feat: verify native Windows client probe and preserve unknown APT outcome
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
This commit is contained in:
Generated
+188
-3
@@ -70,6 +70,45 @@ version = "1.0.104"
|
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "330a5ed07fa54e4702c9d6c4174f74427fc0ef6e214bbd677ae50a5099946470"
|
||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
name = "asn1-rs"
|
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version = "0.7.2"
|
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
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checksum = "b7f43a50ac4fdca5df8e885c21b835997f0a1cdee65494a6847694a98652d9d8"
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dependencies = [
|
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"asn1-rs-derive",
|
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"asn1-rs-impl",
|
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"displaydoc",
|
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"nom",
|
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"num-traits",
|
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"rusticata-macros",
|
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"thiserror",
|
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"time",
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]
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|
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[[package]]
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name = "asn1-rs-derive"
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version = "0.6.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "3109e49b1e4909e9db6515a30c633684d68cdeaa252f215214cb4fa1a5bfee2c"
|
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dependencies = [
|
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"proc-macro2",
|
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"quote",
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"syn 2.0.119",
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"synstructure 0.13.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "asn1-rs-impl"
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version = "0.2.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "7b18050c2cd6fe86c3a76584ef5e0baf286d038cda203eb6223df2cc413565f7"
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dependencies = [
|
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"proc-macro2",
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"quote",
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"syn 2.0.119",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "async-trait"
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version = "0.1.92"
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@@ -181,6 +220,15 @@ version = "1.8.3"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
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[[package]]
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name = "bit-vec"
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version = "0.9.1"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "b71798fca2c1fe1086445a7258a4bc81e6e49dcd24c8d0dd9a1e57395b603f51"
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dependencies = [
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"serde",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "bitflags"
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version = "2.13.2"
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@@ -468,6 +516,20 @@ dependencies = [
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"zeroize",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "der-parser"
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version = "10.0.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "07da5016415d5a3c4dd39b11ed26f915f52fc4e0dc197d87908bc916e51bc1a6"
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dependencies = [
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"asn1-rs",
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"displaydoc",
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"nom",
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"num-bigint",
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"num-traits",
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"rusticata-macros",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "deranged"
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version = "0.5.9"
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@@ -1310,7 +1372,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"js-sys",
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"p256",
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"p384",
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"pem",
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"pem 3.0.6",
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"rand 0.8.8",
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"rsa",
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"serde",
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@@ -1430,6 +1492,12 @@ dependencies = [
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"unicase",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "minimal-lexical"
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version = "0.2.1"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "68354c5c6bd36d73ff3feceb05efa59b6acb7626617f4962be322a825e61f79a"
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[[package]]
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name = "mio"
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version = "1.2.4"
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@@ -1441,6 +1509,16 @@ dependencies = [
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "nom"
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version = "7.1.3"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "d273983c5a657a70a3e8f2a01329822f3b8c8172b73826411a55751e404a0a4a"
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dependencies = [
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"memchr",
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"minimal-lexical",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "num-bigint"
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version = "0.4.8"
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@@ -1502,6 +1580,15 @@ dependencies = [
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"libm",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "oid-registry"
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version = "0.8.1"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "12f40cff3dde1b6087cc5d5f5d4d65712f34016a03ed60e9c08dcc392736b5b7"
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dependencies = [
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"asn1-rs",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "once_cell"
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version = "1.21.4"
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@@ -1620,6 +1707,16 @@ dependencies = [
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"serde_core",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "pem"
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version = "4.0.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "d354a98a3d1251555de99e8fdd8afda05573c31b82f59063a7b0a29b5527f120"
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dependencies = [
|
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"base64 0.23.1",
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"serde_core",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "pem-rfc7468"
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version = "0.7.0"
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@@ -1913,6 +2010,20 @@ dependencies = [
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"rand_core 0.10.1",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rcgen"
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version = "0.14.10"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "8774e05a7d0de114588e6a28fe7e71694b82614ed569d86d8b389dfbc98b8ad8"
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dependencies = [
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"pem 4.0.0",
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"ring",
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"rustls-pki-types",
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"time",
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"x509-parser",
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"yasna",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "redox_syscall"
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version = "0.5.18"
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@@ -2101,6 +2212,32 @@ dependencies = [
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"uuid",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rmm-agent-windows"
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version = "0.1.0"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"chrono",
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"fs2",
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"futures-util",
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"prost",
|
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"rand 0.9.5",
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"rcgen",
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"reqwest",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-protocol",
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"rusqlite",
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"rustls",
|
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"rustls-pemfile",
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"serde",
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"serde_json",
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"sha2 0.10.9",
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"tokio",
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"tokio-tungstenite 0.28.0",
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"uuid",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rmm-domain"
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version = "0.1.0"
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@@ -2254,6 +2391,15 @@ dependencies = [
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"semver",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rusticata-macros"
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version = "4.1.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
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checksum = "faf0c4a6ece9950b9abdb62b1cfcf2a68b3b67a10ba445b3bb85be2a293d0632"
|
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dependencies = [
|
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"nom",
|
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rustls"
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version = "0.23.46"
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@@ -2835,6 +2981,17 @@ dependencies = [
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"futures-core",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "synstructure"
|
||||
version = "0.13.2"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
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checksum = "728a70f3dbaf5bab7f0c4b1ac8d7ae5ea60a4b5549c8a5914361c99147a709d2"
|
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dependencies = [
|
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"proc-macro2",
|
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"quote",
|
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"syn 2.0.119",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "synstructure"
|
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version = "0.14.0"
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@@ -3618,6 +3775,34 @@ version = "0.6.4"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "3ad82d2a33cdc9674dc7465672f271e096168fcdbe0f799d9e6db8c5892679dc"
|
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|
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[[package]]
|
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name = "x509-parser"
|
||||
version = "0.18.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
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checksum = "d43b0f71ce057da06bc0851b23ee24f3f86190b07203dd8f567d0b706a185202"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
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"asn1-rs",
|
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"data-encoding",
|
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"der-parser",
|
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"lazy_static",
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"nom",
|
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"oid-registry",
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"ring",
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"rusticata-macros",
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"thiserror",
|
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"time",
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]
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|
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[[package]]
|
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name = "yasna"
|
||||
version = "0.6.0"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "b5f6765e852b9b4dc8e2a76843e4d64d1cea8e79bcde0b6901aea8e7c7f08282"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"bit-vec",
|
||||
"time",
|
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]
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|
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[[package]]
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name = "yoke"
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version = "0.8.4"
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@@ -3638,7 +3823,7 @@ dependencies = [
|
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"proc-macro2",
|
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"quote",
|
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"syn 3.0.10",
|
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"synstructure",
|
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"synstructure 0.14.0",
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]
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|
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[[package]]
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@@ -3679,7 +3864,7 @@ dependencies = [
|
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"proc-macro2",
|
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"quote",
|
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"syn 3.0.10",
|
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"synstructure",
|
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"synstructure 0.14.0",
|
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]
|
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|
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[[package]]
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+1
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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[workspace]
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resolver = "2"
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exclude = ["crates/oidc-auth"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper"]
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[workspace.package]
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version = "0.1.0"
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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[package]
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name = "rmm-agent-windows"
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version.workspace = true
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edition.workspace = true
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license.workspace = true
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[dependencies]
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anyhow.workspace = true
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chrono.workspace = true
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futures-util.workspace = true
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prost.workspace = true
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rand.workspace = true
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reqwest.workspace = true
|
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rustls.workspace = true
|
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rustls-pemfile.workspace = true
|
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serde.workspace = true
|
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serde_json.workspace = true
|
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sha2.workspace = true
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tokio.workspace = true
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tokio-tungstenite.workspace = true
|
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uuid.workspace = true
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rmm-domain = { path = "../domain" }
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rmm-protocol = { path = "../protocol" }
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rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
|
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fs2 = "0.4.3"
|
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rcgen = { version = "=0.14.10", default-features = false, features = ["crypto", "ring", "pem"] }
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|
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[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
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windows-sys = { version = "0.61.2", features = ["Win32_Foundation", "Win32_Security", "Win32_Security_Authorization", "Win32_Storage_FileSystem", "Win32_System_SystemInformation", "Win32_System_Registry", "Win32_System_Memory", "Win32_System_Services", "Win32_System_Threading"] }
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@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
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use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
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use fs2::FileExt;
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use prost::Message;
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use rmm_protocol::Envelope;
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use rusqlite::{Connection, OptionalExtension, params};
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use std::{fs::OpenOptions, path::Path};
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pub struct Journal {
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db: Connection,
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_lock: std::fs::File,
|
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}
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impl Journal {
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pub fn open(directory: &Path) -> Result<Self> {
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ensure!(directory.is_dir(), "STATE_DIRECTORY_REQUIRED");
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let lock = OpenOptions::new()
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.read(true)
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.write(true)
|
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.create(true)
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.truncate(false)
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.open(directory.join("agent.lock"))?;
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lock.try_lock_exclusive()?;
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let db = Connection::open(directory.join("telemetry.sqlite"))?;
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db.execute_batch(
|
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"PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL; PRAGMA synchronous=FULL; PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON;
|
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS metadata(key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,value INTEGER NOT NULL);
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INSERT OR IGNORE INTO metadata VALUES('sequence',0);
|
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS events(id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,payload BLOB NOT NULL);",
|
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)?;
|
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ensure!(
|
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db.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |r| r.get::<_, String>(0))? == "ok",
|
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"JOURNAL_INTEGRITY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(Self { db, _lock: lock })
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn next_sequence(&mut self) -> Result<u64> {
|
||||
let tx = self.db.transaction()?;
|
||||
let sequence: i64 =
|
||||
tx.query_row("SELECT value FROM metadata WHERE key='sequence'", [], |r| {
|
||||
r.get(0)
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let next = sequence
|
||||
.checked_add(1)
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("SEQUENCE_EXHAUSTED"))?;
|
||||
tx.execute("UPDATE metadata SET value=?1 WHERE key='sequence'", [next])?;
|
||||
tx.commit()?;
|
||||
Ok(u64::try_from(next)?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn save(&self, envelope: &Envelope) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// This slice never deletes a durable event to make room for telemetry.
