From 76440e1cf568e406a4287fc2a725edf6203f55a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Janssen Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 19:26:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] test: accept full Linux script through MCP and simulated WebUI --- deploy/script_console_job_acceptance.py | 472 ++++++++++++++++++++ deploy/script_console_job_acceptance_v2.py | 477 +++++++++++++++++++++ docs/script-console-job-acceptance-v2.md | 53 +++ docs/script-console-job-acceptance.md | 181 ++++++++ docs/script-console-linux-full-results.md | 89 ++++ 5 files changed, 1272 insertions(+) create mode 100644 deploy/script_console_job_acceptance.py create mode 100644 deploy/script_console_job_acceptance_v2.py create mode 100644 docs/script-console-job-acceptance-v2.md create mode 100644 docs/script-console-job-acceptance.md create mode 100644 docs/script-console-linux-full-results.md diff --git a/deploy/script_console_job_acceptance.py b/deploy/script_console_job_acceptance.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59ea7a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/script_console_job_acceptance.py @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""One exact benign Cloud Linux script: MCP plan/submit and read-only evidence. + +No approval endpoint, browser, rights/policy mutation, direct job SQL write, +cancel, retry, interpreter execution or local agent. Parent executes after review. +""" +import argparse +import base64 +import datetime as dt +import hashlib +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import re +import time +import uuid + +ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +INSTALL_SHA='667b56f7e5f085db249f27a7094919c7c0e6055dabc9f0600cb261c34760cd26' +if hashlib.sha256((ROOT/'deploy/script_console_install.py').read_bytes()).hexdigest()!=INSTALL_SHA: + raise RuntimeError('Reviewed bootstrap transport source changed') +import script_console_install as old +support=old.support +TEMPLATE=ROOT/'devstate/output/playwright-private/console-full-v1/mcp-plan-input.template.json' +TEMPLATE_SHA='66f684ab9c5c31be6583fe04f090ba9d7b8724d6e6c920dd9c67c484a339245e' +ORIGINAL=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-install/2e27c312-58cc-444d-92a6-863a11ac6ffd/intent.json' +ORIGINAL_SHA='8aec7bf7df13bc4968f47ca1554c813406409530613ce95241e74a81204cd02e' +PATTERN_SHA='71ec226ef98acdd7a59cd1cc8648cce910ef143efad08b8e937afde7f26b6d72' +SCRIPT_SHA='c878ba5b5c37fa3f1b9485c6994d6c57f6f37d01d99d4239c64d264d4ed95336' +CREATOR='automation:11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111' +APPROVER='simulated-testprincipal-a' +STDOUT=b'0\nRMM_FULL_CONSOLE_LINUX_V1\n' +STDERR=b'RMM_FULL_CONSOLE_STDERR_V1\n' +STATE=ROOT/'devstate/script-console-job-acceptance' + + +def require(value,code): + if not value:raise RuntimeError(code) + + +def encode(value):return json.dumps(value,ensure_ascii=False,separators=(',',':')).encode() + + +def timestamp_ns(value): + """Strict RFC3339 calendar/offset -> integer epoch nanoseconds, no rounding.""" + import datetime as dt + import re + require(isinstance(value,str),'RFC3339 timestamp string') + match=re.fullmatch(r'([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})[Tt]([0-9]{2}):([0-9]{2}):([0-9]{2})(?:\.([0-9]{1,9}))?([Zz]|[+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})',value) + require(match is not None,'exact RFC3339 with at most nine fractional digits') + year,month,day,hour,minute,second=(int(match[i]) for i in range(1,7)) + require(hour<24 and minute<60 and second<60,'valid bounded RFC3339 clock; leap-second spelling unsupported') + try:days=(dt.date(year,month,day)-dt.date(1970,1,1)).days + except ValueError:raise RuntimeError('valid RFC3339 calendar date') from None + offset=match[8];offset_seconds=0 + if offset not in ('Z','z'): + offset_hours=int(offset[1:3]);offset_minutes=int(offset[4:6]) + require(offset_hours<24 and offset_minutes<60,'valid RFC3339 UTC offset') + offset_seconds=(offset_hours*60+offset_minutes)*60*(1 if offset[0]=='+' else -1) + seconds=((days*24+hour)*60+minute)*60+second-offset_seconds + return seconds*1_000_000_000+int((match[7] or '').ljust(9,'0')) + + +def guards(): + require(support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/script_console_install.py')==INSTALL_SHA + and support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py')==old.PREFLIGHT_SHA + and support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/cloud_mvp_acceptance.py')==PATTERN_SHA + and support.sha(TEMPLATE)==TEMPLATE_SHA and support.sha(ORIGINAL)==ORIGINAL_SHA,'exact reviewed template/transport/target') + old.pre.native.verify_support();manifest=support.load(old.pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json') + require(support.sha(old.pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json')==old.pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA + and len(manifest['source_files'])==158 and all(support.sha(ROOT/n)==h for n,h in manifest['source_files'].items()),'frozen158 inputs unchanged') + template=support.load(TEMPLATE);script=template['parameters']['variants'][0]['script_utf8'].encode() + require(len(script)==130 and hashlib.sha256(script).hexdigest()==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact benign130 script bytes') + return template,support.load(ORIGINAL) + + +def stored_json_slice(raw,path): + """Slice a nested value directly from stored UTF-8 JSON, never reencode it.""" + text=raw.decode('utf-8');decoder=json.JSONDecoder(object_pairs_hook=support.object_pairs);start=0 + for component in path: + while text[start].isspace():start+=1 + opening=text[start];cursor=start+1;found=None + while True: + while text[cursor].isspace() or text[cursor]==',':cursor+=1 + if text[cursor] in '}]':break + if opening=='{': + key,cursor=decoder.raw_decode(text,cursor) + while text[cursor].isspace():cursor+=1 + require(text[cursor]==':','stored object separator');cursor+=1 + while text[cursor].isspace():cursor+=1 + else:key=0 if found is None else found + begin=cursor;_,cursor=decoder.raw_decode(text,cursor) + if key==component:start=begin;break + if opening=='[':found=key+1 + else:raise RuntimeError('Stored JSON path') + require(key==component,'stored value path present') + _,end=decoder.raw_decode(text,start);return text[start:end].encode() + + +def checked_plan(record,intent): + raw=base64.b64decode(record['payload_b64'],validate=True);require(len(raw)<=65536,'bounded original plan') + plan=json.loads(raw,object_pairs_hook=support.object_pairs);require(hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==record['plan_hash'],'hash original stored plan bytes') + require(plan['plan_id']==record['plan_id'] and str(uuid.UUID(plan['plan_id']))==plan['plan_id'] + and plan['schema_version']==1 and plan['tenant_id']==intent['target']['tenant_id'] and plan['principal']==CREATOR + and plan['reason']==intent['input']['reason'] and plan['max_parallel']==plan['halt_after_failures']==1 + and len(plan['jobs'])==1 and plan.get('recipe_references',[])==plan.get('artifact_references',[])==[], 'one exact creator/target/rollout plan') + entry=plan['jobs'][0];job=entry['payload'];job_raw=stored_json_slice(raw,['jobs',0,'payload']) + expected=dict(schema_version=1,**intent['target'],job_id=job['job_id'],attempt_id=job['attempt_id'], + action=dict(action='run_script',interpreter='posix_sh',script_utf8=intent['input']['parameters']['variants'][0]['script_utf8'],arguments=[],expected_stdout=STDOUT.decode(),privileged_script_profile='full_maintenance_v1'), + execution_identity='root',not_before=job['not_before'],start_before=job['start_before'],max_runtime_seconds=30,max_output_bytes=4096) + require(job==expected and all(str(uuid.UUID(job[k]))==job[k] for k in ('job_id','attempt_id')) + and timestamp_ns(job['not_before'])==timestamp_ns(intent['input']['schedule']['not_before']) + and timestamp_ns(job['start_before'])==timestamp_ns(intent['input']['schedule']['start_before']) + and hashlib.sha256(job_raw).hexdigest()==entry['job_payload_hash'] and entry['script_sha256']==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact stored job bytes/IDs/identity/profile/script/limits') + view=dict(plan_id=plan['plan_id'],plan_hash=record['plan_hash'],payload=plan,plan_payload=plan,plan_payload_bytes=list(raw), + jobs=[dict(job_id=job['job_id'],attempt_id=job['attempt_id'],asset_id=job['asset_id'],agent_id=job['agent_id'],job_payload_hash=entry['job_payload_hash'],script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA,payload=job)], + resolved_targets=[dict(asset_id=job['asset_id'],agent_id=job['agent_id'])],excluded_targets=[],authorization_status='required',approval_state=None,expires_at=job['start_before']) + return dict(record=record,view=view,job=job,job_bytes_b64=base64.b64encode(job_raw).decode(),job_payload_hash=entry['job_payload_hash']) + + +def server(request): + import base64 + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import http.client as http_client + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import socket + import ssl + import stat + import subprocess + import time + import uuid + p=request['intent'];case_id=str(uuid.UUID(p['id']));require(case_id==p['id'] and request['action'] in ('plan','submit','read','mcp-result','isolation'),'fixed MCP/evidence case') + target=p['target'];tenant=str(uuid.UUID(target['tenant_id']));agent=str(uuid.UUID(target['agent_id']));asset=str(uuid.UUID(target['asset_id'])) + require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111' and target['agent_id']=='e9d85af1-067f-4cbe-a547-3a63b70a8d2e' and asset=='30aad079-86b3-41f2-a1e9-34275e7c08fc','only actual Cloud Linux target') + creator='automation:'+tenant;approver='simulated-testprincipal-a';root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery') + def quote(text):return "'"+text.replace("'","''")+"'" + def sql(query): + cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm'] + done=subprocess.run(cmd,input=('BEGIN READ ONLY; '+query+'; COMMIT;').encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25) + require(len(done.stdout)<=4*1024*1024,'bounded fixed read-only SQL evidence');return json.loads(done.stdout) + def current_rights(): + rows=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(m)), '[]') FROM (SELECT principal,kind,permissions,revoked_at FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND principal IN ("+quote(creator)+","+quote(approver)+") ORDER BY principal)m") + roles={r['principal']:r for r in rows};require(set(roles)=={creator,approver} and all(r['revoked_at'] is None for r in rows),'existing active actors') + require(roles[creator]['kind']=='automation' and