43 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Integrated server OIDC test (explicit local development fixture)
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Prerequisites: native `cargo build -p rmm-server --locked`, normal migrations through
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0011 applied to the existing development database, existing protected development
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configuration/CA/job key, Python cryptography, existing web Playwright/Chromium and
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the isolated certutil tool used by the browser harness. No external IdP is required.
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Run `python3 tests/oidc/server_integration.py`. It starts its own ephemeral loopback
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TLS provider and native API on an unused loopback port, and reaches the existing
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development PostgreSQL container through its bridge address. It does not publish
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PostgreSQL or restart the existing server/database. Private configuration is parsed
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internally as data; no shell sourcing, credential stdout/argv or browser artifacts.
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The only administrative fixtures are its own random restricted auth-state login
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role, synthetic external identity routing row and explicit `human` membership row
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in development tenant A. It grants no membership from OIDC groups/email. Those
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fixtures and its own encrypted state rows are removed afterwards. It does **not**
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write authorization/job/permit rows or positively invoke a plan approval endpoint.
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The only approval-endpoint test uses a bearer and must be denied before plan lookup.
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Actual latest standalone run: **35 assertions passed**, including a real Chromium
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provider button/cross-site callback with normal CA validation and a temporary NSS
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store. Browser interaction is visibly synthetic and uses explicit dev simulation.
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The configured production-profile start/login check uses simulation false solely
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to test configuration behavior against the mock; this is **not** external-provider,
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human production-approval or Linux-VM acceptance.
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Covered: code/PKCE/nonce/state, binding non-burning and callback replay, stable
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mapping, final session/CSRF/logout, JWT resource audience/ID-token separation,
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issuer/expiry/kid/rotation/scopes, actual MCP lifecycle/inventory call and insufficient
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scope denial, persistent membership revocation, disabled external identity, foreign
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tenant not-found, bearer+cookie approval denial, production dev-route disabling.
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Harness corrections during implementation: avoid duplicate Python environment
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keywords; do not route the dev-login JSON extractor in production; read MCP SSE to
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its concrete JSON-RPC response instead of waiting for a long-lived stream to close.
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No auth/approval check was disabled to make the harness pass.
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Current backend configuration/routes/migration/provisioning contract is
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`crates/server/OIDC.md`. Earlier `proto/BACKEND_CONTRACT.md` statements about absent
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production auth describe the pre-OIDC backend increment, not this additive adapter.
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The other Sync/root/APT contracts and native-execution gates are unchanged.
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