Add typed updater handoff and preserving Linux Full renderer
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Keep release verifier and native drivers unchanged. Independently reviewed as an isolated contract after provisioned-file-key correction; eight local release contracts and format/clippy checks pass. Runtime persistence, approvals, service ownership, apply and rollback remain unimplemented.
This commit is contained in:
Generated
+13
@@ -2377,6 +2377,19 @@ dependencies = [
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"uuid",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rmm-updater-handoff"
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version = "0.1.0"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"ed25519-dalek",
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"hex",
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"serde",
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"serde_json",
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"sha2 0.10.9",
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"uuid",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rsa"
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version = "0.9.10"
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+1
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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[workspace]
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resolver = "2"
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exclude = ["crates/oidc-auth"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-core", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper", "crates/updater"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-core", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper", "crates/updater", "crates/updater-handoff"]
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[workspace.package]
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version = "0.1.0"
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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[package]
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name = "rmm-updater-handoff"
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version.workspace = true
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edition.workspace = true
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license.workspace = true
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[dependencies]
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anyhow.workspace = true
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ed25519-dalek = "=2.2.0"
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hex.workspace = true
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serde.workspace = true
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serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
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sha2.workspace = true
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uuid.workspace = true
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@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@
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//! Draft, effect-free helper/updater handoff contract. No approval, grant,
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//! service operation, lock acquisition, persistence or general start lease.
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//!
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//! A platform adapter must authenticate the original request, atomically store
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//! consumption + its exact existing start witness + the handoff in the SAME
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//! helper ledger, and durably append each event before performing its action.
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//! This module validates retained bytes and sequencing; it cannot attest OS
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//! observations or make an uncommitted in-memory event durable.
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use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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mod linux_full;
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pub use linux_full::{LinuxFullTransition, LinuxFullTransitionProof, render_linux_full};
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pub const MAX_RECORD_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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pub const MAX_EVENT_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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pub const MAX_EVENTS: usize = 16;
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pub const HEALTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rmm.agent-update-health.v1\0";
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/// All fields below are untrusted wire data, never authorization capabilities.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct AttemptBinding {
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pub tenant_id: Uuid,
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pub asset_id: Uuid,
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pub agent_id: Uuid,
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pub enrollment_generation: u64,
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pub assignment_version: u64,
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pub plan_id: Uuid,
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pub plan_sha256: String,
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pub job_id: Uuid,
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pub attempt_id: Uuid,
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pub job_payload_sha256: String,
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pub grant_id: Uuid,
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pub authorization_id: Uuid,
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pub original_request_sha256: String,
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pub original_start_witness_sha256: String,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct CodePair {
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pub manifest_sha256: String,
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pub agent_sha256: String,
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pub helper_sha256: String,
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pub pin_sha256: String,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum Service {
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LinuxAgent,
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LinuxGeneralHelper,
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LinuxAptHelper,
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LinuxFullHelper,
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WindowsAgent,
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WindowsHelper,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum PinTransition {
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UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1,
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LinuxGeneralFullV1,
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WindowsCodePairV1,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum FileRole {
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AgentBinary,
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HelperBinary,
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LinuxFullConfig,
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LinuxFullPin,
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WindowsSettings,
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WindowsPin,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct FileTransition {
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pub role: FileRole,
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pub old_sha256: String,
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pub new_sha256: String,
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}
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/// Hashes bind the retained, authenticated baseline; they are not substitutes
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/// for reading original rows/signatures/inodes through pinned OS handles.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Handoff {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub attempt: AttemptBinding,
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pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_checkpoint: u64,
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pub previous_decision_id: Uuid,
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
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pub connection_generation: u64,
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pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
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pub updater_sha256: String,
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pub updater_policy_sha256: String,
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pub predecessor_record_sha256: String,
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pub retained_state_sha256: String,
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pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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pub staged_files_sha256: String,
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pub predecessor: CodePair,
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pub target: CodePair,
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pub pin_transition: PinTransition,
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pub pin_transition_sha256: String,
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pub files: Vec<FileTransition>,
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/// Exact provisioned order. All installed helper profiles must be present.
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pub stop_set: Vec<Service>,
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pub consumed_at: u64,
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pub finish_before: u64,
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}
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impl Handoff {
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pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(self.schema_version == 1, "HANDOFF_SCHEMA");
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for id in [
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self.attempt.tenant_id,
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self.attempt.asset_id,
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self.attempt.agent_id,
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self.attempt.plan_id,
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self.attempt.job_id,
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self.attempt.attempt_id,
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self.attempt.grant_id,
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self.attempt.authorization_id,
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self.agent_journal_id,
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self.helper_journal_id,
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self.previous_decision_id,
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self.boot_id,
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self.owner_nonce,
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] {
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ensure!(!id.is_nil(), "HANDOFF_NIL_ID");
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}
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ensure!(
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self.attempt.enrollment_generation > 0
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&& self.attempt.assignment_version > 0
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&& self.connection_generation > 0,
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"HANDOFF_GENERATION"
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);
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for hash in [
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&self.attempt.plan_sha256,
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&self.attempt.job_payload_sha256,
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&self.attempt.original_request_sha256,
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&self.attempt.original_start_witness_sha256,
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&self.updater_sha256,
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&self.updater_policy_sha256,
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&self.predecessor_record_sha256,
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&self.retained_state_sha256,
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&self.ledger_identity_sha256,
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&self.staged_files_sha256,
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&self.pin_transition_sha256,
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] {
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digest(hash)?;
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}
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for pair in [&self.predecessor, &self.target] {
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for hash in [
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&pair.manifest_sha256,
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&pair.agent_sha256,
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&pair.helper_sha256,
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&pair.pin_sha256,
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] {
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digest(hash)?;
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}
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}
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ensure!(
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self.predecessor.manifest_sha256 != self.target.manifest_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_SAME_RELEASE"
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);
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ensure!(
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self.consumed_at > 0
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&& self.finish_before > self.consumed_at
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&& self.finish_before - self.consumed_at <= 600,
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"HANDOFF_DEADLINE"
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);
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let roles: Vec<_> = self.files.iter().map(|file| file.role).collect();
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let expected_roles = match self.pin_transition {
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PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
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vec![FileRole::AgentBinary, FileRole::HelperBinary]
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}
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PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => vec![
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FileRole::AgentBinary,
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FileRole::HelperBinary,
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FileRole::LinuxFullConfig,
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FileRole::LinuxFullPin,
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],
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PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => vec![
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FileRole::AgentBinary,
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FileRole::HelperBinary,
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FileRole::WindowsSettings,
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FileRole::WindowsPin,
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],
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};
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ensure!(roles == expected_roles, "HANDOFF_FILE_SET");
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for file in &self.files {
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digest(&file.old_sha256)?;
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digest(&file.new_sha256)?;
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}
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ensure!(
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self.files[0].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.agent_sha256
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&& self.files[0].new_sha256 == self.target.agent_sha256
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&& self.files[1].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.helper_sha256
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&& self.files[1].new_sha256 == self.target.helper_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_FILE_IMAGE_BINDING"
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);
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if self.files.len() == 4 {
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ensure!(
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self.files[3].old_sha256 == self.predecessor.pin_sha256
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&& self.files[3].new_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_FILE_PIN_BINDING"
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);
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}
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match self.pin_transition {
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PinTransition::UnchangedLinuxGeneralV1 => {
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ensure!(
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self.stop_set == [Service::LinuxAgent, Service::LinuxGeneralHelper]
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|| self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxAptHelper
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],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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);
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ensure!(
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self.predecessor.pin_sha256 == self.target.pin_sha256,
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"HANDOFF_LINUX_PIN_CHANGED"
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);
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}
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PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1 => ensure!(
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self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxFullHelper
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]
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|| self.stop_set
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== [
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Service::LinuxAgent,
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Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
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Service::LinuxFullHelper,
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Service::LinuxAptHelper
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],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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),
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PinTransition::WindowsCodePairV1 => ensure!(
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self.stop_set == [Service::WindowsAgent, Service::WindowsHelper],
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"HANDOFF_UNSUPPORTED_SERVICE_SET"
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),
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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pub fn bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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self.validate()?;
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let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(self)?;
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_RECORD_BYTES, "HANDOFF_TOO_LARGE");
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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}
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/// Concrete process birth, not an unqualified PID or a service's Running flag.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Process {
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pub pid: u32,
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pub birth: u64,
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pub image_sha256: String,
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}
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impl Process {
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fn validate(&self, expected_image: &str) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(
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self.pid > 0 && self.birth > 0 && self.image_sha256 == expected_image,
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"HANDOFF_PROCESS_BINDING"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct StartedService {
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pub service: Service,
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pub process: Process,
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}
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/// The server signs evidence only. `ready` MUST be false while the original
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/// handoff remains inflight; this receipt is never an ExecutionPermit.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct HealthReceipt {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub handoff_sha256: String,
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pub owner_nonce: Uuid,
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
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pub helper_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub agent_journal_id: Uuid,
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pub connection_generation: u64,
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pub service_processes: Vec<StartedService>,
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pub ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_decision_id: Uuid,
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pub signed_sync_request_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_response_sha256: String,
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pub signed_sync_applied_at: u64,
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pub ready: bool,
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pub inventory_message_id: Uuid,
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pub inventory_received_at: u64,
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pub inventory_ack_sha256: String,
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pub issued_at: u64,
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pub valid_until: u64,
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}
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/// Already decoded, bounded input; a network adapter must also bound encoding.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct SignedHealth {
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pub payload: Vec<u8>,
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pub signature: Vec<u8>,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(tag = "phase", rename_all = "snake_case", deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub enum Evidence {
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StopIntent,
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AllStopped {
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observation_sha256: String,
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},
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UpdaterOwnsLedger {
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process: Process,
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ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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},
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ReplaceIntent {
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role: FileRole,
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},
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Replaced {
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role: FileRole,
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observed_sha256: String,
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},
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PairVerified {
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pair: CodePair,
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retained_state_sha256: String,
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},
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/// This append must be flushed under the updater guard; the guard is then
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/// dropped BEFORE starting the new helper, which reacquires the SAME lock.
