Document the accepted MVP and retire superseded development plans
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 14s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 14s
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -1,277 +1,26 @@
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# Linux agent/helper bootstrap contract (not a VM acceptance)
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# Linux-Agent betreiben
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**Current integrated runtime contract:** [runtime-README.md](runtime-README.md).
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The module-only blockers and integration steps below record the earlier increments;
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they are historical and superseded by that runtime document. In particular Sync,
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HTTPS, rotation and authenticated helper apply are now wired in source, not VM-
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accepted. Use the current document and installed units for new bootstrap work.
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Der Linux-Client für `x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` meldet sich ausgehend per mTLS am Gerätegateway. Als Systembenutzer `rmm-discovery` liefert er Heartbeats und Inventar, holt genehmigte Shell-Skripte ab und meldet Ausgabe und Exitcode zurück. Der optionale Root-Helper gehört zur gleichen signierten Releaseversion wie der Agent.
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Dedicated APT runner, exact config/unit/CLI/readiness/agent-routing preflight:
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[`apt-helper-README.md`](apt-helper-README.md). This newer profile does not weaken
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the existing general/readiness helper unit. Native VM measurements remain open.
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## Installation
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No install/start/reboot command in this document has been executed on the VM.
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No RustDesk component is installed. Deploy only the artifacts/configuration for
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the explicitly agreed test; do not copy central signing/TLS private keys.
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1. In der WebUI den Zielkunden wählen, **Gerät aufnehmen** öffnen und einen Einmalcode erzeugen.
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2. Auf dem x86-64-Linux-Gerät mit systemd und Python 3 den dort angezeigten Linux-Befehl ausführen. Er lädt `/install/linux.sh` über HTTPS und ruft es mit `sudo sh` und dem Bootstrap-Ursprung des Servers auf. Den Einmalcode am verdeckten Prompt eingeben.
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3. Für Root-Skripte die Administratoroption der WebUI wählen. Sie ergänzt `--enable-admin-scripts`. Auf einem bereits eingeschriebenen Gerät lässt sich der Installer mit demselben Ursprung und dieser Option erneut ausführen. Die Geräteidentität bleibt erhalten.
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4. Im Gerätedetail Hostname, Kunde, Agentversion und letzten authentisierten Kontakt kontrollieren. Für einen Root-Auftrag braucht das Gerät den gemeldeten Root-Kontext und eine passende zentrale Geräteregel. Ein MCP-Token benötigt zusätzlich die passenden Rechte für diesen Kunden. [MCP-Zugang](../../docs/public-access.md)
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## Built artifacts and process configuration
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## Selbstupdate und Diagnose
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Planned build command (the debug test/build commands actually executed are listed
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in `tests/agent_jobs/README.md`):
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`rmm-discovery-update.timer` ruft den Releasebestand nach dem Booten und anschließend alle fünf Minuten mit einer zufälligen Verzögerung von bis zu 20 Sekunden ab. Vor dem Wechsel prüft der Updater das signierte Paket und die Auftragsjournale. Eine neue Generation wird durch den frischen Kontakt des Agenten bestätigt. Scheitert die Aktivierung, wählt der Updater den Vorgänger. Ein über den Installer aktivierter Helper wechselt zusammen mit dem Agenten. [Installer und Aktualisierungslogik](../../crates/server/src/bootstrap/lifecycle.py)
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```sh
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cargo build --release -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper
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```
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| Am Gerät prüfen | Befehl oder Pfad |
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| --- | --- |
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| Agent und letzter Update-Lauf | `systemctl status rmm-discovery-agent.service rmm-discovery-update.timer` und `journalctl -u rmm-discovery-update.service -n 50` |
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| Installierter Root-Helper | `systemctl status rmm-discovery-managed-script-helper.service` |
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| Aktive Generation | `readlink -f /opt/rust-discovery-client/current` |
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| Zustand und Identität | `/var/lib/rmm-discovery` gehört dem Dienstkonto. Bei einem Binärwechsel bleiben Gerätedaten, Schlüssel und Journal erhalten. |
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| Tatsächlicher Neustart | `cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id` vor und nach dem Neustart vergleichen. Anschließend denselben Agenten am Gateway und das Ergebnis eines nachfolgenden Skripts prüfen. |
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Both binaries are environment-configured, **not** positional-argument CLIs.
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Die Bibliotheksrevision „Linux neu starten“ kündigt den Neustart mit einer Minute Vorlauf an. Eine Datei unter `/tmp` kann beim Booten gemäß lokaler Systemkonfiguration verschwinden. Für die Beurteilung eines Auftrags zählt die Ausgabe seines konkreten Versuchs. [Native MCP-Abnahme](../../docs/evidence/mcp-scoped-script-requests-20261118.json)
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Agent: `RMM_AGENT_STATE` (default `devstate/agent`), `RMM_CA_FILE` (default
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`devstate/pki/ca.pem`), `RMM_CONNECT_ADDR` (default `127.0.0.1:18443`),
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`RMM_ENROLLMENT_TOKEN_FILE` (first registration only), and optional
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`RMM_JOB_BINDING_FILE`, plus optional `RMM_HELPER_SOCKET` for explicit-root grants.
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The TCP override never changes the TLS DNS/SNI name
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`rmm-dev.internal`. No proxy or invalid-certificate bypass. Without a binding,
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the agent remains passive. It refuses to advertise/execute actions as UID 0.
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Provision a dedicated unprivileged `rmm-agent` system account/group. Install the
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agent binary root-owned and non-writable by that account at
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`/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent`. State must be owned by that account, mode 0700;
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its files are 0600. The sample service uses systemd `StateDirectory` and no
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ambient capabilities. Install only the public CA at `/etc/rmm/ca.pem`. An
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optional root-owned 0600 `/etc/rmm/agent.env` supplies the first-enrollment token
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**path**, never an inline token. Remove that bootstrap token after registration.
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Retain the enrolled VM-generated private device key on the VM.
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The operator must provision the job signing key over the authenticated bootstrap
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channel: authenticated `GET https://rmm-dev.internal:18443/api/v1/job-signing-key`
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using the verified CA, checking `algorithm == "Ed25519"`, `schema_version == 1`,
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32-byte `public_key_hex` and `key_id == SHA256(raw_public_key)`. Do not trust a key
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sent alongside a job, use an unauthenticated GET, put bearer credentials in
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command arguments, or substitute TLS/update keys. This increment does not
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rotate this trust anchor. Optional automatic agent fetching is described below;
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the helper remains independently provisioned. The authenticated operator/bootstrap
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must also resolve the enrolled agent's tenant, asset, generation and assignment
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from server records, not accept an offer as identity provisioning.
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Agent binding JSON, owned by `rmm-agent`, 0600, in a root-owned configuration
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directory (replace every placeholder; invalid placeholders intentionally fail):
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```json
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{
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"tenant_id": "PROVISIONED-TENANT-UUID",
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"asset_id": "ENROLLED-ASSET-UUID",
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"agent_id": "ENROLLED-AGENT-UUID",
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"enrollment_generation": 1,
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"assignment_version": 1,
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"public_key_hex": "AUTHENTICATED-32-BYTE-KEY-IN-HEX"
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}
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```
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The agent additionally compares asset/agent IDs to its enrollment response.
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Generation/assignment changes require an authenticated re-provisioning procedure,
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not an in-band config assertion. State lock, integrity check and journal capacity
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errors fail closed; never delete journal/consumption files to force a retry.
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## Independent helper boundary
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Helper: `RMM_HELPER_CONFIG`, default `/etc/rmm/helper.json`. It requires UID 0,
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a root-owned 0600 config, root-owned private 0700 state directory, and a
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root-owned socket parent not writable by group/others. `/run/rmm-helper` may be
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0750 with group `rmm-agent`. The root-owned socket is 0660 with the configured
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group; `SO_PEERCRED` additionally requires **exactly** the configured non-root
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agent UID. Group membership alone grants no execution authority.
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Example `/etc/rmm/helper.json` (root:root, 0600):
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```json
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{
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"binding": {
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"tenant_id": "PROVISIONED-TENANT-UUID",
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"asset_id": "ENROLLED-ASSET-UUID",
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"agent_id": "ENROLLED-AGENT-UUID",
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"enrollment_generation": 1,
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"assignment_version": 1,
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"public_key_hex": "AUTHENTICATED-32-BYTE-KEY-IN-HEX"
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},
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"agent_uid": 12345,
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"socket_gid": 12345,
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"socket": "/run/rmm-helper/control.sock",
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"state": "/var/lib/rmm-helper",
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"allowed_services": ["rmm-acceptance.service"],
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"allow_reboot": false,
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"allow_root_scripts": false
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}
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```
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Use the actual dedicated account's numeric UID/GID, not the example numbers.
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The helper re-verifies exact Ed25519 bytes, all identity/hash/action/parameter
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bindings, a <=60-second grant interval, synchronized bounded host clock, explicit
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`execution_identity:"root"`, local action policy and its **own** SQLite consumption
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ledger before invoking the typed OS provider. A request-provided bearer, key or
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identity assertion is never an authority. The config has a separate, default-off
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root-script permission; enabling it is consciously broad administration, still
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subject to the sample service sandbox. Only exact allowed service units with
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running/stopped state and >=180s runtime are accepted; restart is not silently
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rewritten as start. Reboot is default-off and never yields exit-code success.
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IPC framing: one big-endian u32 length plus JSON `Request` (<=512 KiB) per Unix
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connection. Fields are `job_bytes`, `permit_bytes`, `signature` (JSON byte arrays),
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`plan_hash`, `authorization_id`. Response has the same framing and an `Outcome`.
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Read/write deadlines are 5s. No request errors/secrets are echoed. The server
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process is serial; unknown effects retain its global device resource lock, even
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after restart. Duplicate consumed grants return stored evidence/unknown, never
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execute again. A new grant for an already consumed attempt is also refused.
