Files
rust-discovery/crates/time-attestation/src/lib.rs
T
2026-11-15 10:54:40 +01:00

740 lines
28 KiB
Rust

//! Independent online time comparison, never a sync lease or execution permit.
//! Nanoseconds are signed UTC Unix ns, intervals are unsigned ns. Callers must
//! hold their own native clock observations and protected context/pins.
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use uuid::Uuid;
pub const ENDPOINT: &str = "https://discovery.ease-technologies.de/agent/v1/time-attestation";
pub const MAX_RTT_NS: u64 = 1_000_000_000;
pub const MAX_RECEIVED_AGE_NS: u64 = 100_000_000;
pub const MAX_CAPTURE_ERROR_NS: u64 = 50_000_000;
pub const MAX_SERVER_ERROR_NS: u64 = 500_000_000;
pub const MAX_SYNC_AGE_NS: u64 = 3_600_000_000_000;
const DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"RMM-TIME-ATTESTATION/v1\0";
const MAX_BYTES: usize = 8192;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum Role {
Agent,
SystemHelper,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Context {
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
pub asset_id: Uuid,
pub agent_id: Uuid,
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
pub assignment_generation: u64,
pub connection_generation: u64,
pub windows_boot_id: Uuid,
pub verifier_incarnation: Uuid,
pub role: Role,
pub helper_image_sha256: Option<String>,
pub binding_schema: u32,
}
impl Context {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
[
self.tenant_id,
self.asset_id,
self.agent_id,
self.windows_boot_id,
self.verifier_incarnation
]
.iter()
.all(|v| !v.is_nil()),
"TIME_CONTEXT_ID"
);
ensure!(
self.enrollment_generation > 0
&& self.assignment_generation > 0
&& self.connection_generation > 0
&& self.binding_schema == 1,
"TIME_CONTEXT_GENERATION"
);
match self.role {
Role::Agent => ensure!(
self.helper_image_sha256.is_none(),
"TIME_AGENT_HELPER_IMAGE"
),
Role::SystemHelper => {
exact_hex(self.helper_image_sha256.as_deref().unwrap_or(""), 32)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Request {
pub version: u32,
pub endpoint: String,
pub nonce: String,
pub context: Context,
}
impl Request {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.version == 1 && self.endpoint == ENDPOINT,
"TIME_REQUEST_PROFILE"
);
exact_hex(&self.nonce, 32)?;
self.context.validate()
}
pub fn sha256(&self) -> Result<String> {
self.validate()?;
Ok(hex::encode(Sha256::digest(serde_json::to_vec(self)?)))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Payload {
pub version: u32,
pub request_sha256: String,
pub server_instance: Uuid,
pub server_boot_id: Uuid,
pub key_id: String,
pub key_generation: u64,
pub captured_utc_ns: i64,
pub server_error_ns: u64,
pub source_sync_age_ns: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SignedAttestation {
/// Exact canonical JSON bytes (UTF-8); verification never normalizes input.
pub payload: String,
pub signature_hex: String,
}
fn exact_hex(value: &str, bytes: usize) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
value.len() == bytes * 2
&& value
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)),
"TIME_HEX_FORMAT"
);
Ok(())
}
fn validate_payload(p: &Payload) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
p.version == 1 && !p.server_instance.is_nil() && !p.server_boot_id.is_nil(),
"TIME_SERVER_CONTEXT"
);
ensure!(
!p.key_id.is_empty()
&& p.key_id.len() <= 64
&& p.key_id
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'-' || b == b'_')
&& p.key_generation > 0,
"TIME_KEY_CONTEXT"
);
exact_hex(&p.request_sha256, 32)?;
ensure!(
p.captured_utc_ns > 0
&& p.server_error_ns <= MAX_SERVER_ERROR_NS
&& p.source_sync_age_ns <= MAX_SYNC_AGE_NS,
"TIME_SERVER_QUALITY"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Only server code which has independently qualified the native source may
/// construct/sign this payload. This codec is not a provider qualification.
