Document the accepted MVP and retire superseded development plans
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 14s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 14s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,384 +0,0 @@
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# Typed RootHelper bridge contract (implementation, not native acceptance)
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## Host reboot evidence and historical configured effect (Spec 1.13)
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An ambient `reboot_required=true` is honest pending evidence, not an implicit
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reboot request or a failed package postcondition. Future fixture effects must
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prove equal HOST flags before/after, unchanged boot and no private-worker flag.
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The parent captures `active/host-reboot-before.json` **before unshare/private
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`/run`**. Schema 1 fields are `transaction_sha256`, `job_payload_sha256`,
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`effect_armed_ledger_id`, `grant_id`, `boot_id`, `host_reboot_required` (bool),
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and `observed_at_ms`, plus `schema_version`. Creation is exclusive and fsynced;
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its observation must belong to the original grant window. New native prechecks
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use schema 2, retaining the old exact checks and adding
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`host_reboot_before_sha256` and `host_reboot_required_before`. The child binds the
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saved host observation; its private `/run` never measures the host flag.
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After real APT success the parent verifies the current host flag equals the
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saved value, boot is unchanged and `sandbox-result.reboot_required` is false.
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False/false and true/true are valid; either change or a private-worker flag
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vetoes acceptance. Outcome evidence includes `host_reboot_required_before`,
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`host_reboot_required_after`, `host_reboot_before_sha256`,
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`reboot_required_introduced:false`; `reboot_required` truthfully retains ambient
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true. Ordinary acceptance record **schema 3** explicitly binds those fields and
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`native_prechecks_schema_version:2`. The reader rejects old record schemas or
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inconsistent values. Separate future recovery records use schema 2 and retain
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their distinct `rmm.apt.native-recovery` type. Noop observations remain effect-free
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and report their actual current reboot flag. Fresh planning adds the required
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public bool `host_reboot_required`; known ambient true is shown in the fixed
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WebUI plan reason.
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Historical grant `33775478-15b0-46ec-b059-44f500dbb0b6` had **no host-before
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sample**. It must never acquire retroactive success or an acceptance record.
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Fixed mode `verify-configured-recovery` receives the same eight original binding
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fields as `verify-partial`. Only its signed schema-4 configure-only job, old
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provider `5ff260…`, old schema-1 prechecks, original partial grant `31ef5e5e…` /
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proof `dc3bf387…`, preserved recovery once marker, exact Configure hook, APT exit
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0 and private-worker false are eligible. It checks complete stable installed
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1.0 state, clean audit, actual payload, unchanged boot, idle locks and current
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host marker contents twice, rechecking all thirteen immutable witnesses.
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Output is `known_failed` /
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`APT_RECOVERY_CONFIGURED_ACCEPTANCE_REBOOT_FLAG_VERIFIED`. Its 24-field proof
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contains the original eight bindings, type/schema, original evidence digest,
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partial proof hash, original baseline and current snapshot hashes/fingerprint,
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payload hash, full snapshot, check time, `effect_complete:true`,
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`partial_effect:false`, `postconditions_passed:false`, `reboot_required:true`,
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`host_reboot_required:true` and `host_reboot_marker_sha256`. No ctime-based
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inference becomes a before measurement. It writes nothing and runs no package
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mutation. Rust independently verifies the saved signature/old unknown code,
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appends a separate immutable proof, and leaves consumption locked until normal
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signed RootSync. Native classification and future 1.1 acceptance remain pending
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until actually executed; **81 local Python tests passed**, including both actual
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APT argument regressions under the readonly unprivileged offline container.
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## Configure-only partial recovery (schema 4, local implementation)
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This is a **new, separately WebUI-approved** dev-test native action. Schema 4
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requires `native_recovery = {schema_version:1, previous_grant_id,
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previous_attempt_id, partial_proof_sha256}` and forbids `native_retry`.
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Resolved transaction schema 2 adds `operation:"configure_only"`; only the
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existing `rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0` recipe/version 1, pinned fixture archive,
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and old/new version `1.0` are eligible. Schema 1 retains its exact encoding.
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The helper first requires the original saved signed request, immutable SQLite
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partial proof, definitive `APT_PARTIAL_UNCONFIGURED_VERIFIED` outcome, and closed
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consumed row. `recovery-planning` receives exactly `{native_recovery, proof}`;
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Python rechecks the original still-active witnesses and complete current partial
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snapshot. It seals only the content-addressed baseline and returns the normal
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planning projection plus `native_recovery`. Ordinary planning continues to reject
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unconfigured packages. This passive projection creates no job or authorization.
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For execution the helper archives the definitive old active directory, stages
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the exact proof as `active/partial-proof.json`, and binds its hash in the new
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signed manifest. Python independently checks history, original target, full
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partial baseline and installed fixture bytes. APT receives only
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`install -- rmm-mvp-test=1.0`; the actual v3 hook must contain exactly one
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equal-version `**CONFIGURE**` action. Unpack, removal, foreign packages and pending
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configuration remain forbidden. The same native sandbox, grant deadlines,
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locked-store handoff and complete postcondition/audit checks apply.
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Create-once markers are `recovery-attempt-<previous_grant>.json`,
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`pending-recovery-<previous_grant>.json`, and `recovery-<previous_grant>.json`.
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Original/retry markers, signed histories and the original unknown proof remain
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intact. Recovery produces `native_recovery:true`, `recovery_record_sha256` and
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`partial_proof_sha256`; it creates no fresh-install acceptance record or
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`native_record_sha256`. A later separately approved native 1.1 upgrade must
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provide the ordinary acceptance evidence for the changed provider/runtime.
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Local actual APT 2.6.2, with a vetoing collector and independently guarded fake
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dpkg, emitted only the exact configure action/target; real and copied package
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status stayed unchanged. This is **local regression evidence**, not Cloud-VM
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recovery acceptance. Native deployment, UI approval and execution remain the
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parent's next acceptance step.
