Qualify atomic deny-only helper abandonment on actual Linux VM
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-14 06:48:32 +01:00
parent 44c45c15b9
commit 67370d21a3
7 changed files with 1174 additions and 14 deletions
+49 -9
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ impl Binding {
request: &Request,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
verifier: &impl Ed25519Verifier,
) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
let (job, p) = self.verify_signed_request(request, verifier)?;
ensure!(
permit_window(&job, &p) && now >= p.not_before && now < p.start_before,
"PERMIT_TIME"
);
Ok((job, p))
}
/// Evidence-only verification. This never supplies a current start window
/// and cannot be substituted for verify_with at an execution boundary.
pub fn verify_historical_for_denial_with(
&self,
request: &Request,
identity: HelperIdentity,
verifier: &impl Ed25519Verifier,
) -> Result<VerifiedHistoricalDenial> {
let (job, permit) = self.verify_signed_request(request, verifier)?;
ensure!(permit_window(&job, &permit), "PERMIT_TIME");
ensure!(
job.execution_identity == identity.as_str()
&& matches!(&job.action, rmm_domain::jobs::Action::SetServiceState { state, .. }
if matches!(state.as_str(), "running" | "stopped")),
"DENIAL_HELPER_SCOPE"
);
Ok(VerifiedHistoricalDenial {
request: request.clone(),
permit,
request_sha256: hash(&serde_json::to_vec(request)?),
})
}
fn verify_signed_request(
&self,
request: &Request,
verifier: &impl Ed25519Verifier,
) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
let job = self.job(&request.job_bytes)?;
ensure!(
@@ -91,19 +125,25 @@ impl Binding {
&& p.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds,
"PERMIT_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
p.not_before >= job.not_before
&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
&& p.not_before < p.start_before
&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
&& now >= p.not_before
&& now < p.start_before,
"PERMIT_TIME"
);
Ok((job, p))
}
}
fn permit_window(job: &JobPayload, p: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> bool {
p.not_before >= job.not_before
&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
&& p.not_before < p.start_before
&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
}
/// Not serializable or constructible by an IPC caller. Only the deny-only
/// helper path consumes this evidence; it is never an execution authorization.
pub struct VerifiedHistoricalDenial {
pub(crate) request: Request,
pub(crate) permit: ExecutionPermitPayload,
pub(crate) request_sha256: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Request {