# Dev/test root-helper readiness, not package acceptance `python3 deploy/vm_root_bootstrap.py inspect` is read-only. `build` creates a private minimal Docker context containing only Rust sources, pinned Cargo files, migrations and the reviewed APT-tool sources; it never includes credentials. `install` is the separately authorized create-only systemd bootstrap. It refuses existing root-helper paths, unresolved VM jobs, an active agent/tunnel, changed agent identity/signing authority or incompatible artifacts. It never resets an identity/journal or authorizes a job. Do not retry a partial install blindly. Fixed resources: `/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper`, root-owned 0600 `/etc/rmm/helper-dev-test-v1.json` and `helper-signing-key-v1.json`, private root state `/var/lib/rmm-helper`, `rmm-helper-dev-test.service`, and root-owned agent drop-in `10-dev-helper-v1.conf`. The drop-in adds only `RMM_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper/control.sock`; it does not restart the agent. The helper's root-owned socket is 0660/group `rmm-agent` in a 0750 root-owned runtime directory. `SO_PEERCRED` separately checks exactly the provisioned non-root agent UID; a connect-only readiness probe is not a signed IPC test. Public signing authority comes from the authenticated, CA/name-verified server GET and must match the preserved agent binding. No server private key is copied. Helper trust/ledger remain inaccessible to the network service. The helper is enabled for its expressly named dev/test service but stopped after readiness only when its own consumption ledger is confirmed empty. No agent/tunnel is started. Creation lists, native measurements and sanitized failure class/line numbers are stored privately; raw stderr, payloads and exceptions are withheld. ## Intentionally disabled execution gates The dev/test config allows only the future exact `rmm-mvp-test.service` unit; this bootstrap **does not create or start that test service**. Root scripts and reboot are disabled. `apt_provider` is null. Installing the compiled-in provider via `--install-apt-provider` creates trusted code/hook and empty sealed-store directories/metadata only. No package, fixture archive, baseline, active context, grant or native-acceptance record is generated. `inspect-runtime` and `print-config` are measurements, not authority. Their hashes belong to a future explicitly UI-approved immutable plan. `inspect-sandbox` is invoked read-only as root in the parent environment. A veto there is expected and reported as **not passed**, never bypassed with fabricated `host-namespaces.json`/sandbox-ready files. The actual provider requires its signed worker context before building the final sandbox. The new readiness unit preserves restrictive protections; it is deliberately **not APT-execution-capable**. Package setup requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN for private mount/PID/network namespaces and mount setup, CAP_MKNOD for the four basic device nodes, and write access to the actual fixture package payload/dpkg/APT stores. The final package child must then retain exactly CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, FSETID, SETGID, SETUID, SETPCAP and SETFCAP, NNP and seccomp; no SYS_ADMIN, SYS_BOOT, KILL or MKNOD may remain. Host control sockets must be hidden and the private PID1/mount/network checks must pass. The readiness unit's deny-mount syscall policy and ProtectSystem=strict prevent this setup. Do not loosen them blindly: a separately reviewed native APT runner/profile is still required. Future backend root planning, manifest preservation, helper policy changes and agent capability negotiation do not follow from installation. Reconnect/sync must be ready before starting new jobs. Every service/package/update/reboot or new attempt still needs its own fixed plan and actual dev/test WebUI approval. Actual commands/results are recorded in `docs/implementation-status.md`; this document alone claims no VM execution or Linux-MVP acceptance.