Accept native Windows automatic WSS to HTTPS fallback and close test hooks
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -4,6 +4,34 @@ Stand 2026-11-13, Spezifikation 1.15. Windows-11-Gast und Notebook-Host sind
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verschiedene Geräte. Auf dem Notebook laufen ausschließlich Entwicklungstools;
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der Client verwendet den endgültigen Cloudserver `discovery.ease-technologies.de`.
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## Automatischer WSS→HTTPS-Fallback nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
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Eigener Fall `2ff2e1aa-0037-4831-9bc2-31218bf1461c` auf derselben bestehenden
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Windows-Identität unter LocalService. Nur der eigene Agenttransport wurde
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versioniert auf `auto` gestellt. Zunächst zwei frische WSS-Heartbeats;
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dann exakt gerätegebundene, zehn Minuten gültige dev/test-Störung.
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Zwei tatsächliche mTLS-authentisierte HTTP503 bei WSS, mit unterschiedlichen
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Handshake-IDs und den festen Slots1/2, Zertifikatsfingerprint und Config-Hash.
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Der Agent wechselte selbst zu HTTPS; zwei frische HTTPS-Heartbeats und konkreter
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Inventar-ACK nach beiden Verweigerungen tatsächlich gespeichert.
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Gleiche Agent-/Asset-/Enrollment-/Zuordnungsversion und Dateien/ACLs, monotone
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Sequenz, TenantB weiter verweigert. Kein neuer RMM-Job: Windows vor/nach
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0Jobs/0Outbox/0Grants/0offen; Linux unverändert30/30/26/0. Zentrale Rootpolicy
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unverändert. Beide realen Serverrollen danach mit Faultflagfalse und ohne
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konfigurierten Fault-Dateipfad; exakte ursprüngliche WSS-Konfigurationsbytes und
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ACLs auf Windows restauriert, wieder zwei frische WSS-Heartbeats/ACK0.
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Dies ist keine Behauptung eines automatischen HTTPS→WSS-Switchbacks: Rückkehr
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folgte aus der ausdrücklichen operativen Wiederherstellung der Konfiguration.
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Ausgeführt: `python3 deploy/windows/auto_transport_acceptance.py start
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--https-case 3c60e1a8-7ab7-4720-8b1a-f89f4f0d7458`.
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Sechs gezielte lokale Guards ergänzen den nativen Nachweis; kein neuer
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Clientbuild und keine Windows-Syncbereitschaft erfunden. Geschützt:
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`devstate/windows-client/auto-transport/2ff2e1aa-0037-4831-9bc2-31218bf1461c/result.json`,
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verifiziert. Aktueller Dienst nach dieser Abnahme wieder mit ursprünglichem WSS;
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eine dauerhafte Defaultumstellung ist ein eigener dokumentierter Schritt.
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## TLS-Negativfälle auf Windows nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
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Feste getrennte Fixture `7b190a5c-c928-4348-bd0d-c9698dad5417`, Schlüssel auf
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@@ -62,7 +90,7 @@ Der Runner verwendet einen per Hash und SFTP gepinnten Bootstrap-PowerShellcode;
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prozessbezogenes RemoteSigned ändert keine Maschinen-/Gruppenrichtlinie und
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keine RMM-Jobausführung. Sieben gezielte lokale Runner-Guards und drei
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PowerShell-Parserprüfungen bestanden; kein neuer Clientbuild für diese Abnahme.
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TLS-Negativfälle sind oben separat abgenommen; automatischer Fallback folgt getrennt.
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TLS-Negativfälle und automatischer Fallback sind oben separat nativ abgenommen.
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PowerShell-Jobs bleiben bis zu [ihren Voraussetzungen](../../docs/windows-job-boundary.md)
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gesperrt. Die folgenden Erstnachweise bleiben historisch erhalten.
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@@ -144,8 +172,8 @@ Strecke ausschließlich passive Standardbeobachtungen verarbeitet.
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Dieser erste Entwicklungsbuild ist **unsigniert**. Kein produktiver signierter
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Installer/MSVC-Supportnachweis, keine Zertifikatsrotations-/Widerrufs-/Proxy- oder
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Windows-Paket-/Dienstaktionsabnahme. Der erste native Onlinenachweis verwendete WSS. Explizites HTTPS ist inzwischen
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oben separat nativ abgenommen; automatischer Fallback folgt gesondert. Die passive SCM-/Enrollment-/mTLS-/Inventar-/Mandantentrennungsstrecke sowie
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Windows-Paket-/Dienstaktionsabnahme. Der erste native Onlinenachweis verwendete WSS. Explizites HTTPS und automatischer Fallback sind inzwischen oben separat nativ
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abgenommen. Die passive SCM-/Enrollment-/mTLS-/Inventar-/Mandantentrennungsstrecke sowie
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die oben benannten nativen Tests sind nun tatsächlich getrennt belegt.