roles[approver]['kind']=='test_human' + and set(roles[creator]['permissions'])=={'inventory:read','logs:read','operations:plan','operations:submit','operations:read','jobs:cancel','scripts:execute','root:execute'} + and 'plans:approve' not in roles[creator]['permissions'] + and {'plans:approve','scripts:execute','root:execute'}<=set(roles[approver]['permissions']),'current exact actor kinds and required rights before MCP mutation') + return rows + def policy_guard(): + path=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=path.lstat();raw=path.read_bytes() + require(not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode)==0o600 and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==p['policy_sha256'],'explicit reviewed protected Root policy') + policy=json.loads(raw);require(policy['schema_version']==2 and policy['profile']=='development' and len(policy['scopes'])==1,'single reviewed development Fullscope') + scope=policy['scopes'][0] + require(all(scope[k]==v for k,v in target.items()) and set(scope['principals'])=={creator,approver} + and scope['helper_binary_sha256']=='79442727c3ba31cda02a8bc0e67481f14db9f39fc07520a880a90b64f10f1eaf' + and scope['helper_policy_sha256']=='8101afd12b303c23bad57339729569262d4c1d66c741da9d6d4a72ebf3495ece' + and scope['allow_root_scripts'] is True and scope['allowed_script_profiles']==['full_maintenance_v1'] + and scope['allowed_services']==[] and scope['allow_reboot'] is False and 'apt' not in scope,'exact narrow Fullscope/code/policy/actors') + expiry=timestamp_ns(policy['expires_at']);deadline=timestamp_ns(p['input']['schedule']['start_before']) + require(expiry>=deadline>time.time_ns(),'explicit current start deadline within policy expiry') + return dict(sha256=p['policy_sha256'],expires_at=policy['expires_at']) + def http(body,headers,principal): + class HTTPS(http_client.HTTPSConnection): + def connect(self):self.sock=self._context.wrap_socket(socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',18443),timeout=15),server_hostname='localhost') + require(principal in ('a','b'),'fixed existing server-only credential') + token_path=root/('devstate/operator-'+principal+'.token');m=token_path.lstat();require(not token_path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_uid in (0,10001) and not m.st_mode&0o077 and m.st_size<=8192,'existing private server-only operator credential') + client=HTTPS('localhost',18443,timeout=15,context=ssl.create_default_context(cafile=str(root/'devstate/api-pki/ca.pem'))) + try: + client.request('POST','/mcp',body=json.dumps(body),headers={'Content-Type':'application/json','Authorization':'Bearer '+token_path.read_text().strip(),**headers}) + response=client.getresponse();session=response.getheader('Mcp-Session-Id');status=response.status;data=None + if status!=202: + if 'text/event-stream' in response.getheader('Content-Type',''): + parts=[];total=0 + for _ in range(256): + line=response.readline(1024*1024+1);total+=len(line);require(total<=1024*1024,'bounded MCP SSE') + if not line:break + if line.startswith(b'data:'):parts.append(line[5:].lstrip(b' ').rstrip(b'\r\n')) + if not line.strip() and parts: + value=json.loads(b'\n'.join(parts));parts=[] + if 'result' in value or 'error' in value:data=value;break + else: + raw=response.read(1024*1024+1);require(len(raw)<=1024*1024,'bounded MCP JSON');data=json.loads(raw) if raw else None + return status,session,data + finally:client.close() + def mcp(name,args,principal='a',expect_denied=False): + require((principal=='a' and not expect_denied and name in ('operations.plan','operations.submit','jobs.get')) + or (principal=='b' and expect_denied and name in ('jobs.get','inventory.get_device')),'only fixed mutation or affected readonly MCP methods; no approvals/cancel') + headers={'Accept':'application/json, text/event-stream','MCP-Protocol-Version':'2025-11-25'} + status,session,data=http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',id=1,method='initialize',params=dict(protocolVersion='2025-11-25',capabilities={},clientInfo=dict(name='script-console-cloud-only',version='1'))),headers,principal) + require(status==200 and session and data['jsonrpc']=='2.0' and data['id']==1 + and data['result']['protocolVersion']=='2025-11-25','existing verified MCP initialize') + headers['Mcp-Session-Id']=session + require(http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',method='notifications/initialized'),headers,principal)[0]==202,'MCP initialized notification') + status,_,data=http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',id=2,method='tools/call',params=dict(name=name,arguments=args)),headers,principal) + if expect_denied: + require(status==200 and data and data.get('id')==2 and data.get('jsonrpc')=='2.0' + and data.get('result',{}).get('isError') is True,'actual authenticated MCP tool denial required') + denial=data['result']['structuredContent'] + require(set(denial)=={'code','retryable','message','correlation_id','details'} and denial['code'] in ('FORBIDDEN','NOT_FOUND') + and denial['retryable'] is False and denial['details']=={},'no successful other-tenant response or leaked details') + return dict(tool=name,http_status=status,valid_authenticated_initialize=True,is_error=True,code=denial['code'],details={}) + require(status==200 and data and data['jsonrpc']=='2.0' and data['id']==2 + and 'result' in data and not data['result'].get('isError'),'MCP call incomplete; retain case and read only') + return data['result']['structuredContent'] + def safe(path,directory=False): + m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0 and stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode)==(0o700 if directory else 0o600) + and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) if directory else stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1),'private bootstrap case') + def once(path,value): + raw=json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode();fd=os.open(path,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) + with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(raw);out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) + fd=os.open(path.parent,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW) + try:os.fsync(fd) + finally:os.close(fd) + parent=root/'devstate/script-console-job-acceptance';case=parent/case_id + if request['action'] in ('plan','submit'): + rights=current_rights();policy=policy_guard() + os.umask(0o077) + if request['action']=='plan': + if not parent.exists():parent.mkdir(mode=0o700) + safe(parent,True);case.mkdir(mode=0o700);once(case/'intent.json',p) + safe(parent,True);safe(case,True);safe(case/'intent.json') + require(json.loads((case/'intent.json').read_bytes())==p,'original immutable remote intent') + if request['action']=='plan': + once(case/'plan-entered.json',dict(plan_once=True,rights=rights,policy=policy)) + result=mcp('operations.plan',dict(tenant_id=tenant,input=p['input']));once(case/'plan-result.json',result);return dict(plan=result,rights=rights,policy=policy) + stored=request['plan'];plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(stored['plan_id'])) + require(plan_id==stored['plan_id'],'canonical stored plan ID') + actual=sql("SELECT json_build_object('payload_b64',replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),''),'principal',principal,'reason',convert_from(payload,'UTF8')::jsonb->>'reason') FROM operation_plans WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)) + require(actual['principal']==creator and actual['reason']==p['input']['reason'] + and hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(actual['payload_b64'],validate=True)).hexdigest()==stored['plan_hash'],'actual original plan before submit') + once(case/'submit-entered.json',dict(submit_once=True,plan_id=plan_id,plan_hash=stored['plan_hash'],idempotency_key=p['idempotency_key'],rights=rights,policy=policy)) + result=mcp('operations.submit',dict(tenant_id=tenant,plan_id=plan_id,idempotency_key=p['idempotency_key']));once(case/'submit-result.json',result);return dict(pending=result,rights=rights,policy=policy) + if request['action'] in ('mcp-result','isolation'): + stored=request['plan'];plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(stored['plan_id'])) + actual=sql("SELECT json_build_object('payload_b64',replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),''),'principal',principal) FROM operation_plans WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)) + raw=base64.b64decode(actual['payload_b64'],validate=True) + require(actual['principal']==creator and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==stored['plan_hash'],'same actual stored A-plan for readonly HTTP proof') + plan=json.loads(raw);require(plan['reason']==p['input']['reason'] and len(plan['jobs'])==1,'same one fixed acceptance plan') + job=plan['jobs'][0]['payload'];job_id=str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id'])) + require(job['tenant_id']==tenant and job['agent_id']==agent and job['asset_id']==asset,'same existing A-job/asset for readonly HTTP proof') + if request['action']=='mcp-result':return dict(result=mcp('jobs.get',dict(tenant_id=tenant,job_id=job_id)),read_only=True) + return dict(read_only=True,credential='existing server-only operator-b',tests=[ + mcp('jobs.get',dict(tenant_id=tenant,job_id=job_id),'b',True), + mcp('inventory.get_device',dict(tenant_id=tenant,asset_id=asset),'b',True)]) + # All recovery/status queries are read-only. In particular do not use the + # operation getter, which may expire a pending request in application code. + reason=quote(p['input']['reason']);key=quote(p['idempotency_key']);scope="tenant_id="+quote(tenant) + plans=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT plan_id,plan_hash,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64 FROM operation_plans WHERE "+scope+" AND principal="+quote(creator)+" AND convert_from(payload,'UTF8')::jsonb->>'reason'="+reason+" ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 2)q") + require(len(plans)<=1,'ambiguous stored plan; no retry') + markers={} + if case.exists(): + safe(parent,True);safe(case,True);safe(case/'intent.json');require(json.loads((case/'intent.json').read_bytes())==p,'original case readback') + for name in ('plan-entered','submit-entered'):markers[name]=os.path.lexists(case/(name+'.json')) + result=dict(plans=plans,markers=markers,read_only=True,approvals_performed=False) + if not plans:return result + plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(plans[0]['plan_id']));plan=json.loads(base64.b64decode(plans[0]['payload_b64']));job=plan['jobs'][0]['payload'];job_id=str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id']));attempt=str(uuid.UUID(job['attempt_id'])) + require(job['agent_id']==agent