455 lines
19 KiB
Rust
455 lines
19 KiB
Rust
//! Independent development-only Windows SYSTEM ceiling. Policy never approves a
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//! plan, publishes a capability, provisions a helper or substitutes for Sync.
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use crate::jobs::Error;
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use axum::http::StatusCode;
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use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
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use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, JobPayload};
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use sqlx::{Postgres, Transaction};
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use std::{
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fs::{self, File},
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io::Read,
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os::unix::fs::{MetadataExt, PermissionsExt},
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path::Path,
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};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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const POLICY_LIMIT: u64 = 65536;
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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struct SystemPolicy {
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schema_version: u32,
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profile: String,
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expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
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scopes: Vec<SystemScope>,
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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struct SystemScope {
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tenant_id: Uuid,
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asset_id: Uuid,
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agent_id: Uuid,
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enrollment_generation: u64,
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assignment_version: u64,
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principals: Vec<String>,
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helper_policy_sha256: String,
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helper_binary_sha256: String,
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// Administrative evidence pin, never an approval or authorization ID.
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acceptance_evidence_id: Uuid,
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allowed_services: Vec<String>,
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max_runtime_seconds: u32,
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}
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fn digest(value: &str) -> bool {
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value.len() == 64
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&& value
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.bytes()
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.all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || b"abcdef".contains(&c))
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}
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fn fixture_service(name: &str) -> bool {
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name.starts_with("RmmDiscoveryFixture")
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&& name.len() > "RmmDiscoveryFixture".len()
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&& name.len() <= 80
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&& name
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.bytes()
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.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b"_-".contains(&c))
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}
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impl SystemScope {
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fn valid(&self) -> bool {
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!self.tenant_id.is_nil()
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&& !self.asset_id.is_nil()
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&& !self.agent_id.is_nil()
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&& self.enrollment_generation > 0
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&& self.assignment_version > 0
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&& !self.acceptance_evidence_id.is_nil()
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&& digest(&self.helper_policy_sha256)
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&& digest(&self.helper_binary_sha256)
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&& !self.principals.is_empty()
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&& self.principals.len() <= 64
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&& self
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.principals
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.iter()
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.all(|p| !p.trim().is_empty() && p.len() <= 256)
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&& self
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.principals
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.iter()
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.collect::<std::collections::BTreeSet<_>>()
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.len()
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== self.principals.len()
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&& self.allowed_services.len() <= 16
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&& self
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.allowed_services
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.iter()
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.all(|name| fixture_service(name))
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&& self
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.allowed_services
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.iter()
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.collect::<std::collections::BTreeSet<_>>()
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.len()
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== self.allowed_services.len()
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&& (1..=120).contains(&self.max_runtime_seconds)
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}
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fn permits(&self, principal: &str, job: &JobPayload, capabilities: &[String]) -> bool {
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let has = |cap: &str| capabilities.iter().any(|c| c == cap);
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self.valid()
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&& job.execution_identity == "system"
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&& self.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
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&& self.asset_id == job.asset_id
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&& self.agent_id == job.agent_id
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&& self.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
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&& self.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
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&& self.principals.iter().any(|p| p == principal)
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&& has("windows.base/1")
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&& !has("linux.base/1")
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&& has("rmm.sync.v1")
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&& has("helper.system.v1")
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&& has(&format!(
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"helper.policy.sha256:{}",
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self.helper_policy_sha256
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))
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&& has(&format!(
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"helper.binary.sha256:{}",
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self.helper_binary_sha256
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))
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&& has("system:set_service_state")
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&& has("set_service_state")
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&& (1..=self.max_runtime_seconds).contains(&job.max_runtime_seconds)
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&& (1..=65536).contains(&job.max_output_bytes)
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&& matches!(&job.action,Action::SetServiceState{unit,state}
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if self.allowed_services.contains(unit) && matches!(state.as_str(),"running"|"stopped"))
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}
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}
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impl SystemPolicy {
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fn valid(&self, now: DateTime<Utc>) -> bool {
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self.schema_version == 1
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&& self.profile == "development"
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&& self.expires_at > now
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&& !self.scopes.is_empty()
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&& self.scopes.len() <= 64
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&& self.scopes.iter().all(SystemScope::valid)
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}
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fn permits(
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&self,
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principal: &str,
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job: &JobPayload,
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capabilities: &[String],
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now: DateTime<Utc>,
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) -> bool {
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self.valid(now)
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&& self
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.scopes
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.iter()
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.any(|scope| scope.permits(principal, job, capabilities))
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}
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}
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fn disabled() -> Error {
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Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT, "UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY")
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}
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fn no_symlink_components(path: &Path) -> Result<(), Error> {
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let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
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path.to_path_buf()
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} else {
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std::env::current_dir().map_err(|_| disabled())?.join(path)
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};
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for component in absolute.ancestors() {
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if fs::symlink_metadata(component)
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.map_err(|_| disabled())?
