feat: snapshot Linux-first RMM MVP and pause handover
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 1m10s

This commit is contained in:
BuTzZ
2026-11-12 22:06:25 +01:00
commit 6c3203d725
194 changed files with 49234 additions and 0 deletions
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[package]
name = "rmm-privileged-helper"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
anyhow.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
openssl.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
libc = "0.2.177"
fs2 = "0.4.3"
rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
rmm-domain = { path = "../domain" }
rmm-agent-linux = { path = "../agent-linux" }
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//! Typed, root-only APT bridge. No network fetch, shell conversion or capability
//! advertisement. The public constructor always re-verifies the signed request.
use crate::{Binding, Outcome, Request, private_path};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail, ensure};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
collections::BTreeMap,
fs::{self, File, OpenOptions},
io::{Read, Write},
os::unix::fs::{DirBuilderExt, MetadataExt, OpenOptionsExt},
path::{Path, PathBuf},
process::{Command, Stdio},
};
const BASE: &str = "/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction";
pub const CODE: &str = "/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py";
const HOOK: &str = "/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/hook";
const PYTHON: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../tools/apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py");
const HOOK_BYTES: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../tools/apt-transaction/hook");
pub const INSTALL_RECIPE: &str = "rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0";
pub const UPDATE_RECIPE: &str = "rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1";
const INSTALL_SHA: &str = "74036ae81223deab3aae994fd2a2a695af408741777e1ce17dcb4e32f1235867";
const UPDATE_SHA: &str = "ef67c9fe0ba1443fcfe465768e1204763063c369a2a1da04af6027d8a9c00491";
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct ProviderConfig {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub execution_profile: String,
pub allow_fixture_bootstrap: bool,
pub allowed_recipes: Vec<String>,
pub runtime_sha256: String,
pub apt_config_sha256: String,
}
impl ProviderConfig {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.schema_version == 1 && self.execution_profile == "dev-test",
"APT_PROFILE_NOT_CONFIGURED"
);
ensure!(
!self.allowed_recipes.is_empty()
&& self.allowed_recipes.len() <= 2
&& self
.allowed_recipes
.iter()
.all(|r| matches!(r.as_str(), INSTALL_RECIPE | UPDATE_RECIPE)),
"APT_RECIPE_POLICY"
);
sha(&self.runtime_sha256)?;
sha(&self.apt_config_sha256)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct PackageArchive {
pub name: String,
pub architecture: String,
pub old_version: Option<String>,
pub new_version: String,
pub origin: String,
pub sha256: String,
pub size: u64,
pub archive_path: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct ResolvedAptTransaction {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub recipe_id: String,
pub recipe_version: String,
pub platform: String,
pub resolver_config_version: String,
pub no_reboot: bool,
pub status_fingerprint: String,
pub baseline_sha256: String,
pub packages: Vec<PackageArchive>,
}
impl ResolvedAptTransaction {
pub fn validate_fixture(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.schema_version == 1
&& self.recipe_version == "1"
&& self.platform == "ubuntu-24.04-amd64"
&& self.resolver_config_version == "rmm-apt-local-v1"
&& self.no_reboot
&& self.packages.len() == 1,
"APT_TRANSACTION_SCOPE"
);
sha(&self.status_fingerprint)?;
sha(&self.baseline_sha256)?;
let p = &self.packages[0];
let (old, new, expected_hash) = match self.recipe_id.as_str() {
INSTALL_RECIPE => (None, "1.0", INSTALL_SHA),
UPDATE_RECIPE => (Some("1.0"), "1.1", UPDATE_SHA),
_ => bail!("APT_RECIPE_NOT_CONFIGURED"),
};
ensure!(
p.name == "rmm-mvp-test"
&& p.architecture == "all"
&& p.origin == "rmm-test"
&& p.old_version.as_deref() == old
&& p.new_version == new
&& p.sha256 == expected_hash
&& p.size == 20672
&& p.archive_path == format!("{BASE}/archives/{expected_hash}.deb"),
"APT_FIXTURE_BYTES_OR_CLOSURE"
);
Ok(())
}
}
/// Must be a field named `apt_manifest` of the signed domain Action. The full
/// transaction object AND its exact serialized bytes are part of those bytes.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AptExecutionManifest {
#[serde(rename = "type")]
pub kind: String,
pub schema_version: u32,
pub action: String,
pub execution_profile: String,
pub transaction_sha256: String,
pub resolved_apt_transaction: ResolvedAptTransaction,
pub transaction_bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub provider_sha256: String,
pub hook_sha256: String,
pub apt_config_sha256: String,
pub runtime_sha256: String,
pub test_result_id: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ActionCarrier {
action: String,
apt_manifest: Option<AptExecutionManifest>,
#[serde(flatten)]
parameters: BTreeMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct SignedJob {
schema_version: u32,
tenant_id: uuid::Uuid,
asset_id: uuid::Uuid,
agent_id: uuid::Uuid,
enrollment_generation: u64,
assignment_version: u64,
job_id: uuid::Uuid,
attempt_id: uuid::Uuid,
action: ActionCarrier,
execution_identity: String,
not_before: DateTime<Utc>,
start_before: DateTime<Utc>,
max_runtime_seconds: u32,
max_output_bytes: u32,
}
pub fn is_apt_action(job: &JobPayload) -> bool {
matches!(
job.action.name(),
"ensure_package" | "apply_updates" | "apt_native_acceptance"
)
}
pub fn policy_header(job: &JobPayload, config: &ProviderConfig) -> Result<()> {
config.validate()?;
ensure!(
is_apt_action(job) && job.execution_identity == "root" && job.max_runtime_seconds >= 180,
"APT_EXPLICIT_ROOT_AND_RUNTIME_REQUIRED"
);
ensure!(
job.action.name() != "apt_native_acceptance" || config.allow_fixture_bootstrap,
"APT_BOOTSTRAP_DENIED"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Opaque verified capability: callers cannot manufacture one from a manifest.
pub struct PreparedApt {
job: JobPayload,
permit: ExecutionPermitPayload,
request: Request,
manifest: AptExecutionManifest,
}
pub fn prepare(
binding: &Binding,
request: &Request,
config: &ProviderConfig,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<PreparedApt> {
let (job, permit) = binding.verify(request, now)?;
policy_header(&job, config)?;
let manifest = validate_signed_manifest(&job, &request.job_bytes, config)?;
verify_installation()?;
verify_prefetched(&manifest, &permit)?;
Ok(PreparedApt {
job,
permit,
request: request.clone(),
manifest,
})
}
fn validate_signed_manifest(
job: &JobPayload,
bytes: &[u8],
config: &ProviderConfig,
) -> Result<AptExecutionManifest> {
let signed: SignedJob = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
ensure!(
signed.schema_version == job.schema_version
&& signed.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
&& signed.asset_id == job.asset_id
&& signed.agent_id == job.agent_id
&& signed.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
&& signed.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
&& signed.job_id == job.job_id
&& signed.attempt_id == job.attempt_id
&& signed.execution_identity == job.execution_identity
&& signed.not_before == job.not_before
&& signed.start_before == job.start_before
&& signed.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds
&& signed.max_output_bytes == job.max_output_bytes
&& signed.action.action == job.action.name(),
"APT_SIGNED_JOB_BINDING"
);
let manifest = signed
.action
.apt_manifest
.context("APT_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED")?;
validate_manifest(&manifest, job.action.name(), config)?;
// Domain deserialization must preserve the manifest, not ignore an unknown
// field. This is the explicit fail-closed gate until the additive domain
// contract lands. No separately supplied unsigned manifest is accepted.
let mut domain_action = serde_json::to_value(&job.action)?;
let embedded = domain_action
.as_object_mut()
.context("APT_ACTION_OBJECT")?
.remove("apt_manifest")
.context("APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED")?;
let domain_manifest: AptExecutionManifest = serde_json::from_value(embedded)?;
ensure!(
serde_json::to_vec(&domain_manifest)? == serde_json::to_vec(&manifest)?,
"APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_MISMATCH"
);
let mut original = serde_json::to_value(signed.action.parameters)?;
original
.as_object_mut()
.context("APT_PARAMETERS")?
.insert("action".into(), serde_json::json!(job.action.name()));
ensure!(
original == domain_action,
"APT_PARAMETERS_ALIAS_OR_MISMATCH"
);
// Approved recipe identity is explicit outside the manifest too. Normal
// updates bind provider, selected package names and reboot policy as well.
let t = &manifest.resolved_apt_transaction;
if job.action.name() == "apply_updates" {
ensure!(
original.get("provider") == Some(&serde_json::json!("apt"))
&& original.get("packages") == Some(&serde_json::json!(["rmm-mvp-test"]))
&& original.get("reboot_policy") == Some(&serde_json::json!("never"))
&& t.recipe_id == UPDATE_RECIPE,
"APT_UPDATE_SELECTION"
);
} else {
ensure!(
original.get("recipe_id") == Some(&serde_json::json!(t.recipe_id))
&& original.get("recipe_version") == Some(&serde_json::json!(t.recipe_version)),
"APT_RECIPE_PARAMETER_BINDING"
);
if job.action.name() == "ensure_package" {
let package = &t.packages[0];
ensure!(
original.get("provider") == Some(&serde_json::json!("apt"))
&& original.get("package") == Some(&serde_json::json!(package.name))
&& original.get("version") == Some(&serde_json::json!(package.new_version))
&& original.get("architecture")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(package.architecture))
&& original.get("installation_context") == Some(&serde_json::json!("system")),
"APT_ENSURE_TARGET_BINDING"
);
}
}
Ok(manifest)
}
fn validate_manifest(
m: &AptExecutionManifest,
action: &str,
config: &ProviderConfig,
) -> Result<()> {
config.validate()?;
ensure!(
m.kind == "rmm.apt.helper-action"
&& m.schema_version == 2
&& m.execution_profile == config.execution_profile
&& !m.test_result_id.is_empty()
&& m.test_result_id.len() <= 128
&& m.test_result_id
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b"_.-".contains(&b)),
"APT_MANIFEST_SCHEMA"
);
let bootstrap = action == "apt_native_acceptance";
ensure!(
matches!(
action,
"ensure_package" | "apply_updates" | "apt_native_acceptance"
) && m.action
== if bootstrap {
"apt-native-acceptance"
} else {
"apt-execute"
}
&& (!bootstrap || config.allow_fixture_bootstrap),
"APT_DEDICATED_ACTION_BINDING"
);
m.resolved_apt_transaction.validate_fixture()?;
ensure!(
config
.allowed_recipes
.contains(&m.resolved_apt_transaction.recipe_id),
"APT_RECIPE_POLICY"
);
ensure!(
m.transaction_bytes.len() <= 65536 && hash(&m.transaction_bytes) == m.transaction_sha256,
"APT_TRANSACTION_EXACT_BYTES_HASH"
);
let decoded: ResolvedAptTransaction = serde_json::from_slice(&m.transaction_bytes)?;
ensure!(
decoded == m.resolved_apt_transaction,
"APT_NESTED_TRANSACTION_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
m.provider_sha256 == hash(PYTHON)
&& m.hook_sha256 == hash(HOOK_BYTES)
&& m.runtime_sha256 == config.runtime_sha256
&& m.apt_config_sha256 == config.apt_config_sha256,
"APT_APPROVED_CODE_OR_RUNTIME"
);
for value in [
&m.transaction_sha256,
&m.provider_sha256,
&m.hook_sha256,
&m.runtime_sha256,
&m.apt_config_sha256,
] {
sha(value)?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn sha(value: &str) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
value.len() == 64
&& value
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b)),
"APT_SHA256"
);
Ok(())
}
fn secure(path: &Path, uid: u32, private: bool, directory: bool) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
path.is_absolute()
&& !path
.components()
.any(|c| matches!(c, std::path::Component::ParentDir)),
"APT_PATH"
);
for component in path.ancestors() {
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(component)?;
ensure!(
!m.file_type().is_symlink() && m.uid() == uid && m.mode() & 0o022 == 0,
"APT_UNSAFE_PATH_COMPONENT"
);
}
if private {
private_path(path, uid, directory)?;
}
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(path)?;
ensure!(
if directory { m.is_dir() } else { m.is_file() },
"APT_PATH_TYPE"
);
Ok(())
}
fn read_sealed(path: &Path, limit: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
secure(path, 0, false, false)?;
let mut f = OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(path)?;
ensure!(f.metadata()?.len() <= limit, "APT_FILE_LIMIT");
let mut bytes = vec![];
(&mut f).take(limit + 1).read_to_end(&mut bytes)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() as u64 <= limit, "APT_FILE_LIMIT");
Ok(bytes)
}
fn create_dir(path: &Path, mode: u32) -> Result<()> {
fs::DirBuilder::new().mode(mode).create(path)?;
File::open(path.parent().context("APT_PARENT")?)?.sync_all()?;
Ok(())
}
fn write_once(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8], mode: u32) -> Result<()> {
let mut f = OpenOptions::new()
.write(true)
.create_new(true)
.mode(mode)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(path)?;
f.write_all(bytes)?;
f.sync_all()?;
File::open(path.parent().context("APT_PARENT")?)?.sync_all()?;
Ok(())
}
fn json_once(path: &Path, value: &impl Serialize) -> Result<()> {
write_once(path, &serde_json::to_vec(value)?, 0o600)
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct InstallMetadata {
schema_version: u32,
provider_sha256: String,
hook_sha256: String,
unit_sha256: String,
}
/// Administrator bootstrap only, not a network job. Compile-time known bytes,
/// fixed paths, create-only. Does not grant execution or create acceptance.
pub fn install_known_payloads() -> Result<()> {
ensure_root()?;
secure(Path::new("/usr/lib"), 0, false, true)?;
secure(Path::new("/var/lib"), 0, false, true)?;
create_dir(Path::new("/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction"), 0o755)?;
write_once(Path::new(CODE), PYTHON, 0o644)?;
write_once(Path::new(HOOK), HOOK_BYTES, 0o755)?;
secure(Path::new("/etc/systemd/system"), 0, false, true)?;
write_once(
Path::new(crate::readiness::UNIT_PATH),
crate::readiness::UNIT_BYTES,
0o644,
)?;
secure(Path::new("/usr/share"), 0, false, true)?;
create_dir(Path::new("/usr/share/rmm-mvp-test"), 0o755)?;
create_dir(Path::new(BASE), 0o700)?;
for dir in ["archives", "baselines", "history", "probes", "log", "state"] {
create_dir(&Path::new(BASE).join(dir), 0o700)?;
}
json_once(
&Path::new(BASE).join("install-metadata.json"),
&InstallMetadata {
schema_version: 2,
provider_sha256: hash(PYTHON),
hook_sha256: hash(HOOK_BYTES),
unit_sha256: hash(crate::readiness::UNIT_BYTES),
},
)
}
fn ensure_root() -> Result<()> {
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions or pointers.
ensure!(unsafe { libc::geteuid() } == 0, "APT_ROOT_REQUIRED");
Ok(())
}
pub fn verify_installation() -> Result<()> {
ensure_root()?;
secure(Path::new(BASE), 0, true, true)?;
let metadata: InstallMetadata = serde_json::from_slice(&read_sealed(
&Path::new(BASE).join("install-metadata.json"),
4096,
)?)?;
ensure!(
metadata.schema_version == 2
&& metadata.provider_sha256 == hash(PYTHON)
&& metadata.hook_sha256 == hash(HOOK_BYTES)
&& metadata.unit_sha256 == hash(crate::readiness::UNIT_BYTES)
&& read_sealed(Path::new(crate::readiness::UNIT_PATH), 65536)?