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The helper refuses a preexisting socket; systemd removes its RuntimeDirectory
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on stop. Manual stale-socket recovery requires checking that no helper is alive,
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not blindly unlinking a path at startup.
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## Explicit integration/acceptance blockers
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* Backend currently permits only `agent_service`. Network agent intentionally
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advertises only `run_script` and `refresh_inventory`, not privileged actions.
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Network-agent → Unix-helper invocation is wired for explicit-root signed jobs
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when `RMM_HELPER_SOCKET` is configured, with root socket/peer authentication.
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A backend-authorized explicit root identity plus helper capability negotiation
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must land before service/reboot/root-script E2E tests. Helper policy denies
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unconfigured actions independently; the agent never relabels a service-identity
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grant into root authority.
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* Real APT mutation remains unsupported. A simulation followed by `apt-get`
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cannot guarantee exact approved resolution under dpkg fcntl locks or suppress
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arbitrary maintainer-script reboots. Neither `ensure_package` nor
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`apply_updates` is advertised. No false flock-on-dpkg-lock implementation.
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* No backend SyncRequest/Response exists. Only the **first** authenticated session
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of a journal may start effects. On reconnect/restart new effects are blocked;
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in-flight reservations become unknown, durable evidence still replays and
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heartbeats remain fresh. No DB deletion/new-grant shortcut. Existing previously
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connected state also needs real synchronization before jobs can be enabled.
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* Running-script cancellation is recorded but not claimed as confirmed abort;
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bounded execution finishes and reports its real result. A reboot does not
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complete without authenticated new-boot evidence; automatic reboot recovery
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synchronization is not implemented.
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* Extended collectors now map to bounded per-source observations inside the
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existing `linux.base` JSON, not new protobuf scopes/tags. Enable only after
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backend JSON-extension acceptance is confirmed, as described below.
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* No VM deployment, systemd install, root action, package/update/reboot host
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effects or real UI approval were performed by this increment.
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## Additional environment variables and bootstrap (second increment)
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* `RMM_JOB_SIGNING_KEY_BOOTSTRAP=1`: after enrollment, use **device mTLS** to GET
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`/api/v1/job-signing-key` over verified TLS. DNS/SNI remains `rmm-dev.internal`;
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`RMM_CONNECT_ADDR` changes TCP only. Built-in roots, proxies and redirects are
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disabled. The response is bounded to 4096 bytes and Ed25519/schema/key-hash
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checked. No bearer is copied into the agent. A preconfigured binding key must
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match; an empty key allows initial authenticated provisioning. The resulting
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`RMM_AGENT_STATE/job-signing-key.json` is private and create-only. A changed
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existing pin **fails**, never silently rotates. Keep the bootstrap flag enabled
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on subsequent starts when the binding's key is empty, so the endpoint is
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reauthenticated and checked against the cached pin. If the current backend
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endpoint accepts bearer identity only, bootstrap fails closed; backend must
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explicitly authorize the authenticated enrolled device at that endpoint.
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* Helper config optional `"signing_key_file":"/etc/rmm/helper-signing-key.json"`:
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root-owned 0600 JSON with `key_id`, `algorithm`, `schema_version`,
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`public_key_hex` in the GET response shape. Provision via the trusted operator
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bootstrap, **not** from an agent-provided file/path/request. If an inline helper
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binding key is present it must match. The helper has no network key-fetch or
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auto-replacement operation; agent cache changes cannot change helper trust.
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* `RMM_LOG_UNITS_FILE`: private, agent-owned 0600 JSON array of 1–128 exact
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`.service` names. `query_logs` is advertised only when this allowlist and a
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native journald executable/runtime exist. The signed action must bind an
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allowlisted unit, nonnegative UTC window <=24h, <=1000 lines, >=20s runtime and
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bounded output. No arbitrary paths or caller-defined journal arguments.
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Access/JSON/output failures retain quality/error metadata. The current action
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has **no cursor input field**; no cursor is fabricated or advanced. Results
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explicitly report `cursor_status:not_advanced_no_ack_contract` and partial
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coverage until a concrete durable cursor-ACK contract exists.
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* `RMM_EXTENDED_INVENTORY=1`: opt-in additive snapshot JSON fields `observations`,
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`collection_started_at`, `collection_completed_at`. Every observation has
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`scope`, source, real RFC3339 observation time, quality, completeness,
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truncation, error and data. CPU, memory, OS, interfaces, routes, DNS, volumes,
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installed packages, local update metadata and DMI are mapped; SMART remains
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explicitly unsupported. Per-scope output is <=32 KiB and entire data <=512 KiB.
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**Do not enable against a gateway deserializing the old deny-unknown-fields
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Inventory struct.** Confirm backend storage accepts these additive JSON fields
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first. Default remains compatible base JSON; no wire/protocol file changed.
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Passive collection now runs in one bounded-inflight blocking worker with a
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bounded completion channel, not inside the network/heartbeat loop. A reconnect
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does not spawn a second collector while one is already running. A refresh job
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still collects a **new** base observation for its signed `linux.base` scope;
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it never returns an old stored passive snapshot as a live measurement.
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Awaiting-reboot evidence now persists before effect: original native boot ID,
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exact signed request, reservation time and reconnect deadline in each process's
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own `execution_evidence` ledger. Awaiting/unknown outcomes persist without
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unlocking the consumed attempt. Neither exit code nor a process restart supplies
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authenticated new-boot completion. Cancellation arriving while a permit is
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outstanding is checked before effect; running cancellation remains conservative.
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An earlier future-scheduled job no longer starves later ready jobs.
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## Offline package installer (not executed on VM)
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`deploy/linux/install.py` is create-only. Planned invocation:
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```sh
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python3 deploy/linux/install.py --root /PATH/TO/STAGING \
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--agent-binary target/release/rmm-agent \
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--helper-binary target/release/rmm-privileged-helper --ca-file /PATH/TO/PUBLIC-CA.pem
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```
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Staging writes only the x86-64 ELF artifacts, public CA and unit files. A live
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installation additionally requires root, `--root / --install-live` and an already
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provisioned unprivileged `rmm-agent` account. It refuses overwrites, writable or
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symlinked install directories, non-x86-64 artifacts and private-key CA inputs.
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It does **not** create accounts/config/identities/state, call systemctl, enable or
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start anything, install packages, change the network or reboot. Configure trust
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and enrollment first; systemd StateDirectory/RuntimeDirectory creates the correct
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runtime state when a later explicitly authorized bootstrap starts the units.
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The units retain empty agent capabilities, NoNewPrivileges, private temp,
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read-only system/home protection and no privileged-shell bypass. Privileged
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scripts are separately default-off and remain subject to the helper sandbox.
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## Concrete backend contracts needed next
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### APT bridge increment (not installed or VM-tested)
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The helper's typed APT bridge is implemented at
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`crates/privileged-helper/src/apt.rs`, through its existing SO_PEERCRED/signature/
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parent-consumption boundary. Root config has optional `apt_provider`; default is
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disabled. The exact schema-2 signed manifest, additive domain action fields,
|
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compile-time-known create-only provider installation, pre-grant sealed archive/
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baseline layout, context/ledger mapping and conservative outcome contract are
|
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documented in [`../../tools/apt-transaction/HELPER-CONTRACT.md`](../../tools/apt-transaction/HELPER-CONTRACT.md).
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|
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This does not remove the package-capability blocker: the domain must preserve
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the complete typed `action.apt_manifest`, validate the narrow fixture closure,
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and support dedicated `apt_native_acceptance`; the agent remains unchanged.
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Legacy package/update actions without this field fail closed. No RunScript
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conversion, arbitrary archive URL or unsigned IPC manifest is accepted.
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Planned root-only `rmm-privileged-helper --install-apt-provider` installs only
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embedded reviewed provider/hook bytes and fixed metadata, create-only. It does
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not start services, create grants, install .deb packages or create acceptance.
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`provision-fixture-store` prepares only the pinned fixture artifacts before any
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final grant. Neither command was executed in this increment.
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The existing helper unit's ProtectSystem=strict/other protections are **not**
|
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an APT write/setup profile. A reviewed native fixture runner/unit configuration
|
||||
and actual VM tests are still required; no unit restriction was relaxed here.
|
||||
Do not advertise APT merely because the Rust bridge and local tests compile.
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|
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Before removing `begin_session`'s fail-closed reconnect gate, agree a versioned
|
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authenticated SyncRequest/Response carrying device identity/assignment and
|
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connection generation, journal identity/checkpoint, fixed job/attempt, payload
|
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hash, grant ID/bytes or reservation ambiguity, local revision/state, original
|
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boot ID, persisted outcomes and concrete durable event receipts. Server must
|
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return an explicit reconciled/fenced decision, not a blanket `ok`. Unknown or
|
||||
missing old reservations must retain resource locks; no response may authorize a
|
||||
new attempt or silently manufacture a replacement grant. Restored/mismatched
|
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generations must stay blocked. Reboot success requires authenticated current
|
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envelope boot ID different from persisted original boot and bound postconditions.
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Long-poll must deliver the same typed envelopes and concrete ACKs with one active
|
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generation, including late evidence ingestion; no new endpoint/wire assumption
|
||||
is implemented here. Root planning must bind explicit root identity and local
|
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helper capabilities/policy, never reinterpret `agent_service`. The public key
|
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GET must authorize enrolled device mTLS. Additive inventory JSON acceptance must
|
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be confirmed before enabling extended collection in a real agent.
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Für einen neuen Release oder eine direkte Entwicklungsbereitstellung den gemeinsamen [Entwicklungsweg](../../docs/development.md) verwenden.
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||||
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
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# Dev/test root-helper readiness, not package acceptance
|
||||
|
||||
`python3 deploy/vm_root_bootstrap.py inspect` is read-only. `build` creates a
|
||||
private minimal Docker context containing only Rust sources, pinned Cargo files,
|
||||
migrations and the reviewed APT-tool sources; it never includes credentials.