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Dies ist keine vollständige Windows-/Linux-MVP-Abnahme.
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@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Passive Windows auto-WSS→HTTPS with two exact authenticated rejections.
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Reuses the qualified Windows preservation primitive and existing dev/test
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server fault. No job, direct approval, new identity or guest reboot exists here.
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"""
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import argparse
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import datetime as dt
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import time
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import uuid
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import transport_acceptance as base
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import cloud_transport_acceptance as fault
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cloud = base.cloud
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require = base.require
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STATE = base.cb.EVIDENCE/'auto-transport'
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PRIOR_CASE = '697b19ba-e7ff-4ebf-8a45-f5a0b0514fea'
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def server_state(payload):
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"""Only fixed nonsecret flags and known file hashes; no complete env."""
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root = Path('/opt/rust-discovery'); compose = root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'
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selected = root/'devstate/root-policy/transport-fault.json'
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require(not compose.is_symlink() and not selected.is_symlink(), 'fixed transport metadata paths')
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command = ['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(compose)]
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flags = ('RMM_PROFILE','RMM_DEV_AUTH','RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULTS','RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULT_FILE')
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roles = {}
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for role in ('api','gateway'):
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identifier = subprocess.run(command+['ps','-q',role],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode().strip()
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require(len(identifier) == 64 and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in identifier), 'one running application role')
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values = {}
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for flag in flags:
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response = subprocess.run(['docker','exec',identifier,'printenv',flag],capture_output=True,timeout=10)
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require(response.returncode in (0,1) and len(response.stdout) <= 1024, 'bounded explicit nonsecret flag')
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values[flag] = response.stdout.decode().strip() if response.returncode == 0 else None
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roles[role] = values
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policy = root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json'
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require(not policy.is_symlink(), 'known Root policy path')
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return dict(compose_sha256=hashlib.sha256(compose.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
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fault_config_sha256=hashlib.sha256(selected.read_bytes()).hexdigest() if selected.exists() else None,
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root_policy_sha256=hashlib.sha256(policy.read_bytes()).hexdigest(),roles=roles)
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def flags_disabled(value):
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return len(value['roles']) == 2 and all(
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role['RMM_PROFILE'] == 'development' and role['RMM_DEV_AUTH'] == 'true'
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and role['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULTS'] in (None,'false')
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and role['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULT_FILE'] is None for role in value['roles'].values())
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def flags_enabled(value):
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return len(value['roles']) == 2 and all(
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role['RMM_PROFILE'] == 'development' and role['RMM_DEV_AUTH'] == 'true'
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and role['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULTS'] == 'true'
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and role['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULT_FILE'] == '/root-policy/transport-fault.json' for role in value['roles'].values())
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def scopes():
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linux = base.cb.contract.protected_json(cloud.ROOT/'devstate/cloud-mvp-final-closeout.json')
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require(linux['verified'] is True, 'qualified Linux target witness')
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return dict(windows=base.gate(),linux=cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',cloud.server,
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dict(kind='gate',tenant_id=linux['target']['tenant_id'],agent_id=linux['target']['agent_id'])))
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def status():
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return cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',server_state,{})
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def observe(ident):
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return cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',fault.server_evidence,
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dict(tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,agent_id=base.AGENT,fault_id=ident))
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def validate_receipts(value, config, config_sha, baseline):
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receipts = value['receipts']; device = value['device']
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require(len(receipts) == 2 and {r['data']['slot'] for r in receipts} == {1,2}
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and len({r['data']['handshake_id'] for r in receipts}) == 2, 'two distinct actual authenticated WSS rejections')
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require(all(r['data']['status'] == 503 and r['data']['agent_id'] == base.AGENT
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and r['data']['tenant_id'] == cloud.TENANT and r['data']['fault_id'] == config['fault_id']
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and r['data']['config_sha256'] == config_sha and r['data']['testsimulation'] is True
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and r['data']['certificate_sha256'] == baseline['certificate_sha256'] for r in receipts),
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'same exact dev/test fault, original authenticated device and configuration')
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require(all(device[k] == baseline[k] for k in ('agent_id','asset_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_version','certificate_sha256')),
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'same retained Windows identity and assignment')
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require(device['transport'] == 'https' and device['last_contact_at']
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and base.cb.contract.timestamp(device['last_contact_at']) > max(base.cb.contract.timestamp(r['created_at']) for r in receipts),
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'actual HTTPS heartbeat after both WSS rejections')
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def wait_fallback(ident, config, digest, baseline):
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deadline = time.monotonic()+150; first = None
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while True:
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observed = observe(ident)
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device = observed.get('device') or {}
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if (len(observed['receipts']) == 2 and device.get('transport') == 'https'
