Files
rust-discovery/crates/updater-worker/src/trust.rs
T
2026-11-16 15:25:46 +01:00

705 lines
27 KiB
Rust

//! Actual protected local policy/keyring/health/baseline verification. No key
//! returned in a job/manifest is promoted to trust and no floor is guessed.
use crate::{clock::NativeClock, original::Original};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use rmm_agent_core::{auth::Binding, reconcile::SyncClock};
use rmm_domain::{
agent_update::{Platform, UpdateKeyringFile},
agent_update_provisioning::{
ActivationEvidence, BASELINE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN, HealthKeyPin, InstalledReleaseRecord,
LocalUpdatePolicy,
},
jobs::hash,
};
use rmm_updater::{
ActiveRelease, Platform as ReleasePlatform, SignedRelease, TrustedContext, TrustedUpdateKey,
UpdateKeyring, verify_release,
};
use rmm_updater_linux::files::{Directory, HeldFile};
use std::{ffi::OsStr, path::Path};
struct Protected {
dir: Directory,
file: HeldFile,
name: String,
max: u64,
}
impl Protected {
fn read(path: &Path, max: u64) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>)> {
let dir = Directory::open(path.parent().context("UPDATE_TRUST_PARENT")?, 0, false)?;
let name = path
.file_name()
.context("UPDATE_TRUST_NAME")?
.to_str()
.context("UPDATE_TRUST_NAME")?
.to_owned();
let mut file = dir.inspect(OsStr::new(&name), 0, max)?;
let raw = file.bytes(max)?;
Ok((
Self {
dir,
file,
name,
max,
},
raw,
))
}
fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
self.dir
.file(OsStr::new(&self.name), self.file.proof(), self.max)?;
Ok(())
}
}
pub struct TrustState {
updater_binding: rmm_domain::agent_update::UpdaterBinding,
predecessor: rmm_domain::agent_update::Predecessor,
protected: Vec<Protected>,
policy: LocalUpdatePolicy,
installed: InstalledReleaseRecord,
installed_raw: Vec<u8>,
keyring: UpdateKeyring,
keyring_file: UpdateKeyringFile,
baseline_signer_revoked: bool,
health_public_key: [u8; 32],
}
impl TrustState {
pub fn load(original: &Original, binding: &Binding, clock: &NativeClock) -> Result<Self> {
let result = Self::load_retained(original, binding)?;
result.recheck(original, clock)?;
Ok(result)
}
/// EXACT ORIGINAL evidence only. The separate historical keyring below
/// never supplies current admission, Health, Finalize or effect authority.
pub fn load_retained(original: &Original, binding: &Binding) -> Result<Self> {
Self::load_inputs(
Some(original.update()),
binding,
original.delegation().prepared_at,
)
}
/// Explicit PRE-consumption verification. No Original/start/consumption is
/// fabricated to reuse a retained-evidence API. Caller still needs fresh
/// independent HelperSync admission and atomic durable handoff afterwards.
pub fn load_prepared(
update: &rmm_domain::agent_update::ResolvedAgentUpdate,
binding: &Binding,
clock: &NativeClock,
) -> Result<Self> {
ensure!(
update.validate() && update.execution_identity() == Some("root"),
"UPDATE_PREPARED_ACTION"
);
let state = Self::load_inputs(Some(update), binding, clock.now()?)?;
state.recheck_prepared(update, clock)?;
Ok(state)
}
pub fn load_observed(binding: &Binding, clock: &NativeClock) -> Result<Self> {
let state = Self::load_inputs(None, binding, clock.now()?)?;
state.recheck_observed()?;
Ok(state)
}
pub fn recheck_observed(&self) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_protected()?;
ensure!(
!self.baseline_signer_revoked,
"UPDATE_BASELINE_SIGNER_REVOKED"
);
verify_installed_release(
&self.keyring,
&self.installed,
self.updater_binding.keyring_generation,
)
}
pub fn updater_binding(&self) -> &rmm_domain::agent_update::UpdaterBinding {
&self.updater_binding
}
pub fn predecessor(&self) -> &rmm_domain::agent_update::Predecessor {