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.file_type()
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.is_symlink()
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{
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn protected_parent_chain(path: &Path, owner: u32) -> Result<(), Error> {
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// A private immediate parent can itself be renamed through an unsafe
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// ancestor. Trust every directory owner, and reject writable ancestors
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// unless their sticky bit protects the trusted-owned next component.
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// This deliberately preserves /tmp's root-owned sticky-directory contract.
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let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
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path.to_path_buf()
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} else {
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std::env::current_dir().map_err(|_| disabled())?.join(path)
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};
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for ancestor in absolute.ancestors().skip(1) {
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let directory = fs::symlink_metadata(ancestor).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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let mode = directory.permissions().mode();
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if !directory.is_dir()
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|| ![0, owner].contains(&directory.uid())
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|| (mode & 0o022 != 0 && mode & 0o1000 == 0)
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{
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn protected_bytes(path: &Path, owner: u32) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
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no_symlink_components(path)?;
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protected_parent_chain(path, owner)?;
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let before = fs::symlink_metadata(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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let parent = path.parent().ok_or_else(disabled)?;
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let directory = fs::symlink_metadata(parent).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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if !before.is_file()
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|| before.uid() != owner
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|| before.permissions().mode() & 0o777 != 0o600
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|| before.len() > POLICY_LIMIT
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|| !directory.is_dir()
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|| ![0, owner].contains(&directory.uid())
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|| directory.permissions().mode() & 0o022 != 0
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{
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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// The protected immediate parent excludes unprivileged swaps. Additionally
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// bind the opened descriptor to the lstat identity and bound the actual read.
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let mut file = File::open(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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let opened = file.metadata().map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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if opened.dev() != before.dev() || opened.ino() != before.ino() {
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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let mut bytes = Vec::new();
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file.by_ref()
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.take(POLICY_LIMIT + 1)
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.read_to_end(&mut bytes)
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.map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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no_symlink_components(path)?;
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protected_parent_chain(path, owner)?;
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let after = fs::symlink_metadata(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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if bytes.len() as u64 > POLICY_LIMIT
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|| !after.is_file()
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|| after.dev() != before.dev()
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|| after.ino() != before.ino()
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|| after.uid() != owner
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|| after.permissions().mode() & 0o777 != 0o600
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|| after.len() != before.len()
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|| after.mtime() != before.mtime()
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|| after.mtime_nsec() != before.mtime_nsec()
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{
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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fn load() -> Result<SystemPolicy, Error> {
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if std::env::var("RMM_PROFILE").as_deref() != Ok("development")
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|| std::env::var("RMM_DEV_SYSTEM_ENABLED").as_deref() != Ok("true")
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{
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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let path = std::env::var("RMM_DEV_SYSTEM_POLICY_FILE").map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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let key =
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std::env::var("RMM_JOB_KEY_FILE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "devstate/jobs/ed25519.pem".into());
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// Inspect only signing-key metadata, never read/log/export the private key.
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no_symlink_components(Path::new(&key))?;
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let key = fs::symlink_metadata(key).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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if !key.is_file() {
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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let policy: SystemPolicy =
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serde_json::from_slice(&protected_bytes(Path::new(&path), key.uid())?)
