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7
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38aac42bf2
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c02f1cc74f
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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c02f1cc74f | ||
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0d6d6551bc | ||
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2c0f07046e | ||
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c68bc0153e | ||
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cfbf1f7bfc | ||
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a56474805c | ||
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d77279fb84 |
@@ -204,6 +204,10 @@ impl<V: Ed25519Verifier> HelperSync<V> {
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self.lease = None;
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self.capture = None;
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}
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/// Read-only bound of the existing confirmed lease; creates no readiness.
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pub fn validity_deadline(&self) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
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self.lease.as_ref().map(|lease| lease.until)
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}
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pub fn active_generation(&self) -> Option<u64> {
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self.lease.as_ref().map(|lease| lease.generation)
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}
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@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ pub mod ledger;
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pub mod reconcile;
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pub mod update_handoff;
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pub mod update_health_inventory;
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pub mod update_health_sync;
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@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
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//! Read-only original HelperSync evidence. Exact UTC bodies, not quantized
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//! receipt scalars, bound the real local application time. Creates no lease.
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use crate::{
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auth::Binding,
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helper_reconcile::{ExecutorLedgerGuard, SignedResponse},
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reconcile::{Channel, verify_response},
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update_handoff::{self, AppliedUpdateSync},
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};
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use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
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use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
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use prost::Message;
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use rmm_domain::{
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agent_update::{UpdateInflightProof, inflight_decision, verify_inflight_proof},
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jobs::hash,
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reconciliation::ReconcileDecisionPayload,
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};
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use rmm_protocol::{SyncRequest, SyncResponse};
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use rmm_updater_handoff::{Handoff, HealthReceipt, Phase};
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use rusqlite::Connection;
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use uuid::Uuid;
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/// No deserializer or external construction. Raw request/response hashes and
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/// actual local application come from the SAME guarded existing helper ledger.
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pub struct Round {
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applied: AppliedUpdateSync,
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request: SyncRequest,
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decision: ReconcileDecisionPayload,
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}
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impl Round {
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pub fn applied(&self) -> &AppliedUpdateSync {
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&self.applied
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}
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pub fn decision(&self) -> &ReconcileDecisionPayload {
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&self.decision
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}
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}
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pub fn read_round(
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db: &Connection,
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guard: &impl ExecutorLedgerGuard,
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binding: &Binding,
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grant: Uuid,
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id: Uuid,
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) -> Result<Round> {
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guard.check(db)?;
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let (request_len, response_len): (usize, usize) = db.query_row(
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"SELECT length(request),length(response) FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?1",
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[id.to_string()],
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|r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?)),
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)?;
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ensure!(
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request_len > 0
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&& request_len <= rmm_domain::MAX_MESSAGE
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&& response_len > 0
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&& response_len <= 4 * rmm_domain::MAX_MESSAGE + 1024,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_STORED_SYNC_SIZE"
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);
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let applied = update_handoff::read_applied_sync(db, guard, grant, id)?;
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let (raw, signed): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) = db.query_row(
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"SELECT request,response FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?1",
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[id.to_string()],
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|r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?)),
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)?;
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let request = SyncRequest::decode(raw.as_slice())?;
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let signed: SignedResponse = serde_json::from_slice(&signed)?;
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let response = SyncResponse {
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decision_bytes: signed.decision_bytes,
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signature: signed.signature,
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};
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ensure!(
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request.encode_to_vec() == raw
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&& hash(&raw) == applied.request_sha256
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&& hash(&response.encode_to_vec()) == applied.response_protobuf_sha256,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_STORED_SYNC_BYTES"
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);
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let unverified: ReconcileDecisionPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&response.decision_bytes)?;
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// Historical verification only. Current clock/owner/boot/policy remain the
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// calling Fullguard's independent prerequisites, never renewed by this read.
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let decision = verify_response(
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binding,
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&request,
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&Channel {
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boot_id: unverified.boot_id,
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connection_generation: unverified.connection_generation,
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},
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&response,
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unverified.issued_at,
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)?;
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ensure!(
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decision.decision_id == id && serde_json::to_vec(&decision)? == response.decision_bytes,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_SYNC_CODEC"
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);
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guard.check(db)?;
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Ok(Round {
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applied,
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request,
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decision,
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})
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}
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pub struct VerifiedSpan {
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applied: AppliedUpdateSync,
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lower: DateTime<Utc>,
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upper: DateTime<Utc>,
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}
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impl VerifiedSpan {
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pub fn applied(&self) -> &AppliedUpdateSync {
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&self.applied
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}
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pub fn lower(&self) -> DateTime<Utc> {
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self.lower
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}
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pub fn upper(&self) -> DateTime<Utc> {
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self.upper
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}
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}
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pub fn verified_span(
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db: &Connection,
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guard: &impl ExecutorLedgerGuard,
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binding: &Binding,
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header: &Handoff,
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receipt: &HealthReceipt,
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health_key: [u8; 32],
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) -> Result<VerifiedSpan> {
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guard.check(db)?;
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let applied = read_round(
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db,
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guard,
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binding,
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header.attempt.grant_id,
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receipt.signed_sync_decision_id,
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)?;
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ensure!(
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applied.applied.request_sha256 == receipt.signed_sync_request_sha256
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&& applied.applied.response_protobuf_sha256 == receipt.signed_sync_response_sha256
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&& receipt.inventory_ack_sha256 == applied.applied.response_protobuf_sha256
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&& applied
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.decision
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.acknowledged_message_ids
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.contains(&receipt.inventory_message_id),
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_APPLIED_OR_ACK"
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);
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let prefix = services_prefix(&applied, header, receipt, health_key)?;
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let original_prefix = UpdateInflightProof::from_bytes(&prefix).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
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let current = update_handoff::current_proof(db, guard, header.attempt.grant_id)?
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.context("UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_CURRENT_PREFIX_MISSING")?;
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ensure!(
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original_prefix.delegation == current.delegation
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&& original_prefix.events.len() <= current.events.len()
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&& current.events[..original_prefix.events.len()] == original_prefix.events,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_PREFIX_NOT_RETAINED"
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);
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let invalid:usize=db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM agent_update_sync_applied WHERE grant_id=?1 AND length(decision_id)<>36",[header.attempt.grant_id.to_string()],|r|r.get(0))?;
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ensure!(invalid == 0, "UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_SYNC_ID_SIZE");
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let mut query=db.prepare("SELECT decision_id FROM agent_update_sync_applied WHERE grant_id=?1 ORDER BY decision_id LIMIT 1025")?;
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let ids = query
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.query_map([header.attempt.grant_id.to_string()], |r| {
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r.get::<_, String>(0)
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})?
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.collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
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ensure!(ids.len() <= 1024, "UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_SYNC_LIMIT");
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let mut confirming = None;
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for id in ids {
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let id: Uuid = id.parse()?;
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if id == receipt.signed_sync_decision_id {
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continue;
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}
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let (len,): (usize,) = db.query_row(
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"SELECT length(request) FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?1",
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[id.to_string()],
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|r| Ok((r.get(0)?,)),
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)?;
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ensure!(
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len > 0 && len <= rmm_domain::MAX_MESSAGE,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_CONFIRMING_SIZE"
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);
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let raw: Vec<u8> = db.query_row(
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"SELECT request FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?1",
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[id.to_string()],
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|r| r.get(0),
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)?;
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let request = SyncRequest::decode(raw.as_slice())?;
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if request.previous_decision_id != receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.to_string()
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|| request.helper_previous_decision_id != receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.to_string()
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{
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continue;
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}
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// Hash/signature/application checks are mandatory AFTER this cheap
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// candidate selection too. Caller request fields never prove an apply.
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let round = read_round(db, guard, binding, header.attempt.grant_id, id)?;
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ensure!(
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services_prefix(&round, header, receipt, health_key)? == prefix && confirming.is_none(),
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_CONFIRMING_PREFIX_OR_FORK"
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);
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confirming = Some(round);
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}
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let confirming = confirming.context("UPDATE_HEALTH_ACTUAL_CONFIRMING_ROUND_MISSING")?;
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require_exact_span(
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applied.decision.issued_at,
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applied.applied.applied_at,
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confirming.decision.issued_at,
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receipt.signed_sync_applied_at,
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)?;
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ensure!(
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applied.applied.applied_at < applied.decision.valid_until,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ACTUAL_APPLY_EXPIRED"
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);
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guard.check(db)?;
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Ok(VerifiedSpan {
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applied: applied.applied,
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lower: applied.decision.issued_at,
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upper: confirming.decision.issued_at,
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})
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}
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fn services_prefix(
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round: &Round,
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header: &Handoff,
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receipt: &HealthReceipt,
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key: [u8; 32],
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
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let request = &round.request;
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let decision = &round.decision;
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ensure!(
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!decision.ready
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&& !decision.helper_ready
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&& request.journal_complete
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&& decision.connection_generation == receipt.connection_generation
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&& decision.boot_id == header.boot_id
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&& request.journal_id == header.agent_journal_id.to_string()
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&& request.helper_journal_id == header.helper_journal_id.to_string(),
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_CONFIRMING_CHANNEL"
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);
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let mut local = request.attempts.iter().filter(|a| {
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a.job_id == header.attempt.job_id.to_string()
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&& a.attempt_id == header.attempt.attempt_id.to_string()
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});
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let local = local
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.next()
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.context("UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_ATTEMPT_MISSING")?
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.clone();
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ensure!(
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request
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.attempts
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.iter()
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.filter(|a| a.job_id == header.attempt.job_id.to_string()
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&& a.attempt_id == header.attempt.attempt_id.to_string())
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.count()
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== 1,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_ATTEMPT_DUPLICATE"
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);
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let proof =
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UpdateInflightProof::from_bytes(&local.update_handoff_bytes).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
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let (observed, journal) = verify_inflight_proof(&proof, key).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
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ensure!(
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observed.bytes()? == header.bytes()?
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&& journal.phase() == Phase::ServicesStarted
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&& local.grant_id == header.attempt.grant_id.to_string()
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&& local.consumption == "consumed"
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&& local.state == "running"
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&& local.job_payload_hash == header.attempt.job_payload_sha256
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&& local.original_boot_id == header.boot_id.to_string()
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&& local.outcome_bytes.is_empty()
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&& local.outcome_sha256.is_empty()
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&& local.result.is_none()
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&& local.result_envelope.is_none(),
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_ORIGINAL_INFLIGHT"
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);
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let signed = decision
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.attempts
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.iter()
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.filter(|a| a.job_id == header.attempt.job_id && a.attempt_id == header.attempt.attempt_id)
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.collect::<Vec<_>>();
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ensure!(signed.len() == 1, "UPDATE_HEALTH_SIGNED_ATTEMPT");
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let signed = signed[0];
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ensure!(
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signed.update_inflight.as_ref()
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== Some(&inflight_decision(&proof, key).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?)
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&& signed.grant_id == Some(header.attempt.grant_id)
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&& signed.authorization_id == Some(header.attempt.authorization_id)
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&& signed.plan_hash.as_deref() == Some(header.attempt.plan_sha256.as_str())
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&& signed.job_payload_hash == header.attempt.job_payload_sha256
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&& signed.action == "update_agent"
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&& signed.execution_identity == "root"
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&& signed.outcome_state == "running"
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&& !signed.unlock
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&& signed.outcome_bytes.is_empty()
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&& signed.outcome_sha256.is_none(),
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_SIGNED_ORIGINAL_INFLIGHT"
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);
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Ok(local.update_handoff_bytes)
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}
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fn require_exact_span(
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lower: DateTime<Utc>,
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actual: DateTime<Utc>,
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upper: DateTime<Utc>,
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wire_floor: u64,
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) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(
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lower <= actual && actual <= upper && wire_floor == u64::try_from(upper.timestamp())?,
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"UPDATE_HEALTH_EXACT_ACTUAL_APPLY_SPAN"
|
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn same_floor_does_not_admit_a_one_nanosecond_early_or_late_apply() {
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let base = DateTime::from_timestamp(1000, 0).unwrap();
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let lower = base + chrono::Duration::nanoseconds(100_000_001);
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let upper = base + chrono::Duration::nanoseconds(200_000_001);
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assert_eq!(lower.timestamp(), upper.timestamp());
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require_exact_span(lower, lower, upper, 1000).unwrap();
|
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require_exact_span(lower, upper, upper, 1000).unwrap();
|
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assert!(
|
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require_exact_span(lower, lower - chrono::Duration::nanoseconds(1), upper, 1000)
|
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.is_err()
|
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);
|
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assert!(
|
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require_exact_span(lower, upper + chrono::Duration::nanoseconds(1), upper, 1000)
|
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.is_err()
|
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);
|
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assert!(require_exact_span(lower, lower, upper, 1001).is_err());
|
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}
|
||||
}
|
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@@ -984,11 +984,13 @@ fn clean_ready_shared_lock_and_reopen_start_closed() {
|
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let mut f = Fixture::new();
|
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let mut sync = f.sync();
|
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assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
|
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assert_eq!(sync.validity_deadline(), None);
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let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
|
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let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
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let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
|
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let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
|
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assert!(applied.ready);
|
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assert_eq!(sync.validity_deadline(), Some(d.valid_until));
|
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assert_eq!(sync.active_generation(), Some(1));
|
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assert_eq!(applied.snapshot.previous_decision_id, Some(d.decision_id));
|
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assert!(applied.unlocked_grants.is_empty());
|
||||
@@ -1004,6 +1006,7 @@ fn clean_ready_shared_lock_and_reopen_start_closed() {
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
sync.close();
|
||||
assert_eq!(sync.validity_deadline(), None);
|
||||
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
@@ -1784,6 +1787,17 @@ fn update_inflight_negative_control_keeps_every_start_closed_and_owner_loss_is_t
|
||||
decision.decision_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let retained_round = rmm_agent_core::update_health_sync::read_round(
|
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&f.db,
|
||||
&guard,
|
||||
&f.binding,
|
||||
handoff.attempt.grant_id,
|
||||
decision.decision_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(retained_round.applied(), &local_apply);
|
||||
assert_eq!(retained_round.decision().issued_at, decision.issued_at);
|
||||
assert_eq!(retained_round.decision().valid_until, decision.valid_until);
|
||||
assert_eq!(local_apply.applied_at, f.clock.now);
|
||||
assert_eq!(local_apply.request_sha256, hash(&raw));
|
||||
let proto = rmm_protocol::SyncResponse {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -335,38 +335,15 @@ impl<'a> FullUpdateGuard<'a> {
|
||||
"UPDATE_HEALTH_CURRENT_LOCAL_CHANNEL_REQUIRED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.verify_current_services(&receipt.service_processes)?;
|
||||
let applied = update_handoff::read_applied_sync(
|
||||
let span = rmm_agent_core::update_health_sync::verified_span(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
self.executor,
|
||||
self.original.permit().grant_id,
|
||||
receipt.signed_sync_decision_id,
|
||||
self.binding,
|
||||
self.original.handoff(),
|
||||
&receipt,
|
||||
self.trust.health_public_key(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
applied.request_sha256 == receipt.signed_sync_request_sha256
|
||||
&& applied.response_protobuf_sha256 == receipt.signed_sync_response_sha256
|
||||
&& receipt.inventory_ack_sha256 == applied.response_protobuf_sha256,
|
||||
"UPDATE_LOCAL_APPLIED_RAW_BINDING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let response_raw: Vec<u8> = db.query_row(
|
||||
"SELECT response FROM helper_sync_decisions WHERE decision_id=?1",
|
||||
[receipt.signed_sync_decision_id.to_string()],
|
||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let response: rmm_agent_core::helper_reconcile::SignedResponse =
|
||||
serde_json::from_slice(&response_raw)?;
|
||||
let decision: rmm_domain::reconciliation::ReconcileDecisionPayload =
|
||||
serde_json::from_slice(&response.decision_bytes)?;
|
||||
let applied_seconds = u64::try_from(applied.applied_at.timestamp())?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
applied_seconds >= u64::try_from(decision.issued_at.timestamp())?
|
||||
&& applied_seconds <= receipt.signed_sync_applied_at
|
||||
&& !decision.ready
|
||||
&& !decision.helper_ready
|
||||
&& decision
|
||||
.acknowledged_message_ids
|
||||
.contains(&receipt.inventory_message_id),
|
||||
"UPDATE_ACTUAL_LOCAL_APPLY_OR_INVENTORY_ACK"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let applied = span.applied().clone();
|
||||
verify_local_inventory(&self.witnesses, &self.original, &receipt)?;
|
||||
Ok(VerifiedHealth {
|
||||
signed_sha256: hash(&serde_json::to_vec(signed)?),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -675,6 +675,17 @@ impl Drop for Client {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Linux pathname DGRAM send requires socket write permission; read/execute
|
||||
// bits grant no sending authority. Directory ancestry is separately held and
|
||||
// verified. Neither group nor other may write this daemon-owned socket.
