Accept native broker signatures and container peer isolation
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Once-only public UDS signature fixture; no private signer read or RMM authority."""
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import argparse
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import hashlib
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import importlib.util
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import re
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import stat
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import uuid
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START_SHA = 'e1458cb3feecd3d3302f2fccaff4850cfc8c403ee3314563f5f641e7c8bdfc39'
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START_RESULT_SHA = '8fc6ed5193f9802b7686a93523730c7e805595415c8e887552ffcf4224968d4d'
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CONTAINER_IMAGE = 'sha256:e6f2cff35d0f309acf8433b4f05878ed77092602c5065cc81801177da0bb3a9c'
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PYTHON_IMAGE_QUALIFIED = True
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PYTHON_IMAGE_RECEIPT_SHA = '6431222d42559e79e3aff9e074d743431240bfd173591cbd52ad106921c19114'
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PUBLIC_PIN_SHA = 'c31d31d2d61f881d04f55f704abbbf98f4822650c016f39e39d4d2318bc3f6e2'
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CASE = Path('/var/lib/rmm-time-source-bootstrap/5b358997-3abc-43db-945f-f41855b4e3c0')
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PHASE = 'broker-signature-acceptance-v1'
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PROFILE = 'rmm.server-time-broker.unix-signature-acceptance.v1'
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ENDPOINT = 'https://discovery.ease-technologies.de/agent/v1/time-attestation'
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CTX_KEYS = ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_generation','connection_generation','windows_boot_id')
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DOMAIN = b'RMM-TIME-ATTESTATION/v1\0'
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SPKI = bytes.fromhex('302a300506032b6570032100')
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CLIENT = r'''
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import json,os,socket,struct,sys,time,uuid
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x=json.load(sys.stdin);mode=x['mode']
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expected=0 if mode=='root' else 10001
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assert os.getuid()==os.geteuid()==expected and os.getgid()==os.getegid()==expected
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if mode!='root':
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c={k:x['context'][k] for k in ('tenant_id','asset_id','agent_id','enrollment_generation','assignment_generation','connection_generation','windows_boot_id')}
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c.update(verifier_incarnation=str(uuid.UUID(bytes=os.getrandom(16),version=4)),role='agent',helper_image_sha256=None,binding_schema=1)
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nonce=os.getrandom(32);assert len(nonce)==32
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request={'version':1,'endpoint':x['endpoint'],'nonce':nonce.hex(),'context':c}
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raw=json.dumps(request,ensure_ascii=False,separators=(',',':')).encode('utf-8');assert 1<=len(raw)<=8192
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s=socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.settimeout(1)
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started=time.monotonic_ns();s.connect('/run/rmm-time-source/broker.sock')
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peer=struct.unpack('3i',s.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET,socket.SO_PEERCRED,12))
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assert peer[1:]==(0,989) and (peer[0]==0 if mode=='container' else peer[0]==x['broker_pid'])
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if mode=='root':
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try:
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out=s.recv(1);assert out==b'';denial='eof'
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except ConnectionResetError:denial='reset'
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result={'mode':mode,'peer':peer,'received_bytes':0,'denial':denial}
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else:
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s.sendall(struct.pack('!I',len(raw))+raw)
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def exact(n):
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data=b''
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while len(data)<n:
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part=s.recv(n-len(data));assert part;data+=part
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return data
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length=struct.unpack('!I',exact(4))[0];assert 1<=length<=8192
