diff --git a/deploy/windows/console_access_recovery.py b/deploy/windows/console_access_recovery.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f28cb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/windows/console_access_recovery.py @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Expired development tunnel recovery: server-only CAS + fixed public console code. + +No Windows access, key generation, SSH profile edit, port/download/RMM change. +Root renews the one expired restricted authorized key first, then hands the +reviewed public PowerShell to the User's elevated Windows console. +""" +import argparse +import base64 +import datetime as dt +import hashlib +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import subprocess +import uuid +import zipfile +import client_bootstrap as cb +import system_pipe_upgrade as pair +import dev_access_renewal as previous +require,sha,save=pair.require,pair.sha,pair.save +STATE=cb.EVIDENCE/'dev-access-console-recovery' +OLD_EXPIRY='2026-11-14T12:55:31.254999+00:00' + +def recover_server(payload): + import datetime as dt + import re + import stat + root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/windows-bootstrap') + authorized=Path('/var/lib/rmm-win-tunnel/.ssh/authorized_keys') + profile=Path('/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/80-rmm-windows-tunnel.conf') + ident=str(uuid.UUID(payload['id']));case=root/('console-recovery-'+ident) + require(payload['phase'] in ('state','enter','readback'),'fixed renewal phase') + def check(path,mode): + s=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(s.st_mode) and s.st_uid==0 and stat.S_IMODE(s.st_mode)==mode and s.st_size<65536,'protected original transport file') + def digest(path):return hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() + check(authorized,0o644);check(profile,0o644) + account=pwd.getpwnam('rmm-win-tunnel');require(account.pw_dir=='/var/lib/rmm-win-tunnel' and account.pw_shell=='/usr/sbin/nologin','existing forwarding-only account') + public=' '.join(Path('/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub').read_text().split()[:2]) + fingerprint=subprocess.run(['ssh-keygen','-lf','/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode().split()[1] + require(fingerprint=='SHA256:+NEin4XJc3CbhjQi7/ZpMIgxOrXn8AT2tlpTaXW5quw','confirmed original server host key') + raw=authorized.read_text();match=re.fullmatch(r'restrict,port-forwarding,permitlisten="127\.0\.0\.1:22240",expiry-time="(\d{14}Z)" (ssh-ed25519 [A-Za-z0-9+/=]{68})\n',raw) + require(match is not None and match[2]==payload['tunnel_public_key'],'exact unchanged forwarding key/options') + effective=subprocess.run(['/usr/sbin/sshd','-T','-C','user=rmm-win-tunnel,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout + for line in (b'allowtcpforwarding remote\n',b'permitlisten 127.0.0.1:22240\n',b'permitopen none\n',b'gatewayports no\n',b'maxsessions 0\n',b'passwordauthentication no\n'):require(line in effective,'same restricted forwarding-only profile') + def state():return dict(read_only=True,authorized_sha256=digest(authorized),profile_sha256=digest(profile),effective_sha256=hashlib.sha256(effective).hexdigest(),server_host_key_sha256=hashlib.sha256(public.encode()).hexdigest(),tunnel_public_key_sha256=hashlib.sha256(match[2].encode()).hexdigest(),expiry=match[1],uid=account.pw_uid,gid=account.pw_gid,home=account.pw_dir,shell=account.pw_shell) + if payload['phase']=='state':return state() + if payload['phase']=='readback': + value=state();value['case_exists']=case.exists();value['replace_intent']=case.exists() and (case/'replace-intent.json').exists();value['completed']=case.exists() and (case/'completed.json').exists();return value + old=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['old_expiry']).astimezone(dt.timezone.utc);new=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['new_expiry']).astimezone(dt.timezone.utc) + require(old.isoformat()=='2026-11-14T12:55:31.254999+00:00' and olddt.datetime.fromisoformat(OLD_EXPIRY),'original lease actually expired') + ident=str(uuid.uuid4());folder=STATE/ident;folder.mkdir(mode=0o700,parents=True) + expiry=(cb.contract.now()+dt.timedelta(hours=24)).replace(microsecond=0) + console=cb.contract.protected_json(access.root/'devstate/windows-bootstrap/console-registration.json') + with zipfile.ZipFile(access.root/'devstate/windows-bootstrap/windows-dev-access.zip') as bundle: + original=bundle.read('bootstrap-public.json') + public=json.loads(original,object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + require(public['expires_at']==OLD_EXPIRY and public['server']=='discovery.ease-technologies.de','original public-only bundle') + payload=dict(id=ident,phase='state',old_expiry=OLD_EXPIRY,new_expiry=expiry.isoformat(),tunnel_public_key=console['tunnel_public_key']) + save(folder/'prepare-intent.json',dict(id=ident,source_sha256=sha(__file__),new_expiry=payload['new_expiry'],no_windows_access=True)) + baseline=access.rpc(payload);require(baseline['expiry']==dt.datetime.fromisoformat(OLD_EXPIRY).strftime('%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ'),'only original expired key') + payload['server_before']=baseline + script=CONSOLE + for key,value in {'ID':ident,'EXPIRY':payload['new_expiry'],'CONFIG':hashlib.sha256(original).hexdigest(),'BOOTSTRAP':sha(cb.ROOT/'deploy/windows/Bootstrap-DevAccess.ps1'),'TUNNEL':console['tunnel_public_key'],'HOST':console['windows_host_public_key'],'FILETIME':str((int(expiry.timestamp())+11644473600)*10000000)}.items(): + token='@@'+key+'@@';require(script.count(token)==1,'exact fixed public console field');script=script.replace(token,value) + require('@@' not in script,'complete fixed public instructions') + pair.write_bytes(folder/'Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1',script.encode()) + save(folder/'public-recovery.json',dict(id=ident,new_expiry=payload['new_expiry'],script_sha256=pair.raw_sha(script.encode()),no_private_keys=True)) + readme=('Bestehenden Windows-Entwicklungszugang wiederherstellen\r\n\r\n' + 'Nur in dieser Windows-Test-VM ausfuehren, in einer als Administrator gestarteten PowerShell.\r\n' + 'Der Cloudserver muss zuvor durch den Entwickler fuer diese feste Frist erneuert worden sein.\r\n' + 'Neue UTC-Frist: '+payload['new_expiry']+'\r\n' + 'ZIP-SHA256 mit dem unabhaengig mitgeteilten Downloadhash vergleichen; dann hier entpacken.\r\n' + 'Folgende Befehle im entpackten Verzeichnis ausfuehren:\r\n\r\n' + "$recoveryScript = Join-Path (Get-Location) 'Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1'\r\n" + "if ((Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $recoveryScript -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant() -cne '"+pair.raw_sha(script.encode())+"') { throw 'Falsche Recoverydatei' }\r\n" + 'Unblock-File -LiteralPath $recoveryScript\r\n' + 'powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File $recoveryScript\r\n\r\n' + 'Unblock-File betrifft nur diese exakt gepruefte heruntergeladene Datei; RemoteSigned nur diesen Bootstrapprozess.\r\n' + 'Keine globale Policy/GPO aendern. Falls eine Richtlinie oder Pruefung verweigert: stoppen, Fehlermeldung melden, nicht erneut ausfuehren.\r\n' + 'Das Skript behaelt Schluessel, Pins, SSH-Profil und Taskdefinition bei, erneuert nur die Ablaufzeit und startet den Originaltunnel einmal.\r\n' + 'Keine Installation, ACL-Reparatur, RMM-Aktion, Reboot oder Update. Private Schluessel werden nicht gelesen/ausgegeben.\r\n' + 'Nach Erfolg bitte nur die Abschlusszeile melden, keine Schluessel oder Zugangsdaten. Bei Fehler den Zustand fuer lesende Kontrolle behalten.\r\n') + pair.write_bytes(folder/'README.txt',readme.encode('utf-8')) + bundle=folder/'windows-dev-access-recovery.zip' + with zipfile.ZipFile(bundle,'x',compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as archive: + for name in ('Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1','public-recovery.json','README.txt'): + archive.write(folder/name,name) + bundle.chmod(0o600) + intent=dict(id=ident,source_sha256=sha(__file__),access_root=str(access.root),payload=payload,console_sha256=pair.raw_sha(script.encode()),bundle_sha256=sha(bundle),readme_sha256=sha(folder/'README.txt'),public_json_sha256=sha(folder/'public-recovery.json')) + save(folder/'intent.json',intent) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident,review_sha256=sha(folder/'intent.json'),console_source=str((folder/'Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1').resolve()),console_sha256=intent['console_sha256'],bundle=str(bundle.resolve()),bundle_sha256=sha(bundle),new_expiry=payload['new_expiry'],windows_not_accessed=True))) + + +def run(access,ident,phase,review_sha): + require(str(uuid.UUID(ident))==ident,'canonical original recovery');folder=STATE/ident;intent=cb.contract.protected_json(folder/'intent.json') + require(intent['source_sha256']==sha(__file__) and intent['access_root']==str(access.root) and sha(folder/'Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1')==intent['console_sha256'] and sha(folder/'windows-dev-access-recovery.zip')==intent['bundle_sha256'] and sha(folder/'README.txt')==intent['readme_sha256'] and sha(folder/'public-recovery.json')==intent['public_json_sha256'],'same immutable console recovery source/public package') + if phase=='server-enter': + require(review_sha==sha(folder/'intent.json'),'explicit reviewed server-only CAS');save(folder/'server-enter-intent.json',dict(once=True)) + payload=dict(intent['payload'],phase='enter' if phase=='server-enter' else 'readback') + result=access.rpc(payload);save(folder/('server-entered.json' if phase=='server-enter' else 'readback-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),result) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident,result=result,windows_not_accessed=True,console_handoff_allowed=result.get('completed') is True))) + + +def main(): + os.umask(0o077);parser=argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__);parser.add_argument('phase',choices=('prepare','server-enter','readback'));parser.add_argument('--access-root',required=True,type=Path);parser.add_argument('--id');parser.add_argument('--review-sha256');args=parser.parse_args();access=ServerAccess(args.access_root) + if args.phase=='prepare':require(not(args.id or args.review_sha256),'fresh server-only preparation');prepare(access) + else:require(args.id and ((args.phase=='server-enter')==bool(args.review_sha256)),'same case, reviewed CAS once');run(access,args.id,args.phase,args.review_sha256) + + +if __name__=='__main__': + try:main() + except Exception as error:print('CONSOLE_ACCESS_RECOVERY_INCOMPLETE:'+type(error).