and job['asset_id']==asset and job['tenant_id']==tenant,'fixed target in stored plan') + selected=scope+' AND job_id='+quote(job_id)+' AND attempt_id='+quote(attempt) + result['requests']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT r.operation_id,r.plan_id,r.principal,r.approval_state,r.idempotency_key,r.request_hash FROM approval_requests r JOIN operation_submissions s USING(tenant_id,operation_id) WHERE r.tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND r.plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+" AND s.principal="+quote(creator)+" AND s.idempotency_key="+key+")q") + result['counts']=sql("SELECT json_build_object('jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE "+selected+"),'outbox',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox WHERE "+selected+"),'permits',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits WHERE "+selected+"),'authorizations',(SELECT count(*) FROM authorizations WHERE "+scope+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+"))") + result['jobs']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,operation_id,agent_id,asset_id,payload_hash,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64,state,result FROM jobs WHERE "+selected+")q") + result['permits']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT grant_id,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64,replace(encode(signature,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS signature_b64 FROM execution_permits WHERE "+selected+")q") + result['authorizations']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT authorization_id,operation_id,plan_id,plan_hash,principal,approval_origin,testsimulation FROM authorizations WHERE "+scope+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+")q") + result['audit']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT event_id,principal,event_type,data,created_at FROM audit_events WHERE "+scope+" AND event_type='plan_authorization' AND data->>'plan_id'="+quote(plan_id)+" ORDER BY created_at)q") + return result + + +def native_evidence(p): + import base64 + import hashlib + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import sqlite3 + import subprocess + import uuid + job=p['job'];require(os.geteuid()==0 and str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id']))==job['job_id'] and str(uuid.UUID(job['attempt_id']))==job['attempt_id'],'fixed native evidence binding') + require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==p['boot_id'],'same native boot') + processes={} + for name,key,uid in (('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','helper',0),('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993)): + pid=int(subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','MainPID','--value'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout) + proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));birth=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(')',1)[1].split()[19];status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines() + require(next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'))==[str(uid)]*4 + and next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))==['984']*4 + and hashlib.sha256((proc/'exe').read_bytes()).hexdigest()==p['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] + and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(')',1)[1].split()[19]==birth,'actual qualified process image/accounts/birth') + processes[name]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=birth,sha256=p['artifacts'][key]['sha256']) + path=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite');m=path.lstat() + require(not path.is_symlink() and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==p['database_identity'],'original Root database inode') + import time + original_ids=sorted(p['original_rows']);require(len(original_ids)==18,'exact eighteen original Root IDs') + started=time.monotonic_ns();db=sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25) + try: + db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic_ns()-started>1_000_000_000),1000) + db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN') + require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified readonly DELETE journal') + total,unresolved=db.execute('SELECT count(*),coalesce(sum(result IS NULL),0) FROM consumed').fetchone() + require(total in (18,19),'at most one new Root consumption') + placeholders=','.join('?' for _ in original_ids) + rows=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ' + +'WHERE c.grant_id IN ('+placeholders+') OR (c.job=? AND c.attempt=?) ORDER BY c.grant_id LIMIT 20', + [*original_ids,job['job_id'],job['attempt_id']]).fetchall() + finally: + # Materialize only the known eighteen plus this one attempt; close the + # shared read transaction before hashing/decoding any retained BLOBs. + try:db.rollback() + finally:db.close() + elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started;m=path.lstat() + require(elapsed<=1_000_000_000,'short native read transaction within accepted one-second budget') + require(not path.is_symlink() and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==p['database_identity'],'same Root inode after short read') + def digest(row):return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps([dict(sha256=hashlib.sha256(v).hexdigest(),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row],separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest() + original={row[0]:digest(row) for row in rows if row[0] in p['original_rows']} + require(original==p['original_rows'] and len(rows)==total,'all original18 bytes retained, only this possible new consumption') + found=[row for row in rows if row[3]==job['job_id'] and row[4]==job['attempt_id']] + require(len(found)<=1 and total==18+len(found),'no unrelated new consumption') + records=[] + for row in found: + require(row[1]==job['agent_id'] and row[2]==job['enrollment_generation'],'native consumption target/generation') + records.append(dict(grant_id=row[0],result_b64=base64.b64encode(row[5]).decode() if row[5] is not None else None, + start_b64=base64.b64encode(row[6]).decode() if row[6] is not None else None,outcome_b64=base64.b64encode(row[7]).decode() if row[7] is not None else None)) + return dict(read_only=True,original_root18_unchanged=True,consumed=total,unresolved=unresolved,records=records,processes=processes, + read_transaction_ns=elapsed,read_transaction_budget_ns=1_000_000_000,sqlite_busy_timeout_ms=250,sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False) + + + +def rpc(intent,action,folder,**extra): + guards();require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__),'same original runner before every call/read') + require(support.load(folder/'intent-hash.json')==dict(intent_sha256=support.sha(folder/'intent.json')),'original complete local intent bytes before every target call') + code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(timestamp_ns)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(server) + code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(server('+repr(dict(intent=intent,action=action,**extra))+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__)))\n' + return support.transport(old.server_prefix(),'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=230) + + +def retain_plan(folder,record,intent): + plan=checked_plan(record,intent);path=folder/'stored-plan.json' + if path.exists():require(support.load(path)==plan,'original plan bytes/IDs/hash never replaced') + else:support.save(path,plan) + return plan + + +def read_case(intent,folder): + evidence=rpc(intent,'read',folder);support.save(folder/('server-read-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),evidence) + if not evidence['plans']:return dict(state='plan_effect_unknown' if (folder/'plan-entered.json').exists() else 'not_planned',evidence=evidence) + plan=retain_plan(folder,evidence['plans'][0],intent);_,original=guards() + require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) + and support.load(folder/'intent-hash.json')==dict(intent_sha256=support.sha(folder/'intent.json')),'same original source/intent before native read') + identity=original['preflight']['database_inodes']['/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite'] + native=old.rpc(support.access_settings(old.pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux'),native_evidence,dict(job=plan['job'],boot_id=original['preflight']['boot_id'],artifacts=original['artifacts'],database_identity=identity,original_rows=original['preflight']['root_rows']),folder) + support.save(folder/('native-read-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),native) + return dict(plan=plan,evidence=evidence,native=native) + + +def pending_checkpoint(intent,folder,value): + evidence=value['evidence'];require(len(evidence['requests'])==1,'one immutable submission lookup') + pending=evidence['requests'][0];require(pending['approval_state']=='pending_approval' and pending['principal']==CREATOR + and pending['idempotency_key']==intent['idempotency_key'] and evidence['counts']==dict(jobs=0,outbox=0,permits=0,authorizations=0) + and evidence['jobs']==evidence['permits']==evidence['authorizations']==evidence['audit']==[] + and value['native']['records']==[] and value['native']['consumed']==18 and value['native']['unresolved']==0,'pending has zero executable artifacts and no native consumption') + plan=value['plan'];require(pending['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'],'same pending plan') + checkpoint=dict(profile='dev/test',case='script-console-linux-full-v1',**intent['target'],expected_principal=APPROVER, + plan=plan['view'],job=plan['view']['jobs'][0],request=intent['input'],operation_id=pending['operation_id'], + plan_hash=plan['record']['plan_hash'],plan_payload_bytes=plan['view']['plan_payload_bytes'],job_payload=plan['job'],job_payload_hash=plan['job_payload_hash'], + preapproval=evidence['counts'],operation=dict(operation_id=pending['operation_id'],plan_id=pending['plan_id'],plan_hash=plan['record']['plan_hash'], + approval_state='pending_approval',planned_job_count=1,job_count=0,execution_state=None,jobs=[]), + operation_view_origin='read_only_scoped_SQL',stage='pending_approval',script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA,no_retry=True,approval_performed=False) + path=folder/'pending-checkpoint.json' + if path.exists():require(support.load(path)==checkpoint,'original pending checkpoint remains