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response=exact(length);assert s.recv(1)==b''
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result={'mode':mode,'peer':peer,'request':raw.decode('utf-8'),'response':response.decode('utf-8')}
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s.close();result.update(uid=os.geteuid(),gid=os.getegid(),pid=os.getpid(),pid_namespace_inode=os.stat('/proc/self/ns/pid').st_ino,elapsed_ns=time.monotonic_ns()-started)
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print(json.dumps(result,separators=(',',':')))
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'''
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def require(value,reason):
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if not value:raise RuntimeError(reason)
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def encoded(value):
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return (json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':'),ensure_ascii=True)+'\n').encode('ascii')
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def sha(raw):return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
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def load_start():
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path=Path('/var/lib/rmm-time-source-operators')/START_SHA/'broker_start_acceptance.py'
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parent=os.open('/',os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW)
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try:
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for name in path.parent.parts[1:]:
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info=os.fstat(parent);require(info.st_uid==0 and info.st_mode&0o022==0,'protected_start_source_ancestry')
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child=os.open(name,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,dir_fd=parent);os.close(parent);parent=child
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directory=os.fstat(parent);require(directory.st_uid==0 and directory.st_mode&0o022==0,'protected_start_source_parent')
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fd=os.open(path.name,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,dir_fd=parent)
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with os.fdopen(fd,'rb') as stream:
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info=os.fstat(stream.fileno());require(stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) and info.st_uid==info.st_gid==0 and stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode)==0o600 and info.st_nlink==1 and info.st_size<=131072,'root_start_source_file')
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raw=stream.read(131073);stamp=lambda x:tuple(getattr(x,'st_'+n) for n in ('dev','ino','uid','gid','mode','nlink','size','mtime_ns','ctime_ns'))
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require(sha(raw)==START_SHA and len(raw)==info.st_size and stamp(info)==stamp(os.fstat(stream.fileno()))==stamp(os.stat(path.name,dir_fd=parent,follow_symlinks=False)),'exact_reviewed_start_source')
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finally:os.close(parent)
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module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(importlib.util.spec_from_loader('rmm_signature_start_proof',loader=None));module.__file__=str(path);exec(compile(raw,str(path),'exec'),module.__dict__)
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bootstrap,pin,guard=module.load_bootstrap();held=pin.read_file(path,131072)
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require(held[0]==raw,'same_held_start_source')
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return module,bootstrap,pin,lambda:(guard(),require(pin.read_file(path,131072)==held,'start_source_unchanged'))
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def fixed_inputs():
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require(type(START_RESULT_SHA) is str and re.fullmatch('[0-9a-f]{64}',START_RESULT_SHA),'actual_start_not_bound')
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require(type(CONTAINER_IMAGE) is str and re.fullmatch('sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}',CONTAINER_IMAGE),'actual_cached_python_image_not_bound')
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require(PYTHON_IMAGE_QUALIFIED is True,'cached_arm_python_not_qualified')
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def request(raw,expected_context):
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value=json.loads(raw);require(list(value)==['version','endpoint','nonce','context'] and value['version']==1 and value['endpoint']==ENDPOINT and re.fullmatch('[0-9a-f]{64}',value['nonce']),'exact_request_order_nonce_endpoint')