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## Explicit one-attempt recovery (schema 3, 2026-11-13)
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Schema 2 keeps its exact old encoding (the optional field is omitted). Schema 3
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requires `native_retry` and is valid only for dev-test `apt-native-acceptance`:
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```
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native_retry: {
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schema_version: 1,
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previous_grant_id: UUID,
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previous_attempt_id: UUID,
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bootstrap_marker_sha256: SHA256(original exact marker bytes)
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}
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```
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This reference belongs to a **new separately UI-approved signed job**, never
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an unsigned IPC override. Under the existing device lock, before consuming the
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new grant and again before staging, the helper verifies the original saved
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Ed25519 request historically, identical target/generation/assignment/transaction,
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distinct job/attempt/authorization/plan, same-ledger terminal `failed` result
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`HOOK_NOT_HANDED_OFF`, matching recorded outcome, original context/launch/
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sandbox-100 evidence and absent hook/acceptance/retry markers. Historical
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signature verification never grants a current start. Unknown or partial history
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fails closed. Original active state may only move through the existing terminal
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history rule; original tombstone never changes.
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Provider independently checks original marker hash and immutable history,
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identical full baseline and current normal baseline gates. It exclusively writes
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`bootstrap-retry-<recipe>.json` binding the new attempt, signed reference and
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hashes of historical evidence. Worker, hook and completion recheck it. This is
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one recovery attempt per fixed fixture recipe, not general automatic retries.
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Test/native outcomes are recorded in `docs/implementation-status.md`.
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**Dedicated-runner update:** the current deployment and readiness protocol is
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defined in [`../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md`](../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md).
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The actual additive domain schema-2 types and AptNativeAcceptance variant have
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since landed and are exercised by a local exact-signature/helper roundtrip test.
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Agent routing and nonce/root-peer/identity/profile/stack-bound readiness are
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implemented. Older descriptions below of absent domain fields or missing runner
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describe the earlier increment, not a remaining implementation gate. Real VM
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profile/probe/installation acceptance remains unmeasured, not passed.
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## Current integration status / exact outstanding domain change
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The helper now contains a real provider bridge in
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`crates/privileged-helper/src/apt.rs`, called by its existing peer-credential
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authenticated IPC handler, **not** by a script wrapper. The domain job source
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was leased to the backend worker during this dispatch; it was not edited.
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Legacy package jobs cannot supply the required manifest and remain gated.
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No package capability was added to the agent. No native package/service/reboot
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operation, VM action, helper installation or acceptance record occurred here.
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Required additive domain/backend contract, before capability advertisement:
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1. Define typed `AptExecutionManifest` **schema 2**, `ResolvedAptTransaction`
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schema 1 and `PackageArchive` in domain (same exact fields/serde shape as the
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helper types below; do not make domain depend on the helper crate). All deny
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unknown/duplicate fields. No `serde_json::Value` opaque action authorization.
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2. Existing `Action::EnsurePackage` and `Action::ApplyUpdates` gain a field
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`apt_manifest: Option<AptExecutionManifest>`, default None for legacy reads.
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Execution/validation requires Some for APT. Serialization MUST preserve the
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complete object; ignoring unknown fields is explicitly detected and denied by
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`APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`. No unsigned IPC manifest field exists.
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3. Add a dedicated Action variant with this exact JSON shape:
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```json
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{
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"action": "apt_native_acceptance",
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"recipe_id": "rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0",
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"recipe_version": "1",
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"apt_manifest": {"<all schema-2 fields below>": "<replace this placeholder>"}
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}
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```
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`Action::name()` and permit.action are `apt_native_acceptance`. Root-only,
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explicit dev-test, specific target, fixed UI-authorized job/attempt. The
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upgrade recipe is `rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1` and needs another job. This is
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NOT an alias of run_script/diagnostic arbitrary execution. Backend plan/UI
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allowlisting must show full transaction, exact hashes, origin, no-reboot,
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execution identity and test-acceptance nature before approval.
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4. For fixture ensure_package the outer recipe_id/version must match the nested
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transaction exactly as strings. For apply_updates, outer provider=`apt`,
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packages=`["rmm-mvp-test"]`, reboot_policy=`never`, nested upgrade recipe
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only. Other original action parameters are retained and compared against the
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domain's typed serialization, never accepted through parameter aliases.
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5. Backend validation/planning/signing must validate both manifest transaction
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representations, generate JobPayload once and sign its exact payload hash in
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the existing Ed25519 permit. Keep all existing target/tenant/generation,
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authorization/plan/job/attempt/identity/time bindings. Planning needs the
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inspected root runtime/config hashes and immutable baseline/fingerprint.
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6. Agent forwarding/capability negotiation must be separately integrated after
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the domain contract and native prerequisites are complete. This dispatch did
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not change agent/protocol/server files. No optimistic capability claim.
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Current clear gates include `APT_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED`,
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`APT_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`, `APT_DOMAIN_MANIFEST_NOT_CONFIGURED`; an older
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domain may reject the action even earlier as INVALID_JOB/unknown field. That
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earlier rejection is not a fallback or authorization shortcut.
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## Public Rust API
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Current additive passive/no-change contract is documented in
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`deploy/linux/runtime-README.md` ("Passive APT planning and declarative
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no-change"). `readiness::PlanningResult` is returned only by authenticated
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`apt_planning_v1`; it creates no capability. `planning-status` can create only
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content-addressed root metadata seals. A normal exact already-desired fixture
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returns driver `verified_no_change` / `POSTCONDITION_ALREADY_MET`, never a fake
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`POSTCONDITIONS_VERIFIED` transaction/hook. Parent consumption and all signature,
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manifest/runtime/native-record/artifact/current-state gates remain required.
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```
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apt::ProviderConfig // serde deny_unknown_fields
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apt::AptExecutionManifest // schema 2
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apt::ResolvedAptTransaction // schema 1
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apt::PackageArchive
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apt::is_apt_action(&JobPayload) -> bool
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apt::policy_header(&JobPayload, &ProviderConfig) -> anyhow::Result<()>
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apt::prepare(&Binding, &Request, &ProviderConfig, DateTime<Utc>)
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-> anyhow::Result<PreparedApt>
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PreparedApt::execute(self, &rusqlite::Connection) -> anyhow::Result<Outcome>
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apt::install_known_payloads() -> anyhow::Result<()>
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```
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PreparedApt has no public fields/unchecked constructor. `prepare` independently
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calls Binding::verify (exact Ed25519 request/grant and all existing bindings),
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checks policy, exact signed manifest/domain preservation/code/runtime bindings,
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installed trusted bytes and pre-grant prefetched artifacts. Parent consumes and
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save_start-persists the request before execute. Execute independently requires
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the corresponding consumed row (same agent/generation/job/attempt, result NULL)
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and the exact originally saved request/signature/permit/plan/authorization.
