Record native process privilege clock comparison and preservation
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-14 19:49:09 +01:00
parent 98f4edfbff
commit 59e9544223
6 changed files with 1639 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Local-only isolated process privilege comparison; never starts a target."""
import base64
import difflib
import hashlib
import importlib.util
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import uuid
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
STATE = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-privilege-trace'
IMAGE = 'sha256:1b2fd985d2c1fcc3545ace602405dc68fa899201bd8a73fa319ff96377203fa9'
BASELINE = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-midl/diagnostic-builds/181c3a1c-8324-41fd-9b7c-aa8010262912/qualification.json'
BASELINE_SHA = '2e0de3acf72ab5c3a8e0baa54e8643d086ea7c03d1b38fd89b6bfc00e45f8cbb'
NATIVE = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-midl/native-cases/149bafe2-3469-4580-b133-988812bcc3db'
READBACK = NATIVE / 'readback-059c15ef-0f31-41aa-ad1d-ea6b774280d7.json'
READBACK_SHA = '0dc2373825f7f8f224cda04ecd5c521dd3c37a6e712bc3ed83bc4fa6d0d89c8c'
PARENT_MANIFEST = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-empty-trace/build-9daffc05-64d1-45c2-954a-4ec642c5ef70/manifest.json'
PARENT_SHA = '768293c37702e40876a83bbab4a24186a3b4e284cf9a193c40550dd72ef32548'
PARENT_RESULT = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-empty-trace/5e0e8ce9-b9a3-4c4a-b739-3f84d714dc94/diagnostic-result.json'
PARENT_RESULT_SHA = 'c53378d5b6e1099a781bb007e2480609e4105b94498ce443df937a0a591ff307'
UNCHANGED_DIAGNOSTICS = {
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-empty-trace/clock_rpc_spnego_empty.c': '9d9b5d247e9fc1570a72ced2f02373582c1aed7896e2f4bf8e7e85709a287dc5',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-empty-trace/system_trace_spnego_empty.c': 'b8ce7b360e264e35781831e58a4a3278f7b35e44f07600e832d5d4ba82e8b986',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-empty-trace/build.py': 'f72b50ad6977f491b32723ef9249569e6179e3072445392689a7a0bdf29c7f64',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-empty-trace/native.py': '557cf3900ed16236376a26d24e863972e38d0ac7b34d3feb4329bc7d5bc7bc01',
'deploy/windows/clock-system-trace/system_trace.c': '5be92130fda4dbb2a0078861f2b4ebd70bc3b7ecc3a65af0b426702cb69b772a',
'deploy/windows/clock-system-trace/build.py': 'e66ef17ba8a442f594114e3fa8eec62c256f0a9b1d9ca0d4e5c821675e00f05f',
'deploy/windows/clock-system-trace/native.py': 'fd46fc5167ac85808a4483f76e774e5e05e0d79f4a01def611a0c0b91414714e',
'deploy/windows/clock-eeinfo-trace/clock_rpc_eeinfo.c': '2bf009c3118af34ae7945c7d67b4647f0b24a9db34fbeeb4b44299e69f7e9a68',
'deploy/windows/clock-eeinfo-trace/system_trace_eeinfo.c': '09628d345592c767ebe136e40108e283e96bc37f749c5db93e62e327cb890301',
'deploy/windows/clock-eeinfo-trace/build.py': '59a0c3f881b824d921d165ace4da1e5992b85ddbf9d1d5132404b588dd50f36c',
'deploy/windows/clock-eeinfo-trace/native.py': 'cc71c230d4e6e30831eefd20de3d80848732e74d0ce077d79db29c3a1db33e8f',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-trace/clock_rpc_spnego.c': '10882bb39d7f27cc7e42123f2d2d4b2dbfb7a4cf86ed5bc80767c5fba1a33147',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-trace/system_trace_spnego.c': '74f96e1e3d55799c3b599abf81ad5e66e436b9fcbd3b7125d87fe102d303812c',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-trace/build.py': 'b10cdc0ba340d9b209e40a22391606f763aed01669e0356322f817eca6f08e0c',
'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-trace/native.py': 'b85773f8c65d99aa59ec7318a2edca38d205ad3da394f645220f63ba1914bfd0',
}
def require(value, message):
if not value: raise RuntimeError(message)
def sha(path):
return hashlib.sha256(Path(path).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
def write(path, raw):
path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd = os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as output:
output.write(raw); output.flush(); os.fsync(output.fileno())
def save(path, value):
write(path, (json.dumps(value, indent=2) + '\n').encode())
def original_sources():
require(sha(ROOT/'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-trace/build-2ebcfe9c-1e2b-4a50-99c5-3370640aeb77/manifest.json')=='f6b5cd23b1599c2db4fc803fd7232dfd3522dead840e492f659e4efd7a6be001', 'original F6 manifest retained')
require(sha(ROOT/'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-trace/0f512772-3599-4c83-b877-41c74fe50fb0/diagnostic-result.json')=='4c99b34b8c64f877dbbf0fe860d59499f1c054de7d036016e80b84581448cfc9', 'original F6 result retained')
require(sha(PARENT_MANIFEST) == PARENT_SHA and sha(PARENT_RESULT) == PARENT_RESULT_SHA, 'original Empty and RPC5 case retained')
require(sha(BASELINE) == BASELINE_SHA, 'original b1d3 qualification')
value = json.loads(BASELINE.read_bytes())
require(len(value['source_files']) == 131 and value['artifact']['sha256'] == 'b1d3da4f393ddf20bc8e48a9894ee314666f2ac3613ef97f5c228e3d089ca560', 'unchanged complete original131 source set')
for name, digest in value['source_files'].items():
path = ROOT / name
require(not path.is_symlink() and path.is_file() and sha(path) == digest, 'original131 input changed')
require(all(sha(ROOT/name)==digest for name,digest in UNCHANGED_DIAGNOSTICS.items()),'existing SYSTEM/WINNT/EEInfo diagnostic sources unchanged')
return value
def own_sources():
return {str((HERE / name).relative_to(ROOT)):sha(HERE / name) for name in ('clock_rpc_spnego_privilege.c','system_trace_spnego_privilege.c','build.py','native.py')}
def main():
os.umask(0o077)
baseline = original_sources(); before = own_sources()
require(sha(READBACK) == READBACK_SHA, 'actual Microsoft codegen readback')
receipt = json.loads(READBACK.read_bytes())
require(receipt['readback_only'] is True and receipt['result']['complete'] is True
and receipt['result']['run']['exit_code'] == 0 and receipt['result']['no_rpc'] is True,
'actual completed MIDL codegen')
folder = STATE / ('build-' + str(uuid.uuid4())); folder.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True)
source = folder / 'source'; source.mkdir(mode=0o700)
generated = {}
for name, digest in baseline['generated_inputs'].items():
path = NATIVE / ('native-' + name); raw = path.read_bytes()
item = next(item for item in receipt['files'] if item['name'] == name)
require(sha(path) == item['sha256'] == digest and len(raw) == item['bytes']
and base64.b64decode(item['base64'], validate=True) == raw, 'same actual unchanged Microsoft output')
write(source / name, raw); generated[name] = digest
baseline_wrapper = ROOT / 'crates/agent-windows/native/clock_rpc.c'
require(sha(baseline_wrapper) == '74aceb6e2b70c5dd628fae069a842c356c20300b8c8ab12754258c78eaf295c8','same original C/Auth wrapper')
wrapper = HERE / 'clock_rpc_spnego_privilege.c'
write(source / 'clock_rpc.c', wrapper.read_bytes()); write(source / 'system_trace.c', (HERE / 'system_trace_spnego_privilege.c').read_bytes())
delta = ''.join(difflib.unified_diff(baseline_wrapper.read_text().splitlines(True),wrapper.read_text().splitlines(True),fromfile='original-clock_rpc.c',tofile='diagnostic-clock_rpc_spnego_privilege.c'))
write(folder / 'wrapper-source.diff',delta.encode())
parent_wrapper = ROOT / 'deploy/windows/clock-spnego-empty-trace/clock_rpc_spnego_empty.c'
parent_delta = ''.join(difflib.unified_diff(parent_wrapper.read_text().splitlines(True), wrapper.read_text().splitlines(True),
fromfile='unchanged-parent-spnego.c', tofile='new-spnego-privilege.c'))
write(folder / 'parent-wrapper-source.diff', parent_delta.encode())
save(folder / 'intent.json', dict(image=IMAGE, original131=baseline['source_files'], baseline_sha256=BASELINE_SHA,
actual_codegen_readback_sha256=READBACK_SHA, generated=generated, own_sources=before,
wrapper_sha256=sha(wrapper), original_wrapper_sha256=sha(baseline_wrapper), wrapper_diff_sha256=sha(folder / 'wrapper-source.diff'), unchanged_diagnostics=UNCHANGED_DIAGNOSTICS,
parent_manifest_sha256=PARENT_SHA,parent_result_sha256=PARENT_RESULT_SHA,parent_wrapper_diff_sha256=sha(folder / 'parent-wrapper-source.diff'),
own_system_token_only=True,token_query_only=False,own_token_privilege_adjustment=True,peer_token_query_only=True,max_enables=1,max_restores=1,max_principal_discoveries=1,max_status_queries=1,principal_identity_proven=False,returned_empty_principal_allowed=True,null_principal_allowed=False,no_vm=True))
output = folder / 'output'; output.mkdir(mode=0o700)
checks = {}
def run(name, args):
command = ['docker','run','--rm','--network','none','--read-only','--tmpfs','/tmp:rw,size=128m',
'-v',str(source)+':/src:ro','-v',str(output)+':/out','--entrypoint',args[0],IMAGE,*args[1:]]
done = subprocess.run(command,capture_output=True,timeout=120)
write(folder / (name+'.stdout'),done.stdout); write(folder / (name+'.stderr'),done.stderr)
checks[name] = dict(exit_code=done.returncode,command=command,stdout_sha256=sha(folder / (name+'.stdout')),stderr_sha256=sha(folder / (name+'.stderr')))
save(folder / (name+'.json'),checks[name]); require(done.returncode == 0,'local diagnostic compile/check failure: '+name)
return done.stdout
flags = ['--target=x86_64-w64-windows-gnu','-fms-extensions','-Wall','-Wextra','-Werror','-D_M_AMD64=100','-I/src','-O2']
run('main',['clang',*flags,'-c','/src/system_trace.c','-o','/out/system_trace.o'])
run('wrapper',['clang',*flags,'-c','/src/clock_rpc.c','-o','/out/clock_rpc.o'])
run('actual-midl',['clang',*flags,'-Wno-error=missing-braces','-Wno-error=unused-const-variable','-c','/src/w32time_c.c','-o','/out/w32time_c.o'])
run('link',['x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc','-static-libgcc','-municode','/out/system_trace.o','/out/clock_rpc.o','/out/w32time_c.o',
'-lrpcrt4','-ladvapi32','-lkernel32','-lmincore','-o','/out/ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.linked.exe'])
raw_linked = output / 'ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.linked.exe'
linked = output / 'ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.original.exe'; delivery = output / 'ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe'
# Retain a caller-owned private exact copy; Docker's root-owned raw link is
# kept too. No chmod/chown of unrelated objects or source mutation.
shutil.copyfile(raw_linked,linked); linked.chmod(0o600)
shutil.copyfile(linked,delivery); delivery.chmod(0o600)
run('strip',['x86_64-w64-mingw32-strip','--strip-debug','/out/ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe'])
imports = sorted(set(re.findall(r'DLL Name:\s+(\S+)',run('imports',['x86_64-w64-mingw32-objdump','-p','/out/ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe']).decode())))
require(imports and {name.lower() for name in imports}.issubset({'kernel32.dll','msvcrt.dll','advapi32.dll','rpcrt4.dll','api-ms-win-core-realtime-l1-1-2.dll'}),'reviewed system DLL imports only')
require(imports == json.loads(PARENT_MANIFEST.read_bytes())['artifact']['imports'], 'same DLL imports as exact Empty comparison')
data = delivery.read_bytes(); offset = int.from_bytes(data[60:64],'little')
require(data[:2] == b'MZ' and data[offset:offset+6] == b'PE\0\0\x64\x86' and len(data) < 1048576,'bounded standalone C x64 PE')
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('system_trace_native',HERE / 'native.py'); native = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(native)
script = folder / 'native.ps1'; write(script,native.SCRIPT.encode())
parser = "$e=$null;$t=$null;[System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseFile($args[0],[ref]$t,[ref]$e)|Out-Null;if($e.Count){$e|ForEach-Object{$_.Message};exit 1};'AST_PASS'"
parser_path = folder / 'parse-native.ps1'; write(parser_path,parser.encode())
parsed = subprocess.run(['/tmp/rmm-powershell-parser/pwsh','-NoLogo','-NoProfile','-NonInteractive','-File',str(parser_path),str(script)],capture_output=True,timeout=15)
write(folder / 'powershell-parser.stdout',parsed.stdout); write(folder / 'powershell-parser.stderr',parsed.stderr)
require(parsed.returncode == 0 and b'AST_PASS' in parsed.stdout and not parsed.stderr,'actual PowerShell AST')
command_chars = len(native.encoded_command())
require(command_chars < 32767,'Windows encoded command length')
require(original_sources()['source_files'] == baseline['source_files'] and own_sources() == before,'all original131 and new sources unchanged')
manifest = dict(schema_version=1,profile='clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1',image=IMAGE,baseline_sha256=BASELINE_SHA,
original131=baseline['source_files'],own_sources=before,wrapper_sha256=sha(wrapper),original_wrapper_sha256=sha(baseline_wrapper),wrapper_diff_sha256=sha(folder / 'wrapper-source.diff'),generated=generated,
actual_codegen_readback_sha256=READBACK_SHA,unchanged_diagnostics=UNCHANGED_DIAGNOSTICS,token_query_only=False,own_token_privilege_adjustment=True,peer_token_query_only=True,max_enables=1,max_restores=1,max_principal_discoveries=1,max_status_queries=1,principal_identity_proven=False,
parent_manifest_sha256=PARENT_SHA,parent_result_sha256=PARENT_RESULT_SHA,parent_wrapper_diff_sha256=sha(folder / 'parent-wrapper-source.diff'),returned_empty_principal_allowed=True,null_principal_allowed=False,
checks=checks,script_sha256=hashlib.sha256(native.SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),
powershell_ast_passed=True,encoded_command_characters=command_chars,
artifact=dict(path=str(delivery),sha256=sha(delivery),bytes=len(data),imports=imports),
linked=dict(path=str(linked),sha256=sha(linked)),raw_linked_sha256=sha(raw_linked),native_executed=False,clock_qualified=False,
adapter_qualified=False,product_gate_open=False,no_vm=True,no_rmm_jobs=True)
save(folder / 'manifest.json',manifest)
print(json.dumps(dict(manifest=str(folder / 'manifest.json'),manifest_sha256=sha(folder / 'manifest.json'),artifact=manifest['artifact'],
original131_unchanged=True,powershell_ast=True,command_characters=command_chars,native_executed=False)))
if __name__ == '__main__':
try: main()
except Exception as error:
print(json.dumps(dict(error='CLOCK_SYSTEM_TRACE_LOCAL_INCOMPLETE',error_class=type(error).__name__,details_suppressed=True)))
raise SystemExit(2) from None
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
/* Isolated diagnostic variant: discover SPNEGO principal on the fixed local
* authenticated endpoint, then at most one MS-W32T Opnum6. No fallback/trust.
