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rust-discovery/tools/apt-transaction/HELPER-CONTRACT.md

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# Typed RootHelper bridge contract (implementation, not native acceptance)
## Host reboot evidence and historical configured effect (Spec 1.13)
An ambient `reboot_required=true` is honest pending evidence, not an implicit
reboot request or a failed package postcondition. Future fixture effects must
prove equal HOST flags before/after, unchanged boot and no private-worker flag.
The parent captures `active/host-reboot-before.json` **before unshare/private
`/run`**. Schema 1 fields are `transaction_sha256`, `job_payload_sha256`,
`effect_armed_ledger_id`, `grant_id`, `boot_id`, `host_reboot_required` (bool),
and `observed_at_ms`, plus `schema_version`. Creation is exclusive and fsynced;
its observation must belong to the original grant window. New native prechecks
use schema 2, retaining the old exact checks and adding
`host_reboot_before_sha256` and `host_reboot_required_before`. The child binds the
saved host observation; its private `/run` never measures the host flag.
After real APT success the parent verifies the current host flag equals the
saved value, boot is unchanged and `sandbox-result.reboot_required` is false.
False/false and true/true are valid; either change or a private-worker flag
vetoes acceptance. Outcome evidence includes `host_reboot_required_before`,
`host_reboot_required_after`, `host_reboot_before_sha256`,
`reboot_required_introduced:false`; `reboot_required` truthfully retains ambient
true. Ordinary acceptance record **schema 3** explicitly binds those fields and
`native_prechecks_schema_version:2`. The reader rejects old record schemas or
inconsistent values. Separate future recovery records use schema 2 and retain
their distinct `rmm.apt.native-recovery` type. Noop observations remain effect-free
and report their actual current reboot flag. Fresh planning adds the required
public bool `host_reboot_required`; known ambient true is shown in the fixed
WebUI plan reason.
Historical grant `33775478-15b0-46ec-b059-44f500dbb0b6` had **no host-before
sample**. It must never acquire retroactive success or an acceptance record.
Fixed mode `verify-configured-recovery` receives the same eight original binding
fields as `verify-partial`. Only its signed schema-4 configure-only job, old
provider `5ff260…`, old schema-1 prechecks, original partial grant `31ef5e5e…` /
proof `dc3bf387…`, preserved recovery once marker, exact Configure hook, APT exit
0 and private-worker false are eligible. It checks complete stable installed
1.0 state, clean audit, actual payload, unchanged boot, idle locks and current
host marker contents twice, rechecking all thirteen immutable witnesses.
Output is `known_failed` /
`APT_RECOVERY_CONFIGURED_ACCEPTANCE_REBOOT_FLAG_VERIFIED`. Its 24-field proof
contains the original eight bindings, type/schema, original evidence digest,
partial proof hash, original baseline and current snapshot hashes/fingerprint,
payload hash, full snapshot, check time, `effect_complete:true`,
`partial_effect:false`, `postconditions_passed:false`, `reboot_required:true`,
`host_reboot_required:true` and `host_reboot_marker_sha256`. No ctime-based
inference becomes a before measurement. It writes nothing and runs no package
mutation. Rust independently verifies the saved signature/old unknown code,
appends a separate immutable proof, and leaves consumption locked until normal
signed RootSync. Native classification and future 1.1 acceptance remain pending
until actually executed; **81 local Python tests passed**, including both actual
APT argument regressions under the readonly unprivileged offline container.
## Configure-only partial recovery (schema 4, local implementation)
This is a **new, separately WebUI-approved** dev-test native action. Schema 4
requires `native_recovery = {schema_version:1, previous_grant_id,
previous_attempt_id, partial_proof_sha256}` and forbids `native_retry`.
Resolved transaction schema 2 adds `operation:"configure_only"`; only the
existing `rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0` recipe/version 1, pinned fixture archive,
and old/new version `1.0` are eligible. Schema 1 retains its exact encoding.