|
||||
// At the fixed cap it stops collecting until concrete ACKs release room.
|
||||
ensure!(self.count()? < 8, "TELEMETRY_BACKPRESSURE");
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
matches!(
|
||||
envelope.payload,
|
||||
Some(rmm_protocol::Payload::InventorySnapshot(_))
|
||||
),
|
||||
"PASSIVE_INVENTORY_ONLY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let bytes = envelope.encode_to_vec();
|
||||
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 512 * 1024, "TELEMETRY_LIMIT");
|
||||
self.db.execute(
|
||||
"INSERT INTO events(id,payload) VALUES(?1,?2)",
|
||||
params![envelope.message_id, bytes],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn events(&self) -> Result<Vec<Envelope>> {
|
||||
let mut q = self
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.prepare("SELECT payload FROM events ORDER BY rowid")?;
|
||||
q.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))?
|
||||
.map(|v| Ok(Envelope::decode(v?.as_slice())?))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn count(&self) -> Result<u64> {
|
||||
Ok(self
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM events", [], |r| r.get(0))?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn ack(&self, message_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// Unknown IDs have no effect. An HTTP status never calls this function.
|
||||
self.db
|
||||
.execute("DELETE FROM events WHERE id=?1", [message_id])?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn pin_identity(&self, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.db
|
||||
.execute_batch("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity(agent TEXT PRIMARY KEY)")?;
|
||||
let old: Option<String> = self
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.query_row("SELECT agent FROM identity", [], |r| r.get(0))
|
||||
.optional()?;
|
||||
if let Some(old) = old {
|
||||
ensure!(old == id, "JOURNAL_IDENTITY_MISMATCH");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
self.db.execute("INSERT INTO identity VALUES(?1)", [id])?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn durable_reopen_ack_identity_and_single_process() {
|
||||
let directory =
|
||||
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-windows-journal-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut j = Journal::open(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(Journal::open(&directory).is_err());
|
||||
j.pin_identity("a").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(j.pin_identity("b").is_err());
|
||||
let first = j.next_sequence().unwrap();
|
||||
let e = Envelope {
|
||||
message_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
sequence: first,
|
||||
payload: Some(rmm_protocol::Payload::InventorySnapshot(Default::default())),
|
||||
..Default::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
j.save(&e).unwrap();
|
||||
drop(j);
|
||||
let mut j = Journal::open(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(j.next_sequence().unwrap() > first);
|
||||
assert_eq!(j.events().unwrap()[0].message_id, e.message_id);
|
||||
j.ack("unrelated").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(j.count().unwrap(), 1);
|
||||
j.ack(&e.message_id).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(j.count().unwrap(), 0);
|
||||
let heartbeat = Envelope {
|
||||
payload: Some(rmm_protocol::Payload::Heartbeat(Default::default())),
|
||||
..Default::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(j.save(&heartbeat).is_err());
|
||||
drop(j);
|
||||
std::fs::remove_dir_all(directory).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
//! First Windows slice: passive observations and durable telemetry only.
|
||||
//! No executor, startgrant consumer or privileged helper is advertised.
|
||||
pub mod journal;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
pub mod native;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
pub mod service;
|
||||
|
||||
pub const SERVICE_NAME: &str = "RmmDiscoveryWindows";
|
||||
pub const CAPABILITIES: &[&str] = &["windows.base/1", "heartbeat/1"];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
#[path = "../../agent/src/https_channel.rs"]
|
||||
mod https_channel;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
mod runtime;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
#[path = "../../agent/src/transport.rs"]
|
||||
mod transport;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
#[path = "../../agent/src/wire_channel.rs"]
|
||||
mod wire_channel;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
mod certificate_rotation {
|
||||
// Shared transport input only. Windows certificate rotation is not yet a
|
||||
// capability: this first slice refuses expired TLS identities normally.
|
||||
pub struct DeviceIdentity {
|
||||
pub certificate_pem: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub private_key_pem: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
if runtime::main().is_err() {
|
||||
eprintln!("Windows passive agent stopped: INITIALIZATION_OR_TRANSPORT_FAILURE");
|
||||
std::process::exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(not(windows))]
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
eprintln!("This binary requires native Windows.");
|
||||
std::process::exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
|
||||
//! Read-only Windows APIs. Boot identity comes from Win32_OperatingSystem's
|
||||
//! LastBootUpTime, never from the lifetime of this agent process.
|
||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
|
||||
use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use serde_json::{Value, json};
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
use std::{ffi::c_void, os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt, path::Path, ptr, time::Duration};
|
||||
use windows_sys::Win32::{
|
||||
Foundation::LocalFree,
|
||||
Security::{
|
||||
self, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE, ACL,
|
||||
Authorization::{ConvertSidToStringSidW, GetNamedSecurityInfoW, SE_FILE_OBJECT},
|
||||
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
||||
},
|
||||
Storage::FileSystem::{FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT, GetDiskFreeSpaceExW},
|
||||
System::{Registry::*, SystemInformation::*},
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub fn wide(value: impl AsRef<std::ffi::OsStr>) -> Vec<u16> {
|
||||
value.as_ref().encode_wide().chain(Some(0)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn sid_string(sid: *mut c_void) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
let mut text = ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
// SAFETY: SID was returned by the Windows security API; API allocates text.
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { ConvertSidToStringSidW(sid, &mut text) } != 0,
|
||||
"SID_CONVERSION"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut len = 0;
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
while *text.add(len) != 0 {
|
||||
len += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let result = String::from_utf16(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(text, len) })?;
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
LocalFree(text.cast());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn service_sid() -> Result<String> {
|
||||
let account = wide(format!("NT SERVICE\\{}", crate::SERVICE_NAME));
|
||||
let mut sid_len = 0;
|
||||
let mut domain_len = 0;
|
||||
let mut use_type = 0;
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
Security::LookupAccountNameW(
|
||||
ptr::null(),
|
||||
account.as_ptr(),
|
||||
ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
&mut sid_len,
|
||||
ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
&mut domain_len,
|
||||
&mut use_type,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
sid_len > 0 && sid_len <= 256 && domain_len <= 256,
|
||||
"SERVICE_SID_REQUIRED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut sid = vec![0u8; sid_len as usize];
|
||||
let mut domain = vec![0u16; domain_len as usize];
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
Security::LookupAccountNameW(
|
||||
ptr::null(),
|
||||
account.as_ptr(),
|
||||
sid.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
|
||||
&mut sid_len,
|
||||
domain.as_mut_ptr(),
|
||||
&mut domain_len,
|
||||
&mut use_type,
|
||||
)
|
||||
} != 0,
|
||||
"SERVICE_SID_LOOKUP"
|
||||
);
|
||||
sid_string(sid.as_mut_ptr().cast())
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn private_path(path: &Path, directory: bool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
use std::os::windows::fs::MetadataExt;
|
||||
let metadata = std::fs::symlink_metadata(path)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
metadata.file_attributes() & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT == 0
|
||||
&& metadata.is_dir() == directory,
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_TYPE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let allowed = [
|
||||
"S-1-5-18".to_owned(),
|
||||
"S-1-5-32-544".to_owned(),
|
||||
service_sid()?,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let name = wide(path);
|
||||
let mut owner = ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
let mut dacl: *mut ACL = ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
let mut descriptor = ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
// SAFETY: API writes pointers into one allocated descriptor, released below.
