Files
rust-discovery/crates/oidc-auth/src/postgres.rs
T
BuTzZ 6c3203d725
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 1m10s
feat: snapshot Linux-first RMM MVP and pause handover
2026-11-12 22:06:25 +01:00

227 lines
8.9 KiB
Rust

//! Encrypted, global pre-auth state. No runtime DDL or tenant access.
use crate::{Error, PendingLogin, Result, SecretResolver, StateStore, now};
use aes_gcm::{
Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce,
aead::{Aead, Payload},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
use secrecy::ExposeSecret;
use sqlx::{PgPool, Row};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
pub const MIGRATION_SQL: &str = include_str!("../sql/001_oidc_login_states.sql");
pub const MAX_LOGIN_TTL_SECONDS: u64 = 300;
pub const MAX_CLEANUP_BATCH: u32 = 1000;
// App-specific, database-local insertion admission lock; never an authorization bypass.
const ADMISSION_LOCK: i64 = 0x524d4d4f49444301;
/// No Debug: neither pool configuration nor cryptographic material should enter logs.
pub struct PostgresStateStore {
pool: PgPool,
cipher: Aes256Gcm,
key_ref: String,
capacity: i64,
}
impl PostgresStateStore {
/// `key_ref` must be an immutable/versioned secret reference. Its value is exactly
/// 32 random bytes encoded as unpadded base64url. Resolve it from outside the DB.
/// This constructor does NOT create tables, grant privileges or verify migrations.
pub async fn new(
pool: PgPool,
resolver: &dyn SecretResolver,
key_ref: String,
capacity: u32,
) -> Result<Self> {
if key_ref.is_empty() || key_ref.len() > 256 || !(1..=100_000).contains(&capacity) {
return Err(Error::Configuration);
}
let secret = resolver.resolve(&key_ref).await?;
let bytes = Zeroizing::new(
URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode(secret.expose_secret())
.map_err(|_| Error::Configuration)?,
);
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|_| Error::Configuration)?;
Ok(Self {
pool,
cipher,
key_ref,
capacity: i64::from(capacity),
})
}
/// Bounded, concurrent-safe TTL cleanup. Invoke periodically from the global auth
/// service; expired rows also count toward admission capacity until removed.
pub async fn cleanup_expired(&self, batch: u32) -> Result<u64> {
if batch == 0 || batch > MAX_CLEANUP_BATCH {
return Err(Error::Configuration);
}
let mut tx = self.pool.begin().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
limits(&mut tx).await?;
let result = sqlx::query(
"WITH expired AS (SELECT state_hash FROM rmm_oidc_auth.login_states \
WHERE expires_at <= floor(extract(epoch FROM clock_timestamp()))::bigint \
ORDER BY expires_at, state_hash LIMIT $1) \
DELETE FROM rmm_oidc_auth.login_states AS states USING expired \
WHERE states.state_hash = expired.state_hash",
)
.bind(i64::from(batch))
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
tx.commit().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
Ok(result.rows_affected())
}
fn aad(&self, state: &[u8], binding: &[u8], expiry: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut aad = b"rmm-oidc-preauth-v1\0".to_vec();
aad.extend_from_slice(state);
aad.extend_from_slice(binding);
aad.extend_from_slice(&expiry.to_be_bytes());
aad.extend_from_slice(self.key_ref.as_bytes());
aad
}
}
async fn limits(tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>) -> Result<()> {
// Admission must see a fresh snapshot after waiting for the advisory lock,
// even if the caller's pool changes the connection's default isolation level.