__name__);raise SystemExit(2) from None diff --git a/deploy/windows/dev_access_renewal.py b/deploy/windows/dev_access_renewal.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53dd070 --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/windows/dev_access_renewal.py @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""One 24h renewal of the existing restricted development SSH transport. + +No new key, port, shell, RMM setting, download lease, stop/kill or reboot. +The unchanged tunnel expires naturally; one SYSTEM worker starts its original +scheduled task at original expiry+60s. This deliberately permits a short gap. +Lost mutation replies allow readback only. Main config publication is Root work. +""" +import argparse +import base64 +import datetime as dt +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import subprocess +import uuid + +import client_bootstrap as cb +import system_pipe_upgrade as pair + +require, sha, canonical, save = pair.require, pair.sha, pair.canonical, pair.save +STATE = cb.EVIDENCE / 'dev-access-renewal' +OLD_EXPIRY = '2026-11-14T12:55:31.254999+00:00' +OLD_UTC = dt.datetime.fromisoformat(OLD_EXPIRY) +NEW_UTC = OLD_UTC.replace(microsecond=0) + dt.timedelta(hours=24) +START_UTC = OLD_UTC.replace(microsecond=0) + dt.timedelta(seconds=60) + + +def server(payload): + import datetime as dt + import re + import stat + root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/windows-bootstrap') + authorized=Path('/var/lib/rmm-win-tunnel/.ssh/authorized_keys') + profile=Path('/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/80-rmm-windows-tunnel.conf') + ident=str(uuid.UUID(payload['id']));case=root/('renew-'+ident) + require(payload['phase'] in ('state','enter','readback'),'fixed renewal phase') + def check(path,mode): + s=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(s.st_mode) and s.st_uid==0 and stat.S_IMODE(s.st_mode)==mode and s.st_size<65536,'protected original transport file') + def digest(path):return hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() + check(authorized,0o644);check(profile,0o644) + account=pwd.getpwnam('rmm-win-tunnel');require(account.pw_dir=='/var/lib/rmm-win-tunnel' and account.pw_shell=='/usr/sbin/nologin','existing forwarding-only account') + public=' '.join(Path('/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub').read_text().split()[:2]) + fingerprint=subprocess.run(['ssh-keygen','-lf','/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout.decode().split()[1] + require(fingerprint=='SHA256:+NEin4XJc3CbhjQi7/ZpMIgxOrXn8AT2tlpTaXW5quw','confirmed original server host key') + raw=authorized.read_text();match=re.fullmatch(r'restrict,port-forwarding,permitlisten="127\.0\.0\.1:22240",expiry-time="(\d{14}Z)" (ssh-ed25519 [A-Za-z0-9+/=]{68})\n',raw) + require(match is not None and match[2]==payload['tunnel_public_key'],'exact unchanged forwarding key/options') + effective=subprocess.run(['/usr/sbin/sshd','-T','-C','user=rmm-win-tunnel,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout + for line in (b'allowtcpforwarding remote\n',b'permitlisten 127.0.0.1:22240\n',b'permitopen none\n',b'gatewayports no\n',b'maxsessions 0\n',b'passwordauthentication no\n'):require(line in effective,'same restricted forwarding-only profile') + def state():return dict(read_only=True,authorized_sha256=digest(authorized),profile_sha256=digest(profile),effective_sha256=hashlib.sha256(effective).hexdigest(),server_host_key_sha256=hashlib.sha256(public.encode()).hexdigest(),tunnel_public_key_sha256=hashlib.sha256(match[2].encode()).hexdigest(),expiry=match[1],uid=account.pw_uid,gid=account.pw_gid,home=account.pw_dir,shell=account.pw_shell) + if payload['phase']=='state':return state() + if payload['phase']=='readback': + value=state();value['case_exists']=case.exists();value['replace_intent']=case.exists() and (case/'replace-intent.json').exists();value['completed']=case.exists() and (case/'completed.json').exists();return value + old=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['old_expiry']).astimezone(dt.timezone.utc);new=dt.datetime.fromisoformat(payload['new_expiry']).astimezone(dt.timezone.utc) + require(old.isoformat()=='2026-11-14T12:55:31.254999+00:00' and new==old.replace(microsecond=0)+dt.timedelta(hours=24) and dt.datetime.now(dt.timezone.utc)65536)throw new InvalidOperationException("Token size"); + IntPtr p=Marshal.AllocHGlobal(needed);if(!GetTokenInformation(token,kind,p,needed,out bytes)){Marshal.FreeHGlobal(p);throw new Win32Exception();}return p; + } + public static Dictionary Proof(Held h,int pid,string owner,string serviceSid,string image){ + if(!Alive(h))throw new InvalidOperationException("Process not alive"); + long creation,exit,kernel,user;if(!GetProcessTimes(h,out creation,out exit,out kernel,out user))throw new Win32Exception(); + StringBuilder path=new StringBuilder(32768);uint length=32768;if(!QueryFullProcessImageName(h,0,path,ref length)||!String.Equals(path.ToString(),image,StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))throw new InvalidOperationException("Process image"); + IntPtr token;if(!OpenProcessToken(h,8,out token))throw new Win32Exception(); + try { + int bytes;IntPtr info=Info(token,1,out bytes);string actual; + try {actual=new SecurityIdentifier(Marshal.ReadIntPtr(info)).Value;}finally{Marshal.FreeHGlobal(info);} + if(actual!=owner)throw new InvalidOperationException("Process owner"); + info=Info(token,2,out bytes);bool found=false; + try {int count=Marshal.ReadInt32(info);int offset=(int)Marshal.OffsetOf(typeof(Groups),"First");int stride=Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(SidAndAttributes)); + if(count<0||count>1024||offset+(long)count*stride>bytes)throw new InvalidOperationException("Groups size"); + for(int n=0;n{{"pid",pid},{"creation_filetime",creation.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)},{"owner_sid",actual},{"service_sid",serviceSid},{"service_sid_enabled",true},{"image",path.ToString()},{"kernel_handle_bound",true}}; + }finally{CloseHandle(token);} + } +} +'@ +function FileIdentity($path,[bool]$actor=$false){ + Check $path $false $actor;$file=[IO.File]::Open($path,[IO.FileMode]::Open,[IO.FileAccess]::Read,[IO.FileShare]::Read) + try{$id=New-Object RmmPipeNative+FileId;$size=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SizeOf([type][RmmPipeNative+FileId]);if($size-ne24-or![RmmPipeNative]::GetFileInformationByHandleEx($file.SafeFileHandle,18,[ref]$id,[uint32]$size)){throw 'Native file identity'} + return [ordered]@{volume_serial=$id.Volume.ToString([Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture);file_id=([BitConverter]::ToString($id.Id)).Replace('-','').ToLowerInvariant();bytes=$file.Length;acl_sha256=(AclHash $path);sha256=(Hash $path $actor)} + }finally{$file.Dispose()} +} +function Kernel($role,$record,$held){ + $owner='S-1-5-19';$sid=$agentSid;$image=$agentBinary;if($role-ceq'helper'){$owner=$sys;$sid=$helperSid;$image=$helperBinary} + $proof=[RmmPipeNative]::Proof($held,[int]$record.pid,$owner,$sid,$image) + if($proof.creation_filetime-cne$record.creation_filetime-or$proof.owner_sid-cne$record.owner_sid){throw 'SCM/kernel process identity mismatch'};return $proof +} +function ActualState([bool]$new){ + $value=State $new + $value['files']=[ordered]@{agent=(FileIdentity $agentBinary);helper=(FileIdentity $helperBinary);settings=(FileIdentity $settings);pin=(FileIdentity $pin);config=(FileIdentity $config);ca=(FileIdentity (Join-Path $agentRoot 'server-ca.pem') $true);identity=(FileIdentity (Join-Path $agentState 'identity.json') $true);certificate=(FileIdentity (Join-Path $agentState 'device.pem') $true);private_key=(FileIdentityMetadata (Join-Path $agentState 'device.key'))} + foreach($role in @('agent','helper')){$record=$value.service;if($role-ceq'helper'){$record=$value.helper_service} + $proof=$null;if($record.state-ceq'Running'){$held=[RmmPipeNative]::Open([int]$record.pid);try{$proof=Kernel $role $record $held;if(!(JsonEqual $record (Service $role))-or![RmmPipeNative]::Alive($held)){throw 'SCM/kernel generation changed during proof'}}finally{$held.Dispose()}} + $value[$role+'_kernel']=$proof + };return $value +} +# FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES only: no key content read/hash/export. This also binds +# the private key's actual native FileID, not merely a timestamp/name. +function FileIdentityMetadata($path){ + Check $path $false $true;$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force;$h=[RmmPipeNative]::CreateFile($path,0x80,7,[IntPtr]::Zero,3,0,[IntPtr]::Zero) + try{if($h.IsInvalid){throw 'Private metadata-only handle'};$id=New-Object RmmPipeNative+FileId;if(![RmmPipeNative]::GetFileInformationByHandleEx($h,18,[ref]$id,24)){throw 'Private metadata-only native FileID'};return @{volume_serial=$id.Volume.ToString([Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture);file_id=([BitConverter]::ToString($id.Id)).Replace('-','').ToLowerInvariant();bytes=$i.Length;creation_ticks=$i.CreationTimeUtc.Ticks.ToString();last_write_ticks=$i.LastWriteTimeUtc.Ticks.ToString();acl_sha256=(AclHash $path);private_key_read=$false}}finally{$h.Dispose()} +} +function SameOriginal($before,$after){ + Preserved $before $after $false + if(!(JsonEqual $before.files $after.files)){throw 'Original four files/config/private metadata CAS'} + foreach($role in @('service','helper_service','agent_kernel','helper_kernel')){if(!