From 636362aea507dc69b8556e539492b19b70f8e1b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Janssen Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2026 11:09:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Preserve rejected abstract Chrony transport and native kernel fixture evidence --- crates/time-source-linux/src/native.rs | 218 ++++++------ .../time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py | 317 ++++++++++++++++++ docs/server-time-source-abstract-client.md | 111 ++++++ 3 files changed, 534 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) create mode 100644 deploy/time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py create mode 100644 docs/server-time-source-abstract-client.md diff --git a/crates/time-source-linux/src/native.rs b/crates/time-source-linux/src/native.rs index f36d06a..44f73f1 100644 --- a/crates/time-source-linux/src/native.rs +++ b/crates/time-source-linux/src/native.rs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::ffi::CString; use std::fs::File; use std::io::Read; use std::mem::{self, size_of, size_of_val}; -use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, OwnedFd, RawFd}; +use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, IntoRawFd, OwnedFd, RawFd}; use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt; use uuid::Uuid; @@ -429,11 +429,30 @@ fn address(path: &str) -> Result<(libc::sockaddr_un, libc::socklen_t)> { (mem::offset_of!(libc::sockaddr_un, sun_path) + path.len() + 1) as _, )) } +fn abstract_address(random: Uuid) -> (libc::sockaddr_un, libc::socklen_t) { + let name = format!("rmm-time-source-tracking-{}", random.simple()); + let mut addr: libc::sockaddr_un = unsafe { mem::zeroed() }; + addr.sun_family = libc::AF_UNIX as _; + // Leading NUL selects Linux's abstract namespace. The exact length excludes + // a trailing NUL: every byte after sun_path[0] belongs to the kernel name. + for (dst, src) in addr.sun_path[1..].iter_mut().zip(name.bytes()) { + *dst = src as _; + } + let len = mem::offset_of!(libc::sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 + name.len(); + (addr, len as _) +} +fn bind_once(fd: RawFd, addr: &libc::sockaddr_un, len: libc::socklen_t) -> Result<()> { + ensure!( + unsafe { libc::bind(fd, (addr as *const libc::sockaddr_un).cast(), len) } == 0, + "TIME_CLIENT_BIND_ONCE" + ); + Ok(()) +} struct Client { fd: OwnedFd, dir: OwnedFd, - name: String, - own: Option, + address: libc::sockaddr_un, + address_len: libc::socklen_t, } impl Client { fn open(gid: u32) -> Result { @@ -458,62 +477,17 @@ impl Client { 0, ) })?; - let name = format!("tracking-{}.sock", Uuid::new_v4().simple()); - let mut value = Self { + // UUIDv4 uses the OS CSPRNG. A collision denies this observation: no new + // name, adoption, connect retry or filesystem cleanup is attempted. + let (abstract_addr, address_len) = abstract_address(Uuid::new_v4()); + let value = Self { fd, dir, - name, - own: None, + address: abstract_addr, + address_len, }; - let (addr, len) = address(&format!("{CLIENT_DIR}/{}", value.name))?; bound_dir(CLIENT_DIR, &value.dir, None)?; - ensure!( - unsafe { - libc::bind( - value.fd.as_raw_fd(), - (&addr as *const libc::sockaddr_un).cast(), - len, - ) - } == 0, - "TIME_CLIENT_BIND_ONCE" - ); - let mut own = socket_identity(value.dir.as_raw_fd(), &value.name)?; - ensure!( - own.uid == 0 && own.mode & libc::S_IFMT == libc::S_IFSOCK && own.links == 1, - "TIME_CLIENT_INITIAL_IDENTITY" - ); - value.own = Some(own); - let name = cstr(&value.name)?; - ensure!( - unsafe { - libc::fchownat( - value.dir.as_raw_fd(), - name.as_ptr(), - 0, - gid, - libc::AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, - ) - } == 0, - "TIME_CLIENT_GROUP" - ); - // Parent is root-write-only: no daemon or unprivileged process can swap - // the leaf between this identity capture and chmod. - ensure!( - unsafe { libc::fchmodat(value.dir.as_raw_fd(), name.as_ptr(), 0o660, 0) } == 0, - "TIME_CLIENT_MODE" - ); - let next = socket_identity(value.dir.as_raw_fd(), &value.name)?; - ensure!( - next.dev == own.dev - && next.ino == own.ino - && next.uid == 0 - && next.gid == gid - && next.mode & 0o7777 == 0o660 - && next.links == 1, - "TIME_CLIENT_READY_IDENTITY" - ); - own = next; - value.own = Some(own); + bind_once(value.fd.as_raw_fd(), &value.address, value.address_len)?; value.verify()?; let yes: libc::c_int = 1; ensure!( @@ -543,21 +517,31 @@ impl Client { } fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> { bound_dir(CLIENT_DIR, &self.dir, None)?; + let mut actual: libc::sockaddr_un = unsafe { mem::zeroed() }; + let mut len = size_of::() as libc::socklen_t; ensure!