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Its stable effect_armed_ledger_id is `apt-<grant UUID>-<SQLite rowid>`.
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## Exact manifest schema 2 inside Action.apt_manifest
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```
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type: "rmm.apt.helper-action"
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schema_version: 2
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action: "apt-native-acceptance" | "apt-execute"
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execution_profile: "dev-test"
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transaction_sha256: SHA256(transaction_bytes)
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resolved_apt_transaction: complete typed ResolvedAptTransaction object
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transaction_bytes: Vec<u8> / JSON array of integer bytes
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provider_sha256: SHA256(exact installed Python provider bytes)
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hook_sha256: SHA256(exact installed fixed hook bytes)
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apt_config_sha256: SHA256(print-config output bytes)
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runtime_sha256: SHA256(canonical inspect-runtime output object)
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test_result_id: ASCII identifier [A-Za-z0-9_.-], 1..128 bytes
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```
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The full object AND exact transaction bytes are required. Deserialize the bytes
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with the strict typed schema and require equality to the nested object. The
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provider writes those **same bytes**, not reformatted JSON, to expectation.json.
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It copies **the full original Request.job_bytes unchanged** to signed-action.json;
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job_payload_sha256 in context is SHA256 of those complete domain job bytes.
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The Python loader now requires that full JobPayload envelope and checks the
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nested action, job/attempt/root identity, inner bytes/hash/object and code pins.
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A detached old standalone schema-1 helper-action manifest is no longer accepted.
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ResolvedAptTransaction fields (all mandatory): schema_version=1, recipe_id,
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recipe_version="1", platform="ubuntu-24.04-amd64",
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resolver_config_version="rmm-apt-local-v1", no_reboot=true, status_fingerprint,
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baseline_sha256, packages. PackageArchive fields: name, architecture,
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old_version (null/string), new_version, origin, sha256, size, archive_path.
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Only the code-pinned single-package fixture install/upgrade is configured.
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Production and arbitrary catalogs remain denied; a test acceptance does not
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authorize another recipe/closure/profile. Exact fixture hashes are in README.
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## Root configuration / trusted installation / prefetch
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Existing root-owned 0600 helper config gains optional `apt_provider` (absent =
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disabled). No new secret/environment variable or caller-supplied path:
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```json
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{
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"schema_version": 1,
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"execution_profile": "dev-test",
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"allow_fixture_bootstrap": true,
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"allowed_recipes": ["rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0", "rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1"],
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"runtime_sha256": "<operator-reviewed canonical runtime hash>",
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"apt_config_sha256": "<operator-reviewed exact config output hash>"
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}
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```
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These are local policy limits, not approvals. Keep the existing binding,
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signing-key pin, agent UID/socket GID and parent ledger provisioning unchanged.
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No artifact URL/network fetch exists in the root provider.
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Planned administrator tool installation, **not executed**:
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```
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/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --install-apt-provider
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```
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Root-only, fixed paths, create-only: embeds Python/hook bytes at Rust compile
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time, writes root-owned `/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/{apt_transaction.py,hook}`
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(0644/0755), `/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction` and archives/baselines/history (0700),
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and `install-metadata.json` (0600, provider/hook hashes). Refuses existing files/
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directories instead of replacing/chmodding them. Partial installation requires
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explicit operator reconciliation; no automatic deletion/repair. On each use,
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installed bytes and metadata must match the helper's compiled known payloads.
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The interpreter is fixed `/usr/bin/python3 -I`, root-owned resolved interpreter;
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all provider/store path components are root-owned, nonsymlink and not writable
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by group/others. This installation creates no acceptance or grant.
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Planned explicit pre-grant fixture preparation, **not executed**:
|
||||
|
||||
```
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/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py provision-fixture-store
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```
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Only the two pinned deterministic fixture archives can be created, never an
|
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arbitrary archive/URL. Archives and `prefetch-<sha>.json` receipts are fsynced,
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root-owned 0600, exclusive creation. Receipt fields: schema_version=1, sha256,
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size, sealed_at_ms. Helper requires receipt time <= permit.not_before, matching
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actual SHA256/size/single-link archive. Missing/writable/symlinked/unprefetched
|
||||
artifacts fail before consumption. All downloads/imports must finish before the
|
||||
final short grant, never during execution. Artifact mTLS fetch elsewhere must
|
||||
ultimately yield the same root-verified sealed-store contract, not an agent path.
|
||||
|
||||
The same preparation stores complete canonical dpkg baseline at
|
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`baselines/<baseline_sha256>.json` and emits baseline hash/status fingerprint
|
||||
for the approved immutable plan. It creates neither jobs nor authorization.
|
||||
For subsequent changed baselines, the root-only `prepare-baseline` mode samples
|
||||
current dpkg state and creates a new content-addressed canonical baseline before
|
||||
the new plan/final grant. An identical existing baseline is only read/verified,
|
||||
never rewritten; changed state creates another hash file, never resets archives,
|
||||
receipts or acceptance/attempt markers. It creates no job authority. Do not
|
||||
modify a sealed file or fake a fingerprint. Archive preparation is create-only.
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||||
|
||||
Root `inspect-runtime` / `print-config` provide the planning measurements; hash
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||||
inspect-runtime's canonical JSON object **without its trailing newline**. Review
|
||||
the measured binary/OS/dpkg configuration rather than blindly trusting a hash.
