test: accept bounded cloud logs and equal UI HTTP MCP evidence
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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// Read only through actual UI clicks; inspect its normal HTTP response.
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
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const { chromium } = require('../../web/node_modules/playwright');
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const root = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..');
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function privateJson(file) {
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const s = fs.lstatSync(file);
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assert(s.isFile() && !s.isSymbolicLink() && s.uid === process.getuid() && (s.mode & 0o777) === 0o600 && s.size <= 1048576);
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return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
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}
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(async () => {
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const file = path.resolve(process.argv[2]); const expected = privateJson(file);
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assert.equal(expected.profile, 'dev/test'); assert.equal(expected.case, 'query_logs');
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const login = privateJson(path.join(root, 'credentials/server-browser-login.json'));
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const browsers = path.join(root, 'web/node_modules/.cache/playwright-browsers');
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const version = fs.readdirSync(browsers).find(x => /^chromium-/.test(x));
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const executablePath = ['chrome-linux/chrome', 'chrome-linux64/chrome'].map(x => path.join(browsers, version, x)).find(x => fs.existsSync(x));
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const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true, executablePath,
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env: { ...process.env, HOME: path.join(root, 'web/node_modules/.cache/cloud-acceptance/home') } });
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try {
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const page = await browser.newPage({ ignoreHTTPSErrors: false });
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await page.goto('https://localhost:18443/');
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await page.getByLabel('Benutzername').fill(login.username);
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await page.getByLabel('Passwort', { exact: true }).fill(login.password);
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const sessionResponse = page.waitForResponse(r => new URL(r.url()).pathname === '/auth/session' && r.status() === 200);
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Anmelden', exact: true }).click();
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const session = await (await sessionResponse).json();
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assert(session.testsimulation === true && session.principal === 'simulated-testprincipal-a');
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await page.getByRole('status').filter({ hasText: 'SIMULIERT' }).waitFor();
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assert.equal(await page.getByLabel('Mandant', { exact: true }).inputValue(), expected.tenant_id);
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: expected.operation_id, exact: true }).click();
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const op = page.locator('section').filter({ has: page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Antrag / Ausführung ' + expected.operation_id, exact: true }) });
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const response = page.waitForResponse(r => new URL(r.url()).pathname === `/api/v1/tenants/${expected.tenant_id}/jobs/${expected.job_id}` && r.status() === 200);
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await op.getByRole('button', { name: 'Job ' + expected.job_id + ' · succeeded', exact: true }).click();
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const http = await (await response).json();
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const detail = page.locator('article').filter({ has: page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Job ' + expected.job_id, exact: true }) });
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await detail.locator('pre').waitFor();
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const rendered = JSON.parse(await detail.locator('pre').innerText());
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assert.deepEqual(http, expected.result); assert.deepEqual(rendered, expected.result);
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const observation = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(rendered.result.stdout).toString('utf8'));
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assert.equal(observation.data.unit, 'rmm-mvp-test.service'); assert.equal(observation.data.json_lines.length, 4);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(path.dirname(file), 'read-evidence.json'), JSON.stringify({ verified: true, http, rendered }), { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' });
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Abmelden', exact: true }).click();
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} finally { await browser.close(); }
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})().catch(error => { console.log('CLOUD_LOG_READ_INCOMPLETE:' + error.constructor.name); process.exitCode = 1; });
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import sys
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sys.path.insert(0,str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
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import cloud_mvp_acceptance as cloud
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CASES=('service_setup','service_start','service_stop','apt_native_install','apt_native_update','ensure_package','apply_updates')
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CASES=('service_setup','service_start','service_stop','query_logs','apt_native_install','apt_native_update','ensure_package','apply_updates')
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def run(file,prepare=False):
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Bounded root log acceptance for the one harmless cloud test unit."""
