Prove actual Windows agent process identity under SYSTEM diagnostic
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,9 +1,17 @@
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//! Negative, read-only raw Probe clients. Never SDK self-refusal as server proof.
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//! The permanent services, their tokens/configuration and private state stay intact.
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// Compile the unchanged production proof in this diagnostic crate. Keeping the
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// module public avoids hiding its public transport API behind dead-code lint;
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// no new API is exported from the agent library.
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#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
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#[path = "../src/helper_ipc.rs"]
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pub mod helper_ipc;
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#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
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pub use rmm_agent_windows::SERVICE_NAME;
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#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
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mod platform {
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use crate::helper_ipc as ipc;
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use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
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use rmm_agent_windows::helper_ipc as ipc;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use serde_json::json;
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use std::{
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@@ -35,6 +43,7 @@ mod platform {
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const ROOT: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls";
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static CASE: OnceLock<uuid::Uuid> = OnceLock::new();
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static IS_PARENT: OnceLock<bool> = OnceLock::new();
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static DIRECT_PEER_PROOF: OnceLock<bool> = OnceLock::new();
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static STATUS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
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fn wide(s: &str) -> Vec<u16> {
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s.encode_utf16().chain(Some(0)).collect()
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@@ -866,6 +875,33 @@ mod platform {
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&json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":case,"source":"own_system_fixed_child_controller","result":result,"no_jobs":true,"read_only":true,"token_exported":false}),
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)
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}
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fn direct_peer_proof(case: uuid::Uuid) -> Result<()> {
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let identity = token("parent")?;
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save(case, "parent-token.json", &identity)?;
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let input = read_input(case)?;
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let began = Instant::now();
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let proof = (|| -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
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let mut peer = ipc::PeerProof::for_service(&input.pin.agent, input.expected_agent_pid)?;
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ensure!(
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peer.identity().creation_ticks == input.expected_agent_creation,
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"CONTROL_ORIGINAL_AGENT_BIRTH"
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);
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ensure!(!peer.exited()?, "CONTROL_ORIGINAL_AGENT_EXITED");
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peer.check()?;
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Ok(serde_json::to_value(peer.identity())?)
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})();
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let result = match proof {
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Ok(actual) => json!({"direct_agent_peer_proof":true,"verified":true,"identity":actual}),
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Err(error) => {
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json!({"direct_agent_peer_proof":true,"verified":false,"error_codes":codes(&error)})
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}
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};
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save(
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case,
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"parent-result.json",
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&json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":case,"source":"own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof","result":result,"elapsed_ms":began.elapsed().as_millis(),"expected_agent_pid":input.expected_agent_pid,"expected_agent_creation":input.expected_agent_creation,"no_jobs":true,"read_only":true,"pipe_used":false,"token_duplicated":false,"token_exported":false,"service_or_process_acl_changed":false}),
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)
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}
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fn status(state: u32, error: u32) {
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let handle = STATUS.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE;
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if handle.is_null() {
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@@ -911,7 +947,11 @@ mod platform {
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STATUS.store(handle as usize, Ordering::SeqCst);
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status(SERVICE_RUNNING, 0);
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let result = if *IS_PARENT.get().unwrap_or(&false) {
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parent(*CASE.get().unwrap())
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if *DIRECT_PEER_PROOF.get().unwrap_or(&false) {
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direct_peer_proof(*CASE.get().unwrap())
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} else {
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parent(*CASE.get().unwrap())
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}
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} else {
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run(*CASE.get().unwrap(), "service")
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};
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@@ -924,7 +964,7 @@ mod platform {
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args.len() == 2
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&& matches!(
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args[0].as_str(),
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"--admin" | "--service" | "--agent-child" | "--parent"
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"--admin" | "--service" | "--agent-child" | "--parent" | "--peer-proof"
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),
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"CONTROL_FIXED_MODE"
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);
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@@ -940,11 +980,14 @@ mod platform {
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return run(case, "child");
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}
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IS_PARENT
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.set(args[0] == "--parent")
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.set(matches!(args[0].as_str(), "--parent" | "--peer-proof"))
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_MODE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
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DIRECT_PEER_PROOF
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.set(args[0] == "--peer-proof")
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_MODE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
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CASE.set(case)
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_CASE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