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context=value['context'];require(list(context)==list(CTX_KEYS)+['verifier_incarnation','role','helper_image_sha256','binding_schema'] and all(context[k]==v for k,v in expected_context.items()) and context['role']=='agent' and context['helper_image_sha256'] is None and context['binding_schema']==1 and str(uuid.UUID(context['verifier_incarnation']))==context['verifier_incarnation'] and uuid.UUID(context['verifier_incarnation']).int>0,'exact_public_request_context')
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require(json.dumps(value,ensure_ascii=False,separators=(',',':'))==raw,'rust_canonical_request_bytes')
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return value
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def run_client(mode,pid,context):
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args=['/usr/bin/setpriv','--reuid=10001','--regid=10001','--clear-groups','--no-new-privs','/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',CLIENT]
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if mode=='root':args=['/usr/bin/python3','-I','-c',CLIENT]
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if mode=='container':args=['/usr/bin/docker','run','-i','--rm','--network=none','--read-only','--cap-drop=ALL','--security-opt=no-new-privileges','--user=10001:10001','--pids-limit=16','--memory=128m','--mount=type=bind,src=/run/rmm-time-source,dst=/run/rmm-time-source,readonly','--entrypoint=/usr/bin/python3',CONTAINER_IMAGE,'-I','-c',CLIENT]
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result=subprocess.run(args,input=encoded(dict(mode=mode,context=context,endpoint=ENDPOINT,broker_pid=pid)),stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,timeout=20,check=False,env={'PATH':'/usr/bin:/bin','LC_ALL':'C'})
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require(result.returncode==0 and result.stderr==b'' and len(result.stdout)<=32768,'one_fixed_client_failed_no_retry')
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return json.loads(result.stdout)
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def verify_reply(proof,pin,phase,mode,value,public,boot,context):
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require(value['uid']==value['gid']==10001 and value['peer'][1:]==[0,989] and value['elapsed_ns']>0,'actual_client_identity_and_peer')
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raw=value['request'];rq=request(raw,context);signed=json.loads(value['response'])
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require(list(signed)==['payload','signature_hex'] and json.dumps(signed,ensure_ascii=False,separators=(',',':'))==value['response'] and type(signed['payload']) is str and re.fullmatch('[0-9a-f]{128}',signed['signature_hex']),'exact_signed_envelope')
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payload=json.loads(signed['payload'])
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require(list(payload)==['version','request_sha256','server_instance','server_boot_id','key_id','key_generation','captured_utc_ns','server_error_ns','source_sync_age_ns'] and json.dumps(payload,ensure_ascii=False,separators=(',',':'))==signed['payload'] and payload['version']==1 and payload['request_sha256']==sha(raw.encode()) and payload['server_instance']==public['server_instance'] and payload['server_boot_id']==boot and payload['key_id']==public['key_id'] and payload['key_generation']==public['key_generation'] and type(payload['captured_utc_ns']) is int and 0<payload['captured_utc_ns']<2**63 and type(payload['server_error_ns']) is int and 0<=payload['server_error_ns']<=500000000 and type(payload['source_sync_age_ns']) is int and 0<=payload['source_sync_age_ns']<=3600000000000,'bound_full_request_server_generation_boot_and_quality')
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save(pin,phase,mode+'.request.json',raw.encode());save(pin,phase,mode+'.response.json',value['response'].encode());save(pin,phase,mode+'.message.bin',DOMAIN+signed['payload'].encode());save(pin,phase,mode+'.signature.bin',bytes.fromhex(signed['signature_hex']))
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result=proof.bootstrap.command(pin,Path('/usr/bin/openssl'),['pkeyutl','-verify','-pubin','-inkey',str(CASE/PHASE/'public.der'),'-keyform','DER','-rawin','-in',str(CASE/PHASE/(mode+'.message.bin')),'-sigfile',str(CASE/PHASE/(mode+'.signature.bin'))])
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require(result.returncode==0,'actual_ed25519_public_signature_verification')
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return dict(request_sha256=payload['request_sha256'],nonce=rq['nonce'],verifier_incarnation=rq['context']['verifier_incarnation'],signature_verified=True,payload=payload,client=value)
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def save(pin,parent,name,raw):
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require(name in {'intent.json','before.json','after.json','result.json','failure.json','public.der'} or re.fullmatch('(host|container)\.(request.json|response.json|message.bin|signature.bin)',name),'closed_public_case_filename')
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data=raw if type(raw) is bytes else encoded(raw);require(len(data)<=65536,'bounded_public_evidence')