pub fn sign(payload: &Payload, key: &SigningKey) -> Result<SignedAttestation> {
validate_payload(payload)?;
let raw = serde_json::to_string(payload)?;
let mut message = DOMAIN.to_vec();
message.extend_from_slice(raw.as_bytes());
Ok(SignedAttestation {
payload: raw,
signature_hex: hex::encode(key.sign(&message).to_bytes()),
})
}
/// Loaded through the verifier's protected configuration, never an HTTP reply.
pub struct Pins {
generation: u64,
server_instance: Uuid,
keys: BTreeMap<String, VerifyingKey>,
}
impl Pins {
pub fn new(
generation: u64,
server_instance: Uuid,
keys: BTreeMap<String, [u8; 32]>,
) -> Result<Self> {
ensure!(
generation > 0 && !server_instance.is_nil() && !keys.is_empty() && keys.len() <= 8,
"TIME_PINS"
);
let keys = keys
.into_iter()
.map(|(id, raw)| Ok((id, VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&raw)?)))
.collect::<Result<_>>()?;
Ok(Self {
generation,
server_instance,
keys,
})
}
}
/// A native, locally captured observation; ns counters share one process's OS
/// clock domains. capture_error_ns must come from platform qualification.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
pub struct Sample {
pub wall_utc_ns: i64,
pub interrupt_ns: u64,
pub unbiased_ns: u64,
pub capture_error_ns: u64,
}
impl Sample {
fn validate(self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.wall_utc_ns > 0 && self.capture_error_ns <= MAX_CAPTURE_ERROR_NS,
"TIME_LOCAL_SAMPLE"
);
Ok(())
}
}
/// Opaque, noncloneable request authority: one attempt consumes it even when
/// signature/quality checks fail. A transported Request alone is no authority.
pub struct Challenge {
request: Request,
begin: Sample,
epoch: u64,
verifier_id: Uuid,
}
impl Challenge {
pub fn request(&self) -> &Request {
&self.request
}
}
/// One verified response held only by its original verifier. Neither a lease
/// nor a transferable clock/permit: every use needs a fresh own observation.
/// There is no public constructor, Clone, serialization, or timestamp getter.
pub struct VerifiedEvidence {
payload: Payload,
begin: Sample,
received: Sample,
epoch: u64,
verifier_id: Uuid,
context: Context,
}
/// Lives with the verifier process; callers must not reconstruct it to clear a
/// discontinuity. Native adapters additionally preserve the process-wide fence.
pub struct Verifier {
context: Context,
pins: Pins,
previous: Option<Sample>,
epoch: u64,
pending_nonce: Option<String>,
verifier_id: Uuid,
}
impl Verifier {
pub fn new(context: Context, pins: Pins) -> Result<Self> {
context.validate()?;
Ok(Self {
context,
pins,
previous: None,
epoch: 1,
pending_nonce: None,
verifier_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
})
}
pub fn invalidate(&mut self) {
self.pending_nonce = None;
self.epoch = if self.epoch == 0 {
0
} else {
self.epoch.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(0)
};
}
pub fn observe(&mut self, sample: Sample) -> Result<()> {
if let Err(error) = sample.validate() {
self.invalidate();
return Err(error);
}
let continuous = self.previous.is_none_or(|p| {
match (
sample.wall_utc_ns.checked_sub(p.wall_utc_ns),
sample.interrupt_ns.checked_sub(p.interrupt_ns),
sample.unbiased_ns.checked_sub(p.unbiased_ns),
) {
(Some(w), Some(i), Some(u)) if w >= 0 => {
(w as u64).abs_diff(i) <= MAX_RTT_NS && i.abs_diff(u) <= MAX_RTT_NS
}
_ => false,
}
});
self.previous = Some(sample);
if !continuous {
self.invalidate();
}
ensure!(continuous, "TIME_DISCONTINUITY");
Ok(())
}
pub fn begin(&mut self, sample: Sample) -> Result<Challenge> {
self.observe(sample)?;
ensure!(
self.epoch > 0 && self.pending_nonce.is_none(),
"TIME_CHALLENGE_OUTSTANDING_OR_EXHAUSTED"
);
let nonce: [u8; 32] = rand::random();
let request = Request {
version: 1,
endpoint: ENDPOINT.into(),
nonce: hex::encode(nonce),
context: self.context.clone(),
};
request.validate()?;
self.pending_nonce = Some(request.nonce.clone());
Ok(Challenge {
request,
begin: sample,
epoch: self.epoch,
verifier_id: self.verifier_id,
})
}
pub fn finish(
&mut self,
challenge: Challenge,
signed: &SignedAttestation,
received: Sample,
capture_checked: impl FnOnce() -> Result<Sample>,
) -> Result<Interval> {
// Preserve the original completion API and its exact final native
// capture; no second signature verification or invented current time.
