Add crash-safe passive Windows certificate renewal
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
Generated
+1
@@ -2263,6 +2263,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"tokio-tungstenite 0.28.0",
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"uuid",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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"x509-parser",
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]
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[[package]]
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@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ rmm-protocol = { path = "../protocol" }
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rmm-time-attestation = { path = "../time-attestation" }
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rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
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fs2 = "0.4.3"
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x509-parser = { version = "=0.18.1", features = ["verify"] }
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rcgen = { version = "=0.14.10", default-features = false, features = ["crypto", "ring", "pem"] }
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[build-dependencies]
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@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
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//! Passive TLS renewal. SQLite commits only public CSR/certificate/version data;
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//! private keys stay in immutable, protected files outside the telemetry WAL.
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//! The caller must retain the existing exclusive agent-state journal lock.
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use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
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use rcgen::{CertificateParams, DnType, KeyPair};
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use rusqlite::{Connection, params};
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use rustls::{RootCertStore, pki_types::UnixTime, sign::CertifiedKey};
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use std::{io::Cursor, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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use x509_parser::prelude::*;
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pub struct DeviceIdentity {
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pub certificate_pem: Vec<u8>,
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pub private_key_pem: Vec<u8>,
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}
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/// Never supplies private bytes to the SQLite writer.
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pub trait KeyFiles {
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fn read(&self, version: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
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/// CreateNew, protected before writing, and durable before returning.
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fn create(&self, version: Uuid, key: &[u8]) -> Result<()>;
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}
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pub struct RotationStore {
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agent: Uuid,
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enrollment: u64,
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ca: Vec<u8>,
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}
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pub struct PendingRequest {
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pub identity: DeviceIdentity,
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pub csr_pem: String,
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base: Uuid,
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version: Uuid,
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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struct RenewalResponse {
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agent_id: Uuid,
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certificate_pem: String,
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overlap_seconds: u32,
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}
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impl RotationStore {
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pub fn new(agent: Uuid, enrollment: u64, ca: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self> {
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ensure!(
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!agent.is_nil() && enrollment > 0,
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"ROTATION_IDENTITY_INVALID"
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);
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Ok(Self {
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agent,
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enrollment,
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ca,
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})
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}
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/// Called under the journal lock. Legacy files are eligible exactly once,
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/// before any selector exists. There is no recovery fallback or reenrollment.
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pub fn initialize(
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&self,
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db: &mut Connection,
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keys: &impl KeyFiles,
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cert: &[u8],
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now: i64,
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) -> Result<()> {
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let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
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tx.execute_batch("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_versions(version TEXT PRIMARY KEY,certificate BLOB,csr TEXT);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tls_rotation(id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK(id=1),schema_version INTEGER NOT NULL,agent TEXT NOT NULL,enrollment INTEGER NOT NULL,current_version TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tls_versions(version),pending_version TEXT REFERENCES tls_versions(version));")?;
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let present: bool = tx.query_row("SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM tls_rotation)", [], |r| {
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r.get(0)
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})?;
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if !present {
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let count: u64 = tx.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM tls_versions", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
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ensure!(count == 0, "ROTATION_SELECTOR_MISSING");
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self.verify(cert, &keys.read(Uuid::nil())?, now)?;
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tx.execute(
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"INSERT INTO tls_versions VALUES(?1,?2,NULL)",
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params![Uuid::nil().to_string(), cert],
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)?;
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tx.execute(
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"INSERT INTO tls_rotation VALUES(1,1,?1,?2,?3,NULL)",
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params![
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self.agent.to_string(),
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self.enrollment,
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Uuid::nil().to_string()
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],
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)?;
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}
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self.current(&tx, keys, now)?;
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tx.commit()?;
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Ok(())
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}
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fn selector(&self, db: &Connection) -> Result<(Uuid, Option<Uuid>)> {
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let (schema, agent, enrollment, current, pending): (u32,String,u64,String,Option<String>) = db.query_row("SELECT schema_version,agent,enrollment,current_version,pending_version FROM tls_rotation WHERE id=1",[],|r|Ok((r.get(0)?,r.get(1)?,r.get(2)?,r.get(3)?,r.get(4)?)))?;
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ensure!(
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schema == 1 && agent == self.agent.to_string() && enrollment == self.enrollment,
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"ROTATION_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
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);
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Ok((
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Uuid::parse_str(¤t)?,
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pending.map(|s| Uuid::parse_str(&s)).transpose()?,
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))
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}
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pub fn current(
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&self,
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db: &Connection,
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keys: &impl KeyFiles,
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now: i64,
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) -> Result<DeviceIdentity> {
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let (version, _) = self.selector(db)?;
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let cert: Vec<u8> = db.query_row(
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"SELECT certificate FROM tls_versions WHERE version=?1",
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[version.to_string()],
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|r| r.get(0),
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)?;
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let key = keys.read(version)?;
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self.verify(&cert, &key, now)?;
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Ok(DeviceIdentity {
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certificate_pem: cert,
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private_key_pem: key,
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})
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}
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fn verify(&self, pem: &[u8], key: &[u8], now: i64) -> Result<(i64, i64)> {
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ensure!(
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pem.len() <= 32768 && key.len() <= 16384,
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"ROTATION_IDENTITY_LIMIT"
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);
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let chain =
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rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut Cursor::new(pem)).collect::<std::io::Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
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let leaf = chain.first().context("ROTATION_CERTIFICATE_MISSING")?;
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let (rest, cert) = X509Certificate::from_der(leaf.as_ref())
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("ROTATION_CERTIFICATE_PARSE"))?;
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let names = cert.subject().iter_common_name().collect::<Vec<_>>();
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ensure!(
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rest.is_empty()
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&& names.len() == 1
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&& names[0].as_str()? == self.agent.to_string()
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&& !cert.is_ca(),
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"ROTATION_AGENT_MISMATCH"
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);
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let mut roots = RootCertStore::empty();
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for ca in rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut Cursor::new(&self.ca)) {
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roots.add(ca?)?;
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}
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ensure!(!roots.is_empty(), "ROTATION_CA_MISSING");
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let provider = Arc::new(rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider());
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let verifier = rustls::server::WebPkiClientVerifier::builder_with_provider(
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Arc::new(roots),
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provider.clone(),
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)
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.build()?;
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verifier.verify_client_cert(
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leaf,
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&chain[1..],
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UnixTime::since_unix_epoch(Duration::from_secs(u64::try_from(now)?)),
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)?;
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let key =
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rustls_pemfile::private_key(&mut Cursor::new(key))?.context("ROTATION_KEY_MISSING")?;
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// from_der allows unknown key consistency; require an actual match.