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fd=os.open(name,os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600,dir_fd=parent)
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try:
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view=memoryview(data)
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while view:n=os.write(fd,view);require(n>0,'complete_public_evidence_write');view=view[n:]
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os.fsync(fd)
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finally:os.close(fd)
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os.fsync(parent)
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def main():
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parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);parser.add_argument('command',choices=('host-preflight','host-execute','host-read'));args=parser.parse_args()
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require(sys.flags.isolated==1 and os.geteuid()==0 and os.uname().machine=='aarch64','isolated_root_fixed_server_only');os.umask(0o077)
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fixed_inputs();module,bootstrap,pin,guard=load_start()
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if args.command=='host-read':
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records={}
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for name in ('intent.json','before.json','after.json','result.json','failure.json'):
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try:
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raw,meta=pin.read_file(CASE/PHASE/name,65536);records[name]=dict(sha256=sha(raw),metadata=meta,record=pin.parsed(raw))
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except FileNotFoundError:records[name]=None
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print(encoded(dict(profile=PROFILE,read_only=True,records=records)).decode(),end='');return
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case=pin.directory(CASE);phase=-1;proof=process=None
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try:
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pin.absence(case,PHASE);proof=module.InstalledProof(bootstrap,pin,guard)
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own=proof.context.original.hold(Path(__file__),131072);require(own.path.name=='broker_signature_acceptance.py' and own.path.parent.name==sha(own.raw),'held_exact_signature_fixture_source')
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start=proof.context.original.hold(CASE/module.PHASE/'result.json',65536,expected=START_RESULT_SHA);start_result=pin.parsed(start.raw)
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require(start_result['effective_unit_qualified'] is True and start_result['start_executed_once'] is True,'original_successful_start')
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phase_start=pin.directory(CASE/module.PHASE)
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try:pin.absence(phase_start,'failure.json')
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finally:os.close(phase_start)
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state=module.effective(module.typed_snapshot(proof),True);process=module.ProcessProof(proof,state)
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require(process.expected==start_result['process'] and module.socket_proof(proof,process)==start_result['socket'],'same_original_running_broker_and_listener')
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before=proof.fresh();require(sha(proof.public.raw)==PUBLIC_PIN_SHA,'actual_fixed_public_time_pin');public=pin.parsed(proof.public.raw);host_ns=os.stat('/proc/self/ns/pid').st_ino
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if args.command=='host-preflight':
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print(encoded(dict(profile=PROFILE,read_only=True,qualified_running=True,process=process.expected,socket=start_result['socket'],public_pin_sha256=PUBLIC_PIN_SHA,public_pin=public,signature_query_sent=False,evidence_written=False)).decode(),end='');return
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# Explicit Root decision: own codec-only CSPRNG fixture identities,
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# never an enrolled device, current DB generation, mTLS or clock proof.
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identity=lambda:str(uuid.UUID(bytes=os.getrandom(16),version=4))
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context=dict(tenant_id=identity(),asset_id=identity(),agent_id=identity(),enrollment_generation=1,assignment_generation=1,connection_generation=1,windows_boot_id=identity())
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os.mkdir(PHASE,0o700,dir_fd=case);os.fsync(case);phase=os.open(PHASE,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,dir_fd=case)
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bind=dict(profile=PROFILE,case=CASE.name,phase=PHASE,controller_sha256=sha(own.raw),start_controller_sha256=START_SHA,start_result_sha256=START_RESULT_SHA,public_pin_sha256=sha(proof.public.raw),container_image=CONTAINER_IMAGE,python_image_receipt_sha256=PYTHON_IMAGE_RECEIPT_SHA,context=context,context_authority='operator_fixture_csprng_only_not_enrolled_or_mtls')