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## Handoff, outcomes, recovery and unit prerequisites
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Parent handler retains its existing device lock, consumes once, save_start
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persists exact signed request, and rechecks clock/grant before effects. Bridge
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||||
creates active/0700 and expectation/signed-action/baseline/config/context files
|
||||
0600 using exclusive nofollow writes and file/directory fsync. Context schema 2
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||||
contains the same grant/job/attempt/authorization/plan IDs and original UTC
|
||||
deadline translated to CLOCK_MONOTONIC, not a fresh 60-second grant.
|
||||
|
||||
An old active directory can only move to history/<old grant UUID> when the same
|
||||
parent ledger contains a definitive succeeded/failed result. Unknown/null,
|
||||
unrecognized/partial handoffs or existing history destination block execution.
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||||
No tombstone/native bootstrap-attempt record is removed. Parent grant/attempt
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consumption survives any active-directory move.
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||||
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Python receives only fixed mode/path argv and two hash/ledger fields via stdin,
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||||
with cleared environment; no shell, secret argv or script conversion. Structured
|
||||
stdout is bounded to 64 KiB (excess drained without unbounded allocation), raw
|
||||
stderr discarded. Never timeout-kill APT. Client timeout is unknown while the
|
||||
helper keeps running and eventually journals the real result.
|
||||
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||||
Exit 0 alone is never success. Strict JSON effect_state/code/evidence validation
|
||||
requires bound ledger, exact package versions, full snapshot hash, installed
|
||||
fixture payload hash, and bootstrap test flags/native-record/test-result binding.
|
||||
Malformed/nonzero/missing/wrong evidence -> unknown. known_failed with an armed
|
||||
marker -> unknown, not failed. Existing finish() leaves consumed.result NULL for
|
||||
unknown/awaiting_reboot and persists execution_evidence, retaining the device lock.
|
||||
|
||||
**Existing helper systemd unit is not an APT-capability deployment.** Its
|
||||
ProtectSystem=strict/other hardening can prevent the required store/package
|
||||
writes and namespace setup. A separately reviewed native runner/unit profile
|
||||
must permit the narrowly agreed fixture writes and setup capabilities while
|
||||
preserving the provider's final sandbox. No unit sandbox was weakened here.
|
||||
Do not announce capability based solely on a successful helper build.
|
||||
|
||||
Local verification commands/results are reported in the dispatch return.
|
||||
Native helper installation, IPC package execution, lock probe, fixture install/
|
||||
update and VM approval/acceptance remain unrun. Tests using private temporary
|
||||
ledgers/mock children are not native acceptance evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Actually executed for this bridge increment:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo fmt -p rmm-privileged-helper -- --check
|
||||
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo clippy -p rmm-privileged-helper --lib --bin rmm-privileged-helper --tests -- -D warnings
|
||||
/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo test -p rmm-privileged-helper --lib --bin rmm-privileged-helper
|
||||
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Final results: formatting and warning-denying Clippy passed; **16 library + 2
|
||||
binary Rust tests passed**, **41 Python tests passed**, AST syntax checks passed
|
||||
for **6 Python files**. No full workspace suite was run. An initial Rust test
|
||||
fixture used legacy ApplyUpdates, which the current domain rejected as
|
||||
`INVALID_JOB`; cryptographic/parent-ledger tests were corrected to use an
|
||||
existing valid signed action without executing it or allowing it as an APT
|
||||
action. This is not evidence that the missing domain package contract landed.
|
||||
@@ -1,432 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Root-helper APT transaction provider / explicit first native acceptance
|
||||
# APT-Transaktionsprüfungen
|
||||
|
||||
**Latest 2026-11-13:** The separately WebUI-approved configure-only attempt
|
||||
`33775478…` reached APT 0 and completely installed fixture 1.0, but old provider
|
||||
`5ff260…` rejected acceptance on the actual host reboot flag. Its private worker
|
||||
reported false; the historical job had no HOST-before sample. It remains
|
||||
**unknown** (`FIXTURE_UNEXPECTED_REBOOT_REQUIRED`), with no acceptance record,
|
||||
Root scope closed and APT endpoint stopped. No before measurement or successful
|
||||
acceptance is inferred retrospectively.
|
||||
Dieses Verzeichnis enthält den lokalen APT-Prüfprovider und den Generator seiner Testpakete. Seine eigenen Tests liegen unter `tests/apt_transaction` und prüfen beispielsweise, welche Paketaktionen zur freigegebenen Transaktion gehören. [Provider](apt_transaction.py) · [Paketgenerator](build_fixture.py) · [Tests](../../tests/apt_transaction/test_guard.py)
|
||||
|
||||
New source implements an original-bound readonly failed-effect classification
|
||||
and a parent-namespace host-before/after contract for future jobs, matching
|
||||
Spec 1.13. Ambient true/true is reported honestly; changed host flags, private
|
||||
worker flags or changed boot reject acceptance. All **81 Python tests passed**
|
||||
in the readonly unprivileged offline container, including actual APT argument
|
||||
regressions with guarded fake effects and unchanged real/copied status. Native
|
||||
classification/new-runtime 1.1 acceptance remain pending. See
|
||||
[`HELPER-CONTRACT.md`](HELPER-CONTRACT.md) for the exact versioned contract.
|
||||
|
||||
**Earlier 2026-11-13:** The Cloud fixture retry reached armed hook and APT exit 0,
|
||||
leaving fixture 1.0 unpacked/unconfigured. An original-bound readonly proof and
|
||||
normal signed RootSync now classified that original attempt as **failed**
|
||||
(`APT_PARTIAL_UNCONFIGURED_VERIFIED`), preserving all histories/tombstones.
|
||||
No native acceptance record or package repair exists. Root test policy remains
|
||||
closed. Detailed real evidence: `../../docs/implementation-status.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
The configure-only recovery path, requiring its own new fixed WebUI approval, is implemented in source
|
||||
(schema 4 manifest, transaction schema 2), with a dedicated passive recovery
|
||||
projection and separate immutable recovery records. Its qualified runtime is now installed and its actual Cloud copied-database
|
||||
sandbox readiness probe passed, preserving original state. **No configure-only
|
||||
package effect or native package acceptance has yet run.** All **75 Python tests passed** in the offline readonly
|
||||
unprivileged container, including actual APT 2.6.2 configure-only protocol and
|
||||
guarded fake-dpkg arguments with unchanged real/copied status. See
|
||||
[`HELPER-CONTRACT.md`](HELPER-CONTRACT.md) for the precise recovery boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
Source configuration now disables APT's `dpkg::selection::remove::approved`
|
||||
rewrite, retaining the exact package's Configure operation while both pending
|
||||
modes remain disabled and hook-pinned. Upstream explanation:
|
||||
[APT 2.7.14 dpkgpm.cc](https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/apt-pkg/deb/dpkgpm.cc#L1626-L1657).