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and device.get('last_contact_at') and base.cb.contract.timestamp(device['last_contact_at'])
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> max(base.cb.contract.timestamp(r['created_at']) for r in observed['receipts'])):
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validate_receipts(observed,config,digest,baseline)
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if first is None:
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first = observed
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elif first['device']['last_contact_at'] != observed['device']['last_contact_at']:
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return dict(first=first,second=observed)
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require(time.monotonic() < deadline, 'two actual WSS503 and two fresh HTTPS heartbeats not proven')
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time.sleep(2)
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def prior_hash():
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folder = cloud.ROOT/'devstate/cloud-transport'/PRIOR_CASE
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complete = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'completion.json')
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previous = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'checkpoint.json')
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require(complete['verified'] is True and previous['id'] == PRIOR_CASE
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and previous['disabled']['deployed'] and previous['disabled']['enabled'] is False,
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'actual closed historical Linux fault witness')
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raw = json.dumps(previous['config'],separators=(',',':')).encode()
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digest = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
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require(digest == previous['disabled']['config_sha256'] == previous['enabled']['config_sha256'],
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'independently known original fault configuration; never adopt a host hash')
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return digest
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def cleanup(folder, intent, before):
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ident = intent['id']; current = status()
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require(current['compose_sha256'] == before['server']['compose_sha256']
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and current['root_policy_sha256'] == before['server']['root_policy_sha256'], 'application config and closed Root policy unchanged')
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if (folder/'enable-intent.json').exists():
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base.fixed_intent(folder,'disable-intent.json',dict(id=ident,known_hashes=[intent['config_sha256'],before['server']['fault_config_sha256']]))
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if not flags_disabled(current):
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closed = cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',fault.configure_server,dict(
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id=str(uuid.uuid4()),enabled=False,tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,agent_id=base.AGENT,
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compose_sha256=intent['compose_sha256'],
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expected_config_sha256=[intent['config_sha256'],before['server']['fault_config_sha256']]))
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base.save(folder,'disabled-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json',closed)
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require(closed['deployed'], 'server fault disable must finish')
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actual = status()
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require(flags_disabled(actual) and actual['fault_config_sha256'] in
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(intent['config_sha256'],before['server']['fault_config_sha256']), 'both actual application fault hooks disabled')
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base.save(folder,'disabled-readback-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json',actual)
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base.fixed_intent(folder,'restore-intent.json',dict(id=ident,expected_original_config_sha256=base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG))
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native = base.remote(ident,'state',mode='auto',source_sha256=intent['source_sha256'])
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base.preserved(before['native'],native)
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if not (native['transport'] == 'wss' and native['config_sha256'] == base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG
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and native['config_acl_sha256'] == before['native']['config_acl_sha256'] and native['service_state'] == 'Running'):
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restored = base.remote(ident,'restore',mode='auto',source_sha256=intent['source_sha256'])
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else:
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restored = dict(restored_by_readback=True,snapshot=native,no_jobs=True,no_reboot=True)
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base.save(folder,'restored-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json',restored)
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def finish(ident):
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folder = STATE/str(uuid.UUID(ident)); intent = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'intent.json')
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before = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'before.json')
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require(intent['id'] == ident and intent['case'] == 'automatic_fallback'
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and intent['source_sha256'] == hashlib.sha256(base.SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(), 'same qualified passive Windows case')
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require(not (folder/'result.json').exists(), 'retain completed original acceptance')
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accepted = folder/'https-accepted.json'
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try:
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if not accepted.exists():
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native = base.remote(ident,'state',mode='auto',source_sha256=intent['source_sha256'])
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base.preserved(before['native'],native)
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require(native['transport'] == 'auto', 'automatic mode must have been selected before fault')
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if not (folder/'enable-intent.json').exists():
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initial = base.wait_mode(ident,'wss',base.cb.contract.timestamp(intent['started_at']),before['central']['device'])
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base.save(folder,'initial-auto-wss.json',initial)
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require(base.cb.contract.now() < base.cb.contract.timestamp(intent['config']['expires_at']), 'fixed bounded fault lease')
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call = dict(id=ident,enabled=True,tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,agent_id=base.AGENT,
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compose_sha256=intent['compose_sha256'],expected_config_sha256=before['server']['fault_config_sha256'],config=intent['config'])
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base.save(folder,'enable-intent.json',call)
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enabled = cloud.bootstrap.rpc('server.conf',fault.configure_server,call)
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base.save(folder,'enabled.json',enabled);require(enabled['deployed'], 'bounded server fault activation incomplete')
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else:
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actual = status()
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require(flags_enabled(actual) and actual['fault_config_sha256'] == intent['config_sha256'],
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'resume only an already active exact fault; never repeat activation')
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online = wait_fallback(ident,intent['config'],intent['config_sha256'],before['central']['device'])
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native = base.remote(ident,'state',mode='auto',source_sha256=intent['source_sha256']);base.preserved(before['native'],native)
