feat: snapshot Linux-first RMM MVP and pause handover
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 1m10s

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BuTzZ
2026-11-12 22:06:25 +01:00
commit 6c3203d725
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//! Independently usable authorization boundary. No bearer credentials or keys
//! received with a job are trusted. Both processes keep their own consumption DB.
extern crate self as rmm_privileged_helper;
pub mod apt;
pub mod control;
pub mod readiness;
pub mod reconcile;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use openssl::{
pkey::{Id, PKey},
sign::Verifier,
};
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{fs, os::unix::fs::MetadataExt, path::Path};
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SigningKey {
pub key_id: String,
pub algorithm: String,
pub schema_version: u32,
pub public_key_hex: String,
}
impl SigningKey {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
ensure!(
self.algorithm == "Ed25519"
&& self.schema_version == 1
&& raw.len() == 32
&& self.key_id == hash(&raw),
"SIGNING_KEY_PROFILE"
);
PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(&raw, Id::ED25519)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn read(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<Self> {
private_path(path, uid, false)?;
ensure!(fs::metadata(path)?.len() <= 4096, "SIGNING_KEY_SIZE");
let key: Self = serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(path)?)?;
key.validate()?;
Ok(key)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Binding {
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
pub asset_id: Uuid,
pub agent_id: Uuid,
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
pub assignment_version: u64,
pub public_key_hex: String,
}
impl Binding {
pub fn job(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<JobPayload> {
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 65536, "JOB_SIZE");
let j: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
ensure!(
j.schema_version == 1
&& j.tenant_id == self.tenant_id
&& j.asset_id == self.asset_id
&& j.agent_id == self.agent_id
&& j.enrollment_generation == self.enrollment_generation
&& j.assignment_version == self.assignment_version,
"IDENTITY_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
j.action.validate()
&& (1..=3600).contains(&j.max_runtime_seconds)
&& (1..=262144).contains(&j.max_output_bytes)
&& j.not_before < j.start_before,
"INVALID_JOB"
);
Ok(j)
}
pub fn verify(
&self,
request: &Request,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
let job = self.job(&request.job_bytes)?;
ensure!(
request.permit_bytes.len() <= 8192 && request.signature.len() == 64,
"PERMIT_SIZE"
);
let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
ensure!(raw.len() == 32, "TRUST_KEY_SIZE");
let key = PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(&raw, Id::ED25519)?;
ensure!(
Verifier::new_without_digest(&key)?
.verify_oneshot(&request.signature, &request.permit_bytes)?,
"INVALID_SIGNATURE"
);
let p: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
ensure!(
p.domain == "rmm.execution-permit"
&& p.schema_version == 1
&& p.key_id == hash(&raw)
&& !p.grant_id.is_nil()
&& !p.authorization_id.is_nil(),
"PERMIT_DOMAIN"
);
ensure!(
p.authorization_id == request.authorization_id
&& p.plan_hash == request.plan_hash
&& p.plan_hash.len() == 64
&& hex::decode(&p.plan_hash)?.len() == 32
&& p.job_payload_hash == hash(&request.job_bytes)
&& p.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
&& p.asset_id == job.asset_id
&& p.agent_id == job.agent_id
&& p.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
&& p.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
&& p.job_id == job.job_id
&& p.attempt_id == job.attempt_id
&& p.action == job.action.name()
&& p.execution_identity == job.execution_identity
&& p.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds,
"PERMIT_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
p.not_before >= job.not_before
&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
&& p.not_before < p.start_before
&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
&& now >= p.not_before
&& now < p.start_before,
"PERMIT_TIME"
);
Ok((job, p))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Request {
pub job_bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub permit_bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub plan_hash: String,
pub authorization_id: Uuid,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Outcome {
pub state: String,
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
pub output_truncated: bool,
pub reboot_required: bool,
pub evidence: serde_json::Value,
pub error_code: String,
}
impl Outcome {
pub fn unknown(code: &str) -> Self {
Self {
state: "unknown".into(),
stdout: vec![],
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: None,
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":false}),
error_code: code.into(),
}
}
}
/// Config and journal directories must already be bootstrapped by the intended
/// owner; do not silently chmod a hostile existing path or follow symlinks.