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CertifiedKey::from_der(chain.clone(), key, &provider)?.keys_match()?;
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let begin = cert.validity().not_before.timestamp();
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let end = cert.validity().not_after.timestamp();
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ensure!(
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begin <= now && now < end,
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"ROTATION_EXPIRED_RECOVERY_REQUIRED"
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);
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Ok((begin, end))
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}
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pub fn due(&self, db: &Connection, keys: &impl KeyFiles, now: i64) -> Result<bool> {
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let identity = self.current(db, keys, now)?;
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let (begin, end) =
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self.verify(&identity.certificate_pem, &identity.private_key_pem, now)?;
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Ok(self.selector(db)?.1.is_some()
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|| now.saturating_sub(begin) >= 20 * 86400
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|| end.saturating_sub(now) <= 10 * 86400)
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}
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pub fn has_pending(&self, db: &Connection) -> Result<bool> {
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Ok(self.selector(db)?.1.is_some())
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}
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/// A crash before the transaction leaves only an unselected key file. A
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/// response loss reuses the committed CSR/key and still-valid old mTLS leaf.
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pub fn prepare(
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&self,
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db: &mut Connection,
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keys: &impl KeyFiles,
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now: i64,
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) -> Result<PendingRequest> {
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let identity = self.current(db, keys, now)?;
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let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
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let (base, pending) = self.selector(&tx)?;
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let (version, csr_pem) = if let Some(version) = pending {
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ensure!(
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!version.is_nil() && version != base,
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"ROTATION_PENDING_CONFLICT"
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);
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let csr: String = tx.query_row(
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"SELECT csr FROM tls_versions WHERE version=?1 AND certificate IS NULL",
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[version.to_string()],
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|r| r.get(0),
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)?;
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let key = KeyPair::from_pem(std::str::from_utf8(&keys.read(version)?)?)?;
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let (rest, pem) = x509_parser::pem::parse_x509_pem(csr.as_bytes())
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("ROTATION_PENDING_CSR"))?;
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ensure!(
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rest.is_empty() && pem.label == "CERTIFICATE REQUEST",
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"ROTATION_PENDING_CSR"
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);
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let (rest, request) = X509CertificationRequest::from_der(&pem.contents)
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("ROTATION_PENDING_CSR"))?;
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ensure!(
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rest.is_empty()
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&& request
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.certification_request_info
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.subject_pki
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.subject_public_key
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.data
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.as_ref()
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== key.public_key_raw(),
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"ROTATION_PENDING_KEY_MISMATCH"
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);
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request
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.verify_signature()
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("ROTATION_PENDING_SIGNATURE"))?;
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(version, csr)
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} else {
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let key = KeyPair::generate()?;
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let csr = self.csr(&key)?;
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let version = Uuid::new_v4();
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keys.create(version, key.serialize_pem().as_bytes())?;
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tx.execute(
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"INSERT INTO tls_versions VALUES(?1,NULL,?2)",
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params![version.to_string(), csr],
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)?;
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tx.execute(
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"UPDATE tls_rotation SET pending_version=?1 WHERE id=1",
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[version.to_string()],
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)?;
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(version, csr)
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};
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tx.commit()?;
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Ok(PendingRequest {
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identity,
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csr_pem,
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base,
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version,
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})
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}
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fn csr(&self, key: &KeyPair) -> Result<String> {
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let mut parameters = CertificateParams::default();
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parameters
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.distinguished_name
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.push(DnType::CommonName, self.agent.to_string());
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Ok(parameters.serialize_request(key)?.pem()?)
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}
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/// Commit only the exact pending version, with fresh certificate validation.
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/// Prior certs and key files are retained; failed installs change no selector.
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pub fn install(
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&self,
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db: &mut Connection,
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keys: &impl KeyFiles,
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request: &PendingRequest,
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bytes: &[u8],
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now: i64,
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) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= 65536, "ROTATION_RESPONSE_LIMIT");
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let response: RenewalResponse = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
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ensure!(
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response.agent_id == self.agent && response.overlap_seconds == 300,
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"ROTATION_RESPONSE_BINDING_INVALID"
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);
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self.verify(
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response.certificate_pem.as_bytes(),
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&keys.read(request.version)?,
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now,
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)?;
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let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
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ensure!(
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self.selector(&tx)? == (request.base, Some(request.version)),
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"ROTATION_SELECTOR_CHANGED"
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);
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let csr: String = tx.query_row(
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"SELECT csr FROM tls_versions WHERE version=?1 AND certificate IS NULL",
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[request.version.to_string()],
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|r| r.get(0),
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)?;
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ensure!(csr == request.csr_pem, "ROTATION_PENDING_CHANGED");
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ensure!(
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tx.execute(
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"UPDATE tls_versions SET certificate=?1 WHERE version=?2 AND certificate IS NULL",
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params![
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response.certificate_pem.as_bytes(),
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request.version.to_string()
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]
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)? == 1,
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"ROTATION_PENDING_MISSING"
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);
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tx.execute(
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"UPDATE tls_rotation SET current_version=?1,pending_version=NULL WHERE id=1",
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[request.version.to_string()],
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)?;
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tx.commit()?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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pub struct ProtectedKeyFiles {
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root: std::path::PathBuf,
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// Denying FILE_SHARE_DELETE holds the actual parent against rename/removal.