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LedgerReturnIntent,
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ServicesStarted {
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services: Vec<StartedService>,
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ledger_identity_sha256: String,
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observation_sha256: String,
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},
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HealthVerified {
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receipt: SignedHealth,
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},
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/// Only the new helper's existing outcome-CAS may persist this outcome.
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/// It must still reject any pre-existing definitive Unknown/outcome.
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OutcomePersisted {
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outcome_sha256: String,
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},
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Unknown {
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reason: UnknownReason,
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},
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||||
}
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||||
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum UnknownReason {
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OwnerLost,
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BootChanged,
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DeadlineExpired,
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StopUncertain,
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ReplaceUncertain,
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StartUncertain,
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StateChanged,
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||||
HealthUnproven,
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||||
}
|
||||
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
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pub struct Event {
|
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pub schema_version: u32,
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||||
pub handoff_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub sequence: u32,
|
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pub previous_sha256: String,
|
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pub observed_at: u64,
|
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pub boot_id: Uuid,
|
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pub evidence: Evidence,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum Phase {
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HandoffConsumed,
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StopIntent,
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AllStopped,
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UpdaterOwnsLedger,
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ReplaceIntent,
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||||
Replaced,
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PairVerified,
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LedgerReturnIntent,
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||||
ServicesStarted,
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||||
HealthVerified,
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||||
OutcomePersisted,
|
||||
Unknown,
|
||||
}
|
||||
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||||
/// Retained journal view. No method returns a start grant, ready flag, retry,
|
||||
/// rollback or instruction to perform a service/file operation after a crash.
|
||||
pub struct Journal {
|
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handoff: Handoff,
|
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handoff_hash: String,
|
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head_hash: String,
|
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count: u32,
|
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phase: Phase,
|
||||
replaced: usize,
|
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observed_at: u64,
|
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started: Option<(Vec<StartedService>, u64)>,
|
||||
health_key: VerifyingKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Journal {
|
||||
/// The caller independently verifies this record against the ORIGINAL
|
||||
/// consumed row/start witness, participant policy and retained state.
|
||||
pub fn open(record: &[u8], health_public_key: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
let handoff: Handoff = canonical(record, MAX_RECORD_BYTES)?;
|
||||
handoff.validate()?;
|
||||
let health_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&health_public_key)?;
|
||||
ensure!(!health_key.is_weak(), "HANDOFF_WEAK_HEALTH_KEY");
|
||||
let handoff_hash = sha256(record);
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
observed_at: handoff.consumed_at,
|
||||
handoff,
|
||||
head_hash: handoff_hash.clone(),
|
||||
handoff_hash,
|
||||
count: 0,
|
||||
phase: Phase::HandoffConsumed,
|
||||
replaced: 0,
|
||||
started: None,
|
||||
health_key,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn phase(&self) -> Phase {
|
||||
self.phase
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn head_sha256(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
&self.head_hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn handoff_sha256(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
&self.handoff_hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Prepare exact bytes for a bounded append-only CAS transaction against
|
||||
/// `head_sha256`. Returning bytes is NOT proof that this transaction ran.
|
||||
pub fn prepare(&self, observed_at: u64, evidence: Evidence) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let event = Event {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
handoff_sha256: self.handoff_hash.clone(),
|
||||
sequence: self.count + 1,
|
||||
previous_sha256: self.head_hash.clone(),
|
||||
observed_at,
|
||||
boot_id: self.handoff.boot_id,
|
||||
evidence,
|
||||
};
|
||||
self.validate_event(&event)?;
|
||||
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&event)?;
|
||||
ensure!(bytes.len() <= MAX_EVENT_BYTES, "HANDOFF_EVENT_TOO_LARGE");
|
||||
Ok(bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Strict historical replay. The platform must check durable head/rowcount,
|
||||
/// inode/FileID and original ledger lineage to detect omitted suffixes.
|
||||
pub fn replay(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let event: Event = canonical(bytes, MAX_EVENT_BYTES)?;
|
||||
let next = self.validate_event(&event)?;
|
||||
if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Replaced { .. }) {
|
||||
self.replaced += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Evidence::ServicesStarted { services, .. } = event.evidence {
|
||||
self.started = Some((services, event.observed_at));
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.phase = next;
|
||||
self.observed_at = event.observed_at;
|
||||
self.count = event.sequence;
|
||||
self.head_hash = sha256(bytes);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn validate_event(&self, event: &Event) -> Result<Phase> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
event.schema_version == 1
|
||||
&& event.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
|
||||
&& event.sequence == self.count + 1
|
||||
&& (event.sequence as usize) <= MAX_EVENTS
|
||||
&& event.previous_sha256 == self.head_hash,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_EVENT_CHAIN"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!matches!(self.phase, Phase::Unknown | Phase::OutcomePersisted),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_TERMINAL"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
event.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id && event.observed_at >= self.observed_at,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_BOOT_OR_CLOCK"
|
||||
);
|
||||
if matches!(event.evidence, Evidence::Unknown { .. }) {
|
||||
return Ok(Phase::Unknown);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
event.observed_at < self.handoff.finish_before,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_EXPIRED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let next = match (&self.phase, &event.evidence) {
|
||||
(Phase::HandoffConsumed, Evidence::StopIntent) => Phase::StopIntent,
|
||||
(Phase::StopIntent, Evidence::AllStopped { observation_sha256 }) => {
|
||||
digest(observation_sha256)?;
|
||||
Phase::AllStopped
|
||||
}
|
||||
(
|
||||
Phase::AllStopped,
|
||||
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
||||
process,
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256,
|
||||
},
|
||||
) => {
|
||||
process.validate(&self.handoff.updater_sha256)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Phase::UpdaterOwnsLedger | Phase::Replaced, Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role }) => {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
self.handoff
|
||||
.files
|
||||
.get(self.replaced)
|
||||
.is_some_and(|file| file.role == *role),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_REPLACE_ORDER"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Phase::ReplaceIntent
|
||||
}
|
||||
(
|
||||
Phase::ReplaceIntent,
|
||||
Evidence::Replaced {
|
||||
role,
|
||||
observed_sha256,
|
||||
},
|
||||
) => {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
self.handoff.files.get(self.replaced).is_some_and(
|
||||
|file| file.role == *role && file.new_sha256 == *observed_sha256
|
||||
),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_REPLACEMENT_BINDING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Phase::Replaced
|
||||
}
|
||||
(
|
||||
Phase::Replaced,
|
||||
Evidence::PairVerified {
|
||||
pair,
|
||||
retained_state_sha256,
|
||||
},
|
||||
) => {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
self.replaced == self.handoff.files.len(),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_PAIR_INCOMPLETE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
pair == &self.handoff.target
|
||||
&& retained_state_sha256 == &self.handoff.retained_state_sha256,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_PAIR_OR_STATE_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Phase::PairVerified
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Phase::PairVerified, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent) => Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