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import datetime as dt
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import uuid
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import cloud_apt_retry as apt
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import cloud_root_policy
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cloud=apt.cloud
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def open_policy(payload):
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import datetime as dt
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p=Path('/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/root-policy/policy.json')
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require(not p.is_symlink() and p.stat().st_uid==10001 and p.stat().st_mode&0o777==0o600,'safe existing policy')
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old=p.read_bytes()
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require(hashlib.sha256(old).hexdigest()==payload['previous_sha256'] and
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dt.datetime.fromisoformat(json.loads(old)['expires_at'])<dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc),'known closed policy')
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policy=payload['policy'];scope=policy['scopes'][0]
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require(policy['schema_version']==1 and policy['profile']=='development' and len(policy['scopes'])==1 and
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dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)<dt.datetime.fromisoformat(policy['expires_at'])<=dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)+dt.timedelta(minutes=16) and
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not scope['allowed_services'] and not scope['allow_root_scripts'] and not scope['allow_reboot'] and 'apt' not in scope and
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scope['principals']==['simulated-testprincipal-a'] and
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scope['root_logs']==dict(schema_version=1,allowed_units=['rmm-mvp-test.service'],sensitive_units=[]),'one test-unit read policy only')
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backup=p.parents[1]/('root-policy-bootstrap-'+str(uuid.UUID(payload['id'])));backup.mkdir(mode=0o700)
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def create(path,data,uid=0):
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fd=os.open(path,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600)
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with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as f:f.write(data);f.flush();os.fsync(f.fileno());os.fchown(f.fileno(),uid,uid)
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create(backup/'previous-policy.json',old)
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next_path=p.with_suffix('.logs-next');create(next_path,json.dumps(policy).encode(),10001);os.replace(next_path,p)
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return dict(policy_sha256=hashlib.sha256(p.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),backup=str(backup),approvals_created=False)
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def main():
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os.umask(0o077);m=cloud.contract
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require=cloud.require
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require(apt.prior.evidence('gate')['unresolved']==0,'no unresolved cloud attempts')
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installed=m.protected_json(cloud.ROOT/'devstate/remote-vm.json');identity=installed['identity']
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import cloud_root_evidence
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peers=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('linux-vm.conf',cloud_root_evidence.inspect_helpers,dict(identity,tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,general_only=True))
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require(peers['ledger']['faults']==0,'fault-free shared ledger')
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binding=peers['general']['identity']
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scope={k:binding[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version')}
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scope.update(principals=['simulated-testprincipal-a'],helper_policy_sha256=peers['general']['policy_sha256'],
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acceptance_evidence_id='cloud-general-readiness:bounded-testunit-logs',allowed_services=[],allow_root_scripts=False,allow_reboot=False,
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root_logs=dict(schema_version=1,allowed_units=['rmm-mvp-test.service'],sensitive_units=[]))
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policy=dict(schema_version=1,profile='development',expires_at=(m.now()+dt.timedelta(minutes=15)).isoformat(),scopes=[scope])
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folder=cloud.ROOT/'devstate/cloud-logs';folder.mkdir(mode=0o700,exist_ok=True)
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previous=m.protected_json(apt.STATE/'policy-closed.json')
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record=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',open_policy,dict(id=str(uuid.uuid4()),previous_sha256=previous['policy_sha256'],policy=policy))
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m.write_private(folder/'policy-open.json',dict(record,policy=policy))
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process=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(cloud.ROOT/'deploy/cloud_root_acceptance.py'),'--case','query_logs'],capture_output=True,timeout=600)
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# The child intentionally prints only public contract statuses.
