feat: add pure signed agent release verifier without apply authority
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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[package]
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name = "rmm-updater"
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version.workspace = true
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edition.workspace = true
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license.workspace = true
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[dependencies]
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anyhow.workspace = true
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ed25519-dalek = "=2.2.0"
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hex.workspace = true
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serde.workspace = true
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serde_json.workspace = true
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sha2.workspace = true
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uuid.workspace = true
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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//! Pure release verification. This crate does not install, stage, start services,
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//! grant approval, persist antirollback state, or trust keys from the network.
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//!
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//! See docs/agent-updater-proposal.md for the separate, unfinished integration.
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mod manifest;
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pub use manifest::{
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ActiveRelease, ArtifactDescriptor, ArtifactRole, MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES, MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES,
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Platform, RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN, ReleaseManifest, ReleaseRelation, SignedRelease,
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TrustedContext, TrustedUpdateKey, UpdateKeyring, VerifiedRelease, verify_release,
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};
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@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
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use std::{collections::BTreeMap, io::Read};
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use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail, ensure};
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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pub const MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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/// Verification limit for a FUTURE update-specific streaming transport.
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/// The existing server artifact route only permits 256 KiB and is unchanged.
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pub const MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES: u64 = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
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pub const RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rmm.agent-release.v1\0";
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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pub enum Platform {
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#[serde(rename = "x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu")]
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LinuxX64,
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#[serde(rename = "x86_64-pc-windows-msvc")]
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WindowsX64,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum ArtifactRole {
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Agent,
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Helper,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct ArtifactDescriptor {
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pub role: ArtifactRole,
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pub artifact_id: Uuid,
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pub sha256: String,
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pub bytes: u64,
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}
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/// Exact field order defines codec version 1; no maps or floating point fields.
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/// These public types describe UNTRUSTED metadata, never update authority.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct ReleaseManifest {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub release_id: Uuid,
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pub release_sequence: u64,
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pub version: String,
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pub platform: Platform,
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pub published_at: u64,
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pub expires_at: u64,
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pub protocol_major: u32,
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pub state_schema: u32,
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pub minimum_updater_version: u32,
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pub artifacts: [ArtifactDescriptor; 2],
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}
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/// Already-decoded, bounded transport input. No algorithm negotiation exists.
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pub struct SignedRelease<'a> {
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pub schema_version: u32,
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pub key_id: &'a str,
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pub payload_bytes: &'a [u8],
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pub signature: &'a [u8],
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}
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/// Provisioned update trust, not a key returned by a manifest/job/server request.
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/// Construction validates raw keys and IDs; it does not authenticate provisioning.
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pub struct TrustedUpdateKey {
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key: VerifyingKey,
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key_id: String,
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platform: Platform,
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first_sequence: u64,
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last_sequence: u64,
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revoked: bool,
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}
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impl TrustedUpdateKey {
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pub fn new(
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public_key: [u8; 32],
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platform: Platform,
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first_sequence: u64,
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last_sequence: u64,
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revoked: bool,
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) -> Result<Self> {
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let key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key).context("invalid update public key")?;
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ensure!(!key.is_weak(), "weak update public key");
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ensure!(
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first_sequence > 0 && last_sequence >= first_sequence,
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"invalid key sequence range"
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);
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Ok(Self {
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key,
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key_id: digest(&public_key),
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platform,
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first_sequence,
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last_sequence,
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revoked,
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})
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}
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pub fn key_id(&self) -> &str {
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&self.key_id
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}
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}
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pub struct UpdateKeyring {
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generation: u64,
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keys: BTreeMap<String, TrustedUpdateKey>,
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}
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impl UpdateKeyring {
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pub fn new(generation: u64, keys: Vec<TrustedUpdateKey>) -> Result<Self> {
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ensure!(
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generation > 0 && !keys.is_empty() && keys.len() <= 16,
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"invalid provisioned keyring"
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);
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let mut indexed = BTreeMap::new();
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for key in keys {
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ensure!(!indexed.contains_key(key.key_id()), "duplicate update key");
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indexed.insert(key.key_id.clone(), key);
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}
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Ok(Self {
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generation,
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keys: indexed,
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})
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct ActiveRelease {
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pub sequence: u64,
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pub manifest_sha256: String,
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}
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/// Must be obtained from authenticated local state and a trusted clock.