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require(native['journal']['pending_inventory_events'] == 0 and native['journal']['sequence'] > before['native']['journal']['sequence']
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and native['service_state'] == 'Running' and native['process_owner_sid'] == 'S-1-5-19', 'actual ACK, monotone journal and LocalService')
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inventory = base.read_device(); denied = base.foreign_denied()
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require(scopes() == before['counts'], 'no new jobs/grants on Windows or permanent Linux target')
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base.save(folder,'https-accepted.json',dict(verified=True,online=online,native=native,inventory=inventory,foreign_denied=denied))
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else:
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require(base.cb.contract.protected_json(accepted)['verified'] is True, 'retained actual fallback proof')
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finally:
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cleanup(folder,intent,before)
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restored = base.wait_mode(ident,'wss',base.cb.contract.now(),before['central']['device'])
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native = base.remote(ident,'state',mode='auto',source_sha256=intent['source_sha256']);base.preserved(before['native'],native)
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require(native['config_sha256'] == base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG and native['config_acl_sha256'] == before['native']['config_acl_sha256']
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and native['journal']['pending_inventory_events'] == 0 and scopes() == before['counts'], 'restored exact WSS config/ACL/ACK and both targets unchanged')
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final = status();require(flags_disabled(final), 'no active transport hook remains')
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base.save(folder,'result.json',dict(verified=True,id=ident,case='automatic_fallback',https=base.cb.contract.protected_json(accepted),
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restored_wss=restored,final_native=native,server=final,counts=before['counts'],no_jobs_or_approvals=True,no_reboot=True,
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automatic_switchback_claimed=False))
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print('PASS native Windows auto WSS→HTTPS: two authenticated503, fresh HTTPS heartbeats/ACK, same identity, both hooks disabled, original WSS config/ACL restored, zero new jobs')
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def start(https_case):
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os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True)
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prerequisite = base.STATE/str(uuid.UUID(https_case))/'result.json'
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report = base.cb.contract.protected_json(prerequisite)
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require(report['verified'] is True and report['case'] == 'explicit_https' and report['no_jobs_or_approvals'] is True
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and report['final_native']['agent_id'] == base.AGENT, 'native HTTPS acceptance must be finished first')
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ident = str(uuid.uuid4());folder = STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
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source = base.stage_script();issued = base.cb.contract.now()
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config = dict(schema_version=1,fault_id=ident,tenant_id=cloud.TENANT,agent_id=base.AGENT,
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issued_at=issued.isoformat(),expires_at=(issued+dt.timedelta(minutes=10)).isoformat())
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digest = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(config,separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest()
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intent = dict(id=ident,case='automatic_fallback',started_at=issued.isoformat(),source_sha256=source,config=config,config_sha256=digest,
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compose_sha256=hashlib.sha256((cloud.ROOT/'deploy/server.compose.yaml').read_bytes()).hexdigest(),
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https_prerequisite=dict(path=str(prerequisite),sha256=hashlib.sha256(prerequisite.read_bytes()).hexdigest()),no_jobs=True,no_reboot=True)
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base.save(folder,'intent.json',intent)
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native = base.remote(ident,'state',mode='auto',source_sha256=source);central = observe(ident);server = status();counts = scopes()
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base.preserved(report['final_native'],native)
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require(native['transport'] == 'wss' and native['config_sha256'] == base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG
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and native['journal']['pending_inventory_events'] == 0 and flags_disabled(server)
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and server['compose_sha256'] == intent['compose_sha256'] and server['fault_config_sha256'] == prior_hash()
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and counts['windows'] == dict(jobs=0,outbox=0,permits=0,unresolved=0)
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and counts['linux']['unresolved'] == 0, 'independent original config hashes and settled targets')
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base.save(folder,'before.json',dict(native=native,central=central,server=server,counts=counts))
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base.save(folder,'enter-intent.json',base.payload(ident,'enter','auto'))
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try:
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entered = base.remote(ident,'enter',mode='auto',source_sha256=source)
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base.save(folder,'entered.json',entered)
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except Exception as error:
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base.save(folder,'enter-failure.json',dict(error_class=type(error).__name__,phase='native_enter',same_case_preserved=True))
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cleanup(folder,intent,base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'before.json'))
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raise
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print('Entered existing Windows automatic-fallback case '+ident,flush=True)
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finish(ident)
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def main():
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
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parser.add_argument('action',choices=('start','finish','restore'))
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parser.add_argument('--https-case');parser.add_argument('--id')
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args = parser.parse_args()
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if args.action == 'start':
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require(args.https_case and not args.id, 'one actual finished HTTPS case required')
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start(args.https_case)
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else:
|
||||
require(args.id and not args.https_case, 'same existing fallback case required')
|
||||
if args.action == 'finish':finish(args.id)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
folder = STATE/str(uuid.UUID(args.id));intent = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'intent.json')
|
||||
before = base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'before.json');cleanup(folder,intent,before)
|
||||
print('Closed only existing Windows fallback case '+args.id)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
try:
|
||||
main()
|
||||
except Exception as error:
|
||||
message = str(error)
|
||||
print('WINDOWS_AUTO_TRANSPORT_INCOMPLETE:'+(message if isinstance(error,base.cb.contract.GuardError) else type(error).__name__))
|
||||
raise SystemExit(2) from None
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
|
||||
# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows: automatischer WSS→HTTPS-Fallback nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
Fall2ff2e1aa-0037-4831-9bc2-31218bf1461c verifiziert. Bestehender LocalService-
|
||||
Agent inauto: zwei aktuelle WSS-Heartbeats, danach genau zwei tatsächliche
|
||||
authentisierte503 mit festen Slots/Peer-/Konfigurations-/Fallbindungen.