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.map_err(|_| disabled())?;
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if !policy.valid(Utc::now()) {
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return Err(disabled());
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}
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Ok(policy)
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}
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pub async fn authorize(
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tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
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principal: &str,
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job: &JobPayload,
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) -> Result<(), Error> {
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if job.execution_identity != "system" {
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return Err(Error(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "SYSTEM_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"));
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}
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// Independent DB permission; root:execute never implies this scope.
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crate::permissions::require(tx, principal, "system:execute").await?;
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let policy = load()?;
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let caps:serde_json::Value=sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT capabilities FROM agent_installations WHERE tenant_id=$1 AND agent_id=$2 AND asset_id=$3 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND enrollment_generation=$4 AND assignment_version=$5").bind(job.tenant_id).bind(job.agent_id).bind(job.asset_id).bind(i64::try_from(job.enrollment_generation).map_err(|_|Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"BINDING_MISMATCH"))?).bind(i64::try_from(job.assignment_version).map_err(|_|Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"BINDING_MISMATCH"))?).fetch_optional(&mut **tx).await?.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"))?;
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let capabilities: Vec<String> = serde_json::from_value(caps)?;
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if !policy.permits(principal, job, &capabilities, Utc::now()) {
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return Err(Error(
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StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
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"SYSTEM_SCOPE_OR_HELPER_POLICY_DENIED",
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));
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use serde_json::json;
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fn fixture() -> (SystemPolicy, JobPayload, Vec<String>) {
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let id = Uuid::new_v4();
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let now = Utc::now();
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let policy:SystemPolicy=serde_json::from_value(json!({"schema_version":1,"profile":"development","expires_at":now+chrono::Duration::minutes(10),"scopes":[{"tenant_id":id,"asset_id":id,"agent_id":id,"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":1,"principals":["selected"],"helper_policy_sha256":"ab".repeat(32),"helper_binary_sha256":"cd".repeat(32),"acceptance_evidence_id":Uuid::new_v4(),"allowed_services":["RmmDiscoveryFixtureService"],"max_runtime_seconds":30}]})).unwrap();
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let job = JobPayload {
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schema_version: 1,
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tenant_id: id,
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asset_id: id,
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agent_id: id,
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enrollment_generation: 1,
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assignment_version: 1,
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job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
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attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
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action: Action::SetServiceState {
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unit: "RmmDiscoveryFixtureService".into(),
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state: "running".into(),
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},
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execution_identity: "system".into(),
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not_before: now,
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start_before: now + chrono::Duration::minutes(5),
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max_runtime_seconds: 30,
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max_output_bytes: 4096,
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};
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let caps = vec![
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"windows.base/1".into(),
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"rmm.sync.v1".into(),
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"helper.system.v1".into(),
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format!("helper.policy.sha256:{}", "ab".repeat(32)),
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format!("helper.binary.sha256:{}", "cd".repeat(32)),
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"system:set_service_state".into(),
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"set_service_state".into(),
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];
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(policy, job, caps)
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}
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#[test]
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fn system_permission_and_helper_requirement_are_distinct_from_root() {
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let id = Uuid::new_v4();
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let principal = crate::auth::Principal {
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tenant: id,
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name: "root-only".into(),
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operator: true,
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session_hash: None,
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csrf: None,
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scopes: Some(std::collections::BTreeSet::from(["root:execute".into()])),
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testsimulation: false,
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identity: None,
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tenants: vec![id],
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};
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assert!(principal.permits_scope(crate::root_policy::execution_permission("root").unwrap()));
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assert!(
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!principal.permits_scope(crate::root_policy::execution_permission("system").unwrap())
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);
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assert!(crate::root_policy::needs_helper("system"));
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assert!(crate::root_policy::needs_helper("root"));
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assert!(!crate::root_policy::needs_helper("agent_service"));
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let (policy, job, caps) = fixture();
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let mut empty = policy;
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empty.scopes.clear();
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assert!(!empty.permits("selected", &job, &caps, Utc::now()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn exact_system_scope_never_inherits_root_or_other_device_authority() {
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let (policy, job, caps) = fixture();
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let now = Utc::now();
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assert!(policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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assert!(!policy.permits("root-operator", &job, &caps, now));
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for identity in ["root", "agent_service", "SYSTEM"] {