* Actual Microsoft-generated MIDL is reused. SEH stays entirely inside C.
*/
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0a00
#include <windows.h>
#include <rpc.h>
#include <rpcasync.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "w32time.h"
/* Documented public SDK API; older MinGW headers omit its declaration. */
int RPC_ENTRY RpcExceptionFilter(unsigned long exception_code);
typedef struct Allocation { struct Allocation *next; size_t size; } Allocation;
typedef struct { Allocation *head; size_t total; } Arena;
/* Explicit Windows TLS also works on threads created by SCM. Clang static TLS
* in the mixed Rust/MinGW PE did not initialize such a thread's storage. */
static INIT_ONCE arena_once = INIT_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static DWORD arena_index = TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES;
static BOOL CALLBACK initialize_arena(PINIT_ONCE once, PVOID parameter, PVOID *context) {
(void)once; (void)parameter; (void)context;
arena_index = TlsAlloc();
return arena_index != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES;
}
void *__RPC_USER MIDL_user_allocate(size_t size) {
Arena *arena = TlsGetValue(arena_index);
if (!arena || size > 65536 || arena->total > 65536 - size) return NULL;
Allocation *p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p) + size);
if (!p) return NULL;
p->size = size; p->next = arena->head; arena->head = p; arena->total += size;
return p + 1;
}
void __RPC_USER MIDL_user_free(void *memory) {
Arena *arena = TlsGetValue(arena_index);
if (!memory || !arena) return;
Allocation **link = &arena->head;
while (*link && (*link + 1) != memory) link = &(*link)->next;
if (*link) { Allocation *p = *link; *link = p->next; arena->total -= p->size; free(p); }
}
static void release_allocations(Arena *arena) {
while (arena->head) MIDL_user_free(arena->head + 1);
}
/* Stable numeric ABI, no returned peer/source strings or remotely sized data. */
typedef struct {
uint32_t leap, stratum, state, flags, last_result, size;
uint64_t last_sync, sync_age;
int64_t root_delay;
uint64_t root_dispersion;
int64_t phase;
} RmmClockStatus;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockStatus) == 64, "Rust numeric clock ABI");
_Static_assert(sizeof(RMM_W32TIME_STATUS) == 120, "MS-W32T x64 structure ABI");
/* Diagnostic-only numeric ABI. No strings, names, pointers or remote arrays
* leave C. A zero native return is meaningful only when return_present is1.
* Stages:10 compose,20 binding,30 auth,40 call-timeout,50 arena,
* 60 invoking,61 returned,62 raw numeric status,70 local guard,80 mapped,
* 90 contained RPC/SEH exception. Never used by the clock trust evaluator.
*/
typedef struct {
uint32_t stage, native_rpc_return, native_rpc_return_present, rpc_exception;
uint32_t status_present, ul_size, c_entries, p_entries_present;
} RmmClockTrace;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockTrace) == 32, "Rust numeric diagnostic ABI");
/* Diagnostic source variant only. No strings/parameters leave this function. */
typedef struct {
uint32_t generating_component, status, detection_location, flags;
int32_t number_of_parameters;
} RmmClockEeRecord;
typedef struct {
uint32_t capture_attempted, start_status, next_status, end_status, count, limit_reached;
RmmClockEeRecord records[4];
} RmmClockEeInfo;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockEeRecord) == 20, "numeric EEInfo record ABI");
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockEeInfo) == 104, "bounded four-record EEInfo ABI");
static void capture_eeinfo(RmmClockEeInfo *out) {
RPC_ERROR_ENUM_HANDLE enumeration = {0};
out->capture_attempted = 1;
out->start_status = RpcErrorStartEnumeration(&enumeration);
if (out->start_status != RPC_S_OK) return;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
RPC_EXTENDED_ERROR_INFO info = {0};
info.Version = RPC_EEINFO_VERSION;
info.Flags = 0;
info.NumberOfParameters = MaxNumberOfEEInfoParams;
out->next_status = RpcErrorGetNextRecord(&enumeration, FALSE, &info);
if (out->next_status != RPC_S_OK) break;
RmmClockEeRecord *record = &out->records[out->count++];
record->generating_component = info.GeneratingComponent;
record->status = info.Status;
record->detection_location = info.DetectionLocation;
record->flags = info.Flags;
record->number_of_parameters = info.NumberOfParameters;
/* ComputerName and Parameters are neither copied nor dereferenced.
* CopyStrings=FALSE: RPC owns all borrowed fields until EndEnumeration. */
}
out->limit_reached = out->count == 4;
out->end_status = RpcErrorEndEnumeration(&enumeration);
}
/* Numeric protocol-path observations, never a server-identity assertion. */
typedef struct {
uint32_t discovery_invocations, discovery_status, discovery_return_present;
uint32_t principal_present, principal_units, principal_validated;
uint32_t status_query_invocations, authn_service, authn_level, impersonation_type;
uint32_t principal_free_attempted, principal_free_status;
uint32_t binding_free_attempted, binding_free_status, eeinfo_origin;
} RmmClockAuthTrace;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockAuthTrace) == 60, "numeric SPNEGO path ABI");
static uint32_t check_principal(RPC_WSTR value, RmmClockAuthTrace *auth) {
if (!value) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
auth->principal_present = 1;
int high = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i <= 512; ++i) {
unsigned unit = value[i];
if (!unit) {
auth->principal_units = i;
/* Preserve a returned non-NULL empty string; the SSP decides its meaning. */
if (high) return ERROR_INVALID_NAME;
auth->principal_validated = 1;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
if (i == 512 || unit < 0x20 || (unit >= 0x7f && unit <= 0x9f)) return ERROR_INVALID_NAME;
if (high) {
if (unit < 0xdc00 || unit > 0xdfff) return ERROR_INVALID_NAME;
high = 0;
} else if (unit >= 0xd800 && unit <= 0xdbff) high = 1;
else if (unit >= 0xdc00 && unit <= 0xdfff) return ERROR_INVALID_NAME;
}
return ERROR_INVALID_NAME;
}
static uint32_t invoke_status(RPC_BINDING_HANDLE binding, RmmClockStatus *out, RmmClockTrace *trace, RmmClockEeInfo *eeinfo, RmmClockAuthTrace *auth) {
RMM_W32TIME_STATUS *status = NULL;
unsigned long result = 0;
Arena arena = {0};
if (trace) trace->stage = 50;
if (!result && !InitOnceExecuteOnce(&arena_once, initialize_arena, NULL, NULL)) result = ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
if (!result && TlsGetValue(arena_index)) result = ERROR_BUSY;
if (!result && !TlsSetValue(arena_index, &arena)) result = GetLastError();
if (!result) {
RpcTryExcept {
if (trace) trace->stage = 60;
auth->status_query_invocations = 1;
result = RmmW32TimeQueryStatus(binding, &status);
if (trace) {
trace->stage = 61; trace->native_rpc_return_present = 1;
trace->native_rpc_return = result;
}
if (!result) {
if (trace) {
trace->stage = 62; trace->status_present = status != NULL;
if (status) {
trace->ul_size = status->ulSize; trace->c_entries = status->cEntries;
trace->p_entries_present = status->pEntries != NULL;
}
}
if (!status || status->ulSize != sizeof(*status) || status->cEntries || status->pEntries) {
if (trace) trace->stage = 70;
result = RPC_X_BAD_STUB_DATA;
}
else {
if (trace) trace->stage = 80;
out->leap = status->eLeapIndicator; out->stratum = status->nStratum;
out->state = status->ulLcState; out->flags = status->ulTSFlags;
out->last_result = status->eLastSyncResult; out->size = status->ulSize;
out->last_sync = status->qwLastSyncTicks; out->sync_age = status->tpTimeLastGoodSync;
out->root_delay = status->toRootDelay; out->root_dispersion = status->tpRootDispersion;
out->phase = status->toSysPhaseOffset;
}
}
} RpcExcept(RpcExceptionFilter(RpcExceptionCode())) {
result = RpcExceptionCode();
if (eeinfo) capture_eeinfo(eeinfo); /* before any further RPC call */
if (trace) {trace->stage = 90; trace->rpc_exception = result;}
} RpcEndExcept
release_allocations(&arena);
TlsSetValue(arena_index, NULL);
}
return result;
}
static uint32_t pipe_query(RmmClockStatus *out, RmmClockTrace *trace, RmmClockEeInfo *eeinfo, RmmClockAuthTrace *auth) {
RPC_WSTR text = NULL;
RPC_BINDING_HANDLE binding = NULL;
RPC_WSTR principal = NULL;
RPC_SECURITY_QOS qos = {0};
unsigned long result;
memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
memset(auth, 0, sizeof(*auth));
auth->authn_service = RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE;
auth->authn_level = RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY;
auth->impersonation_type = RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IDENTIFY;
if (trace) trace->stage = 10;
result = RpcStringBindingComposeW(NULL, (RPC_WSTR)L"ncacn_np", NULL,
(RPC_WSTR)L"\\pipe\\W32TIME_ALT", NULL, &text);
if (result) return result;
if (trace) trace->stage = 20;
result = RpcBindingFromStringBindingW(text, &binding);
RpcStringFreeW(&text);
if (result) return result;
/* Bound the management discovery as well as Opnum6. RpcMgmt allocates its
* returned string internally: the 512-unit check bounds inspection/use,
* not RPC runtime allocations made before the API returns. */
if (trace) trace->stage = 40;
result = RpcBindingSetOption(binding, RPC_C_OPT_CALL_TIMEOUT, 1500);
if (!result) {
if (trace) trace->stage = 25;
RpcTryExcept {
auth->discovery_invocations = 1;
result = RpcMgmtInqServerPrincNameW(binding, RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE, &principal);
auth->discovery_return_present = 1;
auth->discovery_status = result;
if (result && eeinfo) {auth->eeinfo_origin = 1; capture_eeinfo(eeinfo);}
} RpcExcept(RpcExceptionFilter(RpcExceptionCode())) {
result = RpcExceptionCode();
auth->discovery_status = result;
if (eeinfo) {auth->eeinfo_origin = 1; capture_eeinfo(eeinfo);}
if (trace) {trace->stage = 91; trace->rpc_exception = result;}
} RpcEndExcept
}
if (!result) {
if (trace) trace->stage = 26;
result = check_principal(principal, auth);
}
qos.Version = RPC_C_SECURITY_QOS_VERSION;
qos.Capabilities = RPC_C_QOS_CAPABILITIES_DEFAULT;
qos.IdentityTracking = RPC_C_QOS_IDENTITY_STATIC;
qos.ImpersonationType = RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IDENTIFY;
if (!result) {
if (trace) trace->stage = 30;
/* The returned principal is ONLY a diagnostic authentication input,
* never an independently trusted service/account/SID assertion. */
result = RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW(binding, principal, RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE, NULL, RPC_C_AUTHZ_NONE, &qos);
if (result && eeinfo) {auth->eeinfo_origin = 3; capture_eeinfo(eeinfo);}
}
if (!result) {
result = invoke_status(binding, out, trace, eeinfo, auth);
if (eeinfo && eeinfo->capture_attempted) auth->eeinfo_origin = 2;
}
/* Preserve the original discovery/auth/query result before cleanup RPC. */
if (principal) {
auth->principal_free_attempted = 1;
auth->principal_free_status = RpcStringFreeW(&principal);
}
auth->binding_free_attempted = 1;
auth->binding_free_status = RpcBindingFree(&binding);
return result;
}
/* At most one authenticated status query after exactly one discovery. */
uint32_t rmm_clock_query_trace_spnego_privilege(RmmClockTrace *trace, RmmClockEeInfo *eeinfo, RmmClockAuthTrace *auth) {
RmmClockStatus ignored = {0};
memset(trace, 0, sizeof(*trace));
memset(eeinfo, 0, sizeof(*eeinfo));
return pipe_query(&ignored, trace, eeinfo, auth);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Parent-only native SYSTEM trace bootstrap: prepare, once start, read, cleanup.
Readback is strictly read-only. Cleanup is a separate explicit phase and may
remove only this exact stopped diagnostic service. Never changes W32Time/RMM.
