Share signed job core and verify native Linux then Windows contracts
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
Rust development slice / linux (push) Failing after 6s
This commit is contained in:
Generated
+22
@@ -2184,6 +2184,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"prost",
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"prost",
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"rand 0.9.5",
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"rand 0.9.5",
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"reqwest",
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"reqwest",
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"rmm-agent-core",
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"rmm-agent-linux",
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"rmm-agent-linux",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-privileged-helper",
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"rmm-privileged-helper",
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@@ -2199,6 +2200,24 @@ dependencies = [
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"uuid",
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"uuid",
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]
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "rmm-agent-core"
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version = "0.1.0"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"chrono",
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"ed25519-dalek",
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"hex",
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"openssl",
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"prost",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-protocol",
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"rusqlite",
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"serde",
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"serde_json",
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"uuid",
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]
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[[package]]
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[[package]]
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name = "rmm-agent-linux"
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name = "rmm-agent-linux"
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version = "0.1.0"
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version = "0.1.0"
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@@ -2217,6 +2236,7 @@ name = "rmm-agent-windows"
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version = "0.1.0"
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version = "0.1.0"
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dependencies = [
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"anyhow",
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"cc",
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"chrono",
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"chrono",
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"fs2",
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"fs2",
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"futures-util",
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"futures-util",
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@@ -2224,6 +2244,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"rand 0.9.5",
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"rand 0.9.5",
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"rcgen",
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"rcgen",
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"reqwest",
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"reqwest",
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"rmm-agent-core",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-protocol",
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"rmm-protocol",
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"rusqlite",
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"rusqlite",
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@@ -2292,6 +2313,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"hex",
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"hex",
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"libc",
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"libc",
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"openssl",
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"openssl",
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"rmm-agent-core",
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"rmm-agent-linux",
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"rmm-agent-linux",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rmm-domain",
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"rusqlite",
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"rusqlite",
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+1
-1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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[workspace]
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