&self.predecessor
}
pub fn activation_floor(&self) -> u64 {
self.installed.activation_floor
}
pub fn verify_candidate(
&self,
envelope: &rmm_domain::agent_update::ReleaseEnvelope,
clock: &NativeClock,
) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_observed()?;
let active = self
.installed
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
verify(
&self.keyring,
envelope,
&TrustedContext {
platform: ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
now_utc_seconds: u64::try_from(clock.now()?.timestamp())?,
keyring_generation: self.updater_binding.keyring_generation,
protocol_major: active.manifest.protocol_major,
state_schema: active.manifest.state_schema,
updater_version: 1,
minimum_release_sequence: self.installed.activation_floor,
active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
sequence: active.manifest.release_sequence,
manifest_sha256: self.installed.manifest_sha256.clone(),
}),
},
)
}
fn load_inputs(
update: Option<&rmm_domain::agent_update::ResolvedAgentUpdate>,
binding: &Binding,
prepared_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
) -> Result<Self> {
let mut protected = Vec::new();
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(Path::new("/etc/rmm-agent-updater/policy.json"), 65536)?;
let (policy, policy_hash) =
LocalUpdatePolicy::from_bytes(&raw).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
ensure!(
policy.tenant_id == binding.tenant_id
&& policy.asset_id == binding.asset_id
&& policy.agent_id == binding.agent_id
&& policy.enrollment_generation == binding.enrollment_generation
&& policy.assignment_version == binding.assignment_version,
"UPDATE_PROTECTED_POLICY_CHANGED"
);
protected.push(file);
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(Path::new(&policy.registry_path), 65536)?;
ensure!(
hash(&raw) == policy.reader_registry_sha256,
"UPDATE_PROTECTED_READER_REGISTRY_CHANGED"
);
protected.push(file);
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(Path::new(&policy.keyring_path), 16384)?;
let keys: UpdateKeyringFile = serde_json::from_slice(&raw)?;
ensure!(keys.validate(), "UPDATE_PROTECTED_KEYRING_CHANGED");
let keyring_sha256 = hash(&raw);
protected.push(file);
let job_key = hex::decode(&binding.public_key_hex)?;
let mut trusted = Vec::new();
let mut historical_keys = Vec::new();
let mut baseline_key = None;
for entry in &keys.keys {
ensure!(entry.platform == Platform::LinuxX64, "UPDATE_KEY_PLATFORM");
let public: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(&entry.public_key_hex)?
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("UPDATE_KEY_SIZE"))?;
ensure!(
public.as_slice() != job_key,
"UPDATE_JOB_RELEASE_KEYS_NOT_SEPARATE"
);
if hash(&public) == policy.initial_baseline.key_id {
baseline_key = Some((entry, public));
}
trusted.push(TrustedUpdateKey::new(
public,
ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
entry.first_sequence,
entry.last_sequence,
entry.revoked,
)?);
historical_keys.push(TrustedUpdateKey::new(
public,
ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
entry.first_sequence,
entry.last_sequence,
false,
)?);
}
let keyring = UpdateKeyring::new(keys.generation, trusted)?;
let historical = UpdateKeyring::new(keys.generation, historical_keys)?;
let baseline = policy
.initial_baseline
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
let (baseline_entry, public) = baseline_key.context("UPDATE_BASELINE_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED")?;
ensure!(
baseline
.record
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?
.manifest
.release_sequence
>= baseline_entry.first_sequence
&& baseline
.record
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?