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_directory: std::fs::File,
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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impl ProtectedKeyFiles {
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pub fn open(root: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Self> {
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use std::{fs::OpenOptions, os::windows::fs::OpenOptionsExt};
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use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::*;
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ensure!(root.is_absolute(), "ROTATION_ABSOLUTE_STATE_REQUIRED");
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let directory = OpenOptions::new()
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.read(true)
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.share_mode(FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE)
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.custom_flags(FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS | FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT)
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.open(root)?;
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crate::native::private_path(root, true)?;
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Self::information(&directory, true)?;
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Ok(Self {
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root: root.into(),
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_directory: directory,
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})
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}
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fn path(&self, version: Uuid) -> std::path::PathBuf {
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self.root.join(if version.is_nil() {
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"device.key".into()
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} else {
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format!("device-{version}.key")
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})
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}
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fn information(file: &std::fs::File, directory: bool) -> Result<()> {
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use std::os::windows::io::AsRawHandle;
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use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::*;
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let mut info: BY_HANDLE_FILE_INFORMATION = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
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ensure!(
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unsafe { GetFileInformationByHandle(file.as_raw_handle(), &mut info) } != 0,
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"ROTATION_FILE_INFORMATION"
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);
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ensure!(
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info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT == 0
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&& (info.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY != 0) == directory
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&& (directory || info.nNumberOfLinks == 1),
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"ROTATION_FILE_TYPE_OR_LINKS"
|
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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impl KeyFiles for ProtectedKeyFiles {
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fn read(&self, version: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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use std::{fs::OpenOptions, io::Read, os::windows::fs::OpenOptionsExt};
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use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT;
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let path = self.path(version);
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let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
|
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.read(true)
|
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.share_mode(0)
|
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.custom_flags(FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT)
|
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.open(&path)?;
|
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Self::information(&file, false)?;
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crate::native::private_path(&path, false)?;
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let mut bytes = Vec::new();
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Read::by_ref(&mut file)
|
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.take(16385)
|
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.read_to_end(&mut bytes)?;
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= 16384, "ROTATION_KEY_LIMIT");
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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fn create(&self, version: Uuid, key: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
|
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use std::{fs::OpenOptions, io::Write, os::windows::fs::OpenOptionsExt};
|
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use windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::{
|
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FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, FILE_FLAG_WRITE_THROUGH,
|
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};
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ensure!(
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!version.is_nil() && key.len() <= 16384,
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"ROTATION_NEW_KEY_REQUIRED"
|
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);
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let path = self.path(version);
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let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
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.write(true)
|
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.create_new(true)
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.share_mode(0)
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.custom_flags(FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT | FILE_FLAG_WRITE_THROUGH)
|
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.open(&path)?;
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Self::information(&file, false)?;
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// Inherited ACL must already be private: no secret byte precedes this.
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crate::native::private_path(&path, false)?;
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file.write_all(key)?;
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file.sync_all()?;
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Ok(())
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}
|
||||
}
|
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|
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use rcgen::{BasicConstraints, ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, IsCa, Issuer, KeyUsagePurpose};
|
||||
use std::{cell::RefCell, collections::BTreeMap};
|
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#[derive(Default)]
|
||||
struct Keys(RefCell<BTreeMap<Uuid, Vec<u8>>>);
|
||||
impl KeyFiles for Keys {
|
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fn read(&self, id: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
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self.0
|
||||
.borrow()
|
||||
.get(&id)
|
||||
.cloned()
|
||||
.context("MISSING_TEST_KEY")
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn create(&self, id: Uuid, key: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(!self.0.borrow().contains_key(&id), "TEST_CREATE_NEW");
|
||||
self.0.borrow_mut().insert(id, key.to_vec());
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn now() -> i64 {
|
||||
chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339("2026-11-21T00:00:00Z")
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.timestamp()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn ca() -> (String, Issuer<'static, KeyPair>) {
|
||||
let mut p = CertificateParams::default();
|
||||
p.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
|
||||
p.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
|
||||
let key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
|
||||
let cert = p.self_signed(&key).unwrap().pem();
|
||||
(cert, Issuer::new(p, key))
