Verify passive Windows time route tooling on the test guest
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,496 @@
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//! Fixed passive development route fixture, never an installed-role or clock proof.
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//! Existing device mTLS material stays on this VM and is never hashed or exported.
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#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
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#[path = "../../agent/src/https_channel.rs"]
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pub mod https_channel;
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#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
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mod probe {
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use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
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use rmm_agent_core::{
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auth::Binding,
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crypto::{DalekVerifier, Ed25519Verifier},
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};
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use rmm_agent_windows::{
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helper_ipc::{self as ipc, PinnedFile},
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native,
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};
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use rmm_time_attestation::{Context, Payload, Request, Role, SignedAttestation};
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use serde_json::{Value, json};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use std::{
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fs::{self, File, OpenOptions},
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io::{Read, Write},
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os::windows::{
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fs::{MetadataExt, OpenOptionsExt},
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io::{FromRawHandle, OwnedHandle},
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},
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path::{Path, PathBuf},
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ptr,
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time::Duration,
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};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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use windows_sys::Win32::{
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Foundation::{ERROR_NO_TOKEN, GetLastError},
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Security::{
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CheckTokenMembership, CreateWellKnownSid, TOKEN_QUERY, WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
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},
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Storage::FileSystem::{
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FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT, FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, FILE_SHARE_READ,
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},
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System::Threading::{GetCurrentThread, OpenThreadToken},
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};
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const ROOT: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\time-route";
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const CONFIG: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json";
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const STATE: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\state";
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const CA: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\server-ca.pem";
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const PEER_PIN: &str = r"C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoverySystem\agent-pin.json";
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const CONFIG_SHA: &str = "7c9f6f3642ef84337c3cd761d8a4788c4babe81522fdd987a3eb9b819bc8d851";
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const PEER_PIN_SHA: &str = "af518db88a6d4a856c32ca9d89d88405689aa2d89163ab0cb638c1abdd8fa118";
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const TIME_PIN_SHA: &str = "c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2";
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const AGENT: &str = "63ea15b2-0643-403d-b5b4-cba1288dbea3";
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const ASSET: &str = "a176520e-8a91-4e93-a78b-8e7620f430e0";
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const SERVER: &str = "discovery.ease-technologies.de";
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const DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"RMM-TIME-ATTESTATION/v1\0";
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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struct FixtureContext {
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schema_version: u32,
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case_id: Uuid,
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connection_generation: u64,
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windows_boot_id: Uuid,
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server_boot_id: Uuid,
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server_context_evidence_sha256: String,
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binding_sha256: String,
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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struct PublicTimePin {
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schema_version: u32,
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algorithm: String,
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server_instance: Uuid,
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key_id: String,
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key_generation: u64,
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public_key_hex: String,
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}
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fn hash(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(bytes))
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}
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fn digest(value: &str) -> bool {
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value.len() == 64
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&& value
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.bytes()
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.all(|v| v.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&v))
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}
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fn hex<const N: usize>(value: &str) -> Result<[u8; N]> {
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ensure!(
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value.len() == 2 * N && value.bytes().all(|v| v.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
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"FIXTURE_HEX"
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);
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let mut out = [0; N];
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for (i, b) in out.iter_mut().enumerate() {
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*b = u8::from_str_radix(&value[i * 2..i * 2 + 2], 16)?;
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}
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Ok(out)
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}
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fn administrator() -> Result<()> {
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let mut thread = ptr::null_mut();
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if unsafe { OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_QUERY, 1, &mut thread) } != 0 {
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let _held = unsafe { OwnedHandle::from_raw_handle(thread) };
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anyhow::bail!("FIXTURE_IMPERSONATION_FORBIDDEN");
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}
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ensure!(
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unsafe { GetLastError() } == ERROR_NO_TOKEN,
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"FIXTURE_THREAD_TOKEN"
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);
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let mut sid = [0usize; 16];
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let mut bytes = std::mem::size_of_val(&sid) as u32;
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ensure!(
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unsafe {
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CreateWellKnownSid(
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WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
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ptr::null_mut(),
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sid.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
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&mut bytes,
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)
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} != 0,
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"FIXTURE_ADMIN_SID"
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);
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let mut enabled = 0;
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ensure!(
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unsafe { CheckTokenMembership(ptr::null_mut(), sid.as_mut_ptr().cast(), &mut enabled) }
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!= 0
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&& enabled != 0,
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"FIXTURE_ADMIN_REQUIRED"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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fn public_read(
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path: &Path,
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maximum: usize,
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readers: &[String],
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) -> Result<(PinnedFile, Vec<u8>)> {
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let mut held = PinnedFile::open(path, false, readers, &[], false)?;
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ensure!(
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held.file.metadata()?.len() <= maximum as u64,
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"FIXTURE_INPUT_LIMIT"
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);
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let mut raw = Vec::new();
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(&mut held.file)
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.take(maximum as u64 + 1)
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.read_to_end(&mut raw)?;
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ensure!(raw.len() <= maximum, "FIXTURE_INPUT_LIMIT");
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held.check()?;
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Ok((held, raw))
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}
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// Do not call sha256() on these credential handles, including on error.
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// Share-read only prevents content replacement/write during the held read.
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fn credential_read(path: &Path, maximum: usize) -> Result<(File, Vec<u8>)> {
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native::private_path(path, false)?;
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let mut held = OpenOptions::new()
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.read(true)
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.share_mode(FILE_SHARE_READ)
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.custom_flags(FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT)
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.open(path)?;
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let before = held.metadata()?;
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ensure!(
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before.is_file()
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&& before.file_attributes() & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT == 0
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&& before.len() <= maximum as u64,
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"FIXTURE_CREDENTIAL_TYPE"
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);
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let identity = ipc::file_identity(&held)?;
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let mut raw = Vec::new();
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(&mut held).take(maximum as u64 + 1).read_to_end(&mut raw)?;
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ensure!(raw.len() <= maximum, "FIXTURE_CREDENTIAL_LIMIT");
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native::private_path(path, false)?;
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let current = OpenOptions::new()
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.read(true)
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.share_mode(FILE_SHARE_READ)
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.custom_flags(FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT)
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.open(path)?;
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ensure!(
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ipc::file_identity(¤t)? == identity && held.metadata()?.len() == before.len(),
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"FIXTURE_CREDENTIAL_REPLACED"
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);
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Ok((held, raw))
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}
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fn create(root: &Path, name: &str, raw: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(raw.len() <= 32768, "FIXTURE_REPORT_LIMIT");
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let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
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.write(true)
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.create_new(true)
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.open(root.join(name))?;
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file.write_all(raw)?;
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file.sync_all()?;
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Ok(())
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}
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fn verify_signed(
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raw: &[u8],
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request: &Request,
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pin: &PublicTimePin,
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context: &FixtureContext,
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) -> Result<Payload> {
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let signed: SignedAttestation = serde_json::from_slice(raw)?;
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ensure!(
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serde_json::to_vec(&signed)? == raw && signed.payload.len() <= 8192,
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"FIXTURE_CANONICAL_RESPONSE"
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);
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ensure!(
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signed.signature_hex.len() == 128
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&& signed
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.signature_hex
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.bytes()
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.all(|v| v.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&v)),
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"FIXTURE_SIGNATURE_FORMAT"
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);
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let payload: Payload = serde_json::from_str(&signed.payload)?;
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ensure!(
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serde_json::to_string(&payload)? == signed.payload,
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"FIXTURE_CANONICAL_PAYLOAD"
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);
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ensure!(
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payload.version == 1
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&& payload.server_instance == pin.server_instance
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&& payload.server_boot_id == context.server_boot_id
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&& payload.key_id == pin.key_id
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&& payload.key_generation == pin.key_generation
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&& payload.request_sha256 == request.sha256()?