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print(process.stdout.decode(),end='')
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closed=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',cloud_root_policy.close_policy,dict(expected_sha256=record['policy_sha256'],backup=record['backup']))
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m.write_private(folder/'policy-closed.json',closed)
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require(process.returncode==0,'bounded log acceptance incomplete; preserve original case')
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print('PASS cloud bounded log collection; test-only read policy closed')
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if __name__=='__main__':
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try:main()
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except Exception as error:
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message=str(error)
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print(message if message.startswith('remote bootstrap incomplete: ') else 'CLOUD_LOG_ACCEPTANCE_INCOMPLETE:'+type(error).__name__)
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raise SystemExit(2) from None
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@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ class Backend:
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return bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',server,dict(kind='http',path='/mcp',method='POST',headers=self.headers,body=body,principal=self.principal))
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def call(self,name,args):
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contract.require(name in ('tenants.list','inventory.get_device','operations.plan','operations.submit','jobs.get','jobs.cancel'),'tool_allowlist')
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contract.require(name in ('tenants.list','inventory.get_device','logs.query','operations.plan','operations.submit','jobs.get','jobs.cancel'),'tool_allowlist')
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self.sequence+=1
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response=self.request(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',id=self.sequence,method='tools/call',params=dict(name=name,arguments=args)))
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data=response.get('data',{}) or {}
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@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ def main():
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m.require(observed['sync_ready'] and not observed['restore_blocked'],'signed sync required')
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device=backend.call('inventory.get_device',dict(tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,asset_id=identity['asset_id']))
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m.require(device['presence']=='online' and device['agent_id']==identity['agent_id'],'online cloud VM required')
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peers=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('linux-vm.conf',cloud_root_evidence.inspect_helpers,{k:settings[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id')})
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peers=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('linux-vm.conf',cloud_root_evidence.inspect_helpers,dict(
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{k:settings[k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id')},general_only=name=='query_logs'))
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m.require(peers['ledger']['integrity']=='ok' and peers['ledger']['faults']==0,'healthy shared helper ledger required')
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if name in adapters.APT_CASES:
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apt_peer=peers['apt'];recipe=adapters.RECIPES[name]
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@@ -42,6 +43,16 @@ def main():
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else recipe in apt_peer['accepted_recipes'],'actual native bootstrap/acceptance gate required')
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planning=adapters.planning_from_device(device) if name in adapters.APT_CASES else None
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request=m.case_input(name,settings,planning=planning)
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if name=='query_logs':
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import datetime as dt
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# Query only the already approved harmless unit's stored start/stop
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# interval. No extra service mutation is needed to manufacture logs.
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prior=m.protected_json(cloud.ROOT/'devstate/cloud-root/cases/service_stop/checkpoint.json')
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prior_payload=prior['job']['payload']
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m.require(prior['verified'] and prior_payload['agent_id']==identity['agent_id'],'same VM test-unit history')
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moment=m.timestamp(prior_payload['not_before'])
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request['parameters'].update(execution_identity='root',since=(moment-dt.timedelta(minutes=1)).isoformat(),
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until=(moment+dt.timedelta(minutes=4)).isoformat())
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m.require({'rmm.sync.v1','helper.root.v1','root:'+request['action'],request['action']}<=set(device['capabilities']),'native root capability required')
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folder=cloud.ROOT/'devstate/cloud-root/cases'/name
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if not args.resume_prepared:folder.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=False)
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@@ -83,6 +94,13 @@ def main():
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m.require(result['state']=='succeeded' and result['result']['evidence']['postconditions_passed'],'native success/postcondition required; no retry')
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if name=='service_setup':
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m.require(result['result']['exit_code']==0 and bytes(result['result']['stdout'])==b'RMM test unit prepared\n','exact root script result')
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if name=='query_logs':
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observation=json.loads(bytes(result['result']['stdout']))
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checkpoint['log_observation']=observation;save()
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m.require(observation['quality']=='valid' and observation['source_id']=='/usr/bin/journalctl' and