|
||||
let status = unsafe {
|
||||
GetNamedSecurityInfoW(
|
||||
name.as_ptr(),
|
||||
SE_FILE_OBJECT,
|
||||
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
||||
&mut owner,
|
||||
ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
&mut dacl,
|
||||
ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
&mut descriptor,
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
ensure!(status == 0, "PRIVATE_PATH_SECURITY");
|
||||
let result = (|| {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!owner.is_null() && !dacl.is_null(),
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_NULL_DACL"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let owner = sid_string(owner)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
allowed.contains(&owner) || (!directory && owner == "S-1-5-19"),
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_OWNER"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(unsafe { (*dacl).AceCount } > 0, "PRIVATE_PATH_EMPTY_DACL");
|
||||
for n in 0..unsafe { (*dacl).AceCount } {
|
||||
let mut ace = ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { Security::GetAce(dacl, u32::from(n), &mut ace) } != 0,
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_ACE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let ace = unsafe { &*ace.cast::<ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE>() };
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
ace.Header.AceType == 0
|
||||
&& usize::from(ace.Header.AceSize) >= std::mem::size_of::<ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE>(),
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_ACE_TYPE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let sid = ptr::addr_of!(ace.SidStart).cast_mut().cast();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
allowed.contains(&sid_string(sid)?),
|
||||
"PRIVATE_PATH_BROAD_ACL"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
})();
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
LocalFree(descriptor.cast());
|
||||
}
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn registry_string(name: &str) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
let key = wide("SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion");
|
||||
let name = wide(name);
|
||||
let mut bytes = vec![0u16; 2048];
|
||||
let mut size = (bytes.len() * 2) as u32;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
RegGetValueW(
|
||||
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
|
||||
key.as_ptr(),
|
||||
name.as_ptr(),
|
||||
RRF_RT_REG_SZ,
|
||||
ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
bytes.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
|
||||
&mut size,
|
||||
)
|
||||
} == 0,
|
||||
"OS_REGISTRY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
size >= 2 && size as usize <= bytes.len() * 2,
|
||||
"OS_REGISTRY_SIZE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(String::from_utf16(&bytes[..size as usize / 2 - 1])?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn snapshot() -> Result<Value> {
|
||||
let started = Utc::now();
|
||||
let mut hostname = vec![0u16; 256];
|
||||
let mut len = hostname.len() as u32;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { GetComputerNameExW(ComputerNameDnsHostname, hostname.as_mut_ptr(), &mut len) }
|
||||
!= 0,
|
||||
"HOSTNAME_QUERY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let hostname = String::from_utf16(&hostname[..len as usize])?;
|
||||
let volume = wide(std::env::var("SystemDrive").context("SYSTEM_DRIVE")? + "\\");
|
||||
let mut available = 0;
|
||||
let mut total = 0;
|
||||
let mut free = 0;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { GetDiskFreeSpaceExW(volume.as_ptr(), &mut available, &mut total, &mut free) } != 0,
|
||||
"VOLUME_QUERY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(total > 0 && available <= total, "VOLUME_VALUES");
|
||||
let product = registry_string("ProductName")?;
|
||||
let display = registry_string("DisplayVersion")?;
|
||||
let build = registry_string("CurrentBuildNumber")?;
|
||||
let os = format!("{product}; DisplayVersion={display}; Build={build}");
|
||||
let completed = Utc::now();
|
||||
Ok(
|
||||
json!({"os":os,"hostname":hostname,"architecture":std::env::consts::ARCH,"root_total_bytes":total,"root_available_bytes":available,"root_available_inodes":null,
|
||||
"collection_started_at":started,"collection_completed_at":completed,
|
||||
"observations":[
|
||||
{"scope":"windows.os","source_id":"windows.registry:CurrentVersion;GetComputerNameExW","observed_at":completed,"quality":"valid","completeness":"partial","truncated":false,"error_code":null,"data":{"product_name":product,"display_version":display,"build":build}},
|
||||
{"scope":"windows.volumes","source_id":"windows.win32:GetDiskFreeSpaceExW","observed_at":completed,"quality":"valid","completeness":"partial","truncated":false,"error_code":null,"data":{"system_volume_total_bytes":total,"system_volume_available_bytes":available}},
|
||||
{"scope":"windows.inodes","source_id":"windows.win32","observed_at":completed,"quality":"unsupported","completeness":"unknown","truncated":false,"error_code":"NOT_APPLICABLE","data":null}
|
||||
]}),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub async fn boot_id() -> Result<String> {
|
||||
// Fixed passive query only. Never interpolates a job or caller-supplied code.
|
||||
// Avoid Win32_Product: it can cause MSI consistency checks and repairs.
|
||||
let executable = Path::new(&std::env::var("SystemRoot")?)
|
||||
.join("System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell.exe");
|
||||
let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new(executable);
|
||||
command.args(["-NoLogo","-NoProfile","-NonInteractive","-Command","$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'; (Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem -Property LastBootUpTime).LastBootUpTime.ToUniversalTime().Ticks.ToString([Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture)"]);
|
||||
command.kill_on_drop(true);
|
||||
let output = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(15), command.output()).await??;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
output.status.success() && output.stdout.len() <= 128 && output.stderr.is_empty(),
|
||||
"BOOT_TIME_QUERY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let text = std::str::from_utf8(&output.stdout)?.trim();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
(17..=19).contains(&text.len()) && text.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()),
|
||||
"BOOT_TIME_FORMAT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut bytes: [u8; 16] = Sha256::digest(format!("rmm.windows.boot.cim.ticks.v1:{text}"))
|
||||
.as_slice()[..16]
|
||||
.try_into()?;
|
||||
bytes[6] = (bytes[6] & 15) | 0x80;
|
||||
bytes[8] = (bytes[8] & 63) | 0x80;
|
||||
Ok(uuid::Uuid::from_bytes(bytes).to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn native_inventory_has_real_windows_sources_and_no_fake_inodes() {
|
||||
let v = super::snapshot().unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(v["root_total_bytes"].as_u64().unwrap() > 0);
|
||||
assert!(v["root_available_inodes"].is_null());
|
||||
assert!(!v["hostname"].as_str().unwrap().is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
v["observations"]
|
||||
.as_array()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.all(|o| o["scope"].as_str().unwrap().starts_with("windows."))
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn boot_identity_survives_independent_native_queries() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
super::boot_id().await.unwrap(),
|
||||
super::boot_id().await.unwrap()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
|
||||
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||
use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use rcgen::{CertificateParams, DnType, KeyPair};
|
||||
use rmm_agent_windows::{CAPABILITIES, journal::Journal, native};
|
||||
use rmm_protocol::*;
|
||||
use serde::Deserialize;
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
fs,
|
||||
path::{Path, PathBuf},
|
||||
sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
|
||||
time::{Duration, Instant},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
struct Config {
|
||||
server_name: String,
|
||||
connect_address: std::net::SocketAddr,
|
||||
ca_file: PathBuf,
|
||||
state_directory: PathBuf,
|
||||
enrollment_token_file: PathBuf,
|
||||
transport: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn create_private(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
use std::io::Write;
|
||||
let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
|
||||
.write(true)
|
||||
.create_new(true)
|
||||
.open(path)?;
|
||||
file.write_all(bytes)?;
|
||||
file.sync_all()?;
|
||||
native::private_path(path, false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn protected_read(path: &Path, max: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
native::private_path(path, false)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
fs::metadata(path)?.len() <= max as u64,
|
||||
"PRIVATE_FILE_LIMIT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(fs::read(path)?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
async fn enrollment(config: &Config, ca: &[u8]) -> Result<EnrollmentResponse> {
|
||||
let state = &config.state_directory;
|
||||
let identity = state.join("identity.json");
|
||||
if identity.try_exists()? {
|
||||
return Ok(serde_json::from_slice(&protected_read(&identity, 32768)?)?);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let key_path = state.join("device.key");
|
||||
let key = if key_path.try_exists()? {
|
||||
KeyPair::from_pem(std::str::from_utf8(&protected_read(&key_path, 16384)?)?)?
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let key = KeyPair::generate()?;
|
||||
create_private(&key_path, key.serialize_pem().as_bytes())?;
|
||||
key
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut parameters = CertificateParams::default();
|
||||
parameters
|
||||
.distinguished_name
|
||||
.push(DnType::CommonName, "new-windows-device");
|
||||
let csr = parameters.serialize_request(&key)?.pem()?;
|
||||
let token = String::from_utf8(protected_read(&config.enrollment_token_file, 128)?)?
|
||||
.trim()
|
||||
.to_owned();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
token.len() == 64 && token.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
|
||||
"ENROLLMENT_TOKEN_FORMAT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.https_only(true)
|
||||
.tls_built_in_root_certs(false)
|
||||
.add_root_certificate(reqwest::Certificate::from_pem(ca)?)
|
||||
.resolve(&config.server_name, config.connect_address)
|
||||
.no_proxy()
|
||||
.redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
|
||||
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(20))
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
let response = client
|
||||
.post(format!(
|
||||
"https://{}:{}/agent/v1/enroll",
|
||||
config.server_name,
|
||||
config.connect_address.port()
|
||||
))
|
||||
.json(&EnrollmentRequest {
|
||||
token,
|
||||
csr_pem: csr,
|
||||
})
|
||||
.send()
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
let bytes = crate::https_channel::bounded_body(response, 32768, "application/json").await?;
|
||||
let identity: EnrollmentResponse = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)?;
|
||||
Uuid::parse_str(&identity.agent_id)?;
|
||||
Uuid::parse_str(&identity.asset_id)?;
|
||||
// The server consumes the token once; a lost response is an explicit recovery
|
||||
// gate. No automatic re-enrollment or replacement identity is attempted.
