 0755
  • /var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction and active, 0700, root-owned
  • sealed archives in archives/, root-owned; no nonroot writer
  • active expectation/context/baseline/signed-action/apt.conf files, 0600
  • empty root-owned active empty, lists, cache directories, 0700

All path components must be real root-owned nonsymlink/non-group/world-writable paths. apt.conf must equal apt_config() bytes. Read-only print-config emits them; root-only inspect-runtime emits canonical measured runtime identity for the helper/planner's reviewed signed payload, not an acceptance claim.

For either operation, stdin is exactly:

{"transaction_sha256":"<same approved hash>","effect_armed_ledger_id":"<same parent row>"}

Use sanitized environment and close inherited private fds. No secrets in argv. An acceptance request must invoke native-acceptance; a normal signed action must invoke execute. Mixing the two is rejected. Internal hook and sandbox-worker modes are not exposed as privileged IPC operations.

Native pipeline and evidence publication

Both modes run the same pipeline:

  1. Root/signed action/recipe/runtime/preconditions/actual archive validation; constant hook/config/code binding before APT. Native provider flock only serializes this provider, never replaces APT's locks.
  2. Bootstrap additionally writes/fsyncs O_EXCL bootstrap-attempt-<fixed recipe_id>.json in BASE, independently of active/ and grant IDs. One-time per recipe; no automatic deletion/reset/retry, even after a failed native precheck. An operator must reconcile failures and use a separately reviewed lifecycle/revision, not remove tombstones to retry.
  3. Separate native child via fixed unshare --mount --pid --fork --mount-proc --net, private propagation, tmpfs /run/tmp/var/tmp/dev, protected readonly/masked kernel/boot/control-plane/tool/archive paths.
  4. Drop bounding/effective/permitted capability sets to exactly filesystem/UID subset {0,1,3,4,6,7,8,31}; inherited/ambient empty. No SYS_BOOT/SYS_ADMIN/ SYS_PTRACE/KILL/RAWIO/NET_ADMIN/MKNOD. Set NoNewPrivileges, load inherited seccomp denying reboot/kexec, module loading, mount/namespace changes, ptrace/process writes and other kernel-control operations.
  5. Actual native prechecks inside that child: different PID/mount/net ns, expected namespace PID1, exact caps/NNP/Seccomp, readonly mount flags, tmpfs identity, masked sysrq, no conventional systemd/dbus/helper sockets; invalid reboot magic and invalid kexec flags/fds must return EPERM. These calls never contain valid reboot magic/commands or valid kexec input. No PID1 signals.
  6. Hold real existing /var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend with fcntl; a separate native apt-get -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=0 check must report that frontend-lock conflict (100 + expected lock diagnostic). check is read-only, not an installation probe. Never delete locks, kill owners or use simulation to prove locking. A busy foreign lock vetoes the bootstrap. Release only this process's fd.
  7. Fsync native-prechecks record, then sandbox-ready marker. Native APT uses exact local archives, --no-remove --no-install-recommends and constant isolated config. No global APT hooks/sources/preferences; reviewed dpkg global config is runtime-hash-bound in the signed action. Native foreign lock wait remains bounded to 10 seconds. 2026-11-13 native diagnosis: --no-download prevented APT's local file acquisition and emitted **ERROR** instead of the absolute archive filename in protocol v3. The provider permits local acquisition of the presealed archive; the AF_UNIX-only private worker still rejects actual IPv4/IPv6 socket creation. Both denials are now checked inside worker/hook/probe. A permitted IP socket or unrelated resource error vetoes; this is not a network-download allowance or acceptance/manifest/hash/path bypass.
  8. Mandatory v3 pre-dpkg hook repeats signed/runtime/scope/sandbox checks, validates the whole actual action set, actual hashes/control/payload, status/baseline and final deadline; O_EXCL + file/directory fsync effect-armed marker before returning 0. Second hook is vetoed. No fallback. Immediately after successful file/directory fsync, UTC/monotonic deadline and boot identity are checked again. Expiry vetoes the hook while retaining its armed marker: conservative unknown/reconciliation, never marker reuse.
  9. After native child exit 0 and valid bound markers/result, independently query all installed versions/statuses, detect unexpected changes, require empty dpkg --audit and exact installed fixture version-file bytes. Private /run reboot flag is combined with host flag. Bootstrap requires no reboot flag.
  10. Only then publish root-owned 0600 schema-2 acceptance-<fixed recipe_id>.json, staging/fsync complete bytes before exclusive publication and directory fsync. No failed/stale-start/partial/ unknown execution is promoted. Parent must treat publication/IO uncertainty as unknown and reconcile; a record is never an excuse to retry that job.