|
||||
Local actual APT 2.6.2 regression in an offline readonly unprivileged container
|
||||
proved unpack + exact `--configure rmm-mvp-test:all`, no `--pending` or foreign
|
||||
target; independent dpkg guard simulated effects, real/copied status unchanged.
|
||||
67 Python tests passed with this opt-in regression. **This correction is now installed and sandbox-probed on the Cloud VM;
|
||||
its native package effect remains unaccepted.** No automatic repair,
|
||||
marker reset or implicit unknown-resolution is introduced. Older sections below
|
||||
describe historical increments; current operational status is the linked log.
|
||||
|
||||
Reproduce that **local** configure regression using the existing development
|
||||
image with APT 2.6.2 (no host APT command):
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
docker run --rm --read-only --network none --user 1000:1000 \
|
||||
--tmpfs /tmp:rw,exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=1777 \
|
||||
--tmpfs /tmp/opencode:rw,exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=1777 \
|
||||
-v "$PWD/tools/apt-transaction:/src/tools/apt-transaction:ro" \
|
||||
-v "$PWD/tests/apt_transaction:/src/tests/apt_transaction:ro" \
|
||||
-v "$PWD/deploy/linux:/src/deploy/linux:ro" -w /src \
|
||||
-e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e RMM_APT_ARGUMENT_REGRESSION=1 \
|
||||
rust-discovery-dev-build:local \
|
||||
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -q
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Current dedicated runner/probe/profile/agent integration and executed local
|
||||
checks: [`../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md`](../../deploy/linux/apt-helper-README.md).
|
||||
The general helper unit remains unchanged; actual native VM measurements are
|
||||
still required. Readiness alone advertises no accepted package capability.
|
||||
|
||||
**Helper integration contract update:**
|
||||
[`HELPER-CONTRACT.md`](HELPER-CONTRACT.md) defines the implemented Rust helper
|
||||
bridge, root installation/store layout, schema-2 embedded manifest and exact
|
||||
remaining additive domain fields. It supersedes the older standalone signed
|
||||
helper-action example below: signed-action.json must now contain the **full
|
||||
original JobPayload bytes**, with `action.apt_manifest`, including exact
|
||||
`transaction_bytes`. No detached/unsigned manifest is accepted. No agent
|
||||
capability or native acceptance follows from this bridge build.
|
||||
|
||||
**Implemented, locally tested; NOT integrated or VM-tested.** No host package
|
||||
installation, VM access, real native acceptance, production evidence, grant
|
||||
issuance or WebUI approval has been performed here. The native process path is
|
||||
real code (unshare/mount/capabilities/seccomp/APT/dpkg), not merely a parser;
|
||||
its root/native execution is still unverified. Local root/installer execution
|
||||
in tests is explicitly mocked. No real acceptance record was created.
|
||||
|
||||
Python >=3.9, standard library; OS dependencies: APT/dpkg, util-linux
|
||||
unshare/mount, libseccomp.so.2, Linux x86-64 namespaces/seccomp/capabilities.
|
||||
Only Ubuntu 24.04 amd64 is eligible; this is not a support/acceptance claim.
|
||||
No Rust API, Cargo workspace changes, network endpoint, signature verifier,
|
||||
grant service or automatic retry is included.
|
||||
|
||||
## The circular gate is replaced, not bypassed
|
||||
|
||||
There are now two distinct helper-only CLI operations:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py native-acceptance
|
||||
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py execute
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* `native-acceptance`: dedicated **dev-test** action, exactly one code-pinned
|
||||
fixture install OR upgrade, its own fixed job/attempt and actual WebUI approval.
|
||||
It permits only absence of a *previous* native record for that fixture recipe.
|
||||
It uses the same signed binding, archives, native sandbox, hooks, locks,
|
||||
deadlines and independent verification as normal execution. No force/insecure/
|
||||
skip-validation flag exists.
|
||||
* `execute`: requires an existing matching record **and** a freshly verified,
|
||||
separately UI-approved normal job/startgrant. An acceptance record never
|
||||
substitutes for any signature or authorization.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope matrix:** records produced here authorize only their exact fixture
|
||||
recipe, package closure, runtime identity and **dev-test** profile. Production
|
||||
is rejected (`PRODUCTION_ACCEPTANCE_REQUIRED`), even for a test record. General
|
||||
catalog packages are rejected (`FIXTURE_RECIPE`); the bootstrap does not certify
|
||||
arbitrary packages or widen provider support. Supporting those needs a separate
|
||||
reviewed native-acceptance policy/provider revision, not relabelling this record.
|
||||
The legacy unsigned administrator-created `native-acceptance.json` schema 1
|
||||
is no longer used. Old helper contexts (schema 1) are rejected as well.
|
||||
|
||||
Each of these is a separate, one-time bootstrap recipe (recipe_version `1`):
|
||||
|
||||
| recipe_id | exact transition | architecture | origin |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0` | absent -> 1.0 | all | rmm-test |
|
||||
| `rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1` | 1.0 -> 1.1 | all | rmm-test |
|
||||
|
||||
Exactly one package, `rmm-mvp-test`, no dependencies/scripts/triggers. One job
|
||||
never installs both versions. Upgrade requires another fixed UI-approved job.
|
||||
Pinned deterministic Debian ar/USTAR archives, **20,672 bytes each**:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
1.0 74036ae81223deab3aae994fd2a2a695af408741777e1ce17dcb4e32f1235867
|
||||
1.1 ef67c9fe0ba1443fcfe465768e1204763063c369a2a1da04af6027d8a9c00491
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`build_fixture.py EXISTING_PRIVATE_OUTPUT_DIR` creates those exact bytes with
|
||||
fixed metadata. It refuses overwrites and never installs/imports/publishes.