.manifest
.release_sequence
<= baseline_entry.last_sequence,
"UPDATE_BASELINE_KEY_REVOKED_OR_RANGE"
);
let public = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public)?;
ensure!(!public.is_weak(), "UPDATE_BASELINE_WEAK_KEY");
let mut message = BASELINE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.to_vec();
message.extend_from_slice(&baseline.payload_bytes);
public.verify_strict(&message, &Signature::from_bytes(&baseline.signature))?;
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(Path::new(&policy.health_pin_path), 4096)?;
let health: HealthKeyPin = serde_json::from_slice(&raw)?;
let health_public_key = health.public_key().map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
ensure!(
!VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&health_public_key)?.is_weak()
&& health_public_key.as_slice() != job_key
&& keys
.keys
.iter()
.all(|key| key.public_key_hex != hex::encode(health_public_key)),
"UPDATE_HEALTH_KEY_NOT_SEPARATE_OR_CHANGED"
);
let health_key_pin_sha256 = hash(&raw);
protected.push(file);
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(Path::new(&policy.installed_record_path), 32768)?;
let installed = InstalledReleaseRecord::from_bytes(&raw).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
ensure!(
!installed.rolled_back
&& installed.activation_floor >= policy.initial_activation_floor
&& installed.activated_at <= u64::try_from(prepared_at.timestamp())?,
"UPDATE_INSTALLED_FLOOR_OR_TIME"
);
if matches!(
installed.activation_evidence,
ActivationEvidence::Bootstrap { .. }
) {
ensure!(
raw == baseline.payload_bytes
&& hash(&raw) == policy.initial_record_sha256
&& installed.activation_floor == policy.initial_activation_floor,
"UPDATE_INSTALLED_BASELINE_CHANGED"
);
}
let active = installed
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
let predecessor = rmm_domain::agent_update::Predecessor {
release_id: active.manifest.release_id,
release_sequence: active.manifest.release_sequence,
manifest_sha256: installed.manifest_sha256.clone(),
installed_record_sha256: hash(&raw),
agent_sha256: active.manifest.artifacts[0].sha256.clone(),
helper_sha256: active.manifest.artifacts[1].sha256.clone(),
};
let updater_binding = rmm_domain::agent_update::UpdaterBinding {
binary_sha256: policy.updater_binary_sha256.clone(),
policy_sha256: policy_hash,
keyring_generation: keys.generation,
keyring_sha256,
health_public_key_hex: hex::encode(health_public_key),
health_key_pin_sha256,
};
if let Some(update) = update {
ensure!(
update.predecessor == predecessor && update.updater == updater_binding,
"UPDATE_PROTECTED_INPUT_BINDING"
);
}
verify_installed_release(&historical, &installed, keys.generation)?;
if let Some(update) = update {
verify(
&historical,
&update.release_envelope,
&TrustedContext {
platform: ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
now_utc_seconds: u64::try_from(prepared_at.timestamp())?,
keyring_generation: keys.generation,
protocol_major: active.manifest.protocol_major,
state_schema: active.manifest.state_schema,
updater_version: 1,
minimum_release_sequence: installed.activation_floor,
active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
sequence: active.manifest.release_sequence,
manifest_sha256: installed.manifest_sha256.clone(),
}),
},
)?;
}
protected.push(file);
let baseline_signer_revoked = baseline_entry.revoked;
Ok(Self {
updater_binding,
predecessor,
protected,
policy,
installed,
installed_raw: raw,
keyring,
keyring_file: keys,
baseline_signer_revoked,
health_public_key,
})
}
pub fn recheck(&self, original: &Original, clock: &NativeClock) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_original_binding(original)?;
self.recheck_protected()?;
self.recheck_crypto(original, clock)
}
fn recheck_crypto(&self, original: &Original, clock: &NativeClock) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_crypto_inputs(original.update(), clock)
}
pub fn recheck_prepared(
&self,
update: &rmm_domain::agent_update::ResolvedAgentUpdate,
clock: &NativeClock,
) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
update.updater == self.updater_binding && update.predecessor == self.predecessor,
"UPDATE_PREPARED_CONTEXT_CHANGED"
);
self.recheck_protected()?;
self.recheck_crypto_inputs(update, clock)
}
fn recheck_crypto_inputs(
&self,
update: &rmm_domain::agent_update::ResolvedAgentUpdate,
clock: &NativeClock,
) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
!self.baseline_signer_revoked,
"UPDATE_BASELINE_SIGNER_REVOKED"
);
verify_installed_release(
&self.keyring,
&self.installed,
update.updater.keyring_generation,
)?;
let active = self
.installed
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
verify(
&self.keyring,
&update.release_envelope,
&TrustedContext {
platform: ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
now_utc_seconds: u64::try_from(clock.now()?.timestamp())?,
keyring_generation: update.updater.keyring_generation,
protocol_major: active.manifest.protocol_major,
state_schema: active.manifest.state_schema,
updater_version: 1,
minimum_release_sequence: self.installed.activation_floor,
active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
sequence: active.manifest.release_sequence,
manifest_sha256: self.installed.manifest_sha256.clone(),
}),
},
)
}
pub fn installed_raw(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.installed_raw
}
/// Exact typed active-record namespace only. Every other protected name
/// remains mandatory; neither caller booleans nor path wildcards can skip it.