sqlx::query("SET TRANSACTION ISOLATION LEVEL READ COMMITTED")
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
sqlx::query("SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '5s'")
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
sqlx::query("SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '2s'")
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
Ok(())
}
fn digest(value: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(value).map_err(|_| Error::State)?;
if bytes.len() != 32 || URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&bytes) != value {
return Err(Error::State);
}
Ok(bytes)
}
#[async_trait]
impl StateStore for PostgresStateStore {
fn is_persistent(&self) -> bool {
true
}
async fn insert(&self, state_hash: String, login: PendingLogin) -> Result<()> {
let state = digest(&state_hash)?;
let binding = digest(&login.binding_hash)?;
let time = now();
if login.expires_at <= time
|| login.expires_at > time.saturating_add(MAX_LOGIN_TTL_SECONDS)
|| digest(&login.nonce).is_err()
|| digest(&login.pkce_verifier).is_err()
{
return Err(Error::State);
}
let expiry = i64::try_from(login.expires_at).map_err(|_| Error::State)?;
let plaintext = Zeroizing::new(serde_json::to_vec(&login).map_err(|_| Error::Store)?);
let nonce = rand::random::<[u8; 12]>();
let aad = self.aad(&state, &binding, expiry);
let ciphertext = self
.cipher
.encrypt(
&Nonce::from(nonce),
Payload {
msg: &plaintext,
aad: &aad,
},
)
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let mut tx = self.pool.begin().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
limits(&mut tx).await?;
// All adapter instances share this lock; concurrent capacity checks cannot race.
sqlx::query("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock($1)")
.bind(ADMISSION_LOCK)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let result = sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO rmm_oidc_auth.login_states \
(state_hash, binding_hash, expires_at, encryption_key_ref, encryption_nonce, ciphertext) \
SELECT $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6 \
WHERE (SELECT count(*) FROM rmm_oidc_auth.login_states) < $7 \
AND $3 > floor(extract(epoch FROM clock_timestamp()))::bigint"
).bind(&state).bind(&binding).bind(expiry).bind(&self.key_ref).bind(nonce.as_slice()).bind(ciphertext).bind(self.capacity)
.execute(&mut *tx).await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
if result.rows_affected() != 1 {
return Err(Error::Store);
}
tx.commit().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
Ok(())
}
async fn consume(
&self,
state_hash: &str,
binding_hash: &str,
time: u64,
) -> Result<PendingLogin> {
let state = digest(state_hash)?;
let binding = digest(binding_hash)?;
let time = i64::try_from(time).map_err(|_| Error::State)?;
let mut tx = self.pool.begin().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
limits(&mut tx).await?;
// The binding predicate is inside DELETE: a wrong-cookie attack cannot burn state.
// Server time is authoritative even when a caller supplies an earlier time.
let row = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM rmm_oidc_auth.login_states \
WHERE state_hash = $1 AND binding_hash = $2 AND encryption_key_ref = $3 \
AND expires_at > GREATEST($4, floor(extract(epoch FROM clock_timestamp()))::bigint) \
RETURNING expires_at, encryption_nonce, ciphertext",
)
.bind(&state)
.bind(&binding)
.bind(&self.key_ref)
.bind(time)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
// Commit consumption BEFORE decrypt/parse: never restore after invalid data or callback failure.
tx.commit().await.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let row = row.ok_or(Error::State)?;
let expiry: i64 = row.try_get("expires_at").map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let nonce: Vec<u8> = row.try_get("encryption_nonce").map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = row.try_get("ciphertext").map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
if nonce.len() != 12 || ciphertext.len() > 4096 {
return Err(Error::Store);
}
let nonce: [u8; 12] = nonce.try_into().map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
let aad = self.aad(&state, &binding, expiry);
let plaintext = Zeroizing::new(
self.cipher
.decrypt(
&Nonce::from(nonce),
Payload {
msg: &ciphertext,
aad: &aad,
},
)
.map_err(|_| Error::Store)?,
);
let login: PendingLogin = serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext).map_err(|_| Error::Store)?;
if login.binding_hash != binding_hash
|| i64::try_from(login.expires_at).ok() != Some(expiry)
|| digest(&login.nonce).is_err()
|| digest(&login.pkce_verifier).is_err()
{
return Err(Error::Store);
}
Ok(login)
}
}