Prove actual Windows agent process identity under SYSTEM diagnostic
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-14 06:48:00 +01:00
parent 41622e3038
commit 44c45c15b9
5 changed files with 107 additions and 13 deletions
@@ -1,9 +1,17 @@
//! Negative, read-only raw Probe clients. Never SDK self-refusal as server proof. //! Negative, read-only raw Probe clients. Never SDK self-refusal as server proof.
//! The permanent services, their tokens/configuration and private state stay intact. //! The permanent services, their tokens/configuration and private state stay intact.
// Compile the unchanged production proof in this diagnostic crate. Keeping the
// module public avoids hiding its public transport API behind dead-code lint;
// no new API is exported from the agent library.
#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
#[path = "../src/helper_ipc.rs"]
pub mod helper_ipc;
#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
pub use rmm_agent_windows::SERVICE_NAME;
#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))] #[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
mod platform { mod platform {
use crate::helper_ipc as ipc;
use anyhow::{Result, ensure}; use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
use rmm_agent_windows::helper_ipc as ipc;
use serde::Deserialize; use serde::Deserialize;
use serde_json::json; use serde_json::json;
use std::{ use std::{
@@ -35,6 +43,7 @@ mod platform {
const ROOT: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls"; const ROOT: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls";
static CASE: OnceLock<uuid::Uuid> = OnceLock::new(); static CASE: OnceLock<uuid::Uuid> = OnceLock::new();
static IS_PARENT: OnceLock<bool> = OnceLock::new(); static IS_PARENT: OnceLock<bool> = OnceLock::new();
static DIRECT_PEER_PROOF: OnceLock<bool> = OnceLock::new();
static STATUS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0); static STATUS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
fn wide(s: &str) -> Vec<u16> { fn wide(s: &str) -> Vec<u16> {
s.encode_utf16().chain(Some(0)).collect() s.encode_utf16().chain(Some(0)).collect()
@@ -866,6 +875,33 @@ mod platform {
&json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":case,"source":"own_system_fixed_child_controller","result":result,"no_jobs":true,"read_only":true,"token_exported":false}), &json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":case,"source":"own_system_fixed_child_controller","result":result,"no_jobs":true,"read_only":true,"token_exported":false}),
) )
} }
fn direct_peer_proof(case: uuid::Uuid) -> Result<()> {
let identity = token("parent")?;
save(case, "parent-token.json", &identity)?;
let input = read_input(case)?;
let began = Instant::now();
let proof = (|| -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let mut peer = ipc::PeerProof::for_service(&input.pin.agent, input.expected_agent_pid)?;
ensure!(
peer.identity().creation_ticks == input.expected_agent_creation,
"CONTROL_ORIGINAL_AGENT_BIRTH"
);
ensure!(!peer.exited()?, "CONTROL_ORIGINAL_AGENT_EXITED");
peer.check()?;
Ok(serde_json::to_value(peer.identity())?)
})();
let result = match proof {
Ok(actual) => json!({"direct_agent_peer_proof":true,"verified":true,"identity":actual}),
Err(error) => {
json!({"direct_agent_peer_proof":true,"verified":false,"error_codes":codes(&error)})
}
};
save(
case,
"parent-result.json",
&json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":case,"source":"own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof","result":result,"elapsed_ms":began.elapsed().as_millis(),"expected_agent_pid":input.expected_agent_pid,"expected_agent_creation":input.expected_agent_creation,"no_jobs":true,"read_only":true,"pipe_used":false,"token_duplicated":false,"token_exported":false,"service_or_process_acl_changed":false}),
)
}
fn status(state: u32, error: u32) { fn status(state: u32, error: u32) {
let handle = STATUS.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE; let handle = STATUS.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE;
if handle.is_null() { if handle.is_null() {
@@ -911,7 +947,11 @@ mod platform {
STATUS.store(handle as usize, Ordering::SeqCst); STATUS.store(handle as usize, Ordering::SeqCst);
status(SERVICE_RUNNING, 0); status(SERVICE_RUNNING, 0);
let result = if *IS_PARENT.get().unwrap_or(&false) { let result = if *IS_PARENT.get().unwrap_or(&false) {
if *DIRECT_PEER_PROOF.get().unwrap_or(&false) {
direct_peer_proof(*CASE.get().unwrap())
} else {
parent(*CASE.get().unwrap()) parent(*CASE.get().unwrap())
}
} else { } else {
run(*CASE.get().unwrap(), "service") run(*CASE.get().unwrap(), "service")
}; };
@@ -924,7 +964,7 @@ mod platform {
args.len() == 2 args.len() == 2
&& matches!( && matches!(
args[0].as_str(), args[0].as_str(),