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/// No boolean `approved`/`ready` is accepted or produced here. Persistence,
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/// rollback detection and independent sync remain the caller's responsibility.
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pub struct TrustedContext {
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pub platform: Platform,
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pub now_utc_seconds: u64,
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pub keyring_generation: u64,
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pub protocol_major: u32,
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pub state_schema: u32,
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pub updater_version: u32,
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pub minimum_release_sequence: u64,
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pub active_release: Option<ActiveRelease>,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum ReleaseRelation {
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AboveActivationFloor,
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/// Metadata identity only: neither actual binary health nor a job Noop proof.
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SameActiveManifest,
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}
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/// Private construction proves only release metadata validity at verification.
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/// Holding this value grants NO permission to download, stop, install or start.
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pub struct VerifiedRelease {
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manifest: ReleaseManifest,
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manifest_sha256: String,
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key_id: String,
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keyring_generation: u64,
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relation: ReleaseRelation,
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}
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impl VerifiedRelease {
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pub fn manifest(&self) -> &ReleaseManifest {
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&self.manifest
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}
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pub fn manifest_sha256(&self) -> &str {
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&self.manifest_sha256
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}
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pub fn key_id(&self) -> &str {
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&self.key_id
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}
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pub fn keyring_generation(&self) -> u64 {
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self.keyring_generation
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}
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pub fn relation(&self) -> ReleaseRelation {
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self.relation
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}
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/// Verify a complete reader with a fixed 32 KiB buffer and no file writes.
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/// A caller supplying a socket/pipe must enforce its own timeout and permit.
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/// Descriptors come only from this verified release, never caller input.
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pub fn verify_artifact(&self, role: ArtifactRole, mut reader: impl Read) -> Result<()> {
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let descriptor = match role {
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ArtifactRole::Agent => &self.manifest.artifacts[0],
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ArtifactRole::Helper => &self.manifest.artifacts[1],
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};
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let mut buffer = [0_u8; 32 * 1024];
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let mut remaining = descriptor.bytes;
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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while remaining > 0 {
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let limit = remaining.min(buffer.len() as u64) as usize;
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let size = match reader.read(&mut buffer[..limit]) {
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Ok(size) => size,
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Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
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Err(error) => return Err(error).context("release artifact read failed"),
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};
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ensure!(size > 0, "release artifact truncated");
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hasher.update(&buffer[..size]);
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remaining -= size as u64;
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}
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loop {
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match reader.read(&mut buffer[..1]) {
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Ok(0) => break,
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Ok(_) => bail!("release artifact has extra bytes"),
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Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => continue,
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Err(error) => return Err(error).context("release artifact EOF check failed"),
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}
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}
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ensure!(
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hex::encode(hasher.finalize()) == descriptor.sha256,
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"release artifact hash mismatch"
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);
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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pub fn verify_release(
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signed: SignedRelease<'_>,
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keyring: &UpdateKeyring,
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context: &TrustedContext,
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) -> Result<VerifiedRelease> {
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ensure!(
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signed.schema_version == 1,
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"unsupported release envelope schema"
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);
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ensure!(
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!signed.payload_bytes.is_empty() && signed.payload_bytes.len() <= MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES,
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"release manifest size limit"