immutable') + else:support.save(path,checkpoint) + return checkpoint + + +def verify_result(intent,value): + plan=value['plan'];evidence=value['evidence'];native=value['native'] + require(evidence['counts']==dict(jobs=1,outbox=1,permits=1,authorizations=1) + and len(evidence['requests'])==len(evidence['jobs'])==len(evidence['permits'])==len(evidence['authorizations'])==len(evidence['audit'])==1,'one job/outbox/grant/authorization only') + request=evidence['requests'][0];job=evidence['jobs'][0];permit=evidence['permits'][0];auth=evidence['authorizations'][0];audit=evidence['audit'][0] + require(request['approval_state']=='approved' and request['principal']==CREATOR and request['idempotency_key']==intent['idempotency_key'] + and auth['principal']==APPROVER and auth['approval_origin']=='dev_test_browser_simulation' and auth['testsimulation'] is True + and auth['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and auth['operation_id']==request['operation_id']==job['operation_id'] + and auth['plan_id']==request['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'] + and audit['principal']==APPROVER and audit['data']['approval_origin']=='dev_test_browser_simulation' and audit['data']['testsimulation'] is True + and audit['data']['decision']=='approve' and audit['data']['profile']=='development' + and audit['data']['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'] and audit['data']['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and audit['data']['operation_id']==request['operation_id'],'actual simulated WebUI audit binding, never production human approval') + raw_job=base64.b64decode(plan['job_bytes_b64'],validate=True) + require(job['state']=='succeeded' and job['job_id']==plan['job']['job_id'] and job['attempt_id']==plan['job']['attempt_id'] + and job['agent_id']==plan['job']['agent_id'] and job['asset_id']==plan['job']['asset_id'] + and job['payload_hash']==plan['job_payload_hash'] and base64.b64decode(job['payload_b64'],validate=True)==raw_job,'same successful stored job/attempt bytes') + result=job['result'];require(result['exit_code']==0 and result['output_truncated'] is False and result['reboot_required'] is False + and bytes(result['stdout'])==STDOUT and bytes(result['stderr'])==STDERR and result['evidence']['postconditions_passed'] is True + and result['evidence']['execution_uid']==0 and result['evidence']['privileged_script_profile']=='full_maintenance_v1' + and result['evidence']['script_sha256']==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact native root/profile/stdout/stderr result') + require(native['original_root18_unchanged'] is True and native['consumed']==19 and native['unresolved']==0 and len(native['records'])==1,'one finished new Root consumption') + record=native['records'][0];start=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['start_b64'],validate=True));outcome=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['outcome_b64'],validate=True));finished=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['result_b64'],validate=True));request=start['request'] + permit_raw=base64.b64decode(permit['payload_b64'],validate=True);grant=json.loads(permit_raw) + require(record['grant_id']==permit['grant_id']==grant['grant_id']==result['grant_id'] + and bytes(request['job_bytes'])==raw_job and bytes(request['permit_bytes'])==permit_raw + and bytes(request['signature'])==base64.b64decode(permit['signature_b64'],validate=True) + and request['plan_hash']==grant['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and request['authorization_id']==grant['authorization_id']==auth['authorization_id'] + and grant['job_payload_hash']==plan['job_payload_hash'] and all(grant[k]==plan['job'][k] for k in (*intent['target'].keys(),'job_id','attempt_id','execution_identity','max_runtime_seconds')) + and grant['domain']=='rmm.execution-permit' and grant['schema_version']==1 + and grant['action']=='run_script' and grant['key_id']==intent['signing_key_id'] + and timestamp_ns(plan['job']['not_before'])<=timestamp_ns(grant['not_before']) + <=timestamp_ns(start['reserved_at']) integer epoch nanoseconds, no rounding.""" + import datetime as dt + import re + require(isinstance(value,str),'RFC3339 timestamp string') + match=re.fullmatch(r'([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})[Tt]([0-9]{2}):([0-9]{2}):([0-9]{2})(?:\.([0-9]{1,9}))?([Zz]|[+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})',value) + require(match is not None,'exact RFC3339 with at most nine fractional digits') + year,month,day,hour,minute,second=(int(match[i]) for i in range(1,7)) + require(hour<24 and minute<60 and second<60,'valid bounded RFC3339 clock; leap-second spelling unsupported') + try:days=(dt.date(year,month,day)-dt.date(1970,1,1)).days + except ValueError:raise RuntimeError('valid RFC3339 calendar date') from None + offset=match[8];offset_seconds=0 + if offset not in ('Z','z'): + offset_hours=int(offset[1:3]);offset_minutes=int(offset[4:6]) + require(offset_hours<24 and offset_minutes<60,'valid RFC3339 UTC offset') + offset_seconds=(offset_hours*60+offset_minutes)*60*(1 if offset[0]=='+' else -1) + seconds=((days*24+hour)*60+minute)*60+second-offset_seconds + return seconds*1_000_000_000+int((match[7] or '').ljust(9,'0')) + + +def guards(): + require(support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/script_console_install.py')==INSTALL_SHA + and support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/script_console_bootstrap.py')==old.PREFLIGHT_SHA + and support.sha(ROOT/'deploy/cloud_mvp_acceptance.py')==PATTERN_SHA + and support.sha(TEMPLATE)==TEMPLATE_SHA and support.sha(ORIGINAL)==ORIGINAL_SHA,'exact reviewed template/transport/target') + old.pre.native.verify_support();manifest=support.load(old.pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json') + require(support.sha(old.pre.native.PACK/'manifest.json')==old.pre.native.MANIFEST_SHA + and len(manifest['source_files'])==158 and all(support.sha(ROOT/n)==h for n,h in manifest['source_files'].items()),'frozen158 inputs unchanged') + template=support.load(TEMPLATE);script=template['parameters']['variants'][0]['script_utf8'].encode() + require(len(script)==130 and hashlib.sha256(script).hexdigest()==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact benign130 script bytes') + return template,support.load(ORIGINAL) + + +def stored_json_slice(raw,path): + """Slice a nested value directly from stored UTF-8 JSON, never reencode it.""" + text=raw.decode('utf-8');decoder=json.JSONDecoder(object_pairs_hook=support.object_pairs);start=0 + for component in path: + while text[start].isspace():start+=1 + opening=text[start];cursor=start+1;found=None + while True: + while text[cursor].isspace() or text[cursor]==',':cursor+=1 + if text[cursor] in '}]':break + if opening=='{': + key,cursor=decoder.raw_decode(text,cursor) + while text[cursor].isspace():cursor+=1 + require(text[cursor]==':','stored object separator');cursor+=1 + while text[cursor].isspace():cursor+=1 + else:key=0 if found is None else found + begin=cursor;_,cursor=decoder.raw_decode(text,cursor) + if key==component:start=begin;break + if opening=='[':found=key+1 + else:raise RuntimeError('Stored JSON path') + require(key==component,'stored value path present') + _,end=decoder.raw_decode(text,start);return text[start:end].encode() + + +def checked_plan(record,intent): + raw=base64.b64decode(record['payload_b64'],validate=True);require(len(raw)<=65536,'bounded original plan') + plan=json.loads(raw,object_pairs_hook=support.object_pairs);require(hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==record['plan_hash'],'hash original stored plan bytes') + require(plan['plan_id']==record['plan_id'] and str(uuid.UUID(plan['plan_id']))==plan['plan_id'] + and plan['schema_version']==1 and plan['tenant_id']==intent['target']['tenant_id'] and plan['principal']==CREATOR + and plan['reason']==intent['input']['reason'] and plan['max_parallel']==plan['halt_after_failures']==1 + and len(plan['jobs'])==1 and plan.get('recipe_references',[])==plan.get('artifact_references',[])==[], 'one exact creator/target/rollout plan') + entry=plan['jobs'][0];job=entry['payload'];job_raw=stored_json_slice(raw,['jobs',0,'payload']) + expected=dict(schema_version=1,**intent['target'],job_id=job['job_id'],attempt_id=job['attempt_id'], + action=dict(action='run_script',interpreter='posix_sh',script_utf8=intent['input']['parameters']['variants'][0]['script_utf8'],arguments=[],expected_stdout=STDOUT.decode(),privileged_script_profile='full_maintenance_v1'), + execution_identity='root',not_before=job['not_before'],start_before=job['start_before'],max_runtime_seconds=30,max_output_bytes=4096) + require(job==expected and all(str(uuid.UUID(job[k]))==job[k] for k in ('job_id','attempt_id')) + and timestamp_ns(job['not_before'])==timestamp_ns(intent['input']['schedule']['not_before']) + and timestamp_ns(job['start_before'])==timestamp_ns(intent['input']['schedule']['start_before']) + and hashlib.sha256(job_raw).hexdigest()==entry['job_payload_hash'] and entry['script_sha256']==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact stored job bytes/IDs/identity/profile/script/limits') + view=dict(plan_id=plan['plan_id'],plan_hash=record['plan_hash'],payload=plan,plan_payload=plan,plan_payload_bytes=list(raw), + jobs=[dict(job_id=job['job_id'],attempt_id=job['attempt_id'],asset_id=job['asset_id'],agent_id=job['agent_id'],job_payload_hash=entry['job_payload_hash'],script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA,payload=job)], + resolved_targets=[dict(asset_id=job['asset_id'],agent_id=job['agent_id'])],excluded_targets=[],authorization_status='required',approval_state=None,expires_at=job['start_before']) + return dict(record=record,view=view,job=job,job_bytes_b64=base64.b64encode(job_raw).decode(),job_payload_hash=entry['job_payload_hash']) + + +def server(request): + import base64 + import datetime as dt + import hashlib + import http.client as http_client + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import socket + import ssl + import stat + import subprocess + import time + import uuid + p=request['intent'];case_id=str(uuid.UUID(p['id']));require(case_id==p['id'] and request['action'] in ('plan','submit','read','mcp-result','isolation'),'fixed MCP/evidence case') + target=p['target'];tenant=str(uuid.UUID(target['tenant_id']));agent=str(uuid.UUID(target['agent_id']));asset=str(uuid.UUID(target['asset_id'])) + require(tenant=='11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111' and target['agent_id']=='e9d85af1-067f-4cbe-a547-3a63b70a8d2e' and asset=='30aad079-86b3-41f2-a1e9-34275e7c08fc','only