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let mut other = job.clone();
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other.execution_identity = identity.into();
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &other, &caps, now));
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}
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for field in ["tenant", "asset", "agent", "enrollment", "assignment"] {
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let mut other = job.clone();
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match field {
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"tenant" => other.tenant_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
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"asset" => other.asset_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
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"agent" => other.agent_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
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"enrollment" => other.enrollment_generation += 1,
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_ => other.assignment_version += 1,
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}
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &other, &caps, now));
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}
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for i in 0..caps.len() {
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let mut missing = caps.clone();
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missing.remove(i);
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &missing, now));
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}
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let mut mixed = caps.clone();
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mixed.push("linux.base/1".into());
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &mixed, now));
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let mut wrong = caps.clone();
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wrong[4] = format!("helper.binary.sha256:{}", "ef".repeat(32));
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &wrong, now));
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, policy.expires_at));
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}
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#[test]
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fn narrow_scm_ceiling_denies_unreviewed_effects_and_provider_inputs() {
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let (mut policy, mut job, caps) = fixture();
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let now = Utc::now();
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for (unit, state) in [
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("RmmDiscoveryWindows", "stopped"),
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("RmmDiscoverySystemHelper", "stopped"),
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("Spooler", "running"),
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("RmmDiscoveryFixtureService", "restarted"),
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] {
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job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
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unit: unit.into(),
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state: state.into(),
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};
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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}
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job.action = Action::RunScript {
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interpreter: "powershell".into(),
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script_utf8: "Write-Output 'hello'".into(),
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arguments: vec![],
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expected_stdout: None,
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windows_execution_profile: None,
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};
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
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unit: "RmmDiscoveryFixtureService".into(),
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state: "stopped".into(),
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};
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assert!(policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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job.max_runtime_seconds = 31;
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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job.max_runtime_seconds = 30;
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policy.scopes[0].acceptance_evidence_id = Uuid::nil();
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assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
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let invalid = json!({"schema_version":1,"profile":"development","expires_at":now,"scopes":[],"allow_system_scripts":true});
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assert!(serde_json::from_value::<SystemPolicy>(invalid).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn policy_file_refuses_symlinks_public_mode_wrong_owner_and_writable_parent() {
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use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
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let directory = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-windows-policy-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
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fs::create_dir(&directory).unwrap();
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fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
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let path = directory.join("policy.json");
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fs::write(&path, b"{}").unwrap();
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fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
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let owner = fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().uid();
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assert_eq!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).unwrap(), b"{}");
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assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner.wrapping_add(1)).is_err());
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let link = directory.join("link.json");
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symlink(&path, &link).unwrap();
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assert!(protected_bytes(&link, owner).is_err());
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fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o640)).unwrap();
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assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
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fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
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fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o770)).unwrap();
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assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
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fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
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fs::write(&path, vec![b' '; POLICY_LIMIT as usize + 1]).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
|
|
let real = directory.join("real");
|
|
let nested = real.join("nested");
|
|
fs::create_dir_all(&nested).unwrap();
|
|
fs::set_permissions(&nested, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
|
|
let data = nested.join("policy.json");
|
|
fs::write(&data, b"{}").unwrap();
|
|
fs::set_permissions(&data, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
|
|
// The immediate parent remains protected throughout. A writable
|
|
// ancestor still permits substitution of that entire directory.
|
|
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(protected_bytes(&data, owner).is_err());
|
|
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o1777)).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(protected_bytes(&data, owner).unwrap(), b"{}");
|
|
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
|
|
let alias = directory.join("alias");
|
|
symlink(&real, &alias).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(protected_bytes(&alias.join("nested/policy.json"), owner).is_err());
|
|
fs::remove_dir_all(directory).unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|