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);
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ensure!(is_digest(signed.key_id), "invalid update key ID");
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ensure!(
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keyring.generation == context.keyring_generation,
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"update trust generation mismatch"
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);
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let key = keyring
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.keys
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.get(signed.key_id)
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.context("untrusted update key")?;
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ensure!(
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!key.revoked && key.platform == context.platform,
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"update key revoked or wrong platform"
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);
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let signature =
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Signature::from_slice(signed.signature).context("invalid release signature size")?;
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let mut message =
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Vec::with_capacity(RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.len() + signed.payload_bytes.len());
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message.extend_from_slice(RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN);
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message.extend_from_slice(signed.payload_bytes);
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key.key
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.verify_strict(&message, &signature)
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.context("release signature rejected")?;
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let manifest: ReleaseManifest =
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serde_json::from_slice(signed.payload_bytes).context("invalid release manifest schema")?;
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ensure!(
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serde_json::to_vec(&manifest)? == signed.payload_bytes,
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"noncanonical release manifest"
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);
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validate_manifest(&manifest, context)?;
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ensure!(
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(key.first_sequence..=key.last_sequence).contains(&manifest.release_sequence),
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"release outside update key sequence range"
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);
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let manifest_sha256 = digest(signed.payload_bytes);
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let relation = match &context.active_release {
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Some(active) => {
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ensure!(
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active.sequence > 0
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&& is_digest(&active.manifest_sha256)
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&& active.sequence <= context.minimum_release_sequence,
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"invalid trusted active release state"
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);
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if manifest.release_sequence == active.sequence {
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ensure!(
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manifest_sha256 == active.manifest_sha256,
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"release sequence content conflict"
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);
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ReleaseRelation::SameActiveManifest
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} else {
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ensure!(
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manifest.release_sequence > context.minimum_release_sequence,
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"release is not above activation floor"
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);
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ReleaseRelation::AboveActivationFloor
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}
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}
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None => {
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ensure!(
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manifest.release_sequence > context.minimum_release_sequence,
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"release is not above activation floor"
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);
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ReleaseRelation::AboveActivationFloor
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}
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};
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Ok(VerifiedRelease {
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manifest,
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manifest_sha256,
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key_id: signed.key_id.to_owned(),
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keyring_generation: keyring.generation,
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relation,
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})
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}
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fn validate_manifest(manifest: &ReleaseManifest, context: &TrustedContext) -> Result<()> {
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ensure!(
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manifest.schema_version == 1,
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"unsupported release manifest schema"
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);
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ensure!(
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!manifest.release_id.is_nil() && manifest.release_sequence > 0,
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"invalid release identity"
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);
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ensure!(
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!manifest.version.is_empty()
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&& manifest.version.len() <= 64
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&& manifest
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.version
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.bytes()
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.all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b".-+_".contains(&byte)),
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"invalid release version label"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.platform == context.platform,