actual Cloud Linux target') + creator='automation:'+tenant;approver='simulated-testprincipal-a';root=Path('/opt/rust-discovery') + def quote(text):return "'"+text.replace("'","''")+"'" + def sql(query): + cmd=['docker','compose','--env-file',str(root/'devstate/.env'),'-f',str(root/'deploy/server.compose.yaml'),'exec','-T','postgres','psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres','-d','rmm'] + done=subprocess.run(cmd,input=('BEGIN READ ONLY; '+query+'; COMMIT;').encode(),capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=25) + require(len(done.stdout)<=4*1024*1024,'bounded fixed read-only SQL evidence');return json.loads(done.stdout) + def current_rights(): + rows=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(m)), '[]') FROM (SELECT principal,kind,permissions,revoked_at FROM memberships WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND principal IN ("+quote(creator)+","+quote(approver)+") ORDER BY principal)m") + roles={r['principal']:r for r in rows};require(set(roles)=={creator,approver} and all(r['revoked_at'] is None for r in rows),'existing active actors') + require(roles[creator]['kind']=='automation' and roles[approver]['kind']=='test_human' + and set(roles[creator]['permissions'])=={'inventory:read','logs:read','operations:plan','operations:submit','operations:read','jobs:cancel','scripts:execute','root:execute'} + and 'plans:approve' not in roles[creator]['permissions'] + and {'plans:approve','scripts:execute','root:execute'}<=set(roles[approver]['permissions']),'current exact actor kinds and required rights before MCP mutation') + return rows + def policy_guard(): + path=root/'devstate/root-policy/policy.json';m=path.lstat();raw=path.read_bytes() + require(not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==10001 and stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode)==0o600 and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==p['policy_sha256'],'explicit reviewed protected Root policy') + policy=json.loads(raw);require(policy['schema_version']==2 and policy['profile']=='development' and len(policy['scopes'])==1,'single reviewed development Fullscope') + scope=policy['scopes'][0] + require(all(scope[k]==v for k,v in target.items()) and set(scope['principals'])=={creator,approver} + and scope['helper_binary_sha256']=='79442727c3ba31cda02a8bc0e67481f14db9f39fc07520a880a90b64f10f1eaf' + and scope['helper_policy_sha256']=='8101afd12b303c23bad57339729569262d4c1d66c741da9d6d4a72ebf3495ece' + and scope['allow_root_scripts'] is True and scope['allowed_script_profiles']==['full_maintenance_v1'] + and scope['allowed_services']==[] and scope['allow_reboot'] is False and 'apt' not in scope,'exact narrow Fullscope/code/policy/actors') + expiry=timestamp_ns(policy['expires_at']);deadline=timestamp_ns(p['input']['schedule']['start_before']) + require(expiry>=deadline>time.time_ns(),'explicit current start deadline within policy expiry') + return dict(sha256=p['policy_sha256'],expires_at=policy['expires_at']) + def http(body,headers,principal): + class HTTPS(http_client.HTTPSConnection): + def connect(self):self.sock=self._context.wrap_socket(socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1',18443),timeout=15),server_hostname='localhost') + require(principal in ('a','b'),'fixed existing server-only credential') + token_path=root/('devstate/operator-'+principal+'.token');m=token_path.lstat();require(not token_path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_uid in (0,10001) and not m.st_mode&0o077 and m.st_size<=8192,'existing private server-only operator credential') + client=HTTPS('localhost',18443,timeout=15,context=ssl.create_default_context(cafile=str(root/'devstate/api-pki/ca.pem'))) + try: + client.request('POST','/mcp',body=json.dumps(body),headers={'Content-Type':'application/json','Authorization':'Bearer '+token_path.read_text().strip(),**headers}) + response=client.getresponse();session=response.getheader('Mcp-Session-Id');status=response.status;data=None + if status!=202: + if 'text/event-stream' in response.getheader('Content-Type',''): + parts=[];total=0 + for _ in range(256): + line=response.readline(1024*1024+1);total+=len(line);require(total<=1024*1024,'bounded MCP SSE') + if not line:break + if line.startswith(b'data:'): + chunk=line[5:].rstrip(b'\r\n') + if chunk.startswith(b' '):chunk=chunk[1:] + parts.append(chunk) + if not line.strip() and parts: + frame=b'\n'.join(parts);parts=[] + if frame==b'':continue + value=json.loads(frame) + if 'result' in value or 'error' in value:data=value;break + else: + raw=response.read(1024*1024+1);require(len(raw)<=1024*1024,'bounded MCP JSON');data=json.loads(raw) if raw else None + return status,session,data + finally:client.close() + def mcp(name,args,principal='a',expect_denied=False): + require((principal=='a' and not expect_denied and name in ('operations.plan','operations.submit','jobs.get')) + or (principal=='b' and expect_denied and name in ('jobs.get','inventory.get_device')),'only fixed mutation or affected readonly MCP methods; no approvals/cancel') + headers={'Accept':'application/json, text/event-stream','MCP-Protocol-Version':'2025-11-25'} + status,session,data=http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',id=1,method='initialize',params=dict(protocolVersion='2025-11-25',capabilities={},clientInfo=dict(name='script-console-cloud-only',version='1'))),headers,principal) + require(status==200 and session and data['jsonrpc']=='2.0' and data['id']==1 + and data['result']['protocolVersion']=='2025-11-25','existing verified MCP initialize') + headers['Mcp-Session-Id']=session + require(http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',method='notifications/initialized'),headers,principal)[0]==202,'MCP initialized notification') + status,_,data=http(dict(jsonrpc='2.0',id=2,method='tools/call',params=dict(name=name,arguments=args)),headers,principal) + if expect_denied: + require(status==200 and data and data.get('id')==2 and data.get('jsonrpc')=='2.0' + and data.get('result',{}).get('isError') is True,'actual authenticated MCP tool denial required') + denial=data['result']['structuredContent'] + require(set(denial)=={'code','retryable','message','correlation_id','details'} and denial['code'] in ('FORBIDDEN','NOT_FOUND') + and denial['retryable'] is False and denial['details']=={},'no successful other-tenant response or leaked details') + return dict(tool=name,http_status=status,valid_authenticated_initialize=True,is_error=True,code=denial['code'],details={}) + require(status==200 and data and data['jsonrpc']=='2.0' and data['id']==2 + and 'result' in data and not data['result'].get('isError'),'MCP call incomplete; retain case and read only') + return data['result']['structuredContent'] + def safe(path,directory=False): + m=path.lstat();require(not path.is_symlink() and m.st_uid==0 and stat.S_IMODE(m.st_mode)==(0o700 if directory else 0o600) + and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) if directory else stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode) and m.st_nlink==1),'private bootstrap case') + def once(path,value): + raw=json.dumps(value,sort_keys=True,separators=(',',':')).encode();fd=os.open(path,os.O_CREAT|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_NOFOLLOW,0o600) + with os.fdopen(fd,'wb') as out:out.write(raw);out.flush();os.fsync(out.fileno()) + fd=os.open(path.parent,os.O_RDONLY|os.O_DIRECTORY|os.O_NOFOLLOW) + try:os.fsync(fd) + finally:os.close(fd) + parent=root/'devstate/script-console-job-acceptance';case=parent/case_id + if request['action'] in ('plan','submit'): + rights=current_rights();policy=policy_guard() + os.umask(0o077) + if request['action']=='plan': + if not parent.exists():parent.mkdir(mode=0o700) + safe(parent,True);case.mkdir(mode=0o700);once(case/'intent.json',p) + safe(parent,True);safe(case,True);safe(case/'intent.json') + require(json.loads((case/'intent.json').read_bytes())==p,'original immutable remote intent') + if request['action']=='plan': + once(case/'plan-entered.json',dict(plan_once=True,rights=rights,policy=policy)) + result=mcp('operations.plan',dict(tenant_id=tenant,input=p['input']));once(case/'plan-result.json',result);return dict(plan=result,rights=rights,policy=policy) + stored=request['plan'];plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(stored['plan_id'])) + require(plan_id==stored['plan_id'],'canonical stored plan ID') + actual=sql("SELECT json_build_object('payload_b64',replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),''),'principal',principal,'reason',convert_from(payload,'UTF8')::jsonb->>'reason') FROM operation_plans WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)) + require(actual['principal']==creator and actual['reason']==p['input']['reason'] + and hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(actual['payload_b64'],validate=True)).hexdigest()==stored['plan_hash'],'actual original plan before submit') + once(case/'submit-entered.json',dict(submit_once=True,plan_id=plan_id,plan_hash=stored['plan_hash'],idempotency_key=p['idempotency_key'],rights=rights,policy=policy)) + result=mcp('operations.submit',dict(tenant_id=tenant,plan_id=plan_id,idempotency_key=p['idempotency_key']));once(case/'submit-result.json',result);return dict(pending=result,rights=rights,policy=policy) + if request['action'] in ('mcp-result','isolation'): + stored=request['plan'];plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(stored['plan_id'])) + actual=sql("SELECT json_build_object('payload_b64',replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),''),'principal',principal) FROM operation_plans WHERE tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)) + raw=base64.b64decode(actual['payload_b64'],validate=True) + require(actual['principal']==creator and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()==stored['plan_hash'],'same actual stored A-plan for readonly HTTP proof') + plan=json.loads(raw);require(plan['reason']==p['input']['reason'] and len(plan['jobs'])==1,'same one fixed acceptance plan') + job=plan['jobs'][0]['payload'];job_id=str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id'])) + require(job['tenant_id']==tenant and job['agent_id']==agent and job['asset_id']==asset,'same existing A-job/asset for readonly HTTP proof') + if request['action']=='mcp-result':return dict(result=mcp('jobs.get',dict(tenant_id=tenant,job_id=job_id)),read_only=True) + return dict(read_only=True,credential='existing server-only operator-b',tests=[ + mcp('jobs.get',dict(tenant_id=tenant,job_id=job_id),'b',True), + mcp('inventory.get_device',dict(tenant_id=tenant,asset_id=asset),'b',True)]) + # All