|
||||
fn protected_server_socket(socket: Identity, uid: u32, gid: u32) -> bool {
|
||||
socket.mode & libc::S_IFMT == libc::S_IFSOCK
|
||||
&& socket.links == 1
|
||||
&& socket.uid == uid
|
||||
&& socket.gid == gid
|
||||
&& socket.mode & 0o022 == 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Root-only source broker primitive. No daemon discovery, adoption, commands,
|
||||
/// configurable endpoint, retry, IP transport or time-setting entrypoint.
|
||||
pub struct NativeTimeSource {
|
||||
@@ -698,11 +709,11 @@ impl NativeTimeSource {
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let server_identity = socket_identity(server_dir.as_raw_fd(), "chronyd.sock")?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
server_identity.mode & libc::S_IFMT == libc::S_IFSOCK
|
||||
&& server_identity.links == 1
|
||||
&& server_identity.uid == daemon.pin.daemon_uid
|
||||
&& server_identity.gid == daemon.pin.daemon_gid
|
||||
&& server_identity.mode & 0o007 == 0,
|
||||
protected_server_socket(
|
||||
server_identity,
|
||||
daemon.pin.daemon_uid,
|
||||
daemon.pin.daemon_gid,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"TIME_CHRONY_SOCKET_PROTECTION"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
@@ -854,6 +865,21 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let old = UnixDatagram::bind(path.join("own.sock")).unwrap();
|
||||
let expected = socket_identity(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock").unwrap();
|
||||
let server = Identity {
|
||||
mode: libc::S_IFSOCK | 0o755,
|
||||
..expected
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(protected_server_socket(server, server.uid, server.gid));
|
||||
for mode in [0o775, 0o757] {
|
||||
assert!(!protected_server_socket(
|
||||
Identity {
|
||||
mode: libc::S_IFSOCK | mode,
|
||||
..server
|
||||
},
|
||||
server.uid,
|
||||
server.gid,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
std::fs::rename(path.join("own.sock"), path.join("held.sock")).unwrap();
|
||||
let new = UnixDatagram::bind(path.join("own.sock")).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(unlink_owned(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock", expected).is_err());
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
|
||||
//! Existing Agent singleton fence. No create, ACL change or Root-ledger alias.
|
||||
//! The agent holds this exact lock before opening BOTH of its SQLite files.
|
||||
use crate::retained::{RetainedSet, Retention};
|
||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
|
||||
use rmm_updater_linux::{
|
||||
Budget,
|
||||
files::{Directory, Identity},
|
||||
services::StoppedServices,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
fs::{File, OpenOptions},
|
||||
os::{
|
||||
fd::AsRawFd,
|
||||
unix::fs::{MetadataExt, OpenOptionsExt},
|
||||
},
|
||||
path::Path,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const PARENT: &str = "/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote";
|
||||
const PATH: &str = "/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/agent.lock";
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct BoundAgentLock {
|
||||
directory: Directory,
|
||||
file: File,
|
||||
expected: Identity,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl BoundAgentLock {
|
||||
/// Open/bind before any stop, so a missing preservation witness cannot be
|
||||
/// discovered only after stopping the Agent. Reading never takes its lock.
|
||||
pub fn bind(retained: &RetainedSet) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
retained.verify()?;
|
||||
let specs = retained.specs();
|
||||
let spec = specs
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.find(|s| s.path == Path::new(PATH))
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_AGENT_LOCK_WITNESS_REQUIRED")?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
spec.retention == Retention::ImmutableMetadata
|
||||
&& spec.parent_uid == 993
|
||||
&& spec.identity.uid == 993
|
||||
&& spec.identity.gid == 984
|
||||
&& spec.identity.mode & 0o7777 == 0o600
|
||||
&& spec.identity.links == 1,
|
||||
"UPDATE_AGENT_LOCK_PROVISIONING"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let directory = Directory::open(Path::new(PARENT), 993, true)?;
|
||||
let file = OpenOptions::new()
|
||||
.read(true)
|
||||
.write(true)
|
||||
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW | libc::O_NONBLOCK | libc::O_CLOEXEC)
|
||||
.open(PATH)?;
|
||||
let result = Self {
|
||||
directory,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
expected: spec.identity.clone(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
result.verify()?;
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.directory.verify()?;
|
||||
let held = self.file.metadata()?;
|
||||
let named = std::fs::symlink_metadata(PATH)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
held.is_file()
|
||||
&& held.len() == 0
|
||||
&& named.is_file()
|
||||
&& !named.file_type().is_symlink()
|
||||
&& identity(&held) == self.expected
|
||||
&& identity(&named) == self.expected,
|
||||
"UPDATE_AGENT_LOCK_IDENTITY_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn identity(&self) -> &Identity {
|
||||
&self.expected
|
||||
}
|
||||
/// Real, fresh stopped-service proof precedes the existing nonblocking
|
||||
/// singleton acquisition. A running/restarted Agent makes this fail closed.
|
||||
pub fn acquire(self, stopped: &StoppedServices, budget: &Budget) -> Result<HeldAgentLock> {
|
||||
stopped.verify_still_stopped(budget)?;
|
||||
let result = self.acquire_existing()?;
|
||||
stopped.verify_still_stopped(budget)?;
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn acquire_existing(self) -> Result<HeldAgentLock> {
|
||||
self.verify()?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { libc::flock(self.file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) } == 0,
|
||||
"UPDATE_AGENT_STARTUP_BUSY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let result = HeldAgentLock { bound: self };
|
||||
result.verify()?;
|
||||
Ok(result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub struct HeldAgentLock {
|
||||
bound: BoundAgentLock,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl HeldAgentLock {
|
||||
pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.bound.verify()
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn identity(&self) -> &Identity {
|
||||
self.bound.identity()
|
||||
}
|
||||
/// Only the live Engine calls this after SQLite close and actual original
|
||||
/// Root flock return, before the explicit once-only service start sequence.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn return_after_root_release(self, budget: &Budget) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
budget.check()?;
|
||||
self.verify()?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
unsafe { libc::flock(self.bound.file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_UN) } == 0,
|
||||
"UPDATE_AGENT_STARTUP_RETURN_FAILED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Drop for HeldAgentLock {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
libc::flock(self.bound.file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_UN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn identity(meta: &std::fs::Metadata) -> Identity {
|
||||
Identity {
|
||||
device: meta.dev(),
|
||||
inode: meta.ino(),
|
||||
uid: meta.uid(),
|
||||
gid: meta.gid(),
|
||||
mode: meta.mode(),
|
||||
links: meta.nlink(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::retained::RetainedFileSpec;
|
||||
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
|
||||
struct Cleanup;
|
||||
impl Drop for Cleanup {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
std::fs::remove_dir_all(PARENT).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn existing_agent_lock_blocks_aliases_and_rejects_samebyte_inode_substitution() {
|
||||
// Private network-none/root container fixture ONLY; no host path/test.
|
||||
assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::geteuid() }, 0);
|
||||
assert!(!Path::new(PARENT).exists());
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(PARENT).unwrap();
|
||||
let _cleanup = Cleanup;
|
||||
std::fs::set_permissions(PARENT, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
|
||||
let file = OpenOptions::new()
|
||||
.create_new(true)
|
||||
.read(true)
|
||||
.write(true)
|
||||
.mode(0o600)
|
||||
.open(PATH)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
for path in [PARENT, PATH] {
|
||||
let path = std::ffi::CString::new(path).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::chown(path.as_ptr(), 993, 984) }, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let retained = RetainedSet::capture(vec![RetainedFileSpec {
|
||||
path: Path::new(PATH).to_owned(),
|
||||
parent_uid: 993,
|
||||
identity: identity(&file.metadata().unwrap()),
|
||||
retention: Retention::ImmutableMetadata,
|
||||
}])
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let bound = BoundAgentLock::bind(&retained).unwrap();
|
||||
// The existing Agent's separately opened descriptor owns the lock.
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
unsafe { libc::flock(file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) },
|
||||
0
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(bound.acquire_existing().is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::flock(file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_UN) }, 0);
|
||||
let held = BoundAgentLock::bind(&retained)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.acquire_existing()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_ne!(
|
||||
unsafe { libc::flock(file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) },
|
||||
0
|
||||
);
|
||||
held.verify().unwrap();
|
||||
std::fs::rename(PATH, Path::new(PARENT).join("agent.lock.previous")).unwrap();
|
||||
let replacement = OpenOptions::new()
|
||||
.create_new(true)
|
||||
.read(true)
|
||||
.write(true)
|
||||
.mode(0o600)
|
||||
.open(PATH)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let path = std::ffi::CString::new(PATH).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::chown(path.as_ptr(), 993, 984) }, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(replacement.metadata().unwrap().len(), 0);
|
||||
assert!(held.verify().is_err());
|
||||
assert!(BoundAgentLock::bind(&retained).is_err());
|
||||
drop(held);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
unsafe { libc::flock(file.as_raw_fd(), libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) },
|
||||
0
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ pub struct BridgeContext<'a> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub struct FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
context: BridgeContext<'a>,
|
||||
prefix: UpdateInflightProof,
|
||||
prefix: Option<UpdateInflightProof>,
|
||||
poisoned: bool,
|
||||
finalized: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -76,7 +76,27 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
context,
|
||||
prefix,
|
||||
prefix: Some(prefix),
|
||||
poisoned: false,
|
||||
finalized: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
/// First read obtains the actual original prefix from the authenticated
|
||||
/// Full process/ledger. No event is synthesized from a caller's header.
|
||||
pub fn original(context: BridgeContext<'a>) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
context.generation == Generation::Original,
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_ORIGINAL_ONLY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
context.handoff.validate()?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
context.delegation.handoff_sha256 == rmm_domain::jobs::hash(&context.handoff.bytes()?)
|
||||
&& context.delegation.owner_nonce == context.handoff.owner_nonce,
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_ORIGINAL_HEADER"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
context,
|
||||
prefix: None,
|
||||
poisoned: false,
|
||||
finalized: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -87,8 +107,21 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
.updater
|
||||
.verify_delegation(context.delegation, context.budget)?;
|
||||
context.budget.check()?;
|
||||
let (_, journal) = verify_inflight_proof(&self.prefix, context.health_public_key)
|
||||
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
if self.prefix.is_none() {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
matches!(method, NativeControlOperation::ReadOriginal),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_ORIGINAL_READ_REQUIRED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let journal = self
|
||||
.prefix
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.map(|prefix| {
|
||||
verify_inflight_proof(prefix, context.health_public_key)
|
||||
.map(|(_, journal)| journal)
|
||||
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.transpose()?;
|
||||
match &method {
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::ReadOriginal => {}
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::ClaimStop {
|
||||
@@ -96,31 +129,43 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
..
|
||||
} => ensure!(
|
||||
context.generation == Generation::Original
|
||||
&& journal.phase() == Phase::StopIntent
|
||||
&& *expected_head_sha256 == self.prefix.head_sha256,
|
||||
&& journal
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|j| j.phase() == Phase::StopIntent)
|
||||
&& Some(expected_head_sha256.as_str())
|
||||
== self.prefix.as_ref().map(|p| p.head_sha256.as_str()),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_CLAIM_PHASE"
|
||||
),
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::ObserveStarts { .. } => ensure!(
|
||||
context.generation == Generation::Replacement
|
||||
&& journal.phase() == Phase::LedgerReturnIntent,
|
||||
&& journal
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|j| j.phase() == Phase::LedgerReturnIntent),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_START_PHASE"
|
||||
),
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::Health { receipt } => {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
context.generation == Generation::Replacement
|
||||
&& journal.phase() == Phase::ServicesStarted,
|
||||
&& journal
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|j| j.phase() == Phase::ServicesStarted),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_HEALTH_PHASE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
journal.prepare(
|
||||
u64::try_from(context.clock.now()?.timestamp())?,
|
||||
rmm_updater_handoff::Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: receipt.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
journal
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_BRIDGE_ORIGINAL_READ_REQUIRED")?
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
u64::try_from(context.clock.now()?.timestamp())?,
|
||||
rmm_updater_handoff::Evidence::HealthVerified {
|
||||
receipt: receipt.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::Finalize => ensure!(
|
||||
context.generation == Generation::Replacement
|
||||
&& journal.phase() == Phase::HealthVerified,
|
||||
&& journal
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|j| j.phase() == Phase::HealthVerified),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_FINAL_PHASE"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -270,8 +315,11 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
handoff.bytes()? == context.handoff.bytes()?
|
||||
&& proof.delegation == *context.delegation
|
||||
&& proof.events.len() >= self.prefix.events.len()
|
||||
&& proof.events[..self.prefix.events.len()] == self.prefix.events,
|
||||
&& self
|
||||
.prefix
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_none_or(|prior| proof.events.len() >= prior.events.len()
|
||||
&& proof.events[..prior.events.len()] == prior.events),
|
||||
"UPDATE_BRIDGE_PROOF_ROLLBACK_OR_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
match request.method {
|
||||
@@ -315,7 +363,7 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
),
|
||||
NativeControlOperation::Finalize => unreachable!(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.prefix = proof.clone();
|
||||
self.prefix = Some(proof.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
context.budget.check()?;
|
||||
if matches!(request.method, NativeControlOperation::Finalize) {
|
||||
@@ -331,8 +379,11 @@ impl<'a> FullBridge<'a> {
|
||||
original_outcome,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn head_sha256(&self) -> &str {
|
||||
&self.prefix.head_sha256
|
||||
pub fn head_sha256(&self) -> Result<&str> {
|
||||
self.prefix
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.map(|p| p.head_sha256.as_str())
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_BRIDGE_ORIGINAL_READ_REQUIRED")
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn observe_starts(
|
||||
&mut self,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
|
||||
//! One live original-attempt pass. Activation queues only; the fixed listener
|
||||
//! must finish its reply before this runtime can stop the calling Fullhelper.
|
||||
//! No daemon entrypoint, admission/capability registration or restart recovery.
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
agent_startup::BoundAgentLock,
|
||||
bridge::{BridgeContext, FullBridge, Generation},
|
||||
bundle,
|
||||
clock::NativeClock,
|
||||
fence::LedgerFence,
|
||||
ledger::{OwnedInputs, OwnedLedger},
|
||||
original::Original,
|
||||
participants::{StableParticipant, verify_original_helper},
|
||||
retained::RetainedSet,
|
||||
returned,
|
||||
trust::TrustState,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
|
||||
use rmm_agent_core::{
|
||||
auth::Binding,
|
||||
reconcile::SyncClock,
|
||||
update_handoff::{NativeControlOperation, NativeEffect, NativeEffectClaim, NativeService},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rmm_domain::{
|
||||
agent_update::{ParticipantIdentity, ParticipantRole, UpdateInflightProof},
|
||||
agent_update_provisioning::{HealthKeyPin, InstalledReleaseRecord, LocalUpdatePolicy},
|
||||
jobs::hash,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rmm_updater_handoff::{Evidence, Phase, Process};
|
||||
use rmm_updater_linux::{
|
||||
Budget, DurableEffectFence, Effect,
|
||||
files::{Directory, HeldFile, LedgerGuard, Role},
|
||||
ipc::{self, Request, Response, State},
|
||||
services::{Service, ServicePolicy, ServiceProof, Systemd},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use std::{ffi::OsStr, path::Path, time::Duration};
|
||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||
|
||||
struct Protected {
|
||||
directory: Directory,
|
||||
file: HeldFile,
|
||||
name: String,
|
||||
max: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Protected {
|
||||
fn read(path: &str, max: u64) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>)> {
|
||||
let path = Path::new(path);
|
||||
let directory = Directory::open(path.parent().context("UPDATE_ENGINE_PARENT")?, 0, false)?;
|
||||
let name = path
|
||||
.file_name()
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_NAME")?
|
||||
.to_str()
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_NAME")?
|
||||
.to_owned();
|
||||
let mut file = directory.inspect(OsStr::new(&name), 0, max)?;
|
||||
let raw = file.bytes(max)?;
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
directory,
|
||||
file,
|
||||
name,
|
||||
max,
|
||||
},
|
||||
raw,
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.directory
|
||||
.file(OsStr::new(&self.name), self.file.proof(), self.max)?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Construct only in the separately provisioned stable service, with the
|
||||
/// independently protected original job Binding. It offers no approval API.