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`install` is the separately authorized create-only systemd bootstrap. It refuses
|
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existing root-helper paths, unresolved VM jobs, an active agent/tunnel, changed
|
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agent identity/signing authority or incompatible artifacts. It never resets an
|
||||
identity/journal or authorizes a job. Do not retry a partial install blindly.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixed resources: `/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper`, root-owned 0600
|
||||
`/etc/rmm/helper-dev-test-v1.json` and `helper-signing-key-v1.json`, private root
|
||||
state `/var/lib/rmm-helper`, `rmm-helper-dev-test.service`, and root-owned agent
|
||||
drop-in `10-dev-helper-v1.conf`. The drop-in adds only
|
||||
`RMM_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-helper/control.sock`; it does not restart the agent.
|
||||
The helper's root-owned socket is 0660/group `rmm-agent` in a 0750 root-owned
|
||||
runtime directory. `SO_PEERCRED` separately checks exactly the provisioned
|
||||
non-root agent UID; a connect-only readiness probe is not a signed IPC test.
|
||||
|
||||
Public signing authority comes from the authenticated, CA/name-verified server
|
||||
GET and must match the preserved agent binding. No server private key is copied.
|
||||
Helper trust/ledger remain inaccessible to the network service. The helper is
|
||||
enabled for its expressly named dev/test service but stopped after readiness
|
||||
only when its own consumption ledger is confirmed empty. No agent/tunnel is
|
||||
started. Creation lists, native measurements and sanitized failure class/line
|
||||
numbers are stored privately; raw stderr, payloads and exceptions are withheld.
|
||||
|
||||
## Intentionally disabled execution gates
|
||||
|
||||
The dev/test config allows only the future exact `rmm-mvp-test.service` unit;
|
||||
this bootstrap **does not create or start that test service**. Root scripts and
|
||||
reboot are disabled. `apt_provider` is null. Installing the compiled-in provider
|
||||
via `--install-apt-provider` creates trusted code/hook and empty sealed-store
|
||||
directories/metadata only. No package, fixture archive, baseline, active context,
|
||||
grant or native-acceptance record is generated. `inspect-runtime` and
|
||||
`print-config` are measurements, not authority. Their hashes belong to a future
|
||||
explicitly UI-approved immutable plan.
|
||||
|
||||
`inspect-sandbox` is invoked read-only as root in the parent environment. A veto
|
||||
there is expected and reported as **not passed**, never bypassed with fabricated
|
||||
`host-namespaces.json`/sandbox-ready files. The actual provider requires its
|
||||
signed worker context before building the final sandbox.
|
||||
|
||||
The new readiness unit preserves restrictive protections; it is deliberately
|
||||
**not APT-execution-capable**. Package setup requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN for private
|
||||
mount/PID/network namespaces and mount setup, CAP_MKNOD for the four basic device
|
||||
nodes, and write access to the actual fixture package payload/dpkg/APT stores.
|
||||
The final package child must then retain exactly CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER,
|
||||
FSETID, SETGID, SETUID, SETPCAP and SETFCAP, NNP and seccomp; no SYS_ADMIN,
|
||||
SYS_BOOT, KILL or MKNOD may remain. Host control sockets must be hidden and the
|
||||
private PID1/mount/network checks must pass. The readiness unit's deny-mount
|
||||
syscall policy and ProtectSystem=strict prevent this setup. Do not loosen them
|
||||
blindly: a separately reviewed native APT runner/profile is still required.
|
||||
|
||||
Future backend root planning, manifest preservation, helper policy changes and
|
||||
agent capability negotiation do not follow from installation. Reconnect/sync
|
||||
must be ready before starting new jobs. Every service/package/update/reboot or
|
||||
new attempt still needs its own fixed plan and actual dev/test WebUI approval.
|
||||
Actual commands/results are recorded in `docs/implementation-status.md`; this
|
||||
document alone claims no VM execution or Linux-MVP acceptance.
|
||||
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Dedicated APT runner / VM preflight contract
|
||||
|
||||
**Implemented, built and locally tested, not deployed or measured on a VM.**
|
||||
Every command below is **planned, not executed here**. No host package, service,
|
||||
reboot, root installation or acceptance operation was executed in this dispatch.
|
||||
Readiness is not package acceptance or authorization. Existing readiness/general
|
||||
helper unit is unchanged: no broadening its write paths/capabilities/filters.
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture and fixed paths
|
||||
|
||||
Same helper binary, two separate daemon profiles:
|
||||
|
||||
| Profile | Socket | Allowed operations |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| general (existing/default) | existing configured general socket | existing explicitly permitted root operations, never APT |
|
||||
| `apt_only` | `/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock` | read-only readiness and typed fixture APT jobs only |
|
||||
|
||||
APT profile requires agent UID **993**, root-owned agent-group socket ACL,
|
||||
empty allowed_services, allow_reboot=false, allow_root_scripts=false and a valid
|
||||
apt_provider policy. Unknown profiles/actions/CLI programs fail closed. No shell,
|
||||
service, reboot or generic-program dispatch exists in apt_only. Root administrative
|
||||
CLI modes are fixed install/probe/inspect operations, not network-callable argv.
|
||||
|
||||
**Both daemons must run the same new helper build** and use the exact same
|
||||
`/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite` and `executor.lock` inodes. All SQLite
|
||||
sidecars stay in that shared directory (current ledger uses synchronous FULL /
|
||||
DELETE journal mode; no database/WAL/SHM copy or private bind). Flank lock is now
|
||||
per actual request/effect, not daemon lifetime, allowing coexistence. Startup DDL
|
||||
is locked; consume/execute/finish are locked. An unresolved consumed row blocks
|
||||
all new effects across both profiles, including reboot/package conflicts.
|
||||
No tombstone deletion, marker reset, database copy or grant replacement shortcut.
|
||||
|
||||
APT-owned store: `/var/lib/rmm-apt-transaction` (0700), including archives,
|
||||
baselines, history, probes, state, log and active handoff. The child sees neither
|
||||
the shared ledger nor `/etc/rmm` keys/config, `/var/lib/rmm-agent`, home directories,
|
||||
host manager sockets or inherited private fds. Only the trusted outside root
|
||||
controller sees the signing-key pin/ledger. Central private signing keys must
|
||||
never be deployed to the VM.
|
||||
|
||||
## Installation order (planned)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Authenticated operator installs the reviewed newly built helper at fixed
|
||||
`/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper` using the existing controlled
|
||||
artifact deployment process. Both helper daemons need this same build; do not
|
||||
blindly overwrite an active old helper or restart away unknown effects.
|
||||
2. Before starting the new unit, run the root-only known-payload installer:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
/usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --install-apt-provider
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It exclusively creates known embedded provider/hook files, schema-2 install
|
||||
metadata, the exact `rmm-apt-helper.service` at `/etc/systemd/system/`, private
|
||||
store directories and empty `/usr/share/rmm-mvp-test`. It does NOT install a
|
||||
.deb, start systemd, create grants or create an acceptance record. Existing/
|
||||
partial paths are refused, not overwritten, chmod-repaired or deleted.
|
||||
3. Root-provision `/etc/rmm/apt-helper.json` (0600) from
|
||||
`apt-helper.example.json`; replace all invalid placeholders and verify actual
|
||||
rmm-agent UID is 993 and socket_gid is the actual rmm-agent group GID. Keep
|
||||
the existing separately authenticated Ed25519 key pin/binding procedure.
|
||||
4. Inspect the installed provider/config/runtime, including installed helper
|
||||
binary and exact unit profile:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py print-config
|
||||
/usr/bin/python3 -I /usr/lib/rmm-apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py inspect-runtime
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Set approved apt_config_sha256 from exact config bytes. Set runtime_sha256
|
||||
from the canonical runtime object **without its trailing newline**. Review
|
||||
the contents/code/configuration; blindly hashing unreviewed configuration is
|
||||
not a security review. No timestamp/hash placeholder can enable execution.
|
||||
5. After valid private config/key provisioning, inspect the helper identity pin:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
RMM_HELPER_CONFIG=/etc/rmm/apt-helper.json /usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --inspect-apt-profile
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Operator installs its exact JSON output at e.g.
|
||||
`/etc/rmm/apt-helper-proof.json`, root:rmm-agent 0640, in root-owned,
|
||||
non-group/world-writable configuration parents. This pin contains public
|
||||
identity/hash metadata, no grant or secret. Agent must be able to read it but
|
||||
not alter it. The inspected executable must match the installed daemon bytes.
|
||||
6. Validate the unit on the VM before start (`systemd-analyze verify`), then
|
||||
perform the separately authorized unit bootstrap. `ExecStartPre` executes:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
RMM_HELPER_CONFIG=/etc/rmm/apt-helper.json /usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --probe-native
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**The probe runs under the actual dedicated service profile**, not a generic
|
||||
root shell: controller verification requires NoNewPrivileges, exact ten-bit
|
||||
setup capability set, zero inherited/ambient caps, the actual
|
||||
rmm-apt-helper.service cgroup and readonly /usr, /etc and /var. Direct daemon/
|
||||
probe invocation outside that profile is rejected. `--inspect-apt-profile`
|
||||
remains a read-only administrative metadata operation and is not readiness.
|
||||
Controller verification also requires an outer seccomp filter, actual writable
|
||||
declared targets, and rejects unexpected writable submounts below /usr,/etc,
|
||||
/var. Inspect effective systemd configuration (`systemctl cat/show`) on the VM;
|
||||
do not introduce unreviewed drop-ins or substitute a root-shell launch.
|
||||
|
||||
## Unit and irreversible worker sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
`rmm-apt-helper.service` provides NNP, PrivateTmp/PrivateNetwork, strict readonly
|
||||
system/home/kernel/control-group protection, AF_UNIX only, native syscall ABI,
|
||||
mount/PID/net namespaces only, no ambient caps. Bounding set is filesystem/UID
|
||||
bits 0,1,3,4,6,7,8,31 plus SYS_ADMIN/MKNOD for trusted setup; no SYS_BOOT,
|
||||
SYS_CHROOT or SYS_TIME. DevicePolicy=strict permits only null/zero/random/urandom
|
||||
rwm; PrivateDevices=no permits trusted construction of a minimal private /dev.