( - Some(socket_identity(self.dir.as_raw_fd(), &self.name)?) == self.own, - "TIME_CLIENT_REPLACED" + unsafe { + libc::getsockname( + self.fd.as_raw_fd(), + (&mut actual as *mut libc::sockaddr_un).cast(), + &mut len, + ) + } == 0 + && len == self.address_len + && actual.sun_family == self.address.sun_family + && actual.sun_path == self.address.sun_path, + "TIME_CLIENT_ABSTRACT_IDENTITY" ); Ok(()) } - fn cleanup(&mut self) -> Result<()> { - // Consume cleanup authority before any fallible work. Unknown cleanup - // never retries from Drop and never adopts a newly observed leaf. - let expected = self - .own - .take() - .context("TIME_CLIENT_CLEANUP_ALREADY_ATTEMPTED")?; - bound_dir(CLIENT_DIR, &self.dir, None)?; - unlink_owned(self.dir.as_raw_fd(), &self.name, expected) + fn cleanup(self) -> Result<()> { + self.verify()?; + // Consume descriptor ownership before close. Linux releases the fd even + // on a close error; retrying could close a reused descriptor. Any error + // leaves the source poisoned and cannot produce positive quality. + let fd = self.fd.into_raw_fd(); + ensure!(unsafe { libc::close(fd) } == 0, "TIME_CLIENT_CLOSE_ONCE"); + Ok(()) } fn exchange(&self, sequence: u32, daemon: &Pin, start: Capture) -> Result { let request = tracking::request(sequence); @@ -654,27 +638,6 @@ impl Client { tracking::reply(&packet, sequence) } } -fn unlink_owned(dir: RawFd, name: &str, expected: Identity) -> Result<()> { - ensure!( - socket_identity(dir, name)? == expected, - "TIME_CLIENT_CLEANUP_IDENTITY" - ); - let name = cstr(name)?; - ensure!( - unsafe { libc::unlinkat(dir, name.as_ptr(), 0) } == 0, - "TIME_CLIENT_UNLINK" - ); - Ok(()) -} -impl Drop for Client { - fn drop(&mut self) { - // Lost identity is intentionally retained, never recursively removed. - if self.own.is_some() { - let _ = self.cleanup(); - } - } -} - // Linux pathname DGRAM send requires socket write permission; read/execute // bits grant no sending authority. Directory ancestry is separately held and // verified. Neither group nor other may write this daemon-owned socket. @@ -744,7 +707,7 @@ impl NativeTimeSource { let first = kernel()?; self.verify()?; self.poisoned = true; - let mut client = Client::open(self.daemon.pin.daemon_gid)?; + let client = Client::open(self.daemon.pin.daemon_gid)?; let random = Uuid::new_v4(); let sequence = u32::from_ne_bytes(random.as_bytes()[..4].try_into()?); let report = client.exchange(sequence, &self.daemon.pin, before)?; @@ -852,22 +815,14 @@ mod tests { ); } #[test] - fn socket_cleanup_preserves_replaced_name_and_removes_only_exact_own_inode() { - use std::os::unix::{fs::PermissionsExt, net::UnixDatagram}; - let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-time-source-unit-{}", Uuid::new_v4())); - std::fs::create_dir(&path).unwrap(); - std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap(); - let dir = openat( - libc::AT_FDCWD, - path.to_str().unwrap(), - libc::O_RDONLY | libc::O_DIRECTORY, - ) - .unwrap(); - let old = UnixDatagram::bind(path.join("own.sock")).unwrap(); - let expected = socket_identity(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock").unwrap(); + fn server_socket_protection_requires_pinned_owner_and_no_group_write() { let server = Identity { + dev: 1, + ino: 2, + uid: 989, + gid: 989, mode: libc::S_IFSOCK | 0o755, - ..expected + links: 1, }; assert!(protected_server_socket(server, server.uid, server.gid)); for mode in [0o775, 0o757] { @@ -880,15 +835,54 @@ mod tests { server.gid, )); } - std::fs::rename(path.join("own.sock"), path.join("held.sock")).unwrap(); - let new = UnixDatagram::bind(path.join("own.sock")).unwrap(); - assert!(unlink_owned(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock", expected).is_err()); - assert!(path.join("own.sock").exists()); - let current = socket_identity(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock").unwrap(); - unlink_owned(dir.as_raw_fd(), "own.sock", current).unwrap(); - assert!(!path.join("own.sock").exists()); - unlink_owned(dir.as_raw_fd(), "held.sock", expected).unwrap(); - drop((old, new)); - std::fs::remove_dir(&path).unwrap(); + assert!(!protected_server_socket(server, 0, server.gid)); + assert!(!protected_server_socket(server, server.uid, 0)); + } + #[test] + fn abstract_address_is_exact_kernel_namespace_and_not_a_pathname() { + let (addr, len) = abstract_address(Uuid::from_bytes([0x17; 16])); + let name = b"rmm-time-source-tracking-17171717171717171717171717171717"; + assert_eq!(addr.sun_family as i32, libc::AF_UNIX); + assert_eq!(addr.sun_path[0], 0); + assert_eq!( + addr.sun_path[1..=name.len()] + .iter() + .map(|v| *v as u8) + .collect::>(), + name + ); + assert_eq!