let (_, interval) = self.finish_evidence(challenge, signed, received, capture_checked)?;
Ok(interval)
}
pub fn finish_evidence(
&mut self,
challenge: Challenge,
signed: &SignedAttestation,
received: Sample,
capture_checked: impl FnOnce() -> Result<Sample>,
) -> Result<(VerifiedEvidence, Interval)> {
let owned = challenge.verifier_id == self.verifier_id
&& self.pending_nonce.as_deref() == Some(challenge.request.nonce.as_str())
&& challenge.epoch == self.epoch
&& challenge.request.context == self.context;
self.pending_nonce = None;
ensure!(owned, "TIME_CHALLENGE_NOT_OWNED");
self.observe(received)?;
ensure!(signed.payload.len() <= MAX_BYTES, "TIME_PAYLOAD_LIMIT");
let p: Payload = serde_json::from_str(&signed.payload)?;
ensure!(
serde_json::to_string(&p)? == signed.payload,
"TIME_NONCANONICAL_PAYLOAD"
);
validate_payload(&p)?;
ensure!(
p.request_sha256 == challenge.request.sha256()?
&& p.server_instance == self.pins.server_instance
&& p.key_generation == self.pins.generation,
"TIME_BINDING"
);
let key = self
.pins
.keys
.get(&p.key_id)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_KEY_NOT_PINNED"))?;
exact_hex(&signed.signature_hex, 64)?;
let signature = Signature::from_slice(&hex::decode(&signed.signature_hex)?)?;
let mut message = DOMAIN.to_vec();
message.extend_from_slice(signed.payload.as_bytes());
key.verify_strict(&message, &signature)?;
let checked = capture_checked()?;
self.observe(checked)?;
let evidence = VerifiedEvidence {
payload: p,
begin: challenge.begin,
received,
epoch: challenge.epoch,
verifier_id: challenge.verifier_id,
context: challenge.request.context,
};
let interval = self.evidence_interval(&evidence, checked)?;
Ok((evidence, interval))
}
/// Re-evaluate the original finite evidence with a fresh observation from
/// this verifier's native adapter. Pending refresh challenges do not alter
/// evidence authority; invalidation/expiry never renews its original time.
pub fn check_evidence(
&mut self,
evidence: &VerifiedEvidence,
current: Sample,
) -> Result<Interval> {
ensure!(
self.epoch > 0
&& evidence.verifier_id == self.verifier_id
&& evidence.epoch == self.epoch
&& evidence.context == self.context,
"TIME_EVIDENCE_NOT_OWNED"
);
self.observe(current)?;
self.evidence_interval(evidence, current)
}
fn evidence_interval(&self, evidence: &VerifiedEvidence, checked: Sample) -> Result<Interval> {
let p = &evidence.payload;
let elapsed = checked
.interrupt_ns
.checked_sub(evidence.begin.interrupt_ns)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_COUNTER"))?;
let age = checked
.interrupt_ns
.checked_sub(evidence.received.interrupt_ns)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_COUNTER"))?;
// Include every local capture/timer budget conservatively, never RTT/2.
let delta = evidence
.begin
.capture_error_ns
.checked_add(evidence.received.capture_error_ns)
.and_then(|d| d.checked_add(checked.capture_error_ns))
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_ERROR_OVERFLOW"))?;
ensure!(delta <= MAX_CAPTURE_ERROR_NS, "TIME_CAPTURE_BUDGET");
// Use the same full qualified uncertainty for freshness as for UTC-U.