|
||||
Real local dpkg-deb control/payload inspection confirms the only installed file
|
||||
is `/usr/share/rmm-mvp-test/version`, with the selected version plus newline.
|
||||
The builder now uses deterministic stdlib ar/USTAR construction, not the previous
|
||||
timestamp-dependent `dpkg-deb --build` output. Older built archives do **not**
|
||||
qualify for bootstrap; import these pinned bytes manually into the approved
|
||||
catalog, verify and seal them before requesting the final 60-second grant.
|
||||
|
||||
## Mandatory signed-action and verified-helper contract
|
||||
|
||||
This module does **not** verify signatures. The root helper is the trust boundary.
|
||||
Before writing any handoff files or invoking either mode, it MUST independently:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Verify the signed grant type/schema/algorithm/key, online validity and actual
|
||||
human WebUI authorization (or explicitly labelled allowed dev-test UI
|
||||
simulation), tenant/asset/agent identity and generation/assignment bindings.
|
||||
2. Verify plan hash, job payload hash **of exact bytes**, fixed job/attempt,
|
||||
action, execution profile, recipe/version, code/hook/config/runtime hashes,
|
||||
exact complete resolved transaction and deadlines against that signed grant.
|
||||
3. Enforce an explicit helper operation allowlist: `apt-native-acceptance` only
|
||||
from the dedicated dev-test fixture-bootstrap action, never a generic
|
||||
diagnostic/shell/API request. `apt-execute` must not invoke bootstrap mode.
|
||||
4. Recheck trusted clocks/current rights and durably consume the grant and
|
||||
attempt in its parent journal BEFORE spawning. Reject previous/uncertain
|
||||
attempts. Unprivileged network/MCP callers cannot write these files or invoke
|
||||
an unrestricted privileged subprocess API. Preserve peer-credential checks.
|
||||
|
||||
### Signed job payload: exact schema 1
|
||||
|
||||
The following object itself is the **signed/grant-hash-bound job payload**,
|
||||
stored unchanged as `active/signed-action.json`; it is NOT an extra unsigned
|
||||
root manifest or a caller's `verified: true` assertion. Fields are mandatory:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "rmm.apt.helper-action",
|
||||
"schema_version": 1,
|
||||
"action": "apt-native-acceptance",
|
||||
"execution_profile": "dev-test",
|
||||
"transaction_sha256": "<SHA256 of exact expectation.json bytes>",
|
||||
"resolved_apt_transaction": "<complete OBJECT defined below, not a string/reference>",
|
||||
"provider_sha256": "<installed apt_transaction.py SHA256>",
|
||||
"hook_sha256": "<fixed installed hook SHA256>",
|
||||
"apt_config_sha256": "<apt_config() bytes SHA256>",
|
||||
"runtime_sha256": "<canonical runtime_identity() SHA256>",
|
||||
"test_result_id": "<fixed acceptance evidence ID>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The string placeholder for `resolved_apt_transaction` above MUST be replaced
|
||||
with the complete nested object in actual payloads. Normal mode uses action
|
||||
`apt-execute`. Production is a recognized profile but cannot use these test
|
||||
records. The helper must verify the signed action, not merely trust ownership
|
||||
of a separately supplied hash. The provider rechecks exact signed-payload hash,
|
||||
type/schema/action/profile, nested transaction equality and code/config/runtime
|
||||
bindings; it relies on the helper for cryptography and grant consumption.
|
||||
|
||||
### ResolvedAptTransaction schema 1
|
||||
|
||||
All fields mandatory; unknown fields/types and duplicate JSON keys are rejected:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
schema_version: integer = 1
|
||||
recipe_id: one exact fixture recipe above
|
||||
recipe_version: "1"
|
||||
platform: "ubuntu-24.04-amd64"
|
||||
resolver_config_version: "rmm-apt-local-v1"
|
||||
no_reboot: true
|
||||
status_fingerprint: 64 lowercase hex characters
|
||||
baseline_sha256: 64 lowercase hex characters
|
||||
packages: [PackageArchive] # exactly one for this accepted scope
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`PackageArchive` exact fields:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
name: "rmm-mvp-test"
|
||||
architecture: "all"
|
||||
old_version: null for install, "1.0" for update
|
||||
new_version: "1.0" for install, "1.1" for update
|
||||
origin: "rmm-test"
|
||||
sha256: corresponding code-pinned hash above
|
||||
size: 20672
|
||||
archive_path: "/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/archives/<same sha256>.deb"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The general parser still understands up to 128 package changes / 1 MiB, but that
|
||||
does not authorize a broader execution scope. Frozen dataclasses/tuple closure;
|
||||
strict Debian version ordering via read-only typed `dpkg --compare-versions`.
|
||||
Status fingerprint hashes raw status/architecture/extended_states and trigger
|
||||
database state. Dirty dpkg updates, pending triggers, repair, reinstall,
|
||||
downgrade, removal, crossgrade and core/kernel/boot packages are unsupported.
|
||||
|
||||
`active/baseline.json` is the complete canonical all-package snapshot from
|
||||
`installed_snapshot()` (`dpkg-query`), not just the changed package:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{"package:architecture":{"version":"<version>","status":"install ok installed"}}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Its canonical byte SHA256 binds `baseline_sha256`. A new install requires actual
|
||||
absence, not leftover config-files. Existing consistent noninstalled entries may
|
||||
be present for other packages. Fingerprint/baseline are rechecked in the native
|
||||
hook, not accepted from simulation as authorization.
|
||||
|
||||
### VerifiedHelperContext schema 2
|
||||
|
||||
Root helper writes `active/context.json` only after the checks/consumption above:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"schema_version": 2,
|
||||
"transaction_sha256": "<exact expectation.json bytes SHA256>",
|
||||
"job_payload_sha256": "<exact signed-action.json bytes SHA256>",
|
||||
"action": "apt-native-acceptance",
|
||||
"execution_profile": "dev-test",
|
||||
"effect_armed_ledger_id": "<stable parent journal row>",
|
||||
"grant_id": "<verified grant ID>",
|
||||
"job_id": "<fixed job ID>",
|
||||
"attempt_id": "<fixed attempt ID>",
|
||||
"authorization_id": "<UI authorization ID>",
|
||||
"plan_sha256": "<verified plan hash>",
|
||||
"not_before_ms": 1794484800000,
|
||||
"start_before_ms": 1794484860000,
|
||||
"boot_id": "<current boot UUID>",
|
||||
"monotonic_start_before_ns": 123456789000
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
UTC integer milliseconds; start window <=60,000ms, exclusive upper deadline.