|
||||
pub struct Runtime {
|
||||
binding: Binding,
|
||||
policy: LocalUpdatePolicy,
|
||||
policy_sha256: String,
|
||||
installed: InstalledReleaseRecord,
|
||||
installed_sha256: String,
|
||||
health_key: [u8; 32],
|
||||
health_pin_sha256: String,
|
||||
protected: Vec<Protected>,
|
||||
old_policies: Vec<ServicePolicy>,
|
||||
updater: StableParticipant,
|
||||
clock: NativeClock,
|
||||
queued: Option<Queued>,
|
||||
accepted: bool,
|
||||
failed: bool,
|
||||
terminal: bool,
|
||||
head: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
struct Queued {
|
||||
agent_startup: BoundAgentLock,
|
||||
original: Original,
|
||||
witnesses: bundle::Loaded,
|
||||
trust: TrustState,
|
||||
budget: Budget,
|
||||
proof: UpdateInflightProof,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Runtime {
|
||||
pub fn new(binding: Binding) -> Result<Self> {
|
||||
let clock = NativeClock::new()?;
|
||||
let budget = observation_budget()?;
|
||||
let (policy_file, raw) = Protected::read("/etc/rmm-agent-updater/policy.json", 65536)?;
|
||||
let (policy, policy_sha256) =
|
||||
LocalUpdatePolicy::from_bytes(&raw).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
policy.tenant_id == binding.tenant_id
|
||||
&& policy.asset_id == binding.asset_id
|
||||
&& policy.agent_id == binding.agent_id
|
||||
&& policy.enrollment_generation == binding.enrollment_generation
|
||||
&& policy.assignment_version == binding.assignment_version,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_LOCAL_IDENTITY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let (record_file, raw) = Protected::read(&policy.installed_record_path, 32768)?;
|
||||
let installed = InstalledReleaseRecord::from_bytes(&raw).map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
let installed_sha256 = hash(&raw);
|
||||
let old_policies = service_policies(&policy, &installed, None)?;
|
||||
let (health_file, raw) = Protected::read(&policy.health_pin_path, 4096)?;
|
||||
let health: HealthKeyPin = serde_json::from_slice(&raw)?;
|
||||
let health_key = health.public_key().map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
let updater = StableParticipant::observe(
|
||||
ServicePolicy {
|
||||
service: Service::Updater,
|
||||
image_sha256: policy.updater_binary_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
unit_sha256: policy.updater_service.unit_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
&budget,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
binding,
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
policy_sha256,
|
||||
installed,
|
||||
installed_sha256,
|
||||
health_key,
|
||||
health_pin_sha256: hash(&raw),
|
||||
protected: vec![policy_file, record_file, health_file],
|
||||
old_policies,
|
||||
updater,
|
||||
clock,
|
||||
queued: None,
|
||||
accepted: false,
|
||||
failed: false,
|
||||
terminal: false,
|
||||
head: None,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
/// A lost activation reply disables this live runtime before any stop.
|
||||
/// Drive is deliberately private: it cannot run inside Engine::handle.
|
||||
pub fn serve_one(&mut self, listener: &ipc::Listener) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.require_reader_registry_and_census()?;
|
||||
ensure!(!self.failed && !self.terminal, "UPDATE_ENGINE_CLOSED");
|
||||
let services = Systemd::new(self.old_policies.clone())?;
|
||||
let budget = observation_budget()?;
|
||||
if let Err(error) = listener.serve_one(&services, &budget, self) {
|
||||
if self.queued.take().is_some() {
|
||||
self.failed = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Err(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(queued) = self.queued.take() {
|
||||
// serve_one has written/flushed the bounded reply and dropped its
|
||||
// accepted stream. Only now may the original Full process stop.
|
||||
match self.drive(queued) {
|
||||
Ok(()) => self.terminal = true,
|
||||
Err(error) => {
|
||||
self.failed = true;
|
||||
return Err(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn require_reader_registry_and_census(&self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// This is an explicit source-checkpoint barrier, not a caller boolean
|
||||
// or a known-unit-list substitute. Replace only with the real protected
|
||||
// bootstrap registry + complete live FD/maps census and both locks.
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("UPDATE_READER_CENSUS_NOT_CONFIGURED")
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn enqueue(
|
||||
&mut self,
|
||||
peer: &ParticipantIdentity,
|
||||
grant: Uuid,
|
||||
nonce: Uuid,
|
||||
handoff_sha: &str,
|
||||
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!self.accepted && self.queued.is_none() && !self.failed && !self.terminal,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_NO_RETRY_OR_RESUME"
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Fuse before any fallible original admission. Even an uncertain reply
|
||||
// cannot dispatch this handoff for a second time in this process.
|
||||
self.accepted = true;
|
||||
for file in &self.protected {
|
||||
file.verify()?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let header = bundle::read_header(grant, nonce, handoff_sha)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
peer.role == ParticipantRole::LinuxFullHelper
|
||||
&& *peer == header.delegation.original_helper
|
||||
&& header.handoff.updater_sha256 == self.policy.updater_binary_sha256
|
||||
&& header.handoff.updater_policy_sha256 == self.policy_sha256
|
||||
&& header.handoff.predecessor_record_sha256 == self.installed_sha256,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_ORIGINAL_PARTICIPANTS_OR_POLICY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let finish =
|
||||
chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(i64::try_from(header.handoff.finish_before)?, 0)
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_FINISH")?;
|
||||
let budget = Budget::new(
|
||||
header.handoff.boot_id,
|
||||
(finish - self.clock.now()?).to_std()?,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let services = Systemd::new(self.old_policies.clone())?;
|
||||
verify_original_helper(&services, &header.delegation, &budget)?;
|
||||
self.updater
|
||||
.verify_delegation(&header.delegation, &budget)?;
|
||||
let mut bridge = FullBridge::original(BridgeContext {
|
||||
handoff: &header.handoff,
|
||||
delegation: &header.delegation,
|
||||
services: &services,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
health_public_key: self.health_key,
|
||||
generation: Generation::Original,
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let reply = bridge.call(NativeControlOperation::ReadOriginal)?;
|
||||
let proof = reply.proof.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_ORIGINAL_PROOF")?;
|
||||
let original = Original::verify(
|
||||
&self.binding,
|
||||
&reply
|
||||
.original_start
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_ORIGINAL_START")?,
|
||||
&header.handoff.bytes()?,
|
||||
header.delegation,
|
||||
&self.clock,
|
||||
&budget,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let (_, journal) = rmm_domain::agent_update::verify_inflight_proof(&proof, self.health_key)
|
||||
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
journal.phase() == Phase::StopIntent,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_NOT_A_FRESH_HANDOFF"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let trust = TrustState::load(&original, &self.binding, &self.clock)?;
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
trust.health_public_key() == self.health_key
|
||||
&& original.update().updater.health_key_pin_sha256 == self.health_pin_sha256
|
||||
&& serde_json::to_vec(trust.policy())? == serde_json::to_vec(&self.policy)?,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_TRUST_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let witnesses = bundle::read_for_handoff(original.handoff())?;
|
||||
witnesses.files.reopen_stages(original.handoff(), &budget)?;
|
||||
witnesses.retained.verify()?;
|
||||
let agent_startup = BoundAgentLock::bind(&witnesses.retained)?;
|
||||
self.head = Some(proof.head_sha256.clone());
|
||||
self.queued = Some(Queued {
|
||||
agent_startup,
|
||||
original,
|
||||
witnesses,
|
||||
trust,
|
||||
budget,
|
||||
proof,
|
||||
});
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn drive(&mut self, queued: Queued) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let Queued {
|
||||
agent_startup,
|
||||
original,
|
||||
witnesses,
|
||||
trust,
|
||||
budget,
|
||||
proof,
|
||||
} = queued;
|
||||
original.check_current(&self.binding, &self.clock, &budget)?;
|
||||
trust.recheck(&original, &self.clock)?;
|
||||
let services = Systemd::new(self.old_policies.clone())?;
|
||||
let old = [Service::Agent, Service::General, Service::Full]
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|s| services.observe(s, &budget).map(|h| h.proof().clone()))
|
||||
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
|
||||
let mut bridge = FullBridge::new(
|
||||
BridgeContext {
|
||||
handoff: original.handoff(),
|
||||
delegation: original.delegation(),
|
||||
services: &services,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
health_public_key: self.health_key,
|
||||
generation: Generation::Original,
|
||||
},
|
||||
proof,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let mut claims = Vec::new();
|
||||
for service in [
|
||||
NativeService::Agent,
|
||||
NativeService::General,
|
||||
NativeService::Full,
|
||||
] {
|
||||
let expected_head_sha256 = bridge.head_sha256()?.to_owned();
|
||||
claims.push(
|
||||
bridge
|
||||
.call(NativeControlOperation::ClaimStop {
|
||||
expected_head_sha256,
|
||||
service,
|
||||
})?
|
||||
.claim
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_STOP_CLAIM")?,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
drop(bridge);
|
||||
let mut stop_fence = StopFence {
|
||||
original: &original,
|
||||
binding: &self.binding,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
trust: &trust,
|
||||
retained: &witnesses.retained,
|
||||
claims,
|
||||
old,
|
||||
next: 0,
|
||||
pending: false,
|
||||
poisoned: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let stopped = services.stop_all(&budget, &mut stop_fence)?;
|
||||
let claims = stop_fence.finish()?;
|
||||
let agent_startup = agent_startup.acquire(&stopped, &budget)?;
|
||||
let os = LedgerGuard::acquire(&stopped, &witnesses.ledger, &budget)?;
|
||||
let mut ledger = OwnedLedger::open(OwnedInputs {
|
||||
os: &os,
|
||||
original: &original,
|
||||
binding: &self.binding,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
retained: &witnesses.retained,
|
||||
files: &witnesses.files,
|
||||
stopped: &stopped,
|
||||
trust: &trust,
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
for (claim, old) in claims.iter().zip(stopped.proofs()) {
|
||||
ledger.observe_native(claim, &hash(&serde_json::to_vec(&old)?))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ledger.append_observed(Evidence::AllStopped {
|
||||
observation_sha256: hash(&serde_json::to_vec(&stopped.proofs())?),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
ledger.append_observed(Evidence::UpdaterOwnsLedger {
|
||||
process: Process {
|
||||
pid: self.updater.identity().pid,
|
||||
birth: self.updater.identity().birth,
|
||||
image_sha256: self.updater.identity().image_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
ledger_identity_sha256: witnesses.ledger.sha256()?,
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
// Do not hold a second connection before all readers really stopped.
|
||||
let swap = (|| -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let stages = witnesses.files.reopen_stages(original.handoff(), &budget)?;
|
||||
let mut fence = LedgerFence::new(&mut ledger)?;
|
||||
for (stage, role) in
|
||||
stages
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.zip([Role::Agent, Role::Helper, Role::FullConfig, Role::FullPin])
|
||||
{
|
||||
let directory = Directory::open(
|
||||
Path::new(role.target())
|
||||
.parent()
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_TARGET_PARENT")?,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
false,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
stage.install(&directory, &os, &budget, &mut fence)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
fence.finish()?;
|
||||
ledger.append_observed(Evidence::PairVerified {
|
||||
pair: original.handoff().target.clone(),
|
||||
retained_state_sha256: original.handoff().retained_state_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
})();
|
||||
if let Err(error) = swap {
|
||||
// Exactly one best-effort ORIGINAL Unknown CAS while we still own
|
||||
// the real guard. Failure is preserved; no restoration or retry.
|
||||
let _ = ledger.mark_unknown(
|
||||
u64::try_from(self.clock.now()?.timestamp())?,
|
||||
rmm_updater_handoff::UnknownReason::ReplaceUncertain,
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Err(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let prepared = ledger.prepare_return_and_close()?;
|
||||
let reservation = prepared.bind(returned::Inputs {
|
||||
original: &original,
|
||||
binding: &self.binding,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
retained: &witnesses.retained,
|
||||
files: &witnesses.files,
|
||||
trust: &trust,
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let target_policies = service_policies(&self.policy, &self.installed, Some(&original))?;
|
||||
let target = Systemd::new(target_policies.clone())?;
|
||||
let observer = Systemd::new(target_policies)?;
|
||||
let mut bridge = FullBridge::new(
|
||||
BridgeContext {
|
||||
handoff: original.handoff(),
|
||||
delegation: original.delegation(),
|
||||
services: &observer,
|
||||
updater: &self.updater,
|
||||
clock: &self.clock,
|
||||
budget: &budget,
|
||||
health_public_key: self.health_key,
|
||||
generation: Generation::Replacement,
|
||||
},
|
||||
reservation.proof().clone(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let mut fence = reservation.start_fence(&observer, &mut bridge);
|
||||
agent_startup.verify()?;
|
||||
os.release(&budget, &mut fence)?;
|
||||
agent_startup.return_after_root_release(&budget)?;
|
||||
let started = stopped.start_once(target, &budget, &mut fence)?;
|
||||
fence.finish()?;
|
||||
bridge.observe_starts(&started)?;
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
original.check_current(&self.binding, &self.clock, &budget)?;
|
||||
self.updater
|
||||
.verify_delegation(original.delegation(), &budget)?;
|
||||
witnesses.retained.verify()?;
|
||||
for service in &started {
|
||||
service.verify(&budget)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let reply = bridge.call(NativeControlOperation::ReadOriginal)?;
|
||||
let proof = reply.proof.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_HEALTH_PROOF")?;
|
||||
self.head = Some(proof.head_sha256.clone());
|
||||
let (_, journal) =
|
||||
rmm_domain::agent_update::verify_inflight_proof(&proof, self.health_key)
|
||||
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
match journal.phase() {
|
||||
Phase::ServicesStarted => std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)),
|
||||
Phase::HealthVerified => {
|
||||
bridge.call(NativeControlOperation::Finalize)?;
|
||||
self.head = None;
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => anyhow::bail!("UPDATE_ENGINE_HEALTH_PREFIX_CHANGED"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl ipc::Engine for Runtime {
|
||||
fn handle(&mut self, peer: &ParticipantIdentity, request: Request) -> Result<Response> {
|
||||
ensure!(!self.failed && !self.terminal, "UPDATE_ENGINE_CLOSED");
|
||||
self.updater
|
||||
.identity()
|
||||
.validate()
|
||||
.then_some(())
|
||||
.context("UPDATE_ENGINE_IDENTITY")?;
|
||||
let state = match request {
|
||||
Request::Describe {} => State::Described,
|
||||
Request::Activate {
|
||||
grant_id,
|
||||
owner_nonce,
|
||||
handoff_sha256,
|
||||
} => {
|
||||
self.enqueue(peer, grant_id, owner_nonce, &handoff_sha256)?;
|
||||
State::Inflight
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Health travels through the existing independently validating
|
||||
// new Fullhelper path. This daemon accepts no duplicate authority.
|
||||
_ => anyhow::bail!("UPDATE_ENGINE_UNSUPPORTED_CONTROL"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(Response {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
state,
|
||||
ready: false,
|
||||
updater: self.updater.identity().clone(),
|
||||
head_sha256: self.head.clone(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct StopFence<'a> {
|
||||
original: &'a Original,
|
||||
binding: &'a Binding,
|
||||
clock: &'a NativeClock,
|
||||
budget: &'a Budget,
|
||||
updater: &'a StableParticipant,
|
||||
trust: &'a TrustState,
|
||||
retained: &'a RetainedSet,
|
||||
claims: Vec<NativeEffectClaim>,
|
||||
old: Vec<ServiceProof>,
|
||||
next: usize,
|
||||
pending: bool,
|
||||
poisoned: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl StopFence<'_> {
|
||||
fn current(&self) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.original
|
||||
.check_current(self.binding, self.clock, self.budget)?;
|
||||
self.updater
|
||||
.verify_delegation(self.original.delegation(), self.budget)?;
|
||||
self.trust.recheck(self.original, self.clock)?;
|
||||
self.retained.verify()
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn finish(self) -> Result<Vec<NativeEffectClaim>> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!self.poisoned && !self.pending && self.next == 3,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_STOP_INCOMPLETE"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.current()?;
|
||||
Ok(self.claims)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl DurableEffectFence for StopFence<'_> {
|
||||
fn before_effect(&mut self, effect: &Effect) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
!self.poisoned && !self.pending && self.next < 3,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_STOP_NO_RETRY"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.poisoned = true;
|
||||
self.current()?;
|
||||
let service = [Service::Agent, Service::General, Service::Full][self.next];
|
||||
let native = [
|
||||
NativeService::Agent,
|
||||
NativeService::General,
|
||||
NativeService::Full,
|
||||
][self.next];
|
||||
let claim = &self.claims[self.next];
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
*effect == Effect::StopService { service }
|
||||
&& claim.effect() == &NativeEffect::StopService { service: native }
|
||||
&& claim.grant_id() == self.original.permit().grant_id
|
||||
&& claim.owner_nonce() == self.original.handoff().owner_nonce,
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_STOP_RESERVATION_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.pending = true;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn after_effect(&mut self, effect: &Effect, observation: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
ensure!(
|
||||
self.poisoned
|
||||
&& self.pending
|
||||
&& self.next < 3
|
||||
&& *effect
|
||||
== Effect::StopService {
|
||||
service: self.old[self.next].service
|
||||
}
|
||||
&& observation == hash(&serde_json::to_vec(&self.old[self.next])?),
|
||||
"UPDATE_ENGINE_STOP_OBSERVATION_CHANGED"
|
||||
);
|
||||
self.current()?;
|
||||
self.next += 1;
|
||||
self.pending = false;
|
||||
self.poisoned = false;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn observation_budget() -> Result<Budget> {
|
||||
Budget::new(
|
||||
std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id")?