"""
import argparse
import base64
import datetime as dt
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import shlex
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import uuid
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
STATE = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-clock-spnego-privilege-trace'
ACCESS_ROOT = Path('/home/kevin/Schreibtisch/Coding/rust-discovery')
def require(value,message):
if not value: raise RuntimeError(message)
def sha(path):
return hashlib.sha256(Path(path).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
def pairs(items):
result = {}
for name,value in items:
require(name not in result,'duplicate JSON key'); result[name] = value
return result
def private(path,directory=False):
item = Path(path).lstat()
require(item.st_uid == os.getuid() and stat.S_IMODE(item.st_mode) == (0o700 if directory else 0o600)
and (stat.S_ISDIR(item.st_mode) if directory else stat.S_ISREG(item.st_mode) and item.st_nlink == 1),'private owned path')
def load(path):
private(path); require(Path(path).stat().st_size <= 2*1024*1024,'bounded private JSON')
return json.loads(Path(path).read_bytes(),object_pairs_hook=pairs)
def save(path,value):
private(path.parent,True)
fd = os.open(path,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600)
with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as output:
json.dump(value,output,indent=2); output.flush(); os.fsync(output.fileno())
SCRIPT = r'''
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine()|ConvertFrom-Json)
$id=[guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString()
if($id-cne$p.id-or$p.profile-cne'clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1'-or$p.action-notin@('prepare','start','readback','cleanup')-or$p.binary_sha256-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.manifest_sha256-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.script_sha256-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'){throw 'Fixed SYSTEM diagnostic request'}
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap';$name='RmmClockSpnegoPrivilegeDiagnostic';$case=Join-Path $root ('clock-spnego-privilege-trace-'+$id);$exe=Join-Path $case 'ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe';$command='"'+$exe+'" --service '+$id
function Test-RmmTracePrivate($path,$dir){$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force;if($i.PSIsContainer-ne$dir-or($i.Attributes-band[IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint)){throw 'Private object type'};$a=Get-Acl -LiteralPath $path;if($a.GetOwner([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value-notin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')){throw 'Private object owner'};$rules=@($a.GetAccessRules($true,$true,[Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]));if(!$rules.Count){throw 'Empty private ACL'};foreach($e in $rules){if($e.AccessControlType-ne'Allow'-or$e.IdentityReference.Value-notin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')-or($e.PropagationFlags-band[Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::InheritOnly)){throw 'Broad private ACL'}}}
function Write-RmmTraceNew($path,$value){$f=[IO.File]::Open($path,[IO.FileMode]::CreateNew,[IO.FileAccess]::Write,[IO.FileShare]::Read);try{$b=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($value|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 12 -Compress));$f.Write($b,0,$b.Length);$f.Flush($true)}finally{$f.Dispose()}}
function Get-RmmTraceJson($path){Test-RmmTracePrivate $path $false;if((Get-Item -LiteralPath $path).Length-gt262144){throw 'Small diagnostic receipt'};return(Get-Content -LiteralPath $path -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json)}
function Get-RmmTraceService{return(Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter "Name='RmmClockSpnegoPrivilegeDiagnostic'" -OperationTimeoutSec 5)}
function Test-RmmTraceService($s){if($s-and($s.PathName-cne$command-or$s.StartName-cne'LocalSystem'-or$s.StartMode-cne'Manual')){throw 'Only own exact temporary service'}}
if($p.action-eq'readback'-and!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)){@{id=$id;status='remote_case_absent';read_only=$true}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 0}
Test-RmmTracePrivate $root $true
if($p.action-eq'prepare'){if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)-or(Get-RmmTraceService)){throw 'Existing case/service retained'};New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $case|Out-Null;Test-RmmTracePrivate $case $true;Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'intent.json') $p;@{id=$id;prepared=$true}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 0}
Test-RmmTracePrivate $case $true;$old=Get-RmmTraceJson (Join-Path $case 'intent.json')
foreach($field in @('id','profile','binary_sha256','manifest_sha256','script_sha256','binary_bytes')){if($old.$field-cne$p.$field){throw 'Original exact diagnostic intent'}}
Test-RmmTracePrivate $exe $false;if((Get-Item -LiteralPath $exe).Length-ne$p.binary_bytes-or(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $exe -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()-cne$p.binary_sha256){throw 'Exact diagnostic executable'}
$s=Get-RmmTraceService;Test-RmmTraceService $s
if($p.action-eq'start'){
if($s-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'start-intent.json'))){throw 'No repeated start; original readback only'}
Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'start-intent.json') @{id=$id;command=$command;binary_sha256=$p.binary_sha256;create_once=$true}
New-Service -Name $name -BinaryPathName $command -StartupType Manual|Out-Null
$s=Get-RmmTraceService;Test-RmmTraceService $s;if(!$s){throw 'Own service creation missing'}
Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'service-created.json') @{id=$id;command=$command;start_name=$s.StartName}
Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'service-start-intent.json') @{start_once=$true}
Start-Service -Name $name
$deadline=[DateTime]::UtcNow.AddSeconds(20)
do{$s=Get-RmmTraceService;Test-RmmTraceService $s;if(!$s-or$s.State-eq'Stopped'){break};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 100}while([DateTime]::UtcNow-lt$deadline)
}
if($p.action-eq'cleanup'){
if(!$s){if(!(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'cleanup-intent.json'))){throw 'Missing service without bound cleanup'};@{id=$id;cleanup_verified=$true;already_absent=$true;read_only=$true}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 0}
if($s.State-cne'Stopped'){throw 'Cleanup only own bound stopped service'}
$created=Get-RmmTraceJson (Join-Path $case 'service-created.json');if($created.id-cne$id-or$created.command-cne$command-or$created.start_name-cne'LocalSystem'){throw 'Original service creation binding'}
if(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'cleanup-intent.json')){throw 'Cleanup already attempted; readback only'}
Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'cleanup-intent.json') @{id=$id;command=$command;delete_once=$true}
& "$env:WINDIR\System32\sc.exe" delete $name|Out-Null;if($LASTEXITCODE-ne0){throw 'Own stopped service deletion incomplete'}
if(Get-RmmTraceService){throw 'Own service still registered; readback only'}
Write-RmmTraceNew (Join-Path $case 'cleanup-completed.json') @{id=$id;service_absent=$true;service_exit_code=$s.ExitCode}
@{id=$id;cleanup_verified=$true;already_absent=$false;read_only=$false}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 0
}
$report=$null;$result=Join-Path $case 'result.json';if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $result){$report=Get-RmmTraceJson $result}
$token=$null;$tokenFile=Join-Path $case 'token.json';if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $tokenFile){$token=Get-RmmTraceJson $tokenFile}
$before=$null;$beforeFile=Join-Path $case 'privilege-before.json';if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $beforeFile){$before=Get-RmmTraceJson $beforeFile}
$adjust=$null;$adjustFile=Join-Path $case 'privilege-adjustment.json';if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $adjustFile){$adjust=Get-RmmTraceJson $adjustFile}
$cleaned=$false;$cleanedExit=$null;$cleanupReceipt=Join-Path $case 'cleanup-completed.json';if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $cleanupReceipt){$c=Get-RmmTraceJson $cleanupReceipt;if($c.id-cne$id-or$c.service_absent-ne$true-or$null-eq$c.service_exit_code-or$c.service_exit_code-lt0-or$c.service_exit_code-gt4294967295){throw 'Bound cleanup receipt'};$cleaned=$true;$cleanedExit=$c.service_exit_code}
@{id=$id;service_present=[bool]$s;service_state=$(if($s){$s.State}else{$null});service_exit_code=$(if($s){$s.ExitCode}else{$null});start_intent_present=(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'service-start-intent.json'));cleanup_intent_present=(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'cleanup-intent.json'));cleanup_completed=$cleaned;cleaned_service_exit_code=$cleanedExit;report=$report;token_before_rpc=$token;privilege_before=$before;privilege_adjustment=$adjust;read_only=($p.action-eq'readback');no_rmm_jobs=$true;no_w32time_change=$true;no_agent_change=$true;own_privilege_adjustment=$true;foreign_token_query_only=$true}|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 12 -Compress
'''
def encoded_command():
script = 'try {\n'+SCRIPT+'\n} catch {[pscustomobject]@{bootstrap_error=$true;error_id=$_.FullyQualifiedErrorId;line=$_.InvocationInfo.ScriptLineNumber}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 1}'
return 'powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand '+base64.b64encode(script.encode('utf-16le')).decode()
def manifest(path):
path = path.absolute(); private(path.parent,True)
require(path.name == 'manifest.json' and path.parent.parent == STATE and re.fullmatch(r'build-[0-9a-f-]{36}',path.parent.name),'fixed local build manifest')
value = load(path)
require(value['profile'] == 'clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1' and value['schema_version'] == 1
and value['native_executed'] is False and value['clock_qualified'] is False and value['product_gate_open'] is False
and value['powershell_ast_passed'] is True and value['encoded_command_characters'] == len(encoded_command()) < 32767
and value['script_sha256'] == hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),'same reviewed nonqualifying diagnostic source')
require(value['original_wrapper_sha256'] == '74aceb6e2b70c5dd628fae069a842c356c20300b8c8ab12754258c78eaf295c8'
and sha(path.parent / 'wrapper-source.diff') == value['wrapper_diff_sha256'],'same exact observational source delta')
require(value['token_query_only'] is False and value['own_token_privilege_adjustment'] is True and value['peer_token_query_only'] is True and value['max_enables']==value['max_restores']==1 and value['max_principal_discoveries']==value['max_status_queries']==1
and value['principal_identity_proven'] is False,'one own-token privilege adjustment/restore, peer QUERY only, no fallback/identity claim')
require(value['parent_manifest_sha256']=='768293c37702e40876a83bbab4a24186a3b4e284cf9a193c40550dd72ef32548'
and value['parent_result_sha256']=='c53378d5b6e1099a781bb007e2480609e4105b94498ce443df937a0a591ff307'
and value['returned_empty_principal_allowed'] is True and value['null_principal_allowed'] is False
and sha(path.parent/'parent-wrapper-source.diff')==value['parent_wrapper_diff_sha256'],
'exact Empty comparison, own process privilege only; no fabricated target or fallback')
for name,digest in value['unchanged_diagnostics'].items():require(sha(ROOT/name)==digest,'original SYSTEM/WINNT/EEInfo inputs retained')
for name,digest in value['own_sources'].items():require(sha(ROOT / name) == digest,'same original local driver source')
for name in ('artifact','linked'):
item=value[name];p=Path(item['path']);require(p.parent == path.parent / 'output','fixed retained PE path');private(p);require(sha(p) == item['sha256'],'retained exact diagnostic PE')
require(Path(value['artifact']['path']).stat().st_size == value['artifact']['bytes'],'exact PE size')
return value
def access(root):
require(root == ACCESS_ROOT and root.resolve() == root,'existing Main access root only')
sys.path.insert(0,str(ROOT / 'deploy'))
import vm_access_check
config = vm_access_check.load_config(root / 'credentials/server.conf')
require(config['address'] == '88.99.80.202' and config['username'] == 'root' and config.get('port','22') == '22','fixed existing cloud reverse jump')
record=load(root / 'credentials/windows-dev-access.json');expiry=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(record['expires_at'])
require(expiry.utcoffset() is not None and dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc) < expiry,'current existing access only')
private(root / 'credentials',True);private(root / 'credentials/windows-dev.known_hosts')
key=str(Path(config['ssh_key_path']).expanduser())
jump=['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p','22','-i',key,'-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-W','127.0.0.1:22240','root@88.99.80.202']
prefix=['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-i',key,'-o','ProxyCommand='+shlex.join(jump),'-o','HostKeyAlias=rmm-windows-dev','-o','UserKnownHostsFile='+str(root / 'credentials/windows-dev.known_hosts'),'-o','GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes','-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','rmm-dev@127.0.0.1']
require(record['ssh_prefix'] == prefix,'original pinned transport only')
return prefix
def run_transport(args,data,folder):
try:
done=subprocess.run(args,input=data,capture_output=True,timeout=50)
save(folder / ('transport-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),dict(returncode=done.returncode,stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(done.stdout).decode(),stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(done.stderr).decode()))
require(done.returncode == 0,'transport incomplete; original readback only')
return done.stdout
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as error:
save(folder / ('transport-timeout-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),dict(timed_out=True,stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(error.stdout or b'').decode(),stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(error.stderr or b'').decode()))
raise RuntimeError('lost reply; no repeated operation') from None
def rpc(prefix,payload,folder):
value=json.loads(run_transport(prefix+[encoded_command()],(json.dumps(payload)+'\n').encode(),folder).decode('utf-8-sig'),object_pairs_hook=pairs)
require(isinstance(value,dict) and 'bootstrap_error' not in value,'remote diagnostic incomplete')
return value
def check_rpc_report(value,ident):
require(value['id'] == ident and value['no_rmm_jobs'] is True and value['no_w32time_change'] is True and value['no_agent_change'] is True and value['own_privilege_adjustment'] is True and value['foreign_token_query_only'] is True,'exact nonproduct diagnostic case')
