Separate SYSTEM policy and verify thirteen policy guards on cloud Linux
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 7s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-14 04:41:09 +01:00
parent b046209ba3
commit 5a6d0b0c3a
15 changed files with 914 additions and 20 deletions
+21 -4
View File
@@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ pub async fn permit(
if !payload.action.validate() {
return Ok(denied("APT_MANIFEST_REQUIRED"));
}
if payload.execution_identity == "root" {
if crate::root_policy::needs_helper(&payload.execution_identity) {
let helper_ready: bool = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT helper_sync_ready FROM agent_installations WHERE agent_id=$1",
"SELECT i.helper_sync_ready AND EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM agent_sync_state s WHERE s.tenant_id=i.tenant_id AND s.agent_id=i.agent_id AND s.helper_journal_id IS NOT NULL) FROM agent_installations i WHERE i.agent_id=$1",
)
.bind(agent)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
@@ -332,7 +332,11 @@ pub async fn permit(
.await
.is_err()
{
return Ok(denied("ROOT_SCOPE_OR_HELPER_SYNC_REQUIRED"));
return Ok(denied(if payload.execution_identity == "system" {
"SYSTEM_SCOPE_OR_HELPER_SYNC_REQUIRED"
} else {
"ROOT_SCOPE_OR_HELPER_SYNC_REQUIRED"
}));
}
}
let sync: (bool, bool) = sqlx::query_as(
@@ -497,7 +501,7 @@ pub async fn next(
if let Some(r)=sqlx::query("SELECT job_id,attempt_id FROM jobs WHERE agent_id=$1 AND cancel_requested AND state IN ('accepted','running','verifying','awaiting_reboot') ORDER BY job_id LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?{
tx.commit().await?;return Ok(Some(Payload::CancelRequest(CancelRequest{job_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("job_id").to_string(),attempt_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("attempt_id").to_string(),reason:"operator_cancel_requested".into()})))
}
let row=sqlx::query("SELECT j.job_id,j.attempt_id,j.payload,j.payload_hash,a.authorization_id,p.plan_hash,i.capabilities FROM outbox b JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) JOIN operations o ON o.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND o.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN authorizations a ON a.tenant_id=o.tenant_id AND a.authorization_id=o.authorization_id JOIN approval_requests r ON r.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND r.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN operation_plans p ON p.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND p.plan_id=r.plan_id JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=j.tenant_id JOIN agent_installations i ON i.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND i.agent_id=j.agent_id WHERE j.agent_id=$1 AND j.state='queued' AND NOT j.cancel_requested AND NOT t.changes_stopped AND a.revoked_at IS NULL AND r.approval_state='approved' AND p.expires_at>now() AND b.acknowledged_at IS NULL AND (b.lease_until IS NULL OR b.lease_until<now()) ORDER BY j.job_id FOR UPDATE OF b SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?;
let row=sqlx::query("SELECT j.job_id,j.attempt_id,j.payload,j.payload_hash,a.authorization_id,a.principal AS approver,p.plan_hash,p.payload AS plan_payload,i.capabilities FROM outbox b JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) JOIN operations o ON o.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND o.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN authorizations a ON a.tenant_id=o.tenant_id AND a.authorization_id=o.authorization_id JOIN approval_requests r ON r.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND r.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN operation_plans p ON p.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND p.plan_id=r.plan_id JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=j.tenant_id JOIN agent_installations i ON i.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND i.agent_id=j.agent_id WHERE j.agent_id=$1 AND j.state='queued' AND NOT j.cancel_requested AND NOT t.changes_stopped AND a.revoked_at IS NULL AND r.approval_state='approved' AND p.expires_at>now() AND b.acknowledged_at IS NULL AND (b.lease_until IS NULL OR b.lease_until<now()) ORDER BY j.job_id FOR UPDATE OF b SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?;
let Some(row) = row else {
tx.commit().await?;
return Ok(None);
@@ -511,6 +515,19 @@ pub async fn next(
tx.commit().await?;
return Ok(None);
}
if crate::root_policy::needs_helper(&payload.execution_identity) {
let plan: PlanPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("plan_payload"))?;
if crate::root_policy::authorize(&mut tx, &plan.principal, &payload)
.await
.is_err()
|| crate::root_policy::authorize(&mut tx, &row.get::<String, _>("approver"), &payload)
.await
.is_err()
{
tx.commit().await?;
return Ok(None);
}
}
sqlx::query("UPDATE outbox SET lease_until=now()+interval '30 seconds' WHERE job_id=$1")
.bind(row.get::<Uuid, _>("job_id"))
.execute(&mut *tx)