|
||||
Automatische HTTPS-Auswahl mit zwei frischen Heartbeats und konkretem Inventar-
|
||||
ACK; Identitäten/Dateien/ACLs erhalten, Sequenz monoton und TenantB verweigert.
|
||||
WindowScounts0/0/0/0, Linux30/30/26/0 und Rootpolicy vor/nach unverändert.
|
||||
Beide Server-Testhooksfalse/Dateipfadeabwesend; ursprüngliche WSS-Konfiguration
|
||||
und ACLs exakt restauriert, wieder frische WSS-Heartbeats/ACK0. Kein automatischer
|
||||
Switchback behauptet. Sechs lokale Guards ergänzen den nativen Nachweis.
|
||||
Details:[Windows-Client](../deploy/windows/CLIENT.md). Windows-Jobs weiterhin
|
||||
ausdrücklich nicht angeboten; erste PowerShell-Strecke benötigt die dokumentierten
|
||||
[Core-/Uhr-/Planvoraussetzungen](windows-job-boundary.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows-TLS-Negativabnahme vollständig bestanden — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
Derselbe erhaltene Fall7b190a5c-c928-4348-bd0d-c9698dad5417 mit unveränderten
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ abgenommen.**
|
||||
| Ziel | Build | Tatsächlicher nativer Nachweis | Offene Grenzen |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Ubuntu 24.04 x86-64, Cloud-Linux-Client | Rust 1.99.1, GNU/glibc, Bookworm-Buildbasis; Agent-/Helperartefakte benötigen höchstens GLIBC 2.34; neue 1-GiB-Variante mit 126 lokalen Tests qualifiziert | systemd-Agent, mTLS/WSS und HTTPS/Auto-Fallback, TLS-Lifecycle, Inventar/Heartbeat; genehmigte Skript-/Rootdienst-/begrenzte Logstrecke, Doppelzustellung/ACK-Verlust; alle drei aktiven Offlinefälle und Prozessabbruch mit dauerhaftem Unknown, signiertem Abschluss und unabhängigem Zähler; begrenztes M4-Update 1.0→1.1 und beide 1.1-Noops; eigener einmaliger Reboot mit signiertem Abschluss; automatische Helper-Startwiederholung; aktuelle native APT-Kopienqualifikation; MCP-Endbericht mit sieben erfolgreichen Operationen und DoD-Endabgleich bestanden | Begrenztes dev/test-MVP M0–M5 abgeschlossen. Genau eine reale Ziel-VM, keine Mehrgeräte-/Mischplattform- oder Produktionsabnahme. Rebootrechte und APT-Endpunkt geschlossen; 18 Rootverbräuche abgeglichen, alte APT-Fehlschläge erhalten. |
|
||||
| Windows 11 Pro, Build 26300, x86-64, eigener Gast | `x86_64-pc-windows-gnu` Crossbuild Debug/Release und Clippy bestanden | LocalService/Service-SID, Enrollment, ausgehendes mTLS/WSS und separat natives explizites HTTPS, gespeichertes `windows.base`, frische Heartbeats und konkrete Inventar-ACKs; Tenant-B-Verweigerung, sieben native Rusttests. HTTPS-Abnahme erhielt Identität/ACLs und restaurierte Original-WSS. Separate native Admin-TLS-Proben verweigerten falsche CA/Name und abgelaufenes Clientzertifikat bei gültigen Kontrollen. | Unsignierter Entwicklungsbuild. Kein Jobexecutor/Helper/PowerShell-/Paketpfad. Automatischer Fallback, Rotation/Widerruf, MSI/EXE, signierter Installer und Rebootpersistenz noch nicht nativ abgenommen. Registry-Produktname meldet noch den tatsächlichen Legacywert „Windows 10 Pro“; unabhängige CIM-Probe bestätigt Windows 11. |
|
||||
| Windows 11 Pro, Build 26300, x86-64, eigener Gast | `x86_64-pc-windows-gnu` Crossbuild Debug/Release und Clippy bestanden | LocalService/Service-SID, Enrollment, ausgehendes mTLS/WSS sowie separat natives explizites HTTPS und automatischer WSS→HTTPS-Fallback nach zwei authentisierten503, gespeichertes `windows.base`, frische Heartbeats und konkrete Inventar-ACKs; Tenant-B-Verweigerung, sieben native Rusttests. HTTPS-Abnahme erhielt Identität/ACLs und restaurierte Original-WSS. Separate native Admin-TLS-Proben verweigerten falsche CA/Name und abgelaufenes Clientzertifikat bei gültigen Kontrollen. | Unsignierter Entwicklungsbuild. Kein Jobexecutor/Helper/PowerShell-/Paketpfad. Rotation/Widerruf, MSI/EXE, signierter Installer und Rebootpersistenz noch nicht nativ abgenommen. Registry-Produktname meldet noch den tatsächlichen Legacywert „Windows 10 Pro“; unabhängige CIM-Probe bestätigt Windows 11. |