|
||||
Helper translates that same verified deadline to same-boot CLOCK_MONOTONIC ns;
|
||||
never grants another fresh window. Both clocks/boot are checked after expensive
|
||||
verification, before native launch and at the final hook gate. An installation
|
||||
validly started is not aborted merely because its start deadline later expires.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment / exact invocation
|
||||
|
||||
Planned, **not deployed here**. Root helper/operator installs reviewed files:
|
||||
|
||||
* `apt_transaction.py` -> `/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py`, 0644
|
||||
* fixed `hook` -> `/usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/hook`, 0755
|
||||
* `/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction` and `active`, 0700, root-owned
|
||||
* sealed archives in `archives/`, root-owned; no nonroot writer
|
||||
* active expectation/context/baseline/signed-action/apt.conf files, 0600
|
||||
* empty root-owned active `empty`, `lists`, `cache` directories, 0700
|
||||
|
||||
All path components must be real root-owned nonsymlink/non-group/world-writable
|
||||
paths. `apt.conf` must equal `apt_config()` bytes. Read-only `print-config` emits
|
||||
them; root-only `inspect-runtime` emits canonical measured runtime identity for
|
||||
the helper/planner's reviewed signed payload, not an acceptance claim.
|
||||
|
||||
For **either** operation, stdin is exactly:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{"transaction_sha256":"<same approved hash>","effect_armed_ledger_id":"<same parent row>"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Use sanitized environment and close inherited private fds. No secrets in argv.
|
||||
An acceptance request must invoke `native-acceptance`; a normal signed action
|
||||
must invoke `execute`. Mixing the two is rejected. Internal `hook` and
|
||||
`sandbox-worker` modes are not exposed as privileged IPC operations.
|
||||
|
||||
## Native pipeline and evidence publication
|
||||
|
||||
Both modes run the same pipeline:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Root/signed action/recipe/runtime/preconditions/actual archive validation;
|
||||
constant hook/config/code binding before APT. Native provider flock only
|
||||
serializes this provider, never replaces APT's locks.
|
||||
2. Bootstrap additionally writes/fsyncs O_EXCL
|
||||
`bootstrap-attempt-<fixed recipe_id>.json` in BASE, independently of active/
|
||||
and grant IDs. One-time per recipe; no automatic deletion/reset/retry, even
|
||||
after a failed native precheck. An operator must reconcile failures and use
|
||||
a separately reviewed lifecycle/revision, not remove tombstones to retry.
|
||||
3. Separate native child via fixed `unshare --mount --pid --fork --mount-proc
|
||||
--net`, private propagation, tmpfs `/run`/`tmp`/`var/tmp`/`dev`, protected
|
||||
readonly/masked kernel/boot/control-plane/tool/archive paths.
|
||||
4. Drop bounding/effective/permitted capability sets to exactly filesystem/UID
|
||||
subset `{0,1,3,4,6,7,8,31}`; inherited/ambient empty. No SYS_BOOT/SYS_ADMIN/
|
||||
SYS_PTRACE/KILL/RAWIO/NET_ADMIN/MKNOD. Set NoNewPrivileges, load inherited
|
||||
seccomp denying reboot/kexec, module loading, mount/namespace changes,
|
||||
ptrace/process writes and other kernel-control operations.
|
||||
5. **Actual native prechecks inside that child:** different PID/mount/net ns,
|
||||
expected namespace PID1, exact caps/NNP/Seccomp, readonly mount flags, tmpfs
|
||||
identity, masked sysrq, no conventional systemd/dbus/helper sockets; invalid
|
||||
reboot magic and invalid kexec flags/fds must return EPERM. These calls never
|
||||
contain valid reboot magic/commands or valid kexec input. No PID1 signals.
|
||||
6. Hold real existing `/var/lib/dpkg/lock-frontend` with fcntl; a separate native
|
||||
`apt-get -o DPkg::Lock::Timeout=0 check` must report that frontend-lock conflict
|
||||
(100 + expected lock diagnostic). `check` is read-only, not an installation
|
||||
probe. Never delete locks, kill owners or use simulation to prove locking.
|
||||
A busy foreign lock vetoes the bootstrap. Release only this process's fd.
|
||||
7. Fsync native-prechecks record, then sandbox-ready marker. Native APT uses
|
||||
exact local archives, `--no-remove --no-install-recommends` and
|
||||
constant isolated config. No global APT hooks/sources/preferences; reviewed
|
||||
dpkg global config is runtime-hash-bound in the signed action. Native foreign
|
||||
lock wait remains bounded to 10 seconds.
|
||||
**2026-11-13 native diagnosis:** `--no-download` prevented APT's local file
|
||||
acquisition and emitted `**ERROR**` instead of the absolute archive filename
|
||||
in protocol v3. The provider permits local acquisition of the presealed
|
||||
archive; the AF_UNIX-only private worker still rejects actual IPv4/IPv6
|
||||
socket creation. Both denials are now checked inside worker/hook/probe.
|
||||
A permitted IP socket or unrelated resource error vetoes; this is not a
|
||||
network-download allowance or acceptance/manifest/hash/path bypass.
|
||||
8. Mandatory v3 pre-dpkg hook repeats signed/runtime/scope/sandbox checks,
|
||||
validates the whole actual action set, actual hashes/control/payload,
|
||||
status/baseline and final deadline; O_EXCL + file/directory fsync effect-armed
|
||||
marker **before returning 0**. Second hook is vetoed. No fallback.
|
||||
Immediately after successful file/directory fsync, UTC/monotonic deadline and
|
||||
boot identity are checked again. Expiry vetoes the hook while retaining its
|
||||
armed marker: conservative unknown/reconciliation, never marker reuse.