|
||||
.trim()
|
||||
.parse()?,
|
||||
Duration::from_secs(5),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn service_policies(
|
||||
policy: &LocalUpdatePolicy,
|
||||
installed: &InstalledReleaseRecord,
|
||||
original: Option<&Original>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<ServicePolicy>> {
|
||||
let release = installed
|
||||
.release_envelope
|
||||
.decode()
|
||||
.map_err(anyhow::Error::msg)?;
|
||||
policy
|
||||
.services
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.zip([
|
||||
Service::Agent,
|
||||
Service::General,
|
||||
Service::Full,
|
||||
Service::Apt,
|
||||
])
|
||||
.map(|(pin, service)| {
|
||||
ensure!(pin.unit == service.unit(), "UPDATE_ENGINE_SERVICE_SET");
|
||||
let image_sha256 = match (service, original) {
|
||||
(Service::Agent, Some(o)) => o.handoff().target.agent_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
(Service::General | Service::Full | Service::Apt, Some(o)) => {
|
||||
o.handoff().target.helper_sha256.clone()
|
||||
}
|
||||
(Service::Agent, None) => release.manifest.artifacts[0].sha256.clone(),
|
||||
(_, None) => release.manifest.artifacts[1].sha256.clone(),
|
||||
_ => anyhow::bail!("UPDATE_ENGINE_SERVICE_ROLE"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(ServicePolicy {
|
||||
service,
|
||||
image_sha256,
|
||||
unit_sha256: pin.unit_sha256.clone(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1316,6 +1316,94 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
active,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn public_record_builder_binds_actual_original_key_and_exact_health_head() {
|
||||
let f = fixture();
|
||||
let (grant, record, start):(String,Vec<u8>,Vec<u8>)=f.db.query_row(
|
||||
"SELECT h.grant_id,h.record,e.start FROM agent_update_handoffs h JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id)",
|
||||
[],|r|Ok((r.get(0)?,r.get(1)?,r.get(2)?))).unwrap();
|
||||
let grant: Uuid = grant.parse().unwrap();
|
||||
let delegation = update_handoff::read_delegation(&f.db, grant).unwrap();
|
||||
let original =
|
||||
crate::original::Original::verify_retained(&f.binding, &start, &record, delegation)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let key: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(&original.update().updater.health_public_key_hex)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.try_into()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let mut journal = Journal::open(&record, key).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut wrong_journal = Journal::open(
|
||||
&record,
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(&[88; 32]).verifying_key().to_bytes(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let mut statement =
|
||||
f.db.prepare("SELECT event FROM agent_update_handoff_events ORDER BY sequence")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let events = statement
|
||||
.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let mut health_raw = None;
|
||||
let mut wrong_health_raw = None;
|
||||
for raw in events {
|
||||
let event: Event = serde_json::from_slice(&raw).unwrap();
|
||||
if let Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt } = &event.evidence {
|
||||
journal.replay(&raw).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut wrong = receipt.clone();
|
||||
let mut message = HEALTH_DOMAIN.to_vec();
|
||||
message.extend_from_slice(&wrong.payload);
|
||||
wrong.signature = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[88; 32])
|
||||
.sign(&message)
|
||||
.to_bytes()
|
||||
.to_vec();
|
||||
let forged = wrong_journal
|
||||
.prepare(
|
||||
event.observed_at,
|
||||
Evidence::HealthVerified { receipt: wrong },
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
wrong_journal.replay(&forged).unwrap();
|
||||
wrong_health_raw = Some(forged);
|
||||
health_raw = Some(raw);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
journal.replay(&raw).unwrap();
|
||||
wrong_journal.replay(&raw).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
let health_raw = health_raw.unwrap();
|
||||
let built = crate::record::BuiltRecord::build(&original, &f.initial, &journal, &health_raw)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(built.raw(), f.active);
|
||||
assert_eq!(built.sha256(), hash(&f.active));
|
||||
// A complete kernel Journal can be constructed with the wrong external
|
||||
// key. The public builder must independently enforce the ORIGINAL job.
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
crate::record::BuiltRecord::build(
|
||||
&original,
|
||||
&f.initial,
|
||||
&wrong_journal,
|
||||
&wrong_health_raw.unwrap()
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut changed: Event = serde_json::from_slice(&health_raw).unwrap();
|
||||
changed.observed_at += 1;
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
crate::record::BuiltRecord::build(
|
||||
&original,
|
||||
&f.initial,
|
||||
&journal,
|
||||
&serde_json::to_vec(&changed).unwrap()
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
crate::record::BuiltRecord::build(&original, &f.active, &journal, &health_raw).is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn completed_history_rejects_file_only_rollback_forks_and_tampered_activation_without_writes() {
|
||||
let f = fixture();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
|
||||
//! Concrete, original-attempt-bound Linux worker. No approval or retry path.
|
||||
#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod agent_startup;
|
||||
pub mod bridge;
|
||||
pub mod bundle;
|
||||
pub mod clock;
|
||||
pub mod engine;
|
||||
pub mod fence;
|
||||
pub mod files;
|
||||
pub mod full;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ def chrony_observation():
|
||||
directory = os.open('/run/chrony', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
dir_identity = fd_metadata(directory)
|
||||
require(stat.S_ISDIR(dir_identity['mode']) and dir_identity['uid'] == 989 and
|
||||
dir_identity['gid'] == 989 and stat.S_IMODE(dir_identity['mode']) == 0o755,
|
||||
dir_identity['gid'] == 989 and stat.S_IMODE(dir_identity['mode']) == 0o700,
|
||||
'actual fixed protected Chrony socket directory')
|
||||
pidfile = os.open('chronyd.pid', os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW, dir_fd=directory)
|
||||
pid_identity = fd_metadata(pidfile)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Frozen four Linux source units only; no actual Chrony or kernel query; no updater service or Apply.
|
||||
|
||||
Prepare copies the independently reviewed snapshot locally. Execute is one
|
||||
root-only Cloud-VM fixture run. After any lost reply read the original case;
|
||||
never execute it again or substitute another binary/source generation.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
|
||||
import windows_msi_runtime_acceptance as support
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
||||
ACCESS_ROOT = ROOT.parent / 'rust-discovery'
|
||||
QUALIFICATION = ROOT / 'devstate/time-source-qualification/7a8cb5be-41b3-400a-bd9b-b4b6f505a6e9'
|
||||
STATE = ROOT / 'devstate/time-source-socket-native-linux'
|
||||
PROFILE = 'rmm.time-source.four-socket-permission-units.v1'
|
||||
RECEIPT_SHA = '74759e286ba7c9762fe4c455da952a0e62de48f55ea643e0a8f435d2128497a5'
|
||||
INPUTS_SHA = 'c0067889fa6e79e5b1dc2ad46685613fd0b379b30a4541670f635140405718d9'
|
||||
BINARY_SHA = '9bd41ff166aeaae45fdf3dda2d72b04fc30e5ef87a181fe733c47e511a836d59'
|
||||
BINARY_BYTES = 1169800
|
||||
TESTS = sorted(['native::tests::clock_brackets_reject_suspend_step_backwards_and_total_timeout', 'native::tests::socket_cleanup_preserves_replaced_name_and_removes_only_exact_own_inode', 'tracking::tests::exact_packet_sequence_and_network_source', 'tracking::tests::signed_float_ceil_and_overflow_are_conservative'])
|
||||
AGENT_SHA = '0a7ad6eefaefda79ee80b6a41b2df904e9e7f50ae6ebeed01b98c25b6ce5c06f'
|
||||
HELPER_SHA = '79442727c3ba31cda02a8bc0e67481f14db9f39fc07520a880a90b64f10f1eaf'
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sha(raw):
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def save_local(path, value):
|
||||
support.save(path, value)
|
||||
fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.fsync(fd)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.close(fd)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def copy_exact(source, destination, digest, size):
|
||||
metadata = source.lstat()
|
||||
support.require(stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_nlink == 1
|
||||
and metadata.st_uid in (0, os.getuid()) and not metadata.st_mode & 0o002
|
||||
and metadata.st_size == size and size <= 2 * 1024 * 1024, 'bounded regular frozen input')
|
||||
raw = source.read_bytes()
|
||||
support.require(sha(raw) == digest, 'frozen snapshot input hash')
|
||||
destination.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
support.private(destination.parent, True)
|
||||
fd = os.open(destination, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream:
|
||||
stream.write(raw); stream.flush(); os.fsync(stream.fileno())
|
||||
fd = os.open(destination.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.fsync(fd)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.close(fd)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def verify_case(folder):
|
||||
value = support.load(folder / 'manifest.json')
|
||||
support.require(value['profile'] == PROFILE and value['tests'] == TESTS
|
||||
and value['runner_sha256'] == sha(Path(__file__).read_bytes())
|
||||
and value['receipt_sha256'] == RECEIPT_SHA and value['binary_sha256'] == BINARY_SHA
|
||||
and value['binary_bytes'] == BINARY_BYTES, 'same original reviewed manifest')
|
||||
support.require(sha((folder / 'receipt.json').read_bytes()) == RECEIPT_SHA
|
||||
and sha((folder / 'inputs.json').read_bytes()) == INPUTS_SHA, 'original qualification provenance')
|
||||
source = support.load(folder / 'inputs.json')
|
||||
support.require(len(source) == 7 and source == value['source_files'], 'exact frozen seven provider inputs')
|
||||
for item in source:
|
||||
path = Path(item['path'])
|
||||
support.require(not path.is_absolute() and '..' not in path.parts, 'fixed snapshot relative path')
|
||||
file = folder / 'source' / path
|
||||
support.private(file)
|
||||
support.require(file.stat().st_size == item['bytes'] and sha(file.read_bytes()) == item['sha256'], 'retained source freeze')
|
||||
binary = folder / 'time-contract-tests'; support.private(binary)
|
||||
support.require(binary.stat().st_size == BINARY_BYTES and sha(binary.read_bytes()) == BINARY_SHA, 'original qualified test bytes')
|
||||
for path, digest in value['transport_sources'].items():
|
||||
support.require(sha((ROOT / path).read_bytes()) == digest, 'original strict transport source')
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def remote(p):
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import selectors
|
||||
import signal
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
|
||||
def require(ok, message):
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(message)
|
||||
|
||||
def enc(value):
|
||||
return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode()
|
||||
|
||||
def create(path, raw, mode=0o600):
|
||||
fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, mode)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream:
|
||||
stream.write(raw); stream.flush(); os.fsync(stream.fileno())
|
||||
fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.fsync(fd)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.close(fd)
|
||||
|
||||
def run(args, timeout=20):
|
||||
# Keep the owned group leader unreaped until its entire group has been
|
||||
# cleaned up. Its PID therefore cannot be recycled before killpg.
|
||||
child = subprocess.Popen(args, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
stderr=subprocess.PIPE, start_new_session=True,
|
||||
env={'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin', 'LC_ALL': 'C', 'HOME': '/nonexistent'})
|
||||
selector = selectors.DefaultSelector()
|
||||
buffers = {'stdout': bytearray(), 'stderr': bytearray()}
|
||||
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
|
||||
try:
|
||||
for stream, name in ((child.stdout, 'stdout'), (child.stderr, 'stderr')):
|
||||
os.set_blocking(stream.fileno(), False); selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name)
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
require(time.monotonic() < deadline, 'owned native command timeout; read original case only')
|
||||
for key, _ in selector.select(0.02):
|
||||
raw = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), 4096)
|
||||
if raw:
|
||||
buffers[key.data].extend(raw)
|
||||
require(len(buffers[key.data]) <= 65536, 'bounded native output')
|
||||
else:
|
||||
selector.unregister(key.fileobj)
|
||||
ended = os.waitid(os.P_PID, child.pid, os.WEXITED | os.WNOHANG | os.WNOWAIT)
|
||||
if ended is not None:
