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rust-discovery/crates/server/OIDC.md
BuTzZ 6c3203d725
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 1m10s
feat: snapshot Linux-first RMM MVP and pause handover
2026-11-12 22:06:25 +01:00

12 KiB

Integrated OIDC/OAuth authentication

The server now wires rmm-oidc-auth into real browser, HTTP and MCP paths. External IdP deployment is not_configured unless the administrator supplies configuration. No external-provider interoperability or production/VM acceptance is implied.

Configuration

Set RMM_OIDC_CONFIG_FILE to an absolute, regular non-symlink 0600 JSON file with a same-owner, non-group/world-writable parent. All secret references are absolute 0600 private files with that same owner and safe parent. Their contents are never passed as argv, logged, reflected in errors or read as shell. Example (placeholders):

{
  "issuer": "https://idp.example/realms/rmm",
  "browser_client_id": "rmm-browser",
  "client_secret_ref": "/private/rmm/oidc-client-secret-v1",
  "redirect_uri": "https://rmm.example/auth/oidc/callback",
  "mcp_audience": "https://rmm.example/mcp",
  "mcp_client_ids": ["approved-mcp-client"],
  "auth_database_url_ref": "/private/rmm/oidc-auth-database-url",
  "state_key_ref": "/private/rmm/oidc-state-key-v1",
  "extra_ca_file": null,
  "testsimulation": false
}

RMM_UI_ORIGIN must be the exact HTTPS origin without trailing slash. The callback must equal that origin plus /auth/oidc/callback. Normal roots are used; optional extra_ca_file explicitly provisions a private IdP CA, never an insecure TLS mode. Issuer discovery/JWKS/endpoints use configured-issuer same-origin HTTPS, no redirects, fixed RS256 and bounded requests. The supported provider profile is documented in ../oidc-auth/README.md (PKCE S256, nonce, client_secret_post; RFC9068 access tokens).

state_key_ref contains 32 random bytes encoded as unpadded base64url, with an immutable versioned reference. The package's AES-256-GCM state protection, 300-second TTL, atomic binding/consume, capacity and drain-before-key-rotation rules remain intact. Global state cleanup runs in bounded 1,000-row batches every 30 seconds.

Production requires RMM_PROFILE=production, RMM_DEV_AUTH=false, configured OIDC and no RMM_DEV_USERNAME/PASSWORD, RMM_OPERATOR_A/B or RMM_VIEWER_A/B values. Production with dev auth is rejected before connecting. testsimulation=true is accepted only in the explicit development profile, never derived from token claims. Development retains the existing separately credentialed browser/viewer/operator paths. Neither profile silently falls back after invalid explicit bearer credentials. Non-OIDC production gaps remain: the local ArtifactStore is still development-only; artifact-dependent features fail closed until a production adapter is supplied. Root/APT selected policies remain development-only and unchanged in their authority.

Migration and provisioning

Normal migration 0011_oidc_auth.sql creates global encrypted pre-auth state and the administrator-maintained external identity index, extends membership kind with human and constrains authorization audit pairs to exactly:

  • dev_test_browser_simulation + testsimulation=true
  • human_webui + testsimulation=false

The runtime does not create schemas, tables, identities, memberships or roles. Apply normal migrations without resetting DB/PKI. Provision a separate global-auth login identity with only schema USAGE and table SELECT/INSERT/DELETE on rmm_oidc_auth.login_states. The server verifies that this pool is neither superuser, BYPASSRLS, table owner nor schema creator, and cannot SELECT tenant memberships. The tenant application pool remains rmm_app, nonowner and RLS-bound. Neither needs a general RLS bypass. Do not reuse the tenant application's database URL for auth state.

An administrator explicitly registers each external (issuer,subject) in public.oidc_principals and assigns tenant routing references; the principal ID is:

oidc: + lowercase SHA-256 hex of compact UTF-8 JSON [issuer,subject].

Rust helper: oidc::principal_id. Email/group claims are never identity or membership. The index is routing metadata only: each chosen tenant still requires a current, unrevoked memberships row with explicit permissions. Browser login additionally requires membership kind human. No auto-registration, tenant or role grants occur. Disabling the index entry revokes subsequent auth and persisted permission rechecks, including start-time rights checks for existing plans. Membership revocation is read on every authenticated HTTP/MCP call, not cached from an ID token or browser session.

Only narrow, fixed-search-path SECURITY DEFINER lookup functions expose identity routing/enabled status to rmm_app; they do not bypass/query memberships RLS or return foreign inventory. MCP/HTTP permissions intersect the validated access-token scopes with current membership. Script/root operations retain their additional permission and selected-helper checks. Bearers have no interactive session context, even with an approver membership/scope plus a valid browser cookie.

  • GET /auth/config: {oidc_configured,oidc_login_url,dev_login_enabled}. oidc_login_url is /auth/oidc/login when configured, otherwise null. UI can show a nonempty configured-provider sign-in link without knowing secrets.
  • GET /auth/oidc/login: code-flow redirect, binding cookie __Host-rmm_oidc_binding, Secure/HttpOnly/Path=/, SameSite=Lax, 300 seconds.
  • GET /auth/oidc/callback: code + state (optional issuer response check), duplicate query/cookie rejection, one-use DB state, token exchange and nonce/PKCE/signature checks, persistent principal/membership mapping. Clears binding on success/failure. Establishes a new opaque RMM session and redirects only to /, never user input.
  • GET /auth/session: existing DTO retained (principal, tenant_id, permissions, roles, csrf_token, testsimulation, approval_origin). Final cookie remains __Host-rmm_session, Secure/HttpOnly/host-only, SameSite=Strict, one hour. Sessions remain in memory; restart requires fresh OIDC login, not job resubmission.
  • POST /auth/logout: exact Origin + session CSRF; server-side invalidation and cookie clearing. Local RMM logout only; no false claim of IdP logout.