// The begin budget is deliberately overcounted for receive age: no
// endpoint or timer-underread allowance can disappear at either gate.
let upper_elapsed = elapsed
.checked_add(delta)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_ERROR_OVERFLOW"))?;
let upper_age = age
.checked_add(delta)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("TIME_ERROR_OVERFLOW"))?;
ensure!(
upper_elapsed <= MAX_RTT_NS && upper_age <= MAX_RECEIVED_AGE_NS,
"TIME_STALE_RESPONSE"
);
ensure!(
p.source_sync_age_ns
.checked_add(elapsed)
.and_then(|v| v.checked_add(delta))
.is_some_and(|v| v <= MAX_SYNC_AGE_NS),
"TIME_SOURCE_AGE_AT_CHECK"
);
let lower = i128::from(p.captured_utc_ns) - i128::from(p.server_error_ns);
let upper = i128::from(p.captured_utc_ns)
+ i128::from(p.server_error_ns)
+ i128::from(elapsed)
+ i128::from(delta);
let wall = i128::from(checked.wall_utc_ns);
ensure!(
(wall - lower).abs().max((wall - upper).abs()) <= 2_000_000_000,
"TIME_LOCAL_WALL_OUTSIDE_BOUND"
);
Ok(Interval {
lower_utc_ns: lower.try_into()?,
upper_utc_ns: upper.try_into()?,
})
}
}
/// Fresh result only. Adapters must recapture/reverify for later use; this type
/// carries no lease, serialization or execution authorization.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Interval {
lower_utc_ns: i64,
upper_utc_ns: i64,
}
impl Interval {
pub fn lower_utc_ns(&self) -> i64 {
self.lower_utc_ns
}
pub fn upper_utc_ns(&self) -> i64 {
self.upper_utc_ns
}
pub fn allows_start(&self, not_before_ns: i64, start_before_ns: i64) -> bool {
self.lower_utc_ns >= not_before_ns && self.upper_utc_ns < start_before_ns
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
const T: i64 = 1_800_000_000_000_000_000;
fn sample(elapsed: u64) -> Sample {
Sample {
wall_utc_ns: T + elapsed as i64,
interrupt_ns: 10_000_000_000 + elapsed,
unbiased_ns: 9_000_000_000 + elapsed,
capture_error_ns: 1_000_000,
}
}
fn context(role: Role) -> Context {
Context {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_generation: 1,
connection_generation: 2,
windows_boot_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
verifier_incarnation: Uuid::new_v4(),
role,
helper_image_sha256: (role == Role::SystemHelper).then(|| "ab".repeat(32)),
binding_schema: 1,
}
}
fn fixture(context: Context) -> (Verifier, SigningKey, Uuid) {
let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&rand::random());
let server = Uuid::new_v4();
let pins = Pins::new(
4,
server,
BTreeMap::from([("time1".into(), key.verifying_key().to_bytes())]),
)
.unwrap();
(Verifier::new(context, pins).unwrap(), key, server)
}
fn reply(c: &Challenge, key: &SigningKey, server: Uuid) -> SignedAttestation {
sign(
&Payload {
version: 1,
request_sha256: c.request().sha256().unwrap(),
server_instance: server,
server_boot_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
key_id: "time1".into(),
key_generation: 4,
captured_utc_ns: T + 20_000_000,
server_error_ns: 10_000_000,
source_sync_age_ns: 100_000_000_000,
},
key,
)
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn signed_roundtrip_uses_entire_rtt_and_strict_deadline_interval() {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::SystemHelper));
let c = v.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let result = v
.finish(c, &signed, sample(70_000_000), || Ok(sample(80_000_000)))
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(result.lower_utc_ns(), T + 10_000_000);
assert_eq!(result.upper_utc_ns(), T + 113_000_000);
assert!(result.allows_start(T, T + 114_000_000));
assert!(!result.allows_start(T, T + 113_000_000));