|
||||
(
|
||||
Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
|
||||
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
|
||||
services,
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256,
|
||||
observation_sha256,
|
||||
},
|
||||
) => {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256 == &self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_LEDGER_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let expected: Vec<_> = self
|
||||
.handoff
|
||||
.stop_set
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.copied()
|
||||
.filter(|service| *service != Service::LinuxAptHelper)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
services.len() == expected.len(),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
|
||||
);
|
||||
for (index, service) in services.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
service.service == expected[index],
|
||||
"HANDOFF_STARTED_SERVICE_SET"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let image =
|
||||
if matches!(service.service, Service::LinuxAgent | Service::WindowsAgent) {
|
||||
&self.handoff.target.agent_sha256
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
&self.handoff.target.helper_sha256
|
||||
};
|
||||
service.process.validate(image)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!services[..index]
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|prior| prior.process.pid == service.process.pid),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_PROCESS_REUSE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
digest(observation_sha256)?;
|
||||
Phase::ServicesStarted
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Phase::ServicesStarted, Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt }) => {
|
||||
self.verify_health(receipt, event.observed_at)?;
|
||||
Phase::HealthVerified
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Phase::HealthVerified, Evidence::OutcomePersisted { outcome_sha256 }) => {
|
||||
digest(outcome_sha256)?;
|
||||
Phase::OutcomePersisted
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => anyhow::bail!("HANDOFF_PHASE_ORDER"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(next)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn verify_health(&self, signed: &SignedHealth, at: u64) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let receipt: HealthReceipt = canonical(&signed.payload, 4096)?;
|
||||
let signature =
|
||||
Signature::from_slice(&signed.signature).context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE_LENGTH")?;
|
||||
let mut message = HEALTH_DOMAIN.to_vec();
|
||||
message.extend_from_slice(&signed.payload);
|
||||
self.health_key
|
||||
.verify_strict(&message, &signature)
|
||||
.context("HANDOFF_HEALTH_SIGNATURE")?;
|
||||
let (services, started_at) = self.started.as_ref().context("HANDOFF_START_MISSING")?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
receipt.schema_version == 1
|
||||
&& receipt.handoff_sha256 == self.handoff_hash
|
||||
&& receipt.owner_nonce == self.handoff.owner_nonce
|
||||
&& receipt.boot_id == self.handoff.boot_id
|
||||
&& receipt.helper_journal_id == self.handoff.helper_journal_id
|
||||
&& receipt.agent_journal_id == self.handoff.agent_journal_id
|
||||
&& receipt.connection_generation > self.handoff.connection_generation
|
||||
&& receipt.service_processes == *services
|
||||
&& receipt.ledger_identity_sha256 == self.handoff.ledger_identity_sha256
|
||||
&& !receipt.ready,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_BINDING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.is_nil() && !receipt.inventory_message_id.is_nil(),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_ID"
|
||||
);
|
||||
for hash in [
|
||||
&receipt.signed_sync_request_sha256,
|
||||
&receipt.signed_sync_response_sha256,
|
||||
&receipt.inventory_ack_sha256,
|
||||
] {
|
||||
digest(hash)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
receipt.signed_sync_applied_at >= *started_at
|
||||
&& receipt.inventory_received_at >= *started_at
|
||||
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.signed_sync_applied_at
|
||||
&& receipt.issued_at >= receipt.inventory_received_at
|
||||
&& receipt.issued_at <= at
|
||||
&& at < receipt.valid_until
|
||||
&& receipt.valid_until <= self.handoff.finish_before
|
||||
&& at.checked_sub(*started_at).is_some_and(|age| age < 180),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_HEALTH_NOT_FRESH"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn sha256(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
|
||||
hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn digest(hash: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
hash.len() == 64
|
||||
&& hash
|
||||
.bytes()
|
||||
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)),
|
||||
"HANDOFF_DIGEST"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn canonical<T: DeserializeOwned + Serialize>(bytes: &[u8], limit: usize) -> Result<T> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!bytes.is_empty() && bytes.len() <= limit,
|
||||
"HANDOFF_BYTE_LIMIT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let value = serde_json::from_slice::<T>(bytes)?;
|
||||
ensure!(serde_json::to_vec(&value)? == bytes, "HANDOFF_NONCANONICAL");
|
||||
Ok(value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
|
||||
//! Closed renderer for the existing Linux Full helper Config -> Policy ->
|
||||
//! GeneralPin schema2. Definitions are deliberately a versioned snapshot until
|
||||
//! integration can use the reviewed runtime types. No arbitrary JSON patch,
|
||||
//! paths, key loading, permission migration, service operation or publication.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{digest, sha256};
|
||||
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
|
||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
use serde_json::value::RawValue;
|
||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Binding {
|
||||
tenant_id: Uuid,
|
||||
asset_id: Uuid,
|
||||
agent_id: Uuid,
|
||||
enrollment_generation: u64,
|
||||
assignment_version: u64,
|
||||
public_key_hex: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Identity {
|
||||
tenant_id: Uuid,
|
||||
asset_id: Uuid,
|
||||
agent_id: Uuid,
|
||||
enrollment_generation: u64,
|
||||
assignment_version: u64,
|
||||
signing_key_id: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
enum FullProfile {
|
||||
#[serde(rename = "full_maintenance_v1")]
|
||||
FullMaintenanceV1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Config {
|
||||
profile: FullProfile,
|
||||
binding: Binding,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
signing_key_file: Option<String>,
|
||||
agent_uid: u32,
|
||||
socket_gid: u32,
|
||||
socket: String,
|
||||
state: String,
|
||||
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
|
||||
allow_reboot: bool,
|
||||
allow_root_scripts: bool,
|
||||
allowed_script_profiles: Vec<FullProfile>,
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: String,
|
||||
/// Full Config forbids an APT provider; any non-null value is rejected.
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
apt_provider: Option<()>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Policy {
|
||||
schema_version: u32,
|
||||
profile: FullProfile,
|
||||
identity: Identity,
|
||||
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
|
||||
allow_root_scripts: bool,
|
||||
allow_reboot: bool,
|
||||
allowed_script_profiles: Vec<FullProfile>,
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Pin {
|
||||
schema_version: u32,
|
||||
profile: FullProfile,
|
||||
identity: Identity,
|
||||
policy_sha256: String,
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Only value spans of these named TOP-LEVEL fields are selected. Full typed
|
||||
/// decoding first rejects unknown/duplicate fields, including nested objects.
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct ConfigSpans<'a> {
|
||||
#[serde(borrow)]
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: &'a RawValue,
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct PinSpans<'a> {
|
||||
#[serde(borrow)]
|
||||
policy_sha256: &'a RawValue,
|
||||
#[serde(borrow)]
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: &'a RawValue,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
|
||||
pub struct LinuxFullTransitionProof {
|
||||
pub schema_version: u32,
|
||||
pub old_config_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub new_config_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub old_pin_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub new_pin_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub old_policy_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub new_policy_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub old_helper_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub new_helper_sha256: String,
|
||||
pub effective_signing_key_id: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Private construction preserves correspondence between rendered bytes and
|
||||
/// their fixed proof. Wire proof fields remain untrusted once transported.
|
||||
pub struct LinuxFullTransition {
|
||||
proof: LinuxFullTransitionProof,
|
||||
new_config: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
new_pin: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl LinuxFullTransition {
|
||||
pub fn proof(&self) -> &LinuxFullTransitionProof {
|
||||
&self.proof
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn new_config_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
|
||||
&self.new_config
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn new_pin_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
|
||||
&self.new_pin
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn sha256(&self) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
Ok(sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&self.proof)?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The adapter must compare old bytes to the exact protected deployed files,
|
||||
/// bind BOTH returned raw-file hashes in the immutable job before approval,
|
||||
/// and independently recheck the same closed transition before/after swap.
|
||||
/// General/APT bytes and central rights/scopes are never rendered or changed.
|
||||
/// `provisioned_signing_key` must be independently authenticated from the
|
||||
/// already provisioned public-key record/pinned identity by the adapter.
|
||||
/// Parsing a VerifyingKey alone does NOT authenticate its provisioning.
|
||||
/// This pure function never opens `signing_key_file` or modifies inline keys.