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"release platform mismatch"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.published_at <= context.now_utc_seconds
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&& manifest.expires_at > context.now_utc_seconds
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&& manifest.expires_at > manifest.published_at,
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"release outside trusted validity interval"
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);
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ensure!(
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context.protocol_major > 0 && manifest.protocol_major == context.protocol_major,
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"incompatible release protocol"
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);
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ensure!(
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context.state_schema > 0 && manifest.state_schema == context.state_schema,
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"incompatible release state schema"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.minimum_updater_version > 0
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&& manifest.minimum_updater_version <= context.updater_version,
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"updater version unsupported"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.release_sequence >= context.minimum_release_sequence,
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"release below activation floor"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.artifacts[0].role == ArtifactRole::Agent
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&& manifest.artifacts[1].role == ArtifactRole::Helper,
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"release requires ordered agent and helper artifacts"
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);
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ensure!(
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manifest.artifacts[0].artifact_id != manifest.artifacts[1].artifact_id,
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"duplicate release artifact ID"
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);
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for artifact in &manifest.artifacts {
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ensure!(
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!artifact.artifact_id.is_nil()
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&& is_digest(&artifact.sha256)
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&& (1..=MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES).contains(&artifact.bytes),
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"invalid release artifact descriptor"
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);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn digest(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
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}
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fn is_digest(value: &str) -> bool {
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value.len() == 64
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&& value
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.bytes()
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.all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&byte))
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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{"schema_version":1,"release_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","release_sequence":4,"version":"0.2.0","platform":"x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu","published_at":90,"expires_at":110,"protocol_major":1,"state_schema":1,"minimum_updater_version":1,"artifacts":[{"role":"agent","artifact_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002","sha256":"8a24d82ccecfb6de46d0fd3488549b3c6757a4c05aab0a4b15c1b73e47000dbc","bytes":11},{"role":"helper","artifact_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003","sha256":"dd4e40b8a4de19a3b9143d926178927aea04ba0316f44f7fde254ecd51931d22","bytes":12}]}
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@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
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use std::io::{self, Cursor, Read};
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|
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
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use rmm_updater::*;
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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fn hash(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
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hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))
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}
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fn key(revoked: bool, first: u64, last: u64) -> TrustedUpdateKey {
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TrustedUpdateKey::new(
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SigningKey::from_bytes(&[41; 32]).verifying_key().to_bytes(),
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Platform::LinuxX64,
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first,
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last,
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revoked,
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)
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.unwrap()
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}
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|
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fn context() -> TrustedContext {
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TrustedContext {
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platform: Platform::LinuxX64,
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now_utc_seconds: 100,
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keyring_generation: 7,
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protocol_major: 1,
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state_schema: 1,
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updater_version: 1,
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minimum_release_sequence: 3,
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active_release: Some(ActiveRelease {
|
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sequence: 3,
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manifest_sha256: hash(b"previous immutable manifest"),
|
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}),
|
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}
|
||||
}
|
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|
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fn manifest() -> ReleaseManifest {
|
||||
ReleaseManifest {
|
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schema_version: 1,
|
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release_id: Uuid::from_u128(1),
|
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release_sequence: 4,
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version: "0.2.0".into(),
|
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platform: Platform::LinuxX64,
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published_at: 90,