(JsonEqual $before.$role $after.$role)){throw 'Fresh original kernel/SCM generation changed; new reviewed baseline required'}} +} +function PreserveImmutableFiles($before,$after,[bool]$frozen){ + Preserved $before $after $frozen + foreach($label in @('config','ca','identity','certificate','private_key')){if(!(JsonEqual $before.files.$label $after.files.$label)){throw 'Original immutable PKI/config native FileID/metadata changed'}} +} +''' + +# The original fixed-role SCM configuration checks are reused exactly. Unlike +# Service(), this readback projection makes no running-process proof claim and +# honestly exposes pending/raw State/PID without changing a service. +READBACK_SERVICE = "\nfunction ReadbackService($role){" + u.SCRIPT.split('function Service($role){', 1)[1].split(' $processId=', 1)[0] + r''' + $state=[string]$service.State;if(!$state-or$state.Length-gt64){throw 'Bounded raw SCM state'} + return [ordered]@{state=$state;pid=[uint32]$service.ProcessId;start_name=$service.StartName;start_mode=$service.StartMode;path=$service.PathName;service_type=$service.ServiceType;sid_type=$sidType;service_acl_sha256=(BytesHash ([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($text)));process_identity_verified=$false;read_only=$true} +} +''' + +PHASES = r''' +CheckControl $boot $true +if($p.script_sha256-notmatch'^[a-f0-9]{64}$'-or$PSCommandPath-cne(Join-Path (Join-Path $boot $p.script_sha256) 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1')-or(Hash $PSCommandPath)-cne$p.script_sha256){throw 'Actual executing pipe-upgrade source'} +if($p.action-ceq'baseline'){$before=ActualState $false;if($before.service.state-cne'Running'-or$before.helper_service.state-notin@('Running','Stopped')-or$before.journal.pending_inventory_events-ne0){throw 'Settled original passive baseline'};$before|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 40 -Compress;exit 0} +function ReadCase{ + CheckControl $folder $true;CheckControl (Join-Path $folder 'intent.json') $false;CheckControl $active $false + $i=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $folder 'intent.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;$a=Get-Content -LiteralPath $active -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json + if((($i.payload.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')-cne(($p.PSObject.Properties.Name|Sort-Object)-join',')){throw 'Original exact pipe payload shape'} + foreach($field in $p.PSObject.Properties.Name){if($field-cne'action'-and!(JsonEqual $i.payload.$field $p.$field)){throw 'Original exact pipe intent'}} + if($a.id-cne$p.id-or$a.script_sha256-cne$p.script_sha256-or$a.baseline_sha256-cne$p.baseline_sha256){throw 'Original active pipe intent'};return $i +} +if($p.action-ceq'readback'){ + function MaybeHash($path){if(!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $path)){return $null};return Hash $path} + $i=ReadCase;$phases=[ordered]@{};foreach($label in @('agent-stop-attempt','agent-stopped','helper-stop-attempt','helper-stopped','helper-already-stopped','frozen','agent-backup','helper-backup','settings-backup','pin-backup','agent-replace-attempt','agent-replaced','helper-replace-attempt','helper-replaced','settings-replace-attempt','settings-replaced','pin-replace-attempt','pin-replaced','swapped','helper-start-attempt','helper-started','agent-start-attempt','agent-started','entered')){$phases[$label]=Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $folder ($label+'.json'))} + @{read_only=$true;id=$p.id;phase_receipts=$phases;service=(ReadbackService 'agent');helper_service=(ReadbackService 'helper');hashes=@{agent=(MaybeHash $agentBinary);helper=(MaybeHash $helperBinary);settings=(MaybeHash $settings);pin=(MaybeHash $pin)}}|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 40 -Compress;exit 0 +} +if($p.action-ceq'finish'){ + $i=ReadCase;$after=ActualState $true;PreserveImmutableFiles $i.before $after $false + CheckControl (Join-Path $folder 'frozen.json') $false;$frozen=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $folder 'frozen.json') -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;PreserveImmutableFiles $frozen $after $false + foreach($role in @('agent','helper')){CheckControl (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-started.json')) $false;$started=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-started.json')) -Raw|ConvertFrom-Json;$live=$after.service;if($role-ceq'helper'){$live=$after.helper_service};if($live.state-cne'Running'-or!(JsonEqual $started.service $live)-or!(JsonEqual $started.kernel $after.($role+'_kernel'))){throw 'Same single-start actual component instance required'}} + @{read_only=$true;completed=$true;id=$p.id;native=$after;original=$i.before;frozen=$frozen}|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 40 -Compress;exit 0 +} +if((Test-Path -LiteralPath $folder)-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $active)){throw 'Existing pipe intent: readback only'} +$baselineBytes=[Convert]::FromBase64String($p.baseline_base64);if((BytesHash $baselineBytes)-cne$p.baseline_sha256){throw 'Exact separately reviewed baseline bytes'};$baseline=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($baselineBytes)|ConvertFrom-Json +$before=ActualState $false;SameOriginal $baseline $before +if($before.journal.pending_inventory_events-ne0-or$before.service.state-cne'Running'){throw 'Original ACK and running agent required'} +$heldAgent=[RmmPipeNative]::Open([int]$before.service.pid);$heldHelper=$null +try{ + $null=Kernel 'agent' $before.service $heldAgent + if($before.helper_service.state-ceq'Running'){$heldHelper=[RmmPipeNative]::Open([int]$before.helper_service.pid);$null=Kernel 'helper' $before.helper_service $heldHelper} + New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $folder|Out-Null;CheckControl $folder $true + WriteNew (Join-Path $folder 'intent.json') @{payload=$p;before=$before};WriteNew $active @{id=$p.id;script_sha256=$p.script_sha256;baseline_sha256=$p.baseline_sha256;no_jobs=$true} + function StopHeld($role,$record,$held){ + $live=Service $role;if(!(JsonEqual $record $live)){throw 'SCM identity changed before own stop'};$null=Kernel $role $record $held + $name=$agentName;if($role-ceq'helper'){$name=$helperName};WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-stop-attempt.json')) @{stop_once=$true;service=$record} + Stop-Service -Name $name;(Get-Service -Name $name).WaitForStatus([ServiceProcess.ServiceControllerStatus]::Stopped,[TimeSpan]::FromSeconds(20));if(![RmmPipeNative]::Exited($held,20000)){throw 'Pinned original process not exited'} + WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-stopped.json')) @{original=$record;kernel_process_exited=$true} + } + StopHeld 'agent' $before.service $heldAgent + if($null-ne$heldHelper){StopHeld 'helper' $before.helper_service $heldHelper}else{if((Service 'helper').state-cne'Stopped'){throw 'Manual helper changed since reviewed stopped baseline'};WriteNew (Join-Path $folder 'helper-already-stopped.json') @{observed_stopped=$true;stop_called=$false;start_called=$false}} + $frozen=ActualState $false;Preserved $before $frozen $false;if($frozen.service.state-cne'Stopped'-or$frozen.helper_service.state-cne'Stopped'-or$frozen.journal.pending_inventory_events-ne0-or!(JsonEqual $before.files $frozen.files)){throw 'Stopped original complete pair/file identities'};WriteNew (Join-Path $folder 'frozen.json') $frozen + function Backup($label,$path,$expected){ + $identity=FileIdentity $path;if(!(JsonEqual $identity $before.files.$label)-or$identity.sha256-cne$expected){throw 'Original backup file identity/hash/ACL'} + $backup=Join-Path $folder ($label+'-original');[IO.File]::Copy($path,$backup,$false);PrivateBackupAcl $backup;FlushCopy $backup + if((Hash $backup)-cne$expected){throw 'Exact private backup bytes'};WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($label+'-backup.json')) @{original=$identity;backup=(FileIdentity $backup);original_sddl=(Get-Acl -LiteralPath $path).Sddl} + } + Backup 'agent' $agentBinary $p.old_agent;Backup 'helper' $helperBinary $p.old_helper;Backup 'settings' $settings $p.old_policy;Backup 'pin' $pin $p.old_pin + $settingBytes=[Convert]::FromBase64String($p.settings_base64);$pinBytes=[Convert]::FromBase64String($p.pin_base64);if((BytesHash $settingBytes)-cne$p.new_policy-or(BytesHash $pinBytes)-cne$p.new_pin){throw 'Deterministic closed reciprocal settings'} + WriteBytes (Join-Path $folder 'new-helper.json') $settingBytes;WriteBytes (Join-Path $folder 'new-agent-pin.json') $pinBytes + function Swap($label,$destination,$source,$oldHash,$newHash){ + if((Service 'agent').state-cne'Stopped'-or(Service 'helper').state-cne'Stopped'){throw 'Both stopped for all four file replacements'} + foreach($other in @('agent','helper','settings','pin')){CheckControl (Join-Path $folder ($other+'-backup.json')) $false;if(!(Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $folder ($other+'-original')))){throw 'All four private backups precede first replacement'}} + $old=FileIdentity $destination;$sddl=(Get-Acl -LiteralPath $destination).Sddl;$nativeBackup=Join-Path $folder ($label+'-native-original');$candidate=Join-Path $folder ($label+'-candidate') + if(!(JsonEqual $old $before.files.$label)-or$old.sha256-cne$oldHash-or(Hash $source)-cne$newHash-or(Hash (Join-Path $folder ($label+'-original')))-cne$oldHash-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $nativeBackup)){throw 'Fresh destination/source/backup CAS'} + [IO.File]::Copy($source,$candidate,$false);FlushCopy $candidate;$candidateId=FileIdentity $candidate;if($candidateId.sha256-cne$newHash){throw 'Complete staged replacement'} + WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($label+'-replace-attempt.json')) @{old=$old;candidate=$candidateId;native_backup=$nativeBackup;source_sha256=$p.script_sha256} + if(!(JsonEqual (FileIdentity $destination) $old)-or!