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let mut name = wide(if args[0] == "--parent" {
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let mut name = wide(if matches!(args[0].as_str(), "--parent" | "--peer-proof") {
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PARENT_NAME
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} else {
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NAME
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@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ $file=Join-Path $version $p.name;$exists=Test-Path -LiteralPath $file;if($exists
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'''
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SCRIPT=r'''$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
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$p=$global:RmmPeerControlPayload
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if($p.action-notin@('prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback')-or([guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString())-cne$p.id-or$p.binary-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.source-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'){throw 'Fixed control intent'}
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if($p.action-notin@('prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback')-or([guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString())-cne$p.id-or$p.binary-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.source-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.direct_peer_proof-isnot[bool]){throw 'Fixed control intent'}
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if($p.direct_peer_proof-and$p.action-notin@('prepare','parent','cleanup','readback')){throw 'Direct proof case has no child, administrator or LocalService probe'}
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$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls';$case=Join-Path $root $p.id;$controller=Join-Path $case 'controller';$exe=Join-Path (Join-Path $root $p.binary) 'HelperPeerControls.exe'
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$agentName='RmmDiscoveryWindows';$helperName='RmmDiscoverySystemHelper';$name='RmmDiscoveryPeerControl';$parentName='RmmDiscoveryPeerParent'
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$agentSid=(New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount('NT SERVICE',$agentName)).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value
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@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ function Baseline {
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return [ordered]@{services=$services;private_helper_metadata=$files;agent_config=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');agent_config_sha256=(Hash 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');device_key_metadata=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\state\device.key');helper_public_pin_sha256=(Hash $pin);helper_public_settings_sha256=(Hash $settings);helper_private_bytes_read=$false}
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}
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function Same($before,$after){if(($before|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)-cne($after|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)){throw 'Original agent/helper or private file metadata changed'}}
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function ReadIntent{Check $case $true @($agentSid,$controlSid) @();Check $controller $true @() @();Check (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') $false @() @();$i=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;foreach($field in @('id','binary','source','agent_pid','helper_pid','agent_binary','helper_binary','policy','pin_sha256','control_sid')){if($i.payload.$field-cne$p.$field){throw 'Exact retained control intent'}};return $i}
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function ReadIntent{Check $case $true @($agentSid,$controlSid) @();Check $controller $true @() @();Check (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') $false @() @();$i=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;foreach($field in @('id','binary','source','agent_pid','helper_pid','agent_binary','helper_binary','policy','pin_sha256','control_sid','direct_peer_proof')){if($i.payload.$field-cne$p.$field){throw 'Exact retained control intent'}};return $i}
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if((Hash $exe)-cne$p.binary){throw 'Exact control executable'}
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if($p.action-ceq'prepare'){
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if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)-or(Get-Service -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)-or(Get-Service -Name $parentName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)){throw 'No preexisting control case/services'}
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@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ if($p.action-ceq'admin'){
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try{$out=$proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync();$err=$proc.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync();if(!$proc.WaitForExit(20000)){$proc.Kill();$proc.WaitForExit(5000)|Out-Null;throw 'Own administrator probe timeout'};WriteNew (Join-Path $controller 'admin-exit.json') @{pid=$proc.Id;exit_code=$proc.ExitCode;stdout_bytes=$out.Result.Length;stderr_bytes=$err.Result.Length};if($proc.ExitCode-ne0){throw 'Own administrator probe incomplete'}}finally{$proc.Dispose()}
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}
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if($p.action-in@('service','parent')){
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$kind=$p.action;$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
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$kind=$p.action;$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}elseif($p.direct_peer_proof){'--peer-proof'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
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if(Get-Service -Name $serviceName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue){throw 'Existing control service: readback only'}
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WriteNew (Join-Path $controller ($kind+'-start-intent.json')) @{once=$true;service=$serviceName;command=$command;probe_only=$true;no_jobs=$true}
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if($kind-ceq'service'){$credential=New-Object Management.Automation.PSCredential('NT AUTHORITY\LocalService',(New-Object Security.SecureString));New-Service -Name $serviceName -BinaryPathName $command -StartupType Manual -Credential $credential|Out-Null}
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@@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ if($p.action-in@('service','parent')){
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}
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$deadline=[DateTime]::UtcNow.AddSeconds(35)
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foreach($kind in @('service','parent')){
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$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
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$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}elseif($p.direct_peer_proof){'--peer-proof'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
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$s=Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter ("Name='"+$serviceName+"'") -OperationTimeoutSec 10
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if($s){
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$expected=if($kind-ceq'service'){'NT AUTHORITY\LocalService'}else{'LocalSystem'}
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@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ def stage(path,name):
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return digest
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def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case):
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def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case,direct_peer_proof=False):
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manifest=cb.contract.protected_json(manifest_path)
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require(manifest['type']=='rmm.windows.helper-peer-controls' and manifest['system_helper_feature'] is True and manifest['source_files']==sources() and helper.sha(manifest['artifact']['path'])==manifest['artifact']['sha256'],'new source-bound control artifact, not old 27-unit proof')
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index,association,native=helper.current_runtime()