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expires_at: 110,
|
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protocol_major: 1,
|
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state_schema: 1,
|
||||
minimum_updater_version: 1,
|
||||
artifacts: [
|
||||
ArtifactDescriptor {
|
||||
role: ArtifactRole::Agent,
|
||||
artifact_id: Uuid::from_u128(2),
|
||||
sha256: hash(b"agent image"),
|
||||
bytes: 11,
|
||||
},
|
||||
ArtifactDescriptor {
|
||||
role: ArtifactRole::Helper,
|
||||
artifact_id: Uuid::from_u128(3),
|
||||
sha256: hash(b"helper image"),
|
||||
bytes: 12,
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn verify_bytes(payload: &[u8], context: &TrustedContext) -> anyhow::Result<VerifiedRelease> {
|
||||
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[41; 32]);
|
||||
let mut message = RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.to_vec();
|
||||
message.extend_from_slice(payload);
|
||||
let signature = signer.sign(&message).to_bytes();
|
||||
let pinned = key(false, 1, 20);
|
||||
let key_id = pinned.key_id().to_owned();
|
||||
verify_release(
|
||||
SignedRelease {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
key_id: &key_id,
|
||||
payload_bytes: payload,
|
||||
signature: &signature,
|
||||
},
|
||||
&UpdateKeyring::new(7, vec![pinned]).unwrap(),
|
||||
context,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn verify(manifest: &ReleaseManifest, context: &TrustedContext) -> anyhow::Result<VerifiedRelease> {
|
||||
verify_bytes(&serde_json::to_vec(manifest).unwrap(), context)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn canonical_release_and_exact_role_bytes_are_metadata_only() {
|
||||
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&manifest()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(payload, include_bytes!("fixtures/release_v1.json"));
|
||||
let checked = verify_bytes(&payload, &context()).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(checked.manifest_sha256(), hash(&payload));
|
||||
assert_eq!(checked.keyring_generation(), 7);
|
||||
assert_eq!(checked.key_id(), key(false, 1, 20).key_id());
|
||||
assert_eq!(checked.manifest().release_sequence, 4);
|
||||
assert_eq!(checked.relation(), ReleaseRelation::AboveActivationFloor);
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Agent, Cursor::new(b"agent image"))
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Helper, Cursor::new(b"helper image"))
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Agent, Cursor::new(b"helper image"))
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn signature_domain_bytes_unknown_key_and_revocation_are_independent() {
|
||||
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&manifest()).unwrap();
|
||||
let signer = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[41; 32]);
|
||||
let mut message = RELEASE_SIGNATURE_DOMAIN.to_vec();
|
||||
message.extend_from_slice(&payload);
|
||||
let signature = signer.sign(&message).to_bytes();
|
||||
let pinned = key(false, 1, 20);
|
||||
let key_id = pinned.key_id().to_owned();
|
||||
let run = |bytes: &[u8], signature: &[u8], id: &str, revoked, first, last| {
|
||||
verify_release(
|
||||
SignedRelease {
|
||||
schema_version: 1,
|
||||
key_id: id,
|
||||
payload_bytes: bytes,
|
||||
signature,
|
||||
},
|
||||
&UpdateKeyring::new(7, vec![key(revoked, first, last)]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&context(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature, &key_id, false, 1, 20).is_ok());
|
||||
let mut changed = payload.clone();
|
||||
changed[0] = b'[';
|
||||
assert!(run(&changed, &signature, &key_id, false, 1, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
run(
|
||||
&payload,
|
||||
&signer.sign(&payload).to_bytes(),
|
||||
&key_id,
|
||||
false,
|
||||
1,
|
||||
20
|
||||
)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let foreign = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[42; 32]).sign(&message).to_bytes();
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &foreign, &key_id, false, 1, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature[..63], &key_id, false, 1, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature, &hash(b"job key"), false, 1, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature, &key_id, true, 1, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature, &key_id, false, 5, 20).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(run(&payload, &signature, &key_id, false, 1, 3).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn signed_noncanonical_unknown_duplicate_and_oversize_payloads_are_rejected() {
|
||||
let payload = String::from_utf8(serde_json::to_vec(&manifest()).unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||
for changed in [
|
||||
format!(" {payload}"),
|
||||
payload.replacen(":1,", ": 1,", 1),
|
||||
payload.replacen("{", "{\"untrusted\":true,", 1),
|
||||
payload.replacen("{", "{\"schema_version\":1,", 1),
|
||||
payload.replacen("\"bytes\":11", "\"bytes\":11,\"path\":\"/etc/passwd\"", 1),
|
||||
payload.replacen("\"release_sequence\":4", "\"release_sequence\":4.0", 1),
|
||||
payload.replacen("x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu", "aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu", 1),
|
||||
] {
|
||||
assert!(verify_bytes(changed.as_bytes(), &context()).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert!(verify_bytes(&vec![b' '; MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES + 1], &context()).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(verify_bytes(b"", &context()).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn incompatible_clock_platform_state_protocol_and_trust_contexts_are_rejected() {
|
||||
let mut ctx = context();
|
||||
ctx.keyring_generation = 6;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
ctx = context();
|
||||
ctx.platform = Platform::WindowsX64;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
for now in [89, 110, 111] {
|
||||
ctx = context();
|
||||
ctx.now_utc_seconds = now;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let changes: [fn(&mut ReleaseManifest); 7] = [
|
||||
|m| m.schema_version = 2,
|
||||
|m| m.platform = Platform::WindowsX64,
|
||||
|m| m.protocol_major = 2,
|
||||
|m| m.state_schema = 2,
|
||||
|m| m.minimum_updater_version = 2,
|
||||
|m| m.minimum_updater_version = 0,
|
||||
|m| m.published_at = m.expires_at,
|
||||
];
|
||||
for change in changes {
|
||||
let mut m = manifest();
|
||||
change(&mut m);
|
||||
assert!(verify(&m, &context()).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn monotone_floor_same_sequence_conflict_and_postrollback_state_are_preserved() {
|
||||
let mut ctx = context();
|
||||
let mut m = manifest();
|
||||
m.release_sequence = 2;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&m, &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
m.release_sequence = 3;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&m, &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
ctx.active_release.as_mut().unwrap().manifest_sha256 = hash(&serde_json::to_vec(&m).unwrap());
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
verify(&m, &ctx).unwrap().relation(),
|
||||
ReleaseRelation::SameActiveManifest
|
||||
);
|
||||
m.version = "modified same sequence".into();
|
||||
assert!(verify(&m, &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
// A code rollback never lowers the remembered successfully activated floor.