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&& payload.captured_utc_ns > 0
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&& payload.server_error_ns <= rmm_time_attestation::MAX_SERVER_ERROR_NS
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&& payload.source_sync_age_ns <= rmm_time_attestation::MAX_SYNC_AGE_NS,
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"FIXTURE_RESPONSE_BINDING"
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);
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let key = hex::<32>(&pin.public_key_hex)?;
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let signature = hex::<64>(&signed.signature_hex)?;
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let mut message = DOMAIN.to_vec();
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message.extend_from_slice(signed.payload.as_bytes());
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ensure!(
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DalekVerifier.validate_key(&key)?
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&& DalekVerifier.verify(&key, &message, &signature)?,
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"FIXTURE_SIGNATURE"
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);
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Ok(payload)
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}
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async fn bounded_response(mut response: reqwest::Response) -> Result<(u16, Vec<u8>)> {
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let status = response.status().as_u16();
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if status == 200 {
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ensure!(
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response
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.headers()
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.get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
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.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
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== Some("application/json"),
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"FIXTURE_RESPONSE_MEDIA"
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);
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}
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ensure!(
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response.content_length().is_none_or(|n| n <= 16384),
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"FIXTURE_RESPONSE_LENGTH"
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);
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let mut raw = Vec::new();
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while let Some(chunk) = response.chunk().await? {
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ensure!(
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raw.len()
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.checked_add(chunk.len())
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.is_some_and(|n| n <= 16384),
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"FIXTURE_RESPONSE_LIMIT"
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);
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raw.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
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}
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Ok((status, raw))
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}
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async fn execute(root: &Path, id: Uuid) -> Result<Value> {
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let mut directory = PinnedFile::open(root, true, &[], &[], false)?;
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let mut root_directory = PinnedFile::open(Path::new(ROOT), true, &[], &[], false)?;
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ensure!(
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std::env::current_exe()?
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.to_string_lossy()
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.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&root.join("TimeRouteProbe.exe").to_string_lossy()),
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"FIXTURE_OWN_EXECUTABLE_PATH"
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);
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let mut leaves = fs::read_dir(root)?
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.map(|v| v.map(|v| v.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned()))
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.collect::<std::io::Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
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leaves.sort();
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ensure!(
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leaves == ["TimeRouteProbe.exe", "context.json", "time-public-key.json"],
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"FIXTURE_CREATE_ONCE_CASE"
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);
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let (mut context_file, context_raw) = public_read(&root.join("context.json"), 4096, &[])?;
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let context: FixtureContext = serde_json::from_slice(&context_raw)?;
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ensure!(
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context.schema_version == 1
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&& context.case_id == id
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&& context.connection_generation > 1
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&& !context.windows_boot_id.is_nil()
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&& !context.server_boot_id.is_nil()
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&& digest(&context.server_context_evidence_sha256)
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&& digest(&context.binding_sha256),
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"FIXTURE_ROOT_CONTEXT"
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);
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let (mut time_file, time_raw) = public_read(&root.join("time-public-key.json"), 4096, &[])?;
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ensure!(
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hash(&time_raw) == TIME_PIN_SHA,
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"FIXTURE_REAL_PUBLIC_TIME_PIN"
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);
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let pin: PublicTimePin = serde_json::from_slice(&time_raw)?;
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ensure!(
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pin.schema_version == 1
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&& pin.algorithm == "Ed25519"
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&& !pin.server_instance.is_nil()
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&& pin.key_generation > 0
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&& !pin.key_id.is_empty()
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&& pin.key_id.len() <= 64
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&& pin
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.key_id
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.bytes()
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.all(|v| v.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || v == b'-' || v == b'_')
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&& digest(&pin.public_key_hex),
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"FIXTURE_PUBLIC_TIME_PROFILE"
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);
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let agent_sid = native::service_sid()?;
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// The protected peer-pin has read ACEs for both fixed installed services.
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let helper_sid = ipc::service_sid("RmmDiscoverySystemHelper")?;
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let (mut peer_file, peer_raw) =
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public_read(Path::new(PEER_PIN), 16384, &[agent_sid, helper_sid])?;
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ensure!(hash(&peer_raw) == PEER_PIN_SHA, "FIXTURE_ORIGINAL_PEER_PIN");
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let peer: ipc::Pin = serde_json::from_slice(&peer_raw)?;
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peer.validate()?;
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let binding: Binding = peer.binding;
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ensure!(
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binding.agent_id.to_string() == AGENT
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&& binding.asset_id.to_string() == ASSET
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&& hash(&serde_json::to_vec(&binding)?) == context.binding_sha256,
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"FIXTURE_EXISTING_DEVICE_BINDING"
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);
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ensure!(
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hex::<32>(&pin.public_key_hex)? != hex::<32>(&binding.public_key_hex)?,
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"FIXTURE_TIME_JOB_KEY_REUSE"
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);
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let (config_handle, config_raw) = credential_read(Path::new(CONFIG), 4096)?;
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ensure!(
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hash(&config_raw) == CONFIG_SHA,
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"FIXTURE_ORIGINAL_PASSIVE_CONFIG"
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);
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let config: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&config_raw)?;
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ensure!(
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config["server_name"] == SERVER
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&& config["connect_address"] == "88.99.80.202:443"
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&& config["state_directory"] == STATE
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&& config["ca_file"] == CA
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&& config["transport"] == "auto",
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"FIXTURE_CONFIG_ENDPOINT"
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);
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create(
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root,
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"intent.json",
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&serde_json::to_vec(&json!({"case_id":id,"run_once":true,
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"context_sha256":hash(&context_raw),"public_time_pin_sha256":TIME_PIN_SHA,
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"route":rmm_time_attestation::ENDPOINT,"no_jobs":true,"clock_proof":false}))?,
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)?;
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let (ca_handle, ca) = credential_read(Path::new(CA), 32768)?;
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let state = Path::new(STATE);
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let (certificate_handle, certificate) = credential_read(&state.join("device.pem"), 32768)?;
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let (private_handle, mut private_key) = credential_read(&state.join("device.key"), 16384)?;
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let client = crate::https_channel::mtls_client(
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"88.99.80.202:443".parse()?,
|
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&ca,
|
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&certificate,
|
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&private_key,
|
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)?;
|
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private_key.fill(0);
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drop(private_key); // Private bytes never enter any JSON, digest or report.