recovery/status queries are read-only. In particular do not use the + # operation getter, which may expire a pending request in application code. + reason=quote(p['input']['reason']);key=quote(p['idempotency_key']);scope="tenant_id="+quote(tenant) + plans=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT plan_id,plan_hash,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64 FROM operation_plans WHERE "+scope+" AND principal="+quote(creator)+" AND convert_from(payload,'UTF8')::jsonb->>'reason'="+reason+" ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 2)q") + require(len(plans)<=1,'ambiguous stored plan; no retry') + markers={} + if case.exists(): + safe(parent,True);safe(case,True);safe(case/'intent.json');require(json.loads((case/'intent.json').read_bytes())==p,'original case readback') + for name in ('plan-entered','submit-entered'):markers[name]=os.path.lexists(case/(name+'.json')) + result=dict(plans=plans,markers=markers,read_only=True,approvals_performed=False) + if not plans:return result + plan_id=str(uuid.UUID(plans[0]['plan_id']));plan=json.loads(base64.b64decode(plans[0]['payload_b64']));job=plan['jobs'][0]['payload'];job_id=str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id']));attempt=str(uuid.UUID(job['attempt_id'])) + require(job['agent_id']==agent and job['asset_id']==asset and job['tenant_id']==tenant,'fixed target in stored plan') + selected=scope+' AND job_id='+quote(job_id)+' AND attempt_id='+quote(attempt) + result['requests']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT r.operation_id,r.plan_id,r.principal,r.approval_state,r.idempotency_key,r.request_hash FROM approval_requests r JOIN operation_submissions s USING(tenant_id,operation_id) WHERE r.tenant_id="+quote(tenant)+" AND r.plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+" AND s.principal="+quote(creator)+" AND s.idempotency_key="+key+")q") + result['counts']=sql("SELECT json_build_object('jobs',(SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE "+selected+"),'outbox',(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox WHERE "+selected+"),'permits',(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits WHERE "+selected+"),'authorizations',(SELECT count(*) FROM authorizations WHERE "+scope+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+"))") + result['jobs']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT job_id,attempt_id,operation_id,agent_id,asset_id,payload_hash,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64,state,result FROM jobs WHERE "+selected+")q") + result['permits']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT grant_id,replace(encode(payload,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS payload_b64,replace(encode(signature,'base64'),chr(10),'') AS signature_b64 FROM execution_permits WHERE "+selected+")q") + result['authorizations']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT authorization_id,operation_id,plan_id,plan_hash,principal,approval_origin,testsimulation FROM authorizations WHERE "+scope+" AND plan_id="+quote(plan_id)+")q") + result['audit']=sql("SELECT coalesce(json_agg(row_to_json(q)),'[]') FROM (SELECT event_id,principal,event_type,data,created_at FROM audit_events WHERE "+scope+" AND event_type='plan_authorization' AND data->>'plan_id'="+quote(plan_id)+" ORDER BY created_at)q") + return result + + +def native_evidence(p): + import base64 + import hashlib + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import sqlite3 + import subprocess + import uuid + job=p['job'];require(os.geteuid()==0 and str(uuid.UUID(job['job_id']))==job['job_id'] and str(uuid.UUID(job['attempt_id']))==job['attempt_id'],'fixed native evidence binding') + require(Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()==p['boot_id'],'same native boot') + processes={} + for name,key,uid in (('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service','helper',0),('rmm-agent-remote.service','agent',993)): + pid=int(subprocess.run(['systemctl','show',name,'-p','MainPID','--value'],capture_output=True,check=True,timeout=10).stdout) + proc=Path('/proc',str(pid));birth=(proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(')',1)[1].split()[19];status=(proc/'status').read_text().splitlines() + require(next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Uid:'))==[str(uid)]*4 + and next(x.split()[1:] for x in status if x.startswith('Gid:'))==['984']*4 + and hashlib.sha256((proc/'exe').read_bytes()).hexdigest()==p['artifacts'][key]['sha256'] + and (proc/'stat').read_text().rsplit(')',1)[1].split()[19]==birth,'actual qualified process image/accounts/birth') + processes[name]=dict(pid=pid,start_ticks=birth,sha256=p['artifacts'][key]['sha256']) + path=Path('/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite');m=path.lstat() + require(not path.is_symlink() and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==p['database_identity'],'original Root database inode') + import time + original_ids=sorted(p['original_rows']);require(len(original_ids)==18,'exact eighteen original Root IDs') + started=time.monotonic_ns();db=sqlite3.connect(path.as_uri()+'?mode=ro',uri=True,timeout=0.25) + try: + db.set_progress_handler(lambda:int(time.monotonic_ns()-started>1_000_000_000),1000) + db.execute('PRAGMA query_only=ON');db.execute('BEGIN') + require(db.execute('PRAGMA journal_mode').fetchone()[0]=='delete','qualified readonly DELETE journal') + total,unresolved=db.execute('SELECT count(*),coalesce(sum(result IS NULL),0) FROM consumed').fetchone() + require(total in (18,19),'at most one new Root consumption') + placeholders=','.join('?' for _ in original_ids) + rows=db.execute('SELECT c.grant_id,c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,c.result,e.start,e.outcome FROM consumed c LEFT JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) ' + +'WHERE c.grant_id IN ('+placeholders+') OR (c.job=? AND c.attempt=?) ORDER BY c.grant_id LIMIT 20', + [*original_ids,job['job_id'],job['attempt_id']]).fetchall() + finally: + # Materialize only the known eighteen plus this one attempt; close the + # shared read transaction before hashing/decoding any retained BLOBs. + try:db.rollback() + finally:db.close() + elapsed=time.monotonic_ns()-started;m=path.lstat() + require(elapsed<=1_000_000_000,'short native read transaction within accepted one-second budget') + require(not path.is_symlink() and [m.st_dev,m.st_ino]==p['database_identity'],'same Root inode after short read') + def digest(row):return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps([dict(sha256=hashlib.sha256(v).hexdigest(),size=len(v)) if isinstance(v,bytes) else v for v in row],separators=(',',':')).encode()).hexdigest() + original={row[0]:digest(row) for row in rows if row[0] in p['original_rows']} + require(original==p['original_rows'] and len(rows)==total,'all original18 bytes retained, only this possible new consumption') + found=[row for row in rows if row[3]==job['job_id'] and row[4]==job['attempt_id']] + require(len(found)<=1 and total==18+len(found),'no unrelated new consumption') + records=[] + for row in found: + require(row[1]==job['agent_id'] and row[2]==job['enrollment_generation'],'native consumption target/generation') + records.append(dict(grant_id=row[0],result_b64=base64.b64encode(row[5]).decode() if row[5] is not None else None, + start_b64=base64.b64encode(row[6]).decode() if row[6] is not None else None,outcome_b64=base64.b64encode(row[7]).decode() if row[7] is not None else None)) + return dict(read_only=True,original_root18_unchanged=True,consumed=total,unresolved=unresolved,records=records,processes=processes, + read_transaction_ns=elapsed,read_transaction_budget_ns=1_000_000_000,sqlite_busy_timeout_ms=250,sqlite_integrity_scan_performed=False) + + + +def rpc(intent,action,folder,**extra): + guards();require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__),'same original runner before every call/read') + require(support.load(folder/'intent-hash.json')==dict(intent_sha256=support.sha(folder/'intent.json')),'original complete local intent bytes before every target call') + code=inspect.getsource(require)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(timestamp_ns)+'\n'+inspect.getsource(server) + code+='\ntry:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(server('+repr(dict(intent=intent,action=action,**extra))+')))\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(__import__("json").dumps(dict(bootstrap_error=True,error_class=type(e).__name__)))\n' + return support.transport(old.server_prefix(),'python3 -',code.encode(),folder,timeout=230) + + +def retain_plan(folder,record,intent): + plan=checked_plan(record,intent);path=folder/'stored-plan.json' + if path.exists():require(support.load(path)==plan,'original plan bytes/IDs/hash never replaced') + else:support.save(path,plan) + return plan + + +def read_case(intent,folder): + evidence=rpc(intent,'read',folder);support.save(folder/('server-read-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),evidence) + if not evidence['plans']:return dict(state='plan_effect_unknown' if (folder/'plan-entered.json').exists() else 'not_planned',evidence=evidence) + plan=retain_plan(folder,evidence['plans'][0],intent);_,original=guards() + require(intent['runner_sha256']==support.sha(__file__) + and support.load(folder/'intent-hash.json')==dict(intent_sha256=support.sha(folder/'intent.json')),'same original source/intent before native read') + identity=original['preflight']['database_inodes']['/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite'] + native=old.rpc(support.access_settings(old.pre.ACCESS_ROOT,'linux'),native_evidence,dict(job=plan['job'],boot_id=original['preflight']['boot_id'],artifacts=original['artifacts'],database_identity=identity,original_rows=original['preflight']['root_rows']),folder) + support.save(folder/('native-read-'+str(uuid.uuid4())+'.json'),native) + return dict(plan=plan,evidence=evidence,native=native) + + +def pending_checkpoint(intent,folder,value): + evidence=value['evidence'];require(len(evidence['requests'])==1,'one immutable submission lookup') + pending=evidence['requests'][0];require(pending['approval_state']=='pending_approval' and pending['principal']==CREATOR + and pending['idempotency_key']==intent['idempotency_key'] and evidence['counts']==dict(jobs=0,outbox=0,permits=0,authorizations=0) + and evidence['jobs']==evidence['permits']==evidence['authorizations']==evidence['audit']==[] + and value['native']['records']==[] and value['native']['consumed']==18 and value['native']['unresolved']==0,'pending has zero executable artifacts and no native