|
||||
ctx.minimum_release_sequence = 5;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
ctx = context();
|
||||
ctx.minimum_release_sequence = 2;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
ctx.active_release = None;
|
||||
ctx.minimum_release_sequence = 4;
|
||||
assert!(verify(&manifest(), &ctx).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn descriptor_roles_ids_bounds_and_digest_encoding_are_strict() {
|
||||
let changes: [fn(&mut ReleaseManifest); 10] = [
|
||||
|m| m.release_id = Uuid::nil(),
|
||||
|m| m.release_sequence = 0,
|
||||
|m| m.version.clear(),
|
||||
|m| m.version = "https://attacker.invalid/latest".into(),
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts[0].artifact_id = Uuid::nil(),
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts[1].artifact_id = m.artifacts[0].artifact_id,
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts.swap(0, 1),
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts[0].bytes = 0,
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts[0].bytes = MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES + 1,
|
||||
|m| m.artifacts[0].sha256 = m.artifacts[0].sha256.to_uppercase(),
|
||||
];
|
||||
for change in changes {
|
||||
let mut m = manifest();
|
||||
change(&mut m);
|
||||
assert!(verify(&m, &context()).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn artifact_eof_extra_bytes_hash_and_io_errors_never_verify() {
|
||||
let checked = verify(&manifest(), &context()).unwrap();
|
||||
for bytes in [b"agent imag".as_slice(), b"agent image!", b"agent imagX"] {
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Agent, Cursor::new(bytes))
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
struct FailingReader;
|
||||
impl Read for FailingReader {
|
||||
fn read(&mut self, _: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
|
||||
Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "fixture"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Agent, FailingReader)
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn streamed_large_release_verifies_with_fixed_read_window() {
|
||||
struct BoundedReader {
|
||||
remaining: u64,
|
||||
largest_read: usize,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Read for BoundedReader {
|
||||
fn read(&mut self, output: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
|
||||
self.largest_read = self.largest_read.max(output.len());
|
||||
assert!(output.len() <= 32 * 1024);
|
||||
let size = self.remaining.min(output.len() as u64) as usize;
|
||||
output[..size].fill(19);
|
||||
self.remaining -= size as u64;
|
||||
Ok(size)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let bytes = vec![19; 512 * 1024 + 7];
|
||||
let mut m = manifest();
|
||||
m.artifacts[0].bytes = bytes.len() as u64;
|
||||
m.artifacts[0].sha256 = hash(&bytes);
|
||||
let checked = verify(&m, &context()).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut reader = BoundedReader {
|
||||
remaining: bytes.len() as u64,
|
||||
largest_read: 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
checked
|
||||
.verify_artifact(ArtifactRole::Agent, &mut reader)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reader.remaining, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(reader.largest_read, 32 * 1024);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn keyring_rejects_weak_keys_duplicates_empty_sets_and_invalid_ranges() {
|
||||
assert!(TrustedUpdateKey::new([0; 32], Platform::LinuxX64, 1, 10, false).is_err());
|
||||
let public = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[41; 32]).verifying_key().to_bytes();
|
||||
assert!(TrustedUpdateKey::new(public, Platform::LinuxX64, 0, 10, false).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(TrustedUpdateKey::new(public, Platform::LinuxX64, 10, 9, false).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(UpdateKeyring::new(0, vec![key(false, 1, 20)]).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(UpdateKeyring::new(1, vec![]).is_err());
|
||||
assert!(UpdateKeyring::new(1, vec![key(false, 1, 20), key(false, 1, 20)]).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user