== crate::readiness::UNIT_BYTES
&& read_sealed(Path::new(CODE), 1024 * 1024)? == PYTHON
&& read_sealed(Path::new(HOOK), 4096)? == HOOK_BYTES,
"APT_INSTALLATION_MISMATCH"
);
// Interpreter may be the distro's root-owned symlink, never a caller path.
secure(&fs::canonicalize("/usr/bin/python3")?, 0, false, false)
}
pub fn verify_controller_profile() -> Result<()> {
verify_installation()?;
let status = Command::new("/usr/bin/python3")
.args(["-I", CODE, "verify-controller"])
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin")
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::null())
.stderr(Stdio::null())
.status()?;
ensure!(status.success(), "APT_CONTROLLER_PROFILE_REQUIRED");
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct PrefetchReceipt {
schema_version: u32,
sha256: String,
size: u64,
sealed_at_ms: i64,
}
impl PrefetchReceipt {
fn validate(&self, package: &PackageArchive, grant_not_before_ms: i64) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.schema_version == 1
&& self.sha256 == package.sha256
&& self.size == package.size
&& self.sealed_at_ms > 0
&& self.sealed_at_ms <= grant_not_before_ms,
"APT_PREFETCH_BEFORE_GRANT_REQUIRED"
);
Ok(())
}
}
fn verify_prefetched(m: &AptExecutionManifest, permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> Result<()> {
for p in &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages {
let bytes = read_sealed(Path::new(&p.archive_path), p.size)?;
let meta = fs::symlink_metadata(&p.archive_path)?;
ensure!(
bytes.len() as u64 == p.size && hash(&bytes) == p.sha256 && meta.nlink() == 1,
"APT_PREFETCH_HASH_SIZE_LINKS"
);
let receipt: PrefetchReceipt = serde_json::from_slice(&read_sealed(
&Path::new(BASE).join(format!("prefetch-{}.json", p.sha256)),
4096,
)?)?;
receipt.validate(p, permit.not_before.timestamp_millis())?;
}
let baseline = read_sealed(
&Path::new(BASE).join("baselines").join(format!(
"{}.json",
m.resolved_apt_transaction.baseline_sha256
)),
1024 * 1024,
)?;
ensure!(
hash(&baseline) == m.resolved_apt_transaction.baseline_sha256,
"APT_BASELINE_HASH"
);
Ok(())
}
impl PreparedApt {
fn verify_parent_consumption(&self, db: &rusqlite::Connection) -> Result<String> {
let row: (i64, String, u64, String, String, Option<Vec<u8>>) = db.query_row(
"SELECT rowid,agent,generation,job,attempt,result FROM consumed WHERE grant_id=?1",
[self.permit.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| {
Ok((
r.get(0)?,
r.get(1)?,
r.get(2)?,
r.get(3)?,
r.get(4)?,
r.get(5)?,
))
},
)?;
ensure!(
row.1 == self.job.agent_id.to_string()
&& row.2 == self.job.enrollment_generation
&& row.3 == self.job.job_id.to_string()
&& row.4 == self.job.attempt_id.to_string()
&& row.5.is_none(),
"APT_PARENT_CONSUMPTION_REQUIRED"
);
let start: Vec<u8> = db.query_row(
"SELECT start FROM execution_evidence WHERE grant_id=?1",
[self.permit.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| r.get(0),
)?;
let start: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&start)?;
let saved: Request =
serde_json::from_value(start.get("request").context("APT_START_REQUEST")?.clone())?;
ensure!(
saved.job_bytes == self.request.job_bytes
&& saved.permit_bytes == self.request.permit_bytes
&& saved.signature == self.request.signature
&& saved.plan_hash == self.request.plan_hash
&& saved.authorization_id == self.request.authorization_id,
"APT_PARENT_START_BINDING"
);
Ok(format!("apt-{}-{}", self.permit.grant_id, row.0))
}
/// Requires the same request already consumed and save_start persisted in
/// the parent's own ledger. Unknown outcomes never fill consumed.result.
pub fn execute(self, db: &rusqlite::Connection) -> Result<Outcome> {
ensure_root()?;
let ledger_id = self.verify_parent_consumption(db)?;
let active = self.stage(db, &ledger_id)?;
// No timeout killing the native package manager. Client timeout means
// unknown; this helper continues and journals the eventual real outcome.
let mut child = Command::new("/usr/bin/python3")
.args([
"-I",
CODE,
if self.manifest.action == "apt-native-acceptance" {
"native-acceptance"
} else {
"execute"
},
])
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin")
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::null())
.spawn()?;
let input = serde_json::json!({"transaction_sha256":self.manifest.transaction_sha256,"effect_armed_ledger_id":ledger_id});
let write_ok = child
.stdin
.take()
.context("APT_STDIN")?
.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec(&input)?)
.is_ok();
let mut bytes = vec![];
let mut output = child.stdout.take().context("APT_STDOUT")?;
let mut chunk = [0; 4096];
let mut overflow = false;
loop {
let count = output.read(&mut chunk)?;
if count == 0 {
break;
}
if bytes.len() + count <= 65536 {
bytes.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..count]);
} else {
overflow = true;
}
}
let status = child.wait()?;
if !write_ok || overflow {
return Ok(Outcome::unknown("APT_DRIVER_OUTPUT_OR_IPC_UNKNOWN"));
}
Ok(map_driver_result(
&bytes,
status.code(),
active.join("hook-armed.json").try_exists()?,
&self.manifest,
&ledger_id,
)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| Outcome::unknown("APT_DRIVER_RESULT_UNKNOWN")))
}
fn stage(&self, db: &rusqlite::Connection, ledger_id: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
verify_installation()?;
verify_prefetched(&self.manifest, &self.permit)?;
let remaining = (self.permit.start_before - Utc::now())
.num_nanoseconds()
.context("APT_DEADLINE_RANGE")?;
ensure!(
remaining > 0 && Utc::now() >= self.permit.not_before,
"APT_START_DEADLINE"
);
let active = Path::new(BASE).join("active");
if active.try_exists()? {
secure(&active, 0, true, true)?;
let prior: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_slice(&read_sealed(&active.join("context.json"), 8192)?)?;
let grant = prior
.get("grant_id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.context("APT_PRIOR_GRANT")?;
let grant: uuid::Uuid = grant.parse()?;
let result: Option<Vec<u8>> = db.query_row(
"SELECT result FROM consumed WHERE grant_id=?1",
[grant.to_string()],
|r| r.get(0),
)?;
let result: Outcome =
serde_json::from_slice(&result.context("APT_PREVIOUS_EFFECT_UNRESOLVED")?)?;
ensure!(
matches!(result.state.as_str(), "succeeded" | "failed"),
"APT_PREVIOUS_EFFECT_UNRESOLVED"
);
let history = Path::new(BASE).join("history");
secure(&history, 0, true, true)?;
let destination = history.join(grant.to_string());
ensure!(!destination.try_exists()?, "APT_HISTORY_EXISTS");
fs::rename(&active, destination)?;
File::open(history)?.sync_all()?;
File::open(BASE)?.sync_all()?;
}
create_dir(&active, 0o700)?;
for dir in ["empty", "lists", "cache"] {
create_dir(&active.join(dir), 0o700)?;
}
write_once(
&active.join("expectation.json"),
&self.manifest.transaction_bytes,
0o600,
)?;
write_once(
&active.join("signed-action.json"),
&self.request.job_bytes,
0o600,
)?;
let baseline = read_sealed(
&Path::new(BASE).join("baselines").join(format!(
"{}.json",
self.manifest.resolved_apt_transaction.baseline_sha256
)),
1024 * 1024,
)?;
write_once(&active.join("baseline.json"), &baseline, 0o600)?;
let config = Command::new("/usr/bin/python3")
.args(["-I", CODE, "print-config"])
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin")
.output()?;
ensure!(
config.status.success()
&& config.stdout.len() <= 16384
&& hash(&config.stdout) == self.manifest.apt_config_sha256,
"APT_CONFIG_BINDING"
);
write_once(&active.join("apt.conf"), &config.stdout, 0o600)?;
let mut time = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::timespec>::zeroed();
// SAFETY: live correctly aligned output; read-only CLOCK_MONOTONIC query.
ensure!(
unsafe { libc::clock_gettime(libc::CLOCK_MONOTONIC, time.as_mut_ptr()) } == 0,
"APT_MONOTONIC_CLOCK"
);
// SAFETY: clock_gettime initialized the timespec on success.
let time = unsafe { time.assume_init() };
// Recompute remaining time immediately at translation: staging/fsync
// cannot extend the signed UTC deadline into a fresh monotonic window.
let remaining = (self.permit.start_before - Utc::now())
.num_nanoseconds()
.context("APT_DEADLINE_RANGE")?;
ensure!(remaining > 0, "APT_START_DEADLINE");
let monotonic = i128::from(time.tv_sec) * 1_000_000_000
+ i128::from(time.tv_nsec)
+ i128::from(remaining);
json_once(
&active.join("context.json"),
&serde_json::json!({
"schema_version":2,"transaction_sha256":self.manifest.transaction_sha256,
"job_payload_sha256":hash(&self.request.job_bytes),"action":self.manifest.action,
"execution_profile":self.manifest.execution_profile,"effect_armed_ledger_id":ledger_id,
"grant_id":self.permit.grant_id,"job_id":self.job.job_id,"attempt_id":self.job.attempt_id,
"authorization_id":self.permit.authorization_id,"plan_sha256":self.permit.plan_hash,
"not_before_ms":self.permit.not_before.timestamp_millis(),"start_before_ms":self.permit.start_before.timestamp_millis(),
"boot_id":rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?,"monotonic_start_before_ns":u64::try_from(monotonic)?
}),
)?;
Ok(active)
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct DriverResult {
effect_state: String,
code: String,
evidence: serde_json::Value,
}
fn map_driver_result(
bytes: &[u8],
exit: Option<i32>,
armed: bool,
m: &AptExecutionManifest,
ledger: &str,
) -> Result<Outcome> {
let result: DriverResult = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
ensure!(
exit == Some(0) && !result.code.is_empty() && result.code.len() <= 128,
"APT_EXIT_NOT_RESULT"
);
let bootstrap = m.action == "apt-native-acceptance";
if bootstrap {
ensure!(
result.evidence.get("test_acceptance") == Some(&serde_json::json!(true))
&& result.evidence.get("noProductionEvidence") == Some(&serde_json::json!(true)),
"APT_TEST_AUDIT_FLAGS"
);
}
let state = match result.effect_state.as_str() {
"verified_no_change" => {
let p = &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0];
ensure!(
!bootstrap
&& !armed
&& result.code == "POSTCONDITION_ALREADY_MET"
&& result.evidence.get("changed") == Some(&serde_json::json!(false))
&& result.evidence.get("already_desired") == Some(&serde_json::json!(true))
&& result.evidence.get("postcondition_already_met")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(true))
&& result.evidence.get("transaction_executed")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(false))
&& result.evidence.get("effect_armed_ledger_id")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(ledger))
&& result.evidence.get("packages")
== Some(
&serde_json::json!([{"name":p.name,"architecture":p.architecture,"version":p.new_version}])
)
&& result.evidence.get("snapshot_sha256")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(
m.resolved_apt_transaction.baseline_sha256
))
&& result.evidence.get("fixture_payload_sha256")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(hash(
format!("{}\n", p.new_version).as_bytes()
)))
&& result
.evidence
.get("reboot_required")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.is_some(),
"APT_NO_CHANGE_POSTCONDITIONS"
);
"succeeded"
}
"verified" => {
let p = &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0];
ensure!(
armed
&& result.code == "POSTCONDITIONS_VERIFIED"
&& result.evidence.get("effect_armed_ledger_id")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(ledger))
&& result.evidence.get("packages")
== Some(
&serde_json::json!([{"name":p.name,"architecture":p.architecture,"version":p.new_version}])
)
&& result
.evidence
.get("reboot_required")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.is_some(),
"APT_POSTCONDITIONS"
);
sha(result
.evidence
.get("snapshot_sha256")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.context("APT_SNAPSHOT")?)?;
ensure!(
result.evidence.get("fixture_payload_sha256")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(hash(
format!("{}\n", p.new_version).as_bytes()
))),
"APT_FIXTURE_PAYLOAD_EVIDENCE"
);
if bootstrap {
sha(result
.evidence
.get("native_record_sha256")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.context("APT_NATIVE_RECORD")?)?;
ensure!(
result.evidence.get("test_result_id")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(m.test_result_id)),
"APT_TEST_RESULT_BINDING"
);
}
"succeeded"
}
"known_failed" if !armed => "failed",
"known_failed" | "unknown" => "unknown",
_ => bail!("APT_UNKNOWN_EFFECT_STATE"),
};
Ok(Outcome {
state: state.into(),
stdout: vec![],
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: exit,
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: result
.evidence
.get("reboot_required")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.unwrap_or(false),
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":state=="succeeded","apt":result.evidence,"effect_armed_ledger_id":ledger,
"test_acceptance":bootstrap,"noProductionEvidence":true}),
error_code: if state == "succeeded" {
String::new()
} else {
result.code
},
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
+456
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
use super::*;
use openssl::{pkey::PKey, sign::Signer};
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, encode};
use uuid::Uuid;
#[test]
fn actual_domain_native_action_roundtrips_exact_signed_manifest_to_helper() {
let (binding, mut request, key, now) = signed_request();
let (config, m) = manifest(true);
let mut job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes).unwrap();
let domain_manifest: rmm_domain::apt_transaction::AptExecutionManifest =
serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(&m).unwrap()).unwrap();
job.action = Action::AptNativeAcceptance {
recipe_id: INSTALL_RECIPE.into(),
recipe_version: "1".into(),
apt_manifest: domain_manifest,
};
assert!(job.action.validate());
request.job_bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
let mut permit: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes).unwrap();
permit.action = "apt_native_acceptance".into();
permit.job_payload_hash = hash(&request.job_bytes);
request.permit_bytes = encode(&permit).unwrap();
request.signature = Signer::new_without_digest(&key)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&request.permit_bytes)
.unwrap();
let (verified, _) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
policy_header(&verified, &config).unwrap();
let parsed = validate_signed_manifest(&verified, &request.job_bytes, &config).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed.transaction_bytes, m.transaction_bytes);
assert_eq!(parsed.transaction_sha256, m.transaction_sha256);
// No unsafe root execution in this test: trusted deployment is absent.
assert!(prepare(&binding, &request, &config, now).is_err());
let mut aliased: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes).unwrap();
aliased["action"]["parameters"] = serde_json::json!({"apt_manifest":m});
request.job_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&aliased).unwrap();
assert!(binding.verify(&request, now).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn prefetch_receipt_must_precede_grant_and_match_exact_archive() {
let (_, m) = manifest(true);
let package = &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0];
let receipt = PrefetchReceipt {
schema_version: 1,
sha256: package.sha256.clone(),
size: package.size,
sealed_at_ms: 1000,
};
receipt.validate(package, 1000).unwrap();
assert!(receipt.validate(package, 999).is_err());
let changed = PackageArchive {
size: 1,
..package.clone()
};
assert!(receipt.validate(&changed, 1001).is_err());
let changed = PackageArchive {
sha256: "0".repeat(64),
..package.clone()
};
assert!(receipt.validate(&changed, 1001).is_err());
assert!(serde_json::from_slice::<PrefetchReceipt>(br#"{"schema_version":1,"sha256":"x","size":1,"sealed_at_ms":1000,"download_url":"https://untrusted.invalid"}"#).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn consumed_parent_row_and_original_start_request_are_mandatory() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = signed_request();
let (job, permit) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
// Test-only construction exercises the ledger validator without granting
// access to the root process path or weakening the public constructor.
let prepared = PreparedApt {
job,
permit: permit.clone(),
request: request.clone(),
manifest: manifest(true).1,
};
let dir = temporary();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions or pointers.
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let mut db = crate::open_ledger(&dir, uid).unwrap();
assert!(prepared.verify_parent_consumption(&db).is_err());
crate::consume(&mut db, &permit).unwrap();
assert!(prepared.verify_parent_consumption(&db).is_err());
crate::save_start(&db, &permit, &request).unwrap();
assert!(
prepared
.verify_parent_consumption(&db)
.unwrap()
.starts_with("apt-")
);
let mut forged = prepared;
forged.request.job_bytes.push(b' ');
assert!(forged.verify_parent_consumption(&db).is_err());
forged.request = request;
let mut outcome = Outcome::unknown("");
outcome.state = "succeeded".into();
crate::finish(&db, &permit, &outcome).unwrap();
assert!(forged.verify_parent_consumption(&db).is_err());
drop(db);
fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
}
fn manifest(bootstrap: bool) -> (ProviderConfig, AptExecutionManifest) {
let transaction = ResolvedAptTransaction {
schema_version: 1,
recipe_id: INSTALL_RECIPE.into(),
recipe_version: "1".into(),
platform: "ubuntu-24.04-amd64".into(),
resolver_config_version: "rmm-apt-local-v1".into(),
no_reboot: true,
status_fingerprint: "a".repeat(64),
baseline_sha256: hash(b"{}"),
packages: vec![PackageArchive {
name: "rmm-mvp-test".into(),
architecture: "all".into(),
old_version: None,
new_version: "1.0".into(),
origin: "rmm-test".into(),
sha256: INSTALL_SHA.into(),
size: 20672,
archive_path: format!("{BASE}/archives/{INSTALL_SHA}.deb"),
}],
};
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&transaction).unwrap();
let config = ProviderConfig {
schema_version: 1,
execution_profile: "dev-test".into(),
allow_fixture_bootstrap: true,
allowed_recipes: vec![INSTALL_RECIPE.into(), UPDATE_RECIPE.into()],
runtime_sha256: "d".repeat(64),
apt_config_sha256: "e".repeat(64),
};
let manifest = AptExecutionManifest {
kind: "rmm.apt.helper-action".into(),
schema_version: 2,
action: if bootstrap {
"apt-native-acceptance"
} else {
"apt-execute"
}
.into(),
execution_profile: "dev-test".into(),
transaction_sha256: hash(&bytes),
resolved_apt_transaction: transaction,
transaction_bytes: bytes,
provider_sha256: hash(PYTHON),
hook_sha256: hash(HOOK_BYTES),
apt_config_sha256: config.apt_config_sha256.clone(),
runtime_sha256: config.runtime_sha256.clone(),
test_result_id: "fixture-test-1".into(),
};
(config, manifest)
}
fn temporary() -> PathBuf {
let dir = Path::new("/tmp/opencode").join(format!("apt-helper-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
fs::DirBuilder::new().mode(0o700).create(&dir).unwrap();
dir
}
fn signed_request() -> (
Binding,
Request,
PKey<openssl::pkey::Private>,
DateTime<Utc>,
) {
let key = PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap();
let raw = key.raw_public_key().unwrap();
let now = Utc::now();
let binding = Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
public_key_hex: hex::encode(&raw),
};
let job = JobPayload {
schema_version: 1,
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
// Existing supported typed action supplies a valid cryptographic/ledger
// fixture only. It is never executed and the APT policy rejects it.