report=value.get('report')
if report is None:return False
require(report['schema_version'] == 1 and report['profile'] == 'clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1' and report['case_id'] == ident
and report['token_system'] is True and report['read_only'] is False and report['diagnostic_only'] is True
and type(report['query_invocations']) is int and report['query_invocations'] in (0,1) and report['clock_qualified'] is False and report['adapter_qualified'] is False
and report['product_gate_open'] is False,'actual SYSTEM token and single nonqualifying trace')
token=report['token']
require(set(token)=={'query_status','system_user','token_type','thread_query_status','thread_present','lookup_status','privileges_status','privilege_present','privilege_attributes','privilege_enabled','privilege_default','privilege_removed'}
and all(type(v) is int and 0<=v<2**32 for v in token.values())
and token==value['token_before_rpc'] and token['query_status']==token['lookup_status']==token['privileges_status']==0
and token['system_user']==1 and token['token_type']==1 and token['thread_present']==0 and token['thread_query_status']==1008,
'durable own SYSTEM primary token/privileges observed before RPC without impersonation')
require(all(token[k] in (0,1) for k in ('privilege_present','privilege_enabled','privilege_default','privilege_removed'))
and token['privilege_enabled']==int(bool(token['privilege_attributes']&2))
and token['privilege_default']==int(bool(token['privilege_attributes']&1))
and token['privilege_removed']==int(bool(token['privilege_attributes']&4))
and (token['privilege_present'] or token['privilege_attributes']==0),'present/enabled privilege attributes remain observations only')
auth=report['auth']
require(set(auth)=={'discovery_invocations','discovery_status','discovery_return_present','principal_present','principal_units','principal_validated','status_query_invocations','authn_service','authn_level','impersonation_type','principal_free_attempted','principal_free_status','binding_free_attempted','binding_free_status','eeinfo_origin'}
and all(type(v) is int and 0<=v<2**32 for v in auth.values())
and auth['authn_service']==9 and auth['authn_level']==6 and auth['impersonation_type']==2
and all(auth[k] in (0,1) for k in ('discovery_invocations','discovery_return_present','principal_present','principal_validated','status_query_invocations','principal_free_attempted','binding_free_attempted'))
and auth['status_query_invocations']==report['query_invocations'] and auth['eeinfo_origin'] in (0,1,2,3)
and auth['discovery_return_present']<=auth['discovery_invocations']
and auth['principal_units']<=512,'bounded one-discovery/at-most-one-status SPNEGO Privacy Identify path')
if auth['principal_validated']:
require(auth['principal_present']==1 and 0<=auth['principal_units']<=512,'checked non-NULL bounded UTF16 principal, possibly empty')
if auth['principal_present']:
require(auth['principal_free_attempted']==1,'owned principal cleanup attempted')
if auth['status_query_invocations']:
require(auth['discovery_invocations']==auth['discovery_return_present']==auth['principal_present']==auth['principal_validated']==1
and auth['discovery_status']==0 and 0<=auth['principal_units']<=512,'no status query without successful checked principal discovery')
fields={'stage','native_rpc_return','native_rpc_return_present','rpc_exception','status_present','ul_size','c_entries','p_entries_present'}
require(set(report['trace']) == fields and type(report['rpc_code']) is int and 0 <= report['rpc_code'] < 2**32
and all(type(n) is int and 0 <= n < 2**32 for n in report['trace'].values()),'bounded numeric trace only')
ee=report['eeinfo']
require(set(ee) == {'capture_attempted','start_status','next_status','end_status','count','limit_reached','records'}
and all(type(ee[k]) is int and 0 <= ee[k] < 2**32 for k in ('capture_attempted','start_status','next_status','end_status','count','limit_reached'))
and ee['capture_attempted'] in (0,1) and 0 <= ee['count'] <= 4 and len(ee['records']) == ee['count']
and ee['limit_reached'] == int(ee['count'] == 4),'four-record numeric EEInfo budget')
require(ee['capture_attempted']==int(auth['eeinfo_origin']!=0),'numeric EEInfo origin matches capture')
record_fields={'generating_component','status','detection_location','flags','number_of_parameters'}
for record in ee['records']:
require(set(record) == record_fields and all(type(n) is int and 0 <= n < 2**32 for n in record.values())
and record['number_of_parameters'] <= 4,'numeric EEInfo fields only; no parameter contents')
if report['trace']['stage'] in (90,91):
require(ee['capture_attempted']==1 and report['rpc_code']==report['trace']['rpc_exception']
and auth['eeinfo_origin']==(2 if report['trace']['stage']==90 else 1),'original exception code preserved before immediate capture')
return (value['service_state'] == 'Stopped' and value['service_exit_code'] == 0) or (value['service_present'] is False and value['cleanup_completed'] is True and value.get('cleaned_service_exit_code')==0)
def numeric(value):
return type(value) is int and 0<=value<2**32
def validate_snapshot(value):
fields={'present','query_status','token_id','authentication_id','modified_id','expiration_time','token_type','impersonation_level','dynamic_charged','dynamic_available','group_count','privilege_count','privileges'}
require(isinstance(value,dict) and set(value)==fields,'exact numeric token snapshot')
for k in fields-{'token_id','authentication_id','modified_id','expiration_time','privileges'}:
require(numeric(value[k]),'numeric token statistic')
for k in ('token_id','authentication_id','modified_id','expiration_time'):
require(isinstance(value[k],list) and len(value[k])==2 and all(numeric(v) for v in value[k]),'numeric LUID/time pair')
require(value['present']==1 and value['query_status']==0 and value['token_type']==1,'queried primary token')
privileges=value['privileges']
require(isinstance(privileges,list) and len(privileges)==value['privilege_count']<=256
and all(isinstance(p,list) and len(p)==3 and all(numeric(n) for n in p) for p in privileges),'bounded complete privilege list')
keys=[(p[1],p[0]) for p in privileges]
require(keys==sorted(set(keys)),'sorted unique privilege LUIDs')
def same_identity(before,after):
return all(before[k]==after[k] for k in ('token_id','authentication_id','token_type'))
def check_privilege_evidence(value):
before=value.get('privilege_before');change=value.get('privilege_adjustment')
if before is None or change is None:return False
require(set(before)=={'schema_version','own_pid','own_creation','own','peers'} and before['schema_version']==1
and numeric(before['own_pid']) and before['own_pid']>0 and isinstance(before['own_creation'],list) and len(before['own_creation'])==2 and all(numeric(v) for v in before['own_creation']),'bound pre-enable numeric witness')
validate_snapshot(before['own'])
require(isinstance(before['peers'],list) and len(before['peers'])==4,'four named peer witnesses')
for i,peer in enumerate(before['peers']):
require(set(peer)=={'role','pid','creation','token'} and peer['role']==i and numeric(peer['pid']) and peer['pid']>0 and peer['pid']!=before['own_pid']
and isinstance(peer['creation'],list) and len(peer['creation'])==2 and all(numeric(v) for v in peer['creation']),'held peer PID/start binding')
validate_snapshot(peer['token'])
require(peer['token']['token_id']!=before['own']['token_id'],'different actual peer token object')
fields={'schema_version','preflight_status','enable_attempted','enable_return','enable_error','previous_count','previous_bytes','previous_luid','previous_attributes','active_status','rpc_attempted','restore_attempted','restore_return','restore_error','restore_input_from_previous','restored_status','peer_after_status','restoration_verified','flow_status','target_luid','active','restored','peers_after'}
require(set(change)==fields and all(numeric(change[k]) for k in fields-{'previous_luid','target_luid','active','restored','peers_after'}),'exact bounded adjustment witness')
for k in ('previous_luid','target_luid'):
require(isinstance(change[k],list) and len(change[k])==2 and all(numeric(n) for n in change[k]),'exact privilege LUID')
target=change['target_luid']
expected=[p.copy() for p in before['own']['privileges']]
targets=[p for p in expected if p[:2]==target]
require(len(targets)==1 and targets[0][2]==0,'exact one present originally disabled privilege')
require(change['schema_version']==1 and change['preflight_status']==0
and all(change[k] in (0,1) for k in ('enable_attempted','enable_return','rpc_attempted','restore_attempted','restore_return','restore_input_from_previous','restoration_verified')),'one bounded activation/restore flow')
# Failure reports remain available raw. Never call them preserved/complete.
if change['flow_status']!=0 or change['restoration_verified']!=1:return False
require(change['enable_attempted']==change['enable_return']==change['restore_attempted']==change['restore_return']==change['restore_input_from_previous']==1
and change['enable_error']==change['restore_error']==change['active_status']==change['restored_status']==change['peer_after_status']==0
and change['previous_count']==1 and change['previous_bytes']==16 and change['previous_luid']==target and change['previous_attributes']==0,
'one successful exact enable and PreviousState restore, not TRUE/NOT_ALL_ASSIGNED')
validate_snapshot(change['active']);validate_snapshot(change['restored'])
targets[0][2]=2
require(same_identity(before['own'],change['active']) and same_identity(before['own'],change['restored'])
and change['active']['privileges']==expected and change['restored']['privileges']==before['own']['privileges'],
'same own token only target enable bit changes and exact original attributes restored')
require(isinstance(change['peers_after'],list) and len(change['peers_after'])==4,'four post-restore peer snapshots')
for peer,after in zip(before['peers'],change['peers_after']):
validate_snapshot(after)
require(same_identity(peer['token'],after) and peer['token']['modified_id']==after['modified_id']
and peer['token']['privileges']==after['privileges'],'observed peer token and privilege state preserved')
require(change['rpc_attempted']==1 and value['report']['query_invocations']<=1,'at most one RPC function after verified enable')
return True
def check_report(value,ident):
rpc_complete=check_rpc_report(value,ident)
privilege_complete=check_privilege_evidence(value)
return rpc_complete and privilege_complete
def execute(action,path,root,ident):
os.umask(0o077);STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,exist_ok=True);private(STATE,True)
value=manifest(path);prefix=access(root)
if action == 'prepare':
require(not ident,'new diagnostic case only');ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=STATE / ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
payload=dict(id=ident,profile='clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1',manifest_sha256=sha(path),binary_sha256=value['artifact']['sha256'],binary_bytes=value['artifact']['bytes'],script_sha256=value['script_sha256'])
save(folder / 'intent.json',dict(payload=payload,manifest_path=str(path.absolute()),access_root=str(root)))
print(json.dumps(dict(case_id=ident,prepare_once=True)),flush=True)
prepared=rpc(prefix,dict(payload,action='prepare'),folder);save(folder / 'prepared-remote.json',prepared);require(prepared == dict(id=ident,prepared=True),'new private remote case')
save(folder / 'upload-intent.json',dict(binary_sha256=payload['binary_sha256'],upload_once=True))
args=['sftp']+[p for p in prefix[1:-1] if p != '-T']+['-b','-',prefix[-1]]
destination='/C:/ProgramData/RustDiscoveryBootstrap/clock-spnego-privilege-trace-'+ident+'/ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe'
run_transport(args,('put '+json.dumps(value['artifact']['path'])+' '+json.dumps(destination)+'\n').encode(),folder)
save(folder / 'upload-completed.json',dict(uploaded=True));print(json.dumps(dict(case_id=ident,prepared=True,service_started=False)));return
require(str(uuid.UUID(ident)) == ident,'canonical original case')
folder=STATE / ident;private(folder,True);original=load(folder / 'intent.json');payload=original['payload']
require(original['manifest_path'] == str(path.absolute()) and original['access_root'] == str(root)
and payload['manifest_sha256'] == sha(path) and payload['script_sha256'] == value['script_sha256'],'original same-case input tuple')
if action in ('start','cleanup'):
if action == 'start':require(load(folder / 'upload-completed.json')['uploaded'] is True,'completed original upload')
save(folder / (action+'-intent.json'),dict(action=action,once=True))
result=rpc(prefix,dict(payload,action=action),folder);save(folder / ('readback-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),result)
if action == 'cleanup':
require(result.get('id') == ident and result.get('cleanup_verified') is True,'own stopped service cleanup only')
print(json.dumps(dict(case_id=ident,cleanup_verified=True)));return
if result.get('status'):
require(action == 'readback' and result['status'] == 'remote_case_absent','read-only original partial status')
print(json.dumps(dict(case_id=ident,complete=False,retry_allowed=False)));return
complete=check_report(result,ident)
if complete:
destination=folder / 'diagnostic-result.json'
receipt=dict(complete=True,manifest_sha256=sha(path),actual=result,clock_qualified=False,product_gate_open=False)
if destination.exists():require(load(destination)['actual']['report'] == result['report'],'preserve original numeric report')
else:save(destination,receipt)
print(json.dumps(dict(case_id=ident,diagnostic_complete=complete,rpc_code=result['report']['rpc_code'] if complete else None,
stage=result['report']['trace']['stage'] if complete else None,eeinfo_count=result['report']['eeinfo']['count'] if complete else None,clock_qualified=False,cleanup_separate=True)))
def main():
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);parser.add_argument('action',choices=('prepare','start','readback','cleanup'))
parser.add_argument('--manifest',type=Path,required=True);parser.add_argument('--access-root',type=Path,required=True);parser.add_argument('--id')
parser.add_argument('--execute-native',action='store_true');args=parser.parse_args()
require((args.action == 'readback' and not args.execute_native) or (args.action != 'readback' and args.execute_native),'explicit native effect phase; readback only reads')
execute(args.action,args.manifest,args.access_root,args.id)
if __name__ == '__main__':
try:main()
except Exception as error:
print(json.dumps(dict(error='CLOCK_SYSTEM_TRACE_NATIVE_INCOMPLETE',error_class=type(error).__name__,details_suppressed=True)))
raise SystemExit(2) from None
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
/* Isolated own-process privilege comparison. Original MIDL/Auth unchanged.
* One existing own privilege enabled and restored; peer tokens QUERY only.