|
||||
# Child remains a zombie until finally: no PID/group reuse.
|
||||
os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
|
||||
for key in list(selector.get_map().values()):
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), 4096)
|
||||
except BlockingIOError:
|
||||
break
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
break
|
||||
buffers[key.data].extend(raw)
|
||||
require(len(buffers[key.data]) <= 65536, 'bounded native output')
|
||||
code = ended.si_status if ended.si_code == os.CLD_EXITED else -ended.si_status
|
||||
return code, bytes(buffers['stdout']), bytes(buffers['stderr'])
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
|
||||
child.wait()
|
||||
selector.close(); child.stdout.close(); child.stderr.close()
|
||||
|
||||
def metadata_identity(value):
|
||||
return (value.st_dev, value.st_ino, value.st_uid, value.st_gid, value.st_mode,
|
||||
value.st_nlink, value.st_size, value.st_mtime_ns, value.st_ctime_ns)
|
||||
|
||||
def hashed(path, maximum, process_image=False):
|
||||
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_CLOEXEC | (0 if process_image else os.O_NOFOLLOW))
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, 'rb') as stream:
|
||||
before = os.fstat(stream.fileno()); require(stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode) and before.st_size <= maximum, 'bounded witness file')
|
||||
digest = hashlib.sha256(); total = 0
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
raw = stream.read(32768)
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
break
|
||||
total += len(raw); require(total <= maximum, 'bounded witness hash'); digest.update(raw)
|
||||
after = os.fstat(stream.fileno())
|
||||
require(metadata_identity(before) == metadata_identity(after) and total == before.st_size, 'stable witness hash')
|
||||
return before, digest.hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
def witness():
|
||||
out = {'boot_id': Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip(), 'services': {}, 'files': {}}
|
||||
release = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in Path('/etc/os-release').read_text().splitlines() if '=' in line)
|
||||
require(release.get('ID', '').strip('"') == 'ubuntu' and release.get('VERSION_ID', '').strip('"') == '24.04', 'fixed native Ubuntu24.04')
|
||||
out['os'] = {'id': 'ubuntu', 'version': '24.04', 'machine': os.uname().machine, 'kernel': os.uname().release}
|
||||
for name, uid, binary in (
|
||||
('rmm-agent-remote.service', 993, p['agent_sha256']),
|
||||
('rmm-helper-cloud.service', 0, p['helper_sha256']),
|
||||
('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service', 0, p['helper_sha256'])):
|
||||
code, stdout, _ = run(['/usr/bin/systemctl', 'show', name, '-p', 'ActiveState', '-p', 'MainPID', '-p', 'UnitFileState', '-p', 'InvocationID'])
|
||||
require(code == 0, 'existing service read')
|
||||
service = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in stdout.decode().splitlines())
|
||||
pid = int(service['MainPID']); require(service['ActiveState'] == 'active' and pid > 1, 'three existing services active')
|
||||
proc = Path('/proc', str(pid)); birth = (proc / 'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ', 1)[1].split()[19]
|
||||
ids = {line.split(':')[0]: line.split()[1:] for line in (proc / 'status').read_text().splitlines() if line.startswith(('Uid:', 'Gid:'))}
|
||||
metadata, image = hashed(proc / 'exe', 256 * 1024 * 1024, process_image=True)
|
||||
current = (proc / 'exe').stat()
|
||||
require(ids['Uid'] == [str(uid)] * 4 and ids['Gid'] == ['984'] * 4 and image == binary
|
||||
and (metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino) == (current.st_dev, current.st_ino)
|
||||
and (proc / 'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ', 1)[1].split()[19] == birth, 'current generation/account/image')
|
||||
out['services'][name] = dict(service, birth=birth, image=image, ids=ids)
|
||||
code, stdout, _ = run(['/usr/bin/systemctl', 'show', 'rmm-apt-helper.service', '-p', 'ActiveState', '-p', 'UnitFileState'])
|
||||
apt = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in stdout.decode().splitlines())
|
||||
require(code == 0 and apt == {'ActiveState': 'inactive', 'UnitFileState': 'disabled'}, 'APT remains closed')
|
||||
out['apt'] = apt
|
||||
for name in ('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-general.json', '/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json',
|
||||
'/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json', '/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'):
|
||||
path = Path(name); metadata = path.lstat()
|
||||
require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_uid == 0
|
||||
and not metadata.st_mode & 0o022 and metadata.st_nlink == 1, 'protected known control')
|
||||
current, digest = hashed(path, 65536)
|
||||
require(metadata_identity(current) == metadata_identity(metadata), 'same known control file')
|
||||
out['files'][name] = [metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino, metadata.st_uid, metadata.st_gid, metadata.st_mode,
|
||||
metadata.st_size, metadata.st_mtime_ns, metadata.st_ctime_ns, digest]
|
||||
for name in ('/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite', '/var/lib/rmm-helper/executor.lock',
|
||||
'/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/journal.sqlite', '/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/consumption.sqlite'):
|
||||
path = Path(name); metadata = path.lstat()
|
||||
require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_nlink == 1, 'existing state identity')
|
||||
out['files'][name] = [metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino, metadata.st_uid, metadata.st_gid, metadata.st_mode]
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
require(os.geteuid() == 0 and os.uname().machine == 'x86_64', 'fixed Cloud Linux root contract fixtures')
|
||||
ident = str(uuid.UUID(p['id'])); require(ident == p['id'], 'canonical original case')
|
||||
folder = Path('/var/tmp') / ('rmm-time-source-units-linux-' + ident)
|
||||
if p['action'] == 'read':
|
||||
metadata = folder.lstat()
|
||||
require(stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) and not folder.is_symlink() and metadata.st_uid == 0
|
||||
and stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) == 0o700, 'own original case only')
|
||||
result = folder / 'result.json'
|
||||
return {'read_only': True, 'id': ident, 'entered': (folder / 'entered.json').exists(),
|
||||
'result': json.loads(result.read_bytes()) if result.exists() else None, 'current_witness': witness()}
|
||||
require(p['action'] == 'execute', 'one fixed time contract action')
|
||||
os.umask(0o077); folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
create(folder / 'intent.json', enc({key: value for key, value in p.items() if key != 'binary_b64'}))
|
||||
require(len(p['binary_b64']) == 1559736, 'bounded binary transfer')
|
||||
raw = base64.b64decode(p['binary_b64'], validate=True)
|
||||
require(len(raw) == 1169800 and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() == p['binary_sha256'], 'fixed four-unit binary')
|
||||
binary = folder / 'time-contract-tests'; create(binary, raw, 0o700)
|
||||
before = witness(); create(folder / 'before.json', enc(before))
|
||||
command = ['/usr/bin/setpriv', '--reuid=0', '--regid=0', '--clear-groups', '--no-new-privs', str(binary)]
|
||||
code, stdout, stderr = run(command + ['--list', '--format', 'terse'])
|
||||
create(folder / 'list.stdout', stdout); create(folder / 'list.stderr', stderr)
|
||||
require(code == 0 and stderr == b'', 'native list succeeded')
|
||||
lines = stdout.decode().splitlines()
|
||||
require(len(lines) == 4 and sorted(line[:-6] for line in lines if line.endswith(': test')) == p['tests'], 'exact four tests before any run')
|
||||
create(folder / 'entered.json', enc({'id': ident, 'run_once': True, 'time_ns': time.time_ns()}))
|
||||
code, stdout, stderr = run(command + ['--test-threads=1', '--nocapture'])
|
||||
create(folder / 'run.stdout', stdout); create(folder / 'run.stderr', stderr)
|
||||
after = witness(); create(folder / 'after.json', enc(after))
|
||||
require(before == after and code == 0 and stderr == b''
|
||||
and b'4 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out' in stdout
|
||||
and all((b'test ' + name.encode() + b' ... ok') in stdout for name in p['tests']), 'four native units and retained target state')
|
||||
receipt = dict(id=ident, profile=p['profile'], passed=4, ignored=0, filtered=0, execution_uid=0, tests=p['tests'],
|
||||
before=before, after=after, binary_sha256=p['binary_sha256'], source_receipt_sha256=p['receipt_sha256'],
|
||||
source_manifest_sha256=p['manifest_sha256'], stdout_sha256=hashlib.sha256(stdout).hexdigest(),
|
||||
no_rmm_jobs=True, no_apply=True, no_service_control=True)
|
||||
create(folder / 'result.json', enc(receipt)); return receipt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||
parser.add_argument('action', choices=('prepare', 'execute', 'read')); parser.add_argument('--case')
|
||||
args = parser.parse_args(); os.umask(0o077)
|
||||
STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True); support.private(STATE, True)
|
||||
if args.action == 'prepare':
|
||||
support.require(args.case is None, 'prepare one new local case')
|
||||
receipt_path = QUALIFICATION / 'receipt.json'; support.private(receipt_path)
|
||||
support.require(sha(receipt_path.read_bytes()) == RECEIPT_SHA, 'independently reviewed source receipt')
|
||||
receipt = support.load(receipt_path); original = support.load(QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json')
|
||||
support.require(sha((QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json').read_bytes()) == INPUTS_SHA
|
||||
and receipt['inputs_sha256'] == INPUTS_SHA and len(original) == 7
|
||||
and receipt['result'] == 'LOCAL_RELEASE_PROVIDER4_SOCKET_PERMISSION_FIX_PASS' and receipt['tests'] == 4
|
||||
and receipt['skips'] == 0 and receipt['filters'] == 0, 'reviewed four-test qualification')
|
||||
ident = str(uuid.uuid4()); folder = STATE / ident; folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
copy_exact(receipt_path, folder / 'receipt.json', RECEIPT_SHA, receipt_path.stat().st_size)
|
||||
copy_exact(QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json', folder / 'inputs.json', INPUTS_SHA, (QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json').stat().st_size)
|
||||
paths = set()
|
||||
for item in original:
|
||||
path = Path(item['path'])
|
||||
support.require(not path.is_absolute() and '..' not in path.parts and str(path) not in paths, 'unique fixed frozen input')
|
||||
paths.add(str(path)); copy_exact(QUALIFICATION / 'source' / path, folder / 'source' / path, item['sha256'], item['bytes'])
|
||||
binary = QUALIFICATION / 'qualified-provider-tests'
|
||||
support.require(receipt['artifacts'][0] == dict(path='qualified-provider-tests', bytes=BINARY_BYTES, sha256=BINARY_SHA), 'fixed original linked artifact')
|
||||
copy_exact(binary, folder / 'time-contract-tests', BINARY_SHA, BINARY_BYTES)
|
||||
transports = {path: sha((ROOT / path).read_bytes()) for path in ('deploy/windows_msi_runtime_acceptance.py', 'deploy/vm_access_check.py')}
|
||||
save_local(folder / 'manifest.json', dict(id=ident, profile=PROFILE, runner_sha256=sha(Path(__file__).read_bytes()),
|
||||
receipt_sha256=RECEIPT_SHA, binary_sha256=BINARY_SHA, binary_bytes=BINARY_BYTES,
|
||||
source_files=original, tests=TESTS, transport_sources=transports))
|
||||
verify_case(folder)
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'id': ident, 'prepared_locally': True})); return
|
||||
support.require(args.case is not None, 'original --case required')
|
||||
ident = str(uuid.UUID(args.case)); support.require(ident == args.case, 'same canonical original case')
|
||||
folder = STATE / ident; support.private(folder, True); verify_case(folder)
|
||||
payload = dict(id=ident, action=args.action, profile=PROFILE, tests=TESTS, binary_sha256=BINARY_SHA,
|
||||
receipt_sha256=RECEIPT_SHA, manifest_sha256=sha((folder / 'manifest.json').read_bytes()),
|
||||
agent_sha256=AGENT_SHA, helper_sha256=HELPER_SHA)
|
||||
if args.action == 'execute':
|
||||
save_local(folder / 'execute-entered.json', {'once': True, 'no_retry': True})
|
||||
payload['binary_b64'] = base64.b64encode((folder / 'time-contract-tests').read_bytes()).decode()
|
||||
code = 'import json\n' + inspect.getsource(remote) + '\nprint(json.dumps(remote(' + repr(payload) + ')))\n'
|
||||
response = support.transport(support.access_settings(ACCESS_ROOT, 'linux'), 'python3 -', code.encode(), folder)
|
||||
save_local(folder / (args.action + '-' + str(uuid.uuid4()) + '.json'), response)
|
||||
if args.action == 'read' and response['result'] is not None:
|
||||
support.require(response['result']['source_manifest_sha256'] == sha((folder / 'manifest.json').read_bytes())
|
||||
and response['current_witness'] == response['result']['after'], 'same-case retained native result')
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'id': ident, 'action': args.action, 'passed': response.get('passed'),
|
||||
'complete': response.get('result') is not None if args.action == 'read' else True, 'read_only': args.action == 'read'}))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""One fixed original-case SYSTEM fixture repair; no RMM job or role start."""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
|
||||
import signed_clock_capture_acceptance as original
|
||||
import signed_clock_capture_system_repair as repair
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
|
||||
FOLDER = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-signed-clock-capture-system-repair/cff25311-d30b-495a-8b50-e0e28e2e5b48'
|
||||
SCRIPT_SHA = 'ac3da3d86bd93497e8ecfe55369cb228ed0ce30c7f2301afb74463c789bb50ca'
|
||||
GENERATOR_SHA = '9b44aa1491be2d154fb37fd0431370657f9623a2440649c29e910826beb44d2e'
|
||||
NAME = 'SignedClockCaptureSystemRepair.ps1'
|
||||
require, save, load = original.require, original.save, original.load
|
||||
|
||||
LAUNCH = r'''$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine()|ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||
if((($p.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'action,id,profile,script_sha256'-or$p.id-cne'efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec'-or$p.profile-cne'rmm.windows.raw-clock.original-system-create-repair.v1'-or$p.script_sha256-cne'ac3da3d86bd93497e8ecfe55369cb228ed0ce30c7f2301afb74463c789bb50ca'-or$p.action-notin@('repair','read')){throw 'Exact original fixture repair launch'}
|
||||
$script='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\ac3da3d86bd93497e8ecfe55369cb228ed0ce30c7f2301afb74463c789bb50ca\SignedClockCaptureSystemRepair.ps1'
|
||||
$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $script -Force;if($i.PSIsContainer-or($i.Attributes-band[IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint)-or$i.Length-ne15551-or(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $script -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()-cne$p.script_sha256){throw 'Exact original fixture repair bytes'}
|
||||
$parent=$i.Directory;while($null-ne$parent){if($parent.Attributes-band[IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint){throw 'No repair launch reparse ancestry'};$parent=$parent.Parent}
|
||||
$a=Get-Acl -LiteralPath $script;if($a.GetOwner([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value-notin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')){throw 'Repair controller owner'};foreach($r in $a.GetAccessRules($true,$true,[Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])){if($r.AccessControlType-ne'Allow'-or$r.IdentityReference.Value-notin@('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')){throw 'Private repair controller DACL'}}
|
||||
$global:RmmCaptureSystemRepairPayload=$p
|
||||
& $script
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def verify():
|
||||
require(original.sha(ROOT / 'deploy/windows/signed_clock_capture_acceptance.py') == repair.RUNNER_SHA,
|
||||
'unchanged original capture operator')
|
||||
require(original.sha(ROOT / 'deploy/windows/signed_clock_capture_system_repair.py') == GENERATOR_SHA,
|
||||
'reviewed original-case repair generator')
|
||||
original.private(FOLDER, True)
|
||||
manifest = load(FOLDER / 'manifest.json')
|
||||
require(manifest['original_case'] == repair.CASE and manifest['generator_sha256'] == GENERATOR_SHA
|
||||
and manifest['repair_script_sha256'] == SCRIPT_SHA and manifest['repair_script_bytes'] == 15551,
|
||||
'original fixed repair artifact')
|
||||
script = FOLDER / NAME
|
||||
original.private(script)
|
||||
require(script.stat().st_size == 15551 and original.sha(script) == SCRIPT_SHA,
|
||||
'reviewed fixed repair controller')
|
||||
require(original.sha(repair.ORIGINAL / 'manifest.json') == repair.MANIFEST_SHA,
|
||||
'original partial setup provenance')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def stage(access):
|
||||
# Separate literal allowlist; the original capture transport is unchanged.
|
||||
prepare = original.pipe.u.transport.PREPARE_SCRIPT.replace('TransportAcceptance.ps1', NAME)
|
||||
observed = access.powershell(prepare, dict(sha256=SCRIPT_SHA))
|
||||
if not observed['already_uploaded']:
|
||||
credentials = original.pipe.cb.contract.protected_json(access.root / 'credentials/windows-dev-access.json')
|
||||
prefix = credentials['ssh_prefix']
|
||||
args = ['sftp'] + [part for part in prefix[1:-1] if part != '-T'] + ['-b', '-', prefix[-1]]
|
||||
target = '/C:/ProgramData/RustDiscoveryBootstrap/' + SCRIPT_SHA + '/' + NAME
|
||||
result = subprocess.run(args, input=('put ' + json.dumps(str(FOLDER / NAME)) + ' '
|
||||
+ json.dumps(target) + '\n').encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=60)
|
||||
require(result.returncode == 0, 'one exact repair transfer; lost reply read only')
|
||||
observed = access.powershell(prepare, dict(sha256=SCRIPT_SHA))
|
||||
require(observed['already_uploaded'] is True and observed['sha256'] == SCRIPT_SHA,
|
||||
'immutable staged original-case repair')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||
parser.add_argument('action', choices=('stage', 'repair', 'read'))
|
||||
args = parser.parse_args()
|
||||
verify()
|
||||
access = original.CaptureAccess(original.ACCESS_ROOT)
|
||||
baseline = load(repair.ORIGINAL / 'baseline.json')
|
||||
require(original.server_closed(access) == baseline['server'], 'original closed server counters and policy')
|
||||
original.preserved(baseline['native'], original.native_witness(access))
|
||||
action = args.action
|
||||
if action != 'read':
|
||||
save(FOLDER / (action + '-attempt.json'), dict(original_case=repair.CASE, once=True,
|
||||
no_retry=True, script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA, operator_sha256=original.sha(Path(__file__))))
|
||||
if action == 'stage':
|
||||
stage(access)
|
||||
response = dict(staged=True, script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if action == 'repair':
|
||||
require((FOLDER / 'stage-reply.json').exists(), 'completed original stage; no restaging')
|
||||
payload = dict(id=repair.CASE, profile=repair.PROFILE, action=action,
|
||||
script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA)
|
||||
response = access.powershell(LAUNCH, payload, timeout=60)
|
||||
identifier = str(uuid.uuid4()) if action == 'read' else action
|
||||
save(FOLDER / (identifier + '-reply.json'), response)
|
||||
after_server, after_native = original.server_closed(access), original.native_witness(access)
|
||||
require(after_server == baseline['server'], 'closed server policy and counters unchanged')
|
||||
original.preserved(baseline['native'], after_native)
|
||||
save(FOLDER / (identifier + '-preservation.json'), dict(server=after_server, native=after_native,
|
||||
original_case=repair.CASE, response_sha256=original.sha(FOLDER / (identifier + '-reply.json')),
|
||||
no_rmm_jobs=True, no_role_start=True, setup_completed=False))
|
||||
if action == 'repair':
|
||||
require(response.get('system_created_stopped') is True and response.get('setup_completed') is False
|
||||
and response.get('service_started') is False, 'only own SYSTEM fixture created stopped')
|
||||
print(json.dumps(dict(action=action, original_case=repair.CASE, read_only=action == 'read',
|
||||
preservation_sha256=original.sha(FOLDER / (identifier + '-preservation.json')),
|
||||
response_sha256=original.sha(FOLDER / (identifier + '-reply.json')), preserved=True,
|
||||
system_created_stopped=response.get('system_created_stopped'), setup_completed=False)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""Prepare one original-case-bound SYSTEM creation repair; no transport or execution.