|
||||
9. After native child exit 0 and valid bound markers/result, independently query
|
||||
**all** installed versions/statuses, detect unexpected changes, require empty
|
||||
`dpkg --audit` and exact installed fixture version-file bytes. Private /run
|
||||
reboot flag is combined with host flag. Bootstrap requires no reboot flag.
|
||||
10. Only then publish root-owned 0600 schema-2
|
||||
`acceptance-<fixed recipe_id>.json`, staging/fsync complete bytes before
|
||||
exclusive publication and directory fsync. No failed/stale-start/partial/
|
||||
unknown execution is promoted. Parent must treat publication/IO uncertainty
|
||||
as unknown and reconcile; a record is never an excuse to retry that job.
|
||||
|
||||
Record binds exact approved recipe/packages, full measured runtime (tool, hook,
|
||||
APT config, resolved binaries including APT/dpkg/dpkg-deb/dpkg-query/Python/
|
||||
unshare/mount/shell/libseccomp hashes and version strings, OS/kernel identity,
|
||||
dpkg config fingerprint), transaction/job-payload/plan hashes, grant/job/attempt/
|
||||
authorization/test-result IDs, precheck/hook/postcondition hashes and completion
|
||||
time. It explicitly contains `test_acceptance: true`, `noProductionEvidence: true`.
|
||||
Install and upgrade have separate records; one does not certify the other.
|
||||
|
||||
## Result / safety bounds
|
||||
|
||||
One JSON result on stdout: `effect_state` = `known_failed`, `verified`, or
|
||||
`unknown`; stable `code`; structured `evidence`. Every structured bootstrap
|
||||
result, including veto/unknown, carries `evidence.test_acceptance=true` and
|
||||
`evidence.noProductionEvidence=true`. Verified bootstrap additionally reports
|
||||
record hash/test-result ID. Exit 0 means structured result, not job success.
|
||||
Malformed CLI/hook input exits 100 with generic diagnostics. Parent must journal
|
||||
missing output/death/partial markers after possible launch as unknown.
|
||||
|
||||
No `awaitreboot` output in this version: no post-boot completion condition exists.
|
||||
No reboot is invoked. Any reboot/follow-up/retry needs another fixed approved job.
|
||||
No auto-configure-all, autoremove, dist-upgrade, repair, index refresh, installer
|
||||
timeout killing, or automatic record/attempt clearing is provided.
|
||||
|
||||
APT retains its frontend lock and normally hands off the inner dpkg lock.
|
||||
**No claim that both locks are held during the hook.** Direct foreign dpkg and
|
||||
malicious root are outside the frontend-lock guarantee; native inner locking
|
||||
still applies. Root scripts are intrinsically trusted host-filesystem code;
|
||||
this is not general malicious-root containment or arbitrary deferred-side-effect
|
||||
verification. Bootstrap avoids that expansion by accepting only pinned
|
||||
script/trigger/dependency-free fixtures. Existing dpkg triggers/global config,
|
||||
kernel, root administrators, trusted binaries/helper remain in the TCB.
|
||||
|
||||
## Primary sources and actual local verification
|
||||
|
||||
APT 2.7.14 sources read before parser implementation:
|
||||
|
||||
* <https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/doc/apt.conf.5.xml>
|
||||
* <https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/apt-pkg/deb/dpkgpm.cc>
|
||||
* <https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/apt-pkg/deb/debsystem.cc>
|
||||
|
||||
Native read-only lock probe checked against `DoCheck` (`Cache.Open/CheckDeps`,
|
||||
not dpkg/install) in:
|
||||
<https://github.com/Debian/apt/blob/2.7.14/cmdline/apt-get.cc>.
|
||||
|
||||
Hook protocol **VERSION 3**, nine fields:
|
||||
`name old-version old-arch old-multiarch direction new-version new-arch
|
||||
new-multiarch action`. New install old triple `- - none`; `<` install/upgrade,
|
||||
`>` downgrade/removal; action absolute archive path or `**CONFIGURE**`/
|
||||
`**REMOVE**`. Config lines precede a blank separator and support percent escaping
|
||||
and repeated unnamed lists. SHA/size/origin are NOT transmitted in v3: actual
|
||||
sealed files are independently checked. Whole closure must match, including one
|
||||
configure per unpack; extra/missing/repeated actions are vetoed.
|
||||
`tests/apt_transaction/fixtures/install-v3.txt` is source-derived, **not a native
|
||||
installation capture**.
|
||||
|
||||
Actually executed unprivileged, with **no host package mutation**:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**39 tests passed** at the documentation update. Original 22 guard/archive/
|
||||
parser/preconditions tests plus pinned fixture/control inspection, context/
|
||||
signed manifest/recipe/profile/runtime binding, native-record matrix, fsync/
|
||||
partial/negative evidence rejection, mocked full driver success/unknown/failure/
|
||||
stale/redelivery, mocked native mount/capability/namespace/socket introspection,
|
||||
and local unprivileged seccomp invalid-input EPERM probes.
|
||||
The post-fsync deadline regression advances mocked UTC/monotonic clocks (both
|
||||
and each independently), observes nonzero hook outcome/no modeled dpkg start,
|
||||
and verifies that the durable marker survives and prevents a second handoff.
|
||||
Native root/installer/VM parts are explicitly mocked under private temporary
|
||||
BASE paths; mock-generated records are deleted with those dirs and are NOT
|
||||
native evidence. Safe invalid-input probes and seccomp loading really ran in
|
||||
short-lived unprivileged children. No valid reboot/kexec operation or host PID1
|
||||
signal was attempted. Deterministic .deb bytes were really built/read/inspected,
|
||||
never installed. Full root sandbox, real APT lock conflict, native fixture
|
||||
install/update, helper signature integration and VM acceptance remain **unrun**.
|
||||
Im MVP planen WebUI und MCP Linux-Wartung als Skriptauftrag. Ein zur Wartung berechtigter Benutzer reicht ein Shellskript für das Zielgerät ein. Die WebUI zeigt Skript und Rechte vor der persönlichen Entscheidung. Für den Ablauf im Produkt gilt der [Geräte- und Skriptvertrag](../../proto/BACKEND_CONTRACT.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user