+16 -5
View File
@@ -384,7 +384,10 @@ pub async fn plan(
if input.targets.asset_ids.is_empty()
|| input.targets.asset_ids.len() > 100
|| !input.action.validate_plan_shape()
|| !matches!(input.execution_identity.as_str(), "agent_service" | "root")
|| !matches!(
input.execution_identity.as_str(),
"agent_service" | "root" | "system"
)
|| !(1..=3600).contains(&input.max_runtime_seconds)
|| input.max_output_bytes == 0
|| input.max_output_bytes > 262144
@@ -423,8 +426,8 @@ pub async fn plan(
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant).await?;
policy(&mut tx).await?;
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, "operations:plan").await?;
if input.execution_identity == "root" && !p.permits_scope("root:execute") {
return Err(Error(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "FORBIDDEN"));
if let Some(permission) = crate::root_policy::execution_permission(&input.execution_identity) {
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, permission).await?;
}
if matches!(input.action, Action::AptNativeAcceptance { .. }) {
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, "apt:native_acceptance").await?;
@@ -661,8 +664,11 @@ pub async fn submit(
if matches!(job.payload.action, Action::QueryLogs { .. }) {
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, "logs:read").await?;
}
if job.payload.execution_identity == "root" {
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, "root:execute").await?;
if let Some(permission) =
crate::root_policy::execution_permission(&job.payload.execution_identity)
{
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, permission).await?;
crate::root_policy::authorize(&mut tx, &p.name, &job.payload).await?;
}
if matches!(job.payload.action, Action::AptNativeAcceptance { .. }) {
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, p, "apt:native_acceptance").await?;
@@ -763,6 +769,11 @@ async fn authorize_http(
return Err(fail("AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"));
}
for job in &plan.jobs {
if let Some(permission) =
crate::root_policy::execution_permission(&job.payload.execution_identity)
{
crate::permissions::require_principal(&mut tx, &p, permission).await?;
}
crate::root_policy::authorize(&mut tx, &p.name, &job.payload).await?;
}
let authorization = Uuid::new_v4();
+1
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ mod root_policy;
mod scheduler;
mod synchronization;
mod tls;
mod windows_policy;
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
use axum::{
+19 -3
View File
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ impl RootScope {
capabilities: &[String],
global_log_units: Option<&[String]>,
) -> bool {
if job.execution_identity != "root" {
if job.execution_identity != "root" || capabilities.iter().any(|c| c == "windows.base/1") {
return false;
}
if !self.matches_target(job)
@@ -279,13 +279,26 @@ fn load() -> Result<RootPolicy, Error> {
}
Ok(policy)
}
pub fn execution_permission(identity: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
match identity {
"root" => Some("root:execute"),
"system" => Some("system:execute"),
_ => None,
}
}
pub fn needs_helper(identity: &str) -> bool {
execution_permission(identity).is_some()
}
pub async fn authorize(
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
principal: &str,
job: &JobPayload,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if job.execution_identity != "root" {
return Ok(());
match job.execution_identity.as_str() {
"system" => return crate::windows_policy::authorize(tx, principal, job).await,
"agent_service" => return Ok(()),
"root" => {}
_ => return Err(Error(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "EXECUTION_IDENTITY_DENIED")),
}
for permission in required_permissions(job, false) {
crate::permissions::require(tx, principal, permission).await?;
@@ -375,6 +388,9 @@ mod tests {
assert!(scope.permits("selected", &job, &caps, None));
assert!(!scope.permits("automation", &job, &caps, None));
assert!(!scope.permits("selected", &job, &caps[..4], None));
let mut windows = caps;
windows.push("windows.base/1".into());
assert!(!scope.permits("selected", &job, &windows, None));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
+6 -2
View File
@@ -504,6 +504,11 @@ pub async fn reconcile(
decisions.push(decision);
continue;
}
let missing_helper =
crate::root_policy::needs_helper(&payload.execution_identity) && !helper_ready;
if missing_helper {
ready = false;
}
let grant = sqlx::query(
"SELECT grant_id,payload,created_at FROM execution_permits WHERE job_id=$1 AND attempt_id=$2",
)
@@ -720,8 +725,7 @@ pub async fn reconcile(
}
.into();
}
if payload.execution_identity == "root" && !helper_ready {
ready = false;
if missing_helper {
decision.unlock = false;
decision.reason = "HELPER_JOURNAL_REQUIRED".into();
}
+453
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
//! Independent development-only Windows SYSTEM ceiling. Policy never approves a
//! plan, publishes a capability, provisions a helper or substitutes for Sync.