The helper first requires the original saved signed request, immutable SQLite
partial proof, definitive `APT_PARTIAL_UNCONFIGURED_VERIFIED` outcome, and closed
consumed row. `recovery-planning` receives exactly `{native_recovery, proof}`;
Python rechecks the original still-active witnesses and complete current partial
snapshot. It seals only the content-addressed baseline and returns the normal
planning projection plus `native_recovery`. Ordinary planning continues to reject
unconfigured packages. This passive projection creates no job or authorization.
For execution the helper archives the definitive old active directory, stages
the exact proof as `active/partial-proof.json`, and binds its hash in the new
signed manifest. Python independently checks history, original target, full
partial baseline and installed fixture bytes. APT receives only
`install -- rmm-mvp-test=1.0`; the actual v3 hook must contain exactly one
equal-version `**CONFIGURE**` action. Unpack, removal, foreign packages and pending
configuration remain forbidden. The same native sandbox, grant deadlines,
locked-store handoff and complete postcondition/audit checks apply.
Create-once markers are `recovery-attempt-<previous_grant>.json`,
`pending-recovery-<previous_grant>.json`, and `recovery-<previous_grant>.json`.
Original/retry markers, signed histories and the original unknown proof remain
intact. Recovery produces `native_recovery:true`, `recovery_record_sha256` and
`partial_proof_sha256`; it creates no fresh-install acceptance record or
`native_record_sha256`. A later separately approved native 1.1 upgrade must
provide the ordinary acceptance evidence for the changed provider/runtime.
Local actual APT 2.6.2, with a vetoing collector and independently guarded fake
dpkg, emitted only the exact configure action/target; real and copied package
status stayed unchanged. This is **local regression evidence**, not Cloud-VM
recovery acceptance. Native deployment, UI approval and execution remain the
parent's next acceptance step.
## Explicit one-attempt recovery (schema 3, 2026-11-13)
Schema 2 keeps its exact old encoding (the optional field is omitted). Schema 3
requires `native_retry` and is valid only for dev-test `apt-native-acceptance`:
```
native_retry: {
schema_version: 1,
previous_grant_id: UUID,
previous_attempt_id: UUID,
bootstrap_marker_sha256: SHA256(original exact marker bytes)
}
```
This reference belongs to a **new separately UI-approved signed job**, never
an unsigned IPC override. Under the existing device lock, before consuming the
new grant and again before staging, the helper verifies the original saved
Ed25519 request historically, identical target/generation/assignment/transaction,
distinct job/attempt/authorization/plan, same-ledger terminal `failed` result
`HOOK_NOT_HANDED_OFF`, matching recorded outcome, original context/launch/
sandbox-100 evidence and absent hook/acceptance/retry markers. Historical
signature verification never grants a current start. Unknown or partial history
fails closed. Original active state may only move through the existing terminal
history rule; original tombstone never changes.
Provider independently checks original marker hash and immutable history,
identical full baseline and current normal baseline gates. It exclusively writes
`bootstrap-retry-<recipe>.json` binding the new attempt, signed reference and
hashes of historical evidence. Worker, hook and completion recheck it. This is
one recovery attempt per fixed fixture recipe, not general automatic retries.
Test/native outcomes are recorded in `docs/implementation-status.md`.
**Dedicated-runner update:** the current deployment and readiness protocol is
defined in [`../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md`](../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md).
The actual additive domain schema-2 types and AptNativeAcceptance variant have
since landed and are exercised by a local exact-signature/helper roundtrip test.
Agent routing and nonce/root-peer/identity/profile/stack-bound readiness are
implemented. Older descriptions below of absent domain fields or missing runner
describe the earlier increment, not a remaining implementation gate. Real VM
profile/probe/installation acceptance remains unmeasured, not passed.
## Current integration status / exact outstanding domain change
The helper now contains a real provider bridge in
`crates/privileged-helper/src/apt.rs`, called by its existing peer-credential
authenticated IPC handler, **not** by a script wrapper. The domain job source
was leased to the backend worker during this dispatch; it was not edited.
Legacy package jobs cannot supply the required manifest and remain gated.