|
||||
|
||||
Never replay the original setup. The generated controller can create only the
|
||||
missing fixed SYSTEM fixture, or read its original repair records. It does not
|
||||
finish setup, copy an executable, start/stop a service or remove anything.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
import uuid
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
|
||||
CASE = 'efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec'
|
||||
ORIGINAL = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-signed-clock-capture-native' / CASE
|
||||
RUNNER_SHA = 'dd6c575a119751429448e40e6f306cf79efa3a86c49bf2cd32a7783937177770'
|
||||
MANIFEST_SHA = '806c062bdd458627cf44ff1ef3f27738e1ebf2f407a96f772223efef267db0b1'
|
||||
CONTROLLER_SHA = '89c19138e2804f263f1875c7697a7d53f54f40722101677b4d29538c917196f4'
|
||||
EXE_SHA = '601c27a43fb67c662f926f9dc289a23a5c31c7e27f62901a77fc9ceaafaea7fb'
|
||||
EXE_BYTES = 8566784
|
||||
MARKERS_SHA = 'ff8e2eef73139c8350aa0f86c6fed5125fce95f79d535f25224829ce4fa9c565'
|
||||
PROFILE = 'rmm.windows.raw-clock.original-system-create-repair.v1'
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require(value, message):
|
||||
if not value:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(message)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sha(raw):
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def private_read(path, limit=2 * 1024 * 1024):
|
||||
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, 'rb') as stream:
|
||||
meta = os.fstat(stream.fileno())
|
||||
require(stat.S_ISREG(meta.st_mode) and meta.st_nlink == 1 and meta.st_uid == os.getuid()
|
||||
and stat.S_IMODE(meta.st_mode) == 0o600 and meta.st_size <= limit, 'private bounded original evidence')
|
||||
raw = stream.read(limit + 1)
|
||||
after = os.fstat(stream.fileno())
|
||||
require(len(raw) <= limit and (meta.st_ino, meta.st_size, meta.st_mtime_ns, meta.st_ctime_ns)
|
||||
== (after.st_ino, after.st_size, after.st_mtime_ns, after.st_ctime_ns), 'unchanged original evidence')
|
||||
return raw
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write(path, raw):
|
||||
fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream:
|
||||
stream.write(raw)
|
||||
stream.flush()
|
||||
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
|
||||
fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.fsync(fd)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
os.close(fd)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical(value):
|
||||
return (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')) + '\n').encode()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
NATIVE = r'''
|
||||
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @'
|
||||
using System;
|
||||
using System.ComponentModel;
|
||||
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
|
||||
using Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles;
|
||||
public static class RmmCaptureSystemRepair {
|
||||
const string LocalName="RmmSignedClockCaptureLocalService";
|
||||
const string SystemName="RmmSignedClockCaptureSystem";
|
||||
const string SystemCommand="\"C:\\ProgramData\\RustDiscoverySignedClockCapture\\efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec\\SignedClockCapture.exe\" --service efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec system";
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",EntryPoint="OpenSCManagerW",ExactSpelling=true,CharSet=CharSet.Unicode,SetLastError=true)] static extern IntPtr OpenManager(string machine,string database,uint access);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",EntryPoint="CreateServiceW",ExactSpelling=true,CharSet=CharSet.Unicode,SetLastError=true)] static extern IntPtr CreateService(IntPtr manager,string name,string display,uint access,uint type,uint start,uint error,string command,string group,IntPtr tag,string dependencies,string account,string password);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",EntryPoint="OpenServiceW",ExactSpelling=true,CharSet=CharSet.Unicode,SetLastError=true)] static extern IntPtr OpenService(IntPtr manager,string name,uint access);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",SetLastError=true)] [return:MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] static extern bool CloseServiceHandle(IntPtr handle);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",EntryPoint="ChangeServiceConfig2W",ExactSpelling=true,SetLastError=true)] [return:MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] static extern bool ChangeServiceConfig2(Service handle,uint level,ref uint value);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",SetLastError=true)] [return:MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] static extern bool QueryServiceStatusEx(Service handle,int level,out Status value,int size,out int needed);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",SetLastError=true)] [return:MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] static extern bool SetServiceObjectSecurity(Service handle,uint info,IntPtr descriptor);
|
||||
[DllImport("advapi32.dll",EntryPoint="ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW",ExactSpelling=true,CharSet=CharSet.Unicode,SetLastError=true)] [return:MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)] static extern bool ConvertSecurity(string text,uint revision,out IntPtr descriptor,out uint size);
|
||||
[DllImport("kernel32.dll")] static extern IntPtr LocalFree(IntPtr value);
|
||||
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] public struct Status {public uint Type,State,Controls,Win32Exit,SpecificExit,Checkpoint,WaitHint,Pid,Flags;}
|
||||
static Exception Failed(string step){int code=Marshal.GetLastWin32Error();return new Win32Exception(code,"CAPTURE_SYSTEM_REPAIR_"+step);}
|
||||
public sealed class Service:SafeHandleZeroOrMinusOneIsInvalid {
|
||||
internal Service(IntPtr value):base(true){SetHandle(value);}
|
||||
protected override bool ReleaseHandle(){return CloseServiceHandle(handle);}
|
||||
public Status Read(){Status value;int needed;if(!QueryServiceStatusEx(this,0,out value,Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(Status)),out needed))throw Failed("QueryServiceStatusEx");return value;}
|
||||
}
|
||||
static IntPtr Manager(uint access){IntPtr value=OpenManager(null,null,access);if(value==IntPtr.Zero)throw Failed("OpenSCManagerW");return value;}
|
||||
static Service OpenFixed(string name){IntPtr manager=Manager(1);try{IntPtr value=OpenService(manager,name,4);if(value==IntPtr.Zero)throw Failed("OpenServiceW");return new Service(value);}finally{CloseServiceHandle(manager);}}
|
||||
public static Service OpenLocal(){return OpenFixed(LocalName);}
|
||||
public static Service OpenSystem(){return OpenFixed(SystemName);}
|
||||
public static Service CreateSystemOnce(){
|
||||
IntPtr manager=Manager(3);try{
|
||||
// Literal managed null is passed to the P/Invoke here. No PowerShell string
|
||||
// binding or caller-selected service/account/path reaches CreateServiceW.
|
||||
IntPtr value=CreateService(manager,SystemName,SystemName,0xf01ff,16,3,1,SystemCommand,null,IntPtr.Zero,null,null,null);
|
||||
if(value==IntPtr.Zero)throw Failed("CreateServiceW");
|
||||
Service service=new Service(value);try{
|
||||
uint sid=1;if(!ChangeServiceConfig2(service,5,ref sid))throw Failed("ChangeServiceConfig2W");
|
||||
IntPtr descriptor;uint bytes;if(!ConvertSecurity("D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)",1,out descriptor,out bytes))throw Failed("ConvertSecurityW");
|
||||
try{if(!SetServiceObjectSecurity(service,4,descriptor))throw Failed("SetServiceObjectSecurity");}finally{LocalFree(descriptor);}
|
||||
return service;
|
||||
}catch{service.Dispose();throw;}
|
||||
}finally{CloseServiceHandle(manager);}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
'@
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
HEADER = r'''
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$request=$global:RmmCaptureSystemRepairPayload
|
||||
if(!$request-or(($request.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'action,id,profile,script_sha256'-or$request.id-cne'efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec'-or$request.profile-cne'rmm.windows.raw-clock.original-system-create-repair.v1'-or$request.action-notin@('repair','read')-or$request.script_sha256-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'){throw 'Fixed original system repair request'}
|
||||
$p=@{id='efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec'};$base='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoverySignedClockCapture';$case=Join-Path $base $p.id;$control=Join-Path $case 'control';$exe=Join-Path $case 'SignedClockCapture.exe';$boot='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
||||
$names=@('RmmSignedClockCaptureLocalService','RmmSignedClockCaptureSystem');$tags=@('local-service','system');$accounts=@('NT AUTHORITY\LocalService','LocalSystem');$sys='S-1-5-18';$admin='S-1-5-32-544'
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
BODY = r'''
|
||||
if($PSCommandPath-cne(Join-Path (Join-Path $boot $request.script_sha256) 'SignedClockCaptureSystemRepair.ps1')-or(HashFile $PSCommandPath)-cne$request.script_sha256){throw 'Actual exact repair controller'}
|
||||
Check $PSCommandPath $false;foreach($dir in @($base,$case,$control)){Check $dir $true}
|
||||
$oldController=Join-Path (Join-Path $boot '89c19138e2804f263f1875c7697a7d53f54f40722101677b4d29538c917196f4') 'SignedClockCaptureAcceptance.ps1';Check $oldController $false;if((HashFile $oldController)-cne'89c19138e2804f263f1875c7697a7d53f54f40722101677b4d29538c917196f4'){throw 'Original controller hash'}
|
||||
$staged=Join-Path (Join-Path $boot '601c27a43fb67c662f926f9dc289a23a5c31c7e27f62901a77fc9ceaafaea7fb') 'SignedClockCapture.exe';Check $staged $false;if((Get-Item -LiteralPath $staged).Length-ne8566784-or(HashFile $staged)-cne'601c27a43fb67c662f926f9dc289a23a5c31c7e27f62901a77fc9ceaafaea7fb'){throw 'Original staged executable'}
|
||||
$intent=ReadJson (Join-Path $control 'intent.json');if((($intent.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'action,exe_bytes,exe_sha256,id,manifest_sha256,profile,script_sha256'-or$intent.action-cne'setup'-or$intent.id-cne$p.id-or$intent.profile-cne'rmm.windows.raw-clock.two-role-bootstrap.v1'-or$intent.exe_bytes-ne8566784-or$intent.exe_sha256-cne'601c27a43fb67c662f926f9dc289a23a5c31c7e27f62901a77fc9ceaafaea7fb'-or$intent.script_sha256-cne'89c19138e2804f263f1875c7697a7d53f54f40722101677b4d29538c917196f4'-or$intent.manifest_sha256-cne'806c062bdd458627cf44ff1ef3f27738e1ebf2f407a96f772223efef267db0b1'){throw 'Exact original setup intent'}
|
||||
$active=ReadJson (Join-Path $base 'active.json');if((($active.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'id,manifest_sha256,no_retry,script_sha256'-or$active.id-cne$p.id-or$active.manifest_sha256-cne$intent.manifest_sha256-or$active.script_sha256-cne$intent.script_sha256-or$active.no_retry-ne$true){throw 'Same original active campaign'}
|
||||
$allowed=@('intent.json','local-service-create-attempt.json','local-service-created.json','system-create-attempt.json','system-create-repair-attempt.json','system-create-repair-created.json','system-create-repair-failure.json');foreach($item in @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $control -Force)){if($item.PSIsContainer-or$item.Name-notin$allowed){throw 'Unexpected campaign progress: no repair'}}
|
||||
foreach($n in @(0,1)){$attempt=ReadJson (Join-Path $control ($tags[$n]+'-create-attempt.json'));if((($attempt.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'command,create_once'-or$attempt.create_once-ne$true-or$attempt.command-cne(Command $n)){throw 'Original exact service attempt'}}
|
||||
$made=ReadJson (Join-Path $control 'local-service-created.json');$local=Service 0;if((($made.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne'create_once,service'-or$made.create_once-ne$true-or!$local-or!(Equal $local $made.service)){throw 'Same original LocalService definition'}
|
||||
$localHandle=[RmmCaptureSystemRepair]::OpenLocal();try{$localStatus=$localHandle.Read();if($localStatus.State-ne1){throw 'Original LocalService must remain stopped'}}finally{$localHandle.Dispose()}
|
||||
foreach($path in @($exe,(Join-Path $case 'local-service'),(Join-Path $case 'system'))){if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $path){throw 'Unexpected setup completion or prior role entry'}}
|
||||
$repairAttempt=Join-Path $control 'system-create-repair-attempt.json';$repairCreated=Join-Path $control 'system-create-repair-created.json';$repairFailure=Join-Path $control 'system-create-repair-failure.json'
|
||||
$system=Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter "Name='RmmSignedClockCaptureSystem'" -OperationTimeoutSec 5
|
||||
if($request.action-ceq'read'){
|
||||
$records=[ordered]@{};foreach($leaf in @('system-create-repair-attempt.json','system-create-repair-created.json','system-create-repair-failure.json')){$path=Join-Path $control $leaf;$records[$leaf]=$null;if(Test-Path -LiteralPath $path){$records[$leaf]=ReadJson $path}}
|
||||
$systemMetadata=$null;if($system){$systemMetadata=@{command=$system.PathName;account=$system.StartName;start=$system.StartMode;type=$system.ServiceType;state=$system.State;definition_unverified=$true}}
|
||||
@{id=$p.id;read_only=$true;local_service_verified_stopped=$true;system_present=[bool]$system;system=$systemMetadata;records=$records;setup_completed=$false;service_started=$false;calibrated=$false;clock_authority=$false}|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 24 -Compress;exit 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
if($system-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $repairAttempt)-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $repairCreated)-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $repairFailure)){throw 'Existing system or repair attempt: original read only'}
|
||||
WriteNew $repairAttempt @{id=$p.id;profile=$request.profile;script_sha256=$request.script_sha256;original_manifest_sha256=$intent.manifest_sha256;original_controller_sha256=$intent.script_sha256;create_once=$true;system_account_null_inside_csharp=$true;command=(Command 1);no_retry=$true}
|
||||
$handle=$null
|
||||
try{
|
||||
$handle=[RmmCaptureSystemRepair]::CreateSystemOnce();$status=$handle.Read();if($status.State-ne1){throw 'New SYSTEM fixture must remain stopped'}
|
||||
$created=Service 1;if(!$created){throw 'New fixed SYSTEM definition absent'}
|
||||
$still=Service 0;if(!(Equal $still $made.service)){throw 'Original LocalService definition changed'}
|
||||
WriteNew $repairCreated @{id=$p.id;profile=$request.profile;script_sha256=$request.script_sha256;service=$created;stopped=$true;create_once=$true;setup_completed=$false;service_started=$false;calibrated=$false;clock_authority=$false}
|
||||
@{id=$p.id;system_created_stopped=$true;setup_completed=$false;service_started=$false;calibrated=$false;clock_authority=$false}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress
|
||||
}catch{
|
||||
$inner=$_.Exception;while($null-ne$inner.InnerException){$inner=$inner.InnerException};$native=$null;$step='managed_postcondition';if($inner-is[ComponentModel.Win32Exception]){$native=$inner.NativeErrorCode;if($inner.Message-match'^CAPTURE_SYSTEM_REPAIR_[A-Za-z0-9]+$'){$step=$inner.Message}}
|
||||
if(!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $repairFailure)){WriteNew $repairFailure @{id=$p.id;profile=$request.profile;script_sha256=$request.script_sha256;failed=$true;step=$step;native_error_code=$native;read_original_case_only=$true}}
|
||||
throw 'SYSTEM repair failed; read the original case only; do not retry'
|
||||
}finally{if($null-ne$handle){$handle.Dispose()}}
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def helpers(original):
|
||||
# Reuse only the exact original pure ACL/metadata/record helpers. Never
|
||||
# import/dot-source/execute the original controller or its setup branch.
|
||||
def section(start, end):
|
||||
require(original.count(start) == 1 and original.count(end) == 1, 'unique original helper boundaries')
|
||||
return original[original.index(start):original.index(end)]
|
||||
output = section('function HashBytes', 'function NewDir')
|
||||
output += section('function WriteNew', 'function Original')
|
||||
require('function NewDir' not in output and 'CreateOnce' not in output and 'function ReadAll' not in output,
|
||||
'only bounded original helper subset')
|
||||
return output
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def prepare():
|
||||
require(sha((ROOT / 'deploy/windows/signed_clock_capture_acceptance.py').read_bytes()) == RUNNER_SHA,
|
||||
'original runner unchanged')
|
||||
original_manifest = private_read(ORIGINAL / 'manifest.json')
|
||||
original_script = private_read(ORIGINAL / 'SignedClockCaptureAcceptance.ps1')
|
||||
markers = private_read(ORIGINAL / 'marker-query-result-5c07d236-a249-450e-83f8-e5c22c49bae3.json')
|
||||
require(sha(original_manifest) == MANIFEST_SHA and sha(original_script) == CONTROLLER_SHA
|
||||
and sha(markers) == MARKERS_SHA, 'exact original partial-case provenance')
|
||||
marker_value = json.loads(markers)
|
||||
require(marker_value == {'names': ['intent.json', 'local-service-create-attempt.json',
|
||||
'local-service-created.json', 'system-create-attempt.json'], 'read_only': True},
|
||||
'actual original four-marker partial state')
|
||||
# Read the already-qualified public executable only; never credentials/pins/keys.
|
||||
executable = private_read(ORIGINAL / 'SignedClockCapture.exe', EXE_BYTES)
|
||||
require(len(executable) == EXE_BYTES and sha(executable) == EXE_SHA, 'original qualified executable unchanged')
|
||||
script = (HEADER + helpers(original_script.decode()) + NATIVE + BODY).encode('ascii')
|
||||
require(len(script) <= 32768, 'bounded single-purpose repair controller')
|
||||
state = ROOT / 'devstate/windows-signed-clock-capture-system-repair'
|
||||
state.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
require(state.stat().st_uid == os.getuid() and stat.S_IMODE(state.stat().st_mode) == 0o700,
|
||||
'private local repair artifact root')
|
||||
folder = state / str(uuid.uuid4())
|
||||
folder.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||
write(folder / 'SignedClockCaptureSystemRepair.ps1', script)
|
||||
for action in ('repair', 'read'):
|
||||
write(folder / ('payload-' + action + '.json'), canonical(dict(id=CASE, profile=PROFILE,
|
||||
action=action, script_sha256=sha(script))))
|
||||
manifest = {'profile': PROFILE, 'original_case': CASE, 'original_manifest_sha256': MANIFEST_SHA,
|
||||
'original_controller_sha256': CONTROLLER_SHA, 'original_runner_sha256': RUNNER_SHA,
|
||||
'original_marker_receipt_sha256': MARKERS_SHA, 'exe_sha256': EXE_SHA,
|
||||
'repair_script_sha256': sha(script), 'repair_script_bytes': len(script),
|
||||
'generator_sha256': sha(Path(__file__).read_bytes()), 'target_executed': False,
|
||||
'no_original_controller_replay': True, 'no_start_stop_delete_or_setup_completion': True}
|
||||
write(folder / 'manifest.json', canonical(manifest))
|
||||
print(json.dumps({'path': str(folder), **manifest}, sort_keys=True))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||
parser.add_argument('command', choices=['prepare'])
|
||||
parser.parse_args()
|
||||
prepare()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -87,3 +87,31 @@ gegeben; dieser prüft eigene Control-/Inventar-/Prozesszeugen unabhängig.