use crate::jobs::Error;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, JobPayload};
use serde::Deserialize;
use sqlx::{Postgres, Transaction};
use std::{
fs::{self, File},
io::Read,
os::unix::fs::{MetadataExt, PermissionsExt},
path::Path,
};
use uuid::Uuid;
const POLICY_LIMIT: u64 = 65536;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct SystemPolicy {
schema_version: u32,
profile: String,
expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
scopes: Vec<SystemScope>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct SystemScope {
tenant_id: Uuid,
asset_id: Uuid,
agent_id: Uuid,
enrollment_generation: u64,
assignment_version: u64,
principals: Vec<String>,
helper_policy_sha256: String,
helper_binary_sha256: String,
// Administrative evidence pin, never an approval or authorization ID.
acceptance_evidence_id: Uuid,
allowed_services: Vec<String>,
max_runtime_seconds: u32,
}
fn digest(value: &str) -> bool {
value.len() == 64
&& value
.bytes()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || b"abcdef".contains(&c))
}
fn fixture_service(name: &str) -> bool {
name.starts_with("RmmDiscoveryFixture")
&& name.len() > "RmmDiscoveryFixture".len()
&& name.len() <= 80
&& name
.bytes()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b"_-".contains(&c))
}
impl SystemScope {
fn valid(&self) -> bool {
!self.tenant_id.is_nil()
&& !self.asset_id.is_nil()
&& !self.agent_id.is_nil()
&& self.enrollment_generation > 0
&& self.assignment_version > 0
&& !self.acceptance_evidence_id.is_nil()
&& digest(&self.helper_policy_sha256)
&& digest(&self.helper_binary_sha256)
&& !self.principals.is_empty()
&& self.principals.len() <= 64
&& self
.principals
.iter()
.all(|p| !p.trim().is_empty() && p.len() <= 256)
&& self
.principals
.iter()
.collect::<std::collections::BTreeSet<_>>()
.len()
== self.principals.len()
&& self.allowed_services.len() <= 16
&& self
.allowed_services
.iter()
.all(|name| fixture_service(name))
&& self
.allowed_services
.iter()
.collect::<std::collections::BTreeSet<_>>()
.len()
== self.allowed_services.len()
&& (1..=120).contains(&self.max_runtime_seconds)
}
fn permits(&self, principal: &str, job: &JobPayload, capabilities: &[String]) -> bool {
let has = |cap: &str| capabilities.iter().any(|c| c == cap);
self.valid()
&& job.execution_identity == "system"
&& self.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
&& self.asset_id == job.asset_id
&& self.agent_id == job.agent_id
&& self.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
&& self.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
&& self.principals.iter().any(|p| p == principal)
&& has("windows.base/1")
&& !has("linux.base/1")
&& has("rmm.sync.v1")
&& has("helper.system.v1")
&& has(&format!(
"helper.policy.sha256:{}",
self.helper_policy_sha256
))
&& has(&format!(
"helper.binary.sha256:{}",
self.helper_binary_sha256
))
&& has("system:set_service_state")
&& has("set_service_state")
&& (1..=self.max_runtime_seconds).contains(&job.max_runtime_seconds)
&& (1..=65536).contains(&job.max_output_bytes)
&& matches!(&job.action,Action::SetServiceState{unit,state}
if self.allowed_services.contains(unit) && matches!(state.as_str(),"running"|"stopped"))
}
}
impl SystemPolicy {
fn valid(&self, now: DateTime<Utc>) -> bool {
self.schema_version == 1
&& self.profile == "development"
&& self.expires_at > now
&& !self.scopes.is_empty()
&& self.scopes.len() <= 64
&& self.scopes.iter().all(SystemScope::valid)
}
fn permits(
&self,
principal: &str,
job: &JobPayload,
capabilities: &[String],
now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> bool {
self.valid(now)
&& self
.scopes
.iter()
.any(|scope| scope.permits(principal, job, capabilities))
