# Preserving Linux shared-core runtime qualification The notebook only builds and orchestrates. The fixed Cloud Linux VM remains the client; `discovery.ease-technologies.de` remains the server. These bootstrap tools never create or approve an RMM job, enroll, reset a journal, install a package or reboot the guest. The original `cloud_shared_core_upgrade.py` remains frozen at SHA-256 `09b60e99e1bf92dbaa60f0b0a64f9b94e3cefebb110d558b14c381293cbde873`. Its case `2f8de8b9-2abe-4125-aa12-ae38332a32c6` stopped before any binary exchange: the generic `nlink == 1` check rejected an existing valid APT publication pair. The original failed report, staged binaries and APT records remain retained. `cloud_shared_core_failed_restore.py` restarts only the verified original runtime, once; its saved actual readback is required before a new V2 case. V2 is a source copy with a narrow alias admission and earlier object checks: `cloud_shared_core_upgrade_v2.py`, SHA-256 `d4f857b8ff6e7d9802f863a120a1576ffac5b36facb6a259149409ef25bfbc91`. The only permitted alias paths are under `/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/`: - `acceptance-rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1.json` - `pending-acceptance-rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1.json` Both must retain device `2049`, inode `1028362`, UID `0`, GID `984`, regular-file mode `0600`, link count `2`, and SHA-256 `a88d6b10bbf6c36eaa8dee87eb1a381f2becc36297db8df2b4189791b9165506`. That content hash comes from the original verified, UI-approved native APT update result. The mode is the actual stored `lstat` value `33152` (`0100600`). Neither name is rewritten, unlinked or chmodded. Other hardlinks, symlinks and unexpected nonregular state objects remain rejected. The qualified `durable-outcome-v1` release artifacts remain: | Artifact | SHA-256 | |---|---| | Linux agent | `c9c09de0ecb52b556d707cf45accb69186c73b8ec9baeeabfaeff220fafb1d4e` | | Linux helper | `51c3142ab332216d6a94ff64ff15cbc37ee1d5a99896c14c87bb6f62e63bb946` | | Unchanged APT provider | `1dc0237dd8df9c9d22568bb1f6b047ede73bc2a5fca5c7fcedb7f24ab2a58b1e` | Planned, not executed by this preparation: ```text python3 deploy/cloud_shared_core_upgrade_v2.py prepare --restore-readback python3 deploy/cloud_shared_core_upgrade_v2.py install python3 deploy/cloud_shared_core_upgrade_v2.py finish ``` Each new intent binds both runner hashes, the restore readback, actual alias metadata, original APT checkpoint, release qualifications and the Linux-MVP closeout. Local cases use `devstate/shared-core/runtime-upgrade-v2/`; remote cases use `/var/lib/rmm-bootstrap-history/shared-core-v2-`. A durable installation receipt forbids repeating installation, including after a lost reply; only readback/finish of that same case is permitted. The pre-restart preservation checks run under both existing locks. Old consumptions, outcomes, signatures, database identities, trust and backup witnesses remain bound. Private key contents are never read or exported. General policy/pin remain unchanged, `allow_reboot=false`; the APT endpoint stays closed and its historical runtime pins remain stale. Native mTLS/Sync, MCP and central-count qualification are separate final acceptance steps. V2 preparation checks passed locally: Python syntax, fixed RPC globals, source format, all 65 qualified release source bindings and the existing native Linux76 core-unit receipt. This document does not claim native V2 installation success. ## Retained native bootstrap assertion failures The original V1 failure above was a bootstrap verifier error: the existing legitimate APT hardlink publication was rejected. Neither alias was repaired or rewritten. Its original-runtime restart and actual readback were separately recorded before the new V2 case. V2 case `a2423612-721f-4a6c-a832-b9eef549c41e` subsequently reached the persisted `installed_preserved` stage: both new binaries were installed, all pre-restart data witnesses matched, and both daemons started. Its last verifier assertion incorrectly compared process GID with the account's primary passwd GID. Actual readback showed the expected service identity, UID993/GID984, matching the independently verified Linux-MVP closeout. This was a second bootstrap verifier error; the report remains `completed=false` and is never rewritten as success. `cloud_shared_core_upgrade_attestation.py` is a separate read-only supplement for that exact case. It rechecks preserved rows/schema/inodes/trust/backups and the actual process identity, and binds the stored native VM/server Sync114 evidence to the retained exact signed decision and request. It does not start services, retry installation, change SQL, alter the original report, or create jobs. Its prepared SHA-256 is `59b20ecd2d32ea3b37f2840868eb67ce677ffdb967e079a667e53c7907fce86b`. ## Actual read-only closeout, 2026-11-14 The supplemental attestation was actually executed and passed; its protected receipt is `readonly-attestation-63730c38-327e-4635-802f-8289c28081de.json` inside the V2 case. A prior strict row-hash readback rejected28 cached outcome references that normal signed Sync had renewed. Only those reference changes were then independently proven: reconstruct the original complete row hash with identical job/attempt/outcome bytes and the preserved original decision ID; verify both original Ed25519 decisions and the exact applied request/response, grant/plan/outcome binding and monotonic journal history. All other historical rows remain byte-identical. No general outcome exemption or state rewrite. Native MCP subsequently read the existing Linux device online, rejected the foreign tenant, and confirmed unchanged30/30/26/0 central counts. Agent/helper and server share the ready signed Sync114; original18 Root consumptions remain closed. `devstate/cloud-shared-core-current-runtime.json` binds both actual attestation and MCP receipts. It supplements the preserved historical MVP closeout and does not requalify APT for the new binary hashes. All original failure reports remain unchanged, and no installation or service start was repeated to obtain this read-only closeout.