(JsonEqual (FileIdentity $candidate) $candidateId)-or(Test-Path -LiteralPath $nativeBackup)){throw 'Immediate file-ID/hash/ACL CAS'} + [IO.File]::Replace($candidate,$destination,$nativeBackup) + PrivateBackupAcl $nativeBackup;$acl=New-Object Security.AccessControl.FileSecurity;$acl.SetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm($sddl);Set-Acl -LiteralPath $destination -AclObject $acl;FlushCopy $destination + if((Hash $destination)-cne$newHash-or(Hash $nativeBackup)-cne$oldHash-or(AclHash $destination)-cne$old.acl_sha256){throw 'Exact actual replacement/explicit native backup/ACL'} + WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($label+'-replaced.json')) @{original=$old;current=(FileIdentity $destination);native_backup=(FileIdentity $nativeBackup);original_backup=(FileIdentity (Join-Path $folder ($label+'-original')))} + } + Swap 'agent' $agentBinary (Join-Path (Join-Path $boot $p.new_agent) 'rmm-agent-windows.exe') $p.old_agent $p.new_agent + Swap 'helper' $helperBinary (Join-Path (Join-Path $boot $p.new_helper) 'rmm-helper-windows.exe') $p.old_helper $p.new_helper + Swap 'settings' $settings (Join-Path $folder 'new-helper.json') $p.old_policy $p.new_policy + Swap 'pin' $pin (Join-Path $folder 'new-agent-pin.json') $p.old_pin $p.new_pin + $swapped=ActualState $true;PreserveImmutableFiles $frozen $swapped $true;if($swapped.service.state-cne'Stopped'-or$swapped.helper_service.state-cne'Stopped'){throw 'All four new files while both stopped'};WriteNew (Join-Path $folder 'swapped.json') $swapped + function StartOnce($role){ + $checked=ActualState $true;PreserveImmutableFiles $frozen $checked $false;if((Service $role).state-cne'Stopped'){throw 'First exact selected start only'};$name=$helperName;if($role-ceq'agent'){$name=$agentName} + WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-start-attempt.json')) @{start_once=$true;all_four_files_verified=$true} + Start-Service -Name $name;(Get-Service -Name $name).WaitForStatus([ServiceProcess.ServiceControllerStatus]::Running,[TimeSpan]::FromSeconds(20)) + $s=Service $role;$held=[RmmPipeNative]::Open([int]$s.pid);try{$kernel=Kernel $role $s $held;WriteNew (Join-Path $folder ($role+'-started.json')) @{service=$s;kernel=$kernel}}finally{$held.Dispose()} + } + StartOnce 'helper';StartOnce 'agent';$after=ActualState $true;PreserveImmutableFiles $before $after $false;WriteNew (Join-Path $folder 'entered.json') $after + @{entered=$true;id=$p.id;no_jobs=$true;no_reboot=$true;no_clock_change=$true}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress +}finally{$heldAgent.Dispose();if($null-ne$heldHelper){$heldHelper.Dispose()}} +''' +SCRIPT = PREFIX + '\n' + NATIVE + READBACK_SERVICE + '\n' + PHASES +PREPARE = u.transport.PREPARE_SCRIPT.replace('TransportAcceptance.ps1', 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1') +LAUNCH = u.transport.LAUNCH_SCRIPT.replace('TransportAcceptance.ps1', 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1').replace('RmmTransportPayload', 'RmmPipeUpgradePayload') + + +class Access: + """Explicit read-only access roots; never redirects source/manifest globals.""" + def __init__(self, root): + self.root = Path(root).absolute() + require(self.root == self.root.resolve() and self.root != ROOT.resolve(), 'separate real access root, no symlink/copy') + self.evidence = self.root / 'devstate/windows-client' + + def powershell(self, source, payload, timeout=180): + access = cb.contract.protected_json(self.root / 'credentials/windows-dev-access.json') + wrapped = "try {\n" + source + "\n} catch {[pscustomobject]@{bootstrap_error=$true;error_id=$_.FullyQualifiedErrorId;line=$_.InvocationInfo.ScriptLineNumber}|ConvertTo-Json -Compress;exit 1}" + command = 'powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -EncodedCommand ' + base64.b64encode(wrapped.encode('utf-16le')).decode() + result = subprocess.run(access['ssh_prefix'] + [command], input=canonical(payload) + b'\n', capture_output=True, timeout=timeout) + if result.returncode: + # Fixed error identifiers/line only; never raw stderr/payload/commands. + safe = dict(returncode=result.returncode, stdout_bytes=len(result.stdout), stderr_bytes=len(result.stderr)) + try: + error = json.loads(result.stdout.decode('utf-8-sig'), object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + if error.get('bootstrap_error') is True: + safe.update(error_id=error.get('error_id'), line=error.get('line')) + except (ValueError, AttributeError): + pass + save(STATE / ('remote-error-' + str(uuid.uuid4()) + '.json'), safe) + raise RuntimeError('fixed pipe upgrade bootstrap incomplete; readback only') + return json.loads(result.stdout.decode('utf-8-sig'), object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + + def stage(self, path, name): + require(name in ('rmm-agent-windows.exe', 'rmm-helper-windows.exe', 'RuntimeStateProbe.exe', 'SystemStateProbe.exe', 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1'), 'fixed stage names') + path = Path(path) + digest = sha(path) + prepare = u.transport.PREPARE_SCRIPT.replace('TransportAcceptance.ps1', name) + observed = self.powershell(prepare, dict(sha256=digest)) + if not observed['already_uploaded']: + access = cb.contract.protected_json(self.root / 'credentials/windows-dev-access.json') + prefix = access['ssh_prefix'] + args = ['sftp'] + [p for p in prefix[1:-1] if p != '-T'] + ['-b', '-', prefix[-1]] + target = '/C:/ProgramData/RustDiscoveryBootstrap/' + digest + '/' + name + result = subprocess.run(args, input=('put ' + json.dumps(str(path.resolve())) + ' ' + json.dumps(target) + '\n').encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=60) + require(result.returncode == 0, 'immutable exact bootstrap transfer; no retry') + observed = self.powershell(prepare, dict(sha256=digest)) + require(observed['already_uploaded'] is True and observed['sha256'] == digest, 'same exact existing-or-new stage') + + def server(self, function, payload): + cloud = u.transport.cloud + require(function in (cloud.server, u.auto.server_state, u.transport.server_transport.server_evidence), 'fixed read-only server witnesses') + # The inherited parser is strict data parsing, not source/eval. Its ROOT + # only checks the source .gitignore; its supplied path remains Main. + cfg = cloud.bootstrap.access.load_config(self.root / 'credentials/server.conf') + ssh = ['ssh', '-F', '/dev/null', '-T', '-p', cfg.get('port', '22'), '-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=yes', '-o', 'BatchMode=yes', '-o', 'IdentitiesOnly=yes', '-o', 'ForwardAgent=no', '-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10', '-i', str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()), cfg['username'] + '@' + cfg['address'], 'python3 -'] + code = ('import os,json,subprocess,base64,hashlib,ssl,http.client,socket,uuid,pwd\nfrom pathlib import Path\n' + inspect.getsource(cloud.bootstrap.require) + '\n' + inspect.getsource(function) + '\ntry:\n print(json.dumps(' + function.__name__ + '(' + repr(payload) + ')))\nexcept Exception as error:\n print(json.dumps(dict(error="READONLY_WITNESS_INCOMPLETE",kind=type(error).__name__)))\n') + result = subprocess.run(ssh, input=code.encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=60) + require(result.returncode == 0 and len(result.stdout) <= 1024 * 1024, 'bounded readonly server witness') + value = json.loads(result.stdout, object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + require('error' not in value, 'readonly server witness incomplete') + return value + + def server_state(self): + cloud = u.transport.cloud + linux = cb.contract.protected_json(self.root / 'devstate/cloud-mvp-final-closeout.json') + require(linux['verified'] is True, 'accepted Linux target only') + counts = {name: self.server(cloud.server, dict(kind='gate', tenant_id=tenant, agent_id=agent)) for name, tenant, agent in ( + ('windows', cloud.TENANT, u.transport.AGENT), ('linux', linux['target']['tenant_id'], linux['target']['agent_id']))} + flags = self.server(u.auto.server_state, {}) + require(u.auto.flags_disabled(flags) and counts['windows'] == dict(jobs=0, outbox=0, permits=0, unresolved=0), 'closed hooks and Windows zero-job gate') + return dict(counts=counts, flags=flags) + + def observe(self, ident): + return self.server(u.transport.server_transport.server_evidence, dict(tenant_id=u.transport.cloud.TENANT, agent_id=u.transport.AGENT, fault_id=ident)) + + def device_and_denials(self): + bridge = self + class ReadBackend(u.transport.cloud.Backend): + def request(self, body): + if body['method'] == 'tools/call': + require(body['params']['name'] == 'inventory.get_device', 'only stored inventory reads') + else: + require(body['method'] in ('initialize', 'notifications/initialized'), 'only MCP read session') + return bridge.server(u.transport.cloud.server, dict(kind='http', path='/mcp', method='POST', headers=self.headers, body=body, principal=self.principal)) + device = ReadBackend().call('inventory.get_device', dict(tenant_id=u.transport.cloud.TENANT, asset_id=u.transport.ASSET)) + require(device['agent_id'] == u.transport.AGENT and device['source_id'] == 'windows.base' and set(device['capabilities']) == {'windows.base/1', 'heartbeat/1'} and device['presence'] == 'online', 'honest unchanged passive inventory') + denied = [] + backend = ReadBackend('b') + for tenant in (u.transport.cloud.TENANT, '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222'): + backend.sequence += 1 + response = backend.request(dict(jsonrpc='2.0', id=backend.sequence, method='tools/call', params=dict(name='inventory.get_device', arguments=dict(tenant_id=tenant, asset_id=u.transport.ASSET)))) + data = response.get('data', {}) + require('error' in data or data.get('result', {}).get('isError'), 'foreign tenant denied') + denied.append(dict(tenant_id=tenant, denied=True)) + return device, denied + + +def dependencies(): + modules = [cb, cb.contract, u, u.transport, u.auto, u.transport.cloud, u.transport.cloud.bootstrap, u.transport.cloud.bootstrap.access, u.transport.server_transport, u.qualification, u.qualification.feature, u.qualification.previous, u.original_helper] + return {str(Path(m.