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isinstance(observation.get('data',{}).get('json_lines'),list) and
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0<len(observation['data']['json_lines'])<=50,'bounded actual test-unit journal observation')
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m.require(len(bytes(result['result']['stdout']))<=65536,'bounded serialized log output')
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if name in adapters.APT_CASES:
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apt=result['result']['evidence']['apt'];manifest=request['parameters']['apt_manifest']
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package=manifest['resolved_apt_transaction']['packages'][0]
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@@ -3,12 +3,13 @@
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def inspect_helpers(payload):
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import sqlite3
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program=r'''import json,os,socket,struct,uuid
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program=r'''import json,os,socket,struct,uuid,sys
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from pathlib import Path
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result={}
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for kind,pin_path,socket_path in (
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('general','/etc/rmm-remote/general-helper-proof.json','/run/rmm-helper-cloud/control.sock'),
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('apt','/etc/rmm-remote/apt-helper-proof.json','/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock')):
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if kind=='apt' and sys.argv[1]=='general':continue
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pin_path=Path(pin_path);socket_path=Path(socket_path)
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for path in list(pin_path.parents)+[pin_path]+list(socket_path.parents):
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meta=path.lstat();assert not path.is_symlink() and meta.st_uid==0 and meta.st_mode&0o022==0
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@@ -30,10 +31,10 @@ for kind,pin_path,socket_path in (
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assert response['schema_version']==1 and response['challenge']==challenge and response['identity']==pin['identity'] and response['profile']==pin['profile']
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assert response[field]==pin[field] and response['ledger_inode'] and response['lock_inode']
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result[kind]=response
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assert all(result['general'][k]==result['apt'][k] for k in ('ledger_device','ledger_inode','lock_device','lock_inode'))
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if 'apt' in result:assert all(result['general'][k]==result['apt'][k] for k in ('ledger_device','ledger_inode','lock_device','lock_inode'))
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print(json.dumps(result))
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'''
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process=subprocess.run(['/usr/sbin/runuser','-u','rmm-agent','--','/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',program],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25)
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process=subprocess.run(['/usr/sbin/runuser','-u','rmm-agent','--','/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',program,'general' if payload.get('general_only') is True else 'both'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25)
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result=json.loads(process.stdout)
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for peer in result.values():
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require(all(peer['identity'][key]==payload[key] for key in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id')),'helper target identity drift')
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@@ -1,5 +1,35 @@
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# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
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## Begrenzte Root-Logs und gleiche UI/HTTP/MCP-Lesesicht bestanden — 2026-11-13
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Neuer fester Cloud-Plan für `query_logs`, ausschließlich
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`rmm-mvp-test.service`, genau 300 Sekunden aus dem bereits genehmigten früheren
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Testdienstlauf, höchstens50Zeilen/65536Bytes. Kein Dienststart nur zur Erzeugung
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von Testlogs. Kurzlebige Rootpolicy erlaubte ausschließlich diese eine
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Logquelle: keine Rootskripte, Dienständerungen, APT oder Reboots. Unabhängiger
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Generalhelper-Readinessbeleg ohne Wiederaktivierung des APT-Endpunkts.
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Vor dem tatsächlichen simulierten WebUI-Klick 0/0/0, danach genau1/1/1,
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Nachbedingungen bestanden. Tatsächlich **vier JSON-Journalzeilen**, Quelle
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`/usr/bin/journalctl`, Unit exaktgebunden, Erhebungszeit
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`2026-11-13T16:50:04.641161226Z`. Qualität valid, Abdeckung bewusst **partial**,
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`JOURNAL_ACCESS_COVERAGE_AND_CURSOR_UNVERIFIED`; kein behaupteter vollständiger
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Journalzugriff oder persistenter Cursor. Keine Rohlogs in Git/Chat.
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Danach denselben gespeicherten Job per tatsächlichem UI-Klick geöffnet und
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seine natürliche HTTP-Antwort beobachtet: vollständiger Job-/Ergebnis-DTO
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exaktgleich zu MCP `jobs.get`. MCP `logs.query` mit `live=false` lieferte genau
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denselben Job und dasselbe Ergebnis samt ursprünglichen Quellen-/Zeitwerten.
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MandantB auf A-Logkontext tatsächlich verweigert. Kein neuer Diagnosejob für
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Lesekonsistenz, keine direkte API-Genehmigung. Testlogpolicy abschließend
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kontrolliert geschlossen; APT-Endpunkt weiterhin inactive.
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Geschützte Nachweise `devstate/cloud-root/cases/query_logs/` und
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`devstate/cloud-logs/{policy-open,policy-closed,mcp-read,read-evidence}.json`.