}
}
fn disabled() -> Error {
Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT, "UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY")
}
fn no_symlink_components(path: &Path) -> Result<(), Error> {
let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
path.to_path_buf()
} else {
std::env::current_dir().map_err(|_| disabled())?.join(path)
};
for component in absolute.ancestors() {
if fs::symlink_metadata(component)
.map_err(|_| disabled())?
.file_type()
.is_symlink()
{
return Err(disabled());
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn protected_parent_chain(path: &Path, owner: u32) -> Result<(), Error> {
// A private immediate parent can itself be renamed through an unsafe
// ancestor. Trust every directory owner, and reject writable ancestors
// unless their sticky bit protects the trusted-owned next component.
// This deliberately preserves /tmp's root-owned sticky-directory contract.
let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
path.to_path_buf()
} else {
std::env::current_dir().map_err(|_| disabled())?.join(path)
};
for ancestor in absolute.ancestors().skip(1) {
let directory = fs::symlink_metadata(ancestor).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
let mode = directory.permissions().mode();
if !directory.is_dir()
|| ![0, owner].contains(&directory.uid())
|| (mode & 0o022 != 0 && mode & 0o1000 == 0)
{
return Err(disabled());
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn protected_bytes(path: &Path, owner: u32) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
no_symlink_components(path)?;
protected_parent_chain(path, owner)?;
let before = fs::symlink_metadata(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
let parent = path.parent().ok_or_else(disabled)?;
let directory = fs::symlink_metadata(parent).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
if !before.is_file()
|| before.uid() != owner
|| before.permissions().mode() & 0o777 != 0o600
|| before.len() > POLICY_LIMIT
|| !directory.is_dir()
|| ![0, owner].contains(&directory.uid())
|| directory.permissions().mode() & 0o022 != 0
{
return Err(disabled());
}
// The protected immediate parent excludes unprivileged swaps. Additionally
// bind the opened descriptor to the lstat identity and bound the actual read.
let mut file = File::open(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
let opened = file.metadata().map_err(|_| disabled())?;
if opened.dev() != before.dev() || opened.ino() != before.ino() {
return Err(disabled());
}
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
file.by_ref()
.take(POLICY_LIMIT + 1)
.read_to_end(&mut bytes)
.map_err(|_| disabled())?;
no_symlink_components(path)?;
protected_parent_chain(path, owner)?;
let after = fs::symlink_metadata(path).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
if bytes.len() as u64 > POLICY_LIMIT
|| !after.is_file()
|| after.dev() != before.dev()
|| after.ino() != before.ino()
|| after.uid() != owner
|| after.permissions().mode() & 0o777 != 0o600
|| after.len() != before.len()
|| after.mtime() != before.mtime()
|| after.mtime_nsec() != before.mtime_nsec()
{
return Err(disabled());
}
Ok(bytes)
}
fn load() -> Result<SystemPolicy, Error> {
if std::env::var("RMM_PROFILE").as_deref() != Ok("development")
|| std::env::var("RMM_DEV_SYSTEM_ENABLED").as_deref() != Ok("true")
{
return Err(disabled());
}
let path = std::env::var("RMM_DEV_SYSTEM_POLICY_FILE").map_err(|_| disabled())?;
let key =
std::env::var("RMM_JOB_KEY_FILE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "devstate/jobs/ed25519.pem".into());
// Inspect only signing-key metadata, never read/log/export the private key.