|
||||
|
||||
Outer filter allows mount/unshare/fork/capset/prctl/seccomp trusted setup instead
|
||||
of an outer @mount prohibition. Reboot/module/raw-io/swap/debug and clock setters
|
||||
remain denied. The narrow adjtimex exception is necessary for the existing
|
||||
read-only modes=0 trusted-clock query; mutating adjtimex still needs CAP_SYS_TIME,
|
||||
which is absent. This is not a clock-verification bypass.
|
||||
|
||||
Write paths are **only** `/var/lib/dpkg`, shared helper ledger, private provider
|
||||
store and precreated `/usr/share/rmm-mvp-test`. No whole /usr, /etc or /var writes.
|
||||
APT terminal/history logs and dpkg log are explicitly under provider `log/`;
|
||||
APT cache/state and extended_states are private, no default /var/log/apt write.
|
||||
These are configured paths, **not natively proven log/write requirements** yet.
|
||||
Unexpected native write failures must be reported, not fixed with blanket writes.
|
||||
|
||||
One common Python setup function serves mutation and readiness. It makes mount
|
||||
propagation private, hides keys/ledger/sockets/fds, mounts minimal devices and
|
||||
kernel controls, then irreversibly drops E/P/B to the original eight caps,
|
||||
clears I/A, retains NNP and installs seccomp. Both clone namespace flags
|
||||
(including NEWUSER/NEWTIME) and clone3 pointer flags are closed: clone3 returns
|
||||
ENOSYS for libc's ordinary fork fallback; clone namespace flags return EPERM.
|
||||
Ordinary fork/exec remains allowed. No reconfiguration/reboot/kexec escape is
|
||||
allowed after setup. Trusted setup with SYS_ADMIN is explicitly in the TCB.
|
||||
|
||||
## Readiness probe: no package transaction
|
||||
|
||||
`--probe-native` does NOT create jobs, grants, receipts, launch/effect markers or
|
||||
native-acceptance records. It exclusively creates a generated private probe dir,
|
||||
copies host dpkg status (host opened read-only), binds the copy over /var/lib/dpkg
|
||||
inside the worker namespace, uses source/hook-isolated private APT config, tests
|
||||
private-db frontend lock conflict and runs positive `apt-get check` on that copy.
|
||||
The host frontend lock is only observed with O_RDONLY/F_GETLK: never F_SETLK,
|
||||
flock/lockf, deletion or killing an owner. Invalid-magic/flags reboot/kexec probes
|
||||
must return EPERM; no valid calls or PID1 signals are attempted.
|
||||
|
||||
The worker checks namespaces/PID1, capabilities/NNP/seccomp, readonly control
|
||||
mounts, hidden sockets and masked sysrq. Parent verifies complete result and
|
||||
private namespace identities, unchanged host status/runtime and publishes only
|
||||
root-private `native-readiness.json` (readiness_only=true, native_acceptance=false).
|
||||
It is boot-/code-/OS-/binary-/unit-bound and invalidated by changes. Partial,
|
||||
failed or malformed results do not publish new readiness. Acceptance/bootstrap
|
||||
attempt tombstones are neither created nor reset by this operation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Agent environment / read-only IPC API
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
RMM_APT_HELPER_SOCKET=/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock
|
||||
RMM_APT_HELPER_PROOF_FILE=/etc/rmm/apt-helper-proof.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`RMM_HELPER_SOCKET` remains the general route. Typed ensure_package,
|
||||
apply_updates and apt_native_acceptance exclusively use the dedicated socket.
|
||||
Missing/wrong APT socket/pin/readiness never falls back to general helper, SSH,
|
||||
shell or local execution. The unprivileged agent obtains a fresh read-only probe
|
||||
before capability advertisement and before use; it authenticates root SO_PEERCRED,
|
||||
root-owned safe socket/parents and independent root-provisioned pin.
|
||||
|
||||
Same u32-big-endian framed JSON socket, a distinct read-only request shape:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
operation: "apt_readiness_v1"
|
||||
challenge: fresh nonnil UUID
|
||||
identity: {tenant_id,asset_id,agent_id,enrollment_generation,assignment_version,signing_key_id}
|
||||
expected_stack_sha256: independently pinned helper/identity/policy/unit stack hash
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response strictly binds nonce, identity, apt_only profile and provider stack;
|
||||
includes shared ledger/lock dev/inodes and separate fixture_acceptance_ready,
|
||||
bootstrap_recipes and accepted_recipes. Wrong nonce/identity/generation/profile/
|
||||
stack/root peer is rejected. An unresolved shared ledger suppresses all APT
|
||||
readiness/capabilities. This API never consumes a grant or authorizes a job.
|
||||
|
||||
Readiness alone advertises **only apt_native_acceptance** for fixed allowed
|
||||
fixtures. Valid native acceptance records enable only matching fixture recipes:
|
||||
ensure_package, and apply_updates only for the accepted update recipe. Agent
|
||||
also checks each actual typed job's manifest recipe, not just aggregate action
|
||||
capability names. No production/arbitrary catalog capability is manufactured.
|
||||
|
||||
## Actual jobs remain UI-authorized
|
||||
|
||||
Domain's additive typed schema-2 apt_manifest and dedicated AptNativeAcceptance
|
||||
are now present; local tests roundtrip the actual domain variant through exact
|
||||
signed bytes into the helper validator. See
|
||||
`tools/apt-transaction/HELPER-CONTRACT.md` for the full immutable payload/context
|
||||
schema. Readiness does not replace independent Ed25519 verification, all target/
|
||||
tenant/generation/plan/job/attempt/authorization/action/hash/time bindings,
|
||||
current trusted clock, parent consumption and immutable WebUI approval.
|
||||
|
||||
Use provision-fixture-store / prepare-baseline **before** final grant to stage
|
||||
the two known archives and snapshot. One UI-approved dedicated fixture job may
|
||||
install 1.0, another may update 1.0 -> 1.1. Same guard/native lock/deadline/hash/
|
||||
postcondition pipeline, no weak path. Failed/stale/partial/unknown never acceptance.
|
||||
Armed/unknown outcomes retain both parent resource fencing and effect markers.
|
||||
One-time failures are not blindly reset: technical no-start recovery needs a
|
||||
separate durable signed reconciliation procedure, not implemented as a shortcut.
|
||||
|
||||
No actual native namespace/APT/service/root execution has been measured here.
|
||||
The subsequent VM worker must execute this profile/probe and UI-authorized
|
||||
fixture jobs, retain actual evidence and report all native failures separately.
|
||||
|
||||
## Executed local verification (this increment)
|
||||
|
||||
* Source-tree rustfmt check passed for helper lib/main and agent main/modules.
|
||||
* Targeted Clippy `-p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent --lib --bins -- -D warnings`
|
||||
passed.
|
||||
* `cargo test -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent --lib --bins`: **37 passed**
|
||||
(20 helper library, 3 helper binary, 14 agent).
|
||||
* `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v`:
|
||||
**48 passed**; AST syntax checks **7 Python files**; example JSON syntax passed.
|
||||
* Local unprivileged seccomp invalid-input/clone-flag denial and ordinary
|
||||
fork/exec really ran. Root setup/installer/APT/probe unit execution was mocked
|
||||
where unsafe. Temporary mock readiness files are not deployed native evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Package-wide verification has a concurrent-work limitation: the last full
|
||||
`cargo fmt --check` encountered formatting in the other worker's
|
||||
`crates/privileged-helper/tests/reconcile.rs`; the last all-target Clippy attempt
|
||||
failed on missing `validate_history` in its included `src/reconcile.rs`. Those
|
||||
Sync files were not edited here. The focused source checks/tests above passed
|
||||
afterwards; this is not a claim that the parallel Sync integration suite passed.
|
||||
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Explizite Hostwartung mit full_maintenance_v1
|
||||
|
||||
Stand 2026-11-14, Spezifikation1.20. Die Batch-Skriptkonsole und der unabhängig
|
||||
geprüfte Fullhelper-Binärpinfix sind implementiert, neu quellqualifiziert und nach
|
||||
tatsächlichem Linux-Unitlauf erhaltend auf der Cloud-Linux-VM bereitgestellt.
|
||||
Agent, General und Full laufen mit den geprüften Images; signierter Folgeabgleich
|
||||
und WebUI-genehmigter Fulljob bleiben separat offen. Tatsächliche Teilfehler,
|
||||
Fortsetzungen und unveränderte Originalbelege:
|
||||
[Bootstrap-Ergebnisse](../../docs/script-console-bootstrap-results.md).
|
||||
Cloud-Linux-VM zuerst, Windowsgast separat; Notebook ausschließlich Entwicklung.
|
||||
|
||||
## Aktueller korrigierter lokaler Nachweis
|
||||
|
||||
Der neue eigenständige Pack liegt privat unter
|
||||
`devstate/script-console-qualification/run-29461892-343f-42f4-b469-88703535425e/`.
|
||||
Manifest-SHA256:
|
||||
`ddd1a78d1cd289b02b1f98572f9652171ec00be84e01ce099fd722d689bcaacd`.
|
||||
158 vollständige Compiler-/Include-/Fixture-/Deploymentinputs vor/nach identisch.