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@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case):
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ident=str(uuid.uuid4());helper.private_dir(STATE);folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
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source=folder/'PeerControls.ps1';fd=os.open(source,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600)
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with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(SCRIPT.encode());out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno())
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payload=dict(id=ident,binary=manifest['artifact']['sha256'],source=hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),control_sid=helper.service_sid(NAME),agent_pid=native['service']['process_id'],helper_pid=6240,agent_binary=index['binary_sha256'],helper_binary=helper.HELPER_SHA,policy=profile['policy_sha256'],pin_sha256=profile['pin_sha256'])
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payload=dict(id=ident,binary=manifest['artifact']['sha256'],source=hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),control_sid=helper.service_sid(NAME),agent_pid=native['service']['process_id'],helper_pid=6240,agent_binary=index['binary_sha256'],helper_binary=helper.HELPER_SHA,policy=profile['policy_sha256'],pin_sha256=profile['pin_sha256'],direct_peer_proof=bool(direct_peer_proof))
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require(payload['agent_pid']==5140,'explicit current accepted agent process; no silent PID adoption')
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intent=dict(payload=payload,source_file_sha256=helper.sha(__file__),manifest_path=str(manifest_path.resolve()),manifest_sha256=helper.sha(manifest_path),runtime_index=association,helper_case=helper_case,no_jobs=True)
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helper.store(folder,'intent.json',intent);helper.store(folder,'prepare-attempt.json',{'create_once':True})
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@@ -274,6 +275,14 @@ def summarize(report,payload,ident):
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require(report.get('writer_binding_checked') is True,'native owner and exact writer-role checks required')
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require(report['original_preserved'] is True and report['own_services_removed'] is True,'original services/files preserved and own stopped services removed')
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result={'id':ident,'original_preserved':True,'own_services_removed':True,'no_jobs':True,'parent_diagnostic':report['reports'].get('parent-result'),'parent_token':report['reports'].get('parent-token'),'report_trust':report.get('report_trust',{}),'controls':{}}
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if payload.get('direct_peer_proof') and report['reports'].get('parent-result'):
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value=report['reports']['parent-result'];token=report['reports'].get('parent-token',{})
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require(token.get('user_sid')=='S-1-5-18' and token.get('parent_service_sid_enabled') is True,'actual own SYSTEM diagnostic parent')
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require(value.get('source')=='own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof' and value.get('case_id')==ident and value.get('expected_agent_pid')==payload['agent_pid'] and value.get('no_jobs') is True and value.get('read_only') is True and value.get('pipe_used') is False and value.get('token_duplicated') is False and value.get('service_or_process_acl_changed') is False,'exact read-only direct proof scope')
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require(value['result'].get('direct_agent_peer_proof') is True and isinstance(value['result'].get('verified'),bool),'actual direct proof result, never pipe proof')
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if value['result']['verified']:
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require(value['result']['identity']['pid']==payload['agent_pid'],'actual original Agent process')
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result['direct_agent_peer_proof']=value
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for kind in ('admin','service'):
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value=report['reports'].get(kind+'-result')
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if value:
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@@ -292,11 +301,11 @@ def summarize(report,payload,ident):
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def main():
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p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=['build-local','memory-guard','prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback']);p.add_argument('--manifest',type=Path);p.add_argument('--helper-case');p.add_argument('--id');a=p.parse_args()
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p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=['build-local','memory-guard','prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback']);p.add_argument('--manifest',type=Path);p.add_argument('--helper-case');p.add_argument('--id');p.add_argument('--direct-peer-proof',action='store_true',help='New prepare case: own SYSTEM parent only runs the exact production Agent peer proof, no child or pipe');a=p.parse_args()
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if a.action=='build-local':build()
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elif a.action=='memory-guard':
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value=cb.powershell(MEMORY_GUARD,{},timeout=30);require(value.get('verified') is True and value.get('filesystem_or_acl_mutations') is False,'actual memory-only ACL constructor guard');print(json.dumps(value))
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elif a.action=='prepare':require(a.manifest is not None and a.helper_case is not None,'new control manifest and explicit existing passive helper case required');prepare(a.manifest,a.helper_case)
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elif a.action=='prepare':require(a.manifest is not None and a.helper_case is not None,'new control manifest and explicit existing passive helper case required');prepare(a.manifest,a.helper_case,a.direct_peer_proof)
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else:require(a.id is not None,'existing explicit control case required');run(a.id,a.action)
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@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ class PeerControlGuards(unittest.TestCase):
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pipe['actual_server_pid']=999
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
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def test_direct_system_proof_is_not_reported_as_a_pipe_control(self):
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report,payload,ident=self.fixture();report['reports'].clear();payload['direct_peer_proof']=True
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report['reports']['parent-token']={'user_sid':'S-1-5-18','parent_service_sid_enabled':True}
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value={'source':'own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof','case_id':ident,'expected_agent_pid':5140,'no_jobs':True,'read_only':True,'pipe_used':False,'token_duplicated':False,'service_or_process_acl_changed':False,'result':{'direct_agent_peer_proof':True,'verified':False,'error_codes':['HELPER_SCM_IMAGE_BINDING']}}
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report['reports']['parent-result']=value
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result=control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
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self.assertFalse(result['direct_agent_peer_proof']['result']['verified']);self.assertEqual(result['controls'],{})
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value['pipe_used']=True
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with self.assertRaises(Exception):control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
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def test_lost_service_start_reply_cannot_repeat_service_operation(self):
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary:
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state=Path(temporary);ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=state/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
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@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ Zugänge und private Rohbelege bleiben gitignoriert.