|
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let incarnation = Uuid::new_v4();
|
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let mut reports = Vec::new();
|
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for kind in ["positive-agent", "tenant-mismatch", "stale-connection"] {
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let mut request = Request {
|
||||
version: 1,
|
||||
endpoint: rmm_time_attestation::ENDPOINT.into(),
|
||||
nonce: rand::random::<[u8; 32]>()
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|v| format!("{v:02x}"))
|
||||
.collect(),
|
||||
context: Context {
|
||||
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
|
||||
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
|
||||
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
|
||||
enrollment_generation: binding.enrollment_generation,
|
||||
assignment_generation: binding.assignment_version,
|
||||
connection_generation: context.connection_generation,
|
||||
windows_boot_id: context.windows_boot_id,
|
||||
verifier_incarnation: incarnation,
|
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role: Role::Agent,
|
||||
helper_image_sha256: None,
|
||||
binding_schema: 1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
if kind == "tenant-mismatch" {
|
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request.context.tenant_id =
|
||||
Uuid::parse_str("22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222")?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
request.context.tenant_id != binding.tenant_id,
|
||||
"FIXTURE_FOREIGN_TENANT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if kind == "stale-connection" {
|
||||
request.context.connection_generation -= 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
request.validate()?;
|
||||
if kind == "positive-agent" {
|
||||
create(
|
||||
root,
|
||||
"positive-request.json",
|
||||
&serde_json::to_vec(&request)?,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let (status, raw) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), async {
|
||||
let response = client
|
||||
.post("https://discovery.ease-technologies.de:443/agent/v1/time-attestation")
|
||||
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(3))
|
||||
.json(&request)
|
||||
.send()
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
bounded_response(response).await
|
||||
})
|
||||
.await??;
|
||||
let mut report = json!({"kind":kind,"http_status":status,"response_bytes":raw.len(),"response_sha256":hash(&raw),"request_sha256":request.sha256()?});
|
||||
if kind == "positive-agent" {
|
||||
create(root, "positive-response.json", &raw)?;
|
||||
ensure!(status == 200, "FIXTURE_POSITIVE_STATUS");
|
||||
let payload = verify_signed(&raw, &request, &pin, &context)?;
|
||||
report["signature_verified"] = true.into();
|
||||
report["whole_request_context_bound"] = true.into();
|
||||
report["server_boot_id"] = payload.server_boot_id.to_string().into();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
status == if kind == "tenant-mismatch" { 403 } else { 409 },
|
||||
"FIXTURE_NEGATIVE_STATUS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
create(
|
||||
root,
|
||||
&format!("{kind}-result.json"),
|
||||
&serde_json::to_vec(&report)?,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
reports.push(report);
|
||||
}
|
||||
context_file.check()?;
|
||||
time_file.check()?;
|
||||
peer_file.check()?;
|
||||
directory.check()?;
|
||||
root_directory.check()?;
|
||||
drop((config_handle, ca_handle, certificate_handle, private_handle));
|
||||
let report = json!({"schema_version":1,"case_id":id,"verified":true,"execution_context":"bootstrap_administrator_protocol_probe",
|
||||
"endpoint":rmm_time_attestation::ENDPOINT,"reports":reports,"shared_existing_device_mtls":true,
|
||||
"private_key_exported":false,"private_key_hashed":false,"private_key_copied_to_evidence":false,
|
||||
"certificate_verification_disabled":false,"service_role_proven":false,"trusted_clock_proven":false,
|
||||
"clock_freshness_qualified":false,"sync_ready":false,"jobs_created":false,"grants_created":false,
|
||||
"context_sha256":hash(&context_raw),"server_context_evidence_sha256":context.server_context_evidence_sha256,
|
||||
"public_time_pin_sha256":TIME_PIN_SHA});
|
||||
create(root, "report.json", &serde_json::to_vec(&report)?)?;
|
||||
Ok(report)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn run() -> Result<Value> {
|
||||
administrator()?;
|
||||
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
args.len() == 2 && args[0] == "probe",
|
||||
"FIXTURE_FIXED_ARGUMENTS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let id = Uuid::parse_str(&args[1])?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!id.is_nil() && id.to_string() == args[1],
|
||||
"FIXTURE_CANONICAL_CASE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Before any async runtime/threads, force the one verified DNS identity.
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
std::env::set_var("RMM_SERVER_NAME", SERVER);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
|
||||
.enable_all()
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
runtime.block_on(execute(&PathBuf::from(ROOT).join(id.to_string()), id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(all(windows, feature = "system-helper"))]
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
match probe::run() {
|
||||
Ok(value) => println!("{value}"),
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"{}",
|
||||
serde_json::json!({"verified":false,"code":"WINDOWS_TIME_ROUTE_FIXTURE_INCOMPLETE","service_role_proven":false,"trusted_clock_proven":false})
|
||||
);
|
||||
std::process::exit(2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(not(all(windows, feature = "system-helper")))]
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
eprintln!("Fixed time route fixture requires native Windows and system-helper build");
|
||||
std::process::exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Fixed once-only passive route fixture operator. All target phases initially closed."""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
import signed_clock_capture_acceptance as original
|
||||
import time_route_context as collector
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT=original.ROOT
|
||||
STATE=ROOT/'devstate/windows-time-route-native'
|
||||
QUAL=ROOT/'devstate/windows-signed-clock/time-route-fixture-qualification-3fdf513e-197b-41ab-b161-9dfc2adc94da'
|
||||
RECEIPT_SHA='fce8c42cce33a35be1ee0468c97010ac3797a713668503783e449d30ea538678'
|
||||
EXE_SHA='4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088'
|
||||
EXE_BYTES=19172660
|
||||
PIN=ROOT/'devstate/server-time-source-bootstrap/qualified-time-public-key.json'
|
||||
PIN_SHA='c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2'
|
||||
# Root pins {id, receipt_sha256} only after the actual post-deploy collector read.
|
||||
CONTEXT_GATE=None
|
||||
require,save,load,sha=original.require,original.save,original.load,original.sha
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT=r'''$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine()|ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if(!$p-or$p.action-isnot[string]-or$p.action-cnotin@('stage','run','read')-or[guid]::ParseExact($p.id,'D').ToString()-cne$p.id){throw 'Exact route action/case'}
|
||||
if((($p.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'action,context_base64,context_sha256,id,manifest_sha256,pin_base64'-or$p.context_sha256-cnotmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$p.manifest_sha256-cnotmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'){throw 'Fixed route payload'}
|
||||
$base='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap';$root=Join-Path $base 'time-route';$controlRoot=Join-Path $base 'time-route-control';$case=Join-Path $root $p.id;$control=Join-Path $controlRoot $p.id
|
||||
$exe=Join-Path $case 'TimeRouteProbe.exe';$source=Join-Path (Join-Path $base '4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088') 'TimeRouteProbe.exe'
|
||||
function Check($path,[bool]$directory){$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force;if($i.PSIsContainer-ne$directory-or($i.Attributes-band[IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint)){throw 'Protected regular route path'};$parent=$i.Directory;if($directory){$parent=$i.Parent};while($null-ne$parent){if($parent.Attributes-band[IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint){throw 'No route reparse ancestry'};$parent=$parent.Parent};$a=Get-Acl -LiteralPath $path;if($a.GetOwner([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value-cnotin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')){throw 'Route owner'};$rules=@($a.GetAccessRules($true,$true,[Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]));if(!$rules.Count){throw 'Route empty DACL'};foreach($r in $rules){if($r.AccessControlType-ne'Allow'-or$r.IdentityReference.Value-cnotin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')){throw 'Route DACL'}}}
|
||||