|
||||
Sourcearchiv-SHA256:
|
||||
`fcb57f69ad81ea4acde15af6022d5c2da32f5699ebd39886c530c77882b369cc`.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich ausgeführt: Formatprüfung, Linux-Workspace-Alltargets-Clippy mit
|
||||
`-D warnings`,285 lokale Tests bestanden (5DB-Fälle zunächst ausgelassen), danach
|
||||
sämtliche45 Serververträge inklusive dieser5 gegen frisches isoliertes PostgreSQL
|
||||
bestanden (0ignored). Windows-GNU-Alltargets-Clippy mit -Dwarnings im Default-
|
||||
und SYSTEM-Helperprofil bestanden. Kein geänderter Test unterdrückt; die neue
|
||||
Imageprüfung führt auch bei nicht vertrauenswürdigem Dateibesitz echte
|
||||
Verweigerungsassertions aus, keinen stillen Early-return-Skip.
|
||||
|
||||
Neue tatsächliche Linux-Unitlisten: Domain22, Linuxruntime16, Helperpolicy6,
|
||||
Serververträge45. Auf Cloud-Linux ohne isolierte DB erwartet:84PASS und5explizite
|
||||
DBignored; diese5 sind separat im lokalen45er-DB-Lauf tatsächlich bestanden.
|
||||
Alle vier vollständigen Listen müssen vor irgendeinem Unitstart geprüft sein.
|
||||
Linux-Release-Helper SHA256
|
||||
`79442727c3ba31cda02a8bc0e67481f14db9f39fc07520a880a90b64f10f1eaf`;
|
||||
Agent `0a7ad6eefaefda79ee80b6a41b2df904e9e7f50ae6ebeed01b98c25b6ce5c06f`;
|
||||
Server `610017637a9f9e55a6cb3cd8264937b953996af84e86dd49f2ea00c8e59739cd`.
|
||||
Keine dieser neuen Binaries ist durch den Builder auf einem Ziel installiert.
|
||||
Native Cloud-Linux-Units bestanden anschließend tatsächlich; siehe den separaten
|
||||
Beleg unten. Auch die späteren 36+7 Windows-Units bestanden separat nativ:
|
||||
[Windows-Nachweis und Grenzen](../../docs/script-console-windows-link.md).
|
||||
Laufende Windows-SYSTEM-Runtime und WebUI-genehmigter FullMaintenancejob sind
|
||||
eigenständige, dadurch nicht ersetzte Nachweise.
|
||||
|
||||
## Frühere lokale Nachweise und der danach behobene Binärpinbefund
|
||||
|
||||
Das eingefrorene Paket liegt ausschließlich privat unter
|
||||
`devstate/script-console-qualification/run-de34d47c-985e-460c-b18c-3f0d1b3fd315/`.
|
||||
Manifest-SHA256:
|
||||
`60a50262f9f8d85c11eb58e1a9e0f6e03be6cd5db7a59bc1745fb7d9dc8a6f65`.
|
||||
157 Compiler-, Include-, Fixture- und Deploymentinputs wurden vor/nach dem
|
||||
vollständigen Lauf identisch geprüft. `reviewed-sources.tar.gz`:
|
||||
`ef822b2e2ec6f8ad3d828f0923b2aa886d462fba328affb61bd80e98acf2c357`.
|
||||
|
||||
Tatsächlich lokal ausgeführt: Formatprüfung; Linux-Workspace-Clippy mit allen
|
||||
Targets und `-D warnings`; Workspace284PASS bei fünf zunächst ausgelassenen
|
||||
DB-Fällen; anschließend sämtliche45 Servertests mit `--include-ignored` in
|
||||
frischem isoliertem PostgreSQL17.6:45PASS,0ignored. DB ohne veröffentlichten Port,
|
||||
Netzwerknamespace ausschließlich intern, frische Rollen/Migrationen, danach
|
||||
entfernt. Keine Produktionsdatenbank. Windows-GNU-Alltargets-Clippy separat im
|
||||
Default- und SYSTEM-Helperprofil jeweils bestanden; keine native Windowsausführung.
|
||||
Linux-Releasebinaries und vier native Linux-Testprogramme dieses früheren
|
||||
Quellenstands sind gebaut/gehasht, noch nicht auf der Cloud-VM ausgeführt oder
|
||||
installiert. **Nachträglicher unabhängiger Reviewblocker:** Dieser Pack bindet
|
||||
noch nicht den tatsächlichen laufenden Linux-Fullhelpercodehash. Er berechtigt
|
||||
keine Fullprofilaktivierung. Der danach separat geprüfte und im neuen Pack qualifizierte enge Corefix ergänzt ausschließlich
|
||||
im Fullprofil tatsächliches gehaltenes `/proc/self/exe`, geschützten Binärpin,
|
||||
authentisierte Probe, zusätzliche Binärcapability und zentrale Hashprüfung.
|
||||
General/APT lassen neue Metadaten vollständig aus. Der neue lokale Stand steht
|
||||
oben; dieser alte Pack bleibt ausdrücklich der ursprüngliche Beleg.
|
||||
|
||||
Die ersten Packvorbereitungen erzeugten kein qualifiziertes Manifest: Der erste
|
||||
before/after-Schutz bemerkte die währenddessen vervollständigte Builderinputliste;
|
||||
der zweite hielt bei PostgreSQLs temporärer Initialisierungsphase an. Der finale
|
||||
oben genannte Lauf wartet auf den endgültigen TCP-Endpunkt und besteht vollständig.
|
||||
Diese Vorbereitungsläufe werden nicht zu bestandenen Abnahmen umgedeutet.
|
||||
|
||||
## Separater Linux-first-Unitrunner
|
||||
|
||||
Der Runner `deploy/script_console_acceptance.py` ist separat reviewbar und kein
|
||||
Teil der158 eingefrorenen Compilerinputs; er baut und verändert diese nicht.
|
||||
Er ist ausdrücklich auf den neuen Pack29461892 und dessen Manifestddd1a78d…
|
||||
gebunden; bei veränderten Compilerinputs wird ein neuer Start verweigert. Die
|
||||
ursprüngliche Vorbereitung für Packde34 bleibt ein früherer, nie ausgeführter
|
||||
Runnerstand. Die jetzigen Counts beruhen auf den tatsächlich erzeugten Listen.
|
||||
Runnerquellhash:
|
||||
`2b3ba8d548d18627643a9f73c9a4f7bacce4ac2cd5495745c6760d088e078145`.
|
||||
Supportquellen werden vor Import und jedem Zielaufruf inklusive Readback exakt
|
||||
geprüft und in Intent/Payload/Result gebunden: Runtime-Bootstraphelper
|
||||
`833ad8806c90a19342aa6fbc71c33e81975caffb1746550e9b0fbdca7fa0c7ab`,
|
||||
Zugangsparser
|
||||
`5c8107ea9151a9f498b2530cdc61c1a7a6d745aff853a9b05710f3395838c0dd`.
|
||||
Der finale Readback verlangt product_state_writes, rmm_jobs,
|
||||
capabilities_activated und approvals ausdrücklich jeweils false.
|
||||
Er verwendet ausschließlich den vorhandenen strikten Bootstraptransport und
|
||||
`credentials/linux-vm.conf` im ursprünglichen Hauptcheckout, ausschließlich als root auf der festgelegten Linux-Test-VM, mit vorhandenem
|
||||
SSH-Key und strenger Hostprüfung. Keine
|
||||
Zugangsdatenkopie ins Scriptworktree, keine alternative IP oder Passwortfallback.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tatsächlich ausgeführt:** Alle vier Listen wurden vor jedem Unitstart geprüft;
|
||||
84 Tests bestanden, fünf ausdrücklich ausgelassene DB-Verträge waren zuvor im
|
||||
isolierten lokalen PostgreSQL-Lauf bestanden. Fall
|
||||
`7b61ce46-7913-492b-9c6b-414a0c2b6ffc`, Beleg-SHA256
|
||||
`a831a70a3cf76a3e8a9bf5820dcca7100d2ef9860dd9388539fe9c13f949f470`.
|
||||
Der verwendete Aufruf war:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_acceptance.py execute-linux
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Es entstehen nur neue private Scratchdateien unter
|
||||
`/var/lib/rmm-script-console-contracts/<case-id>/`. Erst werden alle vier exakten
|
||||
ELF-Hashes und vollständigen Listen geprüft; kein Unitstart vor dem gesamten
|
||||
Listenbeleg. Danach feste Testargumente, geleerte Umgebung, eigenes TMPDIR,
|
||||
eigener Netzwerknamespace und CPU-/Speicher-/Dateilimits. Erwartet werden84PASS
|
||||
und fünf ausdrücklich ausgelassene DB-Fälle auf der VM ohne DB; dieselben fünf
|
||||
DB-Verträge sind bereits im isolierten lokalen45er-Lauf belegt. Keine Installation,
|
||||
Enrollment-, Dienst-, Policy-, Paket-, Schlüssel-, Journal- oder Capabilityänderung.
|
||||
|
||||
Bei verlorenem Ergebnis ausschließlich denselben ursprünglichen Fall lesen:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 deploy/script_console_acceptance.py read-linux --case <urspruengliche-case-id>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Readback erzeugt keinen zweiten Remote-Start. Ein vorhandener Create-once-
|
||||
Startmarker erlaubt kein erneutes `run`; Teilergebnisse bleiben erhalten. Ein
|
||||
unvollständiger/fehlender Beleg ist keine bestandene Abnahme und wird nicht blind
|
||||
wiederholt. Native Units sind keine RMM-Dienst-/WebUI-/FullMaintenanceabnahme.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bootstrapvorbereitung nach gesondertem Erhaltungsreview
|
||||
|
||||
Der ursprüngliche Erhaltungsplan und die weiterhin geltenden Schutzgrenzen
|
||||
folgen unten; tatsächliche Ausführung samt fehlgeschlagenen Teilphasen und
|
||||
separaten Erststartfortsetzungen steht in den
|
||||
[Bootstrap-Ergebnissen](../../docs/script-console-bootstrap-results.md).
|
||||
Aktuelle Cloudbelege, Geräte-/Boot-/
|
||||
Journalidentitäten, Inodes, Verbrauchszeilen und Dienstzustände werden vor einer
|
||||
Änderung durch den verantwortlichen Rootprozess unabhängig gegengeprüft. Die
|
||||
bisherigen General-/APT-Units und Pins sowie deren Historie bleiben erhalten;
|
||||
keine Ledgerkopie, kein Reset und kein stilles Öffnen alter Scopes.