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save(pin,phase,'intent.json',dict(bind,once=True,no_retry=True));save(pin,phase,'before.json',dict(bind,witness=before,process=process.expected,socket=start_result['socket']))
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save(pin,phase,'public.der',SPKI+bytes.fromhex(public['public_key_hex']))
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host=run_client('host',process.pid,context);require(host['peer'][0]==process.pid and host['pid_namespace_inode']==host_ns,'host_client_actual_peer_pid_namespace')
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positive=verify_reply(proof,pin,phase,'host',host,public,before['observation']['boot_id'],context)
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denied=run_client('root',process.pid,context);require(denied['uid']==denied['gid']==0 and denied['peer']==[process.pid,0,989] and denied['received_bytes']==0 and denied['denial'] in ('eof','reset'),'root_uid_denied_without_signed_bytes')
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container=run_client('container',process.pid,context);require(container['peer'][0]==0 and container['pid_namespace_inode']!=host_ns,'default_container_pid_namespace_sees_host_broker_pid_zero')
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isolated=verify_reply(proof,pin,phase,'container',container,public,before['observation']['boot_id'],context)
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require(positive['nonce']!=isolated['nonce'] and positive['verifier_incarnation']!=isolated['verifier_incarnation'],'separate_own_random_challenges')
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after=proof.fresh();require(before==after and process.verify(module.effective(module.typed_snapshot(proof),True))==start_result['process'] and module.socket_proof(proof,process)==start_result['socket'],'same_runtime_pin_generation_process_listener_after_three_clients')
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save(pin,phase,'after.json',dict(bind,witness=after,process=process.expected,socket=start_result['socket']))
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result=dict(bind,host=positive,root=denied,container=isolated,two_actual_signatures_verified=True,private_signer_read=False,clock_authority=False,mtls_identity_attested=False,sync_ready=False,rmm_jobs_created=False,corehistory_witness='external_root_before_after_receipts_required')
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save(pin,phase,'result.json',result);print(encoded(result).decode(),end='')
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except Exception:
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if phase>=0:save(pin,phase,'failure.json',dict(profile=PROFILE,failed=True,fixed_tag='signature_fixture_failed_original_read_only',no_retry_or_cleanup=True))
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raise
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finally:
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if process is not None:process.close()
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if proof is not None:proof.close()
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if phase>=0:os.close(phase)
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os.close(case)
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if __name__=='__main__':
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try:main()
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except Exception:
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print(encoded(dict(profile=PROFILE,failed=True,read_original_phase_only=True)).decode(),end='');raise SystemExit(1)
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@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
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# Übergabe — Linux-MVP abgeschlossen, Windows wird fortgesetzt
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**Broker-UDS und echte Signaturen bestanden:** Host und Standard-PIDnamespace-
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ContainerUID10001 mit getrennten Challenges tatsächlich Ed25519-verifiziert;
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ContainerpeerPID0 und RootUID0-Deny belegt. Separater Originalread und identische
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Corezeugen. [Ergebnisse](server-time-broker-signature-acceptance.md).
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HTTPSdeployment und Windowsrollen-/Jobnachweise bleiben offen.
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**Zeitbroker tatsächlich einmal gestartet:** Effektivhärtung, gehaltener
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Prozess und Root:10001-Socket bestanden; separate Nachlese und identische
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SQL-Corezeugen belegt. [Ergebnisse](server-time-broker-start-acceptance.md).
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Pfad bleiben dort sofort relevant.