"--admin" | "--service" | "--agent-child" | "--parent" "--admin" | "--service" | "--agent-child" | "--parent" | "--peer-proof"
), ),
"CONTROL_FIXED_MODE" "CONTROL_FIXED_MODE"
); );
@@ -940,11 +980,14 @@ mod platform {
return run(case, "child"); return run(case, "child");
} }
IS_PARENT IS_PARENT
.set(args[0] == "--parent") .set(matches!(args[0].as_str(), "--parent" | "--peer-proof"))
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_MODE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
DIRECT_PEER_PROOF
.set(args[0] == "--peer-proof")
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_MODE_ALREADY_SET"))?; .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_MODE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
CASE.set(case) CASE.set(case)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_CASE_ALREADY_SET"))?; .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("CONTROL_CASE_ALREADY_SET"))?;
let mut name = wide(if args[0] == "--parent" { let mut name = wide(if matches!(args[0].as_str(), "--parent" | "--peer-proof") {
PARENT_NAME PARENT_NAME
} else { } else {
NAME NAME
+17 -8
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ $file=Join-Path $version $p.name;$exists=Test-Path -LiteralPath $file;if($exists
''' '''
SCRIPT=r'''$ErrorActionPreference='Stop' SCRIPT=r'''$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
$p=$global:RmmPeerControlPayload $p=$global:RmmPeerControlPayload
if($p.action-notin@('prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback')-or([guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString())-cne$p.id-or$p.binary-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.source-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'){throw 'Fixed control intent'} if($p.action-notin@('prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback')-or([guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString())-cne$p.id-or$p.binary-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.source-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.direct_peer_proof-isnot[bool]){throw 'Fixed control intent'}
if($p.direct_peer_proof-and$p.action-notin@('prepare','parent','cleanup','readback')){throw 'Direct proof case has no child, administrator or LocalService probe'}
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls';$case=Join-Path $root $p.id;$controller=Join-Path $case 'controller';$exe=Join-Path (Join-Path $root $p.binary) 'HelperPeerControls.exe' $root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryPeerControls';$case=Join-Path $root $p.id;$controller=Join-Path $case 'controller';$exe=Join-Path (Join-Path $root $p.binary) 'HelperPeerControls.exe'
$agentName='RmmDiscoveryWindows';$helperName='RmmDiscoverySystemHelper';$name='RmmDiscoveryPeerControl';$parentName='RmmDiscoveryPeerParent' $agentName='RmmDiscoveryWindows';$helperName='RmmDiscoverySystemHelper';$name='RmmDiscoveryPeerControl';$parentName='RmmDiscoveryPeerParent'
$agentSid=(New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount('NT SERVICE',$agentName)).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value $agentSid=(New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount('NT SERVICE',$agentName)).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value
@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ function Baseline {
return [ordered]@{services=$services;private_helper_metadata=$files;agent_config=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');agent_config_sha256=(Hash 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');device_key_metadata=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\state\device.key');helper_public_pin_sha256=(Hash $pin);helper_public_settings_sha256=(Hash $settings);helper_private_bytes_read=$false} return [ordered]@{services=$services;private_helper_metadata=$files;agent_config=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');agent_config_sha256=(Hash 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json');device_key_metadata=(Metadata 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\state\device.key');helper_public_pin_sha256=(Hash $pin);helper_public_settings_sha256=(Hash $settings);helper_private_bytes_read=$false}
} }
function Same($before,$after){if(($before|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)-cne($after|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)){throw 'Original agent/helper or private file metadata changed'}} function Same($before,$after){if(($before|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)-cne($after|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress)){throw 'Original agent/helper or private file metadata changed'}}