|
||||
pub fn render_linux_full(
|
||||
config_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
pin_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
target_helper: &str,
|
||||
provisioned_signing_key: &VerifyingKey,
|
||||
) -> Result<LinuxFullTransition> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!config_bytes.is_empty()
|
||||
&& config_bytes.len() <= 16384
|
||||
&& !pin_bytes.is_empty()
|
||||
&& pin_bytes.len() <= 8192,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_LIMIT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
digest(target_helper)?;
|
||||
let config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(config_bytes)?;
|
||||
let pin: Pin = serde_json::from_slice(pin_bytes)?;
|
||||
digest(&config.helper_binary_sha256)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!provisioned_signing_key.is_weak(),
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_WEAK_SIGNING_KEY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let effective_public_key = hex::encode(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes());
|
||||
if let Some(path) = &config.signing_key_file {
|
||||
ensure!(path.starts_with('/'), "FULL_RENDER_KEY_PATH_ABSOLUTE");
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
config.binding.public_key_hex.is_empty()
|
||||
|| config.binding.public_key_hex == effective_public_key,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_PROVISIONED_KEY_MISMATCH"
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
config.binding.public_key_hex == effective_public_key,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_INLINE_KEY_REQUIRED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
config.helper_binary_sha256 != target_helper,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_SAME_IMAGE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!config.binding.tenant_id.is_nil()
|
||||
&& !config.binding.asset_id.is_nil()
|
||||
&& !config.binding.agent_id.is_nil()
|
||||
&& config.binding.enrollment_generation > 0
|
||||
&& config.binding.assignment_version > 0,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_IDENTITY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
config.allowed_services.is_empty()
|
||||
&& !config.allow_reboot
|
||||
&& config.allow_root_scripts
|
||||
&& config.allowed_script_profiles == [FullProfile::FullMaintenanceV1]
|
||||
&& config.apt_provider.is_none()
|
||||
&& config.state == "/var/lib/rmm-helper"
|
||||
&& config.socket.starts_with('/')
|
||||
&& config.socket != "/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock"
|
||||
&& config.agent_uid > 0
|
||||
&& config.socket_gid > 0,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_PROFILE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let identity = Identity {
|
||||
tenant_id: config.binding.tenant_id,
|
||||
asset_id: config.binding.asset_id,
|
||||
agent_id: config.binding.agent_id,
|
||||
enrollment_generation: config.binding.enrollment_generation,
|
||||
assignment_version: config.binding.assignment_version,
|
||||
signing_key_id: sha256(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes()),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut policy = Policy {
|
||||
schema_version: 2,
|
||||
profile: FullProfile::FullMaintenanceV1,
|
||||
identity,
|
||||
allowed_services: config.allowed_services.clone(),
|
||||
allow_root_scripts: config.allow_root_scripts,
|
||||
allow_reboot: config.allow_reboot,
|
||||
allowed_script_profiles: config.allowed_script_profiles.clone(),
|
||||
helper_binary_sha256: config.helper_binary_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let old_policy_sha256 = sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&policy)?);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
pin.schema_version == 2
|
||||
&& pin.identity == policy.identity
|
||||
&& pin.helper_binary_sha256 == config.helper_binary_sha256
|
||||
&& pin.policy_sha256 == old_policy_sha256,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_PIN_BINDING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
policy.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
|
||||
let new_policy_sha256 = sha256(&serde_json::to_vec(&policy)?);
|
||||
let config_spans: ConfigSpans<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(config_bytes)?;
|
||||
let pin_spans: PinSpans<'_> = serde_json::from_slice(pin_bytes)?;
|
||||
let new_config = replace_spans(
|
||||
config_bytes,
|
||||
vec![(config_spans.helper_binary_sha256, target_helper)],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let new_pin = replace_spans(
|
||||
pin_bytes,
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
(pin_spans.helper_binary_sha256, target_helper),
|
||||
(pin_spans.policy_sha256, &new_policy_sha256),
|
||||
],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let rendered_config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(&new_config)?;
|
||||
let rendered_pin: Pin = serde_json::from_slice(&new_pin)?;
|
||||
let mut expected_config = config.clone();
|
||||
expected_config.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
|
||||
let mut expected_pin = pin;
|
||||
expected_pin.helper_binary_sha256 = target_helper.into();
|
||||
expected_pin.policy_sha256.clone_from(&new_policy_sha256);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
rendered_config == expected_config && rendered_pin == expected_pin,
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(LinuxFullTransition {
|
||||
proof: LinuxFullTransitionProof {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
old_config_sha256: sha256(config_bytes),
|
||||
new_config_sha256: sha256(&new_config),
|
||||
old_pin_sha256: sha256(pin_bytes),
|
||||
new_pin_sha256: sha256(&new_pin),
|
||||
old_policy_sha256,
|
||||
new_policy_sha256,
|
||||
old_helper_sha256: config.helper_binary_sha256,
|
||||
new_helper_sha256: target_helper.into(),
|
||||
effective_signing_key_id: sha256(provisioned_signing_key.as_bytes()),
|
||||
},
|
||||
new_config,
|
||||
new_pin,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn replace_spans(bytes: &[u8], values: Vec<(&RawValue, &str)>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut spans = Vec::new();
|
||||
for (raw, replacement) in values {
|
||||
let raw = raw.get();
|
||||
let start = (raw.as_ptr() as usize)
|
||||
.checked_sub(bytes.as_ptr() as usize)
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("FULL_RENDER_SPAN"))?;
|
||||
let end = start
|
||||
.checked_add(raw.len())
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("FULL_RENDER_SPAN"))?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
bytes.get(start..end) == Some(raw.as_bytes())
|
||||
&& raw.len() == 66
|
||||
&& raw.starts_with('"')
|
||||
&& raw.ends_with('"'),
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_HASH_ENCODING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
digest(&raw[1..65])?;
|
||||
spans.push((start, end, format!("\"{replacement}\"")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
spans.sort_by_key(|span| span.0);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
spans.windows(2).all(|p| p[0].1 <= p[1].0),
|
||||
"FULL_RENDER_SPAN_OVERLAP"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut rendered = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
|
||||
let mut cursor = 0;
|
||||
for (start, end, replacement) in spans {
|
||||
rendered.extend_from_slice(&bytes[cursor..start]);
|
||||
rendered.extend_from_slice(replacement.as_bytes());
|
||||
cursor = end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rendered.extend_from_slice(&bytes[cursor..]);
|
||||
Ok(rendered)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,639 @@
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||
use rmm_updater_handoff::*;
|
||||
use serde_json::{Value, json};
|
||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||
|
||||
fn id(n: u128) -> Uuid {
|
||||
Uuid::from_u128(n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn h(n: u8) -> String {
|
||||
format!("{n:02x}").repeat(32)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn process(pid: u32, image: &str) -> Process {
|
||||
Process {
|
||||
pid,
|
||||
birth: u64::from(pid) + 1000,
|
||||
image_sha256: image.into(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn handoff() -> Handoff {
|
||||
Handoff {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
attempt: AttemptBinding {
|
||||
tenant_id: id(1),
|
||||
asset_id: id(2),
|
||||
agent_id: id(3),
|
||||
enrollment_generation: 1,
|
||||
assignment_version: 2,
|
||||
plan_id: id(4),
|
||||
plan_sha256: h(1),
|
||||
job_id: id(5),
|
||||
attempt_id: id(6),
|
||||
job_payload_sha256: h(2),
|
||||
grant_id: id(7),
|
||||
authorization_id: id(8),
|
||||
original_request_sha256: h(3),
|
||||
original_start_witness_sha256: h(4),
|
||||
},
|
||||
agent_journal_id: id(9),
|
||||
helper_journal_id: id(10),
|
||||
helper_checkpoint: 7,
|
||||
previous_decision_id: id(11),
|
||||
boot_id: id(12),
|
||||
connection_generation: 20,
|
||||
owner_nonce: id(13),
|
||||
updater_sha256: h(5),
|
||||
updater_policy_sha256: h(6),
|
||||
predecessor_record_sha256: h(7),
|
||||
retained_state_sha256: h(8),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
staged_files_sha256: h(9),
|
||||
predecessor: CodePair {
|
||||
manifest_sha256: h(10),
|
||||
agent_sha256: h(11),
|
||||
helper_sha256: h(12),
|
||||
pin_sha256: h(13),
|
||||
},
|
||||
target: CodePair {
|
||||
manifest_sha256: h(14),
|
||||
agent_sha256: h(15),
|
||||
helper_sha256: h(16),
|
||||
pin_sha256: h(17),
|
||||
},
|
||||
pin_transition: PinTransition::LinuxGeneralFullV1,
|
||||
pin_transition_sha256: h(18),
|
||||
files: vec![
|
||||
FileTransition {
|
||||
role: FileRole::AgentBinary,
|
||||
old_sha256: h(11),
|
||||
new_sha256: h(15),
|
||||
},
|
||||
FileTransition {
|
||||
role: FileRole::HelperBinary,
|
||||
old_sha256: h(12),
|
||||
new_sha256: h(16),
|
||||
},
|
||||
FileTransition {
|
||||
role: FileRole::LinuxFullConfig,
|
||||
old_sha256: h(19),
|
||||
new_sha256: h(20),
|
||||
},
|
||||
FileTransition {
|
||||
role: FileRole::LinuxFullPin,
|
||||
old_sha256: h(13),
|
||||
new_sha256: h(17),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
stop_set: vec![
|
||||
Service::LinuxAgent,
|
||||
Service::LinuxGeneralHelper,
|
||||
Service::LinuxFullHelper,
|
||||
],
|
||||
consumed_at: 100,
|
||||
finish_before: 700,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn key() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(&[73; 32])
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn open(handoff: &Handoff) -> Journal {
|
||||
Journal::open(&handoff.bytes().unwrap(), key().verifying_key().to_bytes()).unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn append(journal: &mut Journal, at: u64, evidence: Evidence) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let bytes = journal.prepare(at, evidence).unwrap();
|
||||
journal.replay(&bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
bytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn services(handoff: &Handoff) -> Vec<StartedService> {
|
||||
handoff
|
||||
.stop_set
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|s| **s != Service::LinuxAptHelper)