__file__).resolve().relative_to(ROOT)): sha(m.__file__) for m in modules} + + +def guards(): + require(sha(u.__file__) == ORIGINAL_RUNNER, 'immutable original read-only witness source') + require('function PinProcess' not in PREFIX and 'function Swap' not in PREFIX and 'function StopPinned' not in PREFIX and 'function StartOnce' not in PREFIX, 'historical mutations excluded') + require('[IO.File]::Replace($candidate,$destination,$nativeBackup)' in SCRIPT and '[IO.File]::Replace($candidate,$destination,$null)' not in SCRIPT, 'explicit additional absent native backup') + ordered = [SCRIPT.index(token) for token in (" StopHeld 'agent'", " Backup 'agent'", "Backup 'pin'", " Swap 'agent'", "Swap 'pin'", '$swapped=ActualState $true', " StartOnce 'helper'", "StartOnce 'agent'")] + require(ordered == sorted(ordered), 'all backups before any replacement; all replacements before helper/agent starts') + require(SCRIPT.count('Start-Service -Name $name') == SCRIPT.count('Stop-Service -Name $name') == 1, 'single fixed-role control primitives') + require(all(word not in SCRIPT + LAUNCH for word in ('Restart-Service', 'Restart-Computer', 'Stop-Computer', 'Set-Service', 'New-Service', 'Remove-Item', 'Invoke-Expression', 'Bypass')), 'no install/reconfigure/cleanup/reboot/automatic rollback') + + +# Fresh isolated interpreter: the Pipe pack deliberately imports its transport +# modules from Main. Reusing its module in this interpreter would accidentally +# reuse our cached worktree client_bootstrap and corrupt the source/access split. +# This code calls verification/read-only proof parsing ONLY, never native(). +VERIFY_PACK = r''' +import hashlib,importlib.util,json,re,sys,uuid +from pathlib import Path +path=Path(sys.argv[1]);spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('fixed_pipe_pack',path) +pack=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(pack) +manifest_path=Path(sys.argv[2]).resolve();proof_path=Path(sys.argv[3]).resolve() +manifest=pack.verified(manifest_path) # full current code/access hashes + Linux80/Windows58 Core proofs +proof=pack.cb.contract.protected_json(pack.private_file(proof_path));require=pack.require +case=proof['case_id'];require(str(uuid.UUID(case))==case and proof_path==pack.NATIVE/case/'passed.json','exact native pipe case namespace') +require(proof['verified'] is True and proof['manifest_path']==str(manifest_path) and proof['manifest_sha256']==pack.sha(manifest_path) and proof['no_jobs'] is True and proof['clock_adapter_qualified'] is False and proof['local_service_proof'] is False and proof['native_pipe_proof'] is False,'actual same pipe manifest units, no runtime capability') +intent=pack.cb.contract.protected_json(proof_path.parent/'intent.json') +require(intent['id']==case and intent['manifest_path']==str(manifest_path) and intent['manifest_sha256']==pack.sha(manifest_path) and intent['runner_sha256']==pack.sha(path) and intent['script_sha256']==hashlib.sha256(pack.SCRIPT.encode()).hexdigest(),'exact executed native unit source/manifest') +require(pack.cb.contract.protected_json(proof_path.parent/'started-local.json')['start_once'] is True,'original create-once native execution intent') +before=pack.cb.contract.protected_json(proof_path.parent/'server-before.json') +require(pack.auto.flags_disabled(before['flags']) and before['counts']['windows']==dict(jobs=0,outbox=0,permits=0,unresolved=0),'original closed native zero-job scope') +actual=proof['native'] +require(actual['completed'] is True and actual['manifest_sha256']==pack.sha(manifest_path) and set(actual['reports'])==set(pack.COUNTS) and actual['both_lists_verified_before_any_test'] is True and actual['bootstrap_administrator_units'] is True and actual['local_service_proof'] is False and actual['native_pipe_proof'] is False and actual['rmm_jobs'] is False and actual['product_state_writes'] is False,'actual completed narrow units only') +for kind,count in pack.COUNTS.items(): + report=actual['reports'][kind];listed=report['listed'];run=report['result'] + names=re.findall(r'^(.+): test\r?$',listed['stdout'],re.M) + require(report['sha256']==manifest['artifacts'][kind]['sha256'] and names==report['names']==pack.TESTS[kind] and len(set(names))==count and type(listed['exit_code']) is int and listed['exit_code']==0 and type(run['exit_code']) is int and run['exit_code']==0 and listed['timed_out'] is False and run['timed_out'] is False and re.search(r'test result: ok\. '+str(count)+r' passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out;',run['stdout']),'all exact 23/7 native cases, no ignored/filtered/timeout') +print(json.dumps(manifest)) +''' + + +def qualified(manifest_path, proof_path): + verifier = ROOT / 'deploy/windows/system_pipe_acceptance.py' + require(sha(verifier) == PIPE_VERIFIER_SHA, 'exact independently reviewed Pipe-v2 pack verifier') + result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-I', '-c', VERIFY_PACK, str(verifier), str(manifest_path), str(proof_path)], capture_output=True, timeout=60) + require(result.returncode == 0 and len(result.stdout) <= 1024 * 1024, 'fresh isolated read-only Pipe verifier/native proof; details withheld') + value = json.loads(result.stdout, object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + require(value['type'] == 'rmm.windows.pipe-v2-build' and value['transport_version'] == 2 and value['native_counts_expected'] == dict(lib=23, bin=7), 'Pipe-v2 manifest, never historical delegation relabeling') + return value + + +def prior(access): + runtime_path = access.evidence / 'current-runtime.json' + components_path = access.evidence / 'current-components.json' + runtime = cb.contract.protected_json(runtime_path) + components = cb.contract.protected_json(components_path) + result_path = access.evidence / ('system-delegation-upgrade/' + OLD_CASE + '/result.json') + require(sha(result_path) == OLD_RESULT_SHA, 'independently accepted original joint result') + result = cb.contract.protected_json(result_path) + require(result['verified'] is True and result['completed'] is True and result['no_jobs'] is True and result['windows_jobs_enabled'] is False and result['clock_adapter_qualified'] is False, 'accepted closed passive generation') + evidence = dict(path=str(result_path.resolve()), sha256=OLD_RESULT_SHA) + require(runtime['case_id'] == components['case_id'] == OLD_CASE and runtime['evidence'] == components['evidence'] == evidence and runtime['binary_sha256'] == components['agent_sha256'] == OLD_AGENT and components['helper_sha256'] == OLD_HELPER and components['policy_sha256'] == OLD_POLICY and components['pin_sha256'] == OLD_PIN and runtime['transport'] == 'auto' and runtime['windows_jobs_enabled'] is False and runtime['clock_adapter_qualified'] is False and runtime['system_helper_client_feature'] is True and components['windows_jobs_enabled'] is False and components['clock_adapter_qualified'] is False and components['helper_effects_enabled'] is False, 'current accepted four-file indices, no adoption of readback') + recovery = access.evidence / 'system-delegation-recovery/595dd1da-0d7f-4364-9040-a75e16c6da83/acceptance.json' + require(sha(recovery) == '5ad5925c8928f49cd0f9d48a64f81018281b5b6e3704c799bae64a42898322bb' and cb.contract.protected_json(recovery)['verified'] is True, 'accepted original explicit-backup recovery preserved') + original = cb.contract.protected_json(result_path.parent / 'intent.json') + settings = base64.b64decode(original['payload']['settings_base64'], validate=True) + require(raw_sha(settings) == OLD_POLICY and raw_sha(base64.b64decode(original['payload']['pin_base64'], validate=True)) == OLD_PIN, 'exact original reciprocal public settings') + return dict(runtime=runtime, components=components, runtime_sha256=sha(runtime_path), components_sha256=sha(components_path), result_sha256=OLD_RESULT_SHA), result, json.loads(settings, object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + + +def passive_settings(old, agent, helper): + require(set(old) == {'schema_version', 'binding', 'agent', 'helper', 'allowed_services', 'max_runtime_seconds', 'enable_effects', 'allow_reboot'} and type(old['schema_version']) is int and old['schema_version'] == 1 and old['allowed_services'] == [] and old['enable_effects'] is False and old['allow_reboot'] is False and type(old['max_runtime_seconds']) is int and old['max_runtime_seconds'] == 30 and old['agent']['binary_sha256'] == OLD_AGENT and old['helper']['binary_sha256'] == OLD_HELPER, 'exact original closed public settings') + require(all(isinstance(h, str) and len(h) == 64 and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in h) for h in (agent, helper)), 'qualified new image hashes') + new = json.loads(canonical(old)); new['agent']['binary_sha256'] = agent; new['helper']['binary_sha256'] = helper + settings = canonical(new); policy = raw_sha(settings) + pin = canonical(dict(schema_version=1, binding=new['binding'], policy_sha256=policy, agent=new['agent'], helper=new['helper'])) + return settings, pin, policy + + +def leaves(access): + path = access.evidence / 'system-intent-bootstrap/f322a4d2-c537-4842-bf04-658ad8f814b0/acceptance.json' + require(sha(path) == u.INTENT_PREPARATION_SHA, 'accepted original empty-leaf preparation') + proof = cb.contract.protected_json(path) + require(proof['verified'] is True and proof['sqlite_initialized'] is False, 'not a store/SQLite qualification') + created_path = path.parent / 'created.json' + require(sha(created_path) == proof['native_created_sha256'], 'original native empty-leaf receipt') + created = cb.contract.protected_json(created_path) + items = {v['name']: v for v in created['leaves']} + require(set(items) == {'system-intents.sqlite', 'system-intents.sqlite-journal'} and all(v['length'] == 0 for v in items.values()), 'exact two original zero-byte leaves') + return {label: dict(name=name, acl_sha256=raw_sha(items[name]['sddl'].encode())) for label, name in [('database', 'system-intents.sqlite'), ('journal', 'system-intents.sqlite-journal')]} + + +def remote(access, intent, action): + require(intent['script_sha256'] == raw_sha(SCRIPT.encode()), 