function Get-RmmRouteBytesSha256([byte[]]$raw){$h=[Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create();try{return([BitConverter]::ToString($h.ComputeHash($raw))).Replace('-','').ToLowerInvariant()}finally{$h.Dispose()}}
|
||||
function FH($path){Check $path $false;return(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()}
|
||||
function WriteNew($path,[byte[]]$raw){if($raw.Length-gt32768){throw 'Route record bound'};$f=[IO.File]::Open($path,'CreateNew','Write','Read');try{$f.Write($raw,0,$raw.Length);$f.Flush($true)}finally{$f.Dispose()}}
|
||||
function Record($name,$value){WriteNew (Join-Path $control $name) ([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($value|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 20 -Compress)))}
|
||||
function DirectoryNew($path){New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $path|Out-Null;$a=New-Object Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity;$a.SetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm('O:BAG:BAD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)');Set-Acl -LiteralPath $path -AclObject $a;Check $path $true}
|
||||
function ReadOwn{
|
||||
$records=[ordered]@{};if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $control){Check $control $true;foreach($name in @('stage-intent.json','stage-complete.json','run-attempt.json','process.json','exit.json','stdout.txt','stderr.txt')){$path=Join-Path $control $name;if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $path){Check $path $false;$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $path;if($i.Length-gt32768){throw 'Bounded own control read'};$records[$name]=[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path))}}}
|
||||
if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $case){Check $case $true;foreach($name in @('intent.json','report.json','positive-request.json','positive-response.json','positive-agent-result.json','tenant-mismatch-result.json','stale-connection-result.json')){$path=Join-Path $case $name;if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $path){Check $path $false;if((Get-Item -LiteralPath $path).Length-gt32768){throw 'Bounded own result read'};$records[$name]=[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path))}}}
|
||||
return @{id=$p.id;read_only=$true;records=$records;manifest_sha256=$p.manifest_sha256}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Check $base $true
|
||||
if($p.action-ceq'read'){ReadOwn|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 20 -Compress;exit 0}
|
||||
$context=[Convert]::FromBase64String($p.context_base64);$pin=[Convert]::FromBase64String($p.pin_base64)
|
||||
if($context.Length-gt4096-or(Get-RmmRouteBytesSha256 $context)-cne$p.context_sha256-or$pin.Length-gt4096-or(Get-RmmRouteBytesSha256 $pin)-cne'c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2'){throw 'Exact actual public route inputs'}
|
||||
$c=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($context)|ConvertFrom-Json;if($c.case_id-cne$p.id){throw 'Actual context own case'}
|
||||
if($p.action-ceq'stage'){
|
||||
if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $control)){throw 'Original route stage exists; read only'}
|
||||
foreach($directory in @($root,$controlRoot)){if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $directory){Check $directory $true}else{DirectoryNew $directory}}
|
||||
DirectoryNew $control;Record 'stage-intent.json' @{id=$p.id;manifest_sha256=$p.manifest_sha256;context_sha256=$p.context_sha256;once=$true}
|
||||
DirectoryNew $case
|
||||
if((FH $source)-cne'4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088'-or(Get-Item -LiteralPath $source).Length-ne19172660){throw 'Exact route EXE source'}
|
||||
[IO.File]::Copy($source,$exe,$false);$f=[IO.File]::Open($exe,'Open','ReadWrite','Read');try{$f.Flush($true)}finally{$f.Dispose()}
|
||||
WriteNew (Join-Path $case 'context.json') $context;WriteNew (Join-Path $case 'time-public-key.json') $pin
|
||||
if((FH $exe)-cne'4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088'-or(FH (Join-Path $case 'context.json'))-cne$p.context_sha256-or(FH (Join-Path $case 'time-public-key.json'))-cne'c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2'){throw 'Actual own staged inputs'}
|
||||
Record 'stage-complete.json' @{id=$p.id;manifest_sha256=$p.manifest_sha256;context_sha256=$p.context_sha256;staged=$true}
|
||||
@{id=$p.id;staged=$true;manifest_sha256=$p.manifest_sha256}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
if($p.action-cne'run'){throw 'Exact run required before process start'}
|
||||
Check $case $true;Check $control $true;Check (Join-Path $control 'stage-complete.json') $false
|
||||
$stage=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $control 'stage-complete.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json
|
||||
if($stage.id-cne$p.id-or$stage.manifest_sha256-cne$p.manifest_sha256-or$stage.context_sha256-cne$p.context_sha256-or$stage.staged-ne$true){throw 'Original completed route stage'}
|
||||
if((FH $exe)-cne'4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088'-or(FH (Join-Path $case 'context.json'))-cne$p.context_sha256-or(FH (Join-Path $case 'time-public-key.json'))-cne'c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2'){throw 'Immediate original route input CAS'}
|
||||
Record 'run-attempt.json' @{id=$p.id;manifest_sha256=$p.manifest_sha256;once=$true;no_retry=$true}
|
||||
$start=New-Object Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo;$start.FileName=$exe;$start.Arguments='probe '+$p.id;$start.UseShellExecute=$false;$start.CreateNoWindow=$true;$start.RedirectStandardOutput=$true;$start.RedirectStandardError=$true
|
||||
$process=New-Object Diagnostics.Process;$process.StartInfo=$start;if(!$process.Start()){throw 'Own route probe start failed; read only'}
|
||||
try{$held=$process.Handle;$birth=$process.StartTime.ToUniversalTime().ToFileTimeUtc().ToString();Record 'process.json' @{id=$p.id;pid=$process.Id;birth=$birth;held_kernel_handle=$true;exe_sha256='4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088'}
|
||||
$output=$process.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync();$errors=$process.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync();$timedOut=!$process.WaitForExit(20000)
|
||||
if($timedOut){$process.Kill();if(!$process.WaitForExit(5000)){throw 'Own held route process exit uncertain'}}
|
||||
if(!$output.Wait(5000)-or!$errors.Wait(5000)){throw 'Own route pipe drain uncertain'};$stdout=$output.Result;$stderr=$errors.Result
|
||||
if($stdout.Length-gt32768-or$stderr.Length-gt32768){throw 'Bounded fixed route output'}
|
||||
WriteNew (Join-Path $control 'stdout.txt') ([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($stdout));WriteNew (Join-Path $control 'stderr.txt') ([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($stderr))
|
||||
Record 'exit.json' @{id=$p.id;pid=$process.Id;birth=$birth;kernel_process_exited=$process.HasExited;exit_code=$process.ExitCode;timed_out=$timedOut}
|
||||
if($timedOut-or$process.ExitCode-ne0-or$stderr.Length){throw 'Actual route probe did not complete successfully; original read only'}
|
||||
ReadOwn|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 20 -Compress
|
||||
}finally{$process.Dispose()}
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def guards():
|
||||
require(original.sha(ROOT/'deploy/windows/signed_clock_capture_acceptance.py')=='dd6c575a119751429448e40e6f306cf79efa3a86c49bf2cd32a7783937177770','fixed prior witnesses')
|
||||
require("$p.action-isnot[string]-or$p.action-cnotin@('stage','run','read')" in SCRIPT
|
||||
and "if($p.action-cne'run'){throw 'Exact run required before process start'}" in SCRIPT,'no action case fallthrough')
|
||||
require(all(v not in SCRIPT for v in ('Start-Service','Stop-Service','Restart-Service','Remove-Item','Invoke-Expression','Bypass','Snapshot','TimeBegin')),'own files/process only')
|
||||
require(sha(QUAL/'receipt.json')==RECEIPT_SHA and sha(QUAL/'TimeRouteProbe.exe')==EXE_SHA
|
||||
and (QUAL/'TimeRouteProbe.exe').stat().st_size==EXE_BYTES and sha(PIN)==PIN_SHA,'exact actual qualified artifacts and public time key')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def gate():
|
||||
require(isinstance(CONTEXT_GATE,dict) and set(CONTEXT_GATE)=={'id','receipt_sha256'},'ACTUAL_CONTEXT_GATE_NOT_BOUND')
|
||||
ident=CONTEXT_GATE['id'];require(str(uuid.UUID(ident))==ident,'actual canonical context case')
|
||||
folder=collector.STATE/ident;receipt=load(folder/'receipt.json')
|
||||
require(sha(folder/'receipt.json')==CONTEXT_GATE['receipt_sha256'] and receipt['id']==ident
|
||||
and receipt['collector_sha256']==sha(Path(collector.__file__)) and receipt['read_only'] is True
|
||||
and sha(folder/'response.json')==receipt['response_sha256'] and sha(folder/'context.json')==receipt['context_sha256'],
|
||||
'original actual postdeploy read context only')
|
||||
return ident,folder,receipt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def prepare():
|
||||
guards();ident,context,receipt=gate();STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True);folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