action: Action::RunScript {
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
script_utf8: "true".into(),
arguments: vec![],
expected_stdout: None,
},
execution_identity: "root".into(),
not_before: now - chrono::Duration::seconds(1),
start_before: now + chrono::Duration::seconds(59),
max_runtime_seconds: 300,
max_output_bytes: 4096,
};
let bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
let permit = ExecutionPermitPayload {
domain: "rmm.execution-permit".into(),
schema_version: 1,
grant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
authorization_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
tenant_id: job.tenant_id,
asset_id: job.asset_id,
agent_id: job.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
job_id: job.job_id,
attempt_id: job.attempt_id,
plan_hash: hash(b"approved fixture plan"),
job_payload_hash: hash(&bytes),
action: "run_script".into(),
execution_identity: "root".into(),
not_before: job.not_before,
start_before: job.start_before,
max_runtime_seconds: 300,
key_id: hash(&raw),
};
let permit_bytes = encode(&permit).unwrap();
let signature = Signer::new_without_digest(&key)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&permit_bytes)
.unwrap();
(
binding,
Request {
job_bytes: bytes,
permit_bytes,
signature,
plan_hash: permit.plan_hash,
authorization_id: permit.authorization_id,
},
key,
now,
)
}
#[test]
fn narrow_manifest_exact_bytes_and_code_pins() {
let (config, m) = manifest(true);
validate_manifest(&m, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).unwrap();
for field in [
"provider_sha256",
"hook_sha256",
"runtime_sha256",
"transaction_sha256",
"apt_config_sha256",
] {
let mut v = serde_json::to_value(&m).unwrap();
v[field] = serde_json::json!("0".repeat(64));
let changed: AptExecutionManifest = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
assert!(
validate_manifest(&changed, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).is_err(),
"{field}"
);
}
let mut changed = m.clone();
changed.transaction_bytes.push(b' ');
assert!(validate_manifest(&changed, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).is_err());
changed.transaction_sha256 = hash(&changed.transaction_bytes);
validate_manifest(&changed, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).unwrap(); // exact approved whitespace is retained
changed.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0].new_version = "1.1".into();
assert!(validate_manifest(&changed, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn bootstrap_is_not_normal_script_or_production_and_recipe_is_local_policy() {
let (mut config, m) = manifest(true);
for action in ["run_script", "ensure_package", "apply_updates"] {
assert!(validate_manifest(&m, action, &config).is_err());
}
config.allow_fixture_bootstrap = false;
assert!(validate_manifest(&m, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).is_err());
config.allow_fixture_bootstrap = true;
config.execution_profile = "production".into();
assert!(config.validate().is_err());
config.execution_profile = "dev-test".into();
config.allowed_recipes = vec![UPDATE_RECIPE.into()];
assert!(validate_manifest(&m, "apt_native_acceptance", &config).is_err());
let mut changed = m.clone();
changed
.resolved_apt_transaction
.packages
.push(changed.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0].clone());
assert!(changed.resolved_apt_transaction.validate_fixture().is_err());
}
#[test]
fn duplicate_fields_aliases_and_unsigned_additions_never_authorize() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = signed_request();
let (config, _) = manifest(false);
let (job, _) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
assert!(
validate_signed_manifest(&job, &request.job_bytes, &config)
.unwrap_err()
.to_string()
.contains("APT_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED")
);
let mut forged = request.clone();
forged.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(prepare(&binding, &forged, &config, now).is_err());
forged = request.clone();
let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&forged.job_bytes).unwrap();
v["action"]["apt_manifest"] = serde_json::to_value(manifest(false).1).unwrap();
forged.job_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&v).unwrap();
assert!(prepare(&binding, &forged, &config, now).is_err()); // old signed permit cannot bind any extra field
let raw = br#"{"action":"apply_updates","apt_manifest":null,"apt_manifest":null}"#;
assert!(serde_json::from_slice::<ActionCarrier>(raw).is_err());
let mut m = serde_json::to_value(manifest(false).1).unwrap();
m["parameters"] = serde_json::json!({});
assert!(serde_json::from_value::<AptExecutionManifest>(m).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn create_only_payloads_fsync_and_hostile_files_fail_closed() {
let dir = temporary();
let file = dir.join("payload");
write_once(&file, b"known", 0o600).unwrap();
assert_eq!(fs::read(&file).unwrap(), b"known");
assert!(write_once(&file, b"replacement", 0o600).is_err());
let link = dir.join("link");
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&file, &link).unwrap();
assert!(write_once(&link, b"replacement", 0o600).is_err());
assert!(read_sealed(&file, 64).is_err()); // never accept this unprivileged /tmp store as root trusted
assert!(verify_installation().is_err()); // no deployment/mutation during tests
fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn no_artifact_or_record_is_not_success() {
let (_, m) = manifest(true);
let (binding, request, _, now) = signed_request();
let (_, p) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
assert!(verify_prefetched(&m, &p).is_err());
assert!(
map_driver_result(
br#"{"effect_state":"verified","code":"POSTCONDITIONS_VERIFIED","evidence":{}}"#,
Some(0),
false,
&m,
"ledger"
)
.is_err()
);
assert!(map_driver_result(b"not-json", Some(0), false, &m, "ledger").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn structured_effect_state_not_process_exit_and_armed_failures_stay_unknown() {
let (_, m) = manifest(true);
let ledger = "ledger-1";
let p = &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0];
let result = serde_json::json!({"effect_state":"verified","code":"POSTCONDITIONS_VERIFIED","evidence":{
"test_acceptance":true,"noProductionEvidence":true,"test_result_id":m.test_result_id,"native_record_sha256":"a".repeat(64),
"snapshot_sha256":"b".repeat(64),"fixture_payload_sha256":hash(b"1.0\n"),"effect_armed_ledger_id":ledger,"reboot_required":false,
"packages":[{"name":p.name,"architecture":p.architecture,"version":p.new_version}]}});
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&result).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), true, &m, ledger)
.unwrap()
.state,
"succeeded"
);
assert!(map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(1), true, &m, ledger).is_err());
assert!(map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), true, &m, "wrong").is_err());
let failed = serde_json::json!({"effect_state":"known_failed","code":"START_DEADLINE","evidence":{"test_acceptance":true,"noProductionEvidence":true}});
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&failed).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), false, &m, ledger)
.unwrap()
.state,
"failed"
);
assert_eq!(
map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), true, &m, ledger)
.unwrap()
.state,
"unknown"
);
}
#[test]
fn mapped_unknown_keeps_parent_resource_reservation() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = signed_request();
let (_, p) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let dir = temporary();
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let mut db = crate::open_ledger(&dir, uid).unwrap();
crate::consume(&mut db, &p).unwrap();
crate::save_start(&db, &p, &request).unwrap();
let (_, m) = manifest(false);
let result = map_driver_result(
br#"{"effect_state":"unknown","code":"EFFECT_UNCERTAIN","evidence":{}}"#,
Some(0),
true,
&m,
"ledger",
)
.unwrap();
crate::finish(&db, &p, &result).unwrap();
let mut next = p.clone();
next.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
next.job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(crate::consume(&mut db, &next).is_err());
drop(db);
fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn verified_no_change_is_bound_not_bootstrap_and_consumes_attempt_once() {
let (_, m) = manifest(false);
let ledger = "ledger-noop";
let p = &m.resolved_apt_transaction.packages[0];
let result = serde_json::json!({"effect_state":"verified_no_change","code":"POSTCONDITION_ALREADY_MET","evidence":{
"changed":false,"already_desired":true,"postcondition_already_met":true,"transaction_executed":false,
"snapshot_sha256":m.resolved_apt_transaction.baseline_sha256,"effect_armed_ledger_id":ledger,
"fixture_payload_sha256":hash(format!("{}\n",p.new_version).as_bytes()),"reboot_required":false,
"packages":[{"name":p.name,"architecture":p.architecture,"version":p.new_version}]}});
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&result).unwrap();
let outcome = map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), false, &m, ledger).unwrap();
assert_eq!(outcome.state, "succeeded");
assert_eq!(outcome.evidence["apt"]["changed"], false);
assert!(map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), true, &m, ledger).is_err());
assert!(map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), false, &m, "other-ledger").is_err());
assert!(map_driver_result(&bytes, Some(0), false, &manifest(true).1, ledger).is_err());
for (field, value) in [
("changed", serde_json::json!(true)),
("transaction_executed", serde_json::json!(true)),
("snapshot_sha256", serde_json::json!("0".repeat(64))),
("packages", serde_json::json!([])),
] {
let mut bad = result.clone();
bad["evidence"][field] = value;
assert!(
map_driver_result(
&serde_json::to_vec(&bad).unwrap(),
Some(0),
false,
&m,
ledger
)
.is_err()
);
}
let (binding, request, _, now) = signed_request();
let (_, permit) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let dir = temporary();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions.
let mut db = crate::open_ledger(&dir, unsafe { libc::geteuid() }).unwrap();
crate::consume(&mut db, &permit).unwrap();
crate::save_start(&db, &permit, &request).unwrap();
crate::finish(&db, &permit, &outcome).unwrap();
assert!(crate::consume(&mut db, &permit).is_err());
let mut another_grant = permit.clone();
another_grant.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(crate::consume(&mut db, &another_grant).is_err());
drop(db);
fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
}
+328
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
//! Typed, root-peer authenticated synchronization/policy IPC. No action or
//! readiness flag supplied by the network process grants root authority.
use crate::{
Binding,
readiness::Identity,
reconcile::{SignedResponse, Snapshot},
};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
use std::{
fs,
io::{Read, Write},
os::{
fd::AsRawFd,
unix::{
fs::{FileTypeExt, MetadataExt},
net::UnixStream,
},
},
path::Path,
time::Duration,
};
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "operation", deny_unknown_fields)]
pub enum Request {
#[serde(rename = "sync_snapshot_v1")]
Snapshot {
challenge: Uuid,
identity: Identity,
generation: u64,
},
#[serde(rename = "sync_apply_v1")]
Apply {
challenge: Uuid,
identity: Identity,
response: SignedResponse,
request_bytes: Vec<u8>,
},
#[serde(rename = "general_policy_v1")]
Policy { challenge: Uuid, identity: Identity },
}
impl Request {
pub fn binding(&self) -> (Uuid, &Identity) {
match self {
Self::Snapshot {
challenge,
identity,
..
}
| Self::Apply {
challenge,
identity,
..
}
| Self::Policy {
challenge,
identity,
} => (*challenge, identity),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Policy {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub profile: String,
pub identity: Identity,
pub allowed_services: Vec<String>,
pub allow_root_scripts: bool,
pub allow_reboot: bool,
}
impl Policy {
pub fn sha256(&self) -> Result<String> {
Ok(rmm_domain::jobs::hash(&serde_json::to_vec(self)?))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Response {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub challenge: Uuid,
pub identity: Identity,
pub profile: String,
pub policy_sha256: String,
pub policy: Option<Policy>,
pub snapshot: Option<Snapshot>,
pub unlocked_grants: Vec<Uuid>,
pub ledger_device: u64,
pub ledger_inode: u64,
pub lock_device: u64,
pub lock_inode: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct GeneralPin {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub profile: String,
pub identity: Identity,
pub policy_sha256: String,
}
impl GeneralPin {
pub fn read(path: &Path, binding: &Binding) -> Result<Self> {
trusted(path, false)?;
ensure!(fs::metadata(path)?.len() <= 8192, "POLICY_PIN_LIMIT");
let pin: Self = serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(path)?)?;
ensure!(
pin.schema_version == 1
&& pin.profile == "general"
&& pin.identity == Identity::from_binding(binding)?
&& digest(&pin.policy_sha256),
"POLICY_PIN_BINDING"
);
Ok(pin)
}
}
fn digest(s: &str) -> bool {
s.len() == 64
&& s.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b))
}
pub fn trusted(path: &Path, socket: bool) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(path.is_absolute(), "HELPER_ABSOLUTE_PATH");
for (index, parent) in path.ancestors().enumerate() {
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(parent)?;
ensure!(
!m.file_type().is_symlink()
&& m.uid() == 0
&& (m.mode() & 0o022 == 0 || (socket && index == 0 && m.mode() & 0o007 == 0)),
"UNTRUSTED_HELPER_PATH"
);
}
ensure!(
if socket {
fs::symlink_metadata(path)?.file_type().is_socket()
} else {
fs::metadata(path)?.is_file()
},
"HELPER_PATH_TYPE"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn exchange<Q: Serialize, R: DeserializeOwned>(
socket: &Path,
request: &Q,
timeout: Duration,
max_response: usize,
) -> Result<R> {
trusted(socket, true)?;
let mut stream = UnixStream::connect(socket)?;
let mut credentials = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::ucred>::uninit();
let mut size = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: live socket and correctly aligned writable credentials storage.
ensure!(
unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
credentials.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut size,
)
} == 0
&& size as usize == std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>(),
"HELPER_PEER_CREDENTIALS"
);
// SAFETY: successful getsockopt initialized the full credentials.
ensure!(
unsafe { credentials.assume_init() }.uid == 0,
"HELPER_PEER_NOT_ROOT"
);
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(timeout))?;
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(request)?;
ensure!(
bytes.len() <= 8 * 1024 * 1024,
"HELPER_CONTROL_REQUEST_LIMIT"
);
stream.write_all(&u32::try_from(bytes.len())?.to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
let mut length = [0; 4];
stream.read_exact(&mut length)?;
let length = u32::from_be_bytes(length) as usize;
ensure!(length <= max_response, "HELPER_CONTROL_RESPONSE_LIMIT");
let mut bytes = vec![0; length];
stream.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
Ok(serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)?)
}
pub fn call(socket: &Path, binding: &Binding, request: &Request) -> Result<Response> {
let response: Response = exchange(socket, request, Duration::from_secs(10), 8 * 1024 * 1024)?;
validate_response(request, &response, binding)?;
Ok(response)
}
pub fn validate_response(request: &Request, response: &Response, binding: &Binding) -> Result<()> {
let (challenge, identity) = request.binding();
ensure!(
!challenge.is_nil()
&& response.schema_version == 1
&& response.challenge == challenge
&& &response.identity == identity
&& response.identity == Identity::from_binding(binding)?
&& matches!(response.profile.as_str(), "general" | "apt_only")
&& response.ledger_inode != 0
&& response.lock_inode != 0,
"HELPER_CONTROL_RESPONSE_BINDING"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn general_probe(socket: &Path, binding: &Binding, pin: &GeneralPin) -> Result<Response> {
let request = Request::Policy {
challenge: Uuid::new_v4(),
identity: Identity::from_binding(binding)?,
};
let response = call(socket, binding, &request)?;
let policy = response.policy.as_ref().context("GENERAL_POLICY_MISSING")?;
ensure!(
response.profile == "general"
&& policy.profile == "general"
&& response.policy_sha256 == pin.policy_sha256
&& policy.sha256()? == pin.policy_sha256
&& policy.identity == pin.identity,
"GENERAL_POLICY_PROOF_MISMATCH"
);
Ok(response)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn binding() -> Binding {
Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
public_key_hex: hex::encode(
openssl::pkey::PKey::generate_ed25519()
.unwrap()
.raw_public_key()
.unwrap(),
),
}
}
#[test]
fn control_nonce_identity_and_profile_are_not_unsigned_readiness() {
let b = binding();
let identity = Identity::from_binding(&b).unwrap();
let challenge = Uuid::new_v4();
let q = Request::Policy {
challenge,
identity: identity.clone(),
};
let mut r = Response {
schema_version: 1,
challenge,
identity,
profile: "general".into(),
policy_sha256: "ab".repeat(32),
policy: None,
snapshot: None,
unlocked_grants: vec![],
ledger_device: 1,
ledger_inode: 2,
lock_device: 1,
lock_inode: 3,
};
validate_response(&q, &r, &b).unwrap();
r.challenge = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(validate_response(&q, &r, &b).is_err());
r.challenge = challenge;
r.identity.assignment_version = 2;
assert!(validate_response(&q, &r, &b).is_err());
r.identity = Identity::from_binding(&b).unwrap();
r.profile = "fake_root".into();
assert!(validate_response(&q, &r, &b).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn apply_preserves_original_signed_bytes_and_rejects_unlock_additions() {
let b = binding();
let q = Request::Apply {
challenge: Uuid::new_v4(),
identity: Identity::from_binding(&b).unwrap(),
response: SignedResponse {
decision_bytes: b" exact signed bytes\n".to_vec(),
signature: vec![7; 64],
},
request_bytes: vec![10, 3, 1, 2, 3],
};
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&q).unwrap();
let roundtrip: Request = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap();
let Request::Apply {
response,
request_bytes,
..
