Files
rust-discovery/web

Linux-MVP WebUI

React/TypeScript, no runtime demo data, no desktop/terminal/hypervisor integration. Build assets: web/dist/; serve index.html and /assets/* from the TLS backend on the same origin. Do not proxy authentication to a different origin. All API URLs are relative; cookies use credentials: same-origin, mutations use X-CSRF-Token. No token or password persistence, raw HTML rendering, automatic approval or retry.

Commands

From web/: npm ci, npm run typecheck, npm test, npm run build. npm run dev binds loopback, but is not the authenticated TLS acceptance setup. The authoritative runtime is the backend serving web/dist at https://rmm-dev.internal:18443. No certificate-verification bypass is supported.

JSON adapter contract

src/api.ts is the sole transport/contract boundary. Responses missing required fields fail explicitly. Unknown backend fields are displayed without interpretation. Pages: {items,next_cursor,completeness,truncated,as_of}. Tenant items: {tenant_id,name} (id accepted as ID alias). Session: {principal:{id,display_name,simulated:boolean},tenants:[{tenant_id,name}],csrf_token}. simulated is explicit server evidence, never inferred from a username. The backend session form {principal:string,tenant_id,testsimulation:boolean, csrf_token,roles,permissions} is also accepted, retaining the exact principal and tenant ID as labels until the tenant list supplies its authoritative name. Explicit testsimulation:false is a nonsimulated OIDC session, not a dev identity. Missing simulation metadata fails closed; neither principal names nor roles imply simulation. Dev login POST /auth/dev/login {username,password}, GET /auth/session, POST /auth/logout {}. Session and CSRF stay in memory only. Backend must disable dev login outside dev/test and audit simulation origin/testprincipal/plan binding.

Before offering login, the UI reads GET /auth/config using same-origin cookies, no-store and verified browser TLS. Exact DTO: {oidc_configured:boolean,oidc_login_url:'/auth/oidc/login'|null,dev_login_enabled:boolean}. The only allowed OIDC link is the canonical relative /auth/oidc/login, and only when configured. Issuer/external/absolute/return/query/fragment URLs are not used by the frontend. OIDC callback codes/tokens stay with the backend; the normal reload reads /auth/session. No local/session storage or auth query logging is used. The password form requires explicit dev enablement and prominently identifies a simulated dev/test principal. Production SSO-only configuration has no password form or simulated-principal label. Configuration loading/error/absent modes never fall back to dev login; errors and not_configured remain visible.

Executed UI auth integration: typecheck/build, 23 unit tests including SSO-only, config failure, redirect rejection and explicit nonsimulated session parsing; real TLS management/login-config checks plus all three pending/TLS checks passed. The current deployment announces OIDC not configured, dev login enabled. Its real SSO redirect/callback is therefore not exercised by these UI tests; the positive SSO presentation is unit-tested, not external-IdP or production acceptance.

All business endpoints are under /api/v1/tenants/{tenant}:

  • GET /devices[?cursor=], /devices/{asset}: asset_id, presence, health, last_contact_at, source_id, observed_at, received_at, quality, completeness, inventory/capabilities/other sections. Missing evidence stays unknown.
  • POST /operation-plans: Spec 23.4 shape {tenant_id,action,targets:{asset_ids}, parameters,schedule:{not_before,start_before,offline_policy},rollout:{max_parallel, halt_after_failures},reason}. Times RFC3339 UTC; common parameters: execution_identity, timeout_seconds, max_output_bytes. Script parameters: variants with {os_family:'linux',interpreter,encoding:'utf-8',script_utf8}, arguments, expected_stdout. Other action fields are explicit JSON, never shell commands.
  • GET /operation-plans/{id}: {plan_id,plan_hash,expires_at,resolved_targets:[], excluded_targets:[],plan_payload_bytes|plan_payload,approval_state?}. Preferred resolved_targets entries are immutable previews {asset_id,job_payload_hash, payload,plan_target_id?}. Alternatively resolved_targets lists asset IDs or {asset_id} records and payloads supplies the previews. Legacy jobs is accepted as the preview list only when neither preferred form is supplied. An incomplete preferred form is not silently replaced by legacy data. In legacy previews only, asset_id can also come from the exact payload. Every target requires a nonempty exact payload and payload hash; preview coverage must equal the fixed target set, duplicate asset IDs and contradictory payload asset IDs are rejected. job_id/attempt_id are not prerequisites for planning, submission or approval: if present they are optional fixed plan references, not proof of executable jobs or persisted attempts. Actual jobs/attempts are created only after approval. Exact payload metadata and script/package hashes must be included. UI does not recompute the plan hash from JSON. Missing fixed targets/previews/payload/hash or excluded targets block submission and approval. All fields are shown, not just target count. approval_state enables opening an existing pending request after reload.
  • POST /operation-plans/{id}/submit {idempotency_key} → {operation_id, approval_state:'pending_approval'} (state also accepted for submit status). No execution jobs before approval. The button then enables explicit review.
  • POST /operation-plans/{id}/authorizations {plan_hash} → {operation_id}; only click handler after explicit checkbox. Backend enforces interactive session, pending state, exact immutable binding, permission, tenant, policy, expiry and deduplicates repeated clicks. No MCP/bearer fallback.
  • GET /operations[?cursor=], /operations/{id} → approval_state, execution_state, plan_id, planned_job_count/job_count, jobs (with job_id), counts.
  • GET /jobs/{id} → state, attempt, cancel_requested, pending_reason, output, results, verification, truncation/reboot flags; raw response shown completely. POST /jobs/{id}/cancel {reason} only requests cancellation.