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| Entdeckung / späteres Thema | Tatsächlicher heutiger Stand | Spätere Aufgabe |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Verfügbarkeit der signierten Serverzeit | Tatsächliche Quellproben derselben laufenden Chronygeneration lieferten50.834ms bei43.596s Syncalter und später295.609ms bei320.110s. Beide gültig; kein kontinuierlicher Verfügbarkeitsnachweis. | Nach dem MVP natürlichen Poll-/Kernel-Fehlerverlauf und Verfügbarkeit messen, gegebenenfalls separat genehmigte Betriebsoptimierung. Fehlende Qualität muss bereits jetzt deny bleiben; keine500ms-Grenzlockerung, erfundene Frische oder implizite Resync-/Konfigurationsänderung. |
|
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| Windows-PE nach erneutem Debugstrip | Zwei Lieferkopien mit identischen unveränderten Original-Linkdateien unterscheiden sich nach erneutem Strippen nur an vier Bytes: COFF-Zeitstempel/PE-Prüfsumme, Offsets136/137/216/217. Lokal tatsächlich verglichen; beide ursprünglichen Packs bleiben erhalten. Jeder Pack pinnt seine konkreten Lieferbytes. | Reproduzierbare PE-Werkzeugpipeline vor M7 festlegen. Bis dahin niemals gleichen Lieferhash aus gleicher Rustquelle/gleichem Original-Link behaupten oder ein altes Manifest überschreiben. Kein aktueller Autorisierungs- oder Abnahmebypass. |
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| Dev-Reversetunnel ohne Zielbanner | Windows-RMM-Heartbeats liefen tatsächlich weiter, während Serverlistener/TCP-Verbindung auf127.0.0.1:22240 vorhanden waren, aber kein SSH-Banner durchkam. Der Bootstraploop überwacht nur das äußere ssh.exe und verbindet nach dessen Ende neu; der Task hat kein RestartOnFailure. Konkrete Ursache des blockierten SSH-Ziels unbewiesen. Keine SSH-/Hostkey-/Expirygrenze gelockert. | Nach dem MVP begrenzte Transport-/Workerdiagnose verbessern. Keine automatische Schlüsselverlängerung, öffentliche Windowsportfreigabe oder pauschalen sshd-/UID-Resets. Der aktuelle manuelle Konsolenneustart bleibt ausdrücklich zeitlich abzustimmen und ist kein RMM-Rebootnachweis. |
|
||||
| Legacy-Syncflag ohne signierten Sync | Bei Clients ohne `rmm.sync.v1` setzt der bisherige Hello-Kompatibilitätspfad `sync_ready=true`. Auf dem passiven Windowsclient nach Serverneustart tatsächlich beobachtet; weiterhin keine Jobcapabilities und kein signierter Syncnachweis. | In Status/API `sync_required`, Unterstützung und tatsächlichen signierten Checkpoint trennen. Das Legacyflag niemals als Windows-Jobabnahme verwenden. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
# Enge lokale Broker-/UDS-Signaturfixture
|
||||
|
||||
Quelle `deploy/server_time_broker_signature_acceptance.py`, Stand2026-11-15.
|
||||
Root startet allein die tatsächliche Abnahme nach unabhängigem Source-Review.
|
||||
`host-preflight` prüft ausschließlich geschützte Originale und lebenden Broker,
|
||||
endet vor Random, Phasenmkdir oder UDSrequest. `host-execute` ist create-only im
|
||||
Originalfall5b unter `broker-signature-acceptance-v1`; bei Antwortverlust oder
|
||||
Fehler ausschließlich `host-read`, keine Wiederholung oder Bereinigung.
|
||||
|
||||
Gebunden sind Startcontrollere145, tatsächlich erfolgreicher Startresult8fc6,
|
||||
öffentlicher Zeitpinc31 und das nativ qualifizierte Python-ARMimagee6f2
|
||||
(Rootreceipt6431222d). Vor/nach den Clients bleiben originale Prozess-/Socket-
|
||||
und Source-/Runtime-/Chronygenerationszeugen Pflicht. Root verknüpft seine
|
||||
getrennten Corehistory-Vorher-/Nachherreceipts; hier kein neuer SQLreader.
|
||||
|
||||
Host-UID/GID10001 und eigener Container-UID/GID10001 erzeugen jeweils eine eigene
|
||||
256-Bit-CSPRNGnonce und Verifierinkarnation. Der Container ist read-only, nonet,
|
||||
nocaps, NNP und benutzt seinen Standard-PIDnamespace; Brokerpeer-PID0 wird
|
||||
explizit erwartet. Der Hostclient muss den tatsächlichen Broker-PID sehen.
|
||||
Zwischen beiden positiven Requests erhält RootUID0 keine signierten Bytes.
|
||||
Root hat eigene CSPRNG-IDs und Schema-Testgenerationen ausdrücklich für diese
|
||||
reinen Codec-/Namespacefixtures erlaubt: keine eingeschriebenen Geräte,
|
||||
Windows-DBbindung, mTLS-, Clock-/Sync- oder Jobautorität wird behauptet.