} = roundtrip
else {
panic!("wrong operation")
};
assert_eq!(response.decision_bytes, b" exact signed bytes\n");
assert_eq!(request_bytes, vec![10, 3, 1, 2, 3]);
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(q).unwrap();
value["unlock"] = serde_json::json!(true);
assert!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(value).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn general_policy_hash_binds_identity_units_and_broad_admin_flags() {
let b = binding();
let p = Policy {
schema_version: 1,
profile: "general".into(),
identity: Identity::from_binding(&b).unwrap(),
allowed_services: vec!["rmm-acceptance.service".into()],
allow_root_scripts: false,
allow_reboot: false,
};
let old = p.sha256().unwrap();
let mut changed = p.clone();
changed.allow_root_scripts = true;
assert_ne!(old, changed.sha256().unwrap());
changed = p.clone();
changed.allowed_services.push("other.service".into());
assert_ne!(old, changed.sha256().unwrap());
changed = p;
changed.identity.assignment_version += 1;
assert_ne!(old, changed.sha256().unwrap());
}
}
+466
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
//! Independently usable authorization boundary. No bearer credentials or keys
//! received with a job are trusted. Both processes keep their own consumption DB.
extern crate self as rmm_privileged_helper;
pub mod apt;
pub mod control;
pub mod readiness;
pub mod reconcile;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use openssl::{
pkey::{Id, PKey},
sign::Verifier,
};
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{fs, os::unix::fs::MetadataExt, path::Path};
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SigningKey {
pub key_id: String,
pub algorithm: String,
pub schema_version: u32,
pub public_key_hex: String,
}
impl SigningKey {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
ensure!(
self.algorithm == "Ed25519"
&& self.schema_version == 1
&& raw.len() == 32
&& self.key_id == hash(&raw),
"SIGNING_KEY_PROFILE"
);
PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(&raw, Id::ED25519)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn read(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<Self> {
private_path(path, uid, false)?;
ensure!(fs::metadata(path)?.len() <= 4096, "SIGNING_KEY_SIZE");
let key: Self = serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(path)?)?;
key.validate()?;
Ok(key)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Binding {
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
pub asset_id: Uuid,
pub agent_id: Uuid,
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
pub assignment_version: u64,
pub public_key_hex: String,
}
impl Binding {
pub fn job(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<JobPayload> {
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 65536, "JOB_SIZE");
let j: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
ensure!(
j.schema_version == 1
&& j.tenant_id == self.tenant_id
&& j.asset_id == self.asset_id
&& j.agent_id == self.agent_id
&& j.enrollment_generation == self.enrollment_generation
&& j.assignment_version == self.assignment_version,
"IDENTITY_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
j.action.validate()
&& (1..=3600).contains(&j.max_runtime_seconds)
&& (1..=262144).contains(&j.max_output_bytes)
&& j.not_before < j.start_before,
"INVALID_JOB"
);
Ok(j)
}
pub fn verify(
&self,
request: &Request,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
let job = self.job(&request.job_bytes)?;
ensure!(
request.permit_bytes.len() <= 8192 && request.signature.len() == 64,
"PERMIT_SIZE"
);
let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
ensure!(raw.len() == 32, "TRUST_KEY_SIZE");
let key = PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(&raw, Id::ED25519)?;
ensure!(
Verifier::new_without_digest(&key)?
.verify_oneshot(&request.signature, &request.permit_bytes)?,
"INVALID_SIGNATURE"
);
let p: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
ensure!(
p.domain == "rmm.execution-permit"
&& p.schema_version == 1
&& p.key_id == hash(&raw)
&& !p.grant_id.is_nil()
&& !p.authorization_id.is_nil(),
"PERMIT_DOMAIN"
);
ensure!(
p.authorization_id == request.authorization_id
&& p.plan_hash == request.plan_hash
&& p.plan_hash.len() == 64
&& hex::decode(&p.plan_hash)?.len() == 32
&& p.job_payload_hash == hash(&request.job_bytes)
&& p.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
&& p.asset_id == job.asset_id
&& p.agent_id == job.agent_id
&& p.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
&& p.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
&& p.job_id == job.job_id
&& p.attempt_id == job.attempt_id
&& p.action == job.action.name()
&& p.execution_identity == job.execution_identity
&& p.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds,
"PERMIT_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
p.not_before >= job.not_before
&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
&& p.not_before < p.start_before
&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
&& now >= p.not_before
&& now < p.start_before,
"PERMIT_TIME"
);
Ok((job, p))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Request {
pub job_bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub permit_bytes: Vec<u8>,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub plan_hash: String,
pub authorization_id: Uuid,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Outcome {
pub state: String,
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
pub output_truncated: bool,
pub reboot_required: bool,
pub evidence: serde_json::Value,
pub error_code: String,
}
impl Outcome {
pub fn unknown(code: &str) -> Self {
Self {
state: "unknown".into(),
stdout: vec![],
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: None,
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":false}),
error_code: code.into(),
}
}
}
/// Config and journal directories must already be bootstrapped by the intended
/// owner; do not silently chmod a hostile existing path or follow symlinks.
pub fn private_path(path: &Path, uid: u32, directory: bool) -> Result<()> {
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(path)?;
ensure!(
!m.file_type().is_symlink()
&& m.uid() == uid
&& m.mode() & 0o077 == 0
&& if directory { m.is_dir() } else { m.is_file() },
"UNSAFE_LOCAL_PATH"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn lock_state(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<fs::File> {
use fs2::FileExt;
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
private_path(dir, uid, true)?;
let f = fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(false)
.mode(0o600)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(dir.join("executor.lock"))?;
private_path(&dir.join("executor.lock"), uid, false)?;
f.try_lock_exclusive()?;
Ok(f)
}
pub fn open_ledger(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<rusqlite::Connection> {
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
let path = dir.join("consumption.sqlite");
let f = fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(false)
.mode(0o600)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(&path)?;
f.sync_all()?;
private_path(&path, uid, false)?;
let db = rusqlite::Connection::open(path)?;
db.execute_batch("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL; PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE; PRAGMA max_page_count=16384;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS consumed(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, agent TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
job TEXT NOT NULL, attempt TEXT NOT NULL, result BLOB, UNIQUE(agent,generation,job,attempt));
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS execution_evidence(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, start BLOB NOT NULL, outcome BLOB);")?;
let check: String = db.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
ensure!(check == "ok", "JOURNAL_INTEGRITY");
fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
Ok(db)
}
pub fn consume(db: &mut rusqlite::Connection, p: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> Result<()> {
let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
// Unknown effects retain the global device lock, including across restart.
let unresolved: i64 = tx.query_row(
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
[],
|r| r.get(0),
)?;
ensure!(unresolved == 0, "UNRESOLVED_EFFECT_RESOURCE_LOCKED");
tx.execute(
"INSERT INTO consumed(grant_id,agent,generation,job,attempt) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,?4,?5)",
rusqlite::params![
p.grant_id.to_string(),
p.agent_id.to_string(),
p.enrollment_generation,
p.job_id.to_string(),
p.attempt_id.to_string()
],
)?;
tx.commit()?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn finish(
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
p: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
outcome: &Outcome,
) -> Result<()> {
db.execute(
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1",
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?],
)?;
// Unknown / awaiting reboot keep the resource reserved until a real sync
// protocol exists. Never unlock on a process exit or a network reconnect.
if outcome.state != "unknown" && outcome.state != "awaiting_reboot" {
ensure!(
db.execute(
"UPDATE consumed SET result=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1 AND result IS NULL",
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?]
)? == 1,
"CONSUMPTION_NOT_FOUND"
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Persist the original boot and exact signed request BEFORE any reboot/effect.
/// Awaiting/unknown outcomes never release consumed.result's resource lock.
pub fn save_start(
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
request: &Request,
) -> Result<()> {
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes)?;
let recorded_at = Utc::now();
let deadline = match job.action {
rmm_domain::jobs::Action::Reboot {
reconnect_timeout_seconds,
..
} => Some(recorded_at + chrono::Duration::seconds(reconnect_timeout_seconds.into())),
_ => None,
};
let evidence = serde_json::json!({"previous_boot_id":rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?,
"reserved_at":recorded_at,"reconnect_deadline":deadline,"request":request,
"reauthentication_required":true,"postconditions_passed":false});
db.execute(
"INSERT INTO execution_evidence(grant_id,start) VALUES(?1,?2)",
rusqlite::params![permit.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(&evidence)?],
)?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn script(job: &JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
use rmm_agent_linux::actions::{Interpreter, ScriptRequest, run_script};
let rmm_domain::jobs::Action::RunScript {
interpreter,
script_utf8,
arguments,
expected_stdout,
} = &job.action
else {
anyhow::bail!("NOT_SCRIPT")
};
let interpreter = match interpreter.as_str() {
"posix_sh" => Interpreter::PosixSh,
"bash" => Interpreter::Bash,
_ => anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_INTERPRETER"),
};
let request = ScriptRequest::new(
script_utf8.as_bytes().to_vec(),
interpreter,
arguments.clone(),
std::time::Duration::from_secs(job.max_runtime_seconds.into()),
job.max_output_bytes as usize,
)?;
let output = run_script(&request)?;
let passed = output.code == Some(0)
&& !output.timed_out
&& expected_stdout
.as_ref()
.is_none_or(|s| !output.truncated && output.stdout == s.as_bytes());
Ok(Outcome {
state: if output.timed_out || output.code.is_none() {
"unknown"
} else if passed {
"succeeded"
} else {
"failed"
}
.into(),
stdout: output.stdout,
stderr: output.stderr,
exit_code: output.code,
output_truncated: output.truncated,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":passed}),
error_code: if passed {
""
} else if output.timed_out {
"TIMEOUT_EFFECT_UNKNOWN"
} else {
"SCRIPT_POSTCONDITION_FAILED"
}
.into(),
})
}
pub fn read_binding(path: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<Binding> {
private_path(path, uid, false)?;
let bytes = fs::read(path)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 8192, "CONFIG_SIZE");
serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).context("invalid provisioned binding")
}
/// A fresh online permit is necessary but does not prove the host clock. Use
/// Linux's synchronization/error status, never a gateway-supplied time override.
pub fn clock_trusted() -> bool {
let mut state = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::timex>::zeroed();
// SAFETY: zero modes request a read-only query into initialized storage.
let status = unsafe { libc::adjtimex(state.as_mut_ptr()) };
// SAFETY: storage was zero initialized, including on an error return.
let state = unsafe { state.assume_init() };
status >= 0
&& status != libc::TIME_ERROR
&& state.status & libc::STA_UNSYNC == 0
&& state.maxerror >= 0
&& state.maxerror <= 5_000_000
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct TrustedClock {
wall: DateTime<Utc>,
monotonic: std::time::Instant,
}
/// Local client authenticates the root process as well as the root-owned socket.
/// A malicious same-user Unix server must not be able to forge helper success.
pub fn invoke(socket: &Path, request: &Request, max_runtime_seconds: u32) -> Result<Outcome> {
use std::{
io::{Read, Write},
os::{
fd::AsRawFd,
unix::{fs::FileTypeExt, net::UnixStream},
},
time::Duration,
};
let parent = fs::symlink_metadata(socket.parent().context("socket parent")?)?;
let meta = fs::symlink_metadata(socket)?;
ensure!(
parent.is_dir()
&& !parent.file_type().is_symlink()
&& parent.uid() == 0
&& parent.mode() & 0o022 == 0
&& meta.file_type().is_socket()
&& meta.uid() == 0
&& meta.mode() & 0o007 == 0,
"UNTRUSTED_HELPER_SOCKET"
);
let mut stream = UnixStream::connect(socket)?;
let mut credentials = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::ucred>::uninit();
let mut size = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: correct writable ucred storage and length for a live Unix socket.
ensure!(
unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
credentials.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut size,
)
} == 0
&& size as usize == std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>(),
"HELPER_PEER_CREDENTIALS"
);
// SAFETY: getsockopt initialized the full ucred on success.
ensure!(
unsafe { credentials.assume_init() }.uid == 0,
"HELPER_PEER_NOT_ROOT"
);
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(
u64::from(max_runtime_seconds) + 10,
)))?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(request)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 512 * 1024, "HELPER_REQUEST_SIZE");
stream.write_all(&(u32::try_from(bytes.len())?).to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
let mut length = [0; 4];
stream.read_exact(&mut length)?;
let length = u32::from_be_bytes(length) as usize;
ensure!(length <= 2 * 1024 * 1024, "HELPER_RESPONSE_SIZE");
let mut bytes = vec![0; length];
stream.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
let outcome: Outcome = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)?;
ensure!(
outcome.stdout.len() + outcome.stderr.len() <= 262144,
"HELPER_OUTPUT_LIMIT"
);
Ok(outcome)
}
impl Default for TrustedClock {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl TrustedClock {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
wall: Utc::now(),
monotonic: std::time::Instant::now(),
}
}
pub fn trusted(&self) -> bool {
let elapsed = Utc::now() - self.wall;
let skew = elapsed.num_milliseconds()
- i64::try_from(self.monotonic.elapsed().as_millis()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
clock_trusted() && skew.unsigned_abs() <= 5000
}
}
+733
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
use rmm_domain::jobs::Action;
use rmm_privileged_helper::{
Binding, Outcome, Request, consume, control, finish, lock_state, open_ledger, private_path,
reconcile,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::{
fs,
io::{Read, Write},
os::{
fd::AsRawFd,
unix::{
fs::{MetadataExt, PermissionsExt},
net::{UnixListener, UnixStream},
},
},
path::PathBuf,
time::Duration,
};
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct Config {
#[serde(default)]
profile: HelperProfile,
binding: Binding,
#[serde(default)]
signing_key_file: Option<PathBuf>,
agent_uid: u32,
socket_gid: u32,
socket: PathBuf,
state: PathBuf,
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
allow_reboot: bool,
allow_root_scripts: bool,
#[serde(default)]
apt_provider: Option<rmm_privileged_helper::apt::ProviderConfig>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
enum HelperProfile {
#[default]
General,
AptOnly,
}
impl Config {
fn general_policy(&self) -> Result<control::Policy> {
Ok(control::Policy {
schema_version: 1,
profile: "general".into(),
identity: rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::Identity::from_binding(&self.binding)?,
allowed_services: self.allowed_services.clone(),
allow_root_scripts: self.allow_root_scripts,
allow_reboot: self.allow_reboot,
})
}
fn validate_profile(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.state.as_path()
== std::path::Path::new(rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SHARED_STATE),
"SHARED_HELPER_LEDGER_REQUIRED"
);
if self.profile == HelperProfile::AptOnly {
ensure!(
self.agent_uid == 993
&& self.socket.as_path()
== std::path::Path::new(rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SOCKET)
&& self.allowed_services.is_empty()
&& !self.allow_reboot
&& !self.allow_root_scripts
&& self.apt_provider.is_some(),
"APT_ONLY_PROFILE"
);
} else {
ensure!(
self.apt_provider.is_none()
&& self.socket.as_path()
!= std::path::Path::new(rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SOCKET),
"GENERAL_HELPER_CANNOT_RUN_APT"
);
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
enum Incoming {
Control(control::Request),
Probe(rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::Request),
Job(Request),
}
fn peer_allowed(stream: &UnixStream, uid: u32) -> Result<()> {
let mut credentials = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::ucred>::uninit();
let mut size = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: getsockopt receives correctly aligned writable storage and length.
ensure!(
unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
credentials.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut size,
)
} == 0,
"PEER_CREDENTIALS"
);
ensure!(
size as usize == std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>(),
"PEER_SIZE"
);
// SAFETY: successful SO_PEERCRED initialized the complete ucred.
ensure!(
unsafe { credentials.assume_init() }.uid == uid && uid != 0,
"PEER_DENIED"
);
Ok(())
}
fn policy(config: &Config, job: &rmm_domain::jobs::JobPayload) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
job.execution_identity == "root",
"HELPER_REQUIRES_EXPLICIT_ROOT_IDENTITY"
);
if rmm_privileged_helper::apt::is_apt_action(job) {
ensure!(
config.profile == HelperProfile::AptOnly,
"APT_REQUIRES_DEDICATED_HELPER"
);
return rmm_privileged_helper::apt::policy_header(
job,
config
.apt_provider
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED"))?,
);
}
ensure!(
config.profile != HelperProfile::AptOnly,
"APT_ONLY_CROSS_ACTION_DENIED"
);
match &job.action {
Action::RunScript { interpreter, .. } => {
ensure!(config.allow_root_scripts, "ROOT_SCRIPT_DENIED");
let available = match interpreter.as_str() {
"posix_sh" => rmm_agent_linux::actions::Interpreter::PosixSh.available(),
"bash" => rmm_agent_linux::actions::Interpreter::Bash.available(),
_ => false,
};
ensure!(available, "ROOT_INTERPRETER_UNAVAILABLE");
}
Action::SetServiceState { unit, state } => {
ensure!(
config.allowed_services.contains(unit)
&& matches!(state.as_str(), "running" | "stopped"),
"SERVICE_DENIED"
);
rmm_agent_linux::actions::ServiceUnit::new(unit)?;
// Existing provider has a 120s bounded native service timeout.
ensure!(job.max_runtime_seconds >= 180, "SERVICE_RUNTIME_TOO_SHORT");
}
Action::Reboot { .. } => {
ensure!(
config.allow_reboot && job.max_runtime_seconds >= 60,
"REBOOT_DENIED"
);
}
Action::QueryLogs { unit, .. } => {
ensure!(
config.allowed_services.contains(unit) && job.max_runtime_seconds >= 20,
"ROOT_LOG_UNIT_DENIED"
);
}
// The separate APT bridge requires a complete preserved signed manifest;
// legacy package actions never fall through into a script/provider.
_ => anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"),
}
Ok(())
}
fn execute(job: &rmm_domain::jobs::JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
use rmm_agent_linux::actions::*;
if matches!(job.action, Action::RunScript { .. }) {
return rmm_privileged_helper::script(job);
}
if let Action::QueryLogs {
unit,
since,
until,
max_lines,
} = &job.action
{
let unit = ServiceUnit::new(unit)?;
let request = rmm_agent_linux::inventory::JournalRequest::new(
unit.clone(),
std::slice::from_ref(&unit),
u64::try_from(since.timestamp())?,
u64::try_from(until.timestamp())?,
*max_lines as usize,
job.max_output_bytes as usize,
)?
.precise_window(*since, *until)?;
let observation = rmm_agent_linux::inventory::query_journal(&request);
let valid = observation.quality == rmm_agent_linux::inventory::Quality::Valid;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&observation)?;
ensure!(
bytes.len() <= job.max_output_bytes as usize,
"LOG_SERIALIZED_OUTPUT_LIMIT"
);
return Ok(Outcome {
state: if valid { "succeeded" } else { "failed" }.into(),
stdout: bytes,
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: None,
output_truncated: observation.truncated,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":valid,"cursor_status":"not_advanced_no_ack_contract"}),
error_code: if valid {
String::new()
} else {
observation
.error_code
.unwrap_or_else(|| "LOG_PROVIDER_FAILED".into())
},
});
}
let mut provider = OsActionProvider::new(NativeCommandRunner);
let result = match &job.action {
Action::SetServiceState { unit, state } => provider.set_service_state(&ServiceRequest {
unit: ServiceUnit::new(unit)?,
desired: if state == "running" {
DesiredServiceState::Running
} else {
DesiredServiceState::Stopped
},
})?,
Action::Reboot { .. } => {
provider.reboot(&RebootRequest::new(&rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?)?)?
}
_ => anyhow::bail!("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"),
};
let passed = result.state == ActionState::Verified;
Ok(Outcome {
state: match result.state {
ActionState::Verified => "succeeded",
ActionState::Failed => "failed",
ActionState::Unknown => "unknown",
ActionState::AwaitingReboot => "awaiting_reboot",
}
.into(),
stdout: vec![],
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: None,
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: result.reboot_required.unwrap_or(false),
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":passed,"previous_boot_id":rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?}),
error_code: if passed {
""
} else {
"EFFECT_REQUIRES_RECONCILIATION"
}
.into(),
})
}
fn handle(
config: &Config,
db: &mut rusqlite::Connection,
stream: &mut UnixStream,
clock: &rmm_privileged_helper::TrustedClock,
sync: &mut reconcile::HelperSync,
sync_clock: &reconcile::NativeClock,
) -> Result<()> {
use rusqlite::OptionalExtension;
peer_allowed(stream, config.agent_uid)?;
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
let mut size = [0; 4];
stream.read_exact(&mut size)?;
let size = u32::from_be_bytes(size) as usize;
ensure!(size <= 8 * 1024 * 1024, "REQUEST_SIZE");
let mut bytes = vec![0; size];
stream.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
let request: Request = match serde_json::from_slice::<Incoming>(&bytes)? {
Incoming::Job(request) => {
ensure!(size <= 512 * 1024, "JOB_REQUEST_SIZE");
request
}
Incoming::Control(request) => {
let (challenge, identity) = request.binding();
ensure!(
!challenge.is_nil()
&& *identity
== rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::Identity::from_binding(
&config.binding
)?,
"CONTROL_IDENTITY"
);
let guard = reconcile::ExecutorGuard::acquire(&config.state, 0)?;
let (mut snapshot, mut unlocked) = (None, vec![]);
match &request {
control::Request::Snapshot { generation, .. } => {
snapshot = Some(sync.snapshot(
db,
&guard,
*generation,
sync_clock,
&reconcile::NativeBoot,
)?)
}
control::Request::Apply {
response,
request_bytes,
..
} => {
let applied = sync.apply(
db,
&guard,
response,
request_bytes,
sync_clock,
&reconcile::NativeBoot,
)?;
snapshot = Some(applied.snapshot);
unlocked = applied.unlocked_grants;
}
control::Request::Policy { .. } => ensure!(
config.profile == HelperProfile::General,
"GENERAL_POLICY_PROFILE"
),
}
let general = config.profile == HelperProfile::General;
let policy = if general {
Some(config.general_policy()?)
} else {
None
};
let policy_sha256 = if let Some(policy) = &policy {
policy.sha256()?
} else {
rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::stack_sha256(
&config.binding,
config
.apt_provider
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PROVIDER_REQUIRED"))?,
)?
};
let ledger = fs::metadata(config.state.join("consumption.sqlite"))?;
let lock = fs::metadata(config.state.join("executor.lock"))?;
let response = control::Response {
schema_version: 1,
challenge,
identity: identity.clone(),
profile: if general { "general" } else { "apt_only" }.into(),
policy_sha256,
policy,
snapshot,
unlocked_grants: unlocked,
ledger_device: ledger.dev(),
ledger_inode: ledger.ino(),
lock_device: lock.dev(),
lock_inode: lock.ino(),
};
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&response)?;
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 8 * 1024 * 1024, "CONTROL_RESPONSE_LIMIT");
stream.write_all(&u32::try_from(bytes.len())?.to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
return Ok(());
}
Incoming::Probe(request) => {
ensure!(
config.profile == HelperProfile::AptOnly,
"PROBE_REQUIRES_APT_HELPER"
);
let response = rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::answer(
&request,
&config.binding,
config
.apt_provider
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED"))?,
db,
)?;
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&response)?;
stream.write_all(&(u32::try_from(bytes.len())?).to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
return Ok(());
}
};
ensure!(clock.trusted(), "CLOCK_UNTRUSTED");
let (job, permit) = config.binding.verify(&request, chrono::Utc::now())?;
policy(config, &job)?;
// Both profiles use these exact same inodes, locked per effect rather than
// daemon lifetime so the dedicated and general helper can coexist.
let resource = reconcile::ExecutorGuard::acquire(&config.state, 0)?;
let previous: Option<Option<Vec<u8>>> = db
.query_row(
"SELECT COALESCE(result,(SELECT outcome FROM execution_evidence WHERE execution_evidence.grant_id=consumed.grant_id)) FROM consumed WHERE grant_id=?1",
[permit.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| r.get(0),
)
.optional()?;
let outcome = if let Some(previous) = previous {
previous
.map(|b| serde_json::from_slice(&b))
.transpose()?
.unwrap_or_else(|| Outcome::unknown("PREVIOUS_EFFECT_UNRESOLVED"))
} else {
// A probe, signed job, persisted ready bit or another daemon's sync
// cannot open this process's independent mutation gate.
let generation = sync
.active_generation()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("HELPER_SYNC_REQUIRED"))?;
ensure!(
sync.can_start(
db,
&resource,
generation,
sync_clock,
&reconcile::NativeBoot
),
"HELPER_SYNC_REQUIRED"
);
let apt = if rmm_privileged_helper::apt::is_apt_action(&job) {
Some(rmm_privileged_helper::apt::prepare(
&config.binding,
&request,
config
.apt_provider
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED"))?,
chrono::Utc::now(),
)?)
} else {
None
};
consume(db, &permit)?;
rmm_privileged_helper::save_start(db, &permit, &request)?;
let mut outcome =
if !clock.trusted() || config.binding.verify(&request, chrono::Utc::now()).is_err() {
Outcome {
state: "failed".into(),
evidence: serde_json::json!({"not_started":true,"postconditions_passed":false}),
..Outcome::unknown("START_WINDOW_OR_CLOCK_INVALID_BEFORE_EFFECT")
}
} else {
if let Some(apt) = apt {
apt.execute(db)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| Outcome::unknown("APT_HELPER_EFFECT_UNKNOWN"))
} else {
execute(&job).unwrap_or_else(|_| Outcome::unknown("HELPER_EFFECT_UNKNOWN"))
}
};
if rmm_privileged_helper::apt::is_apt_action(&job) {
outcome.evidence["test_acceptance"] =
serde_json::json!(job.action.name() == "apt_native_acceptance");
outcome.evidence["noProductionEvidence"] = serde_json::json!(true);
}
finish(db, &permit, &outcome)?;
outcome
};
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&outcome)?;
stream.write_all(&(u32::try_from(bytes.len())?).to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
Ok(())
}
fn main() -> Result<()> {
let args: Vec<_> = std::env::args_os().skip(1).collect();
if args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--help")] {
println!(
"rmm-privileged-helper [--help|--inspect-general-profile|--inspect-apt-profile|--probe-native|--install-apt-provider]\nRMM_HELPER_CONFIG=/etc/rmm/helper.json (root-owned 0600).\nDaemon mode accepts only authenticated typed IPC; all effects need independent signed Sync and a fresh consumed grant. Administrative install/probe modes are explicit bootstrap actions, never network commands."
);
return Ok(());
}
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions or pointers.
ensure!(unsafe { libc::geteuid() } == 0, "helper must run as root");
if args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--install-apt-provider")] {
return rmm_privileged_helper::apt::install_known_payloads();
}
ensure!(
args.is_empty()
|| args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--probe-native")]
|| args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--inspect-apt-profile")]
|| args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--inspect-general-profile")],
"UNKNOWN_HELPER_MODE"
);
let path = PathBuf::from(
std::env::var("RMM_HELPER_CONFIG").unwrap_or_else(|_| "/etc/rmm/helper.json".into()),
);
private_path(&path, 0, false)?;
ensure!(fs::metadata(&path)?.len() <= 16384, "CONFIG_SIZE");
let mut config: Config = serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(path)?)?;
if let Some(apt) = &config.apt_provider {
apt.validate()?;
}
if let Some(path) = &config.signing_key_file {
ensure!(path.is_absolute(), "HELPER_KEY_PATH_ABSOLUTE");
let key = rmm_privileged_helper::SigningKey::read(path, 0)?;
ensure!(
config.binding.public_key_hex.is_empty()
|| config.binding.public_key_hex == key.public_key_hex,
"HELPER_PROVISIONED_KEY_MISMATCH"
);
config.binding.public_key_hex = key.public_key_hex;
}
config.validate_profile()?;
if args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--inspect-general-profile")] {
ensure!(
config.profile == HelperProfile::General,
"GENERAL_POLICY_PROFILE"
);
let policy = config.general_policy()?;
let pin = control::GeneralPin {
schema_version: 1,
profile: "general".into(),
identity: policy.identity.clone(),
policy_sha256: policy.sha256()?,
};
println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&pin)?);
return Ok(());
}
if config.profile == HelperProfile::AptOnly
&& (args.is_empty() || args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--probe-native")])
{
rmm_privileged_helper::apt::verify_controller_profile()?;
}
if !args.is_empty() {
ensure!(
config.profile == HelperProfile::AptOnly,
"ADMIN_PROBE_REQUIRES_APT_PROFILE"
);
let provider = config
.apt_provider
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED"))?;
if args == [std::ffi::OsString::from("--probe-native")] {
rmm_privileged_helper::apt::verify_installation()?;
let status = std::process::Command::new("/usr/bin/python3")
.args(["-I", rmm_privileged_helper::apt::CODE, "probe-native"])
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin")
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.status()?;
ensure!(status.success(), "APT_NATIVE_PROBE_FAILED");
} else {
let pin = rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::Pin {
schema_version: 1,
profile: "apt_only".into(),
identity: rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::Identity::from_binding(
&config.binding,
)?,
provider_stack_sha256: rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::stack_sha256(
&config.binding,
provider,
)?,
};
println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&pin)?);
}
return Ok(());
}
ensure!(
config.agent_uid != 0 && config.state.is_absolute() && config.socket.is_absolute(),
"CONFIG_BINDING"
);
let mut db = {
let _initialization_lock = lock_state(&config.state, 0)?;
open_ledger(&config.state, 0)?
};
let clock = rmm_privileged_helper::TrustedClock::new();
let sync_clock = reconcile::NativeClock::default();
let mut sync = reconcile::HelperSync::new(config.binding.clone(), &sync_clock)?;
let parent = config
.socket
.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("socket parent"))?;
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(parent)?;
ensure!(
m.is_dir() && !m.file_type().is_symlink() && m.uid() == 0 && m.mode() & 0o022 == 0,
"UNSAFE_SOCKET_DIRECTORY"
);
// Refuse to unlink anything at startup. Bootstrap/recovery must inspect a
// stale socket explicitly rather than replacing an active/hostile endpoint.
let listener = UnixListener::bind(&config.socket)?;
fs::set_permissions(&config.socket, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
let socket = std::ffi::CString::new(config.socket.as_os_str().as_encoded_bytes())?;
// SAFETY: the freshly bound socket is in a root-owned, non-writable parent;
// path is NUL terminated. This does not change any peer's process identity.
ensure!(
unsafe { libc::chown(socket.as_ptr(), 0, config.socket_gid) } == 0,
"SOCKET_GROUP"
);
fs::set_permissions(&config.socket, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o660))?;
for mut stream in listener.incoming().flatten() {
if let Err(error) = handle(
&config,
&mut db,
&mut stream,
&clock,
&mut sync,
&sync_clock,
) {
let text = error.to_string();
let code = if text.len() <= 96
&& text
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_uppercase() || b.is_ascii_digit() || b == b'_')
{
text.as_str()
} else {
"HELPER_VALIDATION_OR_IO_FAILURE"
};
eprintln!("helper request rejected: {code}");
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn apt_only_profile_denies_scripts_services_reboot_and_wrong_shared_state() {
let id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
let mut config:Config=serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"profile":"apt_only",
"binding":{"tenant_id":id,"asset_id":id,"agent_id":id,"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":1,"public_key_hex":"00".repeat(32)},
"agent_uid":993,"socket_gid":993,"socket":rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SOCKET,
"state":rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SHARED_STATE,"allowed_services":[],"allow_reboot":false,"allow_root_scripts":false,
"apt_provider":{"schema_version":1,"execution_profile":"dev-test","allow_fixture_bootstrap":true,
"allowed_recipes":[rmm_privileged_helper::apt::INSTALL_RECIPE],"runtime_sha256":"a".repeat(64),"apt_config_sha256":"b".repeat(64)}})).unwrap();
config.validate_profile().unwrap();
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
for action in [
serde_json::json!({"action":"run_script","interpreter":"posix_sh","script_utf8":"true","arguments":[],"expected_stdout":null}),
serde_json::json!({"action":"set_service_state","unit":"rmm-acceptance.service","state":"running"}),
serde_json::json!({"action":"reboot","reason":"test","reconnect_timeout_seconds":60,"dependency_group":"test"}),
] {
let job:rmm_domain::jobs::JobPayload=serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"schema_version":1,"tenant_id":id,"asset_id":id,"agent_id":id,
"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":1,"job_id":id,"attempt_id":id,"execution_identity":"root",
"not_before":now,"start_before":now+chrono::Duration::minutes(1),"max_runtime_seconds":300,"max_output_bytes":4096,"action":action})).unwrap();
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
}
config.state = "/var/lib/copied-ledger".into();
assert!(config.validate_profile().is_err());
config.state = rmm_privileged_helper::readiness::SHARED_STATE.into();
config.allow_root_scripts = true;
assert!(config.validate_profile().is_err());
config.allow_root_scripts = false;
config.agent_uid = 1000;
assert!(config.validate_profile().is_err());
}
#[test]
fn peer_acl_does_not_trust_request_identity() {
let (a, _b) = UnixStream::pair().unwrap();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions.