|
||||
create_private(
|
||||
&state.join("device.pem"),
|
||||
identity.certificate_pem.as_bytes(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
create_private(
|
||||
&state.join("identity.json"),
|
||||
&serde_json::to_vec(&identity)?,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
fs::remove_file(&config.enrollment_token_file)?;
|
||||
Ok(identity)
|
||||
}
|
||||
struct Agent {
|
||||
config: Config,
|
||||
identity: EnrollmentResponse,
|
||||
ca: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
journal: Journal,
|
||||
boot: String,
|
||||
instance: String,
|
||||
started: Instant,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Agent {
|
||||
fn envelope(&mut self, generation: u64, payload: Payload) -> Result<Envelope> {
|
||||
Ok(Envelope {
|
||||
protocol_major: 1,
|
||||
protocol_minor: 0,
|
||||
message_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
agent_id: self.identity.agent_id.clone(),
|
||||
enrollment_generation: 1,
|
||||
connection_generation: generation,
|
||||
boot_id: self.boot.clone(),
|
||||
sequence: self.journal.next_sequence()?,
|
||||
observed_at: Utc::now().timestamp_millis(),
|
||||
payload: Some(payload),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn queue_inventory(&mut self, generation: u64) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
if self.journal.count()? > 0 {
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let data = serde_json::to_vec(&native::snapshot()?)?;
|
||||
ensure!(data.len() <= 32768, "WINDOWS_INVENTORY_LIMIT");
|
||||
let envelope = self.envelope(
|
||||
generation,
|
||||
Payload::InventorySnapshot(InventorySnapshot {
|
||||
snapshot_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
scope: "windows.base".into(),
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
chunk_index: 0,
|
||||
chunk_count: 1,
|
||||
sha256: Sha256::digest(&data).to_vec(),
|
||||
data,
|
||||
completeness: "partial".into(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
self.journal.save(&envelope)
|
||||
}
|
||||
async fn session(&mut self, stop: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let hello = self.envelope(
|
||||
0,
|
||||
Payload::ClientHello(ClientHello {
|
||||
agent_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").into(),
|
||||
capabilities: CAPABILITIES.iter().map(|v| v.to_string()).collect(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let identity = crate::certificate_rotation::DeviceIdentity {
|
||||
certificate_pem: protected_read(
|
||||
&self.config.state_directory.join("device.pem"),
|
||||
32768,
|
||||
)?,
|
||||
private_key_pem: protected_read(
|
||||
&self.config.state_directory.join("device.key"),
|
||||
16384,
|
||||
)?,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mode = crate::wire_channel::Mode::parse(&self.config.transport)?;
|
||||
let mut channel = crate::wire_channel::connect(
|
||||
mode,
|
||||
self.config.connect_address,
|
||||
&self.ca,
|
||||
&identity,
|
||||
hello,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
let reply = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(20), channel.receive()).await??;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
reply.agent_id == self.identity.agent_id
|
||||
&& reply.enrollment_generation == 1
|
||||
&& reply.protocol_major == 1
|
||||
&& reply.protocol_minor == 0,
|
||||
"SERVER_HELLO_BINDING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let Some(Payload::ServerHello(server)) = reply.payload else {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("SERVER_HELLO_REQUIRED")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let generation = server.connection_generation;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
generation > 0 && server.max_message_bytes == rmm_domain::MAX_MESSAGE as u32,
|
||||
"SERVER_LIMITS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.queue_inventory(generation)?;
|
||||
let mut replay = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(10);
|
||||
let mut inventory = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut heartbeat = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(60);
|
||||
let mut heartbeat_after = Duration::from_secs(30);
|
||||
let mut tick = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
|
||||
while !stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
|
||||
tokio::select! {
|
||||
_=tick.tick()=>{},
|
||||
message=channel.receive()=>{
|
||||
let message=message?;
|
||||
ensure!(message.agent_id==self.identity.agent_id && message.enrollment_generation==1 && message.protocol_major==1 && message.protocol_minor==0 && message.connection_generation==generation,"SERVER_ENVELOPE_BINDING");
|
||||
match message.payload {
|
||||
Some(Payload::Ack(ack))=>self.journal.ack(&ack.message_id)?,
|
||||
// There is deliberately no acceptance/start path. A stale
|
||||
// or malicious offer cannot activate an unimplemented job.
|
||||
Some(Payload::JobOffer(_)|Payload::ExecutionPermit(_))=>anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_EXECUTION_CAPABILITY"),
|
||||
_=>anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_SERVER_MESSAGE")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if heartbeat.elapsed() >= heartbeat_after {
|
||||
let payload = Payload::Heartbeat(Heartbeat {
|
||||
instance_id: self.instance.clone(),
|
||||
uptime_seconds: self.started.elapsed().as_secs(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
let h = self.envelope(generation, payload)?;
|
||||
channel.send(&h).await?;
|
||||
if channel.uses_https() {
|
||||
let poll = self.envelope(
|
||||
generation,
|
||||
Payload::Heartbeat(Heartbeat {
|
||||
instance_id: self.instance.clone(),
|
||||
uptime_seconds: self.started.elapsed().as_secs(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
channel.poll(poll).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
heartbeat = Instant::now();
|
||||
heartbeat_after = Duration::from_millis(rand::random_range(27000..33000));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if replay.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(5) {
|
||||
for mut event in self.journal.events()? {
|
||||
event.connection_generation = generation;
|
||||
channel.send(&event).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
replay = Instant::now();
|
||||
}
|
||||
if inventory.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(86400) {
|
||||
self.queue_inventory(generation)?;
|
||||
inventory = Instant::now();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn service_run(stop: &'static AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let arguments: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
arguments.len() == 3 && arguments[0] == "--service" && arguments[1] == "--config",
|
||||
"SERVICE_ARGUMENTS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let path = Path::new(&arguments[2]);
|
||||
ensure!(path.is_absolute(), "ABSOLUTE_CONFIG_REQUIRED");
|
||||
let config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(&protected_read(path, 32768)?)?;
|
||||
native::private_path(&config.state_directory, true)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
crate::https_channel::server_name()? == config.server_name,
|
||||
"SERVER_NAME"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let ca = protected_read(&config.ca_file, 32768)?;
|
||||
for child in fs::read_dir(&config.state_directory)? {
|
||||
let child = child?;
|
||||
native::private_path(&child.path(), false)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let journal = Journal::open(&config.state_directory)?;
|
||||
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
|
||||
.enable_all()
|
||||
.worker_threads(2)
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
runtime.block_on(async move {
|
||||
let identity = enrollment(&config, &ca).await?;
|
||||
journal.pin_identity(&identity.agent_id)?;
|
||||
let boot = native::boot_id().await?;
|
||||
let mut agent = Agent {
|
||||
config,
|
||||
identity,
|
||||
ca,
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
boot,
|
||||
instance: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
started: Instant::now(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut backoff = 1;
|
||||
while !stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
|
||||
let start = Instant::now();
|
||||
let _ = agent.session(stop).await;
|
||||
if start.elapsed() > Duration::from_secs(60) {
|
||||
backoff = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let delay = crate::https_channel::retry_delay(backoff);
|
||||
backoff = (backoff + 1).min(6);
|
||||
let until = Instant::now() + delay;
|
||||
while !stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst) && Instant::now() < until {
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn main() -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
|
||||
if args == ["--help"] {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"Development Windows passive service. --service --config ABSOLUTE_PATH. No job executor or approval bypass."
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
if args == ["--native-probe"] {
|
||||
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new()?;
|
||||
let boot = runtime.block_on(native::boot_id())?;
|
||||
let inventory = native::snapshot()?;
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"{}",
|
||||
serde_json::json!({"platform":"windows","architecture":std::env::consts::ARCH,"hostname_available":!inventory["hostname"].as_str().unwrap_or("").is_empty(),"system_volume_available":inventory["root_available_bytes"].as_u64().is_some(),"inodes":null,"boot_id":boot,"capabilities":CAPABILITIES,"jobs_supported":false})
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
args.first().map(String::as_str) == Some("--service"),
|
||||
"UNKNOWN_ARGUMENT"
|
||||
);
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
args.len() == 3 && args[1] == "--config",
|
||||
"SERVICE_ARGUMENTS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(&protected_read(Path::new(&args[2]), 32768)?)?;
|
||||
// Shared transport reads its one DNS identity. Set it before SCM dispatch
|
||||
// creates its service thread and before any Tokio/collector threads exist.
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
std::env::set_var("RMM_SERVER_NAME", &config.server_name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
crate::https_channel::server_name()? == config.server_name,
|
||||
"SERVER_NAME"
|
||||
);
|
||||
rmm_agent_windows::service::dispatch(service_run)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
//! Native SCM lifecycle. This service has no privileged action endpoint.
|
||||
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
ptr,
|
||||
sync::{
|
||||
OnceLock,
|
||||
atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering},
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Services::*;
|
||||
static STOP: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
|
||||
static HANDLE: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
|
||||
type Runner = fn(&'static AtomicBool) -> Result<()>;
|
||||
static RUN: OnceLock<Runner> = OnceLock::new();
|
||||
fn status(state: u32, exit: u32) {
|
||||
let handle = HANDLE.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE;
|
||||
if handle.is_null() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let value = SERVICE_STATUS {
|
||||
dwServiceType: SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
|
||||
dwCurrentState: state,
|
||||
dwControlsAccepted: if state == SERVICE_RUNNING {
|
||||
SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0
|
||||
},
|
||||
dwWin32ExitCode: exit,
|
||||
dwServiceSpecificExitCode: 0,
|
||||
dwCheckPoint: 0,
|
||||
dwWaitHint: if state == SERVICE_STOP_PENDING {
|
||||
15000
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
SetServiceStatus(handle, &value);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
unsafe extern "system" fn control(
|
||||
code: u32,
|
||||
_event: u32,
|
||||
_data: *mut std::ffi::c_void,
|
||||
_context: *mut std::ffi::c_void,
|
||||
) -> u32 {
|
||||
if code == SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP || code == SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN {
|
||||
STOP.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
|
||||
status(SERVICE_STOP_PENDING, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
0
|
||||
}
|
||||
unsafe extern "system" fn service_main(_count: u32, _args: *mut *mut u16) {
|
||||
let name = crate::native::wide(crate::SERVICE_NAME);
|
||||
let handle =
|
||||
unsafe { RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerExW(name.as_ptr(), Some(control), ptr::null_mut()) };
|
||||
if handle.is_null() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
HANDLE.store(handle as usize, Ordering::SeqCst);
|
||||
status(SERVICE_RUNNING, 0);
|
||||
let result = RUN.get().expect("SCM runner initialized")(&STOP);
|
||||
// Error details never enter the Windows event log: paths may contain secrets.