for name,path in [('TimeRouteProbe.exe',QUAL/'TimeRouteProbe.exe'),('time-public-key.json',PIN),('context.json',context/'context.json')]:original.write(folder/name,path.read_bytes())
|
||||
original.write(folder/'TimeRouteAcceptance.ps1',SCRIPT.encode())
|
||||
save(folder/'manifest.json',dict(id=ident,operator_sha256=sha(__file__),script_sha256=hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),
|
||||
fixture_receipt_sha256=RECEIPT_SHA,exe_sha256=EXE_SHA,pin_sha256=PIN_SHA,context_gate=CONTEXT_GATE,
|
||||
context_sha256=sha(folder/'context.json'),context_response_sha256=receipt['response_sha256'],dependencies=original.dependencies()))
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident,prepared_locally=True)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def case(ident):
|
||||
require(str(uuid.UUID(ident))==ident,'original case only');folder=STATE/ident;manifest=load(folder/'manifest.json')
|
||||
require(manifest['id']==ident and manifest['operator_sha256']==sha(__file__)
|
||||
and manifest['script_sha256']==hashlib.sha256(SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest()
|
||||
and manifest['dependencies']==original.dependencies() and sha(folder/'TimeRouteProbe.exe')==EXE_SHA
|
||||
and sha(folder/'context.json')==manifest['context_sha256'] and sha(folder/'time-public-key.json')==PIN_SHA,'exact original prepared case')
|
||||
return folder,manifest
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def stage_exe(access,folder):
|
||||
name='TimeRouteProbe.exe';prepare=original.pipe.u.transport.PREPARE_SCRIPT.replace('TransportAcceptance.ps1',name)
|
||||
observed=access.powershell(prepare,dict(sha256=EXE_SHA))
|
||||
if not observed['already_uploaded']:
|
||||
credentials=original.pipe.cb.contract.protected_json(access.root/'credentials/windows-dev-access.json');prefix=credentials['ssh_prefix']
|
||||
argv=['sftp']+[v for v in prefix[1:-1] if v!='-T']+['-b','-',prefix[-1]]
|
||||
target='/C:/ProgramData/RustDiscoveryBootstrap/'+EXE_SHA+'/'+name
|
||||
result=subprocess.run(argv,input=('put '+json.dumps(str(folder/name))+' '+json.dumps(target)+'\n').encode(),capture_output=True,timeout=60)
|
||||
save(folder/('transfer-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),dict(returncode=result.returncode,stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(result.stdout).decode(),stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(result.stderr).decode()))
|
||||
require(result.returncode==0,'one exact route EXE transfer; lost reply read only')
|
||||
observed=access.powershell(prepare,dict(sha256=EXE_SHA));require(observed['already_uploaded'] is True and observed['sha256']==EXE_SHA,'actual immutable EXE stage')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validate(response,manifest):
|
||||
records=response['records'];require('report.json' in records and 'exit.json' in records,'actual report and kernel exit required')
|
||||
report=json.loads(base64.b64decode(records['report.json'],validate=True));exited=json.loads(base64.b64decode(records['exit.json'],validate=True))
|
||||
require(exited['kernel_process_exited'] is True and exited['exit_code']==0 and exited['timed_out'] is False
|
||||
and report['context_sha256']==manifest['context_sha256'] and report['server_context_evidence_sha256']==manifest['context_response_sha256']
|
||||
and report['verified'] is True and report['case_id']==response['id'] and report['public_time_pin_sha256']==PIN_SHA
|
||||
and [v['http_status'] for v in report['reports']]==[200,403,409]
|
||||
and report['reports'][0]['signature_verified'] is True and report['reports'][0]['whole_request_context_bound'] is True
|
||||
and all(report[key] is False for key in ('private_key_exported','private_key_hashed','private_key_copied_to_evidence',
|
||||
'certificate_verification_disabled','service_role_proven','trusted_clock_proven','clock_freshness_qualified','sync_ready','jobs_created','grants_created')),
|
||||
'actual passive signature/context route only, no role/clock/job claim')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run(action,ident):
|
||||
guards();folder,manifest=case(ident);access=original.CaptureAccess(original.ACCESS_ROOT)
|
||||
operation='read-'+str(uuid.uuid4()) if action=='read' else action
|
||||
require(action in ('stage','run','read'),'fixed local action')
|
||||
if action=='run':
|
||||
stage=load(folder/'stage-reply.json');proof=load(folder/'stage-preservation.json')
|
||||
require(stage.get('staged') is True and stage['id']==ident and stage['manifest_sha256']==sha(folder/'manifest.json')
|
||||
and proof['id']==ident and proof['operation_id']=='stage' and proof['action']=='stage' and proof['read_only'] is False
|
||||
and proof['operator_sha256']==sha(__file__) and proof['manifest_sha256']==sha(folder/'manifest.json')
|
||||
and proof['raw_reply']==dict(filename='stage-reply.json',sha256=sha(folder/'stage-reply.json')),'original complete linked stage before the single run')
|
||||
for name in ('server','native'):
|
||||
link=proof[name+'_witness'];require(link['filename']=='stage-'+name+'.json' and sha(folder/link['filename'])==link['sha256'],'original stage witness links')
|
||||
if action!='read':
|
||||
gate_id,context,receipt=gate();require(gate_id==ident and manifest['context_gate']==CONTEXT_GATE,'actual original sealed context gate')
|
||||
fresh=collector.rpc(access,dict(id=ident,deployment_result_sha256=receipt['deployment_result_sha256'],image=collector.IMAGE),folder)
|
||||
require(fresh==load(context/'response.json'),'actual current DB boot/generation/gateway still exact before action')
|
||||
save(folder/(operation+'-attempt.json'),dict(action=action,once=True,no_retry=True,operator_sha256=sha(__file__)))
|
||||
else:save(folder/(operation+'-intent.json'),dict(action='read',read_only=True,operator_sha256=sha(__file__)))
|
||||
before_server,before_native=original.server_closed(access),original.native_witness(access)
|
||||
baseline=folder/'baseline.json'
|
||||
if not baseline.exists():save(baseline,dict(server=before_server,native=before_native))
|
||||
original.preserved(load(baseline)['native'],before_native);require(load(baseline)['server']==before_server,'same original closed server scope')
|
||||
if action=='stage':stage_exe(access,folder)
|
||||
payload=dict(action=action,id=ident,manifest_sha256=sha(folder/'manifest.json'),context_sha256=manifest['context_sha256'],
|
||||
context_base64=base64.b64encode((folder/'context.json').read_bytes()).decode(),pin_base64=base64.b64encode((folder/'time-public-key.json').read_bytes()).decode())
|
||||
response=access.powershell(SCRIPT,payload,timeout=90)
|
||||
raw=folder/(operation+'-reply.json');save(raw,response) # raw first, before outcome/witness assertions
|
||||
after_server,after_native=original.server_closed(access),original.native_witness(access)
|
||||
require(before_server==after_server,'closed server gates and counters preserved');original.preserved(before_native,after_native)
|
||||
binding=dict(id=ident,operation_id=operation,action=action,read_only=action=='read',operator_sha256=sha(__file__),
|
||||
raw_reply=dict(filename=raw.name,sha256=sha(raw)),manifest_sha256=sha(folder/'manifest.json'))
|
||||
server=folder/(operation+'-server.json');native=folder/(operation+'-native.json')
|
||||
save(server,dict(binding,before=before_server,after=after_server));save(native,dict(binding,before=before_native,after=after_native))
|
||||
save(folder/(operation+'-preservation.json'),dict(binding,server_witness=dict(filename=server.name,sha256=sha(server)),
|
||||
native_witness=dict(filename=native.name,sha256=sha(native)),no_rmm_jobs=True,no_service_action=True))
|
||||
require(response['id']==ident and response['manifest_sha256']==sha(folder/'manifest.json'),'same original route case response')
|
||||
if action=='stage':require(response['staged'] is True,'actual complete stage')
|
||||
elif action=='run' or 'report.json' in response.get('records',{}):validate(response,manifest)
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident,action=action,preserved=True,completed='report.json' in response.get('records',{}),read_only=action=='read')))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':
|
||||
p=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);p.add_argument('action',choices=('guards','prepare','stage','run','read'));p.add_argument('--case');a=p.parse_args()
|
||||
if a.action=='guards':guards();print('PASS source guards; no target call')
|
||||
elif a.action=='prepare':require(a.case is None,'actual sealed context determines own case');prepare()
|
||||
else:require(a.case is not None,'original case required');run(a.action,a.case)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""One fixed post-deployment public context read. No SQL/HTTP writes or secrets."""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
import signed_clock_capture_acceptance as original
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT=original.ROOT
|
||||
STATE=ROOT/'devstate/windows-time-route-context'