pub fn private_path(path: &Path, uid: u32, directory: bool) -> Result<()> {
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(path)?;
ensure!(
!m.file_type().is_symlink()
&& m.uid() == uid
&& m.mode() & 0o077 == 0
&& if directory { m.is_dir() } else { m.is_file() },
"UNSAFE_LOCAL_PATH"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn lock_state(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<fs::File> {
use fs2::FileExt;
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
private_path(dir, uid, true)?;
let f = fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(false)
.mode(0o600)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(dir.join("executor.lock"))?;
private_path(&dir.join("executor.lock"), uid, false)?;
f.try_lock_exclusive()?;
Ok(f)
}
pub fn open_ledger(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<rusqlite::Connection> {
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
let path = dir.join("consumption.sqlite");
let f = fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(false)
.mode(0o600)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(&path)?;
f.sync_all()?;
private_path(&path, uid, false)?;
let db = rusqlite::Connection::open(path)?;
db.execute_batch("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL; PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE; PRAGMA max_page_count=16384;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS consumed(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, agent TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
job TEXT NOT NULL, attempt TEXT NOT NULL, result BLOB, UNIQUE(agent,generation,job,attempt));
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS execution_evidence(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, start BLOB NOT NULL, outcome BLOB);")?;
let check: String = db.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
ensure!(check == "ok", "JOURNAL_INTEGRITY");
fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
Ok(db)
}
pub fn consume(db: &mut rusqlite::Connection, p: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> Result<()> {
let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
// Unknown effects retain the global device lock, including across restart.
let unresolved: i64 = tx.query_row(
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
[],
|r| r.get(0),
)?;
ensure!(unresolved == 0, "UNRESOLVED_EFFECT_RESOURCE_LOCKED");
tx.execute(
"INSERT INTO consumed(grant_id,agent,generation,job,attempt) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,?4,?5)",
rusqlite::params![
p.grant_id.to_string(),
p.agent_id.to_string(),
p.enrollment_generation,
p.job_id.to_string(),
p.attempt_id.to_string()
],
)?;
tx.commit()?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn finish(
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
p: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
outcome: &Outcome,
) -> Result<()> {
db.execute(
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1",
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?],
)?;
// Unknown / awaiting reboot keep the resource reserved until a real sync
// protocol exists. Never unlock on a process exit or a network reconnect.
if outcome.state != "unknown" && outcome.state != "awaiting_reboot" {
ensure!(
db.execute(
"UPDATE consumed SET result=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1 AND result IS NULL",
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?]
)? == 1,
"CONSUMPTION_NOT_FOUND"
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Persist the original boot and exact signed request BEFORE any reboot/effect.
/// Awaiting/unknown outcomes never release consumed.result's resource lock.
pub fn save_start(
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
request: &Request,
) -> Result<()> {
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes)?;
let recorded_at = Utc::now();
let deadline = match job.action {
rmm_domain::jobs::Action::Reboot {
reconnect_timeout_seconds,
..
} => Some(recorded_at + chrono::Duration::seconds(reconnect_timeout_seconds.into())),
_ => None,
};
let evidence = serde_json::json!({"previous_boot_id":rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?,
"reserved_at":recorded_at,"reconnect_deadline":deadline,"request":request,
"reauthentication_required":true,"postconditions_passed":false});
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO execution_evidence(grant_id,start) VALUES(?1,?2)",
rusqlite::params![permit.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(&evidence)?],
)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn script(job: &JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
use rmm_agent_linux::actions::{Interpreter, ScriptRequest, run_script};
let rmm_domain::jobs::Action::RunScript {
interpreter,
script_utf8,
arguments,
expected_stdout,
} = &job.action
else {
anyhow::bail!("NOT_SCRIPT")
};
let interpreter = match interpreter.as_str() {
"posix_sh" => Interpreter::PosixSh,
"bash" => Interpreter::Bash,
_ => anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_INTERPRETER"),
};
let request = ScriptRequest::new(
script_utf8.as_bytes().to_vec(),
interpreter,
arguments.clone(),
std::time::Duration::from_secs(job.max_runtime_seconds.into()),
job.max_output_bytes as usize,
)?;
let output = run_script(&request)?;
let passed = output.code == Some(0)
&& !output.timed_out
&& expected_stdout
.as_ref()
.is_none_or(|s| !output.truncated && output.stdout == s.as_bytes());
Ok(Outcome {
state: if output.timed_out || output.code.is_none() {
"unknown"
} else if passed {
"succeeded"
} else {
"failed"
}
.into(),
stdout: output.stdout,
stderr: output.stderr,
exit_code: output.code,
output_truncated: output.truncated,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":passed}),
error_code: if passed {
""
} else if output.timed_out {
"TIMEOUT_EFFECT_UNKNOWN"
} else {
"SCRIPT_POSTCONDITION_FAILED"
}
.into(),
})
}
pub fn read_binding(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<Binding> {
private_path(path, uid, false)?;
let bytes = fs::read(path)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 8192, "CONFIG_SIZE");
serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).context("invalid provisioned binding")
}
/// A fresh online permit is necessary but does not prove the host clock. Use
/// Linux's synchronization/error status, never a gateway-supplied time override.