'immutable new pipe bootstrap source') + return access.powershell(LAUNCH, dict(sha256=intent['script_sha256'], payload=dict(intent['payload'], action=action))) + + +def load(ident, access): + require(str(uuid.UUID(ident)) == ident, 'canonical original case UUID') + folder = STATE / ident + intent = cb.contract.protected_json(folder / 'intent.json') + require(intent['id'] == ident and intent['runner_sha256'] == sha(__file__) and intent['script_sha256'] == raw_sha(SCRIPT.encode()) and intent['dependencies'] == dependencies() and intent['access_root'] == str(access.root), 'same source/dependencies/access root case') + manifest = qualified(Path(intent['manifest_path']), Path(intent['qualification_path'])) + require(sha(intent['manifest_path']) == intent['payload']['manifest_sha256'] and sha(intent['qualification_path']) == intent['payload']['qualification_sha256'] and manifest['artifacts']['agent']['sha256'] == intent['payload']['new_agent'] and manifest['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'] == intent['payload']['new_helper'], 'same actually native-qualified new pair') + return folder, intent + + +def prepare(access, manifest_path, proof_path): + guards() + manifest = qualified(manifest_path, proof_path) + indices, accepted, old = prior(access) + settings, pin, policy = passive_settings(old, manifest['artifacts']['agent']['sha256'], manifest['artifacts']['helper']['sha256']) + require(manifest['artifacts']['agent']['sha256'] != OLD_AGENT and manifest['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'] != OLD_HELPER, 'new coordinated pipe pair, no old source round') + ident = str(uuid.uuid4()); folder = STATE / ident; folder.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True) + script_sha = raw_sha(SCRIPT.encode()) + payload = dict(id=ident, old_agent=OLD_AGENT, old_helper=OLD_HELPER, old_policy=OLD_POLICY, old_pin=OLD_PIN, new_agent=manifest['artifacts']['agent']['sha256'], new_helper=manifest['artifacts']['helper']['sha256'], new_policy=policy, new_pin=raw_sha(pin), config_sha256=accepted['native']['config_sha256'], probe_sha256=manifest['artifacts']['probe']['sha256'], system_probe_sha256=manifest['artifacts']['system_probe']['sha256'], manifest_sha256=sha(manifest_path), qualification_sha256=sha(proof_path), script_sha256=script_sha, settings_base64=base64.b64encode(settings).decode(), pin_base64=base64.b64encode(pin).decode(), intent_leaves=leaves(access)) + draft = dict(id=ident, started_at=cb.contract.now().isoformat(), access_root=str(access.root), runner_sha256=sha(__file__), script_sha256=script_sha, manifest_path=str(manifest_path.resolve()), qualification_path=str(proof_path.resolve()), dependencies=dependencies(), original_indices=indices, payload=payload, no_jobs=True) + save(folder / 'prepare-intent.json', draft) + for name, data in [('runner.py', Path(__file__).read_bytes()), ('SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1', SCRIPT.encode())]: + write_bytes(folder / name, data) + for kind in ('agent', 'helper', 'probe', 'system_probe'): + item = manifest['artifacts'][kind] + require(sha(item['path']) == item['sha256'], 'qualified staged artifact bytes') + access.stage(item['path'], item['name']) + access.stage(folder / 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1', 'SystemPipeUpgrade.ps1') + before = remote(access, draft, 'baseline') + expected = accepted['native'] + for field in ('agent_id', 'asset_id', 'binary_sha256', 'helper_sha256', 'policy_sha256', 'pin_sha256', 'config_sha256', 'config_acl_sha256', 'binary_acl_sha256', 'helper_binary_acl_sha256', 'settings_acl_sha256', 'pin_acl_sha256', 'public_hashes', 'identity_acls', 'private_key_metadata'): + require(before[field] == expected[field], 'accepted original identity/PKI/config/four-file ACLs; no private key read') + for field in ('database_file_id', 'database_creation', 'identity_sha256', 'schema'): + require(before['journal'][field] == expected['journal'][field], 'same actual original telemetry database identity') + for field in ('helper_ledger', 'executor_lock', 'intent_store'): + require(before['helper_witness'][field] == expected['helper_witness'][field], 'same actual helper DB/lock/FileIDs/zero-byte leaves') + for role in ('service', 'helper_service'): + for field in ('start_name', 'start_mode', 'path', 'service_type', 'sid_type', 'service_acl_sha256'): + require(before[role][field] == expected[role][field], 'original exact SCM account/config/ACL') + baseline = canonical(before) + write_bytes(folder / 'baseline.json', baseline) + payload.update(baseline_base64=base64.b64encode(baseline).decode(), baseline_sha256=raw_sha(baseline)) + draft['payload'] = payload + save(folder / 'intent.json', draft) + save(folder / 'server-before.json', access.server_state()) + central = access.observe(ident)['device']; require(central and central['agent_id'] == u.transport.AGENT, 'original stored authenticated device') + save(folder / 'central-before.json', central) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident, prepared=True, no_component_mutation=True, baseline_sha256=raw_sha(baseline), needs_explicit_review_before_enter=True))) + + +def enter(access, ident, baseline_sha): + folder, intent = load(ident, access) + require(sha(folder / 'baseline.json') == intent['payload']['baseline_sha256'] == baseline_sha, 'explicit reviewed exact baseline required') + indices, _, _ = prior(access) + require(indices == intent['original_indices'] and access.server_state() == cb.contract.protected_json(folder / 'server-before.json'), 'both original current indices and server gates unchanged') + save(folder / 'enter-attempt.json', dict(enter_once=True, baseline_sha256=baseline_sha, lost_reply_readback_only=True)) + result = remote(access, intent, 'enter') + require(result.get('entered') is True and result['id'] == ident, 'actual same single transition reply') + save(folder / 'entered.json', result) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident, entered=True, continuation='finish/readback only; never repeat enter'))) + + +def finish(access, ident, read_only=False): + folder, intent = load(ident, access) + action = 'readback' if read_only else 'finish' + observed = remote(access, intent, action) + save(folder / ('readback-' + str(uuid.uuid4()) + '.json'), observed) + require(observed['read_only'] is True and observed['id'] == ident, 'only existing case readback') + if read_only: + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident, read_only=True, phase_receipts=observed['phase_receipts']))); return + require(observed['completed'] is True, 'actual complete pair preservation') + result_path = folder / 'result.json' + if result_path.exists(): + previous = cb.contract.protected_json(result_path) + require(previous['verified'] is True and all(previous['native'][role] == observed['native'][role] for role in ('service', 'helper_service')), 'same completed current instances; no republication or mutation') + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident, verified=True, retained_original_result=True, main_indices_published=False))); return + # Two genuinely new server heartbeats after both single starts, not cached + # contacts from baseline, and no new network-agent jobs/capabilities. + after = cb.contract.timestamp(intent['started_at']); baseline = cb.contract.protected_json(folder / 'central-before.json') + watermark = access.observe(ident)['device'] + require(watermark and watermark['agent_id'] == u.transport.AGENT and watermark['last_contact_at'], 'post-finish server heartbeat watermark') + deadline = time.monotonic() + 150; first = None + while True: + evidence = access.observe(ident); device = evidence['device'] + if device and device['transport'] == 'wss' and device['last_contact_at'] and cb.contract.timestamp(device['last_contact_at']) > cb.contract.timestamp(watermark['last_contact_at']): + require(all(device[k] == baseline[k] for k in ('agent_id', 'asset_id', 'enrollment_generation', 'assignment_version', 'certificate_sha256')), 'same original mTLS identity') + if first is None: first = evidence + elif device['last_contact_at'] != first['device']['last_contact_at']: break + require(time.monotonic() < deadline, 'two native post-upgrade heartbeats missing') + time.sleep(2) + final = remote(access, intent, 'finish'); native = final['native'] + original = json.loads(base64.b64decode(intent['payload']['baseline_base64']), object_pairs_hook=cb.contract.strict_object) + require(native['journal']['pending_inventory_events'] == 0 and native['journal']['sequence'] > original['journal']['sequence'], 'fresh telemetry sequence and concrete inventory ACK') + device, denied = access.device_and_denials() + require(cb.contract.timestamp(device['observed_at']) >= after, 'fresh original stored inventory') + require(access.server_state() == cb.contract.protected_json(folder / 'server-before.json'), 'both target counts/policies/hooks unchanged') + indices, _, _ = prior(access) + require(indices == intent['original_indices'], 'Main current indices still original; Root owns later CAS publication') + pipe = u.actual_pipe_proof(native, intent) + result = dict(verified=True, completed=True, id=ident, original=final['original'], frozen=final['frozen'], native=native, online=dict(watermark=watermark, first=first, second=evidence), stored_inventory=device, foreign_denied=denied, native_pipe_peer_test=pipe, pipe_framing_version=2, no_jobs=True, windows_jobs_enabled=False, clock_adapter_qualified=False, system_helper_client_feature=True, helper_effects_enabled=False, no_reboot=True, no_clock_change=True, private_key_read=False, original_indices=intent['original_indices'], main_indices_published=False, manifest_path=intent['manifest_path'], manifest_sha256=intent['payload']['manifest_sha256'], qualification_sha256=intent['payload']['qualification_sha256'], runner_sha256=intent['runner_sha256'], script_sha256=intent['script_sha256']) + save(result_path, result) + print(json.dumps(dict(id=ident, verified=True, passive_preservation=True, native_pipe_peer_test=pipe, main_indices_published=False))) + + +def