|
||||
# Root binds the actual successful deployment result SHA after its separate read.
|
||||
DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA=None
|
||||
DEPLOYMENT_PATH='/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/time-gateway-deploy-fb87aa88-2b67-4cff-9c90-4cd713380889/result.json'
|
||||
IMAGE='sha256:422c2c28a91ac512e9317908f4d1fb22247eef857ca95d45e1b1880598b0d611'
|
||||
BINDING_SHA='05c5678fed81e0a2a7cdaaeaf18c64f9837cfbe76c140699a47306c9b4598a18'
|
||||
require,save,load,sha=original.require,original.save,original.load,original.sha
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def server_read(p):
|
||||
import hashlib,json,os,stat,subprocess,uuid
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
def need(v):
|
||||
if not v:raise RuntimeError('FIXED_READONLY_CONTEXT_INCOMPLETE')
|
||||
need(set(p)=={'id','deployment_result_sha256','image'})
|
||||
need(str(uuid.UUID(p['id']))==p['id'] and isinstance(p['deployment_result_sha256'],str) and len(p['deployment_result_sha256'])==64
|
||||
and all(v in '0123456789abcdef' for v in p['deployment_result_sha256'])
|
||||
and p['image']=='sha256:422c2c28a91ac512e9317908f4d1fb22247eef857ca95d45e1b1880598b0d611')
|
||||
path=Path('/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/time-gateway-deploy-fb87aa88-2b67-4cff-9c90-4cd713380889/result.json')
|
||||
metadata=path.lstat();need(stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_uid==0 and metadata.st_nlink==1
|
||||
and stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode)==0o600 and metadata.st_size<=65536)
|
||||
def identity(m):return(m.st_dev,m.st_ino,m.st_mode,m.st_uid,m.st_gid,m.st_nlink,m.st_size,m.st_mtime_ns,m.st_ctime_ns)
|
||||
raw=path.read_bytes();need(identity(path.lstat())==identity(metadata) and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==p['deployment_result_sha256'])
|
||||
deployed=json.loads(raw);need(deployed['deployed'] is True and deployed['rmm_jobs_created'] is False
|
||||
and deployed['approvals_created'] is False and deployed['gateway_only_readonly_broker_mount'] is True)
|
||||
def command(args,data=None):
|
||||
r=subprocess.run(args,input=data,stdin=None,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=10)
|
||||
need(r.returncode==0 and len(r.stdout)<=65536 and len(r.stderr)<=65536);return r.stdout
|
||||
def gateway():
|
||||
value=json.loads(command(['docker','inspect','rust-discovery-server-gateway-1','--format',
|
||||
'[{{json .Id}},{{json .Image}},{{json .Config.User}},{{json .State.Running}},{{json .HostConfig.PidMode}}]']))
|
||||
need(value[1]==p['image'] and value[2]=='10001:10001' and value[3] is True and value[4]!='host');return value
|
||||
boot=Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip();need(str(uuid.UUID(boot))==boot)
|
||||
before=gateway()
|
||||
query=("BEGIN TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ READ ONLY; SET LOCAL statement_timeout='3s'; "
|
||||
"SELECT json_build_object('tenant_id',tenant_id,'agent_id',agent_id,'asset_id',asset_id,"
|
||||
"'enrollment_generation',enrollment_generation,'assignment_generation',assignment_version,"
|
||||
"'connection_generation',connection_generation,'windows_boot_id',connection_boot_id,'capabilities',capabilities) "
|
||||
"FROM agent_installations WHERE tenant_id='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111' "
|
||||
"AND agent_id='63ea15b2-0643-403d-b5b4-cba1288dbea3' AND revoked_at IS NULL; COMMIT;")
|
||||
raw=command(['docker','exec','-i','rust-discovery-server-postgres-1','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm'],query.encode())
|
||||
row=json.loads(raw)
|
||||
need(row['tenant_id']=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111' and row['agent_id']=='63ea15b2-0643-403d-b5b4-cba1288dbea3'
|
||||
and row['asset_id']=='a176520e-8a91-4e93-a78b-8e7620f430e0' and row['enrollment_generation']==1
|
||||
and row['assignment_generation']==1 and type(row['connection_generation']) is int and row['connection_generation']>1
|
||||
and str(uuid.UUID(row['windows_boot_id']))==row['windows_boot_id'] and 'windows.base/1' in row['capabilities'])
|
||||
need(before==gateway() and Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==boot)
|
||||
return dict(profile='rmm.windows.time-route.actual-public-context.v1',id=p['id'],server_boot_id=boot,
|
||||
installation=row,gateway=before,deployment_result_sha256=p['deployment_result_sha256'],sql_read_only=True,secrets_read=False)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def rpc(access,payload,folder):