consumption') + plan=value['plan'];require(pending['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'],'same pending plan') + checkpoint=dict(profile='dev/test',case='script-console-linux-full-v1',**intent['target'],expected_principal=APPROVER, + plan=plan['view'],job=plan['view']['jobs'][0],request=intent['input'],operation_id=pending['operation_id'], + plan_hash=plan['record']['plan_hash'],plan_payload_bytes=plan['view']['plan_payload_bytes'],job_payload=plan['job'],job_payload_hash=plan['job_payload_hash'], + preapproval=evidence['counts'],operation=dict(operation_id=pending['operation_id'],plan_id=pending['plan_id'],plan_hash=plan['record']['plan_hash'], + approval_state='pending_approval',planned_job_count=1,job_count=0,execution_state=None,jobs=[]), + operation_view_origin='read_only_scoped_SQL',stage='pending_approval',script_sha256=SCRIPT_SHA,no_retry=True,approval_performed=False) + path=folder/'pending-checkpoint.json' + if path.exists():require(support.load(path)==checkpoint,'original pending checkpoint remains immutable') + else:support.save(path,checkpoint) + return checkpoint + + +def verify_result(intent,value): + plan=value['plan'];evidence=value['evidence'];native=value['native'] + require(evidence['counts']==dict(jobs=1,outbox=1,permits=1,authorizations=1) + and len(evidence['requests'])==len(evidence['jobs'])==len(evidence['permits'])==len(evidence['authorizations'])==len(evidence['audit'])==1,'one job/outbox/grant/authorization only') + request=evidence['requests'][0];job=evidence['jobs'][0];permit=evidence['permits'][0];auth=evidence['authorizations'][0];audit=evidence['audit'][0] + require(request['approval_state']=='approved' and request['principal']==CREATOR and request['idempotency_key']==intent['idempotency_key'] + and auth['principal']==APPROVER and auth['approval_origin']=='dev_test_browser_simulation' and auth['testsimulation'] is True + and auth['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and auth['operation_id']==request['operation_id']==job['operation_id'] + and auth['plan_id']==request['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'] + and audit['principal']==APPROVER and audit['data']['approval_origin']=='dev_test_browser_simulation' and audit['data']['testsimulation'] is True + and audit['data']['decision']=='approve' and audit['data']['profile']=='development' + and audit['data']['plan_id']==plan['record']['plan_id'] and audit['data']['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and audit['data']['operation_id']==request['operation_id'],'actual simulated WebUI audit binding, never production human approval') + raw_job=base64.b64decode(plan['job_bytes_b64'],validate=True) + require(job['state']=='succeeded' and job['job_id']==plan['job']['job_id'] and job['attempt_id']==plan['job']['attempt_id'] + and job['agent_id']==plan['job']['agent_id'] and job['asset_id']==plan['job']['asset_id'] + and job['payload_hash']==plan['job_payload_hash'] and base64.b64decode(job['payload_b64'],validate=True)==raw_job,'same successful stored job/attempt bytes') + result=job['result'];require(result['exit_code']==0 and result['output_truncated'] is False and result['reboot_required'] is False + and bytes(result['stdout'])==STDOUT and bytes(result['stderr'])==STDERR and result['evidence']['postconditions_passed'] is True + and result['evidence']['execution_uid']==0 and result['evidence']['privileged_script_profile']=='full_maintenance_v1' + and result['evidence']['script_sha256']==SCRIPT_SHA,'exact native root/profile/stdout/stderr result') + require(native['original_root18_unchanged'] is True and native['consumed']==19 and native['unresolved']==0 and len(native['records'])==1,'one finished new Root consumption') + record=native['records'][0];start=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['start_b64'],validate=True));outcome=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['outcome_b64'],validate=True));finished=json.loads(base64.b64decode(record['result_b64'],validate=True));request=start['request'] + permit_raw=base64.b64decode(permit['payload_b64'],validate=True);grant=json.loads(permit_raw) + require(record['grant_id']==permit['grant_id']==grant['grant_id']==result['grant_id'] + and bytes(request['job_bytes'])==raw_job and bytes(request['permit_bytes'])==permit_raw + and bytes(request['signature'])==base64.b64decode(permit['signature_b64'],validate=True) + and request['plan_hash']==grant['plan_hash']==plan['record']['plan_hash'] and request['authorization_id']==grant['authorization_id']==auth['authorization_id'] + and grant['job_payload_hash']==plan['job_payload_hash'] and all(grant[k]==plan['job'][k] for k in (*intent['target'].keys(),'job_id','attempt_id','execution_identity','max_runtime_seconds')) + and grant['domain']=='rmm.execution-permit' and grant['schema_version']==1 + and grant['action']=='run_script' and grant['key_id']==intent['signing_key_id'] + and timestamp_ns(plan['job']['not_before'])<=timestamp_ns(grant['not_before']) + <=timestamp_ns(start['reserved_at'])&2 +``` + +Diese Darstellung ist keine Aufforderung zur lokalen Ausführung. Der genaue +ursprüngliche UTF-8-Inhalt einschließlich abschließender Zeile wird gehasht. +Fest gebunden sind `posix_sh`, Root, `full_maintenance_v1`, keine Argumente, +30 Sekunden Laufzeit, 4096 Byte Gesamtausgabe, ein Job mit genau einem Versuch, +`max_parallel:1` und `halt_after_failures:1`. Erwartete rohe Ausgabe ist +`0\nRMM_FULL_CONSOLE_LINUX_V1\n` auf stdout und +`RMM_FULL_CONSOLE_STDERR_V1\n` auf stderr. Der harmlose Warteabschnitt von zwölf Sekunden +ermöglicht die Beobachtung des tatsächlichen laufenden Jobs in der WebUI. + +## Voraussetzungen und Grenze + +Der verantwortliche Rootagent prüft vor der tatsächlichen Benutzung getrennt +den erhaltenden Runtime-/Serverwechsel, frischen signierten Sync und Fullhelper- +Nachweis, Browservertrauen und die konkrete neue Rootpolicy. Vorlagen oder +dieser Runner ersetzen diese Abnahmen nicht. Eine ausdrücklich angegebene +Policy-SHA256 und ein fester künftiger UTC-Startzeitraum werden im unveränderlichen +Intent gebunden; die Deadline muss innerhalb der überprüften Policygültigkeit +liegen. Der Runner öffnet oder schließt selbst keine Policy. + +Vor jedem `operations.plan` und `operations.submit` liest der Runner die +tatsächlichen aktuellen Mitgliedschaften ausschließlich auf dem Server. +Der bestehende Creator ist +`automation:11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111`, Art `automation`; +der Testfreigeber ist `simulated-testprincipal-a`, Art `test_human`. +Beide dürfen nicht widerrufen sein. Automation muss exakt die vorhandenen sieben +Rechte plus `root:execute` haben; `plans:approve` ist dort ausdrücklich verboten. +Der Simulator benötigt seine bestehenden Planfreigabe-, Skript- und Rootrechte. +Fehlende Rechte verweigern den Aufruf **vor** jeder MCP-Mutation. Das gesondert +reviewte Provisionieren des zusätzlichen Automation-Rootrechts gehört nicht +zu diesem Runner. Er verändert weder Rechte noch Actorart. + +Die zentrale Policy muss genau einen Scope für dieses Gerät, diese Generation, +beide Akteure, den tatsächlichen Fullpolicyhash und den qualifizierten Helpercode +enthalten. Nur Fullskripte, keine Service-, APT- oder typisierte Rebootfreigabe. +Das Profil gibt genehmigtem Rootcode volle Hostautorität; daraus wird keine +Sandbox- oder generelle No-Reboot-Zusage abgeleitet. + +Serverzugang nutzt ausschließlich den vorhandenen gepinnten SSH-Bootstrapweg. +Der Token `/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/operator-a.token` wird ausschließlich auf +dem Server für dessen eigene HTTPS-Anfrage gelesen. Er gelangt weder zum +Entwicklungsrechner noch in Logs oder Ergebnisse. Der HTTP-Endpunkt ist fest +`127.0.0.1:18443`, TLS-Name/SNI `localhost`, Vertrauen ausschließlich über +`/opt/rust-discovery/devstate/api-pki/ca.pem`. MCP-Initialize, Initialisierungs- +Notification, Sessionbindung und begrenzte JSON-/SSE-Antworten folgen dem +bestehenden Cloud-MVP-Muster; dessen veralteter privater API-CA-Pfad wird hier +gezielt nicht übernommen. + +## Bedienweg und getrennte tatsächliche Abnahme + +Die folgende Tabelle beschreibt die Modi. Mit dem separat korrigierten +V2-Runner wurde anschließend genau ein [nativer Rootlauf bestanden](script-console-linux-full-results.md). +Der ursprüngliche Fehlversuch bleibt erhalten; die Modusquelle selbst +enthält weiterhin keinen Genehmigungsweg. + +| Modus | Einzige zugelassene Wirkung | +| --- | --- | +| `prepare-local` | Neuer privater lokaler Intent samt unveränderlichem vollständigem Hashzeugen; explizite Policy-SHA und UTC-Zeiten erforderlich | +| `plan --case ` | Einmalig MCP `operations.plan`, erst nach lokalem und serverseitigem dauerhaften Startmarker | +| `submit --case ` | Einmalig MCP `operations.submit` mit festem Idempotenzschlüssel; danach lesender Pending-0/0/0/0-Nachweis | +| `pending --case ` | Bestehende Anfrage und native Nichtverbräuche lesen; niemals einreichen oder genehmigen | +| `read --case ` | Originalfälle, eindeutige Plan-/Idempotenzlookupdaten und vorhandene Resultate lesen | +| `verify-result --case ` | Vorhandenes Endergebnis, tatsächlichen UI-Audit, native Originalbytes und betroffene MCP-Mandantengrenze lesen und prüfen | + +`prepare-local` setzt nur Asset- und Zeitplatzhalter ein. An den Grund wird eine +eindeutige `acceptance_case=`-Kennung angehängt, damit ein verlorener +Planreply rein lesend eindeutig gefunden werden kann. Skript, Identität, +Interpreter, Argumente und Limits werden nicht verändert. Sämtliche Vorlagen-, +Quell- und vollständigen Intentbindungen werden vor jedem Aufruf und Readback +geprüft. Bestehende Pläne, Versuche und Intents werden nicht überschrieben. + +Die einzigen mutierenden MCP-Methoden sind Plan und Submit. Es existiert kein +Approval-API-, Browserautomations-, Cancel-, Retry- oder SQL-Schreibpfad. Auf dem +Server entstehen nur eigene private Bootstrapintents und Einmalmarker sowie die +durch MCP selbst erzeugten Pläne/Anträge. Alle direkten SQL-Abfragen laufen in +`BEGIN READ ONLY`; der Operation-Getter wird bewusst nicht aufgerufen, weil +dieser beim Lesen einen abgelaufenen Pendingantrag aktualisieren kann. + +Nach Submit müssen die gespeicherte Anfrage `pending_approval`, null Jobs, +Outboxeinträge, Grants und Autorisierungen sowie null native Verbräuche des +neuen Versuchs belegt sein. Der lokale `pending-checkpoint.json` enthält die +tatsächlichen ursprünglichen Planbytes, Plan-/Job-/Skripthashes, Job-/Versuch- und +Operation-IDs, Ziel, Rechteprofil und Grenzen für die separate Browserprüfung. +Seine zusätzliche Operationsansicht ist als aus lesendem SQL abgeleitet +gekennzeichnet. **Erst danach darf der separat berechtigte Akteur den exakten +gespeicherten Plan tatsächlich in der WebUI genehmigen.