|
||||
|
||||
Die neue Unit ist `deploy/linux/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service` mit eigenem
|
||||
Runtimeverzeichnis `/run/rmm-helper-maintenance`. Sie verweist auf
|
||||
`/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json`. Diese Konfiguration erhält exakt
|
||||
die bestehende provisionierte öffentliche Bindingidentität und dieselben
|
||||
Root-Sharedledger-/Lockdateien; neue Auswahl:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"profile": "full_maintenance_v1",
|
||||
"allowed_services": [],
|
||||
"allow_reboot": false,
|
||||
"allow_root_scripts": true,
|
||||
"allowed_script_profiles": ["full_maintenance_v1"],
|
||||
"helper_binary_sha256": "<tatsaechlicher SHA256 der qualifizierten laufenden Helperbinary>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Das ist ein Ausschnitt, keine vollständige einsatzfähige Konfiguration. Socket,
|
||||
Agent-UID/GID, Zustandspfad und bestehendes Binding müssen aus dem tatsächlich
|
||||
geprüften Bestand kommen. Kein `apt_provider`. `allow_reboot=false` verweigert
|
||||
nur die typisierte Rebootaction; genehmigter Rootcode besitzt volle Hostautorität.
|
||||
|
||||
Der separat geschützte Policy-Pin bindet Profil `full_maintenance_v1`, bestehende
|
||||
Identität, tatsächlichen lokalen Policyhash und unabhängig beobachteten
|
||||
laufenden Binärhash. Das neue Fullprofil benötigt Schema2 im Pin; der Helper
|
||||
kann diesen nach selbst geprüftem Rootimage mit dem ausdrücklich getrennten
|
||||
Bootstrapmodus `--inspect-full-maintenance-profile` ausgeben. Generalpin
|
||||
Schema1 bleibt unverändert. Agentumgebung ausschließlich
|
||||
additiv um `RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_HELPER_SOCKET` und
|
||||
`RMM_FULL_MAINTENANCE_POLICY_FILE` ergänzen. Kein Fallback auf General/APT und
|
||||
keine Änderung deren bestehender Umgebung. Die zentrale Rootpolicy braucht
|
||||
Schema2 und einen ausdrücklich begrenzten Scope mit neuen exakten Helperpins
|
||||
sowie `allowed_script_profiles=["full_maintenance_v1"]`. Aktuelle Rechte beider
|
||||
Planakteure, Helper-Sync, TrustedClock, ursprünglicher Grant und Einmalverbrauch
|
||||
bleiben zusätzlich erforderlich. Eine Policy ist keine Jobgenehmigung.
|
||||
|
||||
Vor Installation werden zusammengesetzte systemd-Unit und etwaige Drop-ins
|
||||
geprüft: Vollwartung darf keine General-Sandbox erben, die Hostdateisystem oder
|
||||
Netzwerk unerwartet sperrt. Dienst- und Binärwechsel nur mit qualifizierten
|
||||
Artefakten und explizitem Erhaltungsplan. Insbesondere darf eine neue allgemeine
|
||||
Helperbinary nicht still die alten APT-Codepins überschreiben/öffnen. Gegebenenfalls
|
||||
eigenen qualifizierten Binärpfad für die neue FullMaintenanceunit wählen und die
|
||||
bestehenden Providerpfade unverändert erhalten. Native Erhaltung und Sync nachweisen,
|
||||
bevor neue Capabilities/Scopes geöffnet werden.
|
||||
|
||||
Erster tatsächlicher FullMaintenancejob nur nach bereitgestellter WebUI und
|
||||
expliziter Genehmigung der unveränderlichen Skript-/Profil-/Ziel-/Rechtebytes.
|
||||
Abgestimmter Scope: harmlose Identität/stdout/stderr und kontrollierte lesende
|
||||
Dateisystem-/Netzwerkbeobachtung; kein Betriebssystemupdate oder Neustart. Volle
|
||||
Hostautorität wird sichtbar erklärt; kein Sandbox-, No-Reboot- oder Rollbackversprechen.
|
||||
Windows-SYSTEM folgt nach eigenem Clock-/Pipe-/Profilnachweis. Die vorhandene
|
||||
PipeV2-Datei ist unverändert SHA256
|
||||
`ce525dab23f2e4faa2c9816280c1a5a8b40e56d0e63a350256e83b2df1d9229d`;
|
||||
ursprüngliche native Pipebelege werden nicht als Belege der neuen Runtime ausgegeben.
|
||||
|
||||
## Anschließend auf der tatsächlichen Cloud-Linux-VM bestanden
|
||||
|
||||
Root führte ausschließlich den korrigierten Pack29461892 nativ aus: Fall
|
||||
`7b61ce46-7913-492b-9c6b-414a0c2b6ffc`, **84PASS,5explizite DBignored**.
|
||||
Die vier vollständigen tatsächlichen Listen wurden vor irgendeinem Unitstart
|
||||
exakt geprüft; anschließend liefen alle vier festen ELFs im eigenen Scratch,
|
||||
mit geleerter Umgebung, Netzwerknamespace und Ressourcenlimits. Die5DB-Verträge
|
||||
bleiben diesem VM-Lauf ausdrücklich nicht zugerechnet; sie sind im separaten
|
||||
isolierten45er-PostgreSQL-Lauf belegt. Kein stiller Testskip oder Produktjob.
|
||||
|
||||
Beleg `passed-e214cd9b-21ac-48ce-82dc-d10364329d04.json`, SHA256
|
||||
`a831a70a3cf76a3e8a9bf5820dcca7100d2ef9860dd9388539fe9c13f949f470`.
|
||||
Keine Agent-/Helperinstallation, Änderung bestehender Dienste/Policies/PKI/
|
||||
Datenbanken, veröffentlichte Capability oder WebUI-Genehmigung durch diesen
|
||||
Unitlauf. Der oben ursprünglich geplante Unitaufruf ist damit abgeschlossen.
|
||||
Der inzwischen erhaltend ausgeführte Bootstrap steht in den separaten
|
||||
[Bootstrap-Ergebnissen](../../docs/script-console-bootstrap-results.md);
|
||||
signierter Folgeabgleich und tatsächlicher FullMaintenancejob sind dadurch
|
||||
noch nicht abgenommen.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verbindlicher Generationsentscheid vor dem Bootstrap
|
||||
|
||||
Ein eigener neuer Fullhelper bei weiterlaufendem altem Generalhelper reicht
|
||||
nicht: Alle aktiven Leser des gemeinsamen Root-Ledgers müssen neue
|
||||
`privileged_script_profile`-Jobbytes unabhängig dekodieren und prüfen können.
|
||||
Alte Decoder verweigern selbst geschlossene neue Zeilen und können beim
|
||||
Snapshot/Sync einen sticky Fault schreiben. Deshalb neuer Agent und aktive
|
||||
General-/Fullhelper gemeinsam auf die neue qualifizierte Generation; bestehende
|
||||
Generalunit/Sandbox/Config/Policy-/Pinbytes unverändert. APT bleibt disabled/
|
||||
inactive, ohne Endpoint und mit geschlossenen Scopes. Seine aktuelle Generation
|
||||
war bereits laut vorherigem Runtimeindex nicht qualifiziert; historische
|
||||
Abnahmen bleiben erhalten. Vor späterer Wiedereröffnung eigener APT-Stackpin-
|
||||
/Generationnachweis, kein alter Helper gegen neue Ledgerzeilen.
|
||||
|
||||
Der Rootprozess hat die84 native Cloud-Linux-Units tatsächlich ausgeführt:
|
||||
Fall `7b61ce46-7913-492b-9c6b-414a0c2b6ffc`, Proof-SHA256
|
||||
`a831a70a3cf76a3e8a9bf5820dcca7100d2ef9860dd9388539fe9c13f949f470`,
|
||||
84PASS und5 ausdrücklich ausgelassene DB-Fälle. Diese5 sind im isolierten lokalen
|
||||
45er-Lauf bestanden. Keine RMM-Jobs oder neue Capabilities aus diesem Unitlauf;
|
||||
der inzwischen ausgeführte Runtimeaustausch ist separat belegt. Tatsächlicher
|
||||
signierter Folgeabgleich und genehmigter Fulljob bleiben eigene offene Schritte.
|
||||
|
||||
Details und Nach-MVP-Entdeckung:
|
||||
[script-console-helper-generations.md](../../docs/script-console-helper-generations.md).
|
||||
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Agent/helper runtime — integrated source, VM acceptance pending
|
||||
|
||||
This is the current runtime contract. It supersedes the earlier module-only
|
||||
handoffs in `README.md` and `tests/agent_sync/README.md`. No installation, target
|
||||
job, service/reboot/package mutation, SSH tunnel or server restart was performed
|
||||
by this integration. Actual VM execution/acceptance belongs to the next worker.
|
||||
Nothing here approves an RMM job or substitutes for the WebUI approval boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
## Binaries and complete CLI/environment
|
||||
|
||||
Both binaries support `--help`; unknown arguments fail closed. Normal agent
|
||||
operation has no positional arguments. Planned bootstrap invocation:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
RMM_AGENT_STATE=/var/lib/rmm-agent
|
||||
RMM_CA_FILE=/etc/rmm/ca.pem
|
||||
RMM_CONNECT_ADDR=127.0.0.1:18443
|
||||
RMM_TRANSPORT=https
|
||||
/usr/local/libexec/rmm-agent
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These are environment assignments, not an instruction to source a credential
|
||||
file. The trusted CA and TLS name **rmm-dev.internal** are always checked. TCP
|
||||
override changes neither DNS/SNI nor certificate verification. No proxy trust,
|
||||
invalid-certificate bypass or public Docker port is introduced.