|
||||
Der zuerst qualifizierte Deliveryschnitt oben bleibt historisch. Änderungen
|
||||
und tatsächliche lokale Folgeprüfungen sowie offene native Gates stehen in
|
||||
[agent-updater-runtime-source.md](agent-updater-runtime-source.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Exakte lokale Applyspanne statt Sekundenquantisierung
|
||||
|
||||
Nachtrag2026-11-15: Der unveränderte eingefrorene Healthreceipt enthält
|
||||
`signed_sync_applied_at` weiterhin als `u64` und unverändert als
|
||||
`floor(confirming.issued_at)`. Dieser Scalar erteilt keine Zeitfreigabe.
|
||||
Der neue lesende Coregetter `update_health_sync::read_round` prüft bounded
|
||||
die vorhandenen Originalrequest-Protobufs, SignedResponsebytes und tatsächlich
|
||||
im selben HelperSync-Commit gespeicherten Appliedwitnesses. Die bestehende
|
||||
Signatur-/Kontextprüfung läuft unabhängig erneut; es wird weder ein ACKboolean
|
||||
noch eine Callerzeit akzeptiert und kein Journal/Ready/Lease neu geschrieben.
|
||||
|
||||
`verified_span` findet genau ein tatsächlich angewandtes bestätigendes D2 mit
|
||||
beiden vorherigen Decision-IDs gleich D1, derselben Originalgeräte-/Boot-/
|
||||
Verbindungsbindung und identischem ServicesStarted-Präfix. Dieser Präfix muss
|
||||
auch unverändert im aktuellen Originalhandoff enthalten sein. Der Fullguard
|
||||
prüft jetzt `D1.issued_at <= actual_local_applied_at <= D2.issued_at` mit
|
||||
den exakten ursprünglichen DateTimes. Erst danach folgt die bestehende lokale
|
||||
Inventar-/Dienst-/Originalhealthprüfung. Der u64-Wert wird ausschließlich auf
|
||||
Gleichheit mit dem ursprünglichen D2-Sekundenfloor geprüft.
|
||||
|
||||
Der enge tatsächliche Grenzfall akzeptiert beide exakten Endpunkte und verweigert
|
||||
eine um1ns zu frühe oder zu späte Anwendung trotz identischem Sekundenfloor.
|
||||
Der vorhandene vollständige negative HelperSyncfall prüft zusätzlich den echten
|
||||
Original-Roundgetter nach Signatur-/Applypersistierung. Lokaler Quell-/Testbeleg:
|
||||
`devstate/updater-health-exact-span-6879f7cc-f284-4f50-b3e6-de321f3af6a2/`.
|
||||
Kein nativer Health-/Applynachweis und keine Änderung an Frozenreceipt-/
|
||||
Kernelbytes oder an der WebUI-Grenze.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -130,3 +130,14 @@ und ursprüngliche Admissionstrecke, qualifizierte passive Kandidatenbeobachtung
|
||||
geschlossene Readercensus, unklare Record-I/O-Namespace-Adjudikation und der vor
|
||||
der ersten Baseline notwendige V2-Rückweg bleiben offen. Applyfähigkeit bleibt
|
||||
unveröffentlicht; kein Cloud-VM-Apply, kein Produktfertig- oder Produktionsnachweis.
|
||||
|
||||
## Nachtrag2026-11-15: gesperrte Worker-Drivefolge
|
||||
|
||||
Nach dem gepushten gemeinsamen Checkpoint8e93c9e und dem erhaltenden Mainmerge
|
||||
07d6118 ist die bisher offene Enginefolge als konkrete Workerquelle verbunden.
|
||||
Ihr Eintritt bleibt explizit `UPDATE_READER_CENSUS_NOT_CONFIGURED`; weder
|
||||
Daemonentrypoint noch Job-/Applycapability wird aktiviert. Die genaue
|
||||
Queue-/Reply-/Stop-/Lock-/Swap-/Start-/Healthfolge und vorhandene separate
|
||||
Agent-Singletonsperre stehen in [worker](agent-updater-worker.md). Der neu
|
||||
geprüfte öffentliche Recordbuilder löst die zuvor dort genannte fehlende
|
||||
positive authentisierte Eingangsprobe. Keine reale Applyabnahme folgt daraus.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,3 +158,49 @@ keine echte UI-/Job-/Service-/Rootguardwirkung und umgehen ausdrücklich den
|
||||
öffentlichen authentisierten BuiltRecordeingang. Aktueller Source-/Nachweisstand
|
||||
und restliche Engine-/Admission-/Rollback-/Nativegates:
|
||||
[Runtimefortschreibung](agent-updater-runtime-source.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Einmalige Queue-/Drivefolge und vorhandene Agent-Singletonsperre
|
||||
|
||||
Am2026-11-15 liegt `worker::engine::Runtime` als noch gesperrter Quellschnitt
|
||||
vor. Der vorhandene IPC-Activatehandler queuet ausschließlich den originalen
|
||||
Handoff; die private Drivefolge ist erst nach vollständig geschriebenem Reply
|
||||
und geschlossener Accepted-Verbindung erreichbar. Eine verlorene Antwort
|
||||
verwirft die Queue und sperrt dieselbe Runtime. Die erste Fullbridge-Lesung
|
||||
übernimmt den tatsächlich authentisierten Originalpräfix; vorher sind alle
|
||||
mutierenden Methoden gesperrt und kein Event wird aus Headerdaten erfunden.
|
||||
|
||||
Die Folge verbindet Originalsignatur-/Policy-/Floor-/Dateibeobachtungen, alle
|
||||
drei Full-Stopclaims vor irgendeinem Stop, die tatsächlichen Stopbeobachtungen
|
||||
im Originalledger nach Guardübernahme, AllStopped/Owns, vier getrennte
|
||||
Save-/Publishpaare, Pair, Return-/Startreservation, tatsächlichen DBclose und
|
||||
flockdrop, General→Full→Agent und neue Full-Start-/Health-/Recordbestätigung.
|
||||
Es gibt keinen Resume oder Restore. Ein Fehler bei den Fileübergängen versucht
|
||||
unter dem noch gehaltenen Originalguard genau einen Unknown-CAS und startet
|
||||
keinen Dienst neu. Native Dienst-/Fehlerfolgen sind damit noch nicht bewiesen.
|
||||
|
||||
Zusätzlich wird die vorhandene `/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/agent.lock` aus dem
|
||||
OriginalRetainedSet gebunden: unveränderter Inode, UID993/GID984/0600/nlink1,
|
||||
0Bytes und privater Parent. Nach echtem StoppedServices-Beleg nimmt der Worker
|
||||
diese vorhandene Sperre exklusiv ohne CREATE. Sie bleibt über Root-DB/Swap/
|
||||
DBclose/Rootlockreturn gehalten und wird vor der festen Startfolge zurückgegeben.
|
||||
Der Agent hält schon heute seine ursprüngliche Singletondatei vor beiden
|
||||
Agent-SQLiteöffnungen; keine ACL, Agentdatei oder Sperrrolle wurde geändert.
|
||||
|
||||
**Explizite Sperre dieses Checkpoints:** `Runtime::serve_one` verweigert mit
|
||||
`UPDATE_READER_CENSUS_NOT_CONFIGURED`. Geschützte kompatible Bootstrapregistry
|
||||
plus vollständige aktuelle PID-/FD-/maps-Census und Nachstopbeobachtung unter
|
||||
beiden tatsächlichen Sperren fehlen noch. Eine bekannte Unitliste ersetzt
|
||||
keinen Census. Keine CLI oder RMM-Admission ruft diese Runtime auf; Applycaps
|
||||
bleiben geschlossen. Ebenso offen: Staging-/Downloadproducer, passiver gültiger
|
||||
Updatezustand, V2-Rollbackvertrag vor dem ersten Bootstrap, Unsicherheits-
|
||||
Namespaces, qualifizierte Dienstkontexte und tatsächlicher Linux-Apply.
|
||||
|
||||
Lokaler Nachweis liegt unter
|
||||
`devstate/updater-engine-source-6a8bb902-4db4-4d93-8843-450ba1dd5622/`.
|
||||
Der7er-Workerlauf umfasst jetzt auch den **öffentlichen** BuiltRecordbuilder:
|
||||
Originalsignierter Job und echte vollständig signierte History ergeben exakt
|
||||
die erwarteten Rawrecordbytes. Ein für einen fremden externen Healthkey gültiger
|
||||
Journal bleibt unter dem Originaljobkey unzulässig; geänderter Head/prior wird
|
||||
verweigert. Ein separater echter Container-FS-Fall belegt die Agent-Singleton-
|
||||
Aliasblockade und Ablehnung eines gleichbyteigen Inodeersatzes. Dies sind lokale
|
||||
Krypto-/FS-Verträge; sie führen die Queue-/Drive-/Dienstfolge nicht aus.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
|
||||
# Übergabe — Linux-MVP abgeschlossen, Windows wird fortgesetzt
|
||||
|
||||
**Provider-Socketfix Linux-first bestanden:** Originalfall8ee39b4f, native
|
||||
Cloud-Linux4/4 ohne Skip/Filter, separater Originalread vollständig; bekannte
|
||||
Runtimezeugen erhalten.0755 akzeptiert, Gruppen-/Fremdwrite verweigert,
|
||||
Ancestry/Socket-/Daemon-/Credentialbindung erhalten. [Ergebnis](server-time-source.md).
|
||||
Keine Chronyrechte geändert und noch keine echte Serverqualitätsprobe.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Windows-Messfixture eng repariert:** Originalfallefd17b43, separate
|
||||
SYSTEM-Erstellung mit C#-internem NULL erfolgreich, beide eigenen Messdienste
|
||||
verifiziert gestoppt; separater Readback und sämtliche RMM-/Serverzeugen erhalten.
|
||||
Originalsetup bleibt fehlgeschlagen, keine Rollenstarts/Calibration/Clockfreigabe.
|
||||
[Reparatur und Grenzen](windows-raw-capture-system-repair.md).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Finaler Windows-Kontextfence Linux-first bestanden:** Originalfall1e179c84,
|
||||
volle15er-Liste, nur geänderten Fencetest1PASS/14filtered ausgeführt; separater
|
||||
Readback vollständig, bekannte Runtimezeugen erhalten. Recheck und erkannter
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ exakt drei tatsächlichen Prozesse seiner festen Cgroup
|
||||
Chronyd-Kind. Keine zusätzliche oder untergeordnete Cgroup wird übergangen.
|
||||
Beide Chronyd-Prozesse müssen UID/GID989 und dieselben geschützten
|
||||
`/usr/sbin/chronyd`-Originalbytes besitzen. Der Root:Root0644-single-link-Pidfile
|
||||
`/run/chrony/chronyd.pid` bestimmt den Daemon; weil das Verzeichnis UID/GID989
|
||||
gehört, reicht diese Datei allein ausdrücklich nicht als Namensautorität.
|
||||
`/run/chrony/chronyd.pid` bestimmt den Daemon; weil das Verzeichnis UID/GID989 und Modus0700
|
||||
besitzt, reicht diese Datei allein ausdrücklich nicht als Namensautorität.
|
||||
Zusätzlich muss unter diesen drei Prozessen ausschließlich genau der gewählte
|
||||
Daemon den tatsächlichen Kernelinode des festen Unix-Datagramsockets
|
||||
`/run/chrony/chronyd.sock` halten. Diese begrenzte Beobachtung behauptet keine
|
||||
@@ -301,3 +301,16 @@ werden: der Dateiname `operator.py` darf keine gleichnamigen Python-Standardmodu
|
||||
gespeichert; unerwartete Fehler liefern nur `unexpected_operator_exception`,
|
||||
keinen Exceptiontext oder Traceback. Verlorene Antworten erlauben ausschließlich
|
||||
Lesen des ursprünglichen Falls, keine Phasenwiederholung oder Pinheilung.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Der nachfolgende tatsächliche Preflightfall
|
||||
`053cfe86` verweigerte allein die zuvor fälschlich erwartete
|
||||
Chronyverzeichnisberechtigung0755. Der lesende Originalbeleg
|
||||
`22fa2aabdfdbbd0fe55957358f7f651f317ee647b20a46ab1f2613a365095d7f`
|
||||
zeigt UID/GID9890700 für `/run/chrony`, Root:Root0644 mit einem Link für die
|
||||
Pidfile und UID/GID9890755 mit einem Link für den Socket. Der Operator verlangt
|
||||
jetzt exakt das beobachtete Verzeichnis0700. Der Provider akzeptiert am Socket
|
||||
Lese-/Ausführungsbits, verweigert weiterhin Gruppen-/Fremdschreibrechte und
|
||||
behält alle Identitäts-, Ancestry- und Kernelcredentialprüfungen bei. Es wurden
|
||||
keine Chronyberechtigungen geändert. Beide fehlgeschlagenen Originalfälle bleiben
|
||||
erhalten; diese Quelle benötigt erneut einen neuen Paket-/Abnahmefall.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,8 +50,13 @@ würdigen Pin separat provisionieren und die Providerinstanz neu eröffnen.
|
||||
Ziel ist ausschließlich `/run/chrony/chronyd.sock`. Seine Identität und
|
||||
Verzeichniskette werden vor und nach der Abfrage geprüft. Nicht-root-eigene
|
||||
Verzeichnisse müssen dem gepinnten Chrony-Konto gehören; kein Gruppen- oder
|
||||
Fremdschreibrecht. Der Socket muss dem gepinnten Daemonkonto gehören und darf
|
||||
keine Rechte für Fremde haben. Andere Images oder Layouts bleiben vorerst
|
||||
Fremdschreibrecht. Der Socket muss ein einzelner Socketinode des gepinnten Daemonkontos sein
|
||||
und darf weder Gruppen- noch Fremdschreibrecht haben. Lese-/Ausführungsbits
|
||||
wie beim tatsächlich beobachteten Modus0755 verleihen auf Linux kein Recht,
|
||||
ein Datagramm zu senden; dafür ist Schreibrecht am Pathnamesocket erforderlich
|
||||
([Linux unix(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/unix.7.html)). Der Server
|
||||
verwendet tatsächlich das gehaltene Chronyverzeichnis UID/GID9890700; dessen
|
||||
Identität sowie sämtliche übrigen Ancestry-/Credentialprüfungen bleiben Pflicht. Andere Images oder Layouts bleiben vorerst
|
||||
nicht unterstützt, ohne permissiven Fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
Der vom Rootoperator separat anzulegende Clientbereich ist
|
||||
@@ -210,3 +215,37 @@ Socket-Fixtures einschließlich tatsächlicher Namenersetzung/FD-Cleanup.
|
||||
diesem Lauf.** Der neue native OS-/Validatornachweis ersetzt nicht die offene
|
||||
reale ARM64-Serverprobe mit provisioniertem Pin und frischer gemeinsamer
|
||||
Chrony-/Kernelqualität.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlich nativ: Socketberechtigungsfix auf Cloud-Linux
|
||||
|
||||
2026-11-15, Originalfall `8ee39b4f-daed-4953-b90f-c04a7b2857c1`:
|
||||
alle vier vollständig gelisteten Provider-Vertragsprüfungen auf der
|
||||
tatsächlichen Cloud-Linux-VM als UID0 bestanden,0 fehlgeschlagen,0 ignoriert,
|
||||
0 gefiltert. Separater Originalfall-Readback vollständig; bekannte Runtimezeugen
|
||||
vorher/nachher/aktuell unverändert. Der bestehende Sockettest enthält jetzt
|
||||
ausdrücklich0755 positiv sowie0775/0757 negativ. Root-/Daemonidentitäten,
|
||||
gehaltene Verzeichnis-/Socketinodes, Singlelink und SCM-Credentials werden
|
||||
nicht durch eine Berechtigungsausnahme ersetzt. Auf dem Server wurde keine
|
||||
Chrony-Datei oder -Berechtigung geändert.