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn certificate(agent: Uuid, key: &[u8], issuer: &Issuer<'_, KeyPair>, client: bool) -> String {
|
||||
let mut p = CertificateParams::default();
|
||||
p.distinguished_name
|
||||
.push(DnType::CommonName, agent.to_string());
|
||||
p.not_before = rcgen::date_time_ymd(2026, 11, 1);
|
||||
p.not_after = rcgen::date_time_ymd(2026, 12, 1);
|
||||
p.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
|
||||
p.extended_key_usages = vec![if client {
|
||||
ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ClientAuth
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ServerAuth
|
||||
}];
|
||||
p.signed_by(
|
||||
&KeyPair::from_pem(std::str::from_utf8(key).unwrap()).unwrap(),
|
||||
issuer,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.pem()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn setup() -> (
|
||||
Connection,
|
||||
Keys,
|
||||
RotationStore,
|
||||
Issuer<'static, KeyPair>,
|
||||
String,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
let (ca, issuer) = ca();
|
||||
let store = RotationStore::new(Uuid::new_v4(), 1, ca.into_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let keys = Keys::default();
|
||||
keys.create(
|
||||
Uuid::nil(),
|
||||
KeyPair::generate().unwrap().serialize_pem().as_bytes(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let cert = certificate(store.agent, &keys.read(Uuid::nil()).unwrap(), &issuer, true);
|
||||
let mut db = Connection::open_in_memory().unwrap();
|
||||
store
|
||||
.initialize(&mut db, &keys, cert.as_bytes(), now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
(db, keys, store, issuer, cert)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn reply(agent: Uuid, cert: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
serde_json::to_vec(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({"agent_id":agent,"certificate_pem":cert,"overlap_seconds":300}),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn response_loss_reuses_exact_pending_csr_and_private_key_stays_outside_sqlite() {
|
||||
let (mut db, keys, store, issuer, old) = setup();
|
||||
assert!(store.due(&db, &keys, now()).unwrap());
|
||||
let first = store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).unwrap();
|
||||
let second = store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(first.version, second.version);
|
||||
assert_eq!(first.csr_pem, second.csr_pem);
|
||||
assert_eq!(keys.0.borrow().len(), 2);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store.current(&db, &keys, now()).unwrap().certificate_pem,
|
||||
old.as_bytes()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let new = certificate(
|
||||
store.agent,
|
||||
&keys.read(first.version).unwrap(),
|
||||
&issuer,
|
||||
true,
|
||||
);
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(&mut db, &keys, &first, &reply(store.agent, &new), now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store.current(&db, &keys, now()).unwrap().certificate_pem,
|
||||
new.as_bytes()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(store.selector(&db).unwrap(), (first.version, None));
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(&mut db, &keys, &second, &reply(store.agent, &new), now())
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(keys.0.borrow().len(), 2);
|
||||
let values:Vec<String>=db.prepare("SELECT coalesce(CAST(certificate AS TEXT),'') || coalesce(csr,'') FROM tls_versions").unwrap().query_map([],|r|r.get(0)).unwrap().collect::<rusqlite::Result<_>>().unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(values.iter().all(|v| !v.contains("PRIVATE KEY")));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn bad_reply_preserves_current_pending_and_original_identity() {
|
||||
let (mut db, keys, store, issuer, old) = setup();
|
||||
let pending = store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).unwrap();
|
||||
let key = keys.read(pending.version).unwrap();
|
||||
let (_wrong_ca, wrong_issuer) = ca();
|
||||
let wrong_key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap().serialize_pem();
|
||||
for cert in [
|
||||
certificate(Uuid::new_v4(), &key, &issuer, true),
|
||||
certificate(store.agent, wrong_key.as_bytes(), &issuer, true),
|
||||
certificate(store.agent, &key, &issuer, false),
|
||||
certificate(store.agent, &key, &wrong_issuer, true),
|
||||
] {
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(&mut db, &keys, &pending, &reply(store.agent, &cert), now())
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store.current(&db, &keys, now()).unwrap().certificate_pem,
|
||||
old.as_bytes()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store.selector(&db).unwrap(),
|
||||
(Uuid::nil(), Some(pending.version))
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let valid = certificate(store.agent, &key, &issuer, true);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(
|
||||
&mut db,
|
||||
&keys,
|
||||
&pending,
|
||||
&reply(store.agent, &valid),
|
||||
now() + 11 * 86400
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(
|
||||
&mut db,
|
||||
&keys,
|
||||
&pending,
|
||||
&reply(Uuid::new_v4(), &valid),
|
||||
now()
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn committed_version_never_falls_back_to_legacy_on_restart_or_missing_key() {
|
||||
let (mut db, keys, store, issuer, old) = setup();
|
||||
let pending = store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).unwrap();
|
||||
let valid = certificate(
|
||||
store.agent,
|
||||
&keys.read(pending.version).unwrap(),
|
||||
&issuer,
|
||||
true,
|
||||
);
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(&mut db, &keys, &pending, &reply(store.agent, &valid), now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
store
|
||||
.initialize(&mut db, &keys, old.as_bytes(), now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(store.selector(&db).unwrap().0, pending.version);
|
||||
keys.0.borrow_mut().remove(&pending.version);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.initialize(&mut db, &keys, old.as_bytes(), now())
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(store.current(&db, &keys, now()).is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(store.selector(&db).unwrap().0, pending.version);
|
||||
assert!(keys.read(Uuid::nil()).is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn changed_pending_key_or_identity_cannot_create_a_second_request() {
|
||||
let (mut db, keys, store, _issuer, _old) = setup();
|
||||
let pending = store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).unwrap();
|
||||
keys.0.borrow_mut().insert(
|
||||
pending.version,
|
||||
KeyPair::generate().unwrap().serialize_pem().into_bytes(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(store.prepare(&mut db, &keys, now()).is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(keys.0.borrow().len(), 2);
|
||||
let other = RotationStore::new(store.agent, 2, store.ca.clone()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(other.current(&db, &keys, now()).is_err());
|
||||
db.execute("DELETE FROM tls_rotation", []).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.initialize(&mut db, &keys, b"not a bootstrap", now())
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn journal_reopen_recovers_pending_before_hello_and_install_is_one_transaction() {
|
||||
let (_db, keys, store, issuer, old) = setup();
|
||||
let directory = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-tls-renewal-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut journal = crate::journal::Journal::open(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
journal.pin_identity(&store.agent.to_string()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.next_sequence().unwrap(), 1);
|
||||
store
|
||||
.initialize(journal.connection_mut(), &keys, old.as_bytes(), now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let pending = store
|
||||
.prepare(journal.connection_mut(), &keys, now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
drop(journal);
|
||||
let mut journal = crate::journal::Journal::open(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
journal.pin_identity(&store.agent.to_string()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(journal.next_sequence().unwrap(), 2);
|
||||
assert!(store.has_pending(journal.connection()).unwrap());
|
||||
let recovered = store
|
||||
.prepare(journal.connection_mut(), &keys, now())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(pending.version, recovered.version);
|
||||
assert_eq!(pending.csr_pem, recovered.csr_pem);
|
||||
let new = certificate(
|
||||
store.agent,
|
||||
&keys.read(pending.version).unwrap(),
|
||||
&issuer,
|
||||
true,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let response = reply(store.agent, &new);
|
||||
// Force the second SQL write to fail, after writing the certificate:
|
||||
// neither the cert nor selector may survive this aborted transaction.