( + len as usize, + mem::offset_of!(libc::sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 + name.len() + ); + assert!((len as usize) < size_of::()); + } + #[test] + fn abstract_bind_is_exclusive_and_close_releases_only_own_kernel_name() { + let socket = || { + fd_result(unsafe { + libc::socket( + libc::AF_UNIX, + libc::SOCK_DGRAM | libc::SOCK_CLOEXEC | libc::SOCK_NONBLOCK, + 0, + ) + }) + .unwrap() + }; + let (addr, len) = abstract_address(Uuid::new_v4()); + let first = socket(); + bind_once(first.as_raw_fd(), &addr, len).unwrap(); + let second = socket(); + assert!(bind_once(second.as_raw_fd(), &addr, len).is_err()); + let (other, other_len) = abstract_address(Uuid::new_v4()); + let unrelated = socket(); + bind_once(unrelated.as_raw_fd(), &other, other_len).unwrap(); + let raw = first.into_raw_fd(); + assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::close(raw) }, 0); + // A fresh socket can acquire the released name, while the unrelated + // held socket still excludes all others. No pathname was ever created. + bind_once(second.as_raw_fd(), &addr, len).unwrap(); + let third = socket(); + assert!(bind_once(third.as_raw_fd(), &other, other_len).is_err()); } } diff --git a/deploy/time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py b/deploy/time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8c4ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/deploy/time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Frozen six Linux source units only; no actual Chrony or kernel query; no updater service or Apply. + +Prepare copies the source-frozen snapshot locally. Execute is one +root-only Cloud-VM fixture run. After any lost reply read the original case; +never execute it again or substitute another binary/source generation. +""" +import argparse +import base64 +import hashlib +import inspect +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +import stat +import uuid + +import windows_msi_runtime_acceptance as support + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +ACCESS_ROOT = ROOT.parent / 'rust-discovery' +QUALIFICATION = ROOT / 'devstate/server-time-source-abstract-client/945ec634-f787-4496-b019-28f03949f58f' +STATE = ROOT / 'devstate/time-source-abstract-native-linux' +PROFILE = 'rmm.time-source.six-abstract-transport-units.v1' +RECEIPT_SHA = '082666f3d9c07ebda4e935d5a67d16d6a5d7b62963044a6c638f17ae0bc93d09' +INPUTS_SHA = 'd14487a2fd9403e385ea889c1720c31e50d462a8f786e4f07d11b7518b6d1bd9' +BINARY_SHA = 'de9591c30f71d5a46d38cdb799051a22cb17617f2089bce2f12b9864c395462d' +BINARY_BYTES = 1147336 +TESTS = sorted(['native::tests::abstract_address_is_exact_kernel_namespace_and_not_a_pathname', 'native::tests::abstract_bind_is_exclusive_and_close_releases_only_own_kernel_name', 'native::tests::clock_brackets_reject_suspend_step_backwards_and_total_timeout', 'native::tests::server_socket_protection_requires_pinned_owner_and_no_group_write', 'tracking::tests::exact_packet_sequence_and_network_source', 'tracking::tests::signed_float_ceil_and_overflow_are_conservative']) +AGENT_SHA = '0a7ad6eefaefda79ee80b6a41b2df904e9e7f50ae6ebeed01b98c25b6ce5c06f' +HELPER_SHA = '79442727c3ba31cda02a8bc0e67481f14db9f39fc07520a880a90b64f10f1eaf' + + +def sha(raw): + return hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() + + +def save_local(path, value): + support.save(path, value) + fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) + try: + os.fsync(fd) + finally: + os.close(fd) + + +def copy_exact(source, destination, digest, size): + metadata = source.lstat() + support.require(stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_nlink == 1 + and metadata.st_uid in (0, os.getuid()) and not metadata.st_mode & 0o002 + and metadata.st_size == size and size <= 2 * 1024 * 1024, 'bounded regular frozen input') + raw = source.read_bytes() + support.require(sha(raw) == digest, 'frozen snapshot input hash') + destination.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) + support.private(destination.parent, True) + fd = os.open(destination, os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_WRONLY, 0o600) + with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: + stream.write(raw); stream.flush(); os.fsync(stream.fileno()) + fd = os.open(destination.