main(): + os.umask(0o077) + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('phase', choices=('prepare', 'enter', 'finish', 'readback', 'guards')) + parser.add_argument('--access-root', type=Path); parser.add_argument('--manifest', type=Path); parser.add_argument('--qualification', type=Path); parser.add_argument('--id'); parser.add_argument('--baseline-sha256') + args = parser.parse_args(); guards() + if args.phase == 'guards': + require(not any((args.access_root, args.manifest, args.qualification, args.id, args.baseline_sha256)), 'local source guards only'); print('PASS: local source guards; no VM action'); return + require(args.access_root, 'explicit separate read-only Main access root') + access = Access(args.access_root) + if args.phase == 'prepare': + require(args.manifest and args.qualification and not (args.id or args.baseline_sha256), 'qualified new pair and read-only baseline preparation') + prepare(access, args.manifest, args.qualification) + elif args.phase == 'enter': + require(args.id and args.baseline_sha256 and not (args.manifest or args.qualification), 'same prepared case and reviewed baseline hash') + enter(access, args.id, args.baseline_sha256) + else: + require(args.id and not (args.manifest or args.qualification or args.baseline_sha256), 'same original case readback/finish') + finish(access, args.id, args.phase == 'readback') + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + try: main() + except Exception as error: + print('WINDOWS_PIPE_UPGRADE_INCOMPLETE:' + type(error).__name__) + raise SystemExit(2) from None diff --git a/deploy/windows/test_system_pipe_upgrade.py b/deploy/windows/test_system_pipe_upgrade.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..825fc2a --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/windows/test_system_pipe_upgrade.py @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +"""Four local orchestration guards; no credentials/VM/Windows API calls.""" +import contextlib +import copy +import io +import json +from pathlib import Path +import tempfile +import unittest +from unittest.mock import Mock, patch + +import system_pipe_upgrade as p + + +def settings(): + return dict(schema_version=1, binding={'public_fixture': True}, agent=dict(binary_sha256=p.OLD_AGENT), helper=dict(binary_sha256=p.OLD_HELPER), allowed_services=[], max_runtime_seconds=30, enable_effects=False, allow_reboot=False) + + +class PipeUpgradeGuards(unittest.TestCase): + def test_closed_reciprocal_settings_only_change_two_image_pins(self): + original = settings(); preserved = copy.deepcopy(original) + raw, pin, policy = p.passive_settings(original, 'a' * 64, 'b' * 64) + changed = json.loads(raw); changed['agent']['binary_sha256'] = p.OLD_AGENT; changed['helper']['binary_sha256'] = p.OLD_HELPER + self.assertEqual(changed, preserved); self.assertEqual(original, preserved) + self.assertEqual(p.raw_sha(raw), policy); self.assertEqual(json.loads(pin)['policy_sha256'], policy) + for field, value in [('enable_effects', True), ('allow_reboot', True), ('allowed_services', ['foreign']), ('max_runtime_seconds', 120), ('schema_version', True)]: + bad = settings(); bad[field] = value + with self.subTest(field=field), self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): p.passive_settings(bad, 'a' * 64, 'b' * 64) + + def test_historical_mutation_helpers_excluded_and_explicit_backups_ordered(self): + p.guards() + self.assertNotIn('function PinProcess', p.PREFIX) + self.assertNotIn('[IO.File]::Replace($candidate,$destination,$null)', p.SCRIPT) + self.assertIn('[RmmPipeNative]::Open([int]$before.service.pid)', p.SCRIPT) + self.assertNotIn('$expected=5140', p.SCRIPT) + self.assertIn("'helper-already-stopped.json'", p.SCRIPT) + self.assertIn('stop_called=$false;start_called=$false', p.SCRIPT) + self.assertIn("@('config','ca','identity','certificate','private_key')", p.SCRIPT) + self.assertEqual(p.SCRIPT.count('PreserveImmutableFiles '), 5) + readback = p.PHASES.split("if($p.action-ceq'readback'){", 1)[1].split("if($p.action-ceq'finish'){", 1)[0] + self.assertIn("(ReadbackService 'agent')", readback) + self.assertNotIn('(Service ', readback) + self.assertIn('process_identity_verified=$false', p.READBACK_SERVICE) + self.assertIn('pack.verified(manifest_path)', p.VERIFY_PACK) + self.assertIn("names==report['names']==pack.TESTS[kind]", p.VERIFY_PACK) + with patch.object(p.subprocess, 'run', return_value=Mock(returncode=0, stdout=b'{"type":"rmm.windows.system-delegation-build"}')): + with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): p.qualified(Path('unused-fixture'), Path('unused-proof')) + + def test_lost_enter_reply_cannot_repeat_target_mutation(self): + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary: + folder = Path(temporary); p.write_bytes(folder / 'baseline.json', b'{}') + digest = p.sha(folder / 'baseline.json'); indices = {'unit_fixture': True} + intent = dict(payload=dict(baseline_sha256=digest), original_indices=indices) + p.save(folder / 'server-before.json', {'unit_counts': 0}) + access = Mock(); access.server_state.return_value = {'unit_counts': 0} + with patch.object(p, 'load', return_value=(folder, intent)), patch.object(p, 'prior', return_value=(indices, {}, {})), patch.object(p, 'remote', side_effect=TimeoutError('unit fixture lost reply')) as remote: + with self.assertRaises(TimeoutError): p.enter(access, 'fixture', digest) + self.assertTrue((folder / 'enter-attempt.json').exists()) + with self.assertRaises(FileExistsError): p.enter(access, 'fixture', digest) + self.assertEqual(remote.call_count, 1) + + def test_readback_never_queries_server_starts_or_publishes_main_indices(self): + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temporary: + access = Mock(); access.server_state.side_effect = AssertionError('server unavailable in readback') + with patch.object(p, 'load', return_value=(Path(temporary), {})), patch.object(p, 'remote', return_value=dict(read_only=True, id='fixture', phase_receipts={})) as remote, contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()): + p.finish(access, 'fixture', read_only=True) + remote.assert_called_once_with(access, {}, 'readback') + self.assertFalse(access.server_state.called) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main() diff --git a/docs/windows-dev-access-recovery.md b/docs/windows-dev-access-recovery.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a0594b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/windows-dev-access-recovery.md @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +# Windows-Entwicklungszugang: Ablauf und vorbereitete Konsolenwiederherstellung + +Stand: 2026-11-14. Der bisherige SSH-Entwicklungszugang lief am +**2026-11-14T12:55:31.254999+00:00** ab. Die vorher vorbereitete automatische +Verlängerung wurde **nicht betreten**: kein Server- oder Windows-Enter, keine +Ablaufzeitänderung und kein angelegter Renewalworker. Die drei fehlgeschlagenen +Vorbereitungen und ihre Quellen bleiben historische Belege. + +Diese Entwicklungshilfe ist SSH-Bootstrap, keine RMM-Aktion und kein Ersatz für +Geräte-mTLS, Tenantgrenzen, TrustedClock, signierte Grants oder die +WebUI-Genehmigung. Das Notebook bleibt ausschließlich Entwicklungsrechner. + +## Tatsächliche abgebrochene Vorbereitungen + +| Fall unter `devstate/windows-client/dev-access-renewal/` | Tatsächliches Ergebnis | +| --- | --- | +| `45626a0c-edc4-4f35-9f36-921692bccbc1` | Rein lesende Windows-Vorbereitung verweigerte `Transport owner` vor dem Serveraufruf. Die zwei öffentlichen `.pub`-Dateien gehörten dem tatsächlichen lokalen Builtin-Administrator mit SID-Endung `-500`; deren bestehende öffentlichen Leserechte waren für die ursprüngliche private Dateiprüfung zu weit. Nur die separate öffentliche Metadatenprüfung wurde später präzisiert; keine ACL-Reparatur. | +| `d40c06a4-d6d3-4dc0-9ef6-b1ef1197bcc9` | Rein lesende Windows-Vorbereitung verweigerte `VariableNotWritable`: die Hilfsvariable `$host` kollidierte mit PowerShells schreibgeschütztem `$Host`. Die Quelle wurde anschließend auf `$hostPublic` korrigiert. Keine Server- oder Windowsmutation. | +| `6988fd11-0e0a-4fd7-878d-96b130d83aee` | Der lokale Datums-/Fristguard verweigerte nach Ablauf der alten Frist, noch vor `prepare-intent.json`. Dies war kein weiterer ausgeführter Windows-Readonly-Test. Der leere lokale Fall bleibt erhalten. | + +Die ersten beiden Fälle enthalten nur Vorbereitungsintent und Controllerkopie; +keiner enthält einen Server-/Windows-Enterintent. Root bestätigte zusätzlich, +dass kein Renewal-Enter und kein Worker ausgeführt wurden. Ablauf und Fehler +werden nicht nachträglich als erfolgreiche Verlängerung ausgegeben. + +## Getrennte Wiederherstellung des bereits abgelaufenen Zugangs + +Die neue Quelle +[`console_access_recovery.py`](../deploy/windows/console_access_recovery.py) +hat SHA-256 +`703fb5e4ae04d8555bad858c5d7b2ac4880e06d6fa951010acd43f7201a58053`. +Sie trennt den Server-CAS von der erst anschließend durch den User in der +Windows-Administratorkonsole auszuführenden Phase. Die frühere +[`dev_access_renewal.py`](../deploy/windows/dev_access_renewal.py) wird für den +abgelaufenen Lease nicht umgedeutet oder erneut gestartet. + +Root führte ausschließlich den Serverteil im neuen Fall +`4b6506a7-6c3e-4cca-a497-618fa8666300` aus. Dessen `server-entered.json` +meldet `completed=true`; ein getrennt gespeicherter lesender Readback bestätigt +dieselbe neue Autorisierungsdatei und Frist: + +| Bindung | Tatsächlicher Beleg | +| --- | --- | +| Neue feste UTC-Frist | `2026-11-15T13:05:58+00:00` | +| `authorized_keys` nach CAS | `fef4db300dd39fba9b52428817f453451c251c7768dd2fb6a76b39dd110dbbf2` | +| Unverändertes SSH-Profil | `932adc2ad3e88c3a47054c3d09e44024f21918cf144f0bb349bd8763e844e482` | +| Unveränderte effektive SSH-Konfiguration | `3a345912fdd4bb9bb29628d670a8bdbdfbbc22b3e308ab56fb3bafb7bc15533a` | +| Server-Enterbeleg | SHA `2185a88fc32db72119a584d84a46fb25cfca5f32f6e0c4ee5b7cf0728a361317` | +| Getrennter