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## Aktuelle Windowsfortsetzung
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Direkter produktiver Prozess-Peerproof im neuen Fall `d792c4c6…` bestanden:
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eigener SYSTEM-Parent3992 prüfte unverändert Agent5140 mit tatsächlicher
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Startzeit `134390970107200328`, SCM-/Token-/Image-/Dateibindung,20ms. Kein
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Pipeaufruf, Child, Token-Duplikat oder ACLwechsel. Originale Prozesse,
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Metadaten und Zähler erhalten, eigener Dienst entfernt. Ursprünglicher
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SSH-Timeout bleibt dokumentiert; vor expliziter Fortsetzung der ersten noch
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nicht erreichten Startphase wurden fehlender Startmarker und fehlender eigener
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Dienst nur lesend nachgewiesen. Produktive Agentprobe bleibt fehlgeschlagen,
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keine positive Pipeabnahme. [Kontrollbericht](windows-helper-peer-controls.md).
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Korrigierter Parentdiagnosefall `00703dab…`, Manifest `869a999c…`/EXE `35dea018…`:
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tatsächlicher SYSTEM-Parent8256, atomar zugeordneter Child7360 mit Agenttoken,
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Exit0, Originalagent5140 erhalten. Alle fünf Helper-SDK-Vorprüfungen unter SID19/
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@@ -65,6 +65,28 @@ ursprüngliche Prozesse/-metadaten, Policies und Windows-/Linuxjobzähler erhalt
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Der alte Parentfehler bleibt fehlgeschlagen. Die Ursache der tatsächlichen
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Agentverbindung ist weiter offen.
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Der zusätzliche direkte Peerproof-Fall `d792c4c6-1fd6-4a7f-be3f-1c8e515a68e6`
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bestand danach mit Manifest `build-f85a85ab…`, EXE `0a7259bf…` und ursprünglichem
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Runner `27feeb82…`. Der eigene SYSTEM-Parent3992 führte den unveränderten
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produktiven `PeerProof::for_service` gegen Agent5140 aus: tatsächlicher
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LocalService-Token mit Agent-Service-SID, Startzeit `134390970107200328`,
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Imagehash `2beed7fa…`, SCM- und gehaltene Datei-/Prozessprüfungen bestanden
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in20ms. Kein Pipeaufruf, Child, Token-Duplikat oder ACLwechsel. Das ist ein
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positiver direkter Prozessbeleg, weiterhin **keine positive Agent-Pipeabnahme**.
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Der eigene Parentdienst wurde nach Stopped entfernt; Originalprozesse,
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Metadaten, Policies und beide Jobzähler blieben erhalten.
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Der erste SSH-Aufruf dieses Falls verlor nach90s seine Antwort. Readback und
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zusätzliche Nur-Lese-Prüfung belegten noch keinen `parent-start-intent.json`,
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keinen eigenen Dienst und keine Ergebnisdateien. Erst nach dauerhaftem lokalen
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Fortsetzungsintent wurde die noch nicht erreichte erste Startphase im selben
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Fall fortgesetzt; ein zusätzlicher entfernter CreateNew-Intent und der bestehende
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CreateNew-Startmarker verhindern zwei Starts. Der alte Timeout bleibt erhalten.
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Die private Ergänzungsreceipt heißt `first-parent-continuation-result.json`.
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Eine frische tatsächliche produktive Agentprobe um05:16UTC blieb zuvor
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`HELPER_NOT_AVAILABLE`; weder diese noch der diagnostische Childfehler werden
|
||||
durch den direkten Peerproof zu Erfolgen umgedeutet.
|
||||
|
||||
Der frühere Fall `4a60d264…` bleibt vor jedem Kontrolldienststart fehlgeschlagen.
|
||||
Nach einem verlorenen SSH-Reply bei der Stagingprüfung wurden ausschließlich
|
||||
die bereits übertragenen Hashes und das Fehlen eines entfernten Kontrollfalls
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user