|
||||
|
||||
Requestreihenfolge entspricht exakt RustSerde, inklusive explizitem null für
|
||||
helper_image_sha256. Der gesamte Requesthash, Serverinstance, Boot, Key-ID und
|
||||
Generation sowie Qualitätsgrenzen werden geprüft. OpenSSL prüft mit ausschließlich
|
||||
öffentlichem SPKI die Ed25519-Signatur über `RMM-TIME-ATTESTATION/v1\0` und die
|
||||
exakten Payloadbytes. Private Signerbytes werden nicht gelesen. Der Controller
|
||||
wird als `broker_signature_acceptance.py` Root0600 unter seinem Hashparent gehalten.
|
||||
|
||||
Lokal AST und drei gezielte Guardgruppen bestanden: kanonische Requestbytes,
|
||||
Bindungs-/Domain-/Publickeyprüfung mit ausdrücklich ersetzter Signaturautorität,
|
||||
sowie feste Clientgrenzen und Vorprüfungs-/Intentreihenfolge. Keine tatsächliche
|
||||
Signatur erzeugt oder Zielabfrage ausgeführt. Zwei reine Guardhelferfehler
|
||||
(mkdir-Syntaxfragment und die frühere host-read-Intentreferenz) wurden in getrennten
|
||||
Guardkopien korrigiert; Produktquelle und Originalfehlerlogs blieben unverändert.
|
||||
Tatsächliche Signaturen und Namespace-/Root-Deny-Nachweise bleiben Rootaufgaben.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlich nativ auf dem permanenten Server bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
Source `a8afe8a2167f91e743e8c976b58d9f5227fa64914ad492ffc489b0dc98392585`.
|
||||
Readonly Preflight Exit0, Receipt
|
||||
`d5c06a881d4a7493323adb9c7dfdc3c566ee208a6681e7e07b547c8141515e6a`.
|
||||
Einmalige Ausführung Exit0, Receipt
|
||||
`35b35f4e48e9806a877f3e9f2ab53eaf2ac450b492295ad57e17677d6147767c`.
|
||||
Beide unterschiedlichen CSPRNG-Challenges wurden tatsächlich signiert und mit
|
||||
OpenSSL/öffentlichem Ed25519-Key verifiziert. HostpeerPID2576117, ContainerpeerPID0
|
||||
bei eigenem Standard-PIDnamespace; beide ClientsUID/GID10001. RootUID0 erhielt
|
||||
EOF ohne signierte Bytes. Hostfehlergrenze295608676ns bei Syncalter320109975916ns,
|
||||
Container295463150ns/320435768611ns; beide innerhalb der unveränderten Grenzen.
|
||||
|
||||
Originalresultat
|
||||
`38ed1a3079f20438fe07a57f1bfa5a37348bdec9fc7780d7822ca3d6967e5ea1`;
|
||||
separate Originalnachlese Exit0 ohne failure, Receipt
|
||||
`4b442a9022f1ee56f8e851e25ad323d630b220cf47aa8169b83b9c4412c50b8d`.
|
||||
Externe Core-/Runtimezeugen vor/nach exakt gleich, beide
|
||||
`616effee49e79ff10112bb84cda3212029e489d84faaf8d9ae0d8901fce2b01a`;
|
||||
Windows0/0/0/0, Linux31/31/27/0, geschlossene Rootpolicy. Kein privater
|
||||
Signerread, weiteres Dienststarten/Neustarten, HTTPdeployment oder Windowsjob.
|
||||
Diese native Abnahme belegt Brokertransport/Namespaces/UID-Deny und zwei echte
|
||||
Signaturen. mTLS-Gerätebindung und unabhängige Windows-Rollenzeit sind weiterhin
|
||||
separate offene Abnahmen; Fixtureidentitäten sind ausdrücklich keine Geräte.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user