* No clock setter, token impersonation, NTP/ACL/provider or product gate. */
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0a00
#define UNICODE 1
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <wchar.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <tlhelp32.h>
typedef struct {
uint32_t stage, native_rpc_return, native_rpc_return_present, rpc_exception;
uint32_t status_present, ul_size, c_entries, p_entries_present;
} RmmClockTrace;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockTrace) == 32, "same diagnostic trace ABI");
typedef struct {
uint32_t generating_component, status, detection_location, flags;
int32_t number_of_parameters;
} RmmClockEeRecord;
typedef struct {
uint32_t capture_attempted, start_status, next_status, end_status, count, limit_reached;
RmmClockEeRecord records[4];
} RmmClockEeInfo;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockEeInfo) == 104, "same four-record numeric EEInfo ABI");
typedef struct {
uint32_t discovery_invocations, discovery_status, discovery_return_present;
uint32_t principal_present, principal_units, principal_validated;
uint32_t status_query_invocations, authn_service, authn_level, impersonation_type;
uint32_t principal_free_attempted, principal_free_status;
uint32_t binding_free_attempted, binding_free_status, eeinfo_origin;
} RmmClockAuthTrace;
_Static_assert(sizeof(RmmClockAuthTrace) == 60, "same numeric auth trace ABI");
typedef struct {
uint32_t query_status, system_user, token_type, thread_query_status, thread_present;
uint32_t lookup_status, privileges_status, privilege_present, privilege_attributes;
uint32_t privilege_enabled, privilege_default, privilege_removed;
} RmmTokenProbe;
uint32_t rmm_clock_query_trace_spnego_privilege(RmmClockTrace *trace, RmmClockEeInfo *eeinfo, RmmClockAuthTrace *auth);
static WCHAR service_name[] = L"RmmClockSpnegoPrivilegeDiagnostic";
static WCHAR case_id[37];
static SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE status_handle;
static SERVICE_STATUS service_status;
static DWORD WINAPI control(DWORD event, DWORD type, void *data, void *context) {
(void)event; (void)type; (void)data; (void)context;
return ERROR_CALL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
static DWORD own_system_token(RmmTokenProbe *probe) {
HANDLE token = NULL;
HANDLE thread = NULL;
DWORD needed = 0, result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
_Alignas(8) BYTE storage[4096];
if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token)) {
probe->query_status = GetLastError();
return probe->query_status;
}
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, storage, sizeof(storage), &needed)) result = GetLastError();
else if (needed < sizeof(TOKEN_USER) || needed > sizeof(storage)
|| !IsWellKnownSid(((TOKEN_USER *)storage)->User.Sid, WinLocalSystemSid)) result = ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
else probe->system_user = 1;
if (!result) {
TOKEN_TYPE type = 0;
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenType, &type, sizeof(type), &needed)) result = GetLastError();
else {
probe->token_type = (uint32_t)type;
if (needed != sizeof(type) || type != TokenPrimary) result = ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
if (!result) {
if (OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_QUERY, TRUE, &thread)) {
probe->thread_present = 1;
CloseHandle(thread);
result = ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; /* never impersonate/revert to continue */
} else {
probe->thread_query_status = GetLastError();
if (probe->thread_query_status != ERROR_NO_TOKEN) result = probe->thread_query_status;
}
}
if (!result) {
LUID target = {0};
if (!LookupPrivilegeValueW(NULL, SE_SYSTEMTIME_NAME, &target)) {
probe->lookup_status = GetLastError();result = probe->lookup_status;
} else {
needed = 0;
if (GetTokenInformation(token, TokenPrivileges, NULL, 0, &needed)
|| GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER || needed < sizeof(DWORD) || needed > sizeof(storage)) {
probe->privileges_status = ERROR_INVALID_DATA;result = ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
} else if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenPrivileges, storage, sizeof(storage), &needed)) {
probe->privileges_status = GetLastError();result = probe->privileges_status;
} else {
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES *privileges = (TOKEN_PRIVILEGES *)storage;
size_t count = privileges->PrivilegeCount;
if (count > 256 || needed > sizeof(storage)
|| offsetof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES, Privileges) + count * sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES) > needed) {
probe->privileges_status = ERROR_INVALID_DATA;result = ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
} else for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
const LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES *p = &privileges->Privileges[i];
if (p->Luid.LowPart != target.LowPart || p->Luid.HighPart != target.HighPart) continue;
if (probe->privilege_present) {result = ERROR_INVALID_DATA;break;}
probe->privilege_present = 1;
probe->privilege_attributes = p->Attributes;
probe->privilege_enabled = !!(p->Attributes & SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED);
probe->privilege_default = !!(p->Attributes & SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
probe->privilege_removed = !!(p->Attributes & SE_PRIVILEGE_REMOVED);
}
}
}
}
probe->query_status = result;
CloseHandle(token);
return result;
}
#define TOKEN_FIELDS "\"query_status\":%lu,\"system_user\":%lu,\"token_type\":%lu,\"thread_query_status\":%lu,\"thread_present\":%lu,\"lookup_status\":%lu,\"privileges_status\":%lu,\"privilege_present\":%lu,\"privilege_attributes\":%lu,\"privilege_enabled\":%lu,\"privilege_default\":%lu,\"privilege_removed\":%lu"
#define TOKEN_VALUES(p) (unsigned long)(p)->query_status,(unsigned long)(p)->system_user,(unsigned long)(p)->token_type,(unsigned long)(p)->thread_query_status,(unsigned long)(p)->thread_present,(unsigned long)(p)->lookup_status,(unsigned long)(p)->privileges_status,(unsigned long)(p)->privilege_present,(unsigned long)(p)->privilege_attributes,(unsigned long)(p)->privilege_enabled,(unsigned long)(p)->privilege_default,(unsigned long)(p)->privilege_removed
static DWORD write_new(const WCHAR *suffix, const char *bytes, DWORD length) {
WCHAR path[256];DWORD written = 0, result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int count = swprintf(path, sizeof(path) / sizeof(path[0]),
L"C:\\ProgramData\\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\\clock-spnego-privilege-trace-%ls\\%ls", case_id, suffix);
if (count <= 0 || count >= (int)(sizeof(path) / sizeof(path[0]))) return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
HANDLE file = CreateFileW(path, GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, CREATE_NEW,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL | FILE_FLAG_WRITE_THROUGH, NULL);
if (file == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return GetLastError();
if (!WriteFile(file, bytes, length, &written, NULL) || written != length) result = ERROR_WRITE_FAULT;
else if (!FlushFileBuffers(file)) result = GetLastError();
CloseHandle(file);return result;
}
static DWORD write_token(const RmmTokenProbe *token) {
char report[1024];
int count = snprintf(report, sizeof(report), "{" TOKEN_FIELDS "}\n", TOKEN_VALUES(token));
if (count <= 0 || count >= (int)sizeof(report)) return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
return write_new(L"token.json", report, (DWORD)count);
}
/* Only this held own token is ever passed to AdjustTokenPrivileges. Peer
* handles request TOKEN_QUERY only and are retained until the final readback. */
typedef struct {
DWORD present, query_status;
TOKEN_STATISTICS statistics;
DWORD count;
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES privileges[256];
} TokenSnapshot;
typedef struct {
HANDLE process, token;
SC_HANDLE service;
DWORD pid;
FILETIME creation;
TokenSnapshot before, after;
} Peer;
typedef struct {
HANDLE own;
SC_HANDLE manager;
FILETIME creation;
Peer peers[4]; /* SCM, W32Time, agent, helper */
TokenSnapshot before, active, restored;
LUID privilege;
DWORD preflight_status, enable_attempted, enable_return, enable_error;
DWORD previous_count, previous_bytes, previous_luid_low, previous_luid_high, previous_attributes;
DWORD active_status, rpc_attempted, restore_attempted, restore_return, restore_error;
DWORD restore_input_from_previous, restored_status, peer_after_status, restoration_verified, flow_status;
} PrivilegeContext;
static int luid_equal(LUID a, LUID b) {return a.LowPart==b.LowPart && a.HighPart==b.HighPart;}
static int luid_before(LUID a, LUID b) {
return (DWORD)a.HighPart<(DWORD)b.HighPart || (a.HighPart==b.HighPart && a.LowPart<b.LowPart);
}
static DWORD snapshot(HANDLE token, TokenSnapshot *out) {
DWORD needed=0, status=ERROR_SUCCESS;
_Alignas(8) BYTE storage[4096];
out->query_status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if (!GetTokenInformation(token,TokenStatistics,&out->statistics,sizeof(out->statistics),&needed)) status=GetLastError();
else if (needed!=sizeof(out->statistics)) status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if (!status) {
needed=0;
if (GetTokenInformation(token,TokenPrivileges,NULL,0,&needed)
|| GetLastError()!=ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER || needed<sizeof(DWORD) || needed>sizeof(storage)) status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
else if (!GetTokenInformation(token,TokenPrivileges,storage,sizeof(storage),&needed)) status=GetLastError();
else {
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES *value=(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES *)storage;
if (value->PrivilegeCount>256 || value->PrivilegeCount!=out->statistics.PrivilegeCount || needed>sizeof(storage)
|| offsetof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES,Privileges)+(size_t)value->PrivilegeCount*sizeof(LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)>needed) status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
else {
out->count=value->PrivilegeCount;
for (DWORD i=0;i<out->count;++i) out->privileges[i]=value->Privileges[i];
for (DWORD i=1;i<out->count;++i) {
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES item=out->privileges[i];DWORD j=i;
while(j && luid_before(item.Luid,out->privileges[j-1].Luid)) {out->privileges[j]=out->privileges[j-1];--j;}
out->privileges[j]=item;
}
for(DWORD i=1;i<out->count;++i)
if(luid_equal(out->privileges[i-1].Luid,out->privileges[i].Luid)) status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
}
out->query_status=status;out->present=!status;return status;
}
static int identity_equal(const TokenSnapshot *a,const TokenSnapshot *b) {
return a->present && b->present && luid_equal(a->statistics.TokenId,b->statistics.TokenId)
&& luid_equal(a->statistics.AuthenticationId,b->statistics.AuthenticationId)
&& a->statistics.TokenType==b->statistics.TokenType;
}
static DWORD compare_snapshots(const TokenSnapshot *a,const TokenSnapshot *b,LUID target,int enabled) {
if(!identity_equal(a,b) || a->count!=b->count) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
DWORD matched=0;
for(DWORD i=0;i<a->count;++i) {
if(!luid_equal(a->privileges[i].Luid,b->privileges[i].Luid)) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
DWORD attributes=a->privileges[i].Attributes;
if(luid_equal(target,a->privileges[i].Luid)) {++matched;if(attributes) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;if(enabled) attributes=SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;}
if(b->privileges[i].Attributes!=attributes) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
return matched==1?ERROR_SUCCESS:ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD;
}
static DWORD query_service_pid(SC_HANDLE service,DWORD *pid) {
SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS state={0};DWORD needed=0;
if(!QueryServiceStatusEx(service,SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO,(BYTE *)&state,sizeof(state),&needed)) return GetLastError();
if(needed!=sizeof(state) || state.dwCurrentState!=SERVICE_RUNNING || !state.dwProcessId) return ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
*pid=state.dwProcessId;return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
static DWORD scm_pid(DWORD *pid) {
HANDLE list=CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS,0);
if(list==INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return GetLastError();
PROCESSENTRY32W entry={0};entry.dwSize=sizeof(entry);DWORD found=0,status=0;
if(!Process32FirstW(list,&entry)) status=GetLastError();
else {
do {if(!_wcsicmp(entry.szExeFile,L"services.exe")){*pid=entry.th32ProcessID;++found;}}
while(Process32NextW(list,&entry));
if(GetLastError()!=ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) status=GetLastError();
else if(found!=1) status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
CloseHandle(list);return status;
}
static DWORD thread_absent(void) {
HANDLE token=NULL;
if(OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(),TOKEN_QUERY,TRUE,&token)) {CloseHandle(token);return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;}
DWORD error=GetLastError();return error==ERROR_NO_TOKEN?ERROR_SUCCESS:error;
}
static DWORD peer_binding(Peer *peer,DWORD index) {
DWORD pid=0,status=index?query_service_pid(peer->service,&pid):scm_pid(&pid);
if(status) return status;
if(pid!=peer->pid || GetProcessId(peer->process)!=pid || WaitForSingleObject(peer->process,0)!=WAIT_TIMEOUT) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
FILETIME created,ended,kernel,user;
if(!GetProcessTimes(peer->process,&created,&ended,&kernel,&user)) return GetLastError();
if(CompareFileTime(&created,&peer->creation)) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
HANDLE current=NULL;TokenSnapshot now={0};
if(!OpenProcessToken(peer->process,TOKEN_QUERY,&current)) return GetLastError();
status=snapshot(current,&now);CloseHandle(current);
if(status) return status;
return identity_equal(&now,&peer->before)?ERROR_SUCCESS:ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
static DWORD prepare_privilege(PrivilegeContext *ctx) {
if(!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),TOKEN_QUERY|TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES,&ctx->own)) return GetLastError();
_Alignas(8) BYTE user_info[4096];DWORD needed=0;FILETIME ended,kernel,user;
if(!GetTokenInformation(ctx->own,TokenUser,user_info,sizeof(user_info),&needed))return GetLastError();
if(needed<sizeof(TOKEN_USER) || needed>sizeof(user_info) || !IsWellKnownSid(((TOKEN_USER *)user_info)->User.Sid,WinLocalSystemSid))return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if(!GetProcessTimes(GetCurrentProcess(),&ctx->creation,&ended,&kernel,&user))return GetLastError();
DWORD status=snapshot(ctx->own,&ctx->before);if(status) return status;
if(ctx->before.statistics.TokenType!=TokenPrimary) return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if((status=thread_absent())) return status;
if(!LookupPrivilegeValueW(NULL,SE_SYSTEMTIME_NAME,&ctx->privilege)) return GetLastError();
if((status=compare_snapshots(&ctx->before,&ctx->before,ctx->privilege,0))) return status;
ctx->manager=OpenSCManagerW(NULL,NULL,SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
if(!ctx->manager) return GetLastError();
const WCHAR *names[4]={NULL,L"W32Time",L"RmmDiscoveryWindows",L"RmmDiscoverySystemHelper"};
const WCHAR *binaries[4]={L"services.exe",L"svchost.exe",L"C:\\Program Files\\RustDiscovery\\rmm-agent-windows.exe",L"C:\\Program Files\\RustDiscovery\\rmm-helper-windows.exe"};
for(DWORD i=0;i<4;++i) {
Peer *peer=&ctx->peers[i];
if(i) {peer->service=OpenServiceW(ctx->manager,names[i],SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);if(!peer->service)return GetLastError();}
status=i?query_service_pid(peer->service,&peer->pid):scm_pid(&peer->pid);if(status)return status;
if(peer->pid==GetCurrentProcessId()) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
peer->process=OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION|SYNCHRONIZE,FALSE,peer->pid);
if(!peer->process)return GetLastError();
WCHAR path[512],expected[512];DWORD length=512;