|
||||
journal.connection().execute_batch("CREATE TEMP TRIGGER refuse_tls_commit BEFORE UPDATE OF current_version ON tls_rotation BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT,'TEST_COMMIT_DENIED'); END;").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(
|
||||
journal.connection_mut(),
|
||||
&keys,
|
||||
&recovered,
|
||||
&response,
|
||||
now()
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.current(journal.connection(), &keys, now())
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.certificate_pem,
|
||||
old.as_bytes()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let staged: Option<Vec<u8>> = journal
|
||||
.connection()
|
||||
.query_row(
|
||||
"SELECT certificate FROM tls_versions WHERE version=?1",
|
||||
[pending.version.to_string()],
|
||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(staged.is_none());
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.connection()
|
||||
.execute_batch("DROP TRIGGER refuse_tls_commit;")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
store
|
||||
.install(
|
||||
journal.connection_mut(),
|
||||
&keys,
|
||||
&recovered,
|
||||
&response,
|
||||
now(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
drop(journal);
|
||||
let journal = crate::journal::Journal::open(&directory).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(!store.has_pending(journal.connection()).unwrap());
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
store
|
||||
.current(journal.connection(), &keys, now())
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.certificate_pem,
|
||||
new.as_bytes()
|
||||
);
|
||||
for entry in std::fs::read_dir(&directory).unwrap() {
|
||||
let bytes = std::fs::read(entry.unwrap().path()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!bytes
|
||||
.windows(b"PRIVATE KEY".len())
|
||||
.any(|s| s == b"PRIVATE KEY")
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
drop(journal);
|
||||
std::fs::remove_dir_all(directory).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
//! No executor, startgrant consumer or privileged helper is advertised.
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
pub mod actions;
|
||||
pub mod certificate_rotation;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
pub mod clock;
|
||||
pub mod event_log;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,12 +11,7 @@ mod transport;
|
||||
mod wire_channel;
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
mod certificate_rotation {
|
||||
// Shared transport input only. Windows certificate rotation is not yet a
|
||||
// capability: this first slice refuses expired TLS identities normally.
|
||||
pub struct DeviceIdentity {
|
||||
pub certificate_pem: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub private_key_pem: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub use rmm_agent_windows::certificate_rotation::DeviceIdentity;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use rmm_agent_core::{
|
||||
jobs, ledger,
|
||||
reconcile::{self, SyncClock},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rmm_agent_windows::certificate_rotation::{ProtectedKeyFiles, RotationStore};
|
||||
use rmm_agent_windows::{CAPABILITIES, job_binding::readonly_binding, journal::Journal, native};
|
||||
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, ExecutionPermitPayload};
|
||||
use rmm_protocol::*;
|
||||
@@ -411,6 +412,8 @@ struct Agent {
|
||||
identity: EnrollmentResponse,
|
||||
ca: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
journal: Journal,
|
||||
certificates: RotationStore,
|
||||
key_files: ProtectedKeyFiles,
|
||||
boot: String,
|
||||
instance: String,
|
||||
started: Instant,
|
||||
@@ -1213,7 +1216,11 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
let msi = job.action.windows_msi().cloned();
|
||||
let address = self.config.connect_address;
|
||||
let ca = self.ca.clone();
|
||||
let state = self.config.state_directory.clone();
|
||||
let tls_identity = self.certificates.current(
|
||||
self.journal.connection(),
|
||||
&self.key_files,
|
||||
Utc::now().timestamp(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let request_for_stage = request.clone();
|
||||
let binding_for_stage = binding.clone();
|
||||
let worker = tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
@@ -1225,9 +1232,12 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
"MSI_DOWNLOAD_FENCED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
verified_window(&binding_for_stage, &request_for_stage, &clock)?;
|
||||
let cert = protected_read(&state.join("device.pem"), 32768)?;
|
||||
let key = protected_read(&state.join("device.key"), 16384)?;
|
||||
let tls = crate::https_channel::mtls_client(address, &ca, &cert, &key)?;
|
||||
let tls = crate::https_channel::mtls_client(
|
||||
address,
|
||||
&ca,
|
||||
&tls_identity.certificate_pem,
|
||||
&tls_identity.private_key_pem,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let response = tls
|
||||
.get(format!(
|
||||
"https://{}:{}/agent/v1/artifacts/{}?job_id={}&attempt_id={}",
|
||||
@@ -1493,6 +1503,15 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
async fn session_inner(&mut self, stop: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// Server commit may have fenced Hello even if its HTTP response was
|
||||
// lost. Recover the durable original CSR before requiring any channel.