|
||||
status(SERVICE_STOPPED, if result.is_ok() { 0 } else { 1066 });
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn dispatch(run: Runner) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(RUN.set(run).is_ok(), "SCM_ALREADY_INITIALIZED");
|
||||
let mut name = crate::native::wide(crate::SERVICE_NAME);
|
||||
let table = [
|
||||
SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRYW {
|
||||
lpServiceName: name.as_mut_ptr(),
|
||||
lpServiceProc: Some(service_main),
|
||||
},
|
||||
SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRYW {
|
||||
lpServiceName: ptr::null_mut(),
|
||||
lpServiceProc: None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW(table.as_ptr()) } != 0,
|
||||
"SCM_DISPATCH_FAILED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ const crypto = require('node:crypto');
|
||||
const { isDeepStrictEqual: equal } = require('node:util');
|
||||
const { chromium } = require('../../web/node_modules/playwright');
|
||||
const root = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..');
|
||||
const assert = v => { if (!v) throw new Error('APT UI contract mismatch'); };
|
||||
const assert = v => { if (!v) { const error = new Error('APT UI contract mismatch'); Error.captureStackTrace(error, assert); throw error; } };
|
||||
function readPrivate(file) {
|
||||
const s = fs.lstatSync(file);
|
||||
assert(s.isFile() && !s.isSymbolicLink() && s.uid === process.getuid() && (s.mode & 0o777) === 0o600 && s.size < 1048576);
|
||||
@@ -80,7 +80,12 @@ function checkAction(p, expected) {
|
||||
assert(pending.approval_state === 'pending_approval' && pending.job_count === 0 && pending.execution_state === null);
|
||||
await op.getByRole('button', { name: 'Unveränderlichen Plan zur Prüfung öffnen' }).click();
|
||||
const plan = JSON.parse(await detail.locator('pre').innerText());
|
||||
assert(equal(plan, expected.plan) && plan.jobs.length === 1 && plan.resolved_targets.length === 1);
|
||||
// Submission changes request metadata, never the fixed plan bytes/jobs.
|
||||
// Require the new pending state explicitly and compare EVERY other field.
|
||||
const { approval_state: currentState, ...currentPlan } = plan;
|
||||
const { approval_state: preparedState, ...preparedPlan } = expected.plan;
|
||||
assert(currentState === 'pending_approval' && preparedState === null);
|
||||
assert(equal(currentPlan, preparedPlan) && plan.jobs.length === 1 && plan.resolved_targets.length === 1);
|
||||
assert(crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(plan.plan_payload_bytes)).digest('hex') === plan.plan_hash);
|
||||
const p = plan.jobs[0].payload; checkAction(p, expected);
|
||||
assert(p.agent_id === expected.agent_id && p.asset_id === expected.asset_id && p.tenant_id === expected.tenant_id && Date.parse(p.start_before) > Date.now());
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +58,40 @@ def upgrade_agent(payload):
|
||||
return dict(binary_sha256=payload['sha256'], state_preserved_before_start=True, package_effects=False, backup=str(backup))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def stored_attempt_evidence(payload):
|
||||
"""Read only already persisted evidence; no live collector/package command."""
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
import re
|
||||
base = Path('/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction'); active = base/'active'
|
||||
context = json.loads((active/'context.json').read_text())
|
||||
require(context['job_id'] == payload['job_id'] and context['attempt_id'] == payload['attempt_id'], 'exact stored attempt required')
|
||||
result = dict(files={}, records={}, context=context)
|
||||
for name in ('hook-armed.json','native-prechecks.json','sandbox-ready.json','sandbox-result.json','launch.json'):
|
||||
path = active/name
|
||||
result['files'][name] = dict(exists=path.exists(), symlink=path.is_symlink())
|
||||
if path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink(): result['records'][name] = json.loads(path.read_text())
|
||||
for name in ('bootstrap-attempt-rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0.json','bootstrap-retry-rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0.json',
|
||||
'acceptance-rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0.json','pending-acceptance-rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0.json'):
|
||||
path = base/name
|
||||
result['files'][name] = dict(exists=path.exists(), symlink=path.is_symlink(), sha256=hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() if path.is_file() else None)
|
||||
with sqlite3.connect('file:/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite?mode=ro', uri=True) as db:
|
||||
row = db.execute('SELECT c.result,e.outcome FROM consumed c JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) WHERE c.grant_id=?', (context['grant_id'],)).fetchone()
|
||||
result['ledger'] = dict(result=json.loads(row[0]) if row[0] else None, outcome=json.loads(row[1]) if row[1] else None,
|
||||
consumed=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM consumed').fetchone()[0], unresolved=db.execute('SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL').fetchone()[0])
|
||||
result['logs'] = {}
|
||||
for name in ('dpkg.log','term.log','history.log'):
|
||||
path = base/'log'/name
|
||||
if path.is_file() and not path.is_symlink():
|
||||
raw = path.read_bytes(); require(len(raw) <= 1024*1024, 'bounded stored log')
|
||||
text = raw.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
|
||||
result['logs'][name] = dict(sha256=hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(), size=len(raw),
|
||||
fixture_states=re.findall(r'\bstatus (not-installed|half-installed|unpacked|half-configured|installed|triggers-pending|triggers-awaited) rmm-mvp-test(?::all)? (1\.[01])\b', text),
|
||||
configure_record=bool(re.search(r'\bconfigure rmm-mvp-test(?::all)?\b', text)),
|
||||
setup_message='Setting up rmm-mvp-test (1.0)' in text,
|
||||
dpkg_error='dpkg: error' in text)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def switch_endpoint(payload):
|
||||
import sqlite3
|
||||
os.umask(0o077)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
# Windows-Client: erster nativer Entwicklungsstand
|
||||
|
||||
Stand 2026-11-13, Spezifikation 1.9. Windows-11-Gast und Notebook-Host sind
|
||||
verschiedene Geräte. Auf dem Notebook laufen ausschließlich Entwicklungstools;
|
||||
der Client verwendet den endgültigen Cloudserver `discovery.ease-technologies.de`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlich nachgewiesen
|
||||
|
||||
`rmm-agent-windows` als eigene Plattform-Crate mit gemeinsamen Domain-/Protobuf-
|
||||
Verträgen und direkt wiederverwendeten WSS-/HTTPS-/TLS-Modulen des Linux-Agenten.
|
||||
Isolierter Docker-Crossbuild mit Rust 1.99.1 für `x86_64-pc-windows-gnu`:
|
||||
Debug und Release erfolgreich; Windows-target Clippy über alle Targets mit
|
||||
`-D warnings` erfolgreich. Zwei gezielte Domain-Tests prüfen die unveränderte
|
||||
Linux-Validierung, Windows ohne erfundene Inodes und abgewiesene Plattformmischung.
|
||||
Das sind ergänzende lokale Prüfungen, keine nativen Windows-Dienstnachweise.
|
||||
|
||||
Releaseartefakt SHA256
|
||||
`31e360e50b177b4d5729d24e436d4f25aeed7b1a7bd35f2a129841ba1abffd37`
|
||||
auf der tatsächlichen Windows-11-Pro-VM (Version 10.0.26300, x64) gestartet:
|
||||
`--native-probe` erfolgreich. Hostname und Systemvolume tatsächlich über Win32
|
||||
lesbar; Bootkennung aus `Win32_OperatingSystem.LastBootUpTime` abgeleitet statt
|
||||
bei jedem Agentstart neu erzeugt. Inodes ausdrücklich `null`/nicht anwendbar.
|
||||
Keine Schlüssel oder realen Hostnamen in der veröffentlichten Probeausgabe.
|
||||
|
||||
Binärtransfer über bestehendes, hostkeygeprüftes SFTP mit SHA256-Nachprüfung.
|
||||
Große PowerShell-Console-JSON-Eingaben waren als Bootstraptransport ungeeignet
|
||||
(Timeout/Console-Reader-Ausnahme); deshalb nur kleine zeilenbegrenzte Metadaten
|
||||
über stdin. SSH-/Hostkeyprüfung und Reverse-Portgrenzen bleiben unverändert.
|
||||
Artefaktverzeichnisse werden nach Hash neu angelegt, keine vorhandene Identität
|
||||
oder Historie gelöscht. Private Evidenz: `devstate/windows-client/`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementiert, Dienst-/Online-Abnahme noch offen
|
||||
|
||||
- Nativer SCM-Dienstlebenszyklus, vorgesehen als `LocalService` mit eigenem
|
||||
Service-SID-Zugriff auf Zustand und ausschließlich lesbarem Programm/Config.