|
||||
.enumerate()
|
||||
.map(|(i, service)| StartedService {
|
||||
service: *service,
|
||||
process: process(
|
||||
50 + i as u32,
|
||||
if *service == Service::LinuxAgent {
|
||||
&handoff.target.agent_sha256
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
&handoff.target.helper_sha256
|
||||
},
|
||||
),
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn until_started(journal: &mut Journal, handoff: &Handoff) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut events = vec![
|
||||
append(journal, 101, Evidence::StopIntent),
|
||||
append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
102,
|
||||
Evidence::AllStopped {
|
||||
observation_sha256: h(21),
|
||||
},
|
||||
),
|
||||
append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
103,
|
||||
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
||||
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
},
|
||||
),
|
||||
];
|
||||
for file in &handoff.files {
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role: file.role },
|
||||
));
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::Replaced {
|
||||
role: file.role,
|
||||
observed_sha256: file.new_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
105,
|
||||
Evidence::PairVerified {
|
||||
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
|
||||
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
));
|
||||
events.push(append(journal, 106, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent));
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
107,
|
||||
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
|
||||
services: services(handoff),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
observation_sha256: h(23),
|
||||
},
|
||||
));
|
||||
events
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn receipt(journal: &Journal, handoff: &Handoff) -> HealthReceipt {
|
||||
HealthReceipt {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
handoff_sha256: journal.handoff_sha256().into(),
|
||||
owner_nonce: handoff.owner_nonce,
|
||||
boot_id: handoff.boot_id,
|
||||
helper_journal_id: handoff.helper_journal_id,
|
||||
agent_journal_id: handoff.agent_journal_id,
|
||||
connection_generation: 21,
|
||||
service_processes: services(handoff),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
signed_sync_decision_id: id(14),
|
||||
signed_sync_request_sha256: h(24),
|
||||
signed_sync_response_sha256: h(25),
|
||||
signed_sync_applied_at: 108,
|
||||
ready: false,
|
||||
inventory_message_id: id(15),
|
||||
inventory_received_at: 108,
|
||||
inventory_ack_sha256: h(26),
|
||||
issued_at: 109,
|
||||
valid_until: 200,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn signed(receipt: &HealthReceipt, domain: &[u8], key: &SigningKey) -> SignedHealth {
|
||||
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(receipt).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut bytes = domain.to_vec();
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&payload);
|
||||
SignedHealth {
|
||||
payload,
|
||||
signature: key.sign(&bytes).to_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn full_linux_three_service_handoff_replays_exactly_sixteen_events() {
|
||||
let handoff = handoff();
|
||||
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
|
||||
let mut events = until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
|
||||
let receipt = signed(&receipt(&journal, &handoff), HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key());
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
110,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt },
|
||||
));
|
||||
events.push(append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
111,
|
||||
Evidence::OutcomePersisted {
|
||||
outcome_sha256: h(27),
|
||||
},
|
||||
));
|
||||
assert_eq!(events.len(), MAX_EVENTS);
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::OutcomePersisted);
|
||||
let mut reopened = open(&handoff);
|
||||
for event in events {
|
||||
reopened.replay(&event).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.head_sha256(), reopened.head_sha256());
|
||||
assert_eq!(reopened.phase(), Phase::OutcomePersisted);
|
||||
assert!(reopened.prepare(112, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn no_ownership_before_stop_no_partial_pair_no_start_before_return() {
|
||||
let handoff = handoff();
|
||||
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
101,
|
||||
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
||||
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
append(&mut journal, 101, Evidence::StopIntent);
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
102,
|
||||
Evidence::AllStopped {
|
||||
observation_sha256: h(21),
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
103,
|
||||
Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
||||
process: process(40, &handoff.updater_sha256),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::PairVerified {
|
||||
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
|
||||
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone()
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::ReplaceIntent {
|
||||
role: FileRole::HelperBinary
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
for file in &handoff.files {
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::ReplaceIntent { role: file.role },
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::Replaced {
|
||||
role: file.role,
|
||||
observed_sha256: h(99)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
104,
|
||||
Evidence::Replaced {
|
||||
role: file.role,
|
||||
observed_sha256: file.new_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
105,
|
||||
Evidence::PairVerified {
|
||||
pair: handoff.target.clone(),
|
||||
retained_state_sha256: handoff.retained_state_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
106,
|
||||
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
|
||||
services: services(&handoff),
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
observation_sha256: h(23)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
append(&mut journal, 106, Evidence::LedgerReturnIntent);
|
||||
let mut incomplete = services(&handoff);
|
||||
incomplete.pop();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
107,
|
||||
Evidence::ServicesStarted {
|
||||
services: incomplete,
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: h(22),
|
||||
observation_sha256: h(23)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn event_chain_clock_limits_and_canonical_bytes_fail_closed() {
|
||||
let handoff = handoff();
|
||||
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
|
||||
let event = journal.prepare(101, Evidence::StopIntent).unwrap();
|
||||
for field in [
|
||||
"handoff_sha256",
|
||||
"previous_sha256",
|
||||
"boot_id",
|
||||
"sequence",
|
||||
"observed_at",
|
||||
] {
|
||||
let mut value: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&event).unwrap();
|
||||
value[field] = match field {
|
||||
"sequence" => json!(2),
|
||||
"observed_at" => json!(99),
|
||||
"boot_id" => json!(id(99)),
|
||||
_ => json!(h(99)),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let parsed: Event = serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.replay(&serde_json::to_vec(&parsed).unwrap())
|
||||
.is_err(),
|
||||
"{field}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut whitespace = event.clone();
|
||||
whitespace.push(b' ');
|
||||
assert!(journal.replay(&whitespace).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(journal.replay(&vec![b' '; MAX_EVENT_BYTES + 1]).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(journal.prepare(700, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
|
||||
journal.replay(&event).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(journal.replay(&event).is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::StopIntent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn health_is_domain_bound_fresh_evidence_and_never_opens_ready() {
|
||||
let handoff = handoff();
|
||||
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
|
||||
until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
|
||||
let baseline = receipt(&journal, &handoff);
|
||||
for change in 0..11 {
|
||||
let mut receipt = baseline.clone();
|
||||
match change {
|
||||
0 => receipt.ready = true,
|
||||
1 => receipt.owner_nonce = id(99),
|
||||
2 => receipt.boot_id = id(99),
|
||||
3 => receipt.helper_journal_id = id(99),
|
||||
4 => receipt.connection_generation = 20,
|
||||
5 => receipt.signed_sync_applied_at = 106,
|
||||
6 => receipt.inventory_received_at = 106,
|
||||
7 => receipt.service_processes[1].process.birth += 1,
|
||||
8 => receipt.valid_until = 110,
|
||||
9 => receipt.handoff_sha256 = h(99),
|
||||
_ => receipt.issued_at = 111,
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
110,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: signed(&receipt, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err(),
|
||||
"change {change}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
110,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: signed(&baseline, b"rmm.execution-permit.v1\0", &key())
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
110,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: signed(&baseline, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &SigningKey::from_bytes(&[74; 32]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut late = baseline;
|
||||
late.issued_at = 287;
|
||||
late.valid_until = 400;
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
287,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: signed(&late, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
append(
|
||||
&mut journal,
|
||||
701,
|
||||
Evidence::Unknown {
|
||||
reason: UnknownReason::DeadlineExpired,
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::Unknown);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
702,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: signed(&late, HEALTH_DOMAIN, &key())
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(journal.prepare(702, Evidence::StopIntent).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn closed_service_sets_reject_omitted_full_and_apt_restart() {
|
||||
let mut handoff = handoff();
|
||||
handoff.stop_set.pop();
|
||||
assert!(handoff.bytes().is_err());
|
||||
handoff.stop_set.push(Service::LinuxFullHelper);
|
||||
handoff.stop_set.push(Service::LinuxAptHelper);
|
||||
let mut journal = open(&handoff);
|
||||
until_started(&mut journal, &handoff);
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.phase(), Phase::ServicesStarted);
|
||||
handoff.files[3].new_sha256 = h(99);
|
||||
assert!(handoff.bytes().is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn full_files() -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
|
||||
let public_key = hex::encode(key().verifying_key().as_bytes());
|
||||
let identity = json!({"tenant_id":id(1),"asset_id":id(2),"agent_id":id(3),
|
||||
"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":2,"signing_key_id":sha256(&hex::decode(&public_key).unwrap())});
|
||||
// Exact Policy codec order copied from runtime control::Policy schema2.