no_symlink_components(Path::new(&key))?;
let key = fs::symlink_metadata(key).map_err(|_| disabled())?;
if !key.is_file() {
return Err(disabled());
}
let policy: SystemPolicy =
serde_json::from_slice(&protected_bytes(Path::new(&path), key.uid())?)
.map_err(|_| disabled())?;
if !policy.valid(Utc::now()) {
return Err(disabled());
}
Ok(policy)
}
pub async fn authorize(
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
principal: &str,
job: &JobPayload,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
if job.execution_identity != "system" {
return Err(Error(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "SYSTEM_IDENTITY_REQUIRED"));
}
// Independent DB permission; root:execute never implies this scope.
crate::permissions::require(tx, principal, "system:execute").await?;
let policy = load()?;
let caps:serde_json::Value=sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT capabilities FROM agent_installations WHERE tenant_id=$1 AND agent_id=$2 AND asset_id=$3 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND enrollment_generation=$4 AND assignment_version=$5").bind(job.tenant_id).bind(job.agent_id).bind(job.asset_id).bind(i64::try_from(job.enrollment_generation).map_err(|_|Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"BINDING_MISMATCH"))?).bind(i64::try_from(job.assignment_version).map_err(|_|Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"BINDING_MISMATCH"))?).fetch_optional(&mut **tx).await?.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT,"AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"))?;
let capabilities: Vec<String> = serde_json::from_value(caps)?;
if !policy.permits(principal, job, &capabilities, Utc::now()) {
return Err(Error(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"SYSTEM_SCOPE_OR_HELPER_POLICY_DENIED",
));
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::json;
fn fixture() -> (SystemPolicy, JobPayload, Vec<String>) {
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let now = Utc::now();
let policy:SystemPolicy=serde_json::from_value(json!({"schema_version":1,"profile":"development","expires_at":now+chrono::Duration::minutes(10),"scopes":[{"tenant_id":id,"asset_id":id,"agent_id":id,"enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":1,"principals":["selected"],"helper_policy_sha256":"ab".repeat(32),"helper_binary_sha256":"cd".repeat(32),"acceptance_evidence_id":Uuid::new_v4(),"allowed_services":["RmmDiscoveryFixtureService"],"max_runtime_seconds":30}]})).unwrap();
let job = JobPayload {
schema_version: 1,
tenant_id: id,
asset_id: id,
agent_id: id,
enrollment_generation: 1,
assignment_version: 1,
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
action: Action::SetServiceState {
unit: "RmmDiscoveryFixtureService".into(),
state: "running".into(),
},
execution_identity: "system".into(),
not_before: now,
start_before: now + chrono::Duration::minutes(5),
max_runtime_seconds: 30,
max_output_bytes: 4096,
};
let caps = vec![
"windows.base/1".into(),
"rmm.sync.v1".into(),
"helper.system.v1".into(),
format!("helper.policy.sha256:{}", "ab".repeat(32)),
format!("helper.binary.sha256:{}", "cd".repeat(32)),
"system:set_service_state".into(),
"set_service_state".into(),
];
(policy, job, caps)
}
#[test]
fn system_permission_and_helper_requirement_are_distinct_from_root() {
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let principal = crate::auth::Principal {
tenant: id,
name: "root-only".into(),
operator: true,
session_hash: None,
csrf: None,
scopes: Some(std::collections::BTreeSet::from(["root:execute".into()])),
testsimulation: false,
identity: None,
tenants: vec![id],
};
assert!(principal.permits_scope(crate::root_policy::execution_permission("root").unwrap()));
assert!(
!principal.permits_scope(crate::root_policy::execution_permission("system").unwrap())
);
assert!(crate::root_policy::needs_helper("system"));
assert!(crate::root_policy::needs_helper("root"));
assert!(!crate::root_policy::needs_helper("agent_service"));
let (policy, job, caps) = fixture();
let mut empty = policy;
empty.scopes.clear();
assert!(!empty.permits("selected", &job, &caps, Utc::now()));
}
#[test]
fn exact_system_scope_never_inherits_root_or_other_device_authority() {
let (policy, job, caps) = fixture();
let now = Utc::now();
assert!(policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
assert!(!policy.permits("root-operator", &job, &caps, now));
for identity in ["root", "agent_service", "SYSTEM"] {
let mut other = job.clone();
other.execution_identity = identity.into();
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &other, &caps, now));