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Python-/Node-Syntaxprüfung und tatsächliche Browser-Vorbereitung, Genehmigung
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sowie Lesesicht bestanden. **MVP weiterhin offen**: weitere Fehler-/Offline-/
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APT-/Rebootgates bleiben bestehen.
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## WSS-Doppelzustellung nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
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Tatsächlich denselben WebUI-genehmigten Offer mit identischen Bytes/ID doppelt
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+1
-1
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Plan. Zulässige dev/test-Browserbedienung bleibt sichtbar simuliert und auditie
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| 0. **Bestanden:** APT-Teilwirkung abgeglichen | Ursprünglichen signierten Auftrag und vorhandene Nachweise prüfen; aktuelle vollständige Teilwirkung über einen zulässigen, gebundenen prüfenden Pfad feststellen; ausschließlich signierte gezielte Ergebnisübernahme in Agent, Server und **demselben** Helperledger. Alte Marker/History bleiben erhalten. Kein unsigned Unlock, blindes Retry oder pauschales `--configure --pending`. | Jetzt 9 Helperverbräuche, 0 unresolved; zentral 13 Jobs / 13 Outbox / 12 Grants / 0 unresolved. Rootpolicy geschlossen. `cloud_apt_retry.py finish` liest nur den alten Ausgang und ist **kein** Recoveryverfahren. |
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| 1. Begrenzte APT-Wiederherstellung und M4 | Neue Configure-Korrektur unter identitäts-/journalbewahrender Installation nativ prüfen; nötige Wiederherstellungswirkung als neuen festen UI-Plan genehmigen. Fixture 1.0 unabhängig vollständig verifizieren, danach separat genehmigtes Upgrade 1.0→1.1 und passende runtimegebundene Acceptance. Normale `ensure_package`-/`apply_updates`-Pläne auf 1.1 separat als echte Noops mit unverändertem Paketbestand nachweisen. | Erst nach Gate 0 und sicherem Recoveryvertrag. Vorhandene Cloud-APT-Runner/Caseverzeichnisse sind create-only; nicht blind wiederholen. Neue Source-/Runtimepins nicht mit installierten Pins vermischen. |
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| 2. Begrenzte Live-Logs und Lesesicht | Genau erlaubte Testunit, gebundenes Zeitfenster/Zeilen-/Bytelimit, Quelle und tatsächlicher Erhebungszeitpunkt; echte UI-Genehmigung vor Sammlung. Gespeicherte Ergebnisse über UI, HTTP und MCP gleich darstellen. Fremder Tenant/unerlaubte Quelle bleibt verweigert. | `query_logs`-Adapter vorhanden, aktueller Cloud-Nativnachweis fehlt. Historische VM-Runner enthalten überstimmte lokale Server-/Tunnelannahmen; vor Ausführung Cloud-only anpassen. Rootlogs haben eine eigene Read-Allowlist, keine Ableitung aus Dienständerungsrechten. |
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| 2. **Bestanden:** begrenzte Live-Logs und Lesesicht | Genau erlaubte Testunit, gebundenes Zeitfenster/Zeilen-/Bytelimit, Quelle und tatsächlicher Erhebungszeitpunkt; echte UI-Genehmigung vor Sammlung. Gespeicherte Ergebnisse über UI, HTTP und MCP gleich darstellen. Fremder Tenant/unerlaubte Quelle bleibt verweigert. | Nativ vier Zeilen aus fester Testunit/300Sekunden/max50Zeilen/65536Bytes; valid/partial ehrlich. Eigene Rootlog-Read-Allowlist, danach geschlossen. UI/natürliche HTTP-Antwort/MCP exaktgleich, Fremdtenant verweigert. Keine neue Wirkung beim gespeicherten Lesen. |