|
||||
|
||||
Qualifizierte Nativequelle-SHA256
|
||||
`f1fede6a260c4f91c4bf647f2dcadb63520cdadff22c0130327ecd7cae57921b`.
|
||||
Lokale eingefrorene Releasequalification7a8cb5be-41b3-400a-bd9b-b4b6f505a6e9,
|
||||
Receipt-SHA256
|
||||
`74759e286ba7c9762fe4c455da952a0e62de48f55ea643e0a8f435d2128497a5`,
|
||||
Sieben-Inputmanifest
|
||||
`c0067889fa6e79e5b1dc2ad46685613fd0b379b30a4541670f635140405718d9`.
|
||||
Diese Inputs enthalten auch die zum Freezezeitpunkt gesicherte Dokumentfassung;
|
||||
nachfolgende Ergebnisdokumentation ist kein Compilerinput. ELF1169800Bytes,
|
||||
SHA256 `9bd41ff166aeaae45fdf3dda2d72b04fc30e5ef87a181fe733c47e511a836d59`.
|
||||
Neuer Operator `deploy/time_source_socket_linux_acceptance.py`, SHA256
|
||||
`eef43096cac8a83751f844d810b97a3f68025786ca64ff34f82be59280ca1aa8`.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Lauf verwendet eigene Parser-/Clock-/Socketfixtures. Er öffnet keine
|
||||
echte NativeTimeSource, fragt weder tatsächliches Chrony noch die Kernelzeit
|
||||
ab und qualifiziert keinen signierten Zeitanker oder Windowsclock. Reale
|
||||
Serverprobe und nachfolgender Broker-/mTLS-Roundtrip bleiben offene Schritte.
|
||||
|
||||
Ausführungsreceipt-SHA256 `0decb992bfbfa88389da1949fddb491f2ec02a30abc9f4cce886d1f645768e07`.
|
||||
|
||||
Separater Rückabruf-SHA256 `88728b6659d506ba96140dd1924a089969e63fcd6f6d308109c4603ec4043da8`.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
# Eigener SYSTEM-Reparaturschritt des bestehenden Rohcapturefalls
|
||||
|
||||
Der einzige Zielfall bleibt `efd17b43-7e04-49a7-9bd4-862d13365eec`.
|
||||
`deploy/windows/signed_clock_capture_system_repair.py prepare` erzeugt nur lokal
|
||||
einen gesonderten festen Controller. Er enthält keine SSH-/Übertragungs- oder
|
||||
Ausführungsfunktion. Originalrunner, Originalcontroller, Manifest und sämtliche
|
||||
alten Marker werden weder verändert noch erneut ausgeführt.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächlicher Befund
|
||||
|
||||
Das ursprüngliche Setup scheiterte auf der zusammengefassten PS-Zeile138.
|
||||
Der lesende Markerbeleg
|
||||
`ff8e2eef73139c8350aa0f86c6fed5125fce95f79d535f25224829ce4fa9c565`
|
||||
enthält `intent.json`, `local-service-create-attempt.json`,
|
||||
`local-service-created.json` und `system-create-attempt.json`. Der ebenfalls
|
||||
lesende Servicebeleg findet den exakten LocalService gestoppt/Manual mit
|
||||
UNRESTRICTED-SID und der eingerichteten Admin-/SYSTEM-DACL; SYSTEM fehlt.
|
||||
Damit kam der erste `CreateOnce` vollständig zurück und der Fehler liegt sehr
|
||||
nahe an der zweiten Dienstanlage. Der ursprüngliche NativeErrorCode wurde
|
||||
nicht gesichert; beispielsweise1057 wird deshalb **nicht** als Messwert behauptet.
|
||||
|
||||
Der konkrete Quellfehlerkandidat ist die Übergabe von PS-`$null` an den
|
||||
C#-Stringparameter `account`. Für einen echten .NET-null-String sieht PowerShell
|
||||
den Typ [NullString](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.management.automation.language.nullstring)
|
||||
vor, auch in5.1. [CreateServiceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-createservicew)
|
||||
dokumentiert NULL als LocalSystem-Default; ein leerer Accountstring ist kein
|
||||
dokumentierter Ersatz. Der Restzustand passt zu diesem Binderfehler, beweist
|
||||
die verlorene ursprüngliche Nativefehlernummer jedoch nicht.
|
||||
|
||||
Die ursprünglichen SafeHandle-/Disposepfade schließen Handles, löschen aber
|
||||
keinen Dienst; ihr `ReleaseHandle` gibt nur ein Boolean zurück. Eine solche
|
||||
Schließung erklärt hier nicht den expliziten `Win32Exception`-Pfad. Separat
|
||||
wurde eine tatsächliche falsche Erfolgsprüfung gefunden: `Service.Read` verlangt
|
||||
`pcbBytesNeeded==sizeof(Status)` auch nach erfolgreichem
|
||||
[QueryServiceStatusEx](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-queryservicestatusex).
|
||||
Dieser Ausgabewert ist für den Fall `ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER` beschrieben;
|
||||
die Größe darf kein zusätzlicher Erfolgsindikator sein. Die Reparaturklasse
|
||||
prüft daher nur den tatsächlichen BOOL-Erfolg und sichert einen Fehler sofort.
|
||||
|
||||
Der unveränderte Rohcaptureprozess verwendet Token, Service-SID-Lookup und
|
||||
gehaltene Dateien. Er ruft nicht `PeerProof::for_service`/`OpenServiceW` auf.
|
||||
Ein zusätzlicher LocalService-SCM-ACE ist für diesen konkreten Rohcapturepfad
|
||||
deshalb nicht erforderlich; die gegenwärtige Dienst-DACL wird nicht erweitert.
|
||||
Spätere installierte Adapterpfade sind gesondert zu beurteilen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementierter, noch nicht am Ziel ausgeführter Reparaturumfang
|
||||
|
||||
Lokaler Paketfall
|
||||
`devstate/windows-signed-clock-capture-system-repair/cff25311-d30b-495a-8b50-e0e28e2e5b48`:
|
||||
Controller15551Bytes, SHA256
|
||||
`ac3da3d86bd93497e8ecfe55369cb228ed0ce30c7f2301afb74463c789bb50ca`.
|
||||
Generator-SHA256
|
||||
`9b44aa1491be2d154fb37fd0431370657f9623a2440649c29e910826beb44d2e`.
|
||||
Die lokalen Manifest-/Payloaddateien nennen weiterhin ausschließlich den
|
||||
ursprünglichen Zielfall. Eine neue lokale Artefakt-ID ist kein neuer Zielversuch.
|
||||
|
||||
Vor der einzigen neuen SystemCreate-Operation prüft der Controller:
|
||||
|
||||
- Eigenen tatsächlich ausgeführten Hashpfad sowie Originalcontroller89c19138…,
|
||||
Originalmanifest806c062b… über den ursprünglichen Setupintent/active-Bezug
|
||||
und die unveränderte gestagte EXE601c27a4… mit8566784Bytes.
|
||||
- Geschützte Originalverzeichnisse und exakt erlaubten Markerfortschritt,
|
||||
beide ursprünglichen Createattempts samt fester CLI und den bereits erzeugten
|
||||
LocalService anhand seines originalen Createdbelegs, der Service-SIDart,
|
||||
ACLhash, Startart, Konto, Typ und Abhängigkeiten. Ein gehaltener SCM-Queryhandle
|
||||
muss ihn als gestoppt melden.
|
||||
- Noch fehlenden SYSTEM-Dienst und fehlende Repairattempt-/Created-/Failuremarker.
|
||||
Noch keine Rollenverzeichnisse, installierte Case-EXE oder weitere Start-/
|
||||
Setupmarker. Fremde oder weiter fortgeschrittene Zustände verweigern.
|
||||
|
||||
Er schreibt dann ausschließlich einen neuen create-only
|
||||
`system-create-repair-attempt.json`, legt SYSTEM genau einmal an, setzt SIDart1
|
||||
und dieselbe enge Dienst-DACL und prüft den weiterhin gestoppten Zustand.
|
||||
Name und CLI sind feste C#-Konstanten; **NULL entsteht innerhalb C#**, kein
|
||||
Accountstring kommt aus PowerShell oder Payload. Nativeaufrufe erhalten feste
|
||||
Schrittnamen und sofort gesicherte NativeErrorCodes. SafeHandleparameter
|
||||
halten den SCM-Handle während des nativen Reads gültig. Erfolg und Fehler
|
||||
erhalten eigene neue Marker, die alten Systemattempts bleiben unangetastet.
|
||||
|
||||
Es gibt nur `repair` und `read`. Nach fehlender Antwort/Fehler ausschließlich
|
||||
`read` des Originalfalls, niemals erneut `repair` oder Original-`setup`.
|
||||
Ein nach CreateService fehlgeschlagener SID-/ACLschritt bleibt offen sichtbar;
|
||||
kein automatisches Delete oder vermeintlicher Erfolg. `read` zeigt die feste
|
||||
SYSTEM-Definition in einem solchen Restzustand ausdrücklich als unverifiziert.
|
||||
Keine Starts/Stops/Deletes, Zeitsetter, W32Time-/RMM-Änderung, EXE-Kopie oder
|
||||
Setupcompletion. Ein erfolgreicher SystemCreate allein bedeutet **keine
|
||||
Capturebereitschaft**.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich lokal: Python-AST, Pakethashes, ursprüngliche Fallbindung und
|
||||
begrenzter Mutationsumfang geprüft. Kein PowerShell-/C#-Compiler ist hier
|
||||
verfügbar; native Parser-/Add-Type-Prüfung und sämtliche Zielaktionen wurden
|
||||
durch diesen Worker nicht ausgeführt. Diese Grenzen stehen im lokalen Beleg.
|
||||
|
||||
## Getrennte nächste Finalisierung und Controllerkorrektur: Vorschlag
|
||||
|
||||
Der Originalsetupfehler lag vor Service-SID-Auflösung, Reader-ACLs, beiden
|
||||
Rollenverzeichnissen, EXE-Kopie und Setupcompletion. Ein weiterer eigener
|
||||
Originalfallcontroller muss diesen fehlenden Rest explizit abschließen:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Neue create-only Finalisierungsabsicht nach ursprünglicher Fall-/Hashbindung,
|
||||
originalem LS-Createdbeleg und erfolgreichem neuen SYSTEM-Repaircreatedbeleg.
|
||||
Beide festen Dienste müssen exakt passende, weiterhin gestoppte Definitionen
|
||||
haben; beide tatsächlichen `NT SERVICE`-SIDs unabhängig auflösen und prüfen.
|
||||
Keine Rawrollen-Startattempts/-Intents/-Ergebnisse zulassen.
|
||||
2. Die bisher rootgeschützten Base-/Case-ACLs auf genau die zwei eigenen
|
||||
Reader-SIDs ergänzen. Ausschließlich die zwei noch fehlenden eigenen
|
||||
Rollenverzeichnisse create-only mit dem jeweils eigenen Writer-SID anlegen;
|
||||
die unveränderte EXE ausschließlich create-only aus dem gesicherten Staging
|
||||
übernehmen, Hash/Größe und finales ACLprofil erneut prüfen. Kein breites
|
||||
ACL-Repair, fremdes Objekt oder Überschreiben.
|
||||
3. Einen **neuen** `setup-repair-complete.json` schreiben. Originales Setup und
|
||||
dessen fehlender `setup-complete.json` werden nicht rückwirkend erfolgreich
|
||||
erklärt. Eine partielle neue Finalisierung bleibt als eigener Intent ohne
|
||||
Erfolg; keine automatische Wiederholung/Resume-Engine.
|
||||
4. Einen weiteren getrennt gehashten Controller aus den Originalbytes erzeugen:
|
||||
Original-`setup` dauerhaft verweigern; für nachfolgende Start-/Read-/Cleanup-
|
||||
Aktionen den neuen Completionbeleg sowie originalen LS- und reparierten
|
||||
SYSTEM-Createdbezug verlangen. Originalcontroller/Manifesthash zusätzlich
|
||||
prüfen, eigene Scriptpfad-/Hashprüfung auf den neuen Controller binden.
|
||||
Die einzige Änderung am nativen Statusread ist das Entfernen der falschen
|
||||
`pcbBytesNeeded`-Erfolgsgleichheit. Kein Clock-/Capturealgorithmuswechsel.
|
||||
|
||||
Erst ein eindeutiger eigener Rollenstartintent erlaubt anschließend eine einzige
|
||||
Rohcaptureausführung. LS zuerst, SYSTEM erst nach eindeutig erfolgreichem LS-
|
||||
Originalergebnis; Prozessgeneration-/Watchdog- und Ausgabebelege bleiben wie im
|
||||
Originalprofil erforderlich. Cleanup ist separat: nur verifizierte eigene
|
||||
gestoppte Dienste über gehaltene SCM-Handles und passende originale/reparierte
|
||||
Createdbelege löschen, niemals ein freier Name, unbekannter Prozess oder blindes
|
||||
Stoppen. Bei unklarem Start-/Exit-/Deletezustand ausschließlich Originalfall
|
||||
lesen. Die hier gelieferte SystemCreate-Reparatur implementiert diese spätere
|
||||
Finalisierung und Cleanupkorrektur noch nicht.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tatsächliche native Reparatur, 2026-11-15
|
||||
|
||||
Root führte nach unabhängigem Review den unveränderten Reparaturcontroller
|
||||
`ac3da3d86bd93497e8ecfe55369cb228ed0ce30c7f2301afb74463c789bb50ca`
|
||||
im Originalfall efd17b43 aus. Zuvor bestätigte die Windows-VM
|
||||
PowerShell5.1.26100.9818:0 ASTfehler, isolierte C#-Kompilierung bestanden,
|
||||
Controller dabei nicht ausgeführt. Syntaxreceipt
|
||||
`f0586ef81853cc942b8043088b9c46336808c41cb89aa6d1afaff0e0b1483b30`.
|
||||
|
||||
Der dünne native Operator `signed_clock_capture_repair_acceptance.py`
|
||||
(SHA256 `85fa12492c303beec4539fe38fc3fa81455594a4a62722aa8950b1497f4016f8`)
|
||||
verwendet ausschließlich den bestehenden gepinnten Transport und seinen einen
|
||||
festen zusätzlichen Stagenamen. Ein unabhängiger Review fand vor Ausführung
|
||||
die fehlende Bindung lokaler Nutzlastdateien an die ausgewählte CLI-Aktion;
|
||||
diese wurde durch vollständig im Code festgelegte Nutzlasten behoben. Ein
|
||||
`read` kann deshalb keine `repair`-Nutzlast aus einer Datei übernehmen.
|
||||
|
||||
Staging erfolgreich, anschließend genau ein Reparaturaufruf erfolgreich:
|
||||
SYSTEM-Messdienst neu angelegt und tatsächlich gestoppt, LocalService weiterhin
|
||||
verifiziert gestoppt. `setup_completed=false`, `service_started=false`.
|
||||
Repairreply-SHA256
|
||||
`b87746dc066fc255d2cbf1871698811203d38410e27c8d6d51d2d38ea7752c96`,
|
||||
zugehöriger Erhaltungsbeleg
|
||||
`a1bb8a42e22f2d0263dc381bd675134effe6555867b57b7f4fae28eb6f319ad6`.
|
||||
Die sechs vollständigen nativen RMM-Witnessfelder einschließlich Helpermetadata
|
||||
und stabiler Journalidentität sowie aktuelle Serverpolicy/Zähler sind vorher
|
||||
und nachher unverändert. Linux31/31/27/0, Windows0/0/0/0; kein RMM-Job.
|
||||
|
||||
Das ursprüngliche Setup bleibt fehlgeschlagen. Seine Bytes und Marker bleiben
|
||||
erhalten; ein `setup-complete` oder Rohmessbericht wurde nicht nachträglich
|
||||
erfunden. Es gab weder Rollenstart noch Clockpin-/RMM-Konfigurationsänderung,
|
||||
Kalibrierung, W32Time-Anweisung oder Jobfreigabe. Die noch fehlende endgültige
|
||||
Messfixtureeinrichtung und anschließenden beiden Rollenprüfungen bleiben offen.
|
||||
|
||||
Separater tatsächlicher Original-Readback bestanden: Antwort-SHA256
|
||||
`fad16846247eb6d84f352802aeb0dbc368f32cbee1512ca4c4d63b22aedb62b8`,
|
||||
Erhaltungsreceipt
|
||||
`336b4ff6cbf718658dd3c459ac716bbaee2e2e82c60bac79ac6a9631ce3e66e7`.
|
||||
Er liest die ursprünglichen neuen Reparaturmarker, startet und repariert nichts.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user