Readback | SHA `f6e3f69a6cd4f006d00c90cadd8bfd47f94e954f1297bea5f6eecc4fd27d3787` | + +Der Serverteil ersetzte ausschließlich den Ablaufwert des gleichen bestehenden +restriktiven Tunnelkeys. Keybytes und Optionen, Loopbacklistener +`127.0.0.1:22240`, SSH-Profil, Serverhostpin und der Account +`rmm-win-tunnel` mit Shell `/usr/sbin/nologin` blieben gebunden. Historische +`prepared.json`/`registered.json` wurden nicht überschrieben. Dieser CAS +veränderte weder einen Downloadlease noch die RMM-Konfiguration. + +## Öffentliches Paket und noch offene Userphase + +Unter dem privaten Consolefall liegt ein öffentliches Paket mit genau +`Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1`, `public-recovery.json` und `README.txt`. +Es enthält öffentliche Pins und feste Parameter, keine privaten Schlüssel oder +Tokens. Die Paketdateien sind zusätzlich im unveränderlichen Intent gebunden. + +| Datei | SHA-256 | +| --- | --- | +| `windows-dev-access-recovery.zip` | `7bf4f7bb8336fb50852f72eec2f3e370e96cb7009b14ee15aa7232c025a38ed7` | +| `Recover-ExistingDevAccess.ps1` | `564da57d70ef06df7bd9adc37565b7e28ef446a6c69b984711c5b77b28441e8a` | +| Consoleintent | `cd827d4056fb0045f23bff1fd9bd21b6137b53f063fe8215ad0945c2013cc44a` | + +Die Windows-Konsolenphase ist **noch nicht ausgeführt**. Sie prüft die alten +Config-/Bootstrapbytes und öffentlichen Pins, den bestehenden Account sowie den +unveränderten SYSTEM-Tunneltask. Erst bei `Ready` und ohne verbliebenen +Maintainer/SSH-Kindprozess darf sie die vorhandene Konfigurations- und +Accountablaufzeit erneuern und den Originaltask mit dauerhaftem Startintent +**einmal** starten. Private Keydateien werden nur über Metadaten beobachtet, +nicht inhaltlich gelesen. Keine Installation, ACL-Reparatur, neue Schlüssel, +zusätzlichen SSH-Rechte, Prozesskills, Reboots oder RMM-Wirkungen. + +Die README verlangt den unabhängig mitgeteilten Downloadhash und den festen +PS1-Hash. Ein etwaiges `Unblock-File` betrifft nur diese exakt geprüfte +Download-Datei; `RemoteSigned` nur den separaten Bootstrapprozess. Eine +verweigernde GPO oder ein fehlgeschlagener Guard wird nicht umgangen. Ein +bereits vorhandener Recoveryfall bleibt zur lesenden Inspektion erhalten. + +Eine gesonderte, auf 45 Minuten begrenzte Veröffentlichung über den vorhandenen +öffentlichen TLS-Bootstrapdienst wird durch Root separat behandelt. Dieser +Server-CAS und diese Dokumentation belegen noch keine Downloadveröffentlichung. +Nach der Userausführung bleiben tatsächliche Tunnelwiederkehr, ursprüngliche +SSH-Hostidentität, erhaltene Schlüssel/Taskdefinition und die lokale +Accessmetadatenfortschreibung durch Root zu prüfen. **Neuer Windowszugriff ist +bis dahin nicht nachgewiesen.** + +Lokale Python-/AST- und Paketprüfungen sowie unabhängige Source-Reviews bestanden. +Der lokale Paketfixture verwendete einen gemockten Serveraufruf und ist kein +zusätzlicher nativer Recoverybeleg. Kein RMM-Job, keine Capability oder +Clockbereitschaft folgt aus der Zugangswiederherstellung. diff --git a/docs/windows-system-pipe-upgrade.md b/docs/windows-system-pipe-upgrade.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cb2755 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/windows-system-pipe-upgrade.md @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +# Windows Pipe-v2: erhaltender Paarupgrade noch nicht betreten + +Stand: 2026-11-14. Der Paarupgrade wurde vorbereitet, aber **nicht betreten**. +Die neue Agent-/Helpergeneration ist noch nicht als laufendes Paar nachgewiesen. +Die Quellen- und nativen Unitbelege des Pipe-v2-Framings ersetzen weder einen +tatsächlichen LocalService/SYSTEM-Pipeaustausch noch einen RMM-Jobnachweis. + +Die ursprüngliche quellengebundene +[Framingdokumentation](windows-helper-pipe-drain.md) bleibt unverändert. Diese +separate Datei beschreibt ausschließlich die späteren Upgradevorbereitungen. +Der Notebookhost bleibt reiner Entwicklungsrechner; Ziel ist die eigene +Windows-VM am endgültigen Cloudserver. + +## Geprüfter Kandidat und begrenzter Bootstrapvertrag + +Der neue Runner +[`system_pipe_upgrade.py`](../deploy/windows/system_pipe_upgrade.py) ist mit +SHA `e466576673a0e5c332cfc1613ae88a62f5b526015ced76b1d22473e292a995e0` +eingefroren. Sein frischer isolierter Prüfer bindet den neuen Pipe-Packtyp und +dessen Originalquellen, genaue native Listen mit **23 Library- und 7 +Binarytests** sowie die erhaltenen Linux-first-Corebelege mit 80 Linux- und +58 Windowsfällen. Es gibt keine Umbenennung alter Delegationsmanifeste und +keine Umleitung des eigenen Source-Roots auf Main. + +Der gebundene Pipe-Pack hat Manifest-SHA +`b2f77713a4f70deddb6472fb1e869a85443ce1028914f62ccee71f8001fbadb4`. +Die tatsächlichen 23+7 Windows-Administratorunits bestanden im Fall +`db25cd4a-bfd2-45d5-9f80-1881950853f7`; dessen `passed.json` hat SHA +`19a8ccd95b7225f7e8657a696055bea4b52ed2f80f6caa3f42c9396ce6272713`. +Das sind Unitnachweise, kein LocalService-/Pipe-/Clock-Erfolgsbeleg. + +Die vorbereitete Mutation verlangt eine separat geprüfte frische Baseline mit +SCM-/Kernel-PID und tatsächlicher Prozessgeburt, Konto, aktivem Service-SID, +Imagehash und ACLs. Ein bereits gestoppter Manual-Helper erhält keinen +Vorabstart. Vor der ersten Ersetzung werden vier private Sicherungen erstellt; +jede Ersetzung verlangt zusätzlich einen eigenen zuvor fehlenden nativen +Backupnamen und frische Datei-ID-/Hash-/ACL-CAS-Prüfungen. Beide Dienste bleiben +bis zur vollständigen neuen EXE-/Policy-/Pingeneration gestoppt. Danach sind +Helper- und Agentstart jeweils create-once. Config-/CA-/Identitäts-/Zertifikats- +und Private-Key-Metadaten samt Datei-IDs werden auch nach den Ersetzungen, +vor dem Start und beim Finish unverändert verlangt. + +`readback` ist rein lesend und kann auch einen fehlenden Zielpfad sowie einen +SCM-Pendingzustand ehrlich zeigen. Baseline, Enter und Finish behalten ihre +strengen Identitätsprüfungen. Nach verlorener Mutationsantwort gibt es keinen +automatischen Enter-/Start-/Rollbackretry. Ein Finish benötigt neue passive +Heartbeats und konkrete Inventar-ACKs; es schreibt nur einen lokalen Beleg. +Main-Indizes werden ausschließlich durch Root separat per CAS fortgeschrieben. + +## Tatsächlicher Fall 14fb: Timeout und geprüfte erste Fortsetzung + +Fallverzeichnis: +`devstate/windows-client/system-pipe-upgrade/14fb176a-f653-4573-a8d7-6f9fe47a3020/`. +Der erste `prepare`-Aufruf begann am `2026-11-14T12:39:48.414511+00:00` +und endete nach 180 Sekunden mit `TimeoutExpired` während des ersten +Stagingaufrufs. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt gab es lokal nur den Prepareintent und +Quellkopien, keine Baseline und keinen Enterintent. Die genaue Ursache des +SSH-/Bootstraptimeouts ist nicht nachgewiesen. + +Ein danach gesondert ausgeführter lesender Check bestätigte: beide neuen +EXE-Stagingverzeichnisse, der neue entfernte Komponentenfall und der neue +Active-Marker waren noch nicht vorhanden. Der alte Agent lief, der alte Helper +war gestoppt. Auf dieser Abwesenheit beruhte die explizite create-once +Fortsetzung der tatsächlich noch unerreichten Vorbereitungsphase im selben +Fall; kein neuer Upgradefall und kein wiederholtes Enter. + +| Erhaltener Beleg | SHA-256 | +| --- | --- | +| `prepare-first-stage-timeout.json` | `535faf7c6c4c7b3dba1f8d7b7889bc59acdee09fd51c2830fe397c3c9076f1e9` | +| `first-prepare-readonly-absence.json` | `983b38fcc2cdc8e907436eb3053f32ad2cd131e765a82dd1e9930346e1c6877b` | +| Private Fortsetzungsquelle `continue-first-prepare.py` | `86453aef4a1d59f73e423993b548e58ad0541205961a5952c80807403881cf3b` | +| `continue-first-prepare-intent.json` | `7420622b7866e7b43b34087d5334599444a046b95a89e7f48503aca0f4e03be0` | +| Neue lesende `baseline.json` | `57b79e9c918df6165cac0bb451b33fcd0c207933f15351afcd2ad6c400f4e2d7` | + +Die Fortsetzung erzeugte schließlich den Baseline-/Intentbeleg und die +serverseitigen Vorherbeobachtungen. Das ursprüngliche Timeout und seine +Abwesenheitsmessung wurden nicht überschrieben. + +## Baseline und verbleibende tatsächliche Abnahme + +Die frische Baseline zeigt den weiterhin vorhandenen Agenten `89004ad3…` +unter LocalService (`S-1-5-19`), `Running/Auto`, PID `3172`, mit exakter +Kernel-FILETIME `134391328200102621`. Der vorhandene Helper `e6aacbdd…` +ist `Stopped/Manual`, PID `0`; dafür wird kein laufender Prozess behauptet. +Policy `007adf5f…` und Pin `126670bc…` gehören weiterhin zur alten Generation. +Die Telemetriedatenbank wurde lesend mit `integrity=ok`, Sequenz `2564` und +`pending_inventory_events=0` beobachtet. Ursprüngliche PKI-/DB-/Lock-Datei-IDs, +ACLs und die beiden uninitialisierten Nullbyte-Intentleaves sind im privaten +Baselinebeleg gebunden. + +Vorherige Serverzählungen blieben: +Windows `jobs/outbox/permits/unresolved = 0/0/0/0`, Linux +`30/30/26/0`. Die beobachteten API-/Gateway-Transportfaultflags waren geschlossen; +dies ist eine konkrete Vorhermessung, kein künftiger Nachherbeleg. + +Der vorbereitete Kandidat umfasst Agent `f10c78dd…`, Helper `5f8c62fa…`, +Policy `a3024467…` und Pin `af518db8…`. **Es existiert für diesen Fall noch kein +Enterintent oder tatsächlicher Stop-/Swap-/Start-/Finishbeleg.** Staging ist +keine Installation oder laufende Nutzung der neuen EXEs. Der alte SSH-Zugang +lief anschließend aus; seine getrennte +[Konsolenwiederherstellung](windows-dev-access-recovery.md) ist eine notwendige +Zugangsstrecke und kein Paarupgrade. + +Nach tatsächlicher Wiederherstellung des Zugangs muss Root die Baseline vor +Mutation erneut bewerten. Geänderte PID/Birth-, Datei-, Index- oder andere +gebundene Werte dürfen nicht still übernommen werden. Erst danach können der +einmalige erhaltende Paarupgrade, zwei neue tatsächliche WSS-Heartbeats, +Inventar-ACK, Tenantverweigerung und unveränderte Job-/Policygrenzen geprüft +werden. Ein tatsächlicher authentisierter Austausch des laufenden +LocalService-Agenten mit dem neuen SYSTEM-Helper bleibt offen. Jobfreigabe, +Helperwirkungen und Clockqualifikation bleiben geschlossen.