Errors: {code,message,retryable,correlation_id,details}. Non-JSON errors also remain visible; failed polling retains the old response alongside an error, never a green success message. Tenant changes unmount all selection/plans/jobs and abort requests. List pagination uses server cursors, without pretending a truncated page is complete.

Browser checks and separate acceptance gates

tests/browser/approval.spec.ts uses actual UI interactions only. It never uses an API client to authorize, never writes storageState, and disables traces/screenshots/ video. Its restricted reporter suppresses raw step logs/errors/stdout/stderr because Playwright failure call logs can contain password-fill arguments. Do not override the reporter or enable Playwright DEBUG/PWDEBUG/trace logging for secret-bearing tests. Failure artifacts remain in gitignored web/node_modules/.cache/browser-results; inspect them only locally as potentially confidential and never publish them. It is opt-in via RMM_E2E_PROFILE=dev/test and RMM_E2E_MODE=execute; without both values no positive authorization/execution test runs. A separate pending.spec.ts uses RMM_E2E_MODE=pending-only, never sends authorization requests and verifies login/cookie, device selection, exact preview, pending with zero executable jobs, session/plan reload, CSRF denial on logout and normal logout. Set RMM_E2E_ASSET_ID to the explicitly selected Linux test asset and RMM_E2E_LOGIN_FILE to an owned mode-0600 JSON file {username,password} in the gitignored credentials directory. Never pass secret values in CLI arguments, log them, bundle them or use production accounts. The test only submits Hello World; it never reboots or updates the VM.

The checked configuration isolates browser HOME to web/node_modules/.cache/browser-home, with a private NSS trust database there; only the public project dev CA is imported, never CA/server private keys. Browser launch resolves the two fixed dev test DNS names to PC loopback via Chromium's host-resolver rules; it does not change hosts files or global trust/configuration. TLS name/chain verification stays enabled. Node's CA setting alone does not establish browser trust. No ignore-HTTPS option, insecure flag, direct API authorization or production simulation is allowed.

Reproduce the pending-only checks with python3 deploy/browser/run_pending.py from repository root after installing the browser/local NSS tool as documented in deploy/browser/README.md. The runner imports the public CA, enrolls an explicitly synthetic local mTLS test device, advertises only the capability required for plan validation, runs real same-origin browser UI checks, and revokes that fixture in cleanup. No executor, simulated result, VM access or approval is involved. Pending requests remain durable and the synthetic device is visibly revoked afterwards.

Actually executed on 2026-11-12: real TLS Chromium login, secure HttpOnly SameSite cookie, tenant/device list, plan preview, pending submission with zero jobs/null execution, reload/review, CSRF-denied logout, valid logout, rejection of the wrong certificate DNS name and rejection of the server chain without the isolated CA. All three real browser tests passed. A server-side count guard confirmed no new jobs/outbox/grants. Sanitized local evidence: web/node_modules/.cache/browser-evidence/pending.json. No positive browser authorization, Hello-World result or VM feature acceptance is claimed here. Verified-TLS fetches also confirmed the served same-origin index and both built asset hashes match the current web/dist build.

Build/unit checks are local development evidence only. Real backend/agent execution, VM feature evidence, browser acceptance and production approval remain separate gates.