|
||||
# Same strict Main SSH configuration parser as CaptureAccess.server; never source/eval.
|
||||
cloud=original.pipe.u.transport.cloud
|
||||
cfg=cloud.bootstrap.access.load_config(access.root/'credentials/server.conf')
|
||||
prefix=['ssh','-F','/dev/null','-T','-p',cfg.get('port','22'),'-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','-o','BatchMode=yes',
|
||||
'-o','IdentitiesOnly=yes','-o','ForwardAgent=no','-o','ConnectTimeout=10','-i',str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()),cfg['username']+'@'+cfg['address'],'python3 -']
|
||||
code=inspect.getsource(server_read)+'\nimport json\nprint(json.dumps(server_read('+repr(payload)+')))\n'
|
||||
r=subprocess.run(prefix,input=code.encode(),capture_output=True,timeout=30)
|
||||
save(folder/('transport-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),dict(returncode=r.returncode,stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(r.stdout).decode(),stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(r.stderr).decode()))
|
||||
require(r.returncode==0 and len(r.stdout)<=65536,'bounded actual context transport; original read only')
|
||||
return json.loads(r.stdout,object_pairs_hook=original.pipe.cb.contract.strict_object)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def collect():
|
||||
require(type(DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA) is str and re.fullmatch('[0-9a-f]{64}',DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA) is not None,'ACTUAL_DEPLOYMENT_GATE_NOT_BOUND')
|
||||
original.original_main();STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True,exist_ok=True)
|
||||
ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
payload=dict(id=ident,deployment_result_sha256=DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA,image=IMAGE)
|
||||
save(folder/'intent.json',dict(id=ident,collector_sha256=sha(__file__),read_only=True,payload=payload))
|
||||
response=rpc(original.CaptureAccess(original.ACCESS_ROOT),payload,folder)
|
||||
save(folder/'response.json',response)
|
||||
require(response['id']==ident and response['sql_read_only'] is True and response['secrets_read'] is False,'actual original public context only')
|
||||
context=dict(schema_version=1,case_id=ident,connection_generation=response['installation']['connection_generation'],
|
||||
windows_boot_id=response['installation']['windows_boot_id'],server_boot_id=response['server_boot_id'],
|
||||
server_context_evidence_sha256=sha(folder/'response.json'),binding_sha256=BINDING_SHA)
|
||||
save(folder/'context.json',context)
|
||||
save(folder/'receipt.json',dict(id=ident,collector_sha256=sha(__file__),deployment_result_sha256=DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA,
|
||||
response_sha256=sha(folder/'response.json'),context_sha256=sha(folder/'context.json'),gateway=response['gateway'],read_only=True))
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident,read_only=True,receipt_sha256=sha(folder/'receipt.json'),context_sha256=sha(folder/'context.json'))))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':
|
||||
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);parser.add_argument('action',choices=('collect','guards'));a=parser.parse_args()
|
||||
if a.action=='collect':collect()
|
||||
else:
|
||||
require('READ ONLY' in inspect.getsource(server_read) and 'UPDATE ' not in inspect.getsource(server_read),'fixed SQL read only')
|
||||
print('PASS source guards; no target action')
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
# Windows: fester passiver mTLS-Zeitrouteprobe
|
||||
|
||||
Stand2026-11-15: Quelle und lokaler Windows-Cross-Link fertig, **noch keine native Ausführung**. Dieser enge Fixture dient als HTTP-/Broker-Endpunktnachweis vor dem erhaltenden passiven Paarupgrade. Er ist kein installierter Dienstrollen-, Trusted-Clock-, SignedSync-/Ready- oder Jobnachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
`crates/agent-windows/examples/time_route_probe.rs` verwendet ausschließlich die bestehende Geräteidentität der Windows-VM. Gerätecert/-key bleiben in den festen vorhandenen Statepfaden und werden nur intern für den gemeinsamen `https_channel::mtls_client` gelesen. Private Keybytes werden weder ausgegeben noch gehasht oder in Evidence kopiert; der zusätzliche rohe Zwischenbuffer wird nach Clientbau gelöscht. Es gibt kein PFX, Enrollment, neues Gerät, frei wählbares Netzwerkziel, Shellkommando oder Zertifikats-/Namensprüfungs-Bypass. Domain/SAN/SNI, Projekt-CA, TCP-Ziel88.99.80.202:443 und `/agent/v1/time-attestation` bleiben fest. Der Pool wird für die drei Aufrufe wiederverwendet.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Fixture läuft nur als tatsächlich berechtigter Bootstrapadministrator ohne Threadimpersonation. Er behauptet ausdrücklich keine LocalService-/SYSTEM-Ausführung. Eigener fester Fallpfad: `C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\time-route\<kanonische UUID>`, darin vor Start genau `TimeRouteProbe.exe`, `context.json`, `time-public-key.json`. Die beiden Kontrollpfade müssen Root-/Administrators-/SYSTEM-geschützt sein. Der tatsächliche EXE-Pfad muss zum eigenen Fall passen; `intent.json` wird create-only **vor** dem ersten Netzwerkaufruf geschrieben. Nach verlorenem Ergebnis werden ausschließlich Originaldateien gelesen, nicht derselbe Lauf wiederholt.
|
||||
|
||||
Die bestehende passive Agentkonfiguration und der bisherige öffentliche Peerpin sind fest an ihre Originalhashes aus14fb gebunden. Die Geräte-/Tenant-/Enrollment-/Assignment-/Jobpublickeybindung stammt aus diesem geschützten Peerpin; Agent-/Asset-ID sind fest. Deshalb ist dieser Fixture absichtlich für den Stand **vor** dem Paarupgrade vorgesehen. Ein später geänderter Peerpin wird nicht still adaptiert. Der echte separate öffentliche Zeitpin ist SHA256 `c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2`, unabhängig vom konkreten Jobkey geprüft. Private Signierdateien wurden nicht gelesen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Feste Protokollfälle und begrenzte Aussage
|
||||
|
||||
Je Aufruf wird eine neue eigene256-Bit-CSPRNG-Nonce verwendet, mit eigener zufälliger Prozessinkarnation und dem fest gebundenen Kontext. Positive Antwort: HTTP200, exakte kanonische Codec-/Signaturbytes, strikte Ed25519-Prüfung mit dem echten öffentlichen Zeitkey, kompletter Originalrequesthash einschließlich Nonce/Context, Serverinstanz/-boot, Key-ID/-generation und begrenzte signierte Qualitätsfelder. Verwendet wird der vorhandene `DalekVerifier`; kein neuer Algorithmus und keine vorgetäuschte `Sample`-/Calibration-/Clockkonstruktion.
|
||||
|
||||
Die beiden weiteren festen Fälle verändern ausschließlich den Tenant zur bekannten anderen Test-Tenant-ID (erwartet403) beziehungsweise die zuvor von Root gelesene aktuelle Connectiongeneration auf deren Vorgänger (erwartet409). Kein Helperrequest, Job-, Grant-, UI-, MCP-, Sync-/Enrollment- oder TimeSetterpfad. Jede Antwort ist begrenzt; drei feste Requests, jeweils höchstens3s. Diese Transporttimeoutgrenze ist **keine** behauptete1s-/100ms-Clockqualifikation. Clock-/Dienstrollen-/SyncReady-Nachweis bleibt ausdrücklich false.
|
||||
|
||||
Nur öffentliche Requests/Signaturantworten, Status-/Hashmetadaten und feste Scopefelder gelangen in den eigenen create-only Fall. Statische „keine Jobs/Grants“-Scopefelder ersetzen keinen unabhängigen tatsächlichen Serverzählersnapshot. Root muss vor/nach dieselben geschlossenen Windows-/Linux-/Policy-/Grantzähler und erhaltene PKI-/DB-/Lockidentitäten separat vergleichen. Erst dieser gekoppelte Beleg darf den Endpunkt als tatsächlich passiv abgenommen ausweisen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Noch fehlende echte Kontextdatei
|
||||
|
||||
Es wurde **keine** `context.json` mit Dummywerten erzeugt. Root liefert nach Gatewaydeployment den tatsächlichen frischen DB-/Bootbeleg; Deployment kann die Verbindungsgeneration ändern. Die enge Datei hat ausschließlich folgende Pflichtfelder:
|
||||
|
||||
| Feld | Bedeutung |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `schema_version` | exakt1 |
|
||||
| `case_id` | exakte eigene kanonische Fall-UUID |
|
||||
| `connection_generation` | tatsächlich aktuell aus der Server-DB, größer1 |
|
||||
| `windows_boot_id` | tatsächliche aktuelle DB-`connection_boot_id` |
|
||||
| `server_boot_id` | tatsächliche aktuelle permanente Serverboot-ID |
|
||||
| `server_context_evidence_sha256` | unveränderlicher Root-Originalbeleg dieser frischen Abfrage |
|
||||
| `binding_sha256` | SHA256 der vorhandenen typisiert serialisierten öffentlichen Gerätebindung |
|
||||
|
||||
Der spätere feste Root-Operator muss Originalbeleg und frisch gerenderte Datei sowie tatsächliches Gateway-/Brokerdeployment vor Ausführung prüfen. Eine beliebige Callerboolean genügt nicht. Der Probe selbst prüft Serverantwort und Kontextbindung; diese vorgelagerte Provenienz ist zusätzlich Root-verantwortet. Der einzelne geplante CLI-Aufruf lautet strukturell `TimeRouteProbe.exe probe <eigene UUID>`; hier **nicht ausgeführt**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlich lokal qualifiziert
|
||||
|
||||
Unveränderlicher Fall `time-route-fixture-qualification-3fdf513e-197b-41ab-b161-9dfc2adc94da`, exakt203 öffentliche Compilerinputs: der erhaltene c467-Produktcheckpoint202 plus genau dieses neue Example. Aktueller fremder Updater-WIP wurde bewusst nicht in diesen Fixture übernommen; es gibt keine Behauptung,203 entspräche dem gesamten gegenwärtigen Workspace. Inputmanifest `1c4ed151efacc60bc3487356fcbdca0b665a02da9b7ceef7454d5eaa4f310d47`; Fixturequelle `808ef3a3fe21ca100fae38250c40c0738c3e4076c686c642776f0aa2bc891d9c`; Receipt `fce8c42cce33a35be1ee0468c97010ac3797a713668503783e449d30ea538678`.