|
||||
if self.certificates.has_pending(self.journal.connection())? {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!self.config.enable_jobs,
|
||||
"ROTATION_PENDING_REQUIRES_PASSIVE_RECOVERY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.renew_certificate().await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.boot = native::boot_id().await?;
|
||||
let advertised = self.capabilities();
|
||||
let hello = self.envelope(
|
||||
@@ -1502,16 +1521,11 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
capabilities: advertised.clone(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let identity = crate::certificate_rotation::DeviceIdentity {
|
||||
certificate_pem: protected_read(
|
||||
&self.config.state_directory.join("device.pem"),
|
||||
32768,
|
||||
)?,
|
||||
private_key_pem: protected_read(
|
||||
&self.config.state_directory.join("device.key"),
|
||||
16384,
|
||||
)?,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let identity = self.certificates.current(
|
||||
self.journal.connection(),
|
||||
&self.key_files,
|
||||
Utc::now().timestamp(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let mode = crate::wire_channel::Mode::parse(&self.config.transport)?;
|
||||
let mut channel = crate::wire_channel::connect(
|
||||
mode,
|
||||
@@ -1557,6 +1571,7 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
let mut replay = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(10);
|
||||
let mut inventory = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut update_at = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut rotation_at = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut heartbeat = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(60);
|
||||
let mut heartbeat_after = Duration::from_secs(30);
|
||||
let mut tick = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
|
||||
@@ -1642,6 +1657,21 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
if stop.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// This slice renews only passive clients. Job admission and helper
|
||||
// lifecycle are not extended by certificate maintenance.
|
||||
if !self.config.enable_jobs && rotation_at.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(30) {
|
||||
rotation_at = Instant::now();
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
|
||||
if self
|
||||
.certificates
|
||||
.due(self.journal.connection(), &self.key_files, now)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
self.renew_certificate().await?;
|
||||
// The server fences the previous connection generation.
|
||||
// A new Hello/Sync uses the newly selected pair.
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if heartbeat.elapsed() >= heartbeat_after {
|
||||
let payload = Payload::Heartbeat(Heartbeat {
|
||||
instance_id: self.instance.clone(),
|
||||
@@ -1677,6 +1707,38 @@ impl Agent {
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
async fn renew_certificate(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(!self.config.enable_jobs, "PASSIVE_RENEWAL_ONLY");
|
||||
self.close_gate();
|
||||
let request = self.certificates.prepare(
|
||||
self.journal.connection_mut(),
|
||||
&self.key_files,
|
||||
Utc::now().timestamp(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let client = crate::https_channel::mtls_client(
|
||||
self.config.connect_address,
|
||||
&self.ca,
|
||||
&request.identity.certificate_pem,
|
||||
&request.identity.private_key_pem,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let response = client
|
||||
.post(format!(
|
||||
"https://{}:{}/agent/v1/certificates/renew",
|
||||
crate::https_channel::server_name()?,
|
||||
self.config.connect_address.port()
|
||||
))
|
||||
.json(&serde_json::json!({"csr_pem":request.csr_pem}))
|
||||
.send()
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
let bytes = crate::https_channel::bounded_body(response, 65536, "application/json").await?;
|
||||
self.certificates.install(
|
||||
self.journal.connection_mut(),
|
||||
&self.key_files,
|
||||
&request,
|
||||
&bytes,
|
||||
Utc::now().timestamp(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn service_run(stop: &'static AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let arguments: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
|
||||
@@ -1719,6 +1781,11 @@ fn service_run(stop: &'static AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
import_legacy_inventory(&mut journal)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ensure!(!config.enable_jobs || binding.is_some(),"ENABLED_JOBS_REQUIRE_BINDING");
|
||||
let certificates=RotationStore::new(Uuid::parse_str(&identity.agent_id)?,binding.as_ref().map_or(1,|b|b.enrollment_generation),ca.clone())?;
|
||||
let key_files=ProtectedKeyFiles::open(&config.state_directory)?;
|
||||
certificates.initialize(journal.connection_mut(),&key_files,&protected_read(&config.state_directory.join("device.pem"),32768)?,Utc::now().timestamp())?;
|
||||
// SQLite and sidecars inherit the same service-SID-only state ACL.
|
||||
for child in fs::read_dir(&config.state_directory)? { let child=child?;native::private_path(&child.path(),child.file_type()?.is_dir())?; }
|
||||
let (ledger,ledger_file)=match &binding {Some(binding)=>{let (db,file)=open_ledger(&config.state_directory,binding)?;(Some(db),Some(file))},None=>(None,None)};
|
||||
let clock=JobClock::new(config.enable_jobs);
|
||||
let sync=if config.enable_jobs {binding.clone().map(|binding|reconcile::ClientSync::new(binding).with_helper_identity(reconcile::HelperIdentity::System))} else {None};
|
||||
@@ -1728,6 +1795,8 @@ fn service_run(stop: &'static AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
identity,
|
||||
ca,
|
||||
journal,
|
||||
certificates,
|
||||
key_files,
|
||||
boot,
|
||||
instance: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
started: Instant::now(), binding, ledger, _ledger_file:ledger_file, clock, sync,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ Stand 2026-11-13, Spezifikation 1.15. Windows-11-Gast und Notebook-Host sind
|
||||
verschiedene Geräte. Auf dem Notebook laufen ausschließlich Entwicklungstools;
|
||||
der Client verwendet den endgültigen Cloudserver `discovery.ease-technologies.de`.
|
||||
|
||||
Neuer Quellenstand 2026-11-15: [passive Zertifikatserneuerung](../../docs/windows-certificate-renewal.md)
|
||||
mit geschützter Keydatei und atomarer Versionswahl ist implementiert; native
|
||||
Windows-Renewal-/Abbruch-/DACLabnahme und Freigabe der permanenten Identität
|
||||
bleiben offen. Frühere Transportabnahmen darunter bleiben historische Belege.