|
||||
let policy = format!(
|
||||
"{{\"schema_version\":2,\"profile\":\"full_maintenance_v1\",\"identity\":{{\"tenant_id\":\"{}\",\"asset_id\":\"{}\",\"agent_id\":\"{}\",\"enrollment_generation\":1,\"assignment_version\":2,\"signing_key_id\":\"{}\"}},\"allowed_services\":[],\"allow_root_scripts\":true,\"allow_reboot\":false,\"allowed_script_profiles\":[\"full_maintenance_v1\"],\"helper_binary_sha256\":\"{}\"}}",
|
||||
id(1),
|
||||
id(2),
|
||||
id(3),
|
||||
identity["signing_key_id"].as_str().unwrap(),
|
||||
h(12)
|
||||
);
|
||||
let config = json!({"profile":"full_maintenance_v1", "binding":{"tenant_id":id(1),"asset_id":id(2),
|
||||
"agent_id":id(3),"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":2,"public_key_hex":public_key},
|
||||
"signing_key_file":format!("/etc/rmm/{}/public-key.json",h(12)),"agent_uid":993,"socket_gid":984,
|
||||
"socket":"/run/rmm-full-helper/helper.sock","state":"/var/lib/rmm-helper","allowed_services":[],
|
||||
"allow_reboot":false,"allow_root_scripts":true,"allowed_script_profiles":["full_maintenance_v1"],
|
||||
"helper_binary_sha256":h(12)});
|
||||
let pin = json!({"schema_version":2,"profile":"full_maintenance_v1","identity":identity,
|
||||
"policy_sha256":sha256(policy.as_bytes()),"helper_binary_sha256":h(12)});
|
||||
(
|
||||
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&config).unwrap(),
|
||||
serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&pin).unwrap(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn render_linux_full(
|
||||
config: &[u8],
|
||||
pin: &[u8],
|
||||
target: &str,
|
||||
) -> anyhow::Result<LinuxFullTransition> {
|
||||
rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(config, pin, target, &key().verifying_key())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn full_renderer_binds_provisioned_file_key_without_inserting_it_into_raw_config() {
|
||||
let (inline_config, pin) = full_files();
|
||||
let mut file_config: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&inline_config).unwrap();
|
||||
file_config["binding"]["public_key_hex"] = json!("");
|
||||
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&file_config).unwrap();
|
||||
let transition = render_linux_full(&bytes, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
|
||||
let actual: Value = serde_json::from_slice(transition.new_config_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(actual["binding"]["public_key_hex"], "");
|
||||
assert_eq!(actual["signing_key_file"], file_config["signing_key_file"]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
transition.proof().effective_signing_key_id,
|
||||
sha256(key().verifying_key().as_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
let expected = String::from_utf8(bytes.clone()).unwrap().replace(
|
||||
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12)),
|
||||
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.new_config_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
|
||||
let inline = render_linux_full(&inline_config, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
transition.proof().new_policy_sha256,
|
||||
inline.proof().new_policy_sha256
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.new_pin_bytes(), inline.new_pin_bytes());
|
||||
let foreign_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[74; 32]).verifying_key();
|
||||
assert!(rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(&bytes, &pin, &h(16), &foreign_key).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
rmm_updater_handoff::render_linux_full(&inline_config, &pin, &h(16), &foreign_key).is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
file_config
|
||||
.as_object_mut()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.remove("signing_key_file");
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&file_config).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
file_config["signing_key_file"] = json!("relative-key.json");
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&file_config).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn full_renderer_changes_only_named_hash_spans_preserving_all_other_raw_bytes() {
|
||||
let (config, pin) = full_files();
|
||||
let transition = render_linux_full(&config, &pin, &h(16)).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.proof().old_config_sha256, sha256(&config));
|
||||
let before: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
|
||||
let after: Value = serde_json::from_slice(transition.new_config_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(before["signing_key_file"], after["signing_key_file"]);
|
||||
assert!(after["signing_key_file"].as_str().unwrap().contains(&h(12)));
|
||||
let needle = format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12));
|
||||
let expected = String::from_utf8(config)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.replace(&needle, &format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)));
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.new_config_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
|
||||
let old_pin = String::from_utf8(pin).unwrap();
|
||||
let expected = old_pin
|
||||
.replace(&needle, &format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(16)))
|
||||
.replace(
|
||||
&transition.proof().old_policy_sha256,
|
||||
&transition.proof().new_policy_sha256,
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.new_pin_bytes(), expected.as_bytes());
|
||||
assert_eq!(transition.sha256().unwrap().len(), 64);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
render_linux_full(
|
||||
transition.new_config_bytes(),
|
||||
transition.new_pin_bytes(),
|
||||
&h(17)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_ok()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn full_renderer_rejects_foreign_pins_unknown_duplicate_escaped_and_privilege_changes() {
|
||||
let (config, pin) = full_files();
|
||||
for field in [
|
||||
"allow_reboot",
|
||||
"allowed_services",
|
||||
"allowed_script_profiles",
|
||||
"profile",
|
||||
"apt_provider",
|
||||
] {
|
||||
let mut value: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
|
||||
value[field] = match field {
|
||||
"allow_reboot" => json!(true),
|
||||
"allowed_services" => json!(["other.service"]),
|
||||
"allowed_script_profiles" => Value::Null,
|
||||
"profile" => json!("general"),
|
||||
_ => json!({}),
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&value).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err(),
|
||||
"{field}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut foreign: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&pin).unwrap();
|
||||
foreign["identity"]["agent_id"] = json!(id(99));
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(&config, &serde_json::to_vec(&foreign).unwrap(), &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
let mut unknown: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config).unwrap();
|
||||
unknown["binding"]["new_field"] = json!(true);
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(&serde_json::to_vec(&unknown).unwrap(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
let text = String::from_utf8(config).unwrap();
|
||||
let duplicate = text.replacen("{", "{\"helper_binary_sha256\":\"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",",1);
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(duplicate.as_bytes(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
let escaped = text.replace(
|
||||
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"{}\"", h(12)),
|
||||
&format!("\"helper_binary_sha256\": \"\\u0030{}\"", &h(12)[1..]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(render_linux_full(escaped.as_bytes(), &pin, &h(16)).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
|
||||
# Reviewstand: erhaltene Helper-/Updater-Übergabe
|
||||
|
||||
2026-11-14. **Isolierter Quellvertrag, keine Produktnorm oder Applyruntime.**
|
||||
Basis: vollständige Spezifikation1.19, vollständige1.20-/PD-Ergänzung des
|
||||
Skriptconsole-Worktrees und [bisheriger Vorschlag](agent-updater-proposal.md).
|
||||
Root hat den engen Kernel und den Fullrenderer zur Ausarbeitung beauftragt;
|
||||
Runtimeintegration, Zielaktionen und Veröffentlichung erfolgen erst nach
|
||||
dessen Koordination. Linux-first und die tatsächliche WebUI-Grenze gelten.
|
||||
|
||||
Die neue Crate `rmm-updater-handoff` verändert weder den qualifizierten
|
||||
Releaseverifier noch die beiden vorhandenen nativen Verifier-Abnahmerunner.
|
||||
Sie enthält keinen Installer, Dateischreiber, Dienststart, IPC-Server,
|
||||
Netzwerkclient, SQLiteadapter, Approver oder neuen Server-Journalslot.