|
||||
- Windows prüft Owner/DACL und verweigert Reparse-Points/breite ACLs. Geräteschlüssel
|
||||
werden nur auf Windows erzeugt; Enrollment über CA- und namensgeprüftes TLS,
|
||||
danach mTLS. Ein verlorener Enrollmentnachweis löst keinen Identitätsreset aus.
|
||||
- SQLite mit FULL-Synchronisierung, Prozesssperre, monotoner persistenter Sequenz,
|
||||
konkretem ACK und begrenzter Telemetriequeue. Kein Löschen für Platzgewinn.
|
||||
- Separate `windows.base`-Beobachtungen mit Erhebungszeit/Quelle/Qualität; Server
|
||||
bindet den Scope an die authentisierte Verbindung und deren Capability.
|
||||
Geräte-API zeigt die gespeicherte Quelle statt eines festen Linuxlabels.
|
||||
- Ausschließlich `windows.base/1` und `heartbeat/1` werden angeboten.
|
||||
**Kein Jobexecutor, keine PowerShell-Jobfähigkeit, kein privilegierter Helper.**
|
||||
Angebote/Startgrants werden verweigert. Es gibt keine Genehmigungsabkürzung.
|
||||
|
||||
Dieser erste Entwicklungsbuild ist **unsigniert**. Kein produktiver signierter
|
||||
Installer/MSVC-Supportnachweis, keine Zertifikatsrotations-/Widerrufs-/Proxy- oder
|
||||
Windows-Paket-/Dienstaktionsabnahme. Native Testprogramme sowie die tatsächliche
|
||||
SCM-/Enrollment-/mTLS-/Inventarstrecke sind zum Zeitpunkt dieses Abschnitts noch
|
||||
offen. Ein erfolgreicher Crossbuild bzw. `--native-probe` ersetzt sie nicht.
|
||||
|
||||
## Ausgeführte und geplante Befehle
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich ausgeführt: Docker-Build und gezielte Rust-Prüfungen oben sowie
|
||||
`python3 deploy/windows/client_bootstrap.py upload-agent --artifact <Release-EXE>`
|
||||
und `python3 deploy/windows/client_bootstrap.py probe` gegen ausschließlich den
|
||||
Windows-Gast. Keine RMM-Jobs oder Genehmigungen wurden dabei erzeugt.
|
||||
|
||||
Geplant, noch nicht als bestanden behauptet: native Testprogramme und
|
||||
`Install-PassiveClient.ps1` über `client_bootstrap.py install`, anschließend
|
||||
zwei frische Heartbeats, korrekt zugeordnetes Inventar und Tenant-B-Verweigerung.
|
||||
Installation ist create-only; bei Teilfehlern Zustand inspizieren und erhalten,
|
||||
nicht blind neu enrollen oder den Bootstrap wiederholen.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
# Development bootstrap only. No RMM jobs, privileged helper or execution bypass.
|
||||
# Run through the pinned SSH transport as the bootstrap administrator.
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
|
||||
$p = $global:RmmBootstrapPayload
|
||||
if ($null -eq $p) { throw 'Bootstrap payload required through the pinned launcher' }
|
||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' -or $p.token -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$') { throw 'Invalid bootstrap metadata' }
|
||||
$serviceName = 'RmmDiscoveryWindows'
|
||||
$application = 'C:\Program Files\RustDiscovery'
|
||||
$root = 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery'
|
||||
$state = Join-Path $root 'state'
|
||||
$source = 'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\' + $p.sha256 + '\rmm-agent-windows.exe'
|
||||
if (Get-Service -Name $serviceName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) { throw 'Service already exists: preserve identity and inspect instead of reinstalling' }
|
||||
if ((Test-Path -LiteralPath $application) -or (Test-Path -LiteralPath $root)) { throw 'Existing client state must be preserved' }
|
||||
if ((Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $source -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant() -cne $p.sha256) { throw 'Artifact hash mismatch' }
|
||||
$ca = [Convert]::FromBase64String($p.ca)
|
||||
if ($ca.Length -lt 100 -or $ca.Length -gt 32768) { throw 'CA size' }
|
||||
$administrators = New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-544')
|
||||
$system = New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-18')
|
||||
function Protect-Directory([string]$Path, $ServiceSid, [string]$Rights) {
|
||||
$acl = New-Object Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
|
||||
$acl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
|
||||
$acl.SetOwner($administrators)
|
||||
foreach ($sid in @($administrators, $system)) {
|
||||
$acl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($sid, 'FullControl', 'ContainerInherit,ObjectInherit', 'None', 'Allow')))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ($null -ne $ServiceSid) {
|
||||
$acl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($ServiceSid, $Rights, 'ContainerInherit,ObjectInherit', 'None', 'Allow')))
|
||||
}
|
||||
Set-Acl -LiteralPath $Path -AclObject $acl
|
||||
}
|
||||
function Protect-ReadFile([string]$Path, $ServiceSid) {
|
||||
$acl = New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSecurity
|
||||
$acl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
|
||||
$acl.SetOwner($administrators)
|
||||
foreach ($sid in @($administrators, $system)) {
|
||||
$acl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($sid, 'FullControl', 'Allow')))
|
||||
}
|
||||
$acl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($ServiceSid, 'ReadAndExecute', 'Allow')))
|
||||
Set-Acl -LiteralPath $Path -AclObject $acl
|
||||
}
|
||||
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $application | Out-Null
|
||||
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $root | Out-Null
|
||||
Protect-Directory $application $null 'ReadAndExecute'
|
||||
Protect-Directory $root $null 'ReadAndExecute'
|
||||
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $source -Destination (Join-Path $application 'rmm-agent-windows.exe')
|
||||
$binary = '"C:\Program Files\RustDiscovery\rmm-agent-windows.exe" --service --config "C:\ProgramData\RustDiscovery\config.json"'
|
||||
$sc = Join-Path $env:WINDIR 'System32\sc.exe'
|
||||
# New-Service passes the quoted image path directly to SCM, avoiding native
|
||||
# PowerShell 5.1 command-line quoting of a path containing spaces. Keep it manual
|
||||
# until the account has been narrowed; it is never started as LocalSystem.
|
||||
New-Service -Name $serviceName -BinaryPathName $binary -StartupType Manual | Out-Null
|
||||
& $sc config $serviceName start= auto obj= 'NT AUTHORITY\LocalService' | Out-Null
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'SCM service identity configuration failed' }
|
||||
& $sc sidtype $serviceName unrestricted | Out-Null
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'SCM service SID configuration failed' }
|
||||
$serviceSid = (New-Object Security.Principal.NTAccount('NT SERVICE', $serviceName)).Translate([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
|
||||
Protect-Directory $application $serviceSid 'ReadAndExecute'
|
||||
Protect-Directory $root $serviceSid 'ReadAndExecute'
|
||||
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $state | Out-Null
|
||||
Protect-Directory $state $serviceSid 'Modify'
|
||||
$caPath = Join-Path $root 'server-ca.pem'
|
||||
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($caPath, $ca)
|
||||
Protect-ReadFile $caPath $serviceSid
|
||||
# Only this one-use token is writable by the service so it can remove the copy.
|
||||
$tokenPath = Join-Path $state 'enrollment.token'
|
||||
[IO.File]::WriteAllText($tokenPath, $p.token, (New-Object Text.UTF8Encoding($false)))
|
||||
$address = @([Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses('discovery.ease-technologies.de') | Where-Object {$_.AddressFamily -eq [Net.Sockets.AddressFamily]::InterNetwork})[0]
|
||||
if ($null -eq $address) { throw 'Server DNS has no IPv4 address' }
|
||||
$config = [ordered]@{
|
||||
server_name = 'discovery.ease-technologies.de'
|
||||
connect_address = $address.ToString() + ':443'
|
||||
ca_file = $caPath
|
||||
state_directory = $state
|
||||
enrollment_token_file = $tokenPath
|
||||
transport = 'wss'
|
||||
}
|
||||
$configPath = Join-Path $root 'config.json'
|
||||
[IO.File]::WriteAllText($configPath, ($config | ConvertTo-Json -Compress), (New-Object Text.UTF8Encoding($false)))
|
||||
Protect-ReadFile $configPath $serviceSid
|
||||
& $sc description $serviceName 'Rust Discovery development passive agent; no job executor' | Out-Null
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw 'Service description failed' }
|
||||
Start-Service -Name $serviceName
|
||||
[pscustomobject]@{installed=$true;service_name=$serviceName;service_identity='LocalService';service_sid=$serviceSid.Value;artifact_sha256=$p.sha256;no_job_executor=$true;no_reboot=$true} | ConvertTo-Json -Compress
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Narrow SSH bootstrap for the Windows development guest. No RMM execution.
|
||||
|
||||
Reads credentials only as protected JSON; all remote code is fixed here.