|
||||
|
||||
## Aktueller Dienst dauerhaft auf Auto — 2026-11-13
|
||||
|
||||
Nach dem bestandenen Fallbacktest wurde die bestehende VM im separaten Fall
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,22 @@
|
||||
# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
|
||||
|
||||
## Passiver Windows-Zertifikatspfad — Quellenstand 2026-11-15
|
||||
|
||||
Eigener RotationStore mit geschützten CreateNew-Keydateien und atomarer
|
||||
öffentlicher CSR-/Zertifikats-/Versionswahl im bestehenden SQLite-Journal.
|
||||
Pending wird vor dem Transport-Hello wiederaufgenommen; kein Schlüssel im
|
||||
Telemetrie-WAL, kein automatisches Reenrollment oder Legacyfallback nach Wechsel.
|
||||
Automatische Erneuerung ausschließlich bei `enable_jobs=false`; keine neue
|
||||
Job-/Helperfähigkeit. [Vertrag und Abnahmegrenzen](windows-certificate-renewal.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Lokal Linux23/23Libtests ohne Filter, GNU-Windows-Alltargetscheck mit
|
||||
`system-helper`, Clippy beider Targets mit `-D warnings` und Workspacefmt
|
||||
bestanden. Anschließend dieselben fünf portablen Rotationsfälle tatsächlich auf
|
||||
Cloud-Linux als UID65534 bestanden (5PASS/18andere gefiltert); Ergebnisquittung
|
||||
`7e6cab5915ec00a9b1392c1f15ddb13fe9ac6dd3b8e007b82e1dc914cb0507e1`.
|
||||
Kein installierter Dienst oder Gerätezertifikat verändert; echte
|
||||
Windows-Renewal-/LocalService-Dateiabnahme bleibt offen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Windowsfortsetzung: Nichtstart-Kern nativ qualifiziert — 2026-11-14
|
||||
|
||||
Der zusätzliche enge deny-only Nichtstart-Kern ist implementiert und mit
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
# Windows: Geräte-TLS bei passiver Telemetrie erneuern
|
||||
|
||||
Quellenstand 2026-11-15, Spezifikation 1.23. Der Windowsdienst verwendet jetzt
|
||||
einen eigenen `RotationStore` und den vorhandenen gemeinsamen mTLS-Transport.
|
||||
Dies ist Quellen-/lokaler Prüfstand, keine Rotation der permanenten
|
||||
Windowsidentität und keine native Windowsabnahme.
|
||||
|
||||
Der tatsächliche Serverendpoint `POST /agent/v1/certificates/renew` verlangt
|
||||
eine noch gültige, registrierte mTLS-Identität. Er prüft die signierte P-256-CSR,
|
||||
stellt ein neues Gerätezertifikat für dieselbe Agent-ID aus, erhöht die
|
||||
Verbindungsgeneration und akzeptiert den vorherigen Fingerprint 300 Sekunden.
|
||||
Die exakten CSR-Bytes sind der serverseitige Wiederholungsschlüssel; eine
|
||||
Wiederholung innerhalb des zulässigen alten Identitätsfensters liefert dasselbe
|
||||
bereits gespeicherte Zertifikat. Weder Reenrollment noch Widerruf sind enthalten.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Client prüft alle 30 Sekunden, ob das Zertifikat mindestens 20 Tage alt ist
|
||||
oder höchstens zehn Tage Restgültigkeit hat. Automatische Erneuerung läuft in
|
||||
diesem Schnitt ausschließlich bei `enable_jobs=false`. Ein dauerhaftes Pending
|
||||
wird nach Prozessneustart und vor einem neuen Transport-Hello wiederaufgenommen,
|
||||
ohne zuvor einen erfolgreichen WSS-/HTTPS-Kanal vorauszusetzen. Während eines
|
||||
Pending ist die Umschaltung auf Jobbetrieb verweigert. Nach erfolgreichem Commit
|
||||
baut der Client eine neue Verbindung auf; Heartbeats und unbestätigte
|
||||
Inventarbytes behalten den bestehenden Journalvertrag.
|
||||
|
||||
Die bisherigen Dateien `identity.json`, `device.pem` und `device.key` werden
|
||||
nicht ersetzt. Nur vor der ersten Versionswahl wird das bestehende Paar als
|
||||
Initialversion aufgenommen. Jeder neue private Schlüssel entsteht mit
|
||||
`CreateNew` als `device-<UUID>.key` im bestehenden geschützten State. Das
|
||||
exklusive Dateihandle verweigert gleichzeitiges Ersetzen; Reparsepoints und
|
||||
Hardlinks werden abgewiesen. Die bestehende SYSTEM-/Administratoren-/Service-
|
||||
SID-DACL wird vor dem ersten Schlüsselbyte geprüft, anschließend werden die
|
||||
Dateibytes mit Write-through und `sync_all` geflusht. Das gehaltene
|
||||
Verzeichnishandle verweigert Löschen/Umbenennen seines Parents. Keine neue
|
||||
ACL-Freigabe oder allgemeine LocalService-Schreibfreigabe wird hinzugefügt.
|
||||
|
||||
Im vorhandenen exklusiv gesperrten Telemetriejournal stehen ausschließlich
|
||||
öffentliche CSR-/Zertifikatsbytes und UUID-/Identitätsselektoren; private
|
||||
Schlüssel gelangen weder in SQLite noch WAL. Die neue Schlüsseldatei ist vor
|
||||
Pending-Commit vollständig geschrieben. Vor der Netzwerkanfrage committen
|
||||
Versions-ID und exakte CSR gemeinsam. Die Antwort wird gegen die konfigurierte
|
||||
CA-Kette, ClientAuth-Verwendung, Gültigkeit, genau einen passenden Geräte-CN,
|
||||
Nicht-CA-Leaf und tatsächlich passende private Schlüsselbytes geprüft.