if(!QueryFullProcessImageNameW(peer->process,0,path,&length))return GetLastError();
if(i<2) {UINT n=GetSystemDirectoryW(expected,512);if(!n || n>480)return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if(swprintf(expected+n,512-n,L"\\%ls",binaries[i])<=0)return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;}
else {if(wcslen(binaries[i])>=512)return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;wcscpy(expected,binaries[i]);}
if(_wcsicmp(path,expected))return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
FILETIME ended,kernel,user;
if(!GetProcessTimes(peer->process,&peer->creation,&ended,&kernel,&user))return GetLastError();
if(!OpenProcessToken(peer->process,TOKEN_QUERY,&peer->token))return GetLastError();
status=snapshot(peer->token,&peer->before);if(status)return status;
if(peer->before.statistics.TokenType!=TokenPrimary || luid_equal(peer->before.statistics.TokenId,ctx->before.statistics.TokenId))return ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
if((status=peer_binding(peer,i)))return status;
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
static DWORD own_current(PrivilegeContext *ctx) {
HANDLE token=NULL;TokenSnapshot current={0};
if(!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(),TOKEN_QUERY,&token))return GetLastError();
DWORD status=snapshot(token,&current);CloseHandle(token);
if(status)return status;
if(!identity_equal(&ctx->before,&current))return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
return thread_absent();
}
static void close_privilege(PrivilegeContext *ctx) {
for(DWORD i=0;i<4;++i){Peer *p=&ctx->peers[i];if(p->token)CloseHandle(p->token);if(p->process)CloseHandle(p->process);if(p->service)CloseServiceHandle(p->service);}
if(ctx->manager)CloseServiceHandle(ctx->manager);if(ctx->own)CloseHandle(ctx->own);
}
static char witness[262144];
static size_t witness_used;
static int append(const char *format,...) {
va_list args;va_start(args,format);
int n=vsnprintf(witness+witness_used,sizeof(witness)-witness_used,format,args);va_end(args);
if(n<=0 || (size_t)n>=sizeof(witness)-witness_used)return 0;
witness_used+=(size_t)n;return 1;
}
static int append_snapshot(const TokenSnapshot *s) {
const TOKEN_STATISTICS *v=&s->statistics;
if(!append("{\"present\":%lu,\"query_status\":%lu,\"token_id\":[%lu,%lu],\"authentication_id\":[%lu,%lu],\"modified_id\":[%lu,%lu],\"expiration_time\":[%lu,%lu],\"token_type\":%lu,\"impersonation_level\":%lu,\"dynamic_charged\":%lu,\"dynamic_available\":%lu,\"group_count\":%lu,\"privilege_count\":%lu,\"privileges\":[",
(unsigned long)s->present,(unsigned long)s->query_status,(unsigned long)v->TokenId.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)v->TokenId.HighPart,
(unsigned long)v->AuthenticationId.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)v->AuthenticationId.HighPart,(unsigned long)v->ModifiedId.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)v->ModifiedId.HighPart,
(unsigned long)v->ExpirationTime.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)v->ExpirationTime.HighPart,(unsigned long)v->TokenType,(unsigned long)v->ImpersonationLevel,
(unsigned long)v->DynamicCharged,(unsigned long)v->DynamicAvailable,(unsigned long)v->GroupCount,(unsigned long)s->count))return 0;
for(DWORD i=0;i<s->count;++i)if(!append("%s[%lu,%lu,%lu]",i?",":"",(unsigned long)s->privileges[i].Luid.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)s->privileges[i].Luid.HighPart,(unsigned long)s->privileges[i].Attributes))return 0;
return append("]}");
}
static DWORD write_before(const PrivilegeContext *ctx) {
witness_used=0;
if(!append("{\"schema_version\":1,\"own_pid\":%lu,\"own_creation\":[%lu,%lu],\"own\":",(unsigned long)GetCurrentProcessId(),(unsigned long)ctx->creation.dwLowDateTime,(unsigned long)ctx->creation.dwHighDateTime) || !append_snapshot(&ctx->before) || !append(",\"peers\":["))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
for(DWORD i=0;i<4;++i){const Peer *p=&ctx->peers[i];
if(!append("%s{\"role\":%lu,\"pid\":%lu,\"creation\":[%lu,%lu],\"token\":",i?",":"",(unsigned long)i,(unsigned long)p->pid,(unsigned long)p->creation.dwLowDateTime,(unsigned long)p->creation.dwHighDateTime)
|| !append_snapshot(&p->before) || !append("}"))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;}
if(!append("]}\n"))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
return write_new(L"privilege-before.json",witness,(DWORD)witness_used);
}
static DWORD write_adjustment(const PrivilegeContext *ctx) {
witness_used=0;
if(!append("{\"schema_version\":1,\"preflight_status\":%lu,\"enable_attempted\":%lu,\"enable_return\":%lu,\"enable_error\":%lu,\"previous_count\":%lu,\"previous_bytes\":%lu,\"previous_luid\":[%lu,%lu],\"previous_attributes\":%lu,\"active_status\":%lu,\"rpc_attempted\":%lu,\"restore_attempted\":%lu,\"restore_return\":%lu,\"restore_error\":%lu,\"restore_input_from_previous\":%lu,\"restored_status\":%lu,\"peer_after_status\":%lu,\"restoration_verified\":%lu,\"flow_status\":%lu,\"target_luid\":[%lu,%lu],\"active\":",
(unsigned long)ctx->preflight_status,(unsigned long)ctx->enable_attempted,(unsigned long)ctx->enable_return,(unsigned long)ctx->enable_error,
(unsigned long)ctx->previous_count,(unsigned long)ctx->previous_bytes,(unsigned long)ctx->previous_luid_low,(unsigned long)ctx->previous_luid_high,(unsigned long)ctx->previous_attributes,
(unsigned long)ctx->active_status,(unsigned long)ctx->rpc_attempted,(unsigned long)ctx->restore_attempted,(unsigned long)ctx->restore_return,(unsigned long)ctx->restore_error,
(unsigned long)ctx->restore_input_from_previous,(unsigned long)ctx->restored_status,(unsigned long)ctx->peer_after_status,(unsigned long)ctx->restoration_verified,(unsigned long)ctx->flow_status,
(unsigned long)ctx->privilege.LowPart,(unsigned long)(DWORD)ctx->privilege.HighPart)
|| !append_snapshot(&ctx->active) || !append(",\"restored\":") || !append_snapshot(&ctx->restored) || !append(",\"peers_after\":["))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
for(DWORD i=0;i<4;++i){if(i && !append(","))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;if(!append_snapshot(&ctx->peers[i].after))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;}
if(!append("]}\n"))return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
return write_new(L"privilege-adjustment.json",witness,(DWORD)witness_used);
}
static DWORD write_result(uint32_t rpc, const RmmClockTrace *trace, const RmmClockEeInfo *eeinfo, const RmmClockAuthTrace *auth, const RmmTokenProbe *token) {
char id[37], report[4096];
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 37; ++i) id[i] = (char)case_id[i];
int count = snprintf(report, sizeof(report),
"{\"schema_version\":1,\"profile\":\"clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1\",\"case_id\":\"%s\","
"\"token_system\":%s,\"read_only\":false,\"diagnostic_only\":true,\"query_invocations\":%lu,"
"\"clock_qualified\":false,\"adapter_qualified\":false,\"product_gate_open\":false,\"rpc_code\":%lu,"
"\"trace\":{\"stage\":%lu,\"native_rpc_return\":%lu,\"native_rpc_return_present\":%lu,"
"\"rpc_exception\":%lu,\"status_present\":%lu,\"ul_size\":%lu,\"c_entries\":%lu,\"p_entries_present\":%lu}}\n",
id, (token->query_status==0 && token->system_user==1 && token->token_type==1 && token->thread_present==0 && token->thread_query_status==ERROR_NO_TOKEN)?"true":"false",
(unsigned long)auth->status_query_invocations, (unsigned long)rpc, (unsigned long)trace->stage,
(unsigned long)trace->native_rpc_return, (unsigned long)trace->native_rpc_return_present,
(unsigned long)trace->rpc_exception, (unsigned long)trace->status_present,
(unsigned long)trace->ul_size, (unsigned long)trace->c_entries, (unsigned long)trace->p_entries_present);
if (count <= 0 || count >= (int)sizeof(report)) return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
if (count < 3 || eeinfo->count > 4) return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
/* Replace only the final root-object closure; original trace stays intact. */
size_t used = (size_t)count - 2;
int appended = snprintf(report + used, sizeof(report) - used,
",\"eeinfo\":{\"capture_attempted\":%lu,\"start_status\":%lu,\"next_status\":%lu,"
"\"end_status\":%lu,\"count\":%lu,\"limit_reached\":%lu,\"records\":[",
(unsigned long)eeinfo->capture_attempted, (unsigned long)eeinfo->start_status,
(unsigned long)eeinfo->next_status, (unsigned long)eeinfo->end_status,
(unsigned long)eeinfo->count, (unsigned long)eeinfo->limit_reached);
if (appended <= 0 || (size_t)appended >= sizeof(report) - used) return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
used += (size_t)appended;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < eeinfo->count; ++i) {
const RmmClockEeRecord *record = &eeinfo->records[i];
appended = snprintf(report + used, sizeof(report) - used,
"%s{\"generating_component\":%lu,\"status\":%lu,\"detection_location\":%lu,"
"\"flags\":%lu,\"number_of_parameters\":%ld}", i ? "," : "",
(unsigned long)record->generating_component, (unsigned long)record->status,
(unsigned long)record->detection_location, (unsigned long)record->flags,
(long)record->number_of_parameters);
if (appended <= 0 || (size_t)appended >= sizeof(report) - used) return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
used += (size_t)appended;
}
appended = snprintf(report + used, sizeof(report) - used,
"]},\"token\":{" TOKEN_FIELDS "},\"auth\":{"
"\"discovery_invocations\":%lu,\"discovery_status\":%lu,\"discovery_return_present\":%lu,"
"\"principal_present\":%lu,\"principal_units\":%lu,\"principal_validated\":%lu,"
"\"status_query_invocations\":%lu,\"authn_service\":%lu,\"authn_level\":%lu,\"impersonation_type\":%lu,"
"\"principal_free_attempted\":%lu,\"principal_free_status\":%lu,\"binding_free_attempted\":%lu,"
"\"binding_free_status\":%lu,\"eeinfo_origin\":%lu}}\n",
TOKEN_VALUES(token), (unsigned long)auth->discovery_invocations, (unsigned long)auth->discovery_status,
(unsigned long)auth->discovery_return_present, (unsigned long)auth->principal_present,
(unsigned long)auth->principal_units, (unsigned long)auth->principal_validated,
(unsigned long)auth->status_query_invocations, (unsigned long)auth->authn_service,
(unsigned long)auth->authn_level, (unsigned long)auth->impersonation_type,
(unsigned long)auth->principal_free_attempted, (unsigned long)auth->principal_free_status,
(unsigned long)auth->binding_free_attempted, (unsigned long)auth->binding_free_status,
(unsigned long)auth->eeinfo_origin);
if (appended <= 0 || (size_t)appended >= sizeof(report) - used) return ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
used += (size_t)appended;
count = (int)used;
return write_new(L"result.json", report, (DWORD)count);
}
static void WINAPI run_service(DWORD argc, WCHAR **argv) {
(void)argc; (void)argv;
status_handle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerExW(service_name, control, NULL);
if (!status_handle) return;
ZeroMemory(&service_status, sizeof(service_status));
service_status.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS;
service_status.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
service_status.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
if (!SetServiceStatus(status_handle, &service_status)) return;
RmmTokenProbe token={0};PrivilegeContext ctx={0};
RmmClockTrace trace={0};RmmClockEeInfo eeinfo={0};
RmmClockAuthTrace auth={0};auth.authn_service=9;auth.authn_level=6;auth.impersonation_type=2;
DWORD result=own_system_token(&token),rpc=0;
DWORD token_write=write_token(&token); /* durable old numeric probe */
if(!result)result=token_write;
if(!result)result=prepare_privilege(&ctx);
if(!result)result=write_before(&ctx); /* durable complete pre-enable witness */
ctx.preflight_status=result;
if(!result) {
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES enable={0},previous={0},restore={0};DWORD previous_bytes=0;
enable.PrivilegeCount=1;enable.Privileges[0].Luid=ctx.privilege;
enable.Privileges[0].Attributes=SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
restore.PrivilegeCount=1;restore.Privileges[0].Luid=ctx.privilege; /* saved original Attr0 */
ctx.enable_attempted=1; /* all paths after this call execute the one restore */
SetLastError(ERROR_SUCCESS);
ctx.enable_return=!!AdjustTokenPrivileges(ctx.own,FALSE,&enable,sizeof(previous),&previous,&previous_bytes);
ctx.enable_error=GetLastError();ctx.previous_count=previous.PrivilegeCount;ctx.previous_bytes=previous_bytes;
if(previous.PrivilegeCount==1) {
ctx.previous_luid_low=previous.Privileges[0].Luid.LowPart;
ctx.previous_luid_high=(DWORD)previous.Privileges[0].Luid.HighPart;
ctx.previous_attributes=previous.Privileges[0].Attributes;
if(previous_bytes==sizeof(previous) && luid_equal(previous.Privileges[0].Luid,ctx.privilege)
&& previous.Privileges[0].Attributes==0) {
restore=previous;ctx.restore_input_from_previous=1;
}
}
if(!ctx.enable_return || ctx.enable_error || !ctx.restore_input_from_previous)
result=ctx.enable_error?ctx.enable_error:ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if(!result)result=snapshot(ctx.own,&ctx.active);
if(!result)result=compare_snapshots(&ctx.before,&ctx.active,ctx.privilege,1);
if(!result)result=own_current(&ctx);
for(DWORD i=0;!result && i<4;++i)result=peer_binding(&ctx.peers[i],i);
ctx.active_status=result;
if(!result) {ctx.rpc_attempted=1;rpc=rmm_clock_query_trace_spnego_privilege(&trace,&eeinfo,&auth);}
/* No report IO or early return between adjustment and this restoration. */
ctx.restore_attempted=1;SetLastError(ERROR_SUCCESS);
ctx.restore_return=!!AdjustTokenPrivileges(ctx.own,FALSE,&restore,0,NULL,NULL);
ctx.restore_error=GetLastError();
ctx.restored_status=snapshot(ctx.own,&ctx.restored);
if(!ctx.restored_status)ctx.restored_status=compare_snapshots(&ctx.before,&ctx.restored,ctx.privilege,0);
if(!ctx.restored_status)ctx.restored_status=own_current(&ctx);
ctx.restoration_verified=ctx.restore_return && !ctx.restore_error && !ctx.restored_status;
if(!ctx.restoration_verified && !result)result=ctx.restore_error?ctx.restore_error:ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
for(DWORD i=0;i<4;++i) {
Peer *peer=&ctx.peers[i];DWORD status=peer_binding(peer,i);
if(!status)status=snapshot(peer->token,&peer->after);
if(!status && (!identity_equal(&peer->before,&peer->after)
|| !luid_equal(peer->before.statistics.ModifiedId,peer->after.statistics.ModifiedId)
|| peer->before.count!=peer->after.count))status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
for(DWORD j=0;!status && j<peer->before.count;++j)
if(!luid_equal(peer->before.privileges[j].Luid,peer->after.privileges[j].Luid)
|| peer->before.privileges[j].Attributes!=peer->after.privileges[j].Attributes)status=ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
if(status && !ctx.peer_after_status)ctx.peer_after_status=status;
}
if(ctx.peer_after_status && !result)result=ctx.peer_after_status;
}
ctx.flow_status=result;
DWORD adjustment_write=write_adjustment(&ctx);
if(!result)result=adjustment_write;
if(!ctx.rpc_attempted){rpc=ctx.flow_status;trace.stage=200;}
DWORD result_write=write_result(rpc,&trace,&eeinfo,&auth,&token);
if(!result)result=result_write;
close_privilege(&ctx);
service_status.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
service_status.dwWin32ExitCode = result;
SetServiceStatus(status_handle, &service_status);
}
int wmain(int argc, WCHAR **argv) {
if (argc != 3 || wcscmp(argv[1], L"--service") || wcslen(argv[2]) != 36) return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 36; ++i) {
WCHAR value = argv[2][i];
if (i == 8 || i == 13 || i == 18 || i == 23) {
if (value != L'-') return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
} else if (!((value >= L'0' && value <= L'9') || (value >= L'a' && value <= L'f'))) return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
case_id[i] = value;
}
case_id[36] = 0;
SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRYW table[] = {{service_name, run_service}, {NULL, NULL}};
if (!StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW(table)) return (int)GetLastError();
return 0;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
# Plan: einmaliger Clockvergleich mit vorhandenem Prozessprivileg
Ursprünglicher Plan 2026-11-14, vor Implementierung verfasst; die inzwischen erfolgte lokale Umsetzung steht im letzten Abschnitt.