function ReadIntent{Check $case $true @($agentSid,$controlSid) @();Check $controller $true @() @();Check (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') $false @() @();$i=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;foreach($field in @('id','binary','source','agent_pid','helper_pid','agent_binary','helper_binary','policy','pin_sha256','control_sid')){if($i.payload.$field-cne$p.$field){throw 'Exact retained control intent'}};return $i} function ReadIntent{Check $case $true @($agentSid,$controlSid) @();Check $controller $true @() @();Check (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') $false @() @();$i=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $controller 'intent.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;foreach($field in @('id','binary','source','agent_pid','helper_pid','agent_binary','helper_binary','policy','pin_sha256','control_sid','direct_peer_proof')){if($i.payload.$field-cne$p.$field){throw 'Exact retained control intent'}};return $i}
if((Hash $exe)-cne$p.binary){throw 'Exact control executable'} if((Hash $exe)-cne$p.binary){throw 'Exact control executable'}
if($p.action-ceq'prepare'){ if($p.action-ceq'prepare'){
if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)-or(Get-Service -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)-or(Get-Service -Name $parentName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)){throw 'No preexisting control case/services'} if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)-or(Get-Service -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)-or(Get-Service -Name $parentName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)){throw 'No preexisting control case/services'}
@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ if($p.action-ceq'admin'){
try{$out=$proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync();$err=$proc.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync();if(!$proc.WaitForExit(20000)){$proc.Kill();$proc.WaitForExit(5000)|Out-Null;throw 'Own administrator probe timeout'};WriteNew (Join-Path $controller 'admin-exit.json') @{pid=$proc.Id;exit_code=$proc.ExitCode;stdout_bytes=$out.Result.Length;stderr_bytes=$err.Result.Length};if($proc.ExitCode-ne0){throw 'Own administrator probe incomplete'}}finally{$proc.Dispose()} try{$out=$proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync();$err=$proc.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync();if(!$proc.WaitForExit(20000)){$proc.Kill();$proc.WaitForExit(5000)|Out-Null;throw 'Own administrator probe timeout'};WriteNew (Join-Path $controller 'admin-exit.json') @{pid=$proc.Id;exit_code=$proc.ExitCode;stdout_bytes=$out.Result.Length;stderr_bytes=$err.Result.Length};if($proc.ExitCode-ne0){throw 'Own administrator probe incomplete'}}finally{$proc.Dispose()}
} }
if($p.action-in@('service','parent')){ if($p.action-in@('service','parent')){
$kind=$p.action;$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id $kind=$p.action;$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}elseif($p.direct_peer_proof){'--peer-proof'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
if(Get-Service -Name $serviceName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue){throw 'Existing control service: readback only'} if(Get-Service -Name $serviceName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue){throw 'Existing control service: readback only'}
WriteNew (Join-Path $controller ($kind+'-start-intent.json')) @{once=$true;service=$serviceName;command=$command;probe_only=$true;no_jobs=$true} WriteNew (Join-Path $controller ($kind+'-start-intent.json')) @{once=$true;service=$serviceName;command=$command;probe_only=$true;no_jobs=$true}
if($kind-ceq'service'){$credential=New-Object Management.Automation.PSCredential('NT AUTHORITY\LocalService',(New-Object Security.SecureString));New-Service -Name $serviceName -BinaryPathName $command -StartupType Manual -Credential $credential|Out-Null} if($kind-ceq'service'){$credential=New-Object Management.Automation.PSCredential('NT AUTHORITY\LocalService',(New-Object Security.SecureString));New-Service -Name $serviceName -BinaryPathName $command -StartupType Manual -Credential $credential|Out-Null}
@@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ if($p.action-in@('service','parent')){
} }
$deadline=[DateTime]::UtcNow.AddSeconds(35) $deadline=[DateTime]::UtcNow.AddSeconds(35)
foreach($kind in @('service','parent')){ foreach($kind in @('service','parent')){
$serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id $serviceName=if($kind-ceq'service'){$name}else{$parentName};$mode=if($kind-ceq'service'){'--service'}elseif($p.direct_peer_proof){'--peer-proof'}else{'--parent'};$command='"'+$exe+'" '+$mode+' '+$p.id
$s=Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter ("Name='"+$serviceName+"'") -OperationTimeoutSec 10 $s=Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter ("Name='"+$serviceName+"'") -OperationTimeoutSec 10
if($s){ if($s){