|
||||
Private keys are generated by the Windows agent and never downloaded.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / 'deploy'))
|
||||
import vm_mvp_acceptance as contract
|
||||
|
||||
EVIDENCE = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-client'
|
||||
REMOTE = r'C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def powershell(script, payload=None, timeout=60, remote_signed=False):
|
||||
access = contract.protected_json(ROOT / 'credentials/windows-dev-access.json')
|
||||
script = "try {\n"+script+"\n} catch {[pscustomobject]@{bootstrap_error=$true;error_id=$_.FullyQualifiedErrorId;line=$_.InvocationInfo.ScriptLineNumber} | ConvertTo-Json -Compress; exit 1}"
|
||||
command = 'powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive ' + ('-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned ' if remote_signed else '') + '-EncodedCommand ' + base64.b64encode(script.encode('utf-16le')).decode('ascii')
|
||||
result = subprocess.run(access['ssh_prefix'] + [command], input=(json.dumps(payload or {})+'\n').encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=timeout)
|
||||
if result.returncode:
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'bootstrap_returncode':result.returncode,'stdout_bytes':len(result.stdout),'stderr_bytes':len(result.stderr)}))
|
||||
failure=EVIDENCE/'bootstrap-private-last-error.json'
|
||||
fd=os.open(failure,os.O_CREAT|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY,0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump({'stdout':result.stdout.decode('utf-8',errors='replace'),'stderr':result.stderr.decode('utf-8',errors='replace')},out)
|
||||
# Exact stderr can contain private paths, command arguments and tokens.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
report=json.loads(result.stdout.decode('utf-8-sig'))
|
||||
if report.get('bootstrap_error'):
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'bootstrap_error':True,'error_id':report.get('error_id'),'line':report.get('line')}))
|
||||
except (ValueError,AttributeError):pass
|
||||
raise RuntimeError('WINDOWS_BOOTSTRAP_FAILED_' + str(result.returncode))
|
||||
return json.loads(result.stdout.decode('utf-8-sig'))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
UPLOAD = r'''
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if ($p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
||||
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
||||
if (!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $root)) {
|
||||
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $root | Out-Null
|
||||
$acl=New-Object Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
|
||||
$acl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true,$false)
|
||||
foreach($sid in @('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')) {
|
||||
$s=New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($sid)
|
||||
$acl.AddAccessRule((New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($s,'FullControl','ContainerInherit,ObjectInherit','None','Allow')))
|
||||
}
|
||||
$acl.SetOwner((New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-544')))
|
||||
Set-Acl -LiteralPath $root -AclObject $acl
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$') {throw 'Artifact hash format'}
|
||||
$version=Join-Path $root $p.sha256
|
||||
if (!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $version)) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $version | Out-Null}
|
||||
$path=Join-Path $version $p.name
|
||||
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) {throw 'Artifact already exists'}
|
||||
[pscustomobject]@{prepared=$true;sha256=$p.sha256} | ConvertTo-Json -Compress
|
||||
'''
|
||||
VERIFY_UPLOAD = r'''
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' -or $p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
||||
$path='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\'+$p.sha256+'\'+$p.name
|
||||
$hash=(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
|
||||
if ($hash -cne $p.sha256) {throw 'Artifact hash'}
|
||||
[pscustomobject]@{uploaded=$true;sha256=$hash;size=(Get-Item -LiteralPath $path).Length} | ConvertTo-Json -Compress
|
||||
'''
|
||||
PROBE = r'''
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$') {throw 'Artifact hash format'}
|
||||
$path='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\'+$p.sha256+'\rmm-agent-windows.exe'
|
||||
$raw=& $path --native-probe
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {throw 'Native probe failed'}
|
||||
$probe=$raw | ConvertFrom-Json
|
||||
$os=Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -Property Caption,Version,OSArchitecture
|
||||
[pscustomobject]@{probe=$probe;os_caption=$os.Caption;os_version=$os.Version;architecture=$os.OSArchitecture;native_execution=$true} | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8 -Compress
|
||||
'''
|
||||
TEST = r'''
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if ($p.kind -notin @('lib','bin')) {throw 'Test allowlist'}
|
||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$') {throw 'Artifact hash format'}
|
||||
$path='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\'+$p.sha256+'\windows-tests-'+$p.kind+'.exe'
|
||||
$out=& $path --test-threads=1 2>&1
|
||||
$code=$LASTEXITCODE
|
||||
$summary=@($out | Where-Object {"$_" -match '^test result: '})
|
||||
if (!$summary) {throw 'No native test summary'}
|
||||
[pscustomobject]@{exit_code=$code;native_execution=$true;summary=($summary -join ' ')} | ConvertTo-Json -Compress
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record(name, evidence):
|
||||
EVIDENCE.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
EVIDENCE.chmod(0o700)
|
||||
path=EVIDENCE/name
|
||||
fd=os.open(path, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:
|
||||
json.dump(evidence,out,indent=2)
|
||||
out.flush(); os.fsync(out.fileno())
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upload(path, name):
|
||||
data=Path(path).read_bytes()
|
||||
digest=hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
|
||||
metadata=dict(name=name,sha256=digest)
|
||||
powershell(UPLOAD,metadata,timeout=60)
|
||||
access=contract.protected_json(ROOT/'credentials/windows-dev-access.json')
|
||||
prefix=access['ssh_prefix']
|
||||
args=['sftp']+[part for part in prefix[1:-1] if part!='-T']+['-b','-',prefix[-1]]
|
||||
remote='/C:/ProgramData/RustDiscoveryBootstrap/'+digest+'/'+name
|
||||
batch='put '+json.dumps(str(Path(path).resolve()))+' '+json.dumps(remote)+'\n'
|
||||
transferred=subprocess.run(args,input=batch.encode(),capture_output=True,timeout=120)
|
||||
if transferred.returncode:raise RuntimeError('WINDOWS_SFTP_UPLOAD_FAILED')
|
||||
result=powershell(VERIFY_UPLOAD,metadata,timeout=60)
|
||||
record(name+'.'+result['sha256']+'.uploaded.json',result)
|
||||
pointer=EVIDENCE/(name+'.latest.json')
|
||||
fd=os.open(pointer,os.O_CREAT|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY,0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd,'w') as out:json.dump(result,out)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser=argparse.ArgumentParser()
|
||||
parser.add_argument('action',choices=['upload-agent','upload-lib-tests','upload-bin-tests','upload-installer','install','install-after-nonstart','probe','test-lib','test-bin'])
|
||||
parser.add_argument('--artifact',type=Path)
|
||||
args=parser.parse_args()
|
||||
if args.action.startswith('upload-'):
|
||||
if args.artifact is None: parser.error('--artifact required')
|
||||
name={'upload-agent':'rmm-agent-windows.exe','upload-lib-tests':'windows-tests-lib.exe','upload-bin-tests':'windows-tests-bin.exe','upload-installer':'Install-PassiveClient.ps1'}[args.action]
|
||||
result=upload(args.artifact,name)
|
||||
print(json.dumps(result))
|
||||
elif args.action in ('install','install-after-nonstart'):
|
||||
import remote_client_bootstrap as cloud
|
||||
artifact=contract.protected_json(EVIDENCE/'rmm-agent-windows.exe.latest.json')
|
||||
installer=contract.protected_json(EVIDENCE/'Install-PassiveClient.ps1.latest.json')
|
||||
# A create-once local checkpoint prevents creating a second token after
|
||||
# an ambiguous remote bootstrap. Inspect/preserve Windows state instead.
|
||||
if args.action=='install-after-nonstart':
|
||||
previous=contract.protected_json(EVIDENCE/'install-nonstart-after-policy.json')
|
||||
contract.require(not any(previous[k] for k in ('client_root','application_root','service')) and previous['machine_policy']=='Undefined' and previous['user_policy']=='Undefined','verified_bootstrap_nonstart_required')
|
||||
checkpoint='installation-started.json' if args.action=='install' else 'installation-after-nonstart-started.json'
|
||||
record(checkpoint,{'artifact_sha256':artifact['sha256'],'installer_sha256':installer['sha256'],'new_windows_guest_only':True,'process_execution_policy':'RemoteSigned' if args.action=='install-after-nonstart' else 'unchanged'})
|
||||
material=cloud.rpc('server.conf',cloud.server,{'action':'enroll'})
|
||||
script="$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json);$path='C:\\ProgramData\\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\\"+installer['sha256']+"\\Install-PassiveClient.ps1'; if ((Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant() -cne '"+installer['sha256']+"') {throw 'Installer hash'}; $global:RmmBootstrapPayload=$p; & $path"
|
||||
# Pass one small JSON line on stdin, never arguments/environment/logs.
|
||||
record(checkpoint+'.enrollment-token-hash.json',{'token_sha256':hashlib.sha256(material['token'].encode()).hexdigest(),'one_use':True})
|
||||
result=powershell(script,{'sha256':artifact['sha256'],'token':material['token'],'ca':material['ca']},timeout=90,remote_signed=args.action=='install-after-nonstart')
|
||||
record('installed.json',result);print(json.dumps(result))
|
||||
elif args.action=='probe':
|
||||
artifact=contract.protected_json(EVIDENCE/'rmm-agent-windows.exe.latest.json')
|
||||
result=powershell(PROBE,{'sha256':artifact['sha256']},timeout=60);record('native-probe-'+artifact['sha256']+'.json',result)
|
||||
print(json.dumps({k:v for k,v in result.items() if k!='probe'}|{'jobs_supported':result['probe']['jobs_supported']}))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
kind=args.action.removeprefix('test-')
|
||||
artifact=contract.protected_json(EVIDENCE/('windows-tests-'+kind+'.exe.latest.json'))
|
||||
result=powershell(TEST,{'kind':kind,'sha256':artifact['sha256']},timeout=120)
|
||||
record(args.action+'.json',result);print(json.dumps(result))
|
||||
if result['exit_code']!=0:raise RuntimeError('NATIVE_WINDOWS_TEST_FAILED')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__=='__main__':
|
||||
try:main()
|
||||
except Exception as error:
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'error':type(error).__name__,'details_suppressed':True}));sys.exit(1)
|
||||
+11
-9
@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
|
||||
# Übergabe / Entwicklungspause — 2026-11-12
|
||||
|
||||
**Aktueller Arbeitsstand 2026-11-13:** Neuer signierter einmaliger APT-
|
||||
Wiederaufnahmevertrag implementiert und lokal geprüft; aktualisierter Helper/
|
||||
Provider auf Cloud-VM installiert, echter Readonly-Sandboxprobe bestanden.