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
assert!(peer_allowed(&a, uid.saturating_add(1)).is_err());
assert_eq!(peer_allowed(&a, uid).is_ok(), uid != 0);
}
#[test]
fn helper_requires_explicit_root_identity_and_separate_local_permissions() {
use uuid::Uuid;
let binding = Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
public_key_hex: "00".repeat(32),
};
let mut config = Config {
profile: HelperProfile::General,
signing_key_file: None,
binding: binding.clone(),
agent_uid: 1000,
socket_gid: 1000,
socket: "/run/rmm-helper/control.sock".into(),
state: "/var/lib/rmm-helper".into(),
allowed_services: vec!["rmm-acceptance.service".into()],
allow_reboot: false,
allow_root_scripts: false,
apt_provider: None,
};
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
let mut job = rmm_domain::jobs::JobPayload {
schema_version: 1,
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
action: Action::RunScript {
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
script_utf8: "true".into(),
arguments: vec![],
expected_stdout: None,
},
execution_identity: "agent_service".into(),
not_before: now,
start_before: now + chrono::Duration::minutes(1),
max_runtime_seconds: 180,
max_output_bytes: 4096,
};
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
job.execution_identity = "root".into();
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
config.allow_root_scripts = true;
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_ok());
job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
unit: "not-approved.service".into(),
state: "running".into(),
};
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
unit: "rmm-acceptance.service".into(),
state: "running".into(),
};
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_ok());
job.action = Action::Reboot {
reason: "mock".into(),
reconnect_timeout_seconds: 60,
dependency_group: "test".into(),
};
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
config.allow_reboot = true;
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_ok());
job.action = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"action":"apply_updates","provider":"apt","packages":["hello"],"reboot_policy":"never"
}))
.unwrap();
assert!(policy(&config, &job).is_err());
}
}
+612
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
//! Read-only nonce/identity/profile/stack-bound readiness, never an execution
//! permit. A successful response may offer fixture bootstrap, not acceptance.
use crate::{Binding, apt};
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
use rmm_domain::jobs::hash;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
fs,
io::{Read, Write},
os::{
fd::AsRawFd,
unix::{fs::MetadataExt, net::UnixStream},
},
path::Path,
};
use uuid::Uuid;
pub const SOCKET: &str = "/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock";
pub const SHARED_STATE: &str = "/var/lib/rmm-helper";
pub const UNIT_PATH: &str = "/etc/systemd/system/rmm-apt-helper.service";
pub const UNIT_BYTES: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../deploy/linux/rmm-apt-helper.service");
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Identity {
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
pub asset_id: Uuid,
pub agent_id: Uuid,
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
pub assignment_version: u64,
pub signing_key_id: String,
}
impl Identity {
pub fn from_binding(binding: &Binding) -> Result<Self> {
let public = hex::decode(&binding.public_key_hex)?;
ensure!(public.len() == 32, "APT_PROBE_KEY");
Ok(Self {
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: binding.enrollment_generation,
assignment_version: binding.assignment_version,
signing_key_id: hash(&public),
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Request {
pub operation: String,
pub challenge: Uuid,
pub identity: Identity,
pub expected_stack_sha256: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Response {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub challenge: Uuid,
pub identity: Identity,
pub profile: String,
pub provider_stack_sha256: String,
pub fixture_acceptance_ready: bool,
pub bootstrap_recipes: Vec<String>,
pub accepted_recipes: Vec<String>,
pub ledger_device: u64,
pub ledger_inode: u64,
pub lock_device: u64,
pub lock_inode: u64,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub planning: Option<PlanningResult>,
}
/// Public, fixed-fixture metadata. No full installed-package list, private
/// artifact paths, authorization, readiness or mutation capability is exposed.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct PlanningResult {
pub observed_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
pub fixture_package: Option<FixturePackage>,
pub baseline_sha256: String,
pub sealed_baseline_sha256: String,
pub status_fingerprint: String,
pub dpkg_updates_empty: bool,
pub pending_triggers_empty: bool,
pub runtime: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
pub runtime_sha256: String,
pub provider_sha256: String,
pub hook_sha256: String,
pub apt_config_sha256: String,
pub prefetch: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, PlanningReceipt>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct FixturePackage {
pub version: String,
pub status: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct PlanningReceipt {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub sha256: String,
pub size: u64,
pub sealed_at_ms: i64,
}
impl PlanningResult {
pub fn validate(&self, now: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.observed_at <= now
&& now - self.observed_at < chrono::Duration::seconds(30)
&& self.dpkg_updates_empty
&& self.pending_triggers_empty
&& self.baseline_sha256 == self.sealed_baseline_sha256,
"APT_PLANNING_STATE_OR_TIME"
);
for value in [
&self.baseline_sha256,
&self.status_fingerprint,
&self.runtime_sha256,
&self.provider_sha256,
&self.hook_sha256,
&self.apt_config_sha256,
] {
ensure!(valid_hash(value), "APT_PLANNING_HASH");
}
let runtime = serde_json::to_vec(&self.runtime)?;
ensure!(
runtime.is_ascii()
&& hash(&runtime) == self.runtime_sha256
&& self.runtime.get("apt_config_sha256")
== Some(&serde_json::json!(self.apt_config_sha256)),
"APT_PLANNING_RUNTIME"
);
ensure!(self.prefetch.len() == 2, "APT_PLANNING_PREFETCH");
for sha in [
rmm_domain::apt_transaction::INSTALL_SHA,
rmm_domain::apt_transaction::UPDATE_SHA,
] {
let receipt = self
.prefetch
.get(sha)
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("APT_PLANNING_PREFETCH"))?;
ensure!(
receipt.schema_version == 1
&& receipt.sha256 == sha
&& receipt.size == 20672
&& receipt.sealed_at_ms > 0
&& receipt.sealed_at_ms <= now.timestamp_millis(),
"APT_PLANNING_RECEIPT"
);
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct Pin {
pub schema_version: u32,
pub identity: Identity,
pub profile: String,
pub provider_stack_sha256: String,
}
impl Pin {
pub fn read(path: &Path, binding: &Binding) -> Result<Self> {
trusted_path(path, false)?;
ensure!(fs::metadata(path)?.len() <= 8192, "APT_PROBE_PIN_LIMIT");
let pin: Self = serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(path)?)?;
ensure!(
pin.schema_version == 1
&& pin.profile == "apt_only"
&& pin.identity == Identity::from_binding(binding)?
&& valid_hash(&pin.provider_stack_sha256),
"APT_PROBE_PIN_BINDING"
);
Ok(pin)
}
}
fn valid_hash(value: &str) -> bool {
value.len() == 64
&& value
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b))
}
fn trusted_path(path: &Path, socket: bool) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(path.is_absolute(), "APT_PROBE_ABSOLUTE_PATH");
for (index, parent) in path.ancestors().enumerate() {
let m = fs::symlink_metadata(parent)?;
ensure!(
!m.file_type().is_symlink() && m.uid() == 0 && m.mode() & 0o022 == 0
|| (index == 0
&& socket
&& m.uid() == 0
&& m.mode() & 0o007 == 0
&& !m.file_type().is_symlink()),
"APT_PROBE_UNTRUSTED_PATH"
);
}
if socket {
use std::os::unix::fs::FileTypeExt;
ensure!(
fs::symlink_metadata(path)?.file_type().is_socket(),
"APT_PROBE_NOT_SOCKET"
);
} else {
ensure!(fs::metadata(path)?.is_file(), "APT_PROBE_PIN_TYPE");
}
Ok(())
}
fn root_peer(stream: &UnixStream) -> Result<()> {
let mut credentials = std::mem::MaybeUninit::<libc::ucred>::uninit();
let mut size = std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>() as libc::socklen_t;
// SAFETY: correct live socket and writable, correctly aligned ucred storage.
ensure!(
unsafe {
libc::getsockopt(
stream.as_raw_fd(),
libc::SOL_SOCKET,
libc::SO_PEERCRED,
credentials.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut size,
)
} == 0
&& size as usize == std::mem::size_of::<libc::ucred>(),
"APT_PROBE_PEER"
);
// SAFETY: getsockopt initialized the full object on success.
ensure!(
unsafe { credentials.assume_init() }.uid == 0,
"APT_PROBE_PEER_NOT_ROOT"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn validate_response(request: &Request, response: &Response) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
matches!(
request.operation.as_str(),
"apt_readiness_v1" | "apt_planning_v1"
),
"APT_PROBE_OPERATION"
);
if let Some(planning) = &response.planning {
ensure!(
request.operation == "apt_planning_v1",
"APT_PLANNING_OPERATION"
);
planning.validate(chrono::Utc::now())?;
}
if request.operation == "apt_planning_v1" {
ensure!(
response.planning.is_some()
&& !response.fixture_acceptance_ready
&& response.bootstrap_recipes.is_empty()
&& response.accepted_recipes.is_empty(),
"APT_PLANNING_NOT_CAPABILITY"
);
}
ensure!(
response.schema_version == 1
&& response.challenge == request.challenge
&& !request.challenge.is_nil()
&& response.identity == request.identity
&& response.profile == "apt_only"
&& response.provider_stack_sha256 == request.expected_stack_sha256
&& valid_hash(&response.provider_stack_sha256)
&& response.ledger_inode != 0
&& response.lock_inode != 0,
"APT_PROBE_RESPONSE_BINDING"
);
ensure!(
response.accepted_recipes.len() <= 2
&& response
.accepted_recipes
.iter()
.all(|r| matches!(r.as_str(), apt::INSTALL_RECIPE | apt::UPDATE_RECIPE)),
"APT_PROBE_RECIPE_SCOPE"
);
ensure!(
response.bootstrap_recipes.len() <= 2
&& response
.bootstrap_recipes
.iter()
.all(|r| matches!(r.as_str(), apt::INSTALL_RECIPE | apt::UPDATE_RECIPE))
&& (response.fixture_acceptance_ready || response.bootstrap_recipes.is_empty()),
"APT_PROBE_BOOTSTRAP_SCOPE"
);
Ok(())
}
pub fn probe(socket: &Path, binding: &Binding, pin: &Pin) -> Result<Response> {
probe_operation(socket, binding, pin, "apt_readiness_v1")
}
pub fn planning(socket: &Path, binding: &Binding, pin: &Pin) -> Result<Response> {
probe_operation(socket, binding, pin, "apt_planning_v1")
}
fn probe_operation(
socket: &Path,
binding: &Binding,
pin: &Pin,
operation: &str,
) -> Result<Response> {
ensure!(
socket == Path::new(SOCKET)
&& pin.identity == Identity::from_binding(binding)?
&& pin.profile == "apt_only"
&& pin.schema_version == 1,
"APT_PROBE_ROUTE"
);
trusted_path(socket, true)?;
let mut stream = UnixStream::connect(socket)?;
root_peer(&stream)?;
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
let request = Request {
operation: operation.into(),
challenge: Uuid::new_v4(),
identity: pin.identity.clone(),
expected_stack_sha256: pin.provider_stack_sha256.clone(),
};
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&request)?;
stream.write_all(&(u32::try_from(bytes.len())?).to_be_bytes())?;
stream.write_all(&bytes)?;
let mut length = [0; 4];
stream.read_exact(&mut length)?;
let length = u32::from_be_bytes(length) as usize;
ensure!(length <= 32768, "APT_PROBE_RESPONSE_LIMIT");
let mut bytes = vec![0; length];
stream.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
let response: Response = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)?;
validate_response(&request, &response)?;
Ok(response)
}
pub fn stack_sha256(binding: &Binding, config: &apt::ProviderConfig) -> Result<String> {
apt::verify_installation()?;
let unit = fs::read(UNIT_PATH)?;
trusted_path(Path::new(UNIT_PATH), false)?;
ensure!(unit == UNIT_BYTES, "APT_UNIT_PROFILE_MISMATCH");
let executable = std::env::current_exe()?.canonicalize()?;
trusted_path(&executable, false)?;
let installed = Path::new("/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper");
trusted_path(installed, false)?;
ensure!(
hash(&fs::read(&executable)?) == hash(&fs::read(installed)?),
"APT_HELPER_BINARY_PROFILE_MISMATCH"
);
Ok(hash(&serde_json::to_vec(
&serde_json::json!({"schema_version":1,"profile":"apt_only",
"identity":Identity::from_binding(binding)?,"provider_policy":config,
"helper_sha256":hash(&fs::read(executable)?),"unit_sha256":hash(&unit)}),
)?))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct NativeStatus {
schema_version: u32,
fixture_acceptance_ready: bool,
accepted_recipes: Vec<String>,
runtime_sha256: String,
readiness_report_sha256: String,
}
pub fn answer(
request: &Request,
binding: &Binding,
config: &apt::ProviderConfig,
ledger: &rusqlite::Connection,
) -> Result<Response> {
ensure!(
matches!(
request.operation.as_str(),
"apt_readiness_v1" | "apt_planning_v1"
) && !request.challenge.is_nil()
&& request.identity == Identity::from_binding(binding)?,
"APT_PROBE_REQUEST_BINDING"
);
let stack = stack_sha256(binding, config)?;
ensure!(
stack == request.expected_stack_sha256,
"APT_PROBE_STACK_MISMATCH"
);
if request.operation == "apt_planning_v1" {
// A metadata-only process is bounded separately from package execution.
// Missing/unsafe/dirty/unprefetched state closes only this observation.
let planning: PlanningResult =
serde_json::from_slice(&rmm_agent_linux::apt_planning_metadata()?)?;
planning.validate(chrono::Utc::now())?;
ensure!(
planning.runtime_sha256 == config.runtime_sha256
&& planning.apt_config_sha256 == config.apt_config_sha256
&& planning.provider_sha256
== hash(include_bytes!(
"../../../tools/apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py"
))
&& planning.hook_sha256
== hash(include_bytes!("../../../tools/apt-transaction/hook")),
"APT_PLANNING_POLICY_PINS"
);
let db = fs::metadata(Path::new(SHARED_STATE).join("consumption.sqlite"))?;
let lock = fs::metadata(Path::new(SHARED_STATE).join("executor.lock"))?;
let response = Response {
schema_version: 1,
challenge: request.challenge,
identity: request.identity.clone(),
profile: "apt_only".into(),
provider_stack_sha256: stack,
fixture_acceptance_ready: false,
bootstrap_recipes: vec![],
accepted_recipes: vec![],
ledger_device: db.dev(),
ledger_inode: db.ino(),
lock_device: lock.dev(),
lock_inode: lock.ino(),
planning: Some(planning),
};
validate_response(request, &response)?;
return Ok(response);
}
let output = std::process::Command::new("/usr/bin/python3")
.args(["-I", apt::CODE, "readiness-status"])
.env_clear()
.env("PATH", "/usr/bin:/bin")
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.output()?;
ensure!(
output.status.success() && output.stdout.len() <= 16384,
"APT_NATIVE_READINESS_REQUIRED"
);
let status: NativeStatus = serde_json::from_slice(&output.stdout)?;
ensure!(
status.schema_version == 1
&& status.runtime_sha256 == config.runtime_sha256
&& valid_hash(&status.readiness_report_sha256),
"APT_NATIVE_READINESS_BINDING"
);
let db = fs::metadata(Path::new(SHARED_STATE).join("consumption.sqlite"))?;
let lock = fs::metadata(Path::new(SHARED_STATE).join("executor.lock"))?;
let unresolved: i64 = ledger.query_row(
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
[],
|r| r.get(0),
)?;
let response = Response {
schema_version: 1,
challenge: request.challenge,
identity: request.identity.clone(),
profile: "apt_only".into(),
provider_stack_sha256: stack,
fixture_acceptance_ready: status.fixture_acceptance_ready
&& config.allow_fixture_bootstrap
&& unresolved == 0,
bootstrap_recipes: if status.fixture_acceptance_ready
&& config.allow_fixture_bootstrap
&& unresolved == 0
{
config.allowed_recipes.clone()
} else {
vec![]
},
accepted_recipes: if unresolved == 0 {
status
.accepted_recipes
.into_iter()
.filter(|r| config.allowed_recipes.contains(r))
.collect()
} else {
vec![]
},
ledger_device: db.dev(),
ledger_inode: db.ino(),
lock_device: lock.dev(),
lock_inode: lock.ino(),
planning: None,
};
validate_response(request, &response)?;
Ok(response)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn planning_fixture() -> PlanningResult {
let raw =
include_str!("../../../tests/apt_transaction/fixtures/planning-canonical.json").trim();
let runtime = serde_json::from_str(raw).unwrap();
PlanningResult {
observed_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
fixture_package: None,
baseline_sha256: "b".repeat(64),
sealed_baseline_sha256: "b".repeat(64),
status_fingerprint: "c".repeat(64),
dpkg_updates_empty: true,
pending_triggers_empty: true,
runtime,
runtime_sha256: hash(raw.as_bytes()),
provider_sha256: "d".repeat(64),
hook_sha256: "e".repeat(64),
apt_config_sha256: "a".repeat(64),
prefetch: [
rmm_domain::apt_transaction::INSTALL_SHA,
rmm_domain::apt_transaction::UPDATE_SHA,
]
.into_iter()
.map(|sha| {
(
sha.into(),
PlanningReceipt {
schema_version: 1,
sha256: sha.into(),
size: 20672,
sealed_at_ms: 1,
},
)
})
.collect(),
}
}
#[test]
fn python_rust_canonical_golden_and_planning_freshness_receipts() {
let fixture = planning_fixture();
fixture.validate(chrono::Utc::now()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
fixture.runtime_sha256,
"f5c1f569110924eca83ad5d347882390b47e077fbef91c4eb86abb68621b92c4"
);
let raw =
include_str!("../../../tests/apt_transaction/fixtures/planning-canonical.json").trim();
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_vec(&fixture.runtime).unwrap(),
raw.as_bytes()
);
for field in [
"runtime_sha256",
"baseline_sha256",
"status_fingerprint",
"dpkg_updates_empty",
"pending_triggers_empty",
"prefetch",
"observed_at",
] {
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(&fixture).unwrap();
value[field] = match field {
"dpkg_updates_empty" | "pending_triggers_empty" => serde_json::json!(false),
"prefetch" => serde_json::json!({}),
"observed_at" => {
serde_json::json!(chrono::Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::seconds(31))
}
"baseline_sha256" => serde_json::json!("0".repeat(64)),
_ => serde_json::json!("invalid"),
};
assert!(
serde_json::from_value::<PlanningResult>(value)
.unwrap()
.validate(chrono::Utc::now())
.is_err(),
"{field}"
);
}
let mut bad = fixture;
bad.prefetch.values_mut().next().unwrap().sealed_at_ms = i64::MAX;
assert!(bad.validate(chrono::Utc::now()).is_err());
}
fn identity() -> Identity {
Identity {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
signing_key_id: "a".repeat(64),
}
}
#[test]
fn forged_nonce_identity_profile_or_stack_never_advertises() {
let request = Request {
operation: "apt_readiness_v1".into(),
challenge: Uuid::new_v4(),
identity: identity(),
expected_stack_sha256: "a".repeat(64),
};
let response = Response {
schema_version: 1,
challenge: request.challenge,
identity: request.identity.clone(),
profile: "apt_only".into(),
provider_stack_sha256: request.expected_stack_sha256.clone(),
fixture_acceptance_ready: true,
bootstrap_recipes: vec![apt::INSTALL_RECIPE.into()],
accepted_recipes: vec![],
ledger_device: 1,
ledger_inode: 2,
lock_device: 1,
lock_inode: 3,
planning: None,
};
validate_response(&request, &response).unwrap();
for field in ["challenge", "identity", "profile", "provider_stack_sha256"] {
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(&response).unwrap();
value[field] = match field {
"challenge" => serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4()),
"identity" => serde_json::to_value(identity()).unwrap(),
_ => serde_json::json!("forged"),
};
assert!(validate_response(&request, &serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap()).is_err());
}
}
#[test]
fn kernel_peer_is_required_not_json_root_assertion() {
let (a, _b) = UnixStream::pair().unwrap();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions.