|
||||
Aus einem gültigen Handoff oder Healthreceipt entsteht keine Startberechtigung.
|
||||
|
||||
## Konkreter Vorwärtsvertrag
|
||||
|
||||
`Handoff` bindet ursprünglichen Tenant/Asset/Agent, beide Generationen,
|
||||
Plan-/Job-/Versuchs-/Grant-/Authorization-IDs, exakte Originalrequest- und
|
||||
Startzeugenhashes, beide vorhandenen Journal-IDs, Helpercheckpoint und letzten
|
||||
signierten Entscheid, Boot, ursprüngliche Verbindungsgeneration, einmalige
|
||||
Ownernonce, stabilen Updater-/Policyhash, Vorgängerrecord, erhaltene Zustands-
|
||||
und Stagingzeugen sowie Vorgänger-/Zielcodepaar. Der Rendererbeleg und alle
|
||||
benannten alten/neuen Dateihashes sind unveränderlicher Bestandteil.
|
||||
|
||||
Die Helperintegration muss Verbrauch, bestehenden exakten Startzeugen und
|
||||
Handoff **in derselben vorhandenen Ledgertransaktion** persistieren. Eine
|
||||
zusätzliche Transaktion nach `ledger::begin_execution` wäre unzureichend:
|
||||
ein Crash könnte einen Verbrauch ohne bestimmbaren Owner hinterlassen.
|
||||
Jeder andere offene/Unknown-Versuch verweigert die Übergabe. Das Handoff
|
||||
ersetzt weder den Originaljob/-grant noch dessen unabhängige Prüfung.
|
||||
|
||||
Die Writergrenze ist ausdrücklich Bestandteil dieses Vertrags: Der alte
|
||||
Helper persistiert auch den Stopintent vor der Übergabeantwort. Solange er
|
||||
seinen lebenslangen Windowsguard hält, schreibt der Updater kein Event in
|
||||
den gemeinsamen Ledger. Nach Stop/Guardübernahme kann der Updater All-stopped
|
||||
und Ownership zusammen transaktional anhängen. Nach dauerhaftem Rückgabeintent
|
||||
und tatsächlicher Guardabgabe stammen die weiteren Start-/Health-/Outcome-
|
||||
Events ausschließlich vom neuen Helper unter dessen Guard. Der Updater
|
||||
erhält nur die eng typisierte lokale Bridge; kein freies Ledger-Schreibrecht
|
||||
parallel zum neuen Helper. Ein einheitlicher Ledger-/Lock-Inode-/FileID-Hash
|
||||
ist vor Übergabe fest gebunden und wird bei Übernahme, neuem Servicepeer und
|
||||
Health erneut verglichen; bloß ein gleichnamiger Dateipfad reicht nicht.
|
||||
|
||||
Der begrenzte Journalcodec prüft kanonische Bytes, Hashvorgänger, monotone
|
||||
Sequenz/Zeit und höchstens16Events. Für Linux Full sind dies genau:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Stopintent, unabhängiger All-stopped-Zeuge, bestätigter Besitz des gleichen
|
||||
Helperledgers durch den konkreten stabilen Updaterprozess.
|
||||
2. Jeweils ein Intent und ein bestätigter Nachhash für Agent, Helper,
|
||||
Fullconfig und Fullpin; keine neue Dienstgeneration vor vollständigem Paar.
|
||||
3. Neues Code-/Pinpaar und erhaltener Zustandszeuge vollständig bestätigt.
|
||||
4. Dauerhafter Ledger-Rückgabeintent unter gehaltenem Guard, danach Guard
|
||||
tatsächlich abgeben; erst anschließend darf der neue Helper denselben
|
||||
Guard erwerben und starten.
|
||||
5. Konkrete neue Serviceprozesse mit Imagehash, PID und Prozessgeburt,
|
||||
anschließend signierter Healthbeleg und ursprüngliches Outcome-CAS.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Codec nimmt nur Beobachtungen entgegen. `prepare` liefert Bytes für ein
|
||||
append-only CAS gegen den bestehenden Head, **keinen Haltbarkeitsnachweis**.
|
||||
Der Plattformadapter muss Flush/Commit vor Wirkung, echte Service-/Peer-
|
||||
und Guardbeobachtungen, Dateihandles/ACLs sowie ursprüngliche SQLrows und
|
||||
Signaturen prüfen. Historischer Replay allein erkennt keinen abgeschnittenen
|
||||
Suffix; er muss gegen den erhaltenen dauerhaften Head, Rowcount und
|
||||
Ledger-/Inode-/FileID-/Kontrollkettenbeleg geprüft werden. Ein unbekannter
|
||||
Stop/Teilwechsel/Start bleibt lesend zu diagnostizieren, kein erneuter Execute.
|
||||
Ein expliziter Unknown ist im neuen Updatekernel terminal und wird durch
|
||||
spätere Health nicht geheilt. Bestehende allgemeine Outcome-CAS-Regeln bleiben.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fullhelper bleibt Teil des ersten Linux-Applyziels
|
||||
|
||||
Die tatsächliche Zieltopologie hat General, Full und Agent aktiv. Daher ist
|
||||
Full kein pauschaler Ausschluss. `linux_general_full_v1` erhält ein geschlossenes
|
||||
Stopset Agent/General/Full; ein bereits installierter APT-Reader kann zusätzlich
|
||||
als vierter Dienst im Stopset stehen, **nie im Startset**. Alle tatsächlich
|
||||
installierten Shared-Ledger-Reader müssen vor Austausch erkannt und gestoppt
|
||||
sein. Unbekannte Profile und ausgelassene Fullservices verweigern den Schnitt.
|
||||
Agent/General/Full erhalten dieselbe neue Codepaargeneration vor Restart.
|
||||
Die alte APT-Unqualifikation/-Deaktivierung bleibt bestehen; kein alter
|
||||
Acceptancebeleg wird umgeschrieben oder auf die neue Helperdatei übertragen.
|
||||
Zukünftiger APT-Start benötigt eine gesonderte passende Qualifikation.
|
||||
|
||||
`render_linux_full` akzeptiert ausschließlich das bekannte Full-Configschema,
|
||||
die daraus in fester Feldreihenfolge abgeleitete `control::Policy` Schema2
|
||||
und den zugehörigen `GeneralPin` Schema2. Alte Binär-/Policy-/Identitybindungen
|
||||
werden vorher geprüft. Die Rendererdefinitionen sind eine explizite
|
||||
Schemamomentaufnahme; Integration muss sie gegen die tatsächlichen Typen aus
|
||||
dem1.20-Quellstand vergleichen, bevor sie Runtime werden.
|
||||
|
||||
Der unabhängige Quellenreview fand einen echten Kompatibilitätsfehler des
|
||||
ersten Entwurfs: Die aktuelle Full-Rawconfig enthält einen leeren Inlinekey
|
||||
und einen `signing_key_file`-Pfad; die Runtime ergänzt den effektiven öffentlichen
|
||||
Key vor der Policyhashbildung. Der reine Renderer erhält deshalb jetzt den
|
||||
bereits provisionierten, **extern authentisierten** öffentlichen Signierkey
|
||||
als expliziten Parameter. Er öffnet keine Datei. Bei vorhandenem absolutem
|
||||
Keypfad darf der Raw-Inlinekey leer oder genau gleich sein; ohne Keypfad ist
|
||||
der gleiche Inlinekey Pflicht. Effektive Policy und Pin werden wie in der
|
||||
Runtime aus diesem Key abgeleitet; Raw-Inlinekey und Pfad bleiben unverändert.
|
||||
Der Transitionbeleg bindet zusätzlich `effective_signing_key_id`. Ein bloß
|
||||
geparstes `VerifyingKey`-Objekt authentisiert keine Provisionierung; der spätere
|
||||
Adapter muss den Input unabhängig gegen die vorhandene geschützte Keydatei
|
||||
und die gebundene öffentliche Identität prüfen. Eine neue lokale Vertragsprobe
|
||||
belegt den Filekeyfall und gleiche Policy-/Pinbytes zum Inlinefall. Dies ist
|
||||
weiterhin kein Lesen der realen Keydatei oder nativer Renderer-Nachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Renderer ändert nur benannte Top-Level-Wertspans:
|
||||
|
||||
- Config: `helper_binary_sha256`.
|
||||
- Pin: `helper_binary_sha256` und daraus exakt neu berechnetes `policy_sha256`.