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| 3. Doppelzustellung bestanden; ACK/Wiederanlauf offen | Tatsächlich denselben genehmigten Offer/Versuch erneut zustellen und einmal gezielt Ergebnis-ACK verlieren: ursprüngliche IDs/Bytes erneut senden, genau ein Verbrauch/eine Wirkung, unveränderte Grantanzahl und dauerhafter Ergebnisempfang. Eigener kontrollierter Agentabbruch nach möglicher Wirkung muss `unknown` und gebundenen Abgleich ergeben. | AT-07/08/33, M2. Eng begrenzter Devadapter implementiert. Native WSS-Doppelzustellung bestanden: zwei tatsächliche Annahme-IDs, ein Grant/Verbrauch/Wirkung, eigener UI-Lesejob bestätigte Zähler1. LostACK und Prozessabbruch weiter offen. Details: `delivery-acceptance.md`. |
|
||||
| 4. Offline, Ablauf und Entzug | Nach Annahme vor Start Verbindung verlieren: offline keine Starterlaubnis/Wirkung. Nach Wiederkontakt nur innerhalb gültiger Bindung/Frist starten. Separater Ablaufversuch bleibt nach Wiederkontakt `expired` ohne Grant/Wirkung. Rechte-/Genehmigungsentzug sperrt neuen Start. Bereits bestandenen Abbruch-vor-Start nicht als laufenden Installerabbruch ausgeben. | AT-06/09, M2/M5. Aktuelle Unknown-Sperre darf den eigentlich geprüften Offline-/Fristgrund nicht verdecken. Kein fremder Paketmanager wird beendet. |
|
||||
| 5. M1-Identitätslebenszyklus | Native Rotation mit erhaltenen Agent-/Asset-/Enrollment-IDs und Journal; nicht nur neues Zertifikat ausgestellt, sondern neuer tatsächlicher TLS-Peerfingerprint benutzt. Ungültige CA/Name/abgelaufenes Zertifikat verweigert. Widerruf verhindert neue Starts und beendet/fenced den Kanal. | AT-03, M1. Öffentliche Fingerprint-/Authzeit-DTOs aus Migration 12 existieren bereits. Der alte Renewalrunner endet mangels Fälligkeit/Trigger bewusst `not_configured`; keine erfundene Zeit, Schlüsselkopie oder Neu-Enrollung als Rotationsbeleg. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ test('simulated human prepares root request through UI only, without approving',
|
||||
const request = object(expected.request), params = object(request.parameters);
|
||||
expect(params.execution_identity).toBe('root');
|
||||
expect(object(request.targets).asset_ids).toEqual([expected.asset_id]);
|
||||
expect(['run_script', 'set_service_state', 'apt_native_acceptance', 'ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'reboot']).toContain(request.action);
|
||||
expect(['run_script', 'query_logs', 'set_service_state', 'apt_native_acceptance', 'ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'reboot']).toContain(request.action);
|
||||
let authorizationRequests = 0;
|
||||
page.on('request', r => { if (new URL(r.url()).pathname.endsWith('/authorizations')) authorizationRequests++; });
|
||||
const sessionResponse = page.waitForResponse(r => new URL(r.url()).pathname === '/auth/session' && r.status() === 200);
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ test('one opted-in immutable dev/test action: inspect all fixed bytes → UI cli
|
||||
expect(payload.execution_identity).toBe('agent_service');
|
||||
expect(action).toEqual({ action: 'refresh_inventory', scope: 'linux.base' });
|
||||
} else if (expected.case === 'query_logs') {
|
||||
expect(payload.execution_identity).toBe('agent_service');
|
||||
// A cloud root log check must keep its explicit helper/policy-bound identity.
|
||||
expect(payload.execution_identity).toBe(object(expected.job_payload).execution_identity);
|
||||
expect(['agent_service', 'root']).toContain(payload.execution_identity);
|
||||
expect(action.action).toBe('query_logs'); expect(action.unit).toBe('rmm-mvp-test.service');
|
||||
expect(action.max_lines).toBe(50);
|
||||
expect(Date.parse(text(action.until)) - Date.parse(text(action.since))).toBe(300000);
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user