No package capability was added to the agent. No native package/service/reboot
operation, VM action, helper installation or acceptance record occurred here.
Required additive domain/backend contract, before capability advertisement:
1. Define typed `AptExecutionManifest` **schema 2**, `ResolvedAptTransaction`
schema 1 and `PackageArchive` in domain (same exact fields/serde shape as the
helper types below; do not make domain depend on the helper crate). All deny
unknown/duplicate fields. No `serde_json::Value` opaque action authorization.
2. Existing `Action::EnsurePackage` and `Action::ApplyUpdates` gain a field
`apt_manifest: Option<AptExecutionManifest>`, default None for legacy reads.
Execution/validation requires Some for APT. Serialization MUST preserve the
complete object; ignoring unknown fields is explicitly detected and denied by
`APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`. No unsigned IPC manifest field exists.
3. Add a dedicated Action variant with this exact JSON shape:
```json
{
"action": "apt_native_acceptance",
"recipe_id": "rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0",
"recipe_version": "1",
"apt_manifest": {"<all schema-2 fields below>": "<replace this placeholder>"}
}
```
`Action::name()` and permit.action are `apt_native_acceptance`. Root-only,
explicit dev-test, specific target, fixed UI-authorized job/attempt. The
upgrade recipe is `rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1` and needs another job. This is
NOT an alias of run_script/diagnostic arbitrary execution. Backend plan/UI
allowlisting must show full transaction, exact hashes, origin, no-reboot,
execution identity and test-acceptance nature before approval.
4. For fixture ensure_package the outer recipe_id/version must match the nested
transaction exactly as strings. For apply_updates, outer provider=`apt`,
packages=`["rmm-mvp-test"]`, reboot_policy=`never`, nested upgrade recipe
only. Other original action parameters are retained and compared against the
domain's typed serialization, never accepted through parameter aliases.
5. Backend validation/planning/signing must validate both manifest transaction
representations, generate JobPayload once and sign its exact payload hash in
the existing Ed25519 permit. Keep all existing target/tenant/generation,
authorization/plan/job/attempt/identity/time bindings. Planning needs the
inspected root runtime/config hashes and immutable baseline/fingerprint.
6. Agent forwarding/capability negotiation must be separately integrated after
the domain contract and native prerequisites are complete. This dispatch did
not change agent/protocol/server files. No optimistic capability claim.
Current clear gates include `APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED`,
`APT_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`; an older
domain may reject the action even earlier as INVALID_JOB/unknown field. That
earlier rejection is not a fallback or authorization shortcut.
## Public Rust API
Current additive passive/no-change contract is documented in
`deploy/linux/runtime-README.md` ("Passive APT planning and declarative
no-change"). `readiness::PlanningResult` is returned only by authenticated
`apt_planning_v1`; it creates no capability. `planning-status` can create only
content-addressed root metadata seals. A normal exact already-desired fixture
returns driver `verified_no_change` / `POSTCONDITION_ALREADY_MET`, never a fake
`POSTCONDITIONS_VERIFIED` transaction/hook. Parent consumption and all signature,
manifest/runtime/native-record/artifact/current-state gates remain required.
```
apt::ProviderConfig // serde deny_unknown_fields
apt::AptExecutionManifest // schema 2
apt::ResolvedAptTransaction // schema 1
apt::PackageArchive
apt::is_apt_action(&JobPayload) -> bool
apt::policy_header(&JobPayload, &ProviderConfig) -> anyhow::Result<()>
apt::prepare(&Binding, &Request, &ProviderConfig, DateTime<Utc>)
-> anyhow::Result<PreparedApt>
PreparedApt::execute(self, &rusqlite::Connection) -> anyhow::Result<Outcome>
apt::install_known_payloads() -> anyhow::Result<()>
```
PreparedApt has no public fields/unchecked constructor. `prepare` independently
calls Binding::verify (exact Ed25519 request/grant and all existing bindings),
checks policy, exact signed manifest/domain preservation/code/runtime bindings,
installed trusted bytes and pre-grant prefetched artifacts. Parent consumes and
save_start-persists the request before execute. Execute independently requires
the corresponding consumed row (same agent/generation/job/attempt, result NULL)
and the exact originally saved request/signature/permit/plan/authorization.