|
||||
| Windows MSVC-Ziel | Geplant | Nicht ausgeführt | GNU-Build/-Lauf ist kein MSVC-Nachweis. |
|
||||
| ARM64-Agenten, weitere Windows-/Linux-Versionen | Nicht freigegeben | Keine entsprechende native Agentabnahme | Keine Supportableitung aus einem Compilerziel oder ARM64-Server. |
|
||||
| Ubuntu 26.04 ARM64, dedizierter Cloudserver | Native ARM64-Serverbuilds bestanden | API/Gateway/PostgreSQL, Migrationen 1–13 und Clientverbindungen auf `discovery.ease-technologies.de` | Öffentliche WebUI/OIDC und Produktionsbetrieb nicht abgenommen; Verwaltungs-UI nur über SSH-Tunnel. Kein ARM64-Agentnachweis. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ bleibt eine eigenständige Abnahme. Dieser Bericht erweitert dessen Umfang nicht
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Zugang | Gepinnter Reverse-SSH-Zugang zum Gast vorhanden; keine öffentliche Windows-SSH-Freigabe. Bestehender Agent bei Wiederaufnahme als LocalService laufend, Auto-Start, unveränderte Identität, kein Enrollmenttoken. | Zugang zeitlich begrenzt; keine automatische Verlängerung oder neue öffentliche Portfreigabe. |
|
||||
| Passiver Client | SCM-Dienst, Service-SID/ACLs, Enrollment/mTLS/WSS, Inventar mit Quelle/Zeit, Heartbeats und Mandantentrennung nativ bestanden; sieben native Rusttests. | Bestehende Identität und Telemetriehistorie bei allen weiteren Schritten erhalten. |
|
||||
| HTTPS/Fallback | Explizites HTTPS unter bestehendem LocalService mit zwei frischen Heartbeats, Inventar-ACK und Tenantverweigerung nativ bestanden; ursprüngliche WSS-Bytes/ACLs restauriert,0Jobs/Grants. | Automatische Auswahl nach exakt begrenzten WSS-Verweigerungen noch separat prüfen. |
|
||||
| HTTPS/Fallback | Explizites HTTPS unter bestehendem LocalService mit zwei frischen Heartbeats, Inventar-ACK und Tenantverweigerung nativ bestanden; ursprüngliche WSS-Bytes/ACLs restauriert,0Jobs/Grants. | Automatischer Fallback nach zwei tatsächlichen mTLS-WSS503 ebenfalls nativ bestanden; zwei frische HTTPS-Heartbeats/ACK, Hooks geschlossen, WSS exakt restauriert. Dauerhafte Defaultkonfiguration gesondert behandeln. |
|
||||
| TLS-Lifecycle | Falsche CA, falscher Name und abgelaufenes Clientzertifikat mit gültigen Kontrollen nativ als getrennte Admin-TLS-Proben bestanden. Permanente Identität/Dienst unverändert. | Rotation und Widerruf noch gesondert sicher implementieren und prüfen. Permanente Identität nicht widerrufen oder ersetzen. |
|
||||
| Signierter Jobkern | Windows verweigert Jobangebote/Grants ausdrücklich und meldet keine Ausführungscapability. | Gemeinsamen Sync-/Checkpoint-/Einmalverbrauchskern portieren; vertrauenswürdige Uhr, Journalmigration ohne Reset, Schlüsselbindung und Fehlerpfade qualifizieren. |
|
||||
| PowerShell | Noch kein Executor oder freigegebener Interpreter. Server/UI lösen derzeit Linuxvarianten auf. | Exakte Windows-PowerShell-5.1-Bytes, Ausgabeencoding, Prozessgrenzen und unprivilegierte Ausführungsidentität binden. Erst nach vollständigem Antrag und tatsächlichem WebUI-Klick ausführen. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Local guards of the passive Windows fault runner; no network or VM."""