|
||||
Zertifikat und aktiver Selektor wechseln in einer einzigen SQLite-Transaktion
|
||||
unter dem vorhandenen WAL-/`synchronous=FULL`-Vertrag.
|
||||
|
||||
Ein Schreib-, Antwort-, Validierungs- oder Commitfehler lässt den bisherigen
|
||||
Selektor erhalten. Unselektierte Schlüsseldateien nach Abbruch werden nicht
|
||||
adoptiert oder automatisch gelöscht. Nach Auswahl einer neuen Version gibt es
|
||||
keinen automatischen Rückfall auf die Initialversion, auch nicht bei fehlender
|
||||
Datei oder Ablauf. Alle vorhandenen mTLS-Verbraucher des Windowsagenten
|
||||
(WSS/HTTPS, Zeitabruf und gegebenenfalls MSI-Download) verwenden dieselbe
|
||||
Version. Kein Helper-Signierpin, Zeitpin, Geräte-/Enrollmentgeneration oder
|
||||
Jobrecht wird rotiert oder freigeschaltet.
|
||||
|
||||
Antwortverlust länger als die serverseitigen 300 Sekunden, abgelaufene oder
|
||||
widerrufene Zertifikate und beschädigter State benötigen eine ausdrücklich
|
||||
abgestimmte Wiederherstellung. Der Client erfindet kein neues Identitätsfenster.
|
||||
Die Crashsicherheit beruht auf der vorhandenen SQLite-/Dateisystem- und
|
||||
Datenträger-Durabilität: keine Behauptung unabhängiger Stromausfalltests oder
|
||||
Schutz gegen Administratoren, die Schlüssel und State verändern können.
|
||||
|
||||
Lokale Prüfungen und noch offene native Gates werden im Implementierungsstand
|
||||
getrennt festgehalten. Native LocalService-DACL-/Flush-/Reparse-/Hardlinktests,
|
||||
Windows-Renewal mit tatsächlichem Server, Antwortverlust, Prozessabbruch,
|
||||
Transportwechsel und Negativabnahmen bleiben vor einer Runtimefreigabe offen.
|
||||
Die permanente Identität darf hierfür nicht ohne weitere Abstimmung rotiert
|
||||
oder widerrufen werden. Keine RMM-Jobs oder Operatorenserie sind Bestandteil.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich lokal ausgeführt: `cargo test --offline --locked -p
|
||||
rmm-agent-windows --lib` (23/23, keine Filter); `cargo check --offline --locked
|
||||
-p rmm-agent-windows --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu --all-targets --features
|
||||
system-helper`; Clippy für beide Targets mit `-D warnings`,
|
||||
`cargo fmt --all --check` und tatsächlicher GNU-Link beider Windowsbinaries mit
|
||||
`system-helper` bestanden. Das Windows-Lib-Testbinary wurde mit `--no-run`
|
||||
gebaut (SHA256 `60e053e6e9cc7fb43de73fe05d50f7934a890e2f5de3c330175af4eba5ed50c5`),
|
||||
hier nicht ausgeführt. Der erste Crosscheck in der unvollständigen
|
||||
Builderimage scheiterte an fehlendem WIDL; der vorhandene vollständige
|
||||
WIDL-/clang-Builder bestand danach, ohne Buildguardänderung.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Orchestrator führte anschließend dasselbe Linux-Testbinary tatsächlich
|
||||
auf Cloud-Linux als UID65534 aus: genau fünf `certificate_rotation::tests::*`
|
||||
bestanden, 18 andere Tests bewusst gefiltert, keine Skips oder Fehler.
|
||||
Binary-SHA256 `33d6e1f0c145e90247e123fba00bad6a972bad6aa8d1f84ffcfa801a97787890`;
|
||||
eigene geschützte Quittung
|
||||
`devstate/cert-renewal-linux/d61686f2-7829-4756-869e-a407667d1f97/result.json`,
|
||||
SHA256 `7e6cab5915ec00a9b1392c1f15ddb13fe9ac6dd3b8e007b82e1dc914cb0507e1`.
|
||||
Das ist ein nativer Linuxnachweis der portablen Logik mit synthetischen
|
||||
In-memory-KeyFiles, kein Windows-DACL-/Dateiflush- oder echtes Renewal.
|
||||
Keine permanente Identität oder Dienstkonfiguration wurde hierfür geändert.
|
||||
|
||||
Die fünf Fälle prüfen exakte CSR-Wiederverwendung nach Antwortverlust;
|
||||
falsche Agent-ID, CA, Schlüssel, Verwendung und Ablauf bei erhaltener alter
|
||||
Version; fehlenden neuen Key ohne Legacyfallback; manipuliertes Pending und
|
||||
Enrollmentbindung; sowie echten SQLite-/WAL-Reopen mit fortbestehender Sequenz
|
||||
und einen absichtlich verweigerten Selektorcommit, bei dem auch das zuvor im
|
||||
selben SQL-Commit geschriebene Zertifikat zurückgerollt wird.
|
||||
|
||||
Die Dateiflags folgen [CreateFileW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-createfilew)
|
||||
und [FlushFileBuffers](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/fileapi/nf-fileapi-flushfilebuffers);
|
||||
der öffentliche Selektor übernimmt den vorhandenen
|
||||
[SQLite-WAL/FULL-Vertrag](https://www.sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_synchronous).
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user