**Keine Implementierung, kein Build und keine Zielaktion für diesen Nachfolger.**
Die Freigabe der konkreten Tokenabgrenzung und des Diagnoseumfangs liegt beim
Hauptagenten. Alle bisherigen Empty-, F6-, SYSTEM-, EEInfo- und Produktquellen
sowie deren Casebelege bleiben unverändert.
## Ausgangspunkt und begrenzte Fragestellung
Der Hauptagent meldet aus dem tatsächlichen Empty-Case
`5e0e8ce9-b9a3-4c4a-b739-3f84d714dc94`: eine Statusquery, RPC5/Stage90,
ein numerischer EEInfo-Record; vorhandenes SeSystemtimePrivilege mit
Attributen0/Enabled0. Dieser Plan ergänzt keinen abgeschlossenen
Readback-/Cleanup-/Preservationnachweis und leitet daraus keine Fehlerursache ab.
Der nächste Vergleich soll ausschließlich prüfen, ob sich das Ergebnis eines
einzelnen lesenden Opnum6 ändert, wenn genau das bereits vorhandene
SeSystemtimePrivilege des getrennten Diagnoseprozesses vorübergehend aktiviert
ist. Es werden keine Kontorechte zugewiesen. Auch ein erfolgreicher Vergleich
wäre weder Produktionsfreigabe noch ausreichende Clock-/Serveridentitätsprüfung.
## Geprüfte Microsoft-Verträge
AdjustTokenPrivileges wirkt auf das übergebene Tokenobjekt. Es benötigt
TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, mit PreviousState zusätzlich TOKEN_QUERY. TRUE allein
bedeutet nicht, dass alle angeforderten Rechte angepasst wurden:
GetLastError ist unmittelbar auszuwerten; ERROR_NOT_ALL_ASSIGNED verweigert den
Diagnoseaufruf. Vorhandene Rechte können aktiviert werden, neue werden nicht
hinzugefügt. PreviousState enthält die tatsächlich geänderten ursprünglichen
Zustände und dient als NewState einer Wiederherstellung. Ein zu kleiner
PreviousState-Puffer führt ohne Anpassung zum Fehler.
[AdjustTokenPrivileges](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-adjusttokenprivileges)
OpenProcessToken öffnet das einem Prozess zugeordnete Token. Dieser Aufruf ist
kein eigenständiger Vertrag über die Exklusivität aller Referenzen auf dieses
Tokenobjekt.
[OpenProcessToken](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-openprocesstoken)
TokenStatistics.TokenId identifiziert die konkrete Tokenobjektinstanz.
AuthenticationId identifiziert eine Anmeldesitzung, zu der viele Tokens gehören
können. ModifiedId ändert sich bei Tokenänderung. Deshalb weder gleiche
AuthenticationId als Tokenidentität noch gleiche ModifiedId nach Wiederherstellung
fordern; die ursprüngliche ModifiedId lässt sich nicht durch Zurücksetzen der
Privilegattribute wiederherstellen.
[TOKEN_STATISTICS](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-token_statistics)
Jeder Prozess hat ein Primärtoken; ein impersonierender Thread kann zusätzlich
ein Threadtoken besitzen. Der Vergleich soll weiterhin ohne Impersonation und
ohne Tokenwechsel laufen.
[Access Tokens](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-tokens)
LocalSystem-Dienste erben den Sicherheitskontext des SCM. Diese Aussage und
derselbe SYSTEM-SID belegen für sich allein keine verschiedenen TokenIds.
SeSystemtimePrivilege ist in Microsofts LocalSystem-Beschreibung standardmäßig
deaktiviert; das erklärt nicht allein den konkreten RPC5.
[LocalSystem Account](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/localsystem-account)
SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS belegt einen eigenen Prozess, nicht durch seine bloße
Bezeichnung eine geprüfte Trennung sämtlicher Tokenreferenzen.
[CreateServiceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-createservicew)
## Noch vom Hauptagenten zu entscheidende Beweisgrenze
Vorgeschlagener enger Gate: Vor jeder Anpassung rein lesend TokenId und
TokenStatistics des Diagnoseprozesses, des SCM-Prozesses und der aktuell an
W32Time, RMM-Agent und RMM-Helper gebundenen Prozesse erfassen. Prozesshandles
und Startzeiten binden die Ablesung gegen PID-Wiederverwendung; Dienst-PID und
Prozessbindung direkt danach erneut prüfen. Nur TOKEN_QUERY gegenüber fremden
Tokens; kein SE_DEBUG_ENABLE, kein fremdes TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES.
Bei fehlender erforderlicher Probe, Prozesswechsel, gemeinsamem TokenId,
falschem SYSTEM-Primärtoken oder vorhandenem Threadtoken: Abbruch vor Anpassung
und vor RPC. Gleiche AuthenticationId allein ist kein Fehler.
Dies belegt lediglich Trennung von den tatsächlich abgefragten Peer-Tokenobjekten.
Es beweist nicht, dass kein weiterer Prozess/Thread irgendeine Referenz auf das
Diagnosetoken hält. Die ausgewerteten primären Verträge liefern hierfür keine
ausreichende universelle Exklusivitätsgarantie. **Ohne ausdrückliche Akzeptanz
dieser Grenze wird kein Anpassungscode erstellt.** Alternativ ist zuerst ein
rein lesender TokenId-Vergleich vorzubereiten. Ein dupliziertes Token plus
Impersonation oder neuer Childprozess ist ein anderer Vergleich und wird nicht
stillschweigend als Ersatz eingebaut.
## Vorgeschlagene neue Quellen, erst nach dieser Entscheidung
Vier neue Dateien unter `deploy/windows/clock-spnego-privilege-trace/`:
- `clock_rpc_spnego_privilege.c`: bytegleicher Empty-RPCpfad bis auf das neue
öffentliche Symbolsuffix. Tatsächlich zurückgegebenen nicht-NULL Emptystring
unverändert weitergeben; GSS9/Privacy6/Identify2, kein Authfallback. Maximal
eine Managementdiscovery und bei erfüllten Vorbedingungen eine Opnum6-Query;
Setupfehler bedeuten null Queries. EEInfo weiter maximal vier numerische
Records. Kein Setter und keine neue Serveridentitätsbehauptung.
- `system_trace_spnego_privilege.c`: eigener, einmalig gestarteter
SYSTEM-OWN_PROCESS-Dienst mit dem nachstehend beschriebenen Tokenablauf.
- `build.py`: alter Compiler/MIDL/Header/SDK/DLL-Vertrag unverändert, neue
vier Inputs sowie Empty-Manifest und tatsächlichen Ausgangscase hashen;
alte Inputs nur vergleichen und unverändert erhalten.
- `native.py`: eigene Case-/Service-/Profilbindung, create-once prepare/start,
rein lesender same-case Readback und getrenntes Cleanup nur des eigenen
gestoppten Dienstes. Antwortverlust erlaubt keine Wiederholung des Starts.
Vorgeschlagene Namen: `RmmClockSpnegoPrivilegeDiagnostic`,
`clock-system-spnego-privilege-v1`, `ClockSpnegoPrivilegeTrace.exe`,
`C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\clock-spnego-privilege-trace-<UUID>`.
## Geplanter Tokenablauf und Fehlerverhalten
1. Vor Anpassung eigenes gehaltenes Primärtoken mit exakt TOKEN_QUERY und
TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES öffnen; keine Vererbung oder Weitergabe des Handles.
SYSTEM, Primärtoken und fehlendes Threadtoken prüfen. Vollständige begrenzte
Privilegliste auslesen, LUIDs numerisch sortieren und auf Duplikate prüfen.
SeSystemtimePrivilege muss genau einmal vorhanden sein, Attribut0 haben und
weder enabled noch removed sein. Abweichung verweigert den Vergleich.
2. Eigenes PID/Startzeit/TokenStatistics und Peer-Proben samt ursprünglicher
numerischer Privilegliste create-once vor Anpassung dauerhaft ablegen.
Geplantes Limit: höchstens256 Privilegien und derselbe4096Byte-Tokenpuffer.
Keine Namen, Anmeldeinformationen oder Tokenhandles als Ausgabedaten.
3. Ein einziges AdjustTokenPrivileges mit DisableAllPrivileges=FALSE,
PrivilegeCount=1, exakter vorhandener LUID und SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED.
Ausreichender fester PreviousState-Puffer für genau eine Änderung;
BOOL und sofortiges GetLastError getrennt speichern. Nur TRUE+ERROR_SUCCESS
und genau ein gültiger PreviousState-Eintrag derselben LUID/Attribut0
erlauben den weiteren Ablauf. Kein SE_PRIVILEGE_REMOVED/DisableAllPrivileges.
4. Direkt am gehaltenen eigenen Token nachlesen: gleiche TokenId,
AuthenticationId und TokenType, unveränderte Privilegmenge sowie lediglich
der erwartete Enablebit-Wechsel. Direkt vor RPC fehlendes Threadtoken erneut
prüfen. Fehler springen zuerst in Restore, nicht in RPC. Der Enablezeitraum
umfasst den unveränderten Discovery-/Authsetup-/Querypfad; es wird keine
Behauptung aufgestellt, dass das Bit nur während des einzelnen Opnum6 aktiv ist.
5. Bestehende RPCfunktion höchstens einmal aufrufen; RPCexception/Fehler bleibt
ihr numerischer Befund. Unmittelbar danach Restore auf demselben gehaltenen
eigenen Token mit PreviousState als NewState. Jeder normale Fehlerpfad nach
Anpassungsbeginn erreicht denselben Cleanupblock, bevor Berichtschreiben
oder Dienstende. Auch fehlgeschlagene Nachprüfung löst Restore aus.
Bei unerwartetem PreviousState ist kein RPC erlaubt; der bereits separat
gesicherte eine ursprüngliche LUID/Attribut0 ist die begrenzte Restoreeingabe.
Keine Wiederholung eines RPCs oder Aktivierungsversuchs.
6. Restore-BOOL und unmittelbaren Fehlercode separat erfassen. Vollständige
Privilegliste erneut lesen; exakt ursprüngliche Attribute/Menge fordern.
TokenId/AuthenticationId/TokenType müssen gleich sein. ModifiedId darf und
wird gegebenenfalls anders sein; dies ist keine fehlgeschlagene Rücksetzung.
Peer-TokenIds/Attribute erneut rein lesend prüfen; Wechsel/Fehler ehrlich
als nicht nachgewiesene Erhaltung melden, nicht durch fremden Schreibzugriff
reparieren. Danach Ergebnis plus before/enabled/restored-Snapshots speichern.
Ein Restorefehler kann nicht durch eine Erfolgsmeldung verdeckt werden und
beweist keine erfolgreiche Erhaltung; Dienstexit wird Fehler, kein weiterer
RPC. Unvorhersehbarer Prozessabbruch, TerminateProcess oder Stromverlust kann
keinen benutzerseitigen finally-Block garantieren. Ohne gespeicherte und
nachgelesene Wiederherstellung lautet der Nachweis daher `unknown`, auch wenn
der Prozess bereits beendet ist. Es wird keine universelle Rücksetzgarantie
für solche Abbrüche behauptet.
Die Statusquery bleibt fachlich lesend; der neue Diagnoseprozess insgesamt ist
wegen AdjustTokenPrivileges **nicht rein lesend**. Maschinen-/Kontorechte,
ACL/GPO, W32Time-Konfiguration, Dienstkonten und Uhrzeit werden nicht geändert.
Die Erzeugung des eigenen Diagnosedienstes bleibt eine gesonderte ausdrückliche
Bootstrapwirkung. Kein Produktgate und keine Job-/Freigabe-/Policyänderung.
## Geplante lokale und native Nachweise, sämtlich noch nicht ausgeführt
Nach akzeptiertem Scope zunächst Quellenreview: genau ein Enable, ein gebundener
Restorepfad, kein Tokenwechsel, keine fremden Tokenwrites, bestehender RPCpfad
bis auf Symbol bytegleich. Lokale gezielte Guardfälle: TRUE mit1300 verweigern,
fehlendes/removed/dupliziertes Recht, bereits enabled, falscher PreviousState,
fremder gleicher TokenId, Peerwechsel, nichtlesbarer Peer, aktiver Threadtoken,
Nachprüfungsfehler, RPCexception sowie Restorefehler. Nicht jeder synthetisch
abgedeckte Fehler ist damit ein nativer Windowsnachweis.
Erst nach getrenntem Source-/Buildreview kann der Hauptagent einen neuen nativen
Case ausdrücklich starten. Benötigte Belege: originale Snapshots vor Anpassung,
sichtbare einzelne Enableänderung, exakter RPC-/EEInfo-Befund, nachgelesener
Restore, unveränderte Peer-Zustände, gestoppter eigener Dienst, same-case
Readback sowie getrenntes Cleanup/Preservation bestehender RMM-Dienste. Keine
Clockqualifikation allein aus einem erfolgreichen Statusqueryreturn ableiten.
## Lokale Umsetzung nach ausdrücklicher Rootfreigabe
Der Hauptagent hat die begrenzte TokenId-Trennung zu gehaltenen SCM-/W32Time-/
Agent-/Helper-Prozessen ausdrücklich akzeptiert. Universelle Exklusivität aller
Referenzen wird weiterhin nicht behauptet. Der ursprüngliche176Zeilen-Plan
mit SHA25627b1035c… ist zusätzlich create-once unter
`devstate/windows-clock-spnego-privilege-trace/local-review/accepted-plan.md`
erhalten. Dieser Abschnitt ersetzt keine Freigabe einer Zielaktion.