|
||||
import copy
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import pathlib
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT=pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT/'deploy/windows'))
|
||||
import auto_transport_acceptance as auto
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def flags(enabled=False):
|
||||
role=dict(RMM_PROFILE='development',RMM_DEV_AUTH='true',RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULTS='true' if enabled else 'false',
|
||||
RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULT_FILE='/root-policy/transport-fault.json' if enabled else None)
|
||||
return dict(roles={'api':copy.deepcopy(role),'gateway':copy.deepcopy(role)},
|
||||
compose_sha256='known-compose',root_policy_sha256='unchanged-closed-policy',fault_config_sha256='old-known-fault')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def receipts():
|
||||
origin='2026-11-13T22:00:00+00:00'; ident='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
|
||||
config=dict(fault_id=ident)
|
||||
baseline=dict(agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,asset_id=auto.base.ASSET,enrollment_generation=1,assignment_version=1,certificate_sha256='same-certificate')
|
||||
rows=[dict(created_at=origin,data=dict(slot=i,handshake_id='handshake-'+str(i),status=503,
|
||||
agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,tenant_id=auto.cloud.TENANT,fault_id=ident,config_sha256='new-known-fault',
|
||||
testsimulation=True,certificate_sha256='same-certificate')) for i in (1,2)]
|
||||
observed=dict(receipts=rows,device=dict(baseline,transport='https',last_contact_at='2026-11-13T22:00:01+00:00',sync_ready=False,restore_blocked=True))
|
||||
return observed,config,baseline
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ReceiptGuards(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_exact_peer_configuration_and_two_distinct_actual_rejections(self):
|
||||
observed,config,baseline=receipts();auto.validate_receipts(observed,config,'new-known-fault',baseline)
|
||||
for mutate in (
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][1]['data'].update(slot=1),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][1]['data'].update(handshake_id='handshake-1'),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(status=401),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(certificate_sha256='other-certificate'),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(config_sha256='unverified-host-hash'),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(tenant_id='other-tenant'),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(fault_id='other-fault'),
|
||||
lambda value:value['receipts'][0]['data'].update(testsimulation=False),
|
||||
lambda value:value['device'].update(assignment_version=2),
|
||||
):
|
||||
bad=copy.deepcopy(observed);mutate(bad)
|
||||
with self.subTest(value=bad),self.assertRaises(auto.base.cb.contract.GuardError):
|
||||
auto.validate_receipts(bad,config,'new-known-fault',baseline)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_hello_before_fresh_heartbeat_is_waited_for_without_inventing_sync(self):
|
||||
observed,config,baseline=receipts()
|
||||
before_heartbeat=copy.deepcopy(observed);before_heartbeat['device']['last_contact_at']='2026-11-13T21:59:59+00:00'
|
||||
second=copy.deepcopy(observed);second['device']['last_contact_at']='2026-11-13T22:00:32+00:00'
|
||||
with patch.object(auto,'observe',side_effect=[before_heartbeat,observed,second]),patch.object(auto.time,'sleep'):
|
||||
outcome=auto.wait_fallback(config['fault_id'],config,'new-known-fault',baseline)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(outcome['second']['device']['last_contact_at'],second['device']['last_contact_at'])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(outcome['second']['device']['sync_ready'])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_both_real_roles_and_explicit_dev_profile_required(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(auto.flags_disabled(flags(False)));self.assertTrue(auto.flags_enabled(flags(True)))
|
||||
for role in ('api','gateway'):
|
||||
wrong=flags(False);wrong['roles'][role]['RMM_PROFILE']='production'
|
||||
self.assertFalse(auto.flags_disabled(wrong))
|
||||
wrong=flags(False);wrong['roles'][role]['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULT_FILE']='/unexpected/file'
|
||||
self.assertFalse(auto.flags_disabled(wrong))
|
||||
wrong=flags(True);wrong['roles'][role]['RMM_DEV_TRANSPORT_FAULTS']='false'
|
||||
self.assertFalse(auto.flags_enabled(wrong))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RestoreGuards(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_already_disabled_and_original_wss_restored_are_only_read_back(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
folder=pathlib.Path(tmp);auto.base.save(folder,'enable-intent.json',{'original_enable_started':True})
|
||||
current=flags(False)
|
||||
native=dict(agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,asset_id=auto.base.ASSET,transport='wss',
|
||||
config_sha256=auto.base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG,config_acl_sha256='same-acl',service_state='Running',
|