All auth responses are no-store/no-referrer. Do not enable callback/query logging, browser traces, HAR, screenshots or third-party resources on auth pages. Browser writes and plan authorizations retain exact Origin/CSRF and immutable plan binding.

Tenant selection comes from the API path, overriding an incoming X-RMM-Tenant header; MCP dispatch selects its explicit tenant_id. X-RMM-Tenant is only a selection hint for other calls, never authority: it must exist in the mapped index AND current tenant membership. /api/v1/tenants lists current readable memberships using separate RLS transactions. Foreign tenant/asset paths remain not-found, not token-controlled routing.

Targeted integration tests

python3 tests/oidc/server_integration.py starts an ephemeral native TLS mock IdP and native loopback API instance against the existing development PostgreSQL. It provisions/removes only its own synthetic identity/human membership and a distinct restricted auth-state login role. No approval/job/permit/VM fixture is fabricated. It uses a private ephemeral CA, real RSA signatures/JWKS, actual one-use code exchange and PKCE. The Chromium step uses a temporary NSS truststore, no TLS bypass/artifacts, and actual provider UI navigation/cross-site callback; no job approval occurs. It also starts a configured production-profile API with simulation false to check the production auth path, not to claim real-provider/human production acceptance. Credentials are parsed internally from local private development configuration; never printed, sourced, passed in argv or included in test failure output.

Existing backend contract, transport, pages/catalog, sync and local integration tests remain required after deployment. Actual commands/counts are returned by the dispatch; the descriptions here are not presumed successful test results.

Verified local auth increment (2026-11-12)

  • Native server build and cargo clippy -p rmm-server --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings passed; changed server files passed targeted rustfmt checking.
  • Targeted Rust tests: server 7, domain 11, protocol 3, persistence 0; all passed. Three server tests cover the added cookie/scope/identity contracts.
  • Standalone OIDC package: 13 unit tests passed; the ordinary run explicitly ignores its owner-opt-in database test, then tests/run_postgres.py ran that 1 real PostgreSQL integration test successfully (1/16 consume, 2/8 capacity).
  • Integrated native server/real mock TLS/real PostgreSQL/Chromium test: 35 assertions passed, including production-profile startup with OIDC configured, simulation false and dev login absent, and actual MCP tool scope enforcement. No plan was approved or executed by this increment.
  • Python syntax checks and Node browser-script syntax check passed.

Initial build/harness failures were corrected without weakening checks: root Cargo needed to exclude the nested standalone OIDC workspace; Python environment merging needed to avoid duplicate keywords; dev login must not register its JSON extractor route in production; MCP testing must consume a concrete SSE response instead of waiting for stream closure. A backend regression also exposed that tenant-denied authentication must preserve NOT_FOUND in the MCP/HTTP structured error code; the shared mapper now preserves it instead of calling every failure UNAUTHENTICATED.

External IdP configuration and all VM/real-human production-approval acceptance remain open. The running development deployment intentionally retains its existing dev identities unless an administrator provisions the OIDC configuration and the separate state-pool identity; no sample provider is silently enabled there.

Final deployed backend verification

Normal additive migrations 0009, 0010 and 0011 were applied without DB/PKI reset; successful migration history is 1 through 11. Docker release build of server and agent succeeded after adding the exact embedded helper unit deploy/linux/rmm-apt-helper.service to the Docker COPY/context whitelist. The unit/helper/provider source and its hardening were not altered by this auth work.

python3 deploy/dev.py up rebuilt/recreated only the project server/migration service; existing PostgreSQL stayed running. Final server observation:

  • started 2026-11-12T19:12:38.969913632Z, status running;
  • image sha256:545318218433a5d0be96c9368096cb2850b059be0b690bee5044ab28aad5cb82;
  • published TLS port only 127.0.0.1:18443; PostgreSQL has no published port;
  • actual /auth/config returns dev login enabled, OIDC not configured, login URL null.

All five affected backend integration programs then passed against that deployment:

Program Actual PASS assertions
tests/backend_contract.py 42
tests/backend_transport.py 20
tests/backend_pages_catalog.py 25
tests/backend_sync.py 28
tests/local_integration.py 35
Total 150

These are assertion counts in five integration programs, not 150 Rust test cases. They cover unchanged immutable pending/approval boundaries, mTLS and rotation, fencing/housekeeping, catalog/pagination/membership, signing-key/bootstrap, Sync/reconnect/restore denial, extended native inventory and tenant isolation. The final NOT_FOUND mapper correction passed the previously failing MCP foreign- tenant contract. Four additional actual database-boundary assertions passed: rmm_app cannot directly read pre-auth state or the external identity index, the narrow lookup rejects a missing identity, and rmm_app remains non-superuser/non-BYPASSRLS.

No VM/systemd/root/APT effect, positive plan approval or privileged-helper execution was performed by this dispatch. Linux-MVP, positive consumed-job/helper SyncAck and real external-IdP/human production-approval acceptance remain separate gates.