assert_eq!(root_peer(&a).is_ok(), unsafe { libc::geteuid() } == 0);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+361
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@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
use super::*;
use openssl::sign::Signer;
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, encode};
fn fixture() -> (
Binding,
Request,
openssl::pkey::PKey<openssl::pkey::Private>,
DateTime<Utc>,
) {
let key = PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap();
let public = key.raw_public_key().unwrap();
let now = DateTime::from_timestamp(1_800_000_000, 0).unwrap();
let binding = Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
public_key_hex: hex::encode(&public),
};
let job = JobPayload {
schema_version: 1,
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
action: Action::RunScript {
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
script_utf8: "printf 'Hello World\\n'".into(),
arguments: vec![],
expected_stdout: Some("Hello World\n".into()),
},
execution_identity: "agent_service".into(),
not_before: now - chrono::Duration::seconds(60),
start_before: now + chrono::Duration::seconds(300),
max_runtime_seconds: 2,
max_output_bytes: 4096,
};
let bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
let permit = ExecutionPermitPayload {
domain: "rmm.execution-permit".into(),
schema_version: 1,
grant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
authorization_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
tenant_id: job.tenant_id,
asset_id: job.asset_id,
agent_id: job.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: job.enrollment_generation,
assignment_version: job.assignment_version,
job_id: job.job_id,
attempt_id: job.attempt_id,
plan_hash: hash(b"immutable approved plan"),
job_payload_hash: hash(&bytes),
action: "run_script".into(),
execution_identity: job.execution_identity.clone(),
not_before: now - chrono::Duration::seconds(1),
start_before: now + chrono::Duration::seconds(59),
max_runtime_seconds: 2,
key_id: hash(&public),
};
let mut request = Request {
job_bytes: bytes,
permit_bytes: encode(&permit).unwrap(),
signature: vec![],
plan_hash: permit.plan_hash.clone(),
authorization_id: permit.authorization_id,
};
sign(&mut request, &key);
(binding, request, key, now)
}
fn sign(request: &mut Request, key: &openssl::pkey::PKey<openssl::pkey::Private>) {
request.signature = Signer::new_without_digest(key)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&request.permit_bytes)
.unwrap();
}
fn directory() -> std::path::PathBuf {
use std::os::unix::fs::DirBuilderExt;
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-ledger-test-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
fs::DirBuilder::new().mode(0o700).create(&path).unwrap();
path
}
#[test]
fn exact_signature_and_every_permit_binding() {
let (binding, request, key, now) = fixture();
assert!(binding.verify(&request, now).is_ok());
let original: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes).unwrap();
for (field, replacement) in [
("domain", serde_json::json!("other")),
("schema_version", serde_json::json!(2)),
("grant_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::nil())),
("authorization_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("tenant_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("asset_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("agent_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("enrollment_generation", serde_json::json!(2)),
("assignment_version", serde_json::json!(4)),
("job_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("attempt_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("plan_hash", serde_json::json!(hash(b"other"))),
("job_payload_hash", serde_json::json!(hash(b"other"))),
("action", serde_json::json!("reboot")),
("execution_identity", serde_json::json!("root")),
("max_runtime_seconds", serde_json::json!(3)),
("key_id", serde_json::json!(hash(b"other"))),
(
"not_before",
serde_json::json!(now + chrono::Duration::seconds(1)),
),
(
"start_before",
serde_json::json!(now + chrono::Duration::seconds(61)),
),
] {
let mut modified = original.clone();
modified[field] = replacement;
let mut candidate = request.clone();
candidate.permit_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&modified).unwrap();
sign(&mut candidate, &key);
assert!(
binding.verify(&candidate, now).is_err(),
"missing binding: {field}"
);
}
let mut forged = request.clone();
forged.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(binding.verify(&forged, now).is_err());
let mut tampered = request.clone();
tampered.job_bytes.push(b' ');
assert!(binding.verify(&tampered, now).is_err());
let mut bad_parameters = request.clone();
let mut job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&bad_parameters.job_bytes).unwrap();
job.action = Action::Reboot {
reason: "different effect".into(),
reconnect_timeout_seconds: 60,
dependency_group: "test".into(),
};
bad_parameters.job_bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
assert!(binding.verify(&bad_parameters, now).is_err());
assert!(
binding
.verify(&request, now + chrono::Duration::seconds(59))
.is_err()
);
assert!(
binding
.verify(&request, now - chrono::Duration::seconds(2))
.is_err()
);
let mut wrong_trust = binding.clone();
wrong_trust.public_key_hex =
hex::encode(PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap().raw_public_key().unwrap());
assert!(wrong_trust.verify(&request, now).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn independent_identity_binding_all_fields() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = fixture();
for field in [
"tenant_id",
"asset_id",
"agent_id",
"enrollment_generation",
"assignment_version",
] {
let mut value = serde_json::to_value(&binding).unwrap();
value[field] = if field.ends_with("id") {
serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())
} else {
serde_json::json!(99)
};
let wrong: Binding = serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap();
assert!(wrong.verify(&request, now).is_err(), "{field}");
}
}
#[test]
fn reopen_consumption_duplicate_grant_attempt_unknown_and_resource_lock() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = fixture();
let (_, permit) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let path = directory();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions.
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let lock = lock_state(&path, uid).unwrap();
assert!(lock_state(&path, uid).is_err());
let mut db = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
consume(&mut db, &permit).unwrap();
drop(db);
let mut db = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
assert!(consume(&mut db, &permit).is_err());
let mut replacement = permit.clone();
replacement.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(consume(&mut db, &replacement).is_err());
finish(&db, &permit, &Outcome::unknown("crash_after_effect")).unwrap();
replacement.job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
replacement.attempt_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(consume(&mut db, &replacement).is_err());
// Only definitive evidence releases the resource, not an ACK or new grant.
let mut definitive = Outcome::unknown("");
definitive.state = "succeeded".into();
finish(&db, &permit, &definitive).unwrap();
assert!(consume(&mut db, &permit).is_err());
replacement.job_id = permit.job_id;
replacement.attempt_id = permit.attempt_id;
assert!(consume(&mut db, &replacement).is_err());
replacement.job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
replacement.attempt_id = Uuid::new_v4();
consume(&mut db, &replacement).unwrap();
drop(db);
drop(lock);
fs::remove_dir_all(path).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn harmless_exact_script_with_bound_output() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = fixture();
let (job, _) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let result = script(&job).unwrap();
assert_eq!(result.state, "succeeded");
assert_eq!(result.stdout, b"Hello World\n");
assert_eq!(result.exit_code, Some(0));
}
#[test]
fn unsafe_paths_and_corrupt_ledger_fail_closed() {
use std::os::unix::fs::{PermissionsExt, symlink};
let path = directory();
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let db = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
drop(db);
fs::write(path.join("consumption.sqlite"), b"corrupt db").unwrap();
assert!(open_ledger(&path, uid).is_err());
fs::remove_file(path.join("consumption.sqlite")).unwrap();
symlink("/dev/null", path.join("consumption.sqlite")).unwrap();
assert!(open_ledger(&path, uid).is_err());
fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
assert!(lock_state(&path, uid).is_err());
fs::remove_dir_all(path).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn wall_clock_jump_is_not_mistaken_for_a_fresh_online_grant() {
let clock = TrustedClock {
wall: Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::minutes(1),
monotonic: std::time::Instant::now(),
};
assert!(!clock.trusted());
let clock = TrustedClock {
wall: Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::minutes(1),
monotonic: std::time::Instant::now(),
};
assert!(!clock.trusted());
}
#[test]
fn two_helper_connections_share_exact_lock_and_sqlite_consumption() {
let (binding, request, _, now) = fixture();
let (_, permit) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let path = directory();
// SAFETY: geteuid has no preconditions.
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let first = lock_state(&path, uid).unwrap();
let inode = (
first.metadata().unwrap().dev(),
first.metadata().unwrap().ino(),
);
assert!(lock_state(&path, uid).is_err());
drop(first);
let second = lock_state(&path, uid).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
inode,
(
second.metadata().unwrap().dev(),
second.metadata().unwrap().ino()
)
);
let mut general = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
let mut apt = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
consume(&mut general, &permit).unwrap();
assert!(consume(&mut apt, &permit).is_err());
let mut other = permit.clone();
other.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
other.job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
other.attempt_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(consume(&mut apt, &other).is_err());
finish(
&general,
&permit,
&Outcome::unknown("shared unknown effect"),
)
.unwrap();
assert!(consume(&mut apt, &other).is_err());
let filename: String = apt
.query_row(
"SELECT file FROM pragma_database_list WHERE name='main'",
[],
|r| r.get(0),
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
fs::metadata(filename).unwrap().ino(),
fs::metadata(path.join("consumption.sqlite")).unwrap().ino()
);
drop(general);
drop(apt);
drop(second);
fs::remove_dir_all(path).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn awaiting_reboot_preserves_original_boot_and_outcome_across_reopen() {
let (binding, mut request, key, now) = fixture();
let mut job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes).unwrap();
job.action = Action::Reboot {
reason: "mock reboot; no native effect".into(),
reconnect_timeout_seconds: 60,
dependency_group: "test".into(),
};
request.job_bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
let mut payload: ExecutionPermitPayload =
serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes).unwrap();
payload.action = "reboot".into();
payload.job_payload_hash = hash(&request.job_bytes);
request.permit_bytes = encode(&payload).unwrap();
sign(&mut request, &key);
let (_, permit) = binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap();
let path = directory();
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let mut db = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
consume(&mut db, &permit).unwrap();
save_start(&db, &permit, &request).unwrap();
let mut outcome = Outcome::unknown("REAUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED");
outcome.state = "awaiting_reboot".into();
finish(&db, &permit, &outcome).unwrap();
drop(db);
let mut db = open_ledger(&path, uid).unwrap();
let (start, outcome): (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) = db
.query_row(
"SELECT start,outcome FROM execution_evidence WHERE grant_id=?1",
[permit.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?)),
)
.unwrap();
let start: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&start).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
start["previous_boot_id"],
rmm_agent_linux::boot_id().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(start["reauthentication_required"], true);
assert!(start["reconnect_deadline"].is_string());
assert_eq!(
serde_json::from_slice::<Outcome>(&outcome).unwrap().state,
"awaiting_reboot"
);
let mut other = permit.clone();
other.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
other.job_id = Uuid::new_v4();
assert!(consume(&mut db, &other).is_err());
drop(db);
fs::remove_dir_all(path).unwrap();
}
+879
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@@ -0,0 +1,879 @@
#[path = "../src/reconcile.rs"]
mod reconcile;
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use openssl::{
pkey::{PKey, Private},
sign::Signer,
};
use reconcile::*;
use rmm_domain::{jobs::*, reconciliation::*};
use rmm_privileged_helper::{Binding, Request};
use rusqlite::{Connection, params};
use std::{fs, os::unix::fs::DirBuilderExt, path::PathBuf};
use uuid::Uuid;
struct TestClock {
now: DateTime<Utc>,
trusted: bool,
}
impl Clock for TestClock {
fn now(&self) -> anyhow::Result<DateTime<Utc>> {
anyhow::ensure!(self.trusted, "CLOCK_UNTRUSTED");
Ok(self.now)
}
}
struct TestBoot(Uuid);
impl BootSource for TestBoot {
fn current_boot(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Uuid> {
Ok(self.0)
}
}
struct Fixture {
dir: PathBuf,
db: Connection,
guard: ExecutorGuard,
binding: Binding,
key: PKey<Private>,
clock: TestClock,
boot: TestBoot,
agent_journal: Uuid,
}
impl Drop for Fixture {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = fs::remove_dir_all(&self.dir);
}
}
impl Fixture {
fn new() -> Self {
let dir = PathBuf::from("/tmp/opencode").join(format!("helper-sync-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
fs::DirBuilder::new().mode(0o700).create(&dir).unwrap();
let uid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() };
let guard = ExecutorGuard::acquire(&dir, uid).unwrap();
let db = rmm_privileged_helper::open_ledger(&dir, uid).unwrap();
let key = PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap();
let binding = Binding {
tenant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
asset_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
agent_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
public_key_hex: hex::encode(key.raw_public_key().unwrap()),
};
let boot = TestBoot(NativeBoot.current_boot().unwrap());
Self {
dir,
db,
guard,
binding,
key,
clock: TestClock {
now: Utc::now(),
trusted: true,
},
boot,
agent_journal: Uuid::new_v4(),
}
}
fn sync(&self) -> HelperSync {
HelperSync::new(self.binding.clone(), &self.clock).unwrap()
}
fn snapshot(&mut self, sync: &mut HelperSync, generation: u64) -> Snapshot {
sync.snapshot(
&mut self.db,
&self.guard,
generation,
&self.clock,
&self.boot,
)
.unwrap()
}
fn request(&self, snapshot: &Snapshot) -> Vec<u8> {
request(
snapshot,
self.agent_journal,
100 + snapshot.checkpoint,
&snapshot.attempts,
)
}
fn decision(
&self,
snapshot: &Snapshot,
raw: &[u8],
generation: u64,
ready: bool,
) -> ReconcileDecisionPayload {
let mut d = ReconcileDecisionPayload {
domain: "rmm.reconciliation-decision".into(),
schema_version: 1,
decision_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
request_id: Uuid::nil(),
request_hash: hash(raw),
tenant_id: self.binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: self.binding.asset_id,
agent_id: self.binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
connection_generation: generation,
boot_id: self.boot.0,
journal_id: self.agent_journal,
checkpoint: 100 + snapshot.checkpoint,
helper_journal_id: Some(snapshot.journal_id),
helper_checkpoint: snapshot.checkpoint,
issued_at: self.clock.now,
valid_until: self.clock.now + Duration::seconds(60),
ready,
helper_ready: ready,
reason: if ready {
"CONSISTENT"
} else {
"ATTEMPT_RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED"
}
.into(),
attempts: snapshot
.attempts
.iter()
.map(|a| AttemptDecision {
job_id: a.job_id,
attempt_id: a.attempt_id,
job_payload_hash: a.job_payload_hash.clone(),
grant_id: Some(a.grant_id),
authorization_id: Some(a.authorization_id),
plan_hash: Some(a.plan_hash.clone()),
action: a.action.clone(),
execution_identity: "root".into(),
revision: a.revision + 1,
outcome_state: if matches!(
a.state.as_str(),
"succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "expired"
) {
a.state.clone()
} else {
"unknown".into()
},
previous_outcome_sha256: (!a.outcome_sha256.is_empty())
.then(|| a.outcome_sha256.clone()),
outcome_sha256: matches!(
a.state.as_str(),
"succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "expired"
)
.then(|| a.outcome_sha256.clone()),
outcome_bytes: vec![],
original_boot_id: Some(a.original_boot_id),
unlock: matches!(
a.state.as_str(),
"succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "expired"
),
reason: "TEST_SERVER_DECISION".into(),
})
.collect(),
acknowledged_message_ids: vec![],
key_id: hash(&self.key.raw_public_key().unwrap()),
};
// The fixture emits a canonical tag-1 request ID first, exactly as prost.