||||
hashes={'key':'unchanged'},acl_sha256={'key':'unchanged'},telemetry_creation_ticks=1,
|
||||
journal=dict(integrity='ok',read_only=True,agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,sequence=7))
|
||||
before=dict(server=current,native=copy.deepcopy(native))
|
||||
intent=dict(id='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',config_sha256='new-known-fault',
|
||||
compose_sha256='known-compose',source_sha256='qualified-source')
|
||||
calls=[]
|
||||
def remote(ident,action,**kwargs):
|
||||
calls.append(action);self.assertEqual(action,'state');return native
|
||||
with patch.object(auto,'status',return_value=current),patch.object(auto.base,'remote',side_effect=remote), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto.cloud.bootstrap,'rpc',side_effect=AssertionError('no replayed activation or disable')):
|
||||
auto.cleanup(folder,intent,before)
|
||||
auto.cleanup(folder,intent,before)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(calls,['state','state'])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(auto.base.cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'disable-intent.json')['known_hashes'],['new-known-fault','old-known-fault'])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unknown_host_fault_hash_never_becomes_mutation_authority(self):
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
folder=pathlib.Path(tmp);auto.base.save(folder,'enable-intent.json',{'original_enable_started':True})
|
||||
before=flags(False);current=flags(True);current['fault_config_sha256']='unknown-host-hash'
|
||||
intent=dict(id='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',config_sha256='new-known-fault',
|
||||
compose_sha256='known-compose',source_sha256='qualified-source')
|
||||
def denied_rpc(host,function,payload):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(host,'server.conf')
|
||||
self.assertIs(function,auto.fault.configure_server)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(payload['expected_config_sha256'],['new-known-fault','old-known-fault'])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(current['fault_config_sha256'],payload['expected_config_sha256'])
|
||||
raise auto.base.cb.contract.GuardError('actual file failed exact known CAS')
|
||||
with patch.object(auto,'status',return_value=current),patch.object(auto.cloud.bootstrap,'rpc',side_effect=denied_rpc), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto.base,'remote',side_effect=AssertionError('no Windows mutation before exact server cleanup')):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(auto.base.cb.contract.GuardError):auto.cleanup(folder,intent,dict(server=before))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_native_enter_lost_reply_closes_same_case_without_reentering(self):
|
||||
https_id='22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'
|
||||
native=dict(agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,asset_id=auto.base.ASSET,transport='wss',
|
||||
config_sha256=auto.base.ORIGINAL_CONFIG,config_acl_sha256='same-acl',service_state='Running',
|
||||
hashes={'key':'unchanged'},acl_sha256={'key':'unchanged'},telemetry_creation_ticks=1,
|
||||
journal=dict(integrity='ok',read_only=True,agent_id=auto.base.AGENT,sequence=7,pending_inventory_events=0))
|
||||
current=flags(False)
|
||||
current['compose_sha256']=hashlib.sha256((auto.cloud.ROOT/'deploy/server.compose.yaml').read_bytes()).hexdigest()
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||
root=pathlib.Path(tmp);https=root/'https';prerequisite=https/https_id;prerequisite.mkdir(parents=True)
|
||||
auto.base.save(prerequisite,'result.json',dict(verified=True,case='explicit_https',no_jobs_or_approvals=True,final_native=native))
|
||||
calls=[]
|
||||
def remote(ident,action,**kwargs):
|
||||
calls.append(action)
|
||||
if action=='enter':raise RuntimeError('lost reply')
|
||||
return native
|
||||
counts=dict(windows=dict(jobs=0,outbox=0,permits=0,unresolved=0),linux=dict(jobs=30,outbox=30,permits=26,unresolved=0))
|
||||
with patch.object(auto,'STATE',root/'auto'),patch.object(auto.base,'STATE',https), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto.base,'stage_script',return_value='known-source'),patch.object(auto.base,'remote',side_effect=remote), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto,'status',return_value=current),patch.object(auto,'observe',return_value={'device':{}}), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto,'scopes',return_value=counts),patch.object(auto,'prior_hash',return_value='old-known-fault'), \
|
||||
patch.object(auto,'cleanup') as cleanup:
|
||||
with self.assertRaisesRegex(RuntimeError,'lost reply'):auto.start(https_id)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(calls,['state','enter'])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cleanup.call_count,1)
|
||||
case=next((root/'auto').iterdir())
|
||||
self.assertTrue((case/'enter-intent.json').exists())
|
||||
self.assertTrue((case/'enter-failure.json').exists())
|
||||
self.assertFalse((case/'result.json').exists())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':unittest.main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user