$expected=if($kind-ceq'service'){'NT AUTHORITY\LocalService'}else{'LocalSystem'} $expected=if($kind-ceq'service'){'NT AUTHORITY\LocalService'}else{'LocalSystem'}
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ def stage(path,name):
return digest return digest
def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case): def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case,direct_peer_proof=False):
manifest=cb.contract.protected_json(manifest_path) manifest=cb.contract.protected_json(manifest_path)
require(manifest['type']=='rmm.windows.helper-peer-controls' and manifest['system_helper_feature'] is True and manifest['source_files']==sources() and helper.sha(manifest['artifact']['path'])==manifest['artifact']['sha256'],'new source-bound control artifact, not old 27-unit proof') require(manifest['type']=='rmm.windows.helper-peer-controls' and manifest['system_helper_feature'] is True and manifest['source_files']==sources() and helper.sha(manifest['artifact']['path'])==manifest['artifact']['sha256'],'new source-bound control artifact, not old 27-unit proof')
index,association,native=helper.current_runtime() index,association,native=helper.current_runtime()
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ def prepare(manifest_path,helper_case):
ident=str(uuid.uuid4());helper.private_dir(STATE);folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) ident=str(uuid.uuid4());helper.private_dir(STATE);folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
source=folder/'PeerControls.ps1';fd=os.open(source,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) source=folder/'PeerControls.ps1';fd=os.open(source,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600)
with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(SCRIPT.encode());out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(SCRIPT.encode());out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno())
payload=dict(id=ident,binary=manifest['artifact']['sha256'],source=hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),control_sid=helper.service_sid(NAME),agent_pid=native['service']['process_id'],helper_pid=6240,agent_binary=index['binary_sha256'],helper_binary=helper.HELPER_SHA,policy=profile['policy_sha256'],pin_sha256=profile['pin_sha256']) payload=dict(id=ident,binary=manifest['artifact']['sha256'],source=hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),control_sid=helper.service_sid(NAME),agent_pid=native['service']['process_id'],helper_pid=6240,agent_binary=index['binary_sha256'],helper_binary=helper.HELPER_SHA,policy=profile['policy_sha256'],pin_sha256=profile['pin_sha256'],direct_peer_proof=bool(direct_peer_proof))
require(payload['agent_pid']==5140,'explicit current accepted agent process; no silent PID adoption') require(payload['agent_pid']==5140,'explicit current accepted agent process; no silent PID adoption')
intent=dict(payload=payload,source_file_sha256=helper.sha(__file__),manifest_path=str(manifest_path.resolve()),manifest_sha256=helper.sha(manifest_path),runtime_index=association,helper_case=helper_case,no_jobs=True) intent=dict(payload=payload,source_file_sha256=helper.sha(__file__),manifest_path=str(manifest_path.resolve()),manifest_sha256=helper.sha(manifest_path),runtime_index=association,helper_case=helper_case,no_jobs=True)
helper.store(folder,'intent.json',intent);helper.store(folder,'prepare-attempt.json',{'create_once':True}) helper.store(folder,'intent.json',intent);helper.store(folder,'prepare-attempt.json',{'create_once':True})
@@ -274,6 +275,14 @@ def summarize(report,payload,ident):
require(report.get('writer_binding_checked') is True,'native owner and exact writer-role checks required') require(report.get('writer_binding_checked') is True,'native owner and exact writer-role checks required')
require(report['original_preserved'] is True and report['own_services_removed'] is True,'original services/files preserved and own stopped services removed') require(report['original_preserved'] is True and report['own_services_removed'] is True,'original services/files preserved and own stopped services removed')
result={'id':ident,'original_preserved':True,'own_services_removed':True,'no_jobs':True,'parent_diagnostic':report['reports'].get('parent-result'),'parent_token':report['reports'].get('parent-token'),'report_trust':report.get('report_trust',{}),'controls':{}} result={'id':ident,'original_preserved':True,'own_services_removed':True,'no_jobs':True,'parent_diagnostic':report['reports'].get('parent-result'),'parent_token':report['reports'].get('parent-token'),'report_trust':report.get('report_trust',{}),'controls':{}}
if payload.get('direct_peer_proof') and report['reports'].get('parent-result'):
value=report['reports']['parent-result'];token=report['reports'].get('parent-token',{})
require(token.get('user_sid')=='S-1-5-18' and token.get('parent_service_sid_enabled') is True,'actual own SYSTEM diagnostic parent')