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) + try: + os.fsync(fd) + finally: + os.close(fd) + + +def verify_case(folder): + value = support.load(folder / 'manifest.json') + support.require(value['profile'] == PROFILE and value['tests'] == TESTS + and value['runner_sha256'] == sha(Path(__file__).read_bytes()) + and value['receipt_sha256'] == RECEIPT_SHA and value['binary_sha256'] == BINARY_SHA + and value['binary_bytes'] == BINARY_BYTES, 'same original reviewed manifest') + support.require(sha((folder / 'receipt.json').read_bytes()) == RECEIPT_SHA + and sha((folder / 'inputs.json').read_bytes()) == INPUTS_SHA, 'original qualification provenance') + source = support.load(folder / 'inputs.json')['source_files'] + support.require(len(source) == 14 and source == value['source_files'], 'exact frozen fourteen complete recipe inputs') + for item in source: + path = Path(item['path']) + support.require(not path.is_absolute() and '..' not in path.parts, 'fixed snapshot relative path') + file = folder / 'source' / path + support.private(file) + support.require(file.stat().st_size == item['bytes'] and sha(file.read_bytes()) == item['sha256'], 'retained source freeze') + binary = folder / 'time-contract-tests'; support.private(binary) + support.require(binary.stat().st_size == BINARY_BYTES and sha(binary.read_bytes()) == BINARY_SHA, 'original qualified test bytes') + for path, digest in value['transport_sources'].items(): + support.require(sha((ROOT / path).read_bytes()) == digest, 'original strict transport source') + return value + + +def remote(p): + import base64 + import hashlib + import json + import os + from pathlib import Path + import selectors + import signal + import stat + import subprocess + import time + import uuid + + def require(ok, message): + if not ok: + raise RuntimeError(message) + + def enc(value): + return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':')).encode() + + def create(path, raw, mode=0o600): + fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, mode) + with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream: + stream.write(raw); stream.flush(); os.fsync(stream.fileno()) + fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW) + try: + os.fsync(fd) + finally: + os.close(fd) + + def run(args, timeout=20): + # Keep the owned group leader unreaped until its entire group has been + # cleaned up. Its PID therefore cannot be recycled before killpg. + child = subprocess.Popen(args, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, start_new_session=True, + env={'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin', 'LC_ALL': 'C', 'HOME': '/nonexistent'}) + selector = selectors.DefaultSelector() + buffers = {'stdout': bytearray(), 'stderr': bytearray()} + deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout + try: + for stream, name in ((child.stdout, 'stdout'), (child.stderr, 'stderr')): + os.set_blocking(stream.fileno(), False); selector.register(stream, selectors.EVENT_READ, name) + while True: + require(time.monotonic() < deadline, 'owned native command timeout; read original case only') + for key, _ in selector.select(0.02): + raw = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), 4096) + if raw: + buffers[key.data].extend(raw) + require(len(buffers[key.data]) <= 65536, 'bounded native output') + else: + selector.unregister(key.fileobj) + ended = os.waitid(os.P_PID, child.pid, os.WEXITED | os.WNOHANG | os.WNOWAIT) + if ended is not None: + # Child remains a zombie until finally: no PID/group reuse. + os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL) + for key in list(selector.get_map().values()): + while True: + try: + raw = os.read(key.fileobj.fileno(), 4096) + except BlockingIOError: + break + if not raw: + break + buffers[key.data].extend(raw) + require(len(buffers[key.data]) <= 65536, 'bounded native output') + code = ended.si_status if ended.si_code == os.CLD_EXITED else -ended.si_status + return code, bytes(buffers['stdout']), bytes(buffers['stderr']) + finally: + os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL) + child.wait() + selector.close(); child.stdout.close(); child.stderr.close() + + def metadata_identity(value): + return (value.st_dev, value.st_ino, value.st_uid, value.st_gid, value.st_mode, + value.st_nlink, value.st_size, value.st_mtime_ns, value.st_ctime_ns) + + def hashed(path, maximum, process_image=False): + fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_CLOEXEC | (0 if process_image else os.O_NOFOLLOW)) + with os.fdopen(fd, 'rb') as stream: + before = os.fstat(stream.fileno()); require(stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode) and before.st_size <= maximum, 'bounded witness file') + digest = hashlib.sha256(); total = 0 + while True: + raw = stream.read(32768) + if not raw: + break + total += len(raw); require(total <= maximum, 'bounded witness hash'); digest.update(raw) + after = os.fstat(stream.fileno()) + require(metadata_identity(before) == metadata_identity(after) and total == before.st_size, 'stable