Its stable effect_armed_ledger_id is `apt-<grant UUID>-<SQLite rowid>`.
## Exact manifest schema 2 inside Action.apt_manifest
```
type: "rmm.apt.helper-action"
schema_version: 2
action: "apt-native-acceptance" | "apt-execute"
execution_profile: "dev-test"
transaction_sha256: SHA256(transaction_bytes)
resolved_apt_transaction: complete typed ResolvedAptTransaction object
transaction_bytes: Vec<u8> / JSON array of integer bytes
provider_sha256: SHA256(exact installed Python provider bytes)
hook_sha256: SHA256(exact installed fixed hook bytes)
apt_config_sha256: SHA256(print-config output bytes)
runtime_sha256: SHA256(canonical inspect-runtime output object)
test_result_id: ASCII identifier [A-Za-z0-9_.-], 1..128 bytes
```
The full object AND exact transaction bytes are required. Deserialize the bytes
with the strict typed schema and require equality to the nested object. The
provider writes those **same bytes**, not reformatted JSON, to expectation.json.
It copies **the full original Request.job_bytes unchanged** to signed-action.json;
job_payload_sha256 in context is SHA256 of those complete domain job bytes.
The Python loader now requires that full JobPayload envelope and checks the
nested action, job/attempt/root identity, inner bytes/hash/object and code pins.
A detached old standalone schema-1 helper-action manifest is no longer accepted.
ResolvedAptTransaction fields (all mandatory): schema_version=1, recipe_id,
recipe_version="1", platform="ubuntu-24.04-amd64",
resolver_config_version="rmm-apt-local-v1", no_reboot=true, status_fingerprint,
baseline_sha256, packages. PackageArchive fields: name, architecture,
old_version (null/string), new_version, origin, sha256, size, archive_path.
Only the code-pinned single-package fixture install/upgrade is configured.
Production and arbitrary catalogs remain denied; a test acceptance does not
authorize another recipe/closure/profile. Exact fixture hashes are in README.
## Root configuration / trusted installation / prefetch
Existing root-owned 0600 helper config gains optional `apt_provider` (absent =
disabled). No new secret/environment variable or caller-supplied path:
```json
{
"schema_version": 1,
"execution_profile": "dev-test",
"allow_fixture_bootstrap": true,
"allowed_recipes": ["rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0", "rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1"],
"runtime_sha256": "<operator-reviewed canonical runtime hash>",
"apt_config_sha256": "<operator-reviewed exact config output hash>"
}
```
These are local policy limits, not approvals. Keep the existing binding,
signing-key pin, agent UID/socket GID and parent ledger provisioning unchanged.
No artifact URL/network fetch exists in the root provider.
Planned administrator tool installation, **not executed**:
```
/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --install-apt-provider
```
Root-only, fixed paths, create-only: embeds Python/hook bytes at Rust compile
time, writes root-owned `/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/{apt_transaction.py,hook}`
(0644/0755), `/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction` and archives/baselines/history (0700),
and `install-metadata.json` (0600, provider/hook hashes). Refuses existing files/
directories instead of replacing/chmodding them. Partial installation requires
explicit operator reconciliation; no automatic deletion/repair. On each use,
installed bytes and metadata must match the helper's compiled known payloads.
The interpreter is fixed `/usr/bin/python3 -I`, root-owned resolved interpreter;
all provider/store path components are root-owned, nonsymlink and not writable
by group/others. This installation creates no acceptance or grant.
Planned explicit pre-grant fixture preparation, **not executed**:
```
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py provision-fixture-store
```
Only the two pinned deterministic fixture archives can be created, never an
arbitrary archive/URL. Archives and `prefetch-<sha>.json` receipts are fsynced,
root-owned 0600, exclusive creation. Receipt fields: schema_version=1, sha256,
size, sealed_at_ms. Helper requires receipt time <= permit.not_before, matching
actual SHA256/size/single-link archive. Missing/writable/symlinked/unprefetched
artifacts fail before consumption. All downloads/imports must finish before the
final short grant, never during execution. Artifact mTLS fetch elsewhere must
ultimately yield the same root-verified sealed-store contract, not an agent path.