|
||||
Originalmarker/Fehlversuch und Sharedledger erhalten, kein Paketjob gestartet.
|
||||
APT wieder gestoppt/Policy geschlossen; Agent und allgemeiner Helper aktiv.
|
||||
Serverbuild läuft getrennt; Windows-Client parallel in Arbeit. Neueste Details
|
||||
stehen oben in `implementation-status.md`. Die folgenden Zwischenstände sind
|
||||
historische Snapshots.
|
||||
|
||||
**Aktueller Arbeitsstand 2026-11-13:** Ein neuer separat WebUI-genehmigter
|
||||
signierter APT-Versuch lief bis Hook armed / APT 0, Nachprüfung jedoch
|
||||
`DPKG_INCONSISTENT`; gespeicherte Logs Fixture1.0 nur unpacked, kein Configure.
|
||||
**unknown**, Sharedledger9/1unresolved, zentrale13/13/12, keine Acceptance.
|
||||
Originalmarker/History sowie eigener Retrymarker erhalten. Keine weiteren
|
||||
Paketjobs/Reparaturen/Markerresets. Rootpolicy geschlossen; signierter Abgleich
|
||||
und begrenzte Configure-Korrektur offen. Windows-native Probe bestanden,
|
||||
LocalService/mTLS/Heartbeat online; Inventar durch alten SQL-Scopecheck blockiert.
|
||||
Identitäten/Journale erhalten; additive Windowsmigration als nächster Schritt.
|
||||
Neueste genaue Nachweise oben in `implementation-status.md`. Ältere Abschnitte
|
||||
sind abgeschlossene historische Snapshots.
|
||||
|
||||
**Aktueller Folgestand 2026-11-13:** APT-100-Ursache durch separat WebUI-genehmigte
|
||||
Cloud-Diagnosen belegt: `--no-download` lieferte im echten v3-Hook `**ERROR**`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,67 @@
|
||||
# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
|
||||
|
||||
## Neuer APT-Versuch: Hook/APT bestanden, Nachprüfung unknown — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
**Kein Paketerfolg und keine Linux-MVP-Abnahme.** Neuer fest gebundener
|
||||
Schema-3-Versuch tatsächlich durch die dev/test-WebUI vorbereitet; separater
|
||||
Freigabebrowser verglich zuerst irrtümlich auch das veränderliche
|
||||
Antragsmetadatum `approval_state`. Er stoppte vor dem Klick; mehrfach gespeicherte
|
||||
0/0/0 belegen keine Wirkung. Vergleich korrigiert: `null` vor Submit und
|
||||
`pending_approval` danach ausdrücklich prüfen, **alle übrigen Felder und exakten
|
||||
Plan-/Jobbytes unverändert vergleichen**. Derselbe bestehende Antrag wurde
|
||||
anschließend einmal tatsächlich per UI genehmigt, kein weiterer Plan/Versuch.
|
||||
|
||||
Vorher 0/0/0, danach **1/1/1**. Audit
|
||||
`approval_origin=dev_test_browser_simulation`, `testsimulation=true`,
|
||||
`simulated-testprincipal-a`, gebundener Planhash. Der neue Helper verifizierte
|
||||
den ursprünglichen Fehler und signierten Auftrag, verschob den alten `active/`
|
||||
in unveränderte Historie und schrieb einen eigenen Create-once-Retrymarker.
|
||||
Ursprünglicher Marker weiterhin
|
||||
`ec84aa4df8065f0b54b282bd273a6f342f07a6d47312289608389d05c7fb6053`.
|
||||
|
||||
Native Sandbox-/Lock-/Syscallprüfungen bestanden, Hook tatsächlich armed,
|
||||
**APT Exit 0**, kein Rebootflag. Gebundene unabhängige Nachprüfung verweigerte
|
||||
jedoch `DPKG_INCONSISTENT`; Rootledger behält **unknown**, Zentrale zeigt
|
||||
`unknown / SYNC_EFFECT_UNRESOLVED`. Gespeicherte dpkg-Logs belegen ausschließlich
|
||||
`half-installed -> unpacked` für Fixture 1.0, keinen Configure-Aufruf. Kein
|
||||
nativer Acceptancebeleg oder gestagter Ersatzbeleg. Vorhandene Logs nur gelesen,
|
||||
keine neue Live-Paketdiagnose über SSH und kein Shell-APT/dpkg-Reparaturaufruf.
|
||||
|
||||
Die konfigurierte Sperre `DPkg::ConfigurePending=false` trifft auf APTs
|
||||
standardmäßiges `dpkg::selection::remove::approved=true`: dieser Pfad entfernt
|
||||
explizite Configure-Aktionen und ergänzt sonst ConfigurePending. Das erklärt
|
||||
den beobachteten Unpack-only-Lauf; Primärquelle:
|
||||
[APT 2.7.14 dpkgpm.cc](https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/apt-pkg/deb/dpkgpm.cc#L1626-L1657).
|
||||
Eine begrenzte Korrektur muss explizites Configure des genehmigten Pakets
|
||||
erhalten, **kein** allgemeines `--configure --pending` erlauben. Neue lokale
|
||||
Regression und sichere gebundene Wiederherstellung des teilweise ausgeführten
|
||||
Versuchs sind offen; kein blindes Retry/Upgrade/Noop gegen diesen Zustand.
|
||||
|
||||
Zähler Linux **13 Jobs / 13 Outbox / 12 Grants, 1 unresolved**; Sharedledger
|
||||
**9 consumed / 1 unresolved**, alle ursprünglichen Tombstones erhalten.
|
||||
Neue Root-Testpolicy geschlossen, Helper bleiben zur unbekannten Wirkung und
|
||||
zum signierten Abgleich erhalten. Geschützt:
|
||||
`devstate/cloud-apt-retry/apt_install_retry/{checkpoint,stored-evidence,stored-log-evidence}.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Windows: native Probe und erster Dienstkontakt — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
Neuer passiver Windows-Client mit gemeinsamem Domain-/Protobuf-/TLS-/WSS-/HTTPS-
|
||||
Vertrag. GNU-x64-Crossbuild Debug/Release und Windows-target Clippy bestanden;
|
||||
native Probe wirklich auf Windows 11 Pro 10.0.26300 x64 bestanden: Win32-Hostname,
|
||||
Systemvolume, CIM-Bootkennung, keine erfundenen Inodes. Artefakt
|
||||
`31e360e50b177b4d5729d24e436d4f25aeed7b1a7bd35f2a129841ba1abffd37`.
|
||||
Anschließend tatsächlicher SCM-Dienst als **LocalService (S-1-5-19)** gestartet,
|
||||
Geräteschlüssel ausschließlich im Gast erzeugt, Enrollmenttoken entfernt;
|
||||
mTLS-Hello und frischer Heartbeat serverseitig online bestätigt.
|
||||
|
||||
**Inventar noch nicht gespeichert:** native Integration deckte den alten
|
||||
SQL-Check `source_id='linux.base'` auf. Additive Migration erforderlich; die
|
||||
bestehende Windowsidentität und durable Inventarnachricht bleiben erhalten.
|
||||
Native Windows-Testprogramme bislang nicht erfolgreich abgeschlossen. Kein
|
||||
Jobexecutor/Helper, keine Jobcapability oder Genehmigungsabkürzung; erster Build
|
||||
unsigniert. Notebook-Host weiterhin ausschließlich Entwicklung. Detailvertrag
|
||||
und ausgeführte/geplante Befehle: `deploy/windows/CLIENT.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Cloudserver und Linux-Agent aktualisiert, ohne neue Jobs — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
Versionierter Cloudserver-Sourceupload/ARM64-Releasebuild tatsächlich erfolgreich,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ Stand: 2026-11-13 · Spezifikation 1.9 · Linux-MVP weiterhin nicht abgenommen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Neuester APT-/Bootstrapstand
|
||||
|
||||
**Neuester Versuch:** Hook armed/APT 0, aber Fixture 1.0 laut gespeicherten Logs
|
||||
nur unpacked, Nachprüfung `DPKG_INCONSISTENT`, Ergebnis **unknown**. Ledger9/1
|
||||
unresolved, zentrale13/13/12; Rootpolicy geschlossen, kein weiterer Paketversuch.
|
||||
Windowsprobe bestanden, LocalService/mTLS/Heartbeat online, Inventar-SQL-Migration
|
||||
offen. Aktuelle Details in `implementation-status.md`; folgende Zwischenstände
|
||||
nicht als heutigen finalen Erfolg lesen.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Fortsetzung:** Signierter einzelner Retryvertrag implementiert, neue
|
||||
Helper-Sandboxreadiness auf Cloud-VM bestanden. Cloudserver und Linux-Agent
|
||||
identitäts-/journalbewahrend aktualisiert, Linux online/sync-ready. APT-Endpunkt
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user