pub fn recheck_record_namespace(
&self,
original: &Original,
clock: &NativeClock,
namespace: &crate::record::RecordNamespaceProof<'_>,
) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_original_binding(original)?;
self.recheck_protected_record_namespace(original, namespace)?;
self.recheck_crypto(original, clock)
}
pub fn recheck_protected_record_namespace(
&self,
original: &Original,
namespace: &crate::record::RecordNamespaceProof<'_>,
) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_original_binding(original)?;
namespace.verify()?;
ensure!(
namespace.grant_id() == original.permit().grant_id
&& namespace.owner_nonce() == original.handoff().owner_nonce
&& namespace.old_sha256() == original.handoff().predecessor_record_sha256
&& namespace.old_sha256() == hash(&self.installed_raw),
"UPDATE_RECORD_NAMESPACE_ORIGINAL_BINDING"
);
let mut matched = 0;
for protected in &self.protected {
if protected.name == "installed-record.json"
&& protected.dir.identity() == namespace.directory_identity()
{
ensure!(
protected.file.proof() == namespace.old_file(),
"UPDATE_RECORD_ORIGINAL_HELD_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
);
matched += 1;
} else {
protected.verify()?;
}
}
ensure!(matched == 1, "UPDATE_RECORD_EXACT_PROTECTED_NAME_REQUIRED");
namespace.verify()
}
pub fn recheck_protected(&self) -> Result<()> {
for file in &self.protected {
file.verify()?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn recheck_original_binding(&self, original: &Original) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
original.update().updater == self.updater_binding
&& original.update().predecessor == self.predecessor,
"UPDATE_TRUST_ORIGINAL_CONTEXT_CHANGED"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Full admission/Stop claims call this under THEIR actual guard. The
/// updater repeats it after all readers stop and before the first swap.
/// Never gate Unknown-only adjudication on this admission-oriented check.
pub fn qualify_history(
&self,
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
guard: &impl rmm_agent_core::helper_reconcile::ExecutorLedgerGuard,
binding: &Binding,
) -> Result<()> {
self.recheck_protected()?;
let baseline = self
.policy
.initial_baseline
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
let baseline_hash = hash(&baseline.payload_bytes);
let mut records = Vec::new();
let mut held = Vec::new();
let mut seen = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
let mut next = self.installed.previous_record_sha256.clone();
let mut total = self.installed_raw.len() + baseline.payload_bytes.len();
while let Some(digest) = next {
ensure!(
rmm_domain::agent_update::digest(&digest)
&& seen.insert(digest.clone())
&& seen.len() < 64,
"UPDATE_RECORD_ARCHIVE_CHAIN"
);
if digest == baseline_hash {
break;
}
let (file, raw) = Protected::read(
&Path::new("/var/lib/rmm-agent-updater/records").join(format!("{digest}.json")),
32768,
)?;
ensure!(hash(&raw) == digest, "UPDATE_RECORD_ARCHIVE_HASH_CHANGED");
total = total
.checked_add(raw.len())
.context("UPDATE_RECORD_ARCHIVE_SIZE")?;
ensure!(total <= 2 * 1024 * 1024, "UPDATE_RECORD_ARCHIVE_SIZE");
let record = InstalledReleaseRecord::from_bytes(&raw).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
next = record.previous_record_sha256.clone();
records.push(raw);
held.push(file);
}
let record = crate::history::verify_history(
db,
guard,
binding,
&self.keyring_file,
&self.policy.initial_baseline,
&records,
&self.installed_raw,
)?;
ensure!(
record.bytes().map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)? == self.installed_raw,
"UPDATE_HISTORY_ACTIVE_CHANGED"
);
for file in &held {
file.verify()?;
}
self.recheck_protected()
}
pub fn policy(&self) -> &LocalUpdatePolicy {
&self.policy
}
pub fn health_public_key(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
self.health_public_key
}
}
fn verify(
keyring: &UpdateKeyring,
envelope: &rmm_domain::agent_update::ReleaseEnvelope,
context: &TrustedContext,
) -> Result<()> {
let decoded = envelope.decode().map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
verify_release(
SignedRelease {
schema_version: envelope.schema_version,
key_id: &envelope.key_id,
payload_bytes: &decoded.payload_bytes,
signature: &decoded.signature,
},
keyring,
context,
)?;
Ok(())
}
fn verify_installed_release(
keyring: &UpdateKeyring,
installed: &InstalledReleaseRecord,
generation: u64,
) -> Result<()> {
let active = installed
.release_envelope
.decode()
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
verify(
keyring,
&installed.release_envelope,