require(value.get('source')=='own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof' and value.get('case_id')==ident and value.get('expected_agent_pid')==payload['agent_pid'] and value.get('no_jobs') is True and value.get('read_only') is True and value.get('pipe_used') is False and value.get('token_duplicated') is False and value.get('service_or_process_acl_changed') is False,'exact read-only direct proof scope')
require(value['result'].get('direct_agent_peer_proof') is True and isinstance(value['result'].get('verified'),bool),'actual direct proof result, never pipe proof')
if value['result']['verified']:
require(value['result']['identity']['pid']==payload['agent_pid'],'actual original Agent process')
result['direct_agent_peer_proof']=value
for kind in ('admin','service'): for kind in ('admin','service'):
value=report['reports'].get(kind+'-result') value=report['reports'].get(kind+'-result')
if value: if value:
@@ -292,11 +301,11 @@ def summarize(report,payload,ident):
def main(): def main():
p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=['build-local','memory-guard','prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback']);p.add_argument('--manifest',type=Path);p.add_argument('--helper-case');p.add_argument('--id');a=p.parse_args() p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=['build-local','memory-guard','prepare','admin','service','parent','cleanup','readback']);p.add_argument('--manifest',type=Path);p.add_argument('--helper-case');p.add_argument('--id');p.add_argument('--direct-peer-proof',action='store_true',help='New prepare case: own SYSTEM parent only runs the exact production Agent peer proof, no child or pipe');a=p.parse_args()
if a.action=='build-local':build() if a.action=='build-local':build()
elif a.action=='memory-guard': elif a.action=='memory-guard':
value=cb.powershell(MEMORY_GUARD,{},timeout=30);require(value.get('verified') is True and value.get('filesystem_or_acl_mutations') is False,'actual memory-only ACL constructor guard');print(json.dumps(value)) value=cb.powershell(MEMORY_GUARD,{},timeout=30);require(value.get('verified') is True and value.get('filesystem_or_acl_mutations') is False,'actual memory-only ACL constructor guard');print(json.dumps(value))
elif a.action=='prepare':require(a.manifest is not None and a.helper_case is not None,'new control manifest and explicit existing passive helper case required');prepare(a.manifest,a.helper_case) elif a.action=='prepare':require(a.manifest is not None and a.helper_case is not None,'new control manifest and explicit existing passive helper case required');prepare(a.manifest,a.helper_case,a.direct_peer_proof)
else:require(a.id is not None,'existing explicit control case required');run(a.id,a.action) else:require(a.id is not None,'existing explicit control case required');run(a.id,a.action)
@@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ class PeerControlGuards(unittest.TestCase):
pipe['actual_server_pid']=999 pipe['actual_server_pid']=999
with self.assertRaises(Exception):control.summarize(report,payload,ident) with self.assertRaises(Exception):control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
def test_direct_system_proof_is_not_reported_as_a_pipe_control(self):
report,payload,ident=self.fixture();report['reports'].clear();payload['direct_peer_proof']=True
report['reports']['parent-token']={'user_sid':'S-1-5-18','parent_service_sid_enabled':True}
value={'source':'own_system_direct_production_agent_peer_proof','case_id':ident,'expected_agent_pid':5140,'no_jobs':True,'read_only':True,'pipe_used':False,'token_duplicated':False,'service_or_process_acl_changed':False,'result':{'direct_agent_peer_proof':True,'verified':False,'error_codes':['HELPER_SCM_IMAGE_BINDING']}}
report['reports']['parent-result']=value
result=control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
self.assertFalse(result['direct_agent_peer_proof']['result']['verified']);self.assertEqual(result['controls'],{})
value['pipe_used']=True
with self.assertRaises(Exception):control.summarize(report,payload,ident)
def test_lost_service_start_reply_cannot_repeat_service_operation(self): def test_lost_service_start_reply_cannot_repeat_service_operation(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary: with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary:
state=Path(temporary);ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=state/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) state=Path(temporary);ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=state/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
+10
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@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ Zugänge und private Rohbelege bleiben gitignoriert.