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Meaning/default |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `RMM_AGENT_STATE` | Private 0700 owned agent state; default `devstate/agent` |
|
||||
| `RMM_CA_FILE` | Public trusted CA; default `devstate/pki/ca.pem` |
|
||||
| `RMM_CONNECT_ADDR` | Parsed TCP SocketAddr; default `127.0.0.1:18443` |
|
||||
| `RMM_TRANSPORT` | `auto` (default), `wss`, or `https`; HTTPS can be explicitly selected for VM acceptance |
|
||||
| `RMM_ENROLLMENT_TOKEN_FILE` | First registration only; remove the bootstrap token after enrollment |
|
||||
| `RMM_JOB_BINDING_FILE` | Optional private agent-owned JSON Binding; absent means passive, no job capabilities |
|
||||
| `RMM_JOB_SIGNING_KEY_BOOTSTRAP=1` | Authenticated device-mTLS GET, using the current rotation-store identity; pins without replacing existing trust |
|
||||
| `RMM_HELPER_SOCKET` | Configured general helper socket, e.g. `/run/rmm-helper/control.sock` |
|
||||
| `RMM_HELPER_POLICY_FILE` | Root-owned, agent-readable public general policy pin; required with general socket |
|
||||
| `RMM_APT_HELPER_SOCKET` | Dedicated fixed `/run/rmm-apt-helper/helper.sock`, never generic fallback |
|
||||
| `RMM_APT_HELPER_PROOF_FILE` | Root-owned public APT stack/profile/identity pin; see `apt-helper-README.md` |
|
||||
| `RMM_LOG_UNITS_FILE` | Private agent-owned JSON array of exact allowed service units for unprivileged live logs |
|
||||
| `RMM_EXTENDED_INVENTORY` | `1` by default with the now-compatible backend, `0` for legacy base-only JSON |
|
||||
| `RMM_AGENT_PROFILE` | `development` required only for the rotation-test interval override |
|
||||
| `RMM_ROTATION_TEST_AFTER_SECONDS` | Positive development-only certificate-age trigger; never bypasses chain/expiry/EKU/key/identity verification |
|
||||
|
||||
Binding fields: tenant_id, asset_id, agent_id, enrollment_generation,
|
||||
assignment_version, public_key_hex. Device/asset must match enrollment. Empty key
|
||||
is allowed only with authenticated signing-key bootstrap; later startup must
|
||||
reauthenticate that bootstrap or use a fully provisioned binding. Key response is
|
||||
Ed25519/schema 1/raw 32-byte key with SHA-256 key ID, bounded and no redirects.
|
||||
The immutable agent cache is `job-signing-key.json`. Signing-pin replacement and
|
||||
identity/assignment recovery are controlled provisioning operations, not automatic
|
||||
trust in a key from a job. Helper trust stays independently root-provisioned.
|
||||
|
||||
The unit leaves the job-binding optional in `/etc/rmm/agent.env`, allowing a first
|
||||
passive enrollment. Set binding/key-bootstrap/helper variables only after the
|
||||
authenticated operator resolves the enrolled IDs and provisions their pins.
|
||||
Do not delete an old identity/journal to get a new first-session shortcut.
|
||||
|
||||
## Integrated transport and sync
|
||||
|
||||
One bounded actor and one dispatcher serve WSS and HTTPS with identical envelopes,
|
||||
journal, result receipts, cancellation and signature checks. `auto` tries WSS
|
||||
first and falls back only after two typed HTTP upgrade-block classifications;
|
||||
401/403, TLS/identity failures and ambiguous errors never select a bypass.
|
||||
WSS Ping/Pong are handled. HTTPS uses the existing MessageBatch/25-second poll
|
||||
contract. Poll cancellation cannot create a new attempt; fresh heartbeat IDs/
|
||||
sequences are never reused or queued as offline telemetry. Actor queues are bounded.
|
||||
|
||||
Every authenticated Hello advertises `rmm.sync.v1` and closes all local effect
|
||||
gates. Agent obtains actual root snapshots, durably reserves the fresh SyncRequest,
|
||||
checks exact signed SyncResponse bytes and all device/channel/boot/checkpoint/
|
||||
request-hash/time bindings, commits targeted journal/receipt changes, applies its
|
||||
own consumption decisions, forwards the **original** signed response plus original
|
||||
request protobuf to every configured helper, then confirms actual applied root
|
||||
checkpoints. No generic ready boolean opens either process.
|
||||
|
||||
Both root profiles share actual DB/lock inodes. They join an unchanged pending
|
||||
root capture created after both process births, so ONE signed response/checkpoint
|
||||
can be independently applied by both. A new process never inherits readiness
|
||||
from the shared DB. Stale process captures are fenced; known outcomes may unlock
|
||||
specifically while an unknown retains the resource and global gates stay closed.
|
||||
Consumed grant/attempt tombstones are never removed.
|
||||
|
||||
Scheduler AND immediate worker effect admission check the current signed lease;
|
||||
the worker also rechecks fresh grant/time and the disconnect/rotation atomic fence.
|
||||
Helper checks its own process gate under the same executor guard before consumption.
|
||||
Unknown, missing authoritative history, clock failure and rollback remain closed.
|
||||
Clock/helper sync failure does not stop independent passive heartbeat/inventory
|
||||
traffic. Sync retries are bounded, happen on fresh inventory/result ACK and on a
|
||||
lease timer, and never retry a lost permit request as a new grant.
|
||||
|
||||
After reboot, old/new boot ID alone is not success. Fresh current-boot inventory
|
||||
is durably ACKed, a new signed decision must bind the persisted original boot and
|
||||
current authenticated boot plus inventory evidence, then each helper independently
|
||||
applies that specific canonical terminal outcome/unlock. Thus an initial negative
|
||||
sync does not deadlock waiting forever without the post-inventory resync.
|
||||
|
||||
Result envelopes are archived before concrete ACK deletion in one SQLite
|
||||
transaction. Historical message identity/output is retained for reconciliation.
|
||||
Inventory mapping preserves source/time/quality/completeness and unsupported states.
|
||||
Live journal permission warnings become permission_denied, not a fake empty success.
|
||||
|
||||
## Helper bootstrap/policy inspection
|
||||
|
||||
Helper normal daemon: `RMM_HELPER_CONFIG=/etc/rmm/helper.json` (root-owned 0600).
|
||||
Both profiles use `/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite` and `executor.lock`.
|
||||
Helper config uses the existing binding, optional independent signing_key_file,
|
||||
agent_uid, socket_gid, socket, shared state, allowed_services, allow_reboot,
|
||||
allow_root_scripts; APT adds its existing sealed apt_provider configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
Public general pin, **planned command, not executed on VM here**:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
RMM_HELPER_CONFIG=/etc/rmm/helper.json /usr/local/libexec/rmm-privileged-helper --inspect-general-profile
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Install the exact JSON as root:rmm-agent 0640 in non-writable root-owned parents,
|
||||
then set RMM_HELPER_POLICY_FILE. It binds profile, device identity/key and exact
|
||||
policy hash. General policy probe uses root socket/peer credentials and a fresh
|
||||
challenge; capabilities reflect actual policy/interpreter availability. Root
|
||||
scripts remain default-off broad administration. Services are exact allowed
|
||||
running/stopped units with >=180s runtime, reboot separately enabled with >=60s.
|
||||
Root jobs are NEVER relabelled into agent_service.
|
||||
|
||||
APT install/probe/inspection modes and profile sandbox remain exactly documented
|
||||
in `apt-helper-README.md`. Both daemons need this same installed build and reviewed
|
||||
new proof hashes (binary bytes are part of the APT proof). Prefetched sealed
|
||||
archives, receipts predating the grant and exact baselines are still prerequisites;
|
||||
this integration introduces no unsafe generic APT download/install/simulation path.
|
||||
Root native-acceptance and accepted-recipe/manifest capabilities come only from
|
||||
authenticated real readiness. Successful native acceptance triggers a controlled
|
||||
reconnect to advertise newly accepted recipes; periodic safe capability refresh
|
||||
also reconnects rather than silently changing the Hello contract.
|
||||
|
||||
## Passive APT planning and declarative no-change
|
||||
|
||||
The normal extended inventory worker now runs at startup and every 60 seconds
|
||||
(one inflight collector; not in the heartbeat handler). Unacknowledged durable
|
||||
traffic backpressures new collection without deleting old data; job results and
|
||||
control receipts retain priority. It includes the fixed
|
||||
`linux.apt.planning` scope from `root-helper:apt_planning_v1`. This currently
|
||||
refreshes the existing extended inventory scopes too; their actual individual
|
||||
source timestamps/quality remain intact. There is no arbitrary package query,
|
||||
requested live diagnosis or software effect hidden in this collector.
|
||||
|
||||
`apt_planning_v1` uses the existing UID-authenticated dedicated Unix socket,
|
||||
fresh challenge, device/generation/signing-key identity, root peer and separately
|
||||
root-provisioned stack pin. Its response is the readiness envelope with a typed
|
||||
`planning` result and **empty capability/acceptance fields**. It does not depend
|
||||
on a prior native-acceptance record and cannot create one. Root validates the
|
||||
installed code, exact runtime/config policy pins and actual archive bytes, sizes,
|
||||
ownership/modes/link count and private prefetch receipts. No artifact is fetched
|
||||
or installed by this RPC. Administratively stage the known fixture archives via
|
||||
`provision-fixture-store` before planning/the final 60-second grant.
|
||||
|
||||
The fixed metadata child has a 4-second whole-process/output budget (32 KiB),
|
||||
the socket has 5-second IO limits, and root measurement timestamps are preserved.
|
||||
Dirty dpkg updates/triggers, foreign locks, unsafe/missing receipts, permission
|
||||
failure, timeout or missing helper yield an unknown observation with null data,
|
||||
not fake hashes or accepted capability. Runtime policy drift fails closed.