}
for field in ["tenant", "asset", "agent", "enrollment", "assignment"] {
let mut other = job.clone();
match field {
"tenant" => other.tenant_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
"asset" => other.asset_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
"agent" => other.agent_id = Uuid::new_v4(),
"enrollment" => other.enrollment_generation += 1,
_ => other.assignment_version += 1,
}
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &other, &caps, now));
}
for i in 0..caps.len() {
let mut missing = caps.clone();
missing.remove(i);
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &missing, now));
}
let mut mixed = caps.clone();
mixed.push("linux.base/1".into());
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &mixed, now));
let mut wrong = caps.clone();
wrong[4] = format!("helper.binary.sha256:{}", "ef".repeat(32));
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &wrong, now));
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, policy.expires_at));
}
#[test]
fn narrow_scm_ceiling_denies_unreviewed_effects_and_provider_inputs() {
let (mut policy, mut job, caps) = fixture();
let now = Utc::now();
for (unit, state) in [
("RmmDiscoveryWindows", "stopped"),
("RmmDiscoverySystemHelper", "stopped"),
("Spooler", "running"),
("RmmDiscoveryFixtureService", "restarted"),
] {
job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
unit: unit.into(),
state: state.into(),
};
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
}
job.action = Action::RunScript {
interpreter: "powershell".into(),
script_utf8: "Write-Output 'hello'".into(),
arguments: vec![],
expected_stdout: None,
};
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
job.action = Action::SetServiceState {
unit: "RmmDiscoveryFixtureService".into(),
state: "stopped".into(),
};
assert!(policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
job.max_runtime_seconds = 31;
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
job.max_runtime_seconds = 30;
policy.scopes[0].acceptance_evidence_id = Uuid::nil();
assert!(!policy.permits("selected", &job, &caps, now));
let invalid = json!({"schema_version":1,"profile":"development","expires_at":now,"scopes":[],"allow_system_scripts":true});
assert!(serde_json::from_value::<SystemPolicy>(invalid).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn policy_file_refuses_symlinks_public_mode_wrong_owner_and_writable_parent() {
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
let directory = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-windows-policy-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
fs::create_dir(&directory).unwrap();
fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
let path = directory.join("policy.json");
fs::write(&path, b"{}").unwrap();
fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
let owner = fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().uid();
assert_eq!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).unwrap(), b"{}");
assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner.wrapping_add(1)).is_err());
let link = directory.join("link.json");
symlink(&path, &link).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&link, owner).is_err());
fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o640)).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o770)).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
fs::set_permissions(&directory, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
fs::write(&path, vec![b' '; POLICY_LIMIT as usize + 1]).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&path, owner).is_err());
let real = directory.join("real");
let nested = real.join("nested");
fs::create_dir_all(&nested).unwrap();
fs::set_permissions(&nested, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
let data = nested.join("policy.json");
fs::write(&data, b"{}").unwrap();
fs::set_permissions(&data, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
// The immediate parent remains protected throughout. A writable
// ancestor still permits substitution of that entire directory.
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&data, owner).is_err());
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o1777)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(protected_bytes(&data, owner).unwrap(), b"{}");
fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
let alias = directory.join("alias");
symlink(&real, &alias).unwrap();
assert!(protected_bytes(&alias.join("nested/policy.json"), owner).is_err());
fs::remove_dir_all(directory).unwrap();
}
}