witness hash') + return before, digest.hexdigest() + + def witness(): + out = {'boot_id': Path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip(), 'services': {}, 'files': {}} + release = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in Path('/etc/os-release').read_text().splitlines() if '=' in line) + require(release.get('ID', '').strip('"') == 'ubuntu' and release.get('VERSION_ID', '').strip('"') == '24.04', 'fixed native Ubuntu24.04') + out['os'] = {'id': 'ubuntu', 'version': '24.04', 'machine': os.uname().machine, 'kernel': os.uname().release} + for name, uid, binary in ( + ('rmm-agent-remote.service', 993, p['agent_sha256']), + ('rmm-helper-cloud.service', 0, p['helper_sha256']), + ('rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service', 0, p['helper_sha256'])): + code, stdout, _ = run(['/usr/bin/systemctl', 'show', name, '-p', 'ActiveState', '-p', 'MainPID', '-p', 'UnitFileState', '-p', 'InvocationID']) + require(code == 0, 'existing service read') + service = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in stdout.decode().splitlines()) + pid = int(service['MainPID']); require(service['ActiveState'] == 'active' and pid > 1, 'three existing services active') + proc = Path('/proc', str(pid)); birth = (proc / 'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ', 1)[1].split()[19] + ids = {line.split(':')[0]: line.split()[1:] for line in (proc / 'status').read_text().splitlines() if line.startswith(('Uid:', 'Gid:'))} + metadata, image = hashed(proc / 'exe', 256 * 1024 * 1024, process_image=True) + current = (proc / 'exe').stat() + require(ids['Uid'] == [str(uid)] * 4 and ids['Gid'] == ['984'] * 4 and image == binary + and (metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino) == (current.st_dev, current.st_ino) + and (proc / 'stat').read_text().rsplit(') ', 1)[1].split()[19] == birth, 'current generation/account/image') + out['services'][name] = dict(service, birth=birth, image=image, ids=ids) + code, stdout, _ = run(['/usr/bin/systemctl', 'show', 'rmm-apt-helper.service', '-p', 'ActiveState', '-p', 'UnitFileState']) + apt = dict(line.split('=', 1) for line in stdout.decode().splitlines()) + require(code == 0 and apt == {'ActiveState': 'inactive', 'UnitFileState': 'disabled'}, 'APT remains closed') + out['apt'] = apt + for name in ('/etc/rmm-remote/helper-general.json', '/etc/rmm-remote/helper-full-maintenance.json', + '/etc/rmm-remote/full-maintenance-helper-proof.json', '/etc/systemd/system/rmm-full-maintenance-helper.service'): + path = Path(name); metadata = path.lstat() + require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_uid == 0 + and not metadata.st_mode & 0o022 and metadata.st_nlink == 1, 'protected known control') + current, digest = hashed(path, 65536) + require(metadata_identity(current) == metadata_identity(metadata), 'same known control file') + out['files'][name] = [metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino, metadata.st_uid, metadata.st_gid, metadata.st_mode, + metadata.st_size, metadata.st_mtime_ns, metadata.st_ctime_ns, digest] + for name in ('/var/lib/rmm-helper/consumption.sqlite', '/var/lib/rmm-helper/executor.lock', + '/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/journal.sqlite', '/var/lib/rmm-agent-remote/consumption.sqlite'): + path = Path(name); metadata = path.lstat() + require(not path.is_symlink() and stat.S_ISREG(metadata.st_mode) and metadata.st_nlink == 1, 'existing state identity') + out['files'][name] = [metadata.st_dev, metadata.st_ino, metadata.st_uid, metadata.st_gid, metadata.st_mode] + return out + + require(os.geteuid() == 0 and os.uname().machine == 'x86_64', 'fixed Cloud Linux root contract fixtures') + ident = str(uuid.UUID(p['id'])); require(ident == p['id'], 'canonical original case') + folder = Path('/var/tmp') / ('rmm-time-source-abstract-units-linux-' + ident) + if p['action'] == 'read': + metadata = folder.lstat() + require(stat.S_ISDIR(metadata.st_mode) and not folder.is_symlink() and metadata.st_uid == 0 + and stat.S_IMODE(metadata.st_mode) == 0o700, 'own original case only') + result = folder / 'result.json' + return {'read_only': True, 'id': ident, 'entered': (folder / 'entered.json').exists(), + 'result': json.loads(result.read_bytes()) if result.exists() else None, 'current_witness': witness()} + require(p['action'] == 'execute', 'one fixed time contract action') + os.umask(0o077); folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) + create(folder / 'intent.json', enc({key: value for key, value in p.items() if key != 'binary_b64'})) + require(len(p['binary_b64']) == 1529784, 'bounded binary transfer') + raw = base64.b64decode(p['binary_b64'], validate=True) + require(len(raw) == 1147336 and hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest() == p['binary_sha256'], 'fixed six-unit binary') + binary = folder / 'time-contract-tests'; create(binary, raw, 0o700) + before = witness(); create(folder / 'before.json', enc(before)) + command = ['/usr/bin/setpriv', '--reuid=0', '--regid=0', '--clear-groups', '--no-new-privs', str(binary)] + code, stdout, stderr = run(command + ['--list', '--format', 'terse']) + create(folder / 'list.stdout', stdout); create(folder / 'list.stderr', stderr) + require(code == 0 and stderr == b'', 'native list succeeded') + lines = stdout.decode().splitlines() + require(len(lines) == 6 and sorted(line[:-6] for line in lines if line.endswith(': test')) == p['tests'], 'exact six tests before any run') + create(folder / 'entered.json', enc({'id': ident, 'run_once': True, 'time_ns': time.time_ns()})) + code, stdout, stderr = run(command + ['--test-threads=1', '--nocapture']) + create(folder / 'run.stdout', stdout); create(folder / 'run.stderr', stderr) + after = witness(); create(folder / 'after.json', enc(after)) + require(before == after and code == 0 and stderr == b'' + and b'6 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out' in stdout + and all((b'test ' + name.encode() + b' ... ok') in stdout for name in p['tests']), 'six native units and retained target state') + receipt = dict(id=ident, profile=p['profile'], passed=6, ignored=0, filtered=0, execution_uid=0, tests=p['tests'], + before=before, after=after, binary_sha256=p['binary_sha256'], source_receipt_sha256=p['receipt_sha256'], + source_manifest_sha256=p['manifest_sha256'], stdout_sha256=hashlib.sha256(stdout).hexdigest(), + no_rmm_jobs=True, no_apply=True, no_service_control=True, no_actual_source_query=True) + create(folder / 'result.json', enc(receipt)); return receipt + + +def main(): + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__) + parser.add_argument('action', choices=('prepare', 'execute', 'read')); parser.add_argument('--case') + args = parser.parse_args(); os.umask(0o077) + STATE.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True); support.private(STATE, True) + if args.action == 'prepare': + support.require(args.case is None, 'prepare one new local case') + receipt_path = QUALIFICATION / 'receipt.json'; support.private(receipt_path) + support.require(sha(receipt_path.read_bytes()) == RECEIPT_SHA, 'fixed source qualification receipt') + receipt = support.load(receipt_path); original = support.load(QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json')['source_files'] + support.require(sha((QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json').read_bytes()) == INPUTS_SHA + and receipt['inputs_sha256'] == INPUTS_SHA and len(original) == 14 + and receipt['result'] == 'LOCAL_RELEASE_PROVIDER6_ABSTRACT_TRANSPORT_PASS' and receipt['tests'] == 6 + and receipt['test_names'] == TESTS + and receipt['native_source_sha256'] == '8d13ef64f1b7ce0991f3d52a8a42d7b096e9020a57d4ca21a16409a4492e3a39' + and receipt['codec_sha256'] == '807cac064b00760d9131dc2a44d01ad9770a3660f4acd5f8d2948bb0f9234d08' + and receipt['skips'] == 0 and receipt['filters'] == 0, 'reviewed six-test qualification') + ident = str(uuid.uuid4()); folder = STATE / ident; folder.mkdir(mode=0o700) + copy_exact(receipt_path, folder / 'receipt.json', RECEIPT_SHA, receipt_path.stat().st_size) + copy_exact(QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json', folder / 'inputs.json', INPUTS_SHA, (QUALIFICATION / 'inputs.json').stat().st_size) + paths = set() + for item in original: + path = Path(item['path']) + support.require(not path.is_absolute() and '..' not in path.parts and str(path) not in paths, 'unique fixed frozen input') + paths.add(str(path)); copy_exact(QUALIFICATION / 'source' / path, folder / 'source' / path, item['sha256'], item['bytes']) + binary = QUALIFICATION / 'qualified-provider-tests' + support.require(receipt['artifacts'][0] == dict(path='qualified-provider-tests', bytes=BINARY_BYTES, sha256=BINARY_SHA), 'fixed original linked artifact') + copy_exact(binary, folder / 'time-contract-tests', BINARY_SHA, BINARY_BYTES) + transports = {path: sha((ROOT / path).read_bytes()) for path in ('deploy/windows_msi_runtime_acceptance.py', 'deploy/vm_access_check.py')} + save_local(folder / 'manifest.json', dict(id=ident, profile=PROFILE, runner_sha256=sha(Path(__file__).read_bytes()), + receipt_sha256=RECEIPT_SHA, binary_sha256=BINARY_SHA, binary_bytes=BINARY_BYTES, + source_files=original, tests=TESTS, transport_sources=transports)) + verify_case(folder) + print(json.dumps({'id': ident, 