|
||||
Complete observations contain the suite's `fixture_package`, `baseline_sha256`,
|
||||
`sealed_baseline_sha256`, `status_fingerprint`, `dpkg_updates_empty`,
|
||||
`pending_triggers_empty`, `runtime`, `runtime_sha256`, `provider_sha256`,
|
||||
`hook_sha256`, `apt_config_sha256` and `prefetch`. The full package baseline stays
|
||||
root-private at `baselines/<sha256>.json`; only hashes, fixture projection and
|
||||
minimal public runtime/artifact pins cross the wire. Stable sampling is checked
|
||||
before and after content-addressed exclusive write/file+directory fsync; existing
|
||||
identical seals are verified, never overwritten. This is passive metadata, not
|
||||
job authority. The ordinary durable inventory outbox/ACK path persists it.
|
||||
|
||||
Normal accepted fixture `ensure_package`/`apply_updates` may return
|
||||
`POSTCONDITION_ALREADY_MET`, `changed=false`, `already_desired=true`,
|
||||
`postcondition_already_met=true`, `transaction_executed=false` only when the
|
||||
**entire selected set** is independently installed at its exact target version
|
||||
and architecture, clean, matches the current approved baseline/fingerprint and
|
||||
has the expected fixture payload. Root signature, all original bindings,
|
||||
expiry/sync/local-policy/resource gates, all manifest/code/runtime/artifact pins,
|
||||
native accepted-recipe record and durable grant/attempt consumption remain
|
||||
mandatory. Only the historical `old_version` condition is skipped in this
|
||||
no-mutation branch. No APT/hook/native launch/effect marker is created. A foreign
|
||||
lock, dirty/unknown state or changed baseline cannot become success; native
|
||||
acceptance itself never uses this branch. Other versions still follow the
|
||||
unchanged no-reinstall/no-downgrade/no-remove mutation guards.
|
||||
|
||||
VM suite owner must update its absent/1.0-only adapter: after native update to
|
||||
1.1, a normal exact desired-1.1 job must use the accepted update recipe with a
|
||||
fresh planning seal. A desired-1.0 job on 1.1 is still correctly denied; this
|
||||
implementation does not authorize removal/downgrade to make a stale test pass.
|
||||
No backend/domain/protobuf signatures or plan bytes have been changed.
|
||||
|
||||
Provider source changes change the embedded provider/helper/stack/runtime pins.
|
||||
Deploy both helpers from this build and provision reviewed new proof/policy
|
||||
pins **before** native acceptance; old native records cannot silently certify
|
||||
new runtime bytes. Manifest schema 2 / transaction schema 1 / fixture archives
|
||||
1.0 and 1.1 (20,672 bytes, unchanged hashes) remain unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
These are implemented source/local-fixture semantics, not VM or MVP acceptance.
|
||||
|
||||
## Certificate rotation and recovery
|
||||
|
||||
`RMM_AGENT_STATE/certificates/current.json` is the authoritative atomic selector
|
||||
over private versioned device key/cert files. Existing enrolled files initialize
|
||||
the store exactly once; later connections/bootstrap use the selected identity.
|
||||
Rotation checks chain, current validity, exact agent CN, clientAuth purpose and
|
||||
public/private key match. It persists one pending key/CSR and retries those SAME
|
||||
CSR bytes after response loss. A verified swap closes the old actor/effect fence
|
||||
and requires a new Hello/Sync. Agent/enrollment IDs and independent job/helper
|
||||
signing pins do not change. Expired/revoked/invalid certs remain blocked and need
|
||||
authorized identity recovery; no auto-reenrollment or TLS downgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification boundaries / concrete remaining policy issue
|
||||
|
||||
Local Rust source/unit/integration tests cover actual loopback mTLS dispatcher
|
||||
WSS/HTTPS clean reconnect, Ping, forged sync rejection, passive traffic with an
|
||||
untrusted effect clock, journal reopen/replay and independent helper checkpoint/
|
||||
outcome/boot checks. Unsafe OS providers are mocked or denied; no local service,
|
||||
APT install or reboot was executed. This is not a real WebUI-approved VM result,
|
||||
native package acceptance, production auth acceptance or full Linux-MVP sign-off.
|
||||
|
||||
Concrete backend policy limitation, not bypassed here: `RootScope::permits` in
|
||||
`crates/server/src/root_policy.rs` does not match `Action::QueryLogs` and falls
|
||||
through to false. The typed, bounded root helper log handler exists, and the
|
||||
unprivileged allowlisted path is live, but a root live-log plan will be denied by
|
||||
that backend policy until its owner adds an explicit permitted scope. Do NOT
|
||||
work around it by relabelling identity, direct approval or a generic root shell.
|
||||
|
||||
## Executed local verification
|
||||
|
||||
Using `/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin/cargo`, actually passed during integration:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
cargo test -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux --all-targets --locked
|
||||
cargo clippy -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings
|
||||
cargo build -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper --locked
|
||||
cargo fmt -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux -- --check
|
||||
python3 tests/agent_jobs/test_install.py
|
||||
target/debug/rmm-agent --help
|
||||
target/debug/rmm-privileged-helper --help
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
111 executed Rust test cases passed (including reused transport tests), two
|
||||
create-only installer guard tests passed, both debug binaries built and both
|
||||
help commands returned successfully without loading secret configuration. No
|
||||
warnings/type errors were suppressed. A boxed tungstenite HTTP-response test
|
||||
constructor was corrected, not bypassed. No coverage percentage was measured.
|
||||
|
||||
Coverage boundaries: real loopback TLS/dispatcher WSS and HTTPS reconnect and
|
||||
forged sync rejection are exercised; helper cryptography/checkpoints/two-process
|
||||
shared signature and replay/unknown/reboot decisions use real SQLite/signatures
|
||||
with local fixtures. Native service/APT/reboot effects and positive root UID-0
|
||||
daemon/VM RPC acceptance are NOT substituted by these tests. The built artifacts
|
||||
are `target/debug/rmm-agent` and `target/debug/rmm-privileged-helper`; a reviewed
|
||||
VM-compatible release artifact still needs the target worker's ELF/glibc/library
|
||||
preflight and actual authorized VM run.
|
||||
|
||||
## Executed local verification — planning/no-change increment
|
||||
|
||||
After **all** source changes, the following complete targeted block passed with
|
||||
`/home/Kevin/.cargo/bin` on PATH (2026-11-12):
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
cargo test -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux --all-targets --locked
|
||||
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/apt_transaction -p 'test_*.py' -v
|
||||
cargo clippy -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings
|
||||
cargo fmt -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper -p rmm-agent-linux -- --check
|
||||
cargo build -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper --locked
|
||||
cargo build -p rmm-agent -p rmm-privileged-helper --release --locked
|
||||
python3 tests/agent_jobs/test_install.py
|
||||
target/debug/rmm-agent --help
|
||||
target/debug/rmm-privileged-helper --help
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Results: **115 Rust tests**, **56 Python APT tests**, **2 installer guard tests**
|
||||
passed; warning-denying all-target Clippy and formatting passed; both Debug and
|
||||
Release binaries built; both help commands succeeded. Separate final AST parsing
|
||||
passed for **8 Python files**. No full workspace/backend/web test suite was run.
|
||||
|
||||
New regressions cover shared Python/Rust canonical golden bytes/hash, receipt
|
||||
and timestamp freshness, private content-addressed seal reuse/change without
|
||||
full-baseline disclosure, sampling drift/dirty/foreign-lock/bad-artifact failure,
|
||||
normal exact already-desired install/update postconditions, no launch/effect
|
||||
markers, old-version mutation rejection, wrong architecture/newer version,
|
||||
audit/payload/expiry rejection, no-change outcome binding and durable duplicate
|
||||
grant/attempt rejection, honest missing-helper data and collection backpressure.
|
||||
Root ownership/kernel state and unsafe native package processes are mocked;
|
||||
existing harmless unprivileged seccomp tests really execute. No native host
|
||||
package mutation, root systemd/probe/VM action, approval or reboot was performed.
|
||||
|
||||
Earlier intermediate failures were corrected, not suppressed: the inherited two
|
||||
unformatted source edits, a mock reader missing the `limit` keyword argument,
|
||||
and a newly inserted function accidentally inheriting a test-only cfg attribute.
|
||||
The final complete block above passed after these corrections.
|
||||
|
||||
Final artifact SHA-256 (native developer-PC builds; **not** Bookworm/VM proof):
|
||||
|
||||
| Artifact | SHA-256 |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `target/debug/rmm-agent` | `90a4eab064301740cd938a41a76a510ad3b4abc3e48a188ba12bfe22f123266c` |
|
||||
| `target/debug/rmm-privileged-helper` | `54db2fe17841fef9af48bbeb446f45bda52f62e442a4900e0543e358095900b7` |
|
||||
| `target/release/rmm-agent` | `eac5434fd7a1e509c0971e4e05d4e1aedbde1bb90f7d7a8f9ec4d48ab4d34597` |
|
||||
| `target/release/rmm-privileged-helper` | `581a033478b41365066df2dc9ac0d11e314160909b5fab612be0be97be1bbbdc` |
|
||||
| `tools/apt-transaction/apt_transaction.py` | `57b695bf57ea2703393e39f92a1b6ef2314b4838f3dfb29e4e70da79687c9987` |
|
||||
|
||||
Remaining: suite-owner adapter update for exact desired 1.1 after native upgrade,
|
||||
reviewed deployment/new pins, actual dedicated-profile metadata RPC and native
|
||||
UI-approved fixture/no-change VM proof, target ELF/library compatibility, and
|
||||
VM resource/retention measurements for the new 60-second extended collection.
|
||||
No real current baseline change was induced on the host/VM: freshness tests use
|
||||
changed temporary/mock package state, not a disguised package installation.
|
||||
Linux-MVP and production acceptance remain open. Backend Root QueryLogs policy
|
||||
is owned by its separate worker and was neither changed nor reverified here.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user