## Aktuelle Windowsfortsetzung ## Aktuelle Windowsfortsetzung
Direkter produktiver Prozess-Peerproof im neuen Fall `d792c4c6…` bestanden:
eigener SYSTEM-Parent3992 prüfte unverändert Agent5140 mit tatsächlicher
Startzeit `134390970107200328`, SCM-/Token-/Image-/Dateibindung,20ms. Kein
Pipeaufruf, Child, Token-Duplikat oder ACLwechsel. Originale Prozesse,
Metadaten und Zähler erhalten, eigener Dienst entfernt. Ursprünglicher
SSH-Timeout bleibt dokumentiert; vor expliziter Fortsetzung der ersten noch
nicht erreichten Startphase wurden fehlender Startmarker und fehlender eigener
Dienst nur lesend nachgewiesen. Produktive Agentprobe bleibt fehlgeschlagen,
keine positive Pipeabnahme. [Kontrollbericht](windows-helper-peer-controls.md).
Korrigierter Parentdiagnosefall `00703dab…`, Manifest `869a999c…`/EXE `35dea018…`: Korrigierter Parentdiagnosefall `00703dab…`, Manifest `869a999c…`/EXE `35dea018…`:
tatsächlicher SYSTEM-Parent8256, atomar zugeordneter Child7360 mit Agenttoken, tatsächlicher SYSTEM-Parent8256, atomar zugeordneter Child7360 mit Agenttoken,
Exit0, Originalagent5140 erhalten. Alle fünf Helper-SDK-Vorprüfungen unter SID19/ Exit0, Originalagent5140 erhalten. Alle fünf Helper-SDK-Vorprüfungen unter SID19/
+22
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@@ -65,6 +65,28 @@ ursprüngliche Prozesse/-metadaten, Policies und Windows-/Linuxjobzähler erhalt
Der alte Parentfehler bleibt fehlgeschlagen. Die Ursache der tatsächlichen Der alte Parentfehler bleibt fehlgeschlagen. Die Ursache der tatsächlichen
Agentverbindung ist weiter offen. Agentverbindung ist weiter offen.
Der zusätzliche direkte Peerproof-Fall `d792c4c6-1fd6-4a7f-be3f-1c8e515a68e6`
bestand danach mit Manifest `build-f85a85ab…`, EXE `0a7259bf…` und ursprünglichem
Runner `27feeb82…`. Der eigene SYSTEM-Parent3992 führte den unveränderten
produktiven `PeerProof::for_service` gegen Agent5140 aus: tatsächlicher
LocalService-Token mit Agent-Service-SID, Startzeit `134390970107200328`,
Imagehash `2beed7fa…`, SCM- und gehaltene Datei-/Prozessprüfungen bestanden
in20ms. Kein Pipeaufruf, Child, Token-Duplikat oder ACLwechsel. Das ist ein
positiver direkter Prozessbeleg, weiterhin **keine positive Agent-Pipeabnahme**.
Der eigene Parentdienst wurde nach Stopped entfernt; Originalprozesse,
Metadaten, Policies und beide Jobzähler blieben erhalten.
Der erste SSH-Aufruf dieses Falls verlor nach90s seine Antwort. Readback und
zusätzliche Nur-Lese-Prüfung belegten noch keinen `parent-start-intent.json`,
keinen eigenen Dienst und keine Ergebnisdateien. Erst nach dauerhaftem lokalen
Fortsetzungsintent wurde die noch nicht erreichte erste Startphase im selben
Fall fortgesetzt; ein zusätzlicher entfernter CreateNew-Intent und der bestehende
CreateNew-Startmarker verhindern zwei Starts. Der alte Timeout bleibt erhalten.
Die private Ergänzungsreceipt heißt `first-parent-continuation-result.json`.
Eine frische tatsächliche produktive Agentprobe um05:16UTC blieb zuvor
`HELPER_NOT_AVAILABLE`; weder diese noch der diagnostische Childfehler werden
durch den direkten Peerproof zu Erfolgen umgedeutet.
Der frühere Fall `4a60d264…` bleibt vor jedem Kontrolldienststart fehlgeschlagen. Der frühere Fall `4a60d264…` bleibt vor jedem Kontrolldienststart fehlgeschlagen.
Nach einem verlorenen SSH-Reply bei der Stagingprüfung wurden ausschließlich Nach einem verlorenen SSH-Reply bei der Stagingprüfung wurden ausschließlich
die bereits übertragenen Hashes und das Fehlen eines entfernten Kontrollfalls die bereits übertragenen Hashes und das Fehlen eines entfernten Kontrollfalls