'prepared_locally': True})); return + support.require(args.case is not None, 'original --case required') + ident = str(uuid.UUID(args.case)); support.require(ident == args.case, 'same canonical original case') + folder = STATE / ident; support.private(folder, True); verify_case(folder) + payload = dict(id=ident, action=args.action, profile=PROFILE, tests=TESTS, binary_sha256=BINARY_SHA, + receipt_sha256=RECEIPT_SHA, manifest_sha256=sha((folder / 'manifest.json').read_bytes()), + agent_sha256=AGENT_SHA, helper_sha256=HELPER_SHA) + if args.action == 'execute': + save_local(folder / 'execute-entered.json', {'once': True, 'no_retry': True}) + payload['binary_b64'] = base64.b64encode((folder / 'time-contract-tests').read_bytes()).decode() + code = 'import json\n' + inspect.getsource(remote) + '\nprint(json.dumps(remote(' + repr(payload) + ')))\n' + response = support.transport(support.access_settings(ACCESS_ROOT, 'linux'), 'python3 -', code.encode(), folder) + save_local(folder / (args.action + '-' + str(uuid.uuid4()) + '.json'), response) + if args.action == 'read' and response['result'] is not None: + result = response['result'] + support.require(result['id'] == ident and result['profile'] == PROFILE and result['tests'] == TESTS + and result['passed'] == 6 and result['ignored'] == 0 and result['filtered'] == 0 + and result['binary_sha256'] == BINARY_SHA and result['source_receipt_sha256'] == RECEIPT_SHA + and result['no_actual_source_query'] is True + and result['source_manifest_sha256'] == sha((folder / 'manifest.json').read_bytes()) + and response['current_witness'] == response['result']['after'], 'same-case retained native result') + print(json.dumps({'id': ident, 'action': args.action, 'passed': response.get('passed'), + 'complete': response.get('result') is not None if args.action == 'read' else True, 'read_only': args.action == 'read'})) + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/docs/server-time-source-abstract-client.md b/docs/server-time-source-abstract-client.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f680b53 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/server-time-source-abstract-client.md @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +# Native Chrony client transport: abstract AF_UNIX + +The native Linux source now binds one CSPRNG UUIDv4 name in the Linux abstract +AF_UNIX namespace. The leading NUL and exact sockaddr length select a kernel +name, without a trailing NUL or filesystem client socket. There is one bind +attempt. A collision fails the observation; the provider never adopts a name, +generates a replacement name after failure, or retries the request. + +The root-protected `/run/rmm-time-source/clients` directory remains mandatory, +with its existing exact root/group/mode checks, held directory descriptor, +exclusive nonblocking flock and empty-directory precondition. Historical named +socket leftovers therefore still block the instance. The provider never deletes +or adopts them. Its own abstract address is checked with getsockname. Successful +observation explicitly consumes and closes the socket descriptor once before +returning quality; a close or verification error cannot return a qualified +sample. Drop closes remaining owned descriptors without an unlink or a close +retry. The source remains poisoned after a failed observation. + +An abstract name grants no filesystem DAC authority. A different process could +reserve a guessed name first and deny bind, or cause denial of service. That +cannot create positive source quality: the kernel excludes a second bind, and +the source still connects only to the fixed protected Chrony pathname. The +pinned daemon PID, birth, image, UID/GID, held process identity, protected server +socket identity, exact single SCM_CREDENTIALS record, reply sequence and fixed +Tracking packet checks are unchanged. The monotonic/boottime/UTC brackets, +kernel-state, error, reference-age and signed-time contracts are unchanged. +The provider exposes no configurable endpoint, clock setter, signer, retry or +network transport. + +The original named-client provider SHA +`3fd9c7a969a583abf97e29165135a8c1044db5c951ad8bd4dbfee3ee77e7ccdc` +and the original 5b build/failed GROUP, DAC and peer probe records remain +historical evidence. They are not overwritten or reclassified. Root's separate +abstract-connect-only diagnosis, receipt +`9bcdaa00b86346b85d73d5bb9d4e491ecd82ed108ca8ec8a0495f7ec19770d56`, +proved connect under the same two-capability profile without sending a +datagram. It did not produce a native quality sample. This transport change +requires its own published source build and native