Die vier oben benannten neuen Dateien sind jetzt lokal implementiert.
Vorher werden eigene TokenUser/SYSTEM, Primärtoken, fehlender Threadtoken und
vollständige numerische Privilegliste geprüft. SCM wird eindeutig über
services.exe samt Systempfad ermittelt; die anderen drei Prozesse sind über
gehaltene Service-/Prozesshandles, Running/PID, Erstellzeit und feste Images
gebunden. Fremde Tokenhandles verlangen ausschließlich TOKEN_QUERY. Der eigene
Tokenhandle verlangt QUERY|ADJUST_PRIVILEGES. Vor Enable wird der vollständige
Beforebeleg create-once geschrieben. Der unmittelbare Enable-Rückgabecode und
GetLastError, PreviousState und volle Nachlese begrenzen den einzigen RPCpfad.
Alle kontrollierten Fehlerpfade nach Enable erreichen dieselbe einzelne
Restorestelle; danach werden volle ursprüngliche Attribute und die
unveränderten numerischen Peer-Privilegzustände/TokenIds/ModifiedIds geprüft.
ModifiedId des eigenen Tokens darf nach korrektem Restore geändert sein.
Berichte kennzeichnen die gesamte Diagnose ausdrücklich als read_only=false;
SYSTEM wird nur bei erfolgreicher tatsächlicher Probe ausgewiesen. Ein eigener
Cleanupreceipt erhält den vorherigen Dienstexitcode, damit Serviceentfernung
keinen fehlgeschlagenen Ablauf nachträglich als vollständig erscheinen lässt.
Finaler lokaler Build:
`devstate/windows-clock-spnego-privilege-trace/build-b56e3f3d-8904-4fd8-9c34-0e55e57c8f07/manifest.json`, SHA256
`6c97658307ec66e6605574dca27cdbc79efefa9cd7f386e6e2cb3f73d9b5c6d3`.
PE114087Bytes, SHA256
`68a217914c15f28b19c52a2f5adfd595854f88210fbb0b69c20e73a59952b65e`.
Originales Microsoft-MIDL/Header und gepinnter Compiler unverändert; eigene
C-Units Wall/Wextra/Werror, gleiche vier DLL-Imports ADVAPI32/KERNEL32/RPCRT4/
msvcrt. PowerShell-AST bestanden, EncodedCommand18858Zeichen unter32767.
Alle131Produktinputs,15bisherige Diagnosequellen sowie F6-/Empty-Manifeste und
Ergebnisbelege unverändert geprüft. Der RPCwrapper unterscheidet sich vom
Empty-Elternteil ausschließlich durch das öffentliche Symbolsuffix.
Gezielte lokale Nachweise, keine Windows-API- oder RPC-Ausführung: der tatsächliche
C-run_service-Block wurde bytegleich extrahiert und mit kontrollierten lokalen
API-Stubs übersetzt/ausgeführt.13Fälle bestanden, unter anderem TRUE/1300,
FALSE, ungültiger PreviousState, aktive Attributabweichung, Own-/Peerprobe-Fehler,
Restorefehler, fehlgeschlagene Nachlese sowie Writefehler vor/nach Enable.
Jeder Fall prüft höchstens1Enable, genau1Restore je Enable und höchstens1RPC.
Der echte Python-Reader akzeptierte zwei synthetische gültige Berichte und
verweigerte17Fälschungen/Fehler einschließlich fremdem TokenId, nicht erhaltenen
Attributen, Peerdrift, schwächerer Privacy und verstecktem Fehlerexit nach Cleanup.
Guardreceipt `local-review/guards.json`, SHA256
`c12c5d06ecad63101874f7c66af1f49eb9f6d9b51dbba9c75e367462660fa831`.
Dies sind lokale Fehlerpfadbelege, keine nativen Token-/Erhaltungsnachweise.
**Bis zum Abschluss dieser lokalen Vorbereitung war kein Privilegvergleich auf
Windows ausgeführt. Der Subagent hat keinen VM-/SSH-/SCM-Start vorgenommen und
keinen Produktcode/Clockgate geändert.** Das erforderliche unabhängige
Source-/Manifestreview und die spätere native Ausführung durch den Hauptagenten
sind inzwischen im [tatsächlichen Ergebnis](windows-clock-process-privilege-result.md)
mit Startfehler, separatem Readback, Restore, Cleanup und Preservation dokumentiert.
Auch eine künftig erfolgreiche Query ließe produktive LocalService-Privilegien,
gebundene Serveridentität und Transport-Positiv-/Negativnachweise weiter offen;
Discovery/NTLM/Mutualauth-Flags allein ersetzen diese nicht.
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
# Tatsächlicher Prozessprivilegvergleich auf der Windows-VM
Stand 2026-11-14: eigener Diagnoseablauf, separater Readback, Cleanup und
After-Preservation durch den Hauptagenten abgeschlossen. Die W32Time-Statusquery
scheitert weiterhin mit RPC5. Kein Produktgate geöffnet, kein RMM-Job ausgeführt.
## Verwendeter Quellen- und Buildstand
Reviewter Nachfolger unter `deploy/windows/clock-spnego-privilege-trace/`, vier
Dateien; ursprünglicher Scope und lokale Nachweise:
[Prozessprivilegplan](windows-clock-process-privilege-plan.md).
Buildmanifest:
`devstate/windows-clock-spnego-privilege-trace/build-b56e3f3d-8904-4fd8-9c34-0e55e57c8f07/manifest.json`, SHA256
`6c97658307ec66e6605574dca27cdbc79efefa9cd7f386e6e2cb3f73d9b5c6d3`.
Windows-PE114087Bytes, SHA256
`68a217914c15f28b19c52a2f5adfd595854f88210fbb0b69c20e73a59952b65e`.
Der Hauptagent und sein unabhängiger Reviewer haben Quelle, Manifest und PE
geprüft. Die vier Quellen wurden für den nativen Vergleich nicht verändert.
## Fehlgeschlagener Startaufruf und getrennte Nachlese
Neuer einmaliger Case: `6de04277-6bec-477d-b1c9-bfca88a9cd78`.
Der ursprüngliche Startaufruf meldet tatsächlich
`StartServiceFailed,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.StartServiceCommand` an Zeile26.
Transportbeleg `transport-6e33c04b-f149-426b-8da1-309129ff3469.json`, SHA256
`83ccfd7db60ad27dd901ddbef223cde8f69ecc9e635373038f20ca864b954ba6`.
Dieser Aufruf bleibt als fehlgeschlagen dokumentiert. **Kein Startretry.**
Anschließend gewinnt der Hauptagent ausschließlich durch einen separaten,
rein lesenden same-case Readback den vollständigen Diagnosebericht. Der eigene
Dienst ist gestoppt, Dienstexit0. Readback
`readback-9039311f-1b98-4d0c-b516-02a543fb2d7b.json`, SHA256
`c5dcf129d329b879be00c801eead32d2047d9b73ffed0e0e692615e9a7459c07`.
Der gebundene vollständige Ergebnisbeleg `diagnostic-result.json` hat SHA256
`c7556589a015fc5ab53feffe3caf74a3904b7f5a65b70066f256cc0693ff8152`.
Exit0 und complete=true belegen den abgeschlossenen Diagnose-/Restoreablauf,
keinen gelungenen W32Time-Aufruf. Die Ursache der anfänglichen Startfehlermeldung
ist nicht nachgewiesen; eine SCM-Race wird nicht als Erklärung behauptet.
## Tatsächliche Token- und RPC-Ergebnisse
Eigenes gehaltenes SYSTEM-Primärtoken; kein Threadtoken. Der vorhandene
SeSystemtimePrivilege-LUID ist12,0, ursprüngliches Attribut0. Genau ein
Enableversuch: BOOLtrue/GetLastError0, PreviousStateCount1,16Bytes, derselbe
LUID12,0 und ursprüngliches Attribut0. Die anschließende vollständige Nachlese
zeigt ausschließlich den vorgesehenen Enablebit-Wechsel auf2.
Genau eine Wiederherstellung auf dem gehaltenen eigenen Token mit dem geprüften
PreviousState: BOOLtrue/GetLastError0. Danach sind die vollständige ursprüngliche
Privilegmenge und Attribute0 wiederhergestellt, restoration_verified1,
restored_status0, flow_status0. Vorher-/Nachher-TokenId und Authentifizierungs-ID
bleiben gebunden; eine geänderte eigene ModifiedId ist keine unerwartete
Attributabweichung. Die beobachteten gehaltenen Peer-Tokens für SCM, W32Time,
Agent und Helper behalten ihre TokenIds, ModifiedIds und Privilegattribute.
Dies ist der vereinbarte begrenzte Peer-Nachweis, keine universelle Behauptung
über sämtliche Tokenreferenzen des Betriebssystems. Fremdtokens werden nur gelesen.
Eine SPNEGO-Managementdiscovery gelingt mit Status0 und normalem Return. Der
tatsächlich gelieferte Principalpointer ist nicht-NULL, UTF16-Länge0. GSS9,
PacketPrivacy6 und Identify2 bleiben unverändert. Danach genau ein Opnum6:
RPCexception5/Stage90, kein normaler Return, kein Statusobjekt. Unmittelbar
erfasst wird ein numerischer EEInfo-Record: Komponente2, Status5,
DetectionLocation1750, Flags0, Parameteranzahl1. Keine Parameterinhalte gelesen.
Principal-/Bindingfreigabe werden jeweils einmal erfolgreich ausgeführt.
Der Unterschied zum vorherigen Emptyvergleich ist damit tatsächlich geprüft:
Aktivieren dieses vorhandenen Prozessprivilegs beseitigt den beobachteten RPC5
nicht. Daraus folgt weder, dass jede Privilegprüfung erfolgreich war, noch eine
eindeutige Aussage über den vom Server geprüften Credential-/Impersonationkontext.
Keine Uhr-, Kontorechte-, ACL-, GPO-, Policy- oder W32Time-Konfigurationsänderung.
Die gesamte Privilegdiagnose kennzeichnet sich korrekt als read_only=false;
die einzige W32Time-Methodenquery selbst ist lesend.
## Cleanup und Erhaltung
Der Hauptagent bereinigt ausschließlich den eigenen gestoppten Diagnosedienst.
Cleanupreceipt `readback-d02e8c7a-5154-488b-a29f-4d4d8155ec7a.json`, SHA256
`e163d7d4790ea4900f1cc1caedf11ff2619f30cf7b25388eabffa9afd75d8d50`,
bestätigt cleanup_verified=true; der eigene Dienst ist anschließend nicht mehr
registriert. Kein Retry, Reset oder zusätzlicher RMM-Job.
Vorherbeleg SHA256
`a4b321f965f4ccc968724fae9abd856cca5f799b5fc96a54d04f5316b95ab05b`;
Afterbeleg im Pipeworktree:
`devstate/windows-client/system-pipe-upgrade/14fb176a-f653-4573-a8d7-6f9fe47a3020/spnego-privilege-trace-after.json`, SHA256
`f37a2e866ebc5dfd1ae13bfd18b7c5355da42dfd01b7e7e69f478555c60eb830`.
Alle sechs nativen Bereiche service/helper_service/agent_kernel/helper_kernel/
files/helper_witness sind exakt gleich. Serverzustand ebenfalls gleich:
Windows0/0/0/0, Linux31/31/27/0, geschlossene Rootpolicycf15. Der separate
Nachweis meldet verified=true, read_only=true, no_jobs=true, clock_qualified=false.
## Nächster abgegrenzter Vergleich und Primärquellen
Der Hauptagent führt separat den vorhandenen Microsoft-Builtin
`w32tm /query /status /verbose` über den bestehenden Administratortransport aus.
Sein Ergebnis wird nicht vorweggenommen und ist kein Bestandteil dieses
Privileg-Abnahmenachweises. Microsoft beschreibt /query /status als Statusanzeige,
ohne /computer standardmäßig lokal, und verlangt für lokale Toolnutzung
Administratorberechtigung. Die Quelle legt weder das konkrete interne Binding
noch Authn-/Impersonationparameter dieses konkreten Builtinlaufs offen.
[Windows Time Service Tools and Settings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings)
MS-W32T AppendixB33 beschreibt eine zusätzliche Prüfung des Rechts zur
Systemzeitänderung; auch eine nicht durchführbare Prüfung kann den Aufruf
verweigern. Der dokumentierte Clientpfad verwendet SPNEGO/Privacy mit dem
Discoveryergebnis. Daraus lässt sich ohne weitere Beobachtung nicht schließen,
welche Prüfung den konkreten RPC5 verursacht hat.
[MS-W32T Appendix B](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-w32t/bb576d39-587b-484a-86a4-e1d378cf9497)
Ein serverseitiger RPC-Securitycallback kann Zugriffe prüfen; eine Ablehnung
wird zum Client als RPC_S_ACCESS_DENIED abgebildet. Der Zahlenwert5 identifiziert
deshalb keine einzelne fehlgeschlagene Prüfung und keinen bestimmten Callback.
[RPC_IF_CALLBACK_FN](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/rpcdce/nc-rpcdce-rpc_if_callback_fn)
Authentifizierung, Clientcredential-Snapshot, SSP-Verhalten und zulässige
serverseitige Impersonation sind getrennte Eigenschaften. Ein NULL-AuthIdentity
verwendet den aktuellen Login-Kontext, nicht explizit anonyme Credentials.
Der Authsetup-Aufruf nimmt einen Credentialsnapshot; die QoS-Unterscheidung
Static/Dynamic und Identify/Impersonate enthält SSP-/Transportsonderfälle.
Diese Unterschiede bleiben Hypothesen bis zu einem passenden Nachweis.
[RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/rpcdce/nf-rpcdce-rpcbindingsetauthinfoexw),
[RPC_SECURITY_QOS](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/rpcdce/ns-rpcdce-rpc_security_qos)
Produktiver Transport, LocalService-Rechte und gebundene W32Time-Serveridentität
einschließlich Positiv-/Negativnachweisen bleiben offen. Discovery, Negotiate,
NTLM oder ein Mutualauth-Flag allein ersetzen keinen sicheren Identitätsbeweis.
Keine weitere Diagnosequelle und keine Produktfunktion als Teil dieses Schritts.