pub fn clock_trusted() -> bool {
let mut state = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::timex>::zeroed();
// SAFETY: zero modes request a read-only query into initialized storage.
let status = unsafe { libc::adjtimex(state.as_mut_ptr()) };
// SAFETY: storage was zero initialized, including on an error return.
let state = unsafe { state.assume_init() };
status >= 0
&& status != libc::TIME_ERROR
&& state.status & libc::STA_UNSYNC == 0
&& state.maxerror >= 0
&& state.maxerror <= 5_000_000
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct TrustedClock {
wall: DateTime<Utc>,
monotonic: std::time::Instant,
}
/// Local client authenticates the root process as well as the root-owned socket.
/// A malicious same-user Unix server must not be able to forge helper success.
pub fn invoke(socket: &Path, request: &Request, max_runtime_seconds: u32) -> Result<Outcome> {
use std::{
io::{Read, Write},
os::{
fd::AsRawFd,
unix::{fs::FileTypeExt, net::UnixStream},
},
time::Duration,
};
let parent = fs::symlink_metadata(socket.parent().context("socket parent")?)?;
let meta = fs::symlink_metadata(socket)?;
ensure!(
parent.is_dir()
&& !parent.file_type().is_symlink()
&& parent.uid() == 0
&& parent.mode() & 0o022 == 0
&& meta.file_type().is_socket()
&& meta.uid() == 0
&& meta.mode() & 0o007 == 0,
"UNTRUSTED_HELPER_SOCKET"
);
let mut stream = UnixStream::connect(socket)?;
let mut credentials = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::ucred>::uninit();
let mut size = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: correct writable ucred storage and length for a live Unix socket.
ensure!(
unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
credentials.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut size,
)
} == 0
&& size as usize == std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>(),
"HELPER_PEER_CREDENTIALS"
);
// SAFETY: getsockopt initialized the full ucred on success.
ensure!(
unsafe { credentials.assume_init() }.uid == 0,
"HELPER_PEER_NOT_ROOT"
);
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(
u64::from(max_runtime_seconds) + 10,
)))?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(request)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 512 * 1024, "HELPER_REQUEST_SIZE");
stream.write_all(&(u32::try_from(bytes.len())?).to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
let mut length = [0; 4];
stream.read_exact(&mut length)?;
let length = u32::from_be_bytes(length) as usize;
ensure!(length <= 2 * 1024 * 1024, "HELPER_RESPONSE_SIZE");
let mut bytes = vec![0; length];
stream.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
let outcome: Outcome = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)?;
ensure!(
outcome.stdout.len() + outcome.stderr.len() <= 262144,
"HELPER_OUTPUT_LIMIT"
);
Ok(outcome)
}
impl Default for TrustedClock {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl TrustedClock {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
wall: Utc::now(),
monotonic: std::time::Instant::now(),
}
}
pub fn trusted(&self) -> bool {
let elapsed = Utc::now() - self.wall;
let skew = elapsed.num_milliseconds()
- i64::try_from(self.monotonic.elapsed().as_millis()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
clock_trusted() && skew.unsigned_abs() <= 5000
}
}