|
||||
|
||||
Alle anderen **rohen Config-/Pinbytes** bleiben erhalten, einschließlich
|
||||
Formatierung, Identity, öffentlicher Schlüssel, Keypfad, UID/GID, Socket,
|
||||
Statepfad und Rechtefelder. Er nutzt begrenzte typisierte Deserialisierung
|
||||
und geborgte `RawValue`-Spans; keine globale Stringersetzung, kein JSONpatch.
|
||||
Ein gleicher Hash innerhalb eines anderen Feldes bleibt erhalten.
|
||||
Unbekannte/duplizierte Felder, abweichende Policy, zusätzliche Profile/Services,
|
||||
fremde Identität und escaped Hashwerte werden verweigert.
|
||||
|
||||
Der `LinuxFullTransition` bindet alte/neue Rawconfig-, Rawpin-, Policy- und
|
||||
Helperhashes. Exakte Zielbytes samt Beleg müssen vor der WebUI-Genehmigung im
|
||||
festen Plan aufgelöst und später unabhängig erneut geprüft werden. General-
|
||||
und APT-Konfigurationen werden nicht gerendert. Die zentrale Fullscope wird
|
||||
**nicht migriert**; künftige Fulljobs bleiben ohne neue konkrete Scopebindung
|
||||
deny. Ein Codewechsel erteilt keine neuen Rechte.
|
||||
|
||||
## Enger Health- und Syncanschluss
|
||||
|
||||
Die eigene offene Updatezeile darf **keinen allgemeinen Readyzustand** erzeugen.
|
||||
`HealthReceipt` ist separat domänengebunden (`rmm.agent-update-health.v1\0`),
|
||||
mit strengem Ed25519 geprüft und an den gesamten Handoffhash, Ownernonce,
|
||||
Boot, beide erhaltenen Journale, neue Verbindungsgeneration und sämtliche
|
||||
konkreten neuen Agent-/Helperprozesse gebunden. Er enthält exakte Hashes des
|
||||
tatsächlich angewandten SignedSync-Requests/-Responses, Decision-ID und
|
||||
frisches Inventar samt ACK-Hash. `ready=true` wird ausdrücklich verweigert.
|
||||
Sync und Inventarempfang müssen nach den bestätigten neuen Dienststarts
|
||||
liegen. Health ist nur innerhalb180Sekunden gültig, Gesamtfrist höchstens600;
|
||||
kein Receipt verlängert sie. Der öffentliche Verifikationsschlüssel wird
|
||||
extern vertrauenswürdig provisioniert, nie aus dem Receipt übernommen.
|
||||
|
||||
Noch vor Integration normativ zu bestätigen:
|
||||
|
||||
| Anschluss | Erforderliche enge Änderung |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `ledger::begin_execution` | Additive atomare Handoffanlage mit Originalverbrauch/-start im selben Ledger; keine Ersatzzeilen und kein Reset |
|
||||
| Helper-/Agent-Startup | Nur exakt vollständiges, lebendes, gleichbootiges, fristgebundenes Updatehandoff als `inflight` erkennen; vorhandenes Unknown niemals umschreiben |
|
||||
| `HelperSync`/Server-Sync | Typed Inflightdatensatz desselben Versuchs bei weiterhin geschlossenem Ready abgleichen; Originalkontrollkette erhalten |
|
||||
| `ClientSync::confirm_helper` | Bestehende allgemeine Unresolved-Sperre erhalten; neuer expliziter read-only Updatekontrollpfad darf keine Startlease setzen |
|
||||
| Lokales IPC | Eigener fest provisionierter Updaterparticipant mit Dienst-/UID/SID-/PID-/Geburts-/Imagebindung; Root/SYSTEM allein reicht nicht |
|
||||
| Healthroute | Tatsächlich gespeicherter neuer Geräte-mTLS-/Inventory-/Syncbeleg; lokale aktuelle Peer-/Code-/Stateprüfung plus exaktes Receipt vergleichen |
|
||||
| Finalisierung | Neuer Helper speichert ausschließlich das noch fehlende Originaloutcome per unverändertem CAS; danach bestehende Spiegelung/normaler Sync |
|
||||
|
||||
Keine dieser Runtimeänderungen ist durch den isolierten Kernel implementiert.
|
||||
Insbesondere ist ein Hash im Receipt kein Ersatz für die unabhängige Prüfung
|
||||
des zugehörigen aktuellen lokalen Kontroll-/Inventarbelegs. Rotation/Revoke-
|
||||
und Trustprovisionierung müssen den aktuellen sowie historischen Prüfkontext
|
||||
beibehalten; der Kernel implementiert keinen neuen Trustdienst.
|
||||
|
||||
Offen bleiben außerdem genehmigte typisierte Action/Plan/Grant-/UI-/MCP-
|
||||
Integration, Updatekatalog und begrenzter eigener Streamingpfad, OSstaging,
|
||||
stabiler Updaterbootstrap, Dienst-/Dateiaustausch, einmaliger zulässiger
|
||||
Vorgängercode-Rollback, tatsächliche Linux-Abnahme und danach Windows.
|
||||
Windows-Codepaar-/Settingsrenderer und Rollbackzustände sind hier **nicht**
|
||||
implementiert. Der ursprüngliche reine Linux9-/Windows9-Verifiernachweis
|
||||
bleibt unverändert; diese neuen Verträge haben noch keinen VM-Nachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlich ausgeführte lokale Prüfungen
|
||||
|
||||
Offlinecontainer aus vorhandenem Image
|
||||
`sha256:9a76ad3744ebfdddae96ca10001ce8291c1b332fb54c8df5eea0e8e999ac6fc6`.
|
||||
Kein Server oder Agent auf dem Notebook gestartet, keine Ziel-/Policyaktion.
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
cargo check --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff
|
||||
cargo fmt --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml -p rmm-updater-handoff
|
||||
cargo test --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --locked --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff --all-targets --release
|
||||
cargo clippy --manifest-path /src/Cargo.toml --locked --offline -p rmm-updater-handoff --all-targets -- -D warnings
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Bestanden: Check, Formatierung, Clippy ohne Warnungen und acht gezielte
|
||||
Vertragsprüfungen ohne Skip. Diese prüfen den vollständigen16-Event-Fullpfad,
|
||||
Originalketten-/Clock-/Limitgrenzen, Stop-/Lock-/Austausch-/Restartreihenfolge,
|
||||
fehlende Fullprozesse/APT-Ausschluss, echte getrennte Healthsignaturen,
|
||||
stale/fremde/ready-Health und terminalen Unknown sowie Rawbyteerhaltung,
|
||||
extern gebundene File-/Inline-Signierkeys und feindliche Fullrenderer-Eingaben.
|
||||
Nur lokale Vertragsnachweise; kein
|
||||
Bootstrapping, dauerhafter SQLite-Commit, nativer Dienst-/Apply-/Rollback-
|
||||
oder Produktionsnachweis. Der erste Formatbefehl scheiterte vor Cargo an
|
||||
einem nicht überschriebenen Image-Entrypoint; mit `--entrypoint cargo`
|
||||
anschließend tatsächlich ausgeführt. Keine Tests als Folge dieses Fehlers
|
||||
erfunden oder Zielaktion wiederholt.
|
||||
@@ -272,6 +272,15 @@ Serverintegration und tatsächlicher genehmigter Codewechsel bleiben
|
||||
offen. Kein Installer, keine Dienständerung, keine Freigabe und kein RMM-Job
|
||||
durch diesen reinen Prüfkern; der Subagent führte keine eigene VM-Aktion aus.
|
||||
|
||||
Zusätzlicher lokaler Reviewstand nach1.20: ein isolierter typisierter
|
||||
Handoff-/Healthkernel und geschlossener Linux-Fullrenderer sind implementiert,
|
||||
ohne den qualifizierten Verifier oder Runtime zu ändern. Die tatsächliche
|
||||
Linuxzieltopologie General+Full+Agent wird ausdrücklich berücksichtigt;
|
||||
Full bleibt kein pauschaler Ausschluss. Konkreter Vertrag, acht lokale
|
||||
Prüfungen, notwendige Reviewentscheidungen und weiterhin fehlende Integration:
|
||||
[Erhaltende Handoffgrenze](agent-updater-handoff.md). Dies ist keine neue
|
||||
Produktnorm, Zielinstallation oder native Applyabnahme.
|
||||
|
||||
## Nächster Integrationsschnitt zur Freigabe: fester Codepaar-Updatejob
|
||||
|
||||
Die folgende Änderungsliste ist **nur Entwurf, nicht implementiert**. Sie
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user