assert!(!result.allows_start(T + 11_000_000, T + 114_000_000));
}
#[test]
fn tampering_wrong_role_nonce_key_and_delays_never_open() {
for mutation in 0..7 {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::Agent));
let c = v.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let mut signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let mut received = sample(70_000_000);
let mut checked = sample(80_000_000);
match mutation {
0 => {
let mut bytes = hex::decode(&signed.signature_hex).unwrap();
bytes[0] ^= 1;
signed.signature_hex = hex::encode(bytes);
}
1 => {
let mut p: Payload = serde_json::from_str(&signed.payload).unwrap();
p.request_sha256 = "cd".repeat(32);
signed = sign(&p, &key).unwrap();
}
2 => {
let other = SigningKey::from_bytes(&rand::random());
signed = reply(&c, &other, server);
}
3 => checked = sample(MAX_RTT_NS + 1),
4 => {
received = sample(10_000_000);
checked = sample(110_000_001);
}
5 => {
let mut p: Payload = serde_json::from_str(&signed.payload).unwrap();
p.key_generation = 3;
signed = sign(&p, &key).unwrap();
}
_ => signed.payload.push(' '),
}
assert!(
v.finish(c, &signed, received, || Ok(checked)).is_err(),
"mutation {mutation}"
);
assert!(v.pending_nonce.is_none());
}
let ctx = context(Role::Agent);
let (mut a, key, server) = fixture(ctx.clone());
let (mut b, _, _) = fixture(ctx);
let ca = a.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&ca, &key, server);
let _cb = b.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
assert!(
b.finish(ca, &signed, sample(20_000_000), || Ok(sample(30_000_000)))
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn foreign_reply_cannot_reenable_an_older_own_challenge() {
let (mut a, key_a, server_a) = fixture(context(Role::Agent));
let (mut b, key_b, server_b) = fixture(context(Role::Agent));
let ca = a.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let reply_a = reply(&ca, &key_a, server_a);
let old_b = b.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let old_reply_b = reply(&old_b, &key_b, server_b);
assert!(
b.finish(ca, &reply_a, sample(10_000_000), || Ok(sample(20_000_000)))
.is_err()
);
let _current_b = b.begin(sample(30_000_000)).unwrap();
assert!(
b.finish(old_b, &old_reply_b, sample(40_000_000), || Ok(sample(
50_000_000
)))
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn discontinuity_invalidates_outstanding_and_requires_new_challenge() {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::SystemHelper));
let c = v.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let mut resumed = sample(2_000_000_000);
resumed.unbiased_ns = 9_000_000_000;
assert!(v.observe(resumed).is_err());
assert!(v.finish(c, &signed, resumed, || Ok(resumed)).is_err());
// A new post-discontinuity challenge is permitted, no old nonce reuse.
let c = v.begin(resumed).unwrap();
let mut p: Payload = serde_json::from_str(&reply(&c, &key, server).payload).unwrap();
p.captured_utc_ns = resumed.wall_utc_ns;
let signed = sign(&p, &key).unwrap();
assert!(v.finish(c, &signed, resumed, || Ok(resumed)).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn held_evidence_expires_without_renewal_and_preserves_pending_refresh() {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::SystemHelper));
let c = v.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let mut signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let (evidence, initial) = v
.finish_evidence(c, &signed, sample(70_000_000), || Ok(sample(80_000_000)))
.unwrap();
// Evidence owns verified facts, not an aliased response or a stored
// signature to parse/verify again at each subsequent clock read.