** + +Bei verlorenem Reply niemals denselben Plan-/Submitaufruf erneut starten. +Nur `read` verwenden: Originalcase und eindeutige gespeicherte Reason-/ +Idempotenzbindung werden gelesen. Ein gefundener Originalplan darf als genau +dieser Plan erhalten werden; es wird kein Ersatzplan erzeugt. Ein fehlender oder +mehrdeutiger Nachweis bleibt unklar und sperrt Wiederholung. + +## Geplanter Ergebnisnachweis und seine Grenzen + +Der Endnachweis verlangt genau einen Job, Outboxeintrag, Grant und eine +Autorisierung. Er prüft tatsächlichen `dev_test_browser_simulation`-Audit mit +Simulatorprincipal, `testsimulation:true`, Developmentprofil sowie unveränderten +Plan-/Operationbindungen. Das ist ausdrücklich kein Produktionsnachweis einer +echten menschlichen Identität. Erfolgreicher Zustand, Exit 0, ungekürzte rohe +stdout-/stderr-Bytes, Root-UID, Fullprofil und Skripthash müssen übereinstimmen. + +Die native Abfrage öffnet ausschließlich das vorhandene Root-Ledger lesend, +prüft Inode und alle ursprünglichen 18 Verbrauchszeilen bytegebunden und erlaubt +genau einen neuen abgeschlossenen Verbrauch für genau diesen Job/Versuch. +Sie materialisiert ausschließlich diese 18 bekannten IDs und den neuen Versuch +sowie die beiden Verbrauchszähler. Der Leseabschnitt wird vor BLOB-Hashing und +Dekodierung vollständig zurückgerollt/geschlossen. SQLite-Busy-Timeout ist +250 Millisekunden, das kooperative Fortschrittsbudget eine Sekunde; längere +gemessene Transaktionen werden als Nachweis verweigert. Dies ist keine harte +OS-/I/O-Echtzeitgarantie. Es läuft kein vollständiger Integritätsscan. +Originalstart, Jobbytes, Grantbytes, Signaturbytes, Autorisierung, Boot und +Ausführungsausgabe werden mit den gespeicherten Serverdaten verglichen. +Skriptbytes werden direkt aus den ursprünglichen Planbytes ausgeschnitten, +nicht aus einer API-Ansicht neu serialisiert. Die primäre Ed25519-Prüfung bleibt +beim qualifizierten Produkthelper; dieser enge Opsrunner ist kein zweiter +unabhängiger Signaturverifizierer und behauptet dies nicht. + +Zeitvergleiche verwenden einen strikten RFC3339-Parser mit ganzzahligen +Epoch-Nanosekunden: null bis neun Nachkommastellen werden exakt auf neun Stellen +aufgefüllt, Z- und numerische UTC-Offsets korrekt verrechnet. Es gibt weder +Gleitkommazahlen noch Rundung/Abschneiden. Ungültige Kalender-/Offsetwerte, +fehlende Zone, mehr als neun Nachkommastellen und die hier nicht unterstützte +Schaltsekunden-Schreibweise werden verweigert. Eingabe und Policy dürfen weiter +Mikrosekunden verwenden; die ursprünglichen Produktbytes bleiben unverändert. +Grant-/Native-Start-/Deadlinegrenzen werden bis zur letzten Nanosekunde verglichen. + +Zusätzlich muss derselbe bestehende Automation-A-Token den bereits gespeicherten +eigenen Job über den tatsächlichen MCP/HTTPS-Weg vollständig lesen können; +Ergebnis und rohe Ausgabe müssen zu SQL und nativen Originalen passen. +Mit dem ausschließlich serverseitigen bestehenden `operator-b.token` werden +danach genau zwei lesende MCP-Abfragen ausgeführt: der neue A-Job und dessen +gespeichertes A-Assetinventar. Gültige Authentisierung/Initialize und tatsächliche +strukturierte `FORBIDDEN`-/`NOT_FOUND`-Toolantworten ohne Daten/Details sind Pflicht. +Eine ungültige B-Anmeldung gilt nicht als Mandantennachweis. Dafür entstehen +weder neue Jobs noch weitere Scopes. Der frühere Datenbank-RLS-Beleg ersetzt +diesen ausdrücklich geplanten HTTP-/MCP-Authnachweis nicht. + +Tatsächlich lokal geprüft: Python-Syntax und Help; sämtliche eingefrorenen +Quell-/Templatebindungen; exakte Jobbyteausschnitte aus allen drei tatsächlichen +Rust-Goldenplänen; synthetischer zulässiger Plan und Verweigerung geänderter +Skriptbytes, Limits, Creatoridentität und mehrerer Versuche. Kein Test wurde als +nativer Job- oder Browsernachweis ausgegeben. Der danach tatsächlich vorbereitete +ursprüngliche Fall hielt während MCP-Initialize vor dem Plan-Toolcall an; +sein Nichtwirkungsbeleg und die separate V2-Korrektur stehen im V2-Nachtrag. + +Der ursprüngliche unbenutzte Runner `c958db665…` bleibt create-only archiviert. +Unabhängiger Review fand dort den zu langen Leseabschnitt über einen vollständigen +SQLite-Integritätsscan und Python-3.10-inkompatible beziehungsweise für Rust- +Nanosekunden ungeeignete `fromisoformat`-Vergleiche. Beide wurden vor jeder +Jobvorbereitung eng korrigiert. Tatsächliche gezielte lokale Prüfungen bestanden: +Z, null bis neun Nachkommastellen, positive/negative Offsets, Zeitpunkt eine +Nanosekunde vor Epoch und die echte Grantgrenzbedingung mit Ein-Nanosekunden- +Abständen. Ein separater temporärer SQLite-Zeuge konnte einen unabhängigen +Schreiber vor jedem Rowhash erwerben; kein Produkt-/VM-Ledger wurde dafür benutzt. diff --git a/docs/script-console-linux-full-results.md b/docs/script-console-linux-full-results.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..064430f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/script-console-linux-full-results.md @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +# Tatsächliche Linux-Abnahme der vollständigen Skriptkonsole + +2026-11-14, ausschließlich Cloud-Linux gegen `discovery.ease-technologies.de`. +Fall `ced97b4d-c352-4f0c-b34f-59e4d69ca192`, Runner-V2 +`c7f42df0a7e89274b7e255ac728ec4198a02278926348113c5b7e363e8983757`. +**Die einzelne vollständige MCP → WebUI → Rootskript → Ergebnisstrecke ist +nativ bestanden.** Dies schließt weder Windows noch den Selbstupdater ab. + +Voraussetzung war der tatsächlich bestandene dreiteilige passive +Linux-Nachbeleg `4c425416…`, SHA256 +`594fdf94261aa882df7ea771dda3f04779533dfdac768cf4a63c83448e1f27d7`. +Die zuvor geöffnete Policy `71660e4c…` wurde ohne neuen Job geschlossen. +Ein neuer, unveränderlicher 15-Minuten-Scope `992a6639…` band ausschließlich +das tatsächlich qualifizierte Cloudgerät, beide berechtigten Akteure, +Fullpolicy `8101afd1…` und Helpercode `79442727…`. Er erteilte keine +Plangenehmigung. SYSTEM, Dienst-, APT- und typisierte Rebootfreigaben wurden +nicht hinzugefügt. Volle Rootautorität des genehmigten Skripts bleibt ausdrücklich +ohne Sandbox- oder generelle No-Reboot-Zusage. + +## Tatsächlich durchlaufene Grenze + +1. Der bestehende Automation-Akteur legte den festen Plan einmal über MCP an + und reichte ihn einmal ein. Plan `259ff8f7-9b91-4707-8c3c-678573576ce3`, + Planhash `070ed2a5aa98acb461719492590b85574e0450739d7ea7a715d2dc3d5ec4966f`. + Antrag `25af50d7-b1fe-46f7-991f-23a4f186b46f` war dauerhaft + `pending_approval`: null Jobs, Outboxeinträge, Grants, Autorisierungen + und native Verbräuche dieses Versuchs. +2. In der echten WebUI wurde genau dieser Antrag geöffnet und dessen + unveränderlicher Plan angezeigt. DOM-Auslesung der vollständigen + Zielpreviews und lokaler Vergleich bestätigten sämtliche originalen + Planbytes, Ziel-/Job-/Versuchs-IDs, Skript- und Jobhashes, Root/ + `full_maintenance_v1`, Argumente, Zeitfenster und Limits. Vor dem + angehakten Prüfkästchen war der Freigabebutton deaktiviert. +3. Ein tatsächlicher Klick auf **„SIMULIERT: Diesen festen Plan ausdrücklich + genehmigen“** erzeugte die Freigabe. Gespeicherte Autorisierung und Audit + binden `simulated-testprincipal-a`, `dev_test_browser_simulation`, + `testsimulation:true`, Entwicklungsprofil und denselben Plan/Antrag. + Dies ist kein Freigabenachweis eines menschlichen Produktionsbenutzers. +4. Genau Job `b014fb7a-c23e-440f-8bb6-8212c3af2b1f`, Versuch + `cc56ea51-a548-4bde-93a5-ef49a31d110d`, wurde erfolgreich abgeschlossen. + Je genau ein Job, Outboxeintrag, Grant und Autorisierungsdatensatz sind + belegt. Der Rootledger enthält die unveränderten ursprünglichen18 Zeilen + plus genau einen abgeschlossenen Verbrauch:19 verbraucht,0 ungeklärt. + +Das [feste harmlose Skript](script-console-job-acceptance.md) umfasst130 +UTF-8-Bytes, SHA256 `c878ba5b5c37fa3f1b9485c6994d6c57f6f37d01d99d4239c64d264d4ed95336`. +Es liest die UID, wartet zwölf Sekunden und schreibt feste Markierungen. +Belegt: UID0, Exit0, erwartetes Fullprofil, bestandene stdout-Nachbedingung, +keine Trunkierung und kein angeforderter Reboot; Limits30s/4096Byte. + +| Unveränderte Ausgabe | Bytes | SHA256 des tatsächlichen WebUI-Downloads | +| --- | ---: | --- | +| stdout: `0\nRMM_FULL_CONSOLE_LINUX_V1\n` | 28 | `056c51deff395a12541cc977f62ad20dad80ccf2dff9f81c2ad8a2bdf09c3c7a` | +| stderr: `RMM_FULL_CONSOLE_STDERR_V1\n` | 27 | `4b810603627a8d0836bc820087c6d566a503a6c1ca5bd06fff7e6f8910fa3311` | + +Die Ergebnisse wurden tatsächlich in der WebUI geöffnet; beide Rohbytebuttons +wurden angeklickt und die heruntergeladenen Dateien bytegenau verglichen. +Der tatsächliche MCP-Getter liefert dasselbe vollständige Ergebnis. +Zwei authentisierte MCP-Abfragen mit dem bestehenden anderen Mandanten +(`jobs.get`, `inventory.get_device`) ergaben jeweils `NOT_FOUND`, leere +Details, HTTP200 mit MCP-Fehler. Dafür wurde kein weiterer Job erzeugt. + +## Abschluss und Grenzen + +Der Scope wurde nach Erfolg geschlossen. Ein separater lesender Readback +bestätigt wieder die originalen abgelaufenen Policybytes +`cf15cbb68b590475df6def28e7dcffb7d88e0ca2d2555a06174fb654eeff05f4`, +Eigentümer10001:10001, Modus0600 und ursprüngliche mtime. Die atomare +Wiederherstellung hat einen neuen Inode; der historische Inode bleibt im +Originalbeleg erhalten. Keine dauerhafte zentrale Fullfreigabe bleibt offen. + +Privater Endbeleg `passed.json`, SHA256 +`89dcb583fb62d8af6cb87e9a386e973451016be6bd7077ac1a8e5f8db3fa2128`. +Browserbelege liegen unter `output/playwright/51c274c9…/evidence/`; +Rohdaten, Zugangsdaten und Browserzustand bleiben gitignoriert. + +Im Browser tatsächlich beobachtet wurden `pending_approval`, `queued` und +`succeeded`; der laufende Zwischenzustand wurde trotz des Warteabschnitts +verpasst. Kein zweiter Lauf wurde dafür erzeugt. Der Nachbeleg bindet die +Originalgrant-/Signatur-/Request-/Outcomebytes; er enthält keine zweite +unabhängige Ed25519-Verifikation und keinen separat erfassten Kindprozess- +Startzeitpunkt. Die feste Frist ist anhand der nativen Startreservierung +belegt. Timeout, Abbruch, Offlinebetrieb und eine fremde Linux-Prozessgruppe +sind durch diesen erfolgreichen Einzelfall nicht zusätzlich nativ abgenommen. +Der ältere SSE-Fehlversuch bleibt [fehlgeschlagen und unverändert](script-console-job-acceptance-v2.md). + +Weiter offen: Windowsclock und native PowerShell-/SYSTEM-Abnahme, +Selbstupdater-Runtime und deren Linux-/Windows-Applynachweise sowie +abschließende Integration und konsistente aktuelle Runtimeindizes.