The same preparation stores complete canonical dpkg baseline at
`baselines/<baseline_sha256>.json` and emits baseline hash/status fingerprint
for the approved immutable plan. It creates neither jobs nor authorization.
For subsequent changed baselines, the root-only `prepare-baseline` mode samples
current dpkg state and creates a new content-addressed canonical baseline before
the new plan/final grant. An identical existing baseline is only read/verified,
never rewritten; changed state creates another hash file, never resets archives,
receipts or acceptance/attempt markers. It creates no job authority. Do not
modify a sealed file or fake a fingerprint. Archive preparation is create-only.
Root `inspect-runtime` / `print-config` provide the planning measurements; hash
inspect-runtime's canonical JSON object **without its trailing newline**. Review
the measured binary/OS/dpkg configuration rather than blindly trusting a hash.
## Handoff, outcomes, recovery and unit prerequisites
Parent handler retains its existing device lock, consumes once, save_start
persists exact signed request, and rechecks clock/grant before effects. Bridge
creates active/0700 and expectation/signed-action/baseline/config/context files
0600 using exclusive nofollow writes and file/directory fsync. Context schema 2
contains the same grant/job/attempt/authorization/plan IDs and original UTC
deadline translated to CLOCK_MONOTONIC, not a fresh 60-second grant.
An old active directory can only move to history/<old grant UUID> when the same
parent ledger contains a definitive succeeded/failed result. Unknown/null,
unrecognized/partial handoffs or existing history destination block execution.
No tombstone/native bootstrap-attempt record is removed. Parent grant/attempt
consumption survives any active-directory move.
Python receives only fixed mode/path argv and two hash/ledger fields via stdin,
with cleared environment; no shell, secret argv or script conversion. Structured
stdout is bounded to 64 KiB (excess drained without unbounded allocation), raw
stderr discarded. Never timeout-kill APT. Client timeout is unknown while the
helper keeps running and eventually journals the real result.
Exit 0 alone is never success. Strict JSON effect_state/code/evidence validation
requires bound ledger, exact package versions, full snapshot hash, installed
fixture payload hash, and bootstrap test flags/native-record/test-result binding.
Malformed/nonzero/missing/wrong evidence -> unknown. known_failed with an armed
marker -> unknown, not failed. Existing finish() leaves consumed.result NULL for
unknown/awaiting_reboot and persists execution_evidence, retaining the device lock.
**Existing helper systemd unit is not an APT-capability deployment.** Its
ProtectSystem=strict/other hardening can prevent the required store/package
writes and namespace setup. A separately reviewed native runner/unit profile
must permit the narrowly agreed fixture writes and setup capabilities while
preserving the provider's final sandbox. No unit sandbox was weakened here.
Do not announce capability based solely on a successful helper build.
Local verification commands/results are reported in the dispatch return.
Native helper installation, IPC package execution, lock probe, fixture install/
update and VM approval/acceptance remain unrun. Tests using private temporary
ledgers/mock children are not native acceptance evidence.
Actually executed for this bridge increment:
```
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo fmt -p rmm-privileged-helper -- --check
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo clippy -p rmm-privileged-helper --lib --bin rmm-privileged-helper --tests -- -D warnings
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo test -p rmm-privileged-helper --lib --bin rmm-privileged-helper
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v
```
Final results: formatting and warning-denying Clippy passed; **16 library + 2
binary Rust tests passed**, **41 Python tests passed**, AST syntax checks passed
for **6 Python files**. No full workspace suite was run. An initial Rust test
fixture used legacy ApplyUpdates, which the current domain rejected as
`INVALID_JOB`; cryptographic/parent-ledger tests were corrected to use an
existing valid signed action without executing it or allowing it as an APT
action. This is not evidence that the missing domain package contract landed.