let len = usize::from(raw[1]);
d.request_id = Uuid::parse_str(std::str::from_utf8(&raw[2..2 + len]).unwrap()).unwrap();
d
}
fn sign(&self, d: &ReconcileDecisionPayload) -> SignedResponse {
let bytes = encode(d).unwrap();
SignedResponse {
signature: Signer::new_without_digest(&self.key)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&bytes)
.unwrap(),
decision_bytes: bytes,
}
}
fn apply(
&mut self,
sync: &mut HelperSync,
d: &ReconcileDecisionPayload,
raw: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<Applied> {
let r = self.sign(d);
sync.apply(&mut self.db, &self.guard, &r, raw, &self.clock, &self.boot)
}
fn add(
&mut self,
action: Action,
outcome: Option<ReconciledOutcome>,
) -> ExecutionPermitPayload {
let job = JobPayload {
schema_version: 1,
tenant_id: self.binding.tenant_id,
asset_id: self.binding.asset_id,
agent_id: self.binding.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
action,
execution_identity: "root".into(),
not_before: self.clock.now - Duration::seconds(10),
start_before: self.clock.now + Duration::minutes(5),
max_runtime_seconds: 180,
max_output_bytes: 4096,
};
let permit = ExecutionPermitPayload {
domain: "rmm.execution-permit".into(),
schema_version: 1,
grant_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
authorization_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
tenant_id: job.tenant_id,
asset_id: job.asset_id,
agent_id: job.agent_id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 3,
job_id: job.job_id,
attempt_id: job.attempt_id,
plan_hash: hash(b"approved fixed plan"),
job_payload_hash: hash(&encode(&job).unwrap()),
action: job.action.name().into(),
execution_identity: "root".into(),
not_before: self.clock.now - Duration::seconds(1),
start_before: self.clock.now + Duration::seconds(59),
max_runtime_seconds: 180,
key_id: hash(&self.key.raw_public_key().unwrap()),
};
let bytes = encode(&permit).unwrap();
let original = Request {
job_bytes: encode(&job).unwrap(),
permit_bytes: bytes.clone(),
signature: Signer::new_without_digest(&self.key)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&bytes)
.unwrap(),
plan_hash: permit.plan_hash.clone(),
authorization_id: permit.authorization_id,
};
rmm_privileged_helper::consume(&mut self.db, &permit).unwrap();
rmm_privileged_helper::save_start(&self.db, &permit, &original).unwrap();
if let Some(o) = outcome {
self.db
.execute(
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1",
params![
permit.grant_id.to_string(),
canonical_outcome_bytes(&o).unwrap()
],
)
.unwrap();
}
permit
}
}
#[test]
fn general_and_apt_instances_share_fencing_but_never_inherit_a_process_gate() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut general = f.sync();
let first = f.snapshot(&mut general, 1);
let raw = f.request(&first);
let d = f.decision(&first, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut general, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(general.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let mut apt = f.sync();
assert!(!apt.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let second = f.snapshot(&mut apt, 1);
assert!(!general.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let raw = f.request(&second);
let d = f.decision(&second, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut apt, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(apt.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(!general.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
#[test]
fn targeted_final_unlock_does_not_release_an_unrelated_unknown() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let known = f.add(script(), Some(success()));
let actual: rmm_privileged_helper::Outcome =
serde_json::from_slice(&canonical_outcome_bytes(&success()).unwrap()).unwrap();
rmm_privileged_helper::finish(&f.db, &known, &actual).unwrap();
let uncertain = f.add(script(), Some(unknown()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, false);
let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert_eq!(applied.unlocked_grants, vec![known.grant_id]);
assert!(!applied.ready);
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let held: bool =
f.db.query_row(
"SELECT result IS NULL FROM consumed WHERE grant_id=?1",
[uncertain.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| r.get(0),
)
.unwrap();
assert!(held);
}
#[test]
fn independently_remembered_agent_journal_cannot_be_replaced_by_server_ready() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let first = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&first);
let d = f.decision(&first, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
let next = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 2);
f.agent_journal = Uuid::new_v4();
let raw = f.request(&next);
let d = f.decision(&next, &raw, 2, true);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn missing_signed_checkpoint_history_closes_the_live_gate_stickily() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
f.db.execute("DELETE FROM helper_sync_decisions", [])
.unwrap();
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn stale_process_connection_does_not_poison_a_new_fenced_process() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut general = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut general, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut general, &d, &raw).unwrap();
let mut apt = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut apt, 2);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 2, true);
f.apply(&mut apt, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(
general
.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
assert!(apt.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
#[test]
fn signed_noncanonical_outcome_bytes_do_not_unlock_root_consumption() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
f.add(script(), Some(success()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let mut d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&success()).unwrap();
d.attempts[0].outcome_sha256 = Some(hash(&d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes));
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert_eq!(
f.db.query_row(
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
[],
|r| r.get::<_, i64>(0)
)
.unwrap(),
1
);
}
#[test]
fn both_live_profiles_apply_one_signature_and_checkpoint_without_inheriting_readiness() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut general = f.sync();
let mut apt = f.sync();
let first = f.snapshot(&mut general, 1);
let second = f.snapshot(&mut apt, 1);
assert_eq!(first.checkpoint, second.checkpoint);
assert!(!general.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(!apt.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let raw = f.request(&first);
let d = f.decision(&first, &raw, 1, true);
f.apply(&mut general, &d, &raw).unwrap();
f.apply(&mut apt, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(general.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(apt.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
fn script() -> Action {
Action::RunScript {
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
script_utf8: "printf hello".into(),
arguments: vec![],
expected_stdout: Some("hello".into()),
}
}
fn success() -> ReconciledOutcome {
ReconciledOutcome {
state: "succeeded".into(),
stdout: b"hello".to_vec(),
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: Some(0),
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":true}),
error_code: String::new(),
}
}
fn unknown() -> ReconciledOutcome {
ReconciledOutcome {
state: "unknown".into(),
stdout: vec![],
stderr: vec![],
exit_code: None,
output_truncated: false,
reboot_required: false,
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":false}),
error_code: "EFFECT_UNKNOWN".into(),
}
}
// Test-only encoder for the actual existing prost field numbers. No substitute
// protocol dependency is added to the independently executable helper crate.
fn vi(mut n: u64, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
loop {
let mut byte = (n & 127) as u8;
n >>= 7;
if n != 0 {
byte |= 128;
}
out.push(byte);
if n == 0 {
break;
}
}
}
fn num(tag: u64, n: u64, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
if n != 0 {
vi(tag << 3, out);
vi(n, out);
}
}
fn blob(tag: u64, b: &[u8], out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
if !b.is_empty() {
vi((tag << 3) | 2, out);
vi(b.len() as u64, out);
out.extend_from_slice(b);
}
}
fn text(tag: u64, s: &str, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
blob(tag, s.as_bytes(), out)
}
fn request(
snapshot: &Snapshot,
journal: Uuid,
checkpoint: u64,
attempts: &[LocalAttempt],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = vec![];
text(1, &Uuid::new_v4().to_string(), &mut out);
text(2, &journal.to_string(), &mut out);
num(3, checkpoint, &mut out);
text(
4,
&snapshot
.previous_decision_id
.map(|id| id.to_string())
.unwrap_or_default(),
&mut out,
);
num(5, 3, &mut out);
for a in attempts {
let mut row = vec![];
text(1, &a.job_id.to_string(), &mut row);
text(2, &a.attempt_id.to_string(), &mut row);
text(3, &a.job_payload_hash, &mut row);
text(4, &a.grant_id.to_string(), &mut row);
text(5, &a.consumption, &mut row);
text(6, &a.state, &mut row);
num(7, a.revision + 1, &mut row);
text(8, &a.original_boot_id.to_string(), &mut row);
text(11, &a.outcome_sha256, &mut row);
blob(12, &a.outcome_bytes, &mut row);
blob(6, &row, &mut out);
}
num(8, 1, &mut out);
text(9, &snapshot.journal_id.to_string(), &mut out);
num(10, snapshot.checkpoint, &mut out);
text(
11,
&snapshot
.previous_decision_id
.map(|id| id.to_string())
.unwrap_or_default(),
&mut out,
);
out
}
#[test]
fn clean_ready_shared_lock_and_reopen_start_closed() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(ExecutorGuard::acquire(&f.dir, unsafe { libc::geteuid() }).is_err());
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(applied.ready);
assert_eq!(sync.active_generation(), Some(1));
assert_eq!(applied.snapshot.previous_decision_id, Some(d.decision_id));
assert!(applied.unlocked_grants.is_empty());
assert!(sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let response = f.sign(&d);
let mut new_process = f.sync();
let mut reopened = Connection::open(f.dir.join("consumption.sqlite")).unwrap();
assert!(!new_process.can_start(&reopened, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
assert!(
new_process
.apply(&mut reopened, &f.guard, &response, &raw, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
sync.close();
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let _native = NativeClock::default();
}
#[test]
fn exact_signatures_fake_key_wrong_domain_and_all_identity_bindings() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let base = serde_json::to_value(&d).unwrap();
for (field, value) in [
("domain", serde_json::json!("rmm.execution-permit")),
("schema_version", serde_json::json!(2)),
("tenant_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("asset_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("agent_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("enrollment_generation", serde_json::json!(2)),
("assignment_version", serde_json::json!(4)),
("connection_generation", serde_json::json!(2)),
("boot_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("journal_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("checkpoint", serde_json::json!(1)),
("helper_journal_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
(
"helper_checkpoint",
serde_json::json!(snapshot.checkpoint + 1),
),
("request_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
("request_hash", serde_json::json!(hash(b"changed"))),
("key_id", serde_json::json!(hash(b"wrongkey"))),
] {
let mut changed = base.clone();
changed[field] = value;
let changed: ReconcileDecisionPayload = serde_json::from_value(changed).unwrap();
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &changed, &raw).is_err(), "{field}");
}
let mut response = f.sign(&d);
response.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(
sync.apply(&mut f.db, &f.guard, &response, &raw, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
let mut response = f.sign(&d);
response.decision_bytes.push(b' ');
assert!(
sync.apply(&mut f.db, &f.guard, &response, &raw, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
let fake = PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap();
let mut response = f.sign(&d);
response.signature = Signer::new_without_digest(&fake)
.unwrap()
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(&response.decision_bytes)
.unwrap();
assert!(
sync.apply(&mut f.db, &f.guard, &response, &raw, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
#[test]
fn definitive_unlock_is_transactional_idempotent_and_keeps_tombstones() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let grant = f.add(script(), Some(success()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
assert_eq!(
snapshot.attempts[0].original_boot_id,
NativeBoot.current_boot().unwrap()
);
assert_eq!(
snapshot.attempts[0].job_payload_hash,
grant.job_payload_hash
);
assert_eq!(snapshot.attempts[0].original_request_sha256.len(), 64);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert_eq!(applied.unlocked_grants, vec![grant.grant_id]);
assert!(applied.ready);
let again = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(again.ready);
assert!(again.unlocked_grants.is_empty());
assert_eq!(again.snapshot.checkpoint, snapshot.checkpoint);
let body: Vec<u8> =
f.db.query_row(
"SELECT result FROM consumed WHERE grant_id=?1",
[grant.grant_id.to_string()],
|r| r.get(0),
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(body, canonical_outcome_bytes(&success()).unwrap());
assert!(rmm_privileged_helper::consume(&mut f.db, &grant).is_err());
assert_eq!(
f.db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM consumed", [], |r| r.get::<_, i64>(0))
.unwrap(),
1
);
}
#[test]
fn omitted_unknown_root_row_is_sticky_despite_signed_ready() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
f.add(script(), Some(unknown()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = request(&snapshot, f.agent_journal, 100 + snapshot.checkpoint, &[]);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let mut restarted = f.sync();
assert!(
restarted
.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_code_or_no_result_never_unlocks_even_signed_ready() {
for outcome in [None, Some(unknown())] {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
f.add(script(), outcome);
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
assert_eq!(snapshot.attempts[0].state, "unknown");
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let mut d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(!applied.ready);
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
d.attempts[0].unlock = true;
d.attempts[0].outcome_state = "succeeded".into();
d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes = canonical_outcome_bytes(&success()).unwrap();
d.attempts[0].outcome_sha256 = Some(hash(&d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes));
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert_eq!(
f.db.query_row(
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
[],
|r| r.get::<_, i64>(0)
)
.unwrap(),
1
);
}
}
#[test]
fn old_process_response_fails_after_fresh_capture_even_inside_ttl() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut first = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut first, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let response = f.sign(&d);
f.clock.now += Duration::seconds(5);
let mut second = f.sync();
let newer = f.snapshot(&mut second, 1);
assert!(newer.checkpoint > snapshot.checkpoint);
assert!(
second
.apply(&mut f.db, &f.guard, &response, &raw, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
assert!(!second.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
#[test]
fn checkpoint_rollback_is_sticky_and_cannot_be_fixed_by_omission() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
f.db.execute("UPDATE helper_sync_meta SET checkpoint=0", [])
.unwrap();
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
f.db.execute(
"UPDATE helper_sync_meta SET checkpoint=?1",
[snapshot.checkpoint],
)
.unwrap();
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn mutated_root_ledger_after_capture_is_not_the_signed_snapshot() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
f.add(script(), Some(success()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let mut changed = success();
changed.stdout = b"different".to_vec();
f.db.execute(
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?1",
[canonical_outcome_bytes(&changed).unwrap()],
)
.unwrap();
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn unrelated_action_plan_and_previous_outcome_cannot_unlock() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
f.add(script(), Some(success()));
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let mut changed = d.clone();
changed.attempts[0].action = "reboot".into();
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &changed, &raw).is_err());
let mut changed = d.clone();
changed.attempts[0].plan_hash = Some(hash(b"changed plan"));
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &changed, &raw).is_err());
let mut changed = d;
changed.attempts[0].previous_outcome_sha256 = Some(hash(b"different outcome"));
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &changed, &raw).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn false_clock_expiry_and_invalid_independent_key_stay_closed() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
f.clock.trusted = false;
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
assert!(!sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot));
f.clock.trusted = true;
f.clock.now += Duration::seconds(61);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err());
let mut invalid = f.binding.clone();
invalid.public_key_hex = "not a key".into();
assert!(HelperSync::new(invalid, &f.clock).is_err());
let mut changed = f.binding.clone();
changed.public_key_hex =
hex::encode(PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap().raw_public_key().unwrap());
let mut different = HelperSync::new(changed, &f.clock).unwrap();
assert!(
different
.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn shared_database_only_and_missing_local_start_fail_closed() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let mut copy = Connection::open_in_memory().unwrap();
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut copy, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
let grant = f.add(script(), None);
f.db.execute(
"DELETE FROM execution_evidence WHERE grant_id=?1",
[grant.grant_id.to_string()],
)
.unwrap();
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn real_local_boot_must_match_signed_reboot_completion() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let old = f.boot.0;
let mut awaiting = unknown();
awaiting.state = "awaiting_reboot".into();
awaiting.reboot_required = true;
f.add(
Action::Reboot {
reason: "mock reboot no native effect".into(),
reconnect_timeout_seconds: 120,
dependency_group: "acceptance".into(),
},
Some(awaiting),
);
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let mut d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let mut done = success();
done.stdout.clear();
done.exit_code = None;
done.evidence = serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":true,"new_boot_id":Uuid::new_v4(),"reconciled_after_reboot":true,"inventory_message_id":Uuid::new_v4()});
d.attempts[0].unlock = true;
d.attempts[0].outcome_state = "succeeded".into();
d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes = canonical_outcome_bytes(&done).unwrap();
d.attempts[0].outcome_sha256 = Some(hash(&d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes));
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).is_err()); // native current boot is still old
f.boot.0 = Uuid::new_v4();
f.clock.now += Duration::seconds(1);
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 2);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let mut d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 2, true);
assert_eq!(snapshot.attempts[0].original_boot_id, old);
assert_ne!(f.boot.0, old);
done.evidence["new_boot_id"] = serde_json::json!(f.boot.0);
d.attempts[0].unlock = true;
d.attempts[0].outcome_state = "succeeded".into();
d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes = canonical_outcome_bytes(&done).unwrap();
d.attempts[0].outcome_sha256 = Some(hash(&d.attempts[0].outcome_bytes));
let applied = f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &raw).unwrap();
assert!(applied.ready);
assert_eq!(applied.snapshot.attempts[0].state, "succeeded");
assert!(sync.can_start(&f.db, &f.guard, 2, &f.clock, &f.boot));
}
#[test]
fn malformed_original_protobuf_or_digest_does_not_open_gate() {
let mut f = Fixture::new();
let mut sync = f.sync();
let snapshot = f.snapshot(&mut sync, 1);
let raw = f.request(&snapshot);
let d = f.decision(&snapshot, &raw, 1, true);
let mut malformed = raw.clone();
malformed.push(0);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &d, &malformed).is_err());
let mut malformed = raw.clone();
text(1, &Uuid::new_v4().to_string(), &mut malformed);
let mut signed = d.clone();
signed.request_hash = hash(&malformed);
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &signed, &malformed).is_err());
let mut signed = d;
signed.request_hash.clear();
assert!(f.apply(&mut sync, &signed, &raw).is_err());
assert!(
sync.snapshot(&mut f.db, &f.guard, 1, &f.clock, &f.boot)
.is_err()
);
}