3.8 KiB
Dev/test root-helper readiness, not package acceptance
python3 deploy/vm_root_bootstrap.py inspect is read-only. build creates a
private minimal Docker context containing only Rust sources, pinned Cargo files,
migrations and the reviewed APT-tool sources; it never includes credentials.
install is the separately authorized create-only systemd bootstrap. It refuses
existing root-helper paths, unresolved VM jobs, an active agent/tunnel, changed
agent identity/signing authority or incompatible artifacts. It never resets an
identity/journal or authorizes a job. Do not retry a partial install blindly.
Fixed resources: /usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper, root-owned 0600
/etc/rmm/helper-dev-test-v1.json and helper-signing-key-v1.json, private root
state /var/lib/rmm-helper, rmm-helper-dev-test.service, and root-owned agent
drop-in 10-dev-helper-v1.conf. The drop-in adds only
RMM_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper/control.sock; it does not restart the agent.
The helper's root-owned socket is 0660/group rmm-agent in a 0750 root-owned
runtime directory. SO_PEERCRED separately checks exactly the provisioned
non-root agent UID; a connect-only readiness probe is not a signed IPC test.
Public signing authority comes from the authenticated, CA/name-verified server GET and must match the preserved agent binding. No server private key is copied. Helper trust/ledger remain inaccessible to the network service. The helper is enabled for its expressly named dev/test service but stopped after readiness only when its own consumption ledger is confirmed empty. No agent/tunnel is started. Creation lists, native measurements and sanitized failure class/line numbers are stored privately; raw stderr, payloads and exceptions are withheld.
Intentionally disabled execution gates
The dev/test config allows only the future exact rmm-mvp-test.service unit;
this bootstrap does not create or start that test service. Root scripts and
reboot are disabled. apt_provider is null. Installing the compiled-in provider
via --install-apt-provider creates trusted code/hook and empty sealed-store
directories/metadata only. No package, fixture archive, baseline, active context,
grant or native-acceptance record is generated. inspect-runtime and
print-config are measurements, not authority. Their hashes belong to a future
explicitly UI-approved immutable plan.
inspect-sandbox is invoked read-only as root in the parent environment. A veto
there is expected and reported as not passed, never bypassed with fabricated
host-namespaces.json/sandbox-ready files. The actual provider requires its
signed worker context before building the final sandbox.
The new readiness unit preserves restrictive protections; it is deliberately not APT-execution-capable. Package setup requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN for private mount/PID/network namespaces and mount setup, CAP_MKNOD for the four basic device nodes, and write access to the actual fixture package payload/dpkg/APT stores. The final package child must then retain exactly CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, FSETID, SETGID, SETUID, SETPCAP and SETFCAP, NNP and seccomp; no SYS_ADMIN, SYS_BOOT, KILL or MKNOD may remain. Host control sockets must be hidden and the private PID1/mount/network checks must pass. The readiness unit's deny-mount syscall policy and ProtectSystem=strict prevent this setup. Do not loosen them blindly: a separately reviewed native APT runner/profile is still required.
Future backend root planning, manifest preservation, helper policy changes and
agent capability negotiation do not follow from installation. Reconnect/sync
must be ready before starting new jobs. Every service/package/update/reboot or
new attempt still needs its own fixed plan and actual dev/test WebUI approval.
Actual commands/results are recorded in docs/implementation-status.md; this
document alone claims no VM execution or Linux-MVP acceptance.