|
||||
|
||||
Rustfmt nur dieses Example (`skip_children`), Windows-Examplecheck, Clippy mit `-D warnings` und Release-Link PASS. Offline-Docker, Quellen nur lesbar, eigene private Targets, keine Credentials-Mounts. Keine zusätzlichen Tests oder VM-Abfragen ausgeführt; vorherige tatsächliche Linux-Codec-/Servernachweise werden separat durch Root gebunden, nicht durch diesen Cross-Build ersetzt.
|
||||
|
||||
`TimeRouteProbe.exe`:19172660Bytes, AMD64-PE, SHA256 `4ef3fc85f5d140f2ad0ff14745dc5d5453a058203d785235d7dabafdf522b088`, Modus0500/ein Hardlink. Enger Readonly-Capabilitymanifest-SHA256 `22ca87604e942b91e68981f694934bc8c933c5fb5ab5858f27a2d3884d64df42`. Der neue Produktpaarbeleg26dc/5967 und dessen Modulquelle d859 bleiben unverändert; dieses Example installiert oder startet keinen Agenten.
|
||||
|
||||
Offen: unabhängiger Fixture-Review, echtes Gateway-/Brokerdeployment und dessen frische Kontextprovenienz, einmalige native Ausführung mit200/403/409, separater lesender Originalfallnachweis und tatsächliche Erhaltungs-/Nulljobwitnesses. Erst danach ist dieser Endpunktgate für die nächste getrennte passive Paarwartung verfügbar. Windows-MVP-Wirkungsabnahmen bleiben offen.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
# Fester passiver Windows-Zeitroutennachweis
|
||||
|
||||
Quellenstand 2026-11-15: `deploy/windows/time_route_context.py` liest ausschließlich
|
||||
öffentliche aktuelle Installationsmetadaten nach dem getrennten Gatewaydeployment.
|
||||
`deploy/windows/time_route_acceptance.py` bereitet die bereits gebaute feste
|
||||
`TimeRouteProbe.exe` vor und besitzt ausschließlich die getrennten Phasen
|
||||
`stage`, `run` und `read`. Keine Phase verändert RMM-Dienste, Geräteidentitäten,
|
||||
Zeitdienst, Richtlinien oder Jobgenehmigungen.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Collector bleibt mit `DEPLOYMENT_RESULT_SHA=None` geschlossen. Der Operator
|
||||
bleibt mit `CONTEXT_GATE=None` geschlossen. Der Operator darf erst den tatsächlich
|
||||
abgelesenen Collectorfall und dessen BelegSHA binden. Keine Beispielkontexte,
|
||||
Dummykeys oder Kalibrierungszahlen ersetzen diese Daten. Vor Stage und Run wird
|
||||
exakt derselbe aktuelle öffentliche Kontext erneut gelesen. Ein Generations-,
|
||||
Boot- oder Gatewaywechsel verlangt eine gesonderte Bewertung; kein automatischer
|
||||
Retry und keine Umdeutung eines alten Belegs.
|
||||
|
||||
Die feste SQL-Transaktion ist `READ ONLY` und liest die aktive Windowsinstallation
|
||||
mit Enrollment, Assignment, Verbindungsgeneration, Windows-Boot und Capabilities.
|
||||
Zusätzlich werden tatsächlicher Serverboot und Gatewayimage/-identität vor/nach
|
||||
verglichen. Weder SQL-Zugangsdaten noch Geräteschlüssel werden gelesen oder
|
||||
exportiert. Auf Windows verwendet ausschließlich die geprüfte EXE den bestehenden
|
||||
Geräte-mTLS-Schlüssel intern, wie in `windows-time-route-fixture.md` beschrieben.
|
||||
|
||||
Die beiden Windows-Verzeichnisse für Nutzlast und Steuerbelege sind getrennt,
|
||||
damit die EXE zu Beginn genau ihre drei festen Eingabedateien vorfindet. Alle
|
||||
Steuerbelege entstehen neu; ein verlorener Run ist ausschließlich lesbar. Der
|
||||
Controller hält sein gestartetes Prozessobjekt mit Kernelhandle, wartet auf das
|
||||
tatsächliche Ende und begrenzt ausschließlich diesen eigenen Prozess bei Timeout.
|
||||
Die tatsächliche positive Signatur-/Kontextantwort sowie HTTP 403 und 409 müssen
|
||||
im unveränderten Bericht stehen. Die ursprünglichen sechs nativen Windowsfelder,
|
||||
Journalidentität und geschlossenen Servergates werden vor/nach separat geprüft.
|
||||
Diese Abnahme beweist Transport und kryptografische Kontextbindung, keine
|
||||
Dienstrolle, Timerqualität, aktuelle Clockfreigabe oder Jobwirkung.
|
||||
|
||||
Lokal tatsächlich ausgeführt: Pythoncompile, beide Quellguards, geschlossene
|
||||
Deployment-/Kontextgates, exakte groß-/kleinschreibungssensitive Aktionsgrenze und
|
||||
Prüfung gegen die PowerShell-Aliaskollision `H`. Alle bestanden. Originalfall
|
||||
`a324c4e5-d1a9-495e-aba8-cb755a174e98` unter
|
||||
`devstate/windows-time-route-source/`; ReceiptSHA
|
||||
`de5fdf7f01b0d0a40c4c8def16eaf87efc8bce2696d35e2097c9e394d52510ad`.
|
||||
Native PowerShell-AST, unabhängiger Quellenreview, tatsächliche Kontextablesung,
|
||||
Stage, Run und anschließender eigener Read sind hier noch nicht ausgeführt.
|
||||
Der Operator führt diese Schritte nicht automatisch aus.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächliche native lesende Vorbereitung
|
||||
|
||||
Nach ausdrücklicher Rootdelegation wurde auf der vorhandenen Windows-VM die
|
||||
PowerShell-5.1-Quelle ausschließlich im Speicher mit `Parser.ParseInput` geparst.
|
||||
Tatsächlich: PowerShell5.1.26100.9818, null AST-Fehler, Controller nicht ausgeführt.
|
||||
Keine Stage-/Route-/Dienstaktion. Davor und danach lief ausschließlich der bereits
|
||||
angenommene originale14fb-`finish`-Leser mit seinen bestehenden passiven Journal- und
|
||||
SYSTEM-State-Probes: alle sechs stabilen nativen Felder und Journalidentität
|
||||
unverändert, Sequenz monoton. Diese Probes rufen keine Clock-/Snapshotoperation
|
||||
auf; sie ersetzen keinen Zeitrollen- oder aktuellen Frischebeweis.
|
||||
|
||||
Eigener unveränderlicher Fall
|
||||
`devstate/windows-time-route-native-readonly/a6d61a92-b7f3-4a8d-9df0-569941ab7ccd`,
|
||||
ReceiptSHA `44504007fa7d0379e608375181b926ff2a20ae248cfeb2fb51d127b858b3536d`.
|
||||
ScriptSHA bleibt `4c88fdf36f22b0273baaa08bf522bfefbf8482b45317ef852c0e0a331a1fbef2`.
|
||||
Deployment-/Kontextgates bleiben geschlossen, Stage und Route weiterhin offen.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user