&TrustedContext {
platform: ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
now_utc_seconds: installed.activated_at,
keyring_generation: generation,
protocol_major: active.manifest.protocol_major,
state_schema: active.manifest.state_schema,
updater_version: 1,
minimum_release_sequence: installed.activation_floor,
active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
sequence: active.manifest.release_sequence,
manifest_sha256: installed.manifest_sha256.clone(),
}),
},
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
use rmm_domain::agent_update::{
ArtifactDescriptor, ArtifactRole, ReleaseEnvelope, ReleaseManifest,
};
use rmm_domain::agent_update_provisioning::SignedBaselineRecord;
use uuid::Uuid;
fn release(sequence: u64, published: u64, expires: u64) -> ReleaseEnvelope {
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[83; 32]); // public TEST fixture only
let manifest = ReleaseManifest {
schema_version: 1,
release_id: Uuid::from_u128(u128::from(sequence)),
release_sequence: sequence,
version: format!("test-{sequence}"),
platform: Platform::LinuxX64,
published_at: published,
expires_at: expires,
protocol_major: 1,
state_schema: 1,
minimum_updater_version: 1,
artifacts: [
ArtifactDescriptor {
role: ArtifactRole::Agent,
artifact_id: Uuid::from_u128(101),
sha256: hash(b"test agent"),
bytes: 10,
},
ArtifactDescriptor {
role: ArtifactRole::Helper,
artifact_id: Uuid::from_u128(102),
sha256: hash(b"test helper"),
bytes: 11,
},
],
};
let raw = serde_json::to_vec(&manifest).unwrap();
let mut signed = rmm_updater::RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.to_vec();
signed.extend_from_slice(&raw);
ReleaseEnvelope {
schema_version: 1,
key_id: hash(signer.verifying_key().as_bytes()),
payload_bytes: URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(raw),
signature: URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(signer.sign(&signed).to_bytes()),
}
}
#[test]
fn separately_signed_baseline_at_floor_is_historical_only_and_candidate_stays_strict() {
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[83; 32]);
let keyring = UpdateKeyring::new(
7,
vec![
TrustedUpdateKey::new(
signer.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
1,
20,
false,
)
.unwrap(),
],
)
.unwrap();
let envelope = release(7, 90, 110);
let record = InstalledReleaseRecord {
schema_version: 1,
profile: "decoder_compatible_handoff_v1".into(),
platform: Platform::LinuxX64,
manifest_sha256: hash(&envelope.decode().unwrap().payload_bytes),
release_envelope: envelope,
activation_floor: 7,
activated_at: 95,
previous_record_sha256: None,
activation_evidence: ActivationEvidence::Bootstrap {
qualification_receipt_sha256: hash(b"local synthetic qualification receipt"),
},
rolled_back: false,
};
let raw = record.bytes().unwrap();
let mut message = BASELINE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.to_vec();
message.extend_from_slice(&raw);
let baseline = SignedBaselineRecord {
schema_version: 1,
key_id: hash(signer.verifying_key().as_bytes()),
payload_bytes: URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&raw),
signature: URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(signer.sign(&message).to_bytes()),
};
let decoded = baseline.decode().unwrap();
signer
.verifying_key()
.verify_strict(&message, &Signature::from_bytes(&decoded.signature))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(decoded.payload_bytes, raw);
// Exercise the ACTUAL production context builder, where None at the
// confirmed floor previously rejected every legitimate initial record.
verify_installed_release(&keyring, &decoded.record, 7).unwrap();
let candidate_context = TrustedContext {
platform: ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
now_utc_seconds: 200,
keyring_generation: 7,
protocol_major: 1,
state_schema: 1,
updater_version: 1,
minimum_release_sequence: 7,
active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
sequence: 7,
manifest_sha256: record.manifest_sha256.clone(),
}),
};
verify(&keyring, &release(8, 190, 210), &candidate_context).unwrap();
assert!(verify(&keyring, &release(7, 190, 210), &candidate_context).is_err());
assert!(verify(&keyring, &record.release_envelope, &candidate_context).is_err());
assert!(verify(&keyring, &release(6, 190, 210), &candidate_context).is_err());
let revoked = UpdateKeyring::new(
7,
vec![
TrustedUpdateKey::new(
signer.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
ReleasePlatform::LinuxX64,
1,
20,
true,
)
.unwrap(),
],
)
.unwrap();
assert!(verify_installed_release(&revoked, &record, 7).is_err());
}
}