qualification before any +broker quality gate may open. It changes no AppArmor rule, ACL, capability, +Chrony service, public pin, signer key or RMM job. + +Subsequent evidence blocks treating this implementation as a working Chrony +transport. Root's separate one-request diagnosis received no reply (receipt +`f82eef4fc7d8f7cab7971a835a68eef855f166c32cb2feaac191551188351881`). +The upstream Chrony 4.8/4.9 [socket.c](https://gitlab.com/chrony/chrony/-/raw/4.9/socket.c) +stores an AF_UNIX sender as `remote_addr.path`, then reconstructs the reply +address using `strlen` in `set_unix_sockaddr`. An abstract sender's leading NUL +therefore loses its random name. This source-level incompatibility explains the +observed connect/send success without a reply, subject to checking the installed +Chrony package's exact source. The local guards below prove kernel socket +semantics, not Chrony interoperability. No ARM quality acceptance or broker +installation may follow from these local results. + +The local six-test qualification uses a frozen three-crate workspace, the held +original offline 70-package lock/recipe and current codec807 source. Two new +guards verify exact abstract sockaddr encoding and actual exclusive kernel bind +with release on close while an unrelated name stays reserved. The existing +clock-bracket and Tracking-parser guards remain; the obsolete filesystem-client +cleanup fixture is replaced by the retained server-socket protection guard. +Local tests do not call NativeTimeSource.open/sample, contact Chrony, or prove +ARM64 or real-server source quality. The existing ecb prepare flow can package +the newly published source tip after review; no handmade original manifest is +used. + +Local qualification `945ec634-f787-4496-b019-28f03949f58f` actually passed six +default release lib tests (zero skipped/filtered), clippy with warnings denied, +rustfmt checking and the offline release operator-probe build. The release test +ELF is x86-64, 1,147,336 bytes, SHA256 +`de9591c30f71d5a46d38cdb799051a22cb17617f2089bce2f12b9864c395462d`. +Its frozen receipt is +`082666f3d9c07ebda4e935d5a67d16d6a5d7b62963044a6c638f17ae0bc93d09`; +the provider source is +`8d13ef64f1b7ce0991f3d52a8a42d7b096e9020a57d4ca21a16409a4492e3a39`. + +`deploy/time_source_abstract_linux_acceptance.py` provides only `prepare`, one +`execute`, and original-case `read`. It copies that exact frozen ELF and all +fourteen recipe/source inputs; it does not rebuild from a moving worktree. The +remote runner first requires the exact full six-test list, then runs the binary +without filters/skips. An intent precedes execution; local and remote case +creation reject repeats. Before/after witnesses bind the existing three RMM +service generations, protected controls, state-file identities and closed APT +service. Timeout cleanup targets only the held unreaped child group. It performs +no RMM job or native source query. After a lost reply, only the original `read` +is permitted. Local prepare of case +`b5e4e4cc-5bb7-441a-8c53-1fc2281e17e8` succeeded; target `execute` and `read` +remain unexecuted by this author and require Root's separate action. + +## Actual Cloud-Linux fixture result; production candidate rejected + +Root actually executed the six frozen guards in original case +`b5e4e4cc-5bb7-441a-8c53-1fc2281e17e8`:6PASS/0ignored/filtered, +receipt `fe989d8ec4d54d7416de2cb6301d6b87b897f4bfa33d1d03403e0968d83eec67`. +Separate original-case read receipt +`a7bdc39d3d448efbdf2711958ed2dea2aa74bb8b9ff0c7a8d970c414ad785a2a` +confirmed retained results and existing runtime witnesses. Independent source +review found no transport trust/lifecycle bypass. These are kernel fixture +results, not a successful Chrony integration. + +A separate fixed read-only Tracking request actually sent exactly one104Byte +request through an exclusive abstract socket and received no reply within its +bound. Receipt `f82eef4fc7d8f7cab7971a835a68eef855f166c32cb2feaac191551188351881`. +Chrony4.8/4.9 source reconstructs the return Unix address as a C string; an +abstract name starts with NUL and is lost. This proves that the candidate +cannot provide the required reply transport with this implementation. No +additional AppArmor denial was observed in the filtered kernel audit. + +The candidate is rejected for deployment. Its exact source and frozen six-test +proof are preserved as evaluation history. Production NativeTimeSource must +retain the prior named transport until a separately qualified compatible fix +is ready. No ARM64 build, signer, key, quality authority, client configuration +or RMM job was activated from this candidate.