Prepare explicit Windows protected key file fixture test
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s

This commit is contained in:
2026-11-15 14:21:16 +01:00
parent 5d6d5b4c01
commit 45b533705d
3 changed files with 169 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -703,4 +703,130 @@ mod tests {
}
std::fs::remove_dir_all(directory).unwrap();
}
/// Deliberately selected fixture-only native I/O, never a default elevated
/// operation. Uses the production KeyFiles implementation; no service,
/// account, impersonation, installed state or network operation is involved.
#[cfg(windows)]
#[test]
#[ignore = "explicit Windows administrator fixture; does not prove LocalService execution"]
fn protected_key_files_create_new_reopen_acl_and_hardlink_guards() {
use std::{fs, os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt, ptr};
use windows_sys::Win32::{
Foundation::LocalFree,
Security::{
Authorization::ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,
CheckTokenMembership, CreateWellKnownSid, SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES,
WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
},
Storage::FileSystem::CreateDirectoryW,
};
// The current token must already be an administrator. This fixture
// never obtains or substitutes a different principal's token.
let mut admin = [0usize; 16];
let mut length = std::mem::size_of_val(&admin) as u32;
let mut member = 0;
assert!(
unsafe {
CreateWellKnownSid(
WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
ptr::null_mut(),
admin.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
&mut length,
)
} != 0
);
assert!(
unsafe {
CheckTokenMembership(ptr::null_mut(), admin.as_mut_ptr().cast(), &mut member)
} != 0
&& member == 1
);
let service_sid = crate::native::service_sid().unwrap();
let create_directory = |path: &std::path::Path, broad: bool| {
let sddl = format!(
"O:BAG:BAD:P(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)(A;OICI;FA;;;{service_sid}){}",
if broad { "(A;OICI;FR;;;BU)" } else { "" }
);
let sddl: Vec<u16> = sddl.encode_utf16().chain(Some(0)).collect();
let mut descriptor = ptr::null_mut();
assert!(
unsafe {
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
sddl.as_ptr(),
1,
&mut descriptor,
ptr::null_mut(),
)
} != 0
);
let wide: Vec<u16> = path.as_os_str().encode_wide().chain(Some(0)).collect();
let attributes = SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
nLength: std::mem::size_of::<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>() as u32,
lpSecurityDescriptor: descriptor,
bInheritHandle: 0,
};
let created = unsafe { CreateDirectoryW(wide.as_ptr(), &attributes) };
unsafe {
LocalFree(descriptor.cast());
}
assert!(created != 0, "fresh protected fixture directory required");
};
let root =
std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-protected-key-fixture-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
create_directory(&root, false);
// On failure retain this isolated case for the operator to inspect;
// successful cleanup addresses only this newly created fixed namespace.
let files = ProtectedKeyFiles::open(&root).unwrap();
// A broad ACL is tested only on an empty, separate fixture directory;
// no private key is ever written there.
let broad = root.join("broad-empty");
create_directory(&broad, true);
let denied = match ProtectedKeyFiles::open(&broad) {
Err(error) => error,
Ok(_) => panic!("broad fixture DACL must be refused"),
};
assert_eq!(denied.to_string(), "PRIVATE_PATH_BROAD_ACL");
fs::remove_dir(broad).unwrap();
let version = Uuid::new_v4();
let key = KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
let pem = key.serialize_pem();
files.create(version, pem.as_bytes()).unwrap();
let path = root.join(format!("device-{version}.key"));
crate::native::private_path(&path, false).unwrap();
let read = files.read(version).unwrap();
// Never put private key bytes into assert_eq's panic formatter.
assert!(read == pem.as_bytes(), "private key bytes changed");
let parsed = KeyPair::from_pem(std::str::from_utf8(&read).unwrap()).unwrap();
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
assert_eq!(
Sha256::digest(parsed.public_key_raw()),
Sha256::digest(key.public_key_raw())
);
let duplicate = files
.create(version, b"must not replace the key")
.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(
duplicate.downcast_ref::<std::io::Error>().unwrap().kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists
);
assert!(files.read(version).unwrap() == pem.as_bytes());
// The actual held directory handle must prevent rename while in use.
assert!(fs::rename(&root, root.with_extension("renamed")).is_err());
drop(files);
let files = ProtectedKeyFiles::open(&root).unwrap();
assert!(files.read(version).unwrap() == pem.as_bytes());
let link = root.join("own-fixture-hardlink");
fs::hard_link(&path, &link).unwrap();
let denied = match files.read(version) {
Err(error) => error,
Ok(_) => panic!("hardlinked private key must be refused"),
};
assert_eq!(denied.to_string(), "ROTATION_FILE_TYPE_OR_LINKS");
fs::remove_file(link).unwrap();
assert!(files.read(version).unwrap() == pem.as_bytes());
drop(files);
fs::remove_file(path).unwrap();
fs::remove_dir(root).unwrap();
}
}