signed.payload.clear();
signed.signature_hex.clear();
let next = v.begin(sample(100_000_000)).unwrap();
let next_reply = reply(&next, &key, server);
let later = v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(110_000_000)).unwrap();
assert!(later.upper_utc_ns() > initial.upper_utc_ns());
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(167_000_000)).is_ok());
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(167_000_001)).is_err());
assert_eq!(
v.pending_nonce.as_deref(),
Some(next.request().nonce.as_str())
);
let (fresh, _) = v
.finish_evidence(next, &next_reply, sample(180_000_000), || {
Ok(sample(190_000_000))
})
.unwrap();
assert!(v.check_evidence(&fresh, sample(200_000_000)).is_ok());
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(201_000_000)).is_err());
// The one-second bound starts at the original challenge, even when
// the complete response itself was received less than100ms ago.
let c = v.begin(sample(300_000_000)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let (evidence, _) = v
.finish_evidence(c, &signed, sample(1_240_000_000), || {
Ok(sample(1_250_000_000))
})
.unwrap();
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(1_297_000_000)).is_ok());
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(1_297_000_001)).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn challenge_freshness_includes_all_capture_budgets_at_one_second() {
// Unequal budgets make omission of any one endpoint observable. These
// are fixture inputs, never installation calibration or measurements.
let delta = 31_000_000;
for excess in [0, 1] {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::Agent));
let mut begin = sample(0);
begin.capture_error_ns = 7_000_000;
let c = v.begin(begin).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let mut received = sample(MAX_RTT_NS - delta - 1_000_000);
received.capture_error_ns = 11_000_000;
let mut checked = sample(MAX_RTT_NS - delta + excess);
checked.capture_error_ns = 13_000_000;
let result = v.finish_evidence(c, &signed, received, || Ok(checked));
assert!(v.pending_nonce.is_none());
if excess == 0 {
let (evidence, _) = result.unwrap();
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, checked).is_ok());
let mut later = sample(MAX_RTT_NS - delta + 1);
later.capture_error_ns = checked.capture_error_ns;
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, later).is_err());
} else {
assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().to_string(), "TIME_STALE_RESPONSE");
}
}
}
#[test]
fn receive_freshness_includes_all_capture_budgets_at_one_hundred_ms() {
let delta = 31_000_000;
for excess in [0, 1] {
let (mut v, key, server) = fixture(context(Role::SystemHelper));
let mut begin = sample(0);
begin.capture_error_ns = 7_000_000;
let c = v.begin(begin).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let mut received = sample(50_000_000);
received.capture_error_ns = 11_000_000;
let mut checked = sample(50_000_000 + MAX_RECEIVED_AGE_NS - delta + excess);
checked.capture_error_ns = 13_000_000;
let result = v.finish_evidence(c, &signed, received, || Ok(checked));
assert!(v.pending_nonce.is_none());
if excess == 0 {
let (evidence, _) = result.unwrap();
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, checked).is_ok());
let mut later = sample(50_000_000 + MAX_RECEIVED_AGE_NS - delta + 1);
later.capture_error_ns = checked.capture_error_ns;
assert!(v.check_evidence(&evidence, later).is_err());
} else {
assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().to_string(), "TIME_STALE_RESPONSE");
}
}
}
#[test]
fn held_evidence_cannot_cross_verifier_epoch_or_discontinuity() {
let ctx = context(Role::Agent);
let (mut a, key, server) = fixture(ctx.clone());
let c = a.begin(sample(0)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let (evidence, _) = a
.finish_evidence(c, &signed, sample(70_000_000), || Ok(sample(80_000_000)))
.unwrap();
let (mut other, _, _) = fixture(ctx);
assert!(other.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(90_000_000)).is_err());
assert!(a.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(90_000_000)).is_ok());
a.invalidate();
assert!(a.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(100_000_000)).is_err());
let c = a.begin(sample(110_000_000)).unwrap();
let signed = reply(&c, &key, server);
let (evidence, _) = a
.finish_evidence(c, &signed, sample(120_000_000), || Ok(sample(130_000_000)))
.unwrap();
let mut backwards = sample(140_000_000);
backwards.unbiased_ns = 1;
assert!(a.check_evidence(&evidence, backwards).is_err());
assert!(a.check_evidence(&evidence, sample(150_000_000)).is_err());
}
}