Record binds exact approved recipe/packages, full measured runtime (tool, hook, APT config, resolved binaries including APT/dpkg/dpkg-deb/dpkg-query/Python/ unshare/mount/shell/libseccomp hashes and version strings, OS/kernel identity, dpkg config fingerprint), transaction/job-payload/plan hashes, grant/job/attempt/ authorization/test-result IDs, precheck/hook/postcondition hashes and completion time. It explicitly contains test_acceptance: true, noProductionEvidence: true. Install and upgrade have separate records; one does not certify the other.

Result / safety bounds

One JSON result on stdout: effect_state = known_failed, verified, or unknown; stable code; structured evidence. Every structured bootstrap result, including veto/unknown, carries evidence.test_acceptance=true and evidence.noProductionEvidence=true. Verified bootstrap additionally reports record hash/test-result ID. Exit 0 means structured result, not job success. Malformed CLI/hook input exits 100 with generic diagnostics. Parent must journal missing output/death/partial markers after possible launch as unknown.

No awaitreboot output in this version: no post-boot completion condition exists. No reboot is invoked. Any reboot/follow-up/retry needs another fixed approved job. No auto-configure-all, autoremove, dist-upgrade, repair, index refresh, installer timeout killing, or automatic record/attempt clearing is provided.

APT retains its frontend lock and normally hands off the inner dpkg lock. No claim that both locks are held during the hook. Direct foreign dpkg and malicious root are outside the frontend-lock guarantee; native inner locking still applies. Root scripts are intrinsically trusted host-filesystem code; this is not general malicious-root containment or arbitrary deferred-side-effect verification. Bootstrap avoids that expansion by accepting only pinned script/trigger/dependency-free fixtures. Existing dpkg triggers/global config, kernel, root administrators, trusted binaries/helper remain in the TCB.

Primary sources and actual local verification

APT 2.7.14 sources read before parser implementation:

Native read-only lock probe checked against DoCheck (Cache.Open/CheckDeps, not dpkg/install) in: https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/cmdline/apt-get.cc.

Hook protocol VERSION 3, nine fields: name old-version old-arch old-multiarch direction new-version new-arch new-multiarch action. New install old triple - - none; < install/upgrade, > downgrade/removal; action absolute archive path or **CONFIGURE**/ **REMOVE**. Config lines precede a blank separator and support percent escaping and repeated unnamed lists. SHA/size/origin are NOT transmitted in v3: actual sealed files are independently checked. Whole closure must match, including one configure per unpack; extra/missing/repeated actions are vetoed. tests/apt_transaction/fixtures/install-v3.txt is source-derived, not a native installation capture.

Actually executed unprivileged, with no host package mutation:

PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v

39 tests passed at the documentation update. Original 22 guard/archive/ parser/preconditions tests plus pinned fixture/control inspection, context/ signed manifest/recipe/profile/runtime binding, native-record matrix, fsync/ partial/negative evidence rejection, mocked full driver success/unknown/failure/ stale/redelivery, mocked native mount/capability/namespace/socket introspection, and local unprivileged seccomp invalid-input EPERM probes. The post-fsync deadline regression advances mocked UTC/monotonic clocks (both and each independently), observes nonzero hook outcome/no modeled dpkg start, and verifies that the durable marker survives and prevents a second handoff. Native root/installer/VM parts are explicitly mocked under private temporary BASE paths; mock-generated records are deleted with those dirs and are NOT native evidence. Safe invalid-input probes and seccomp loading really ran in short-lived unprivileged children. No valid reboot/kexec operation or host PID1 signal was attempted. Deterministic .deb bytes were really built/read/inspected, never installed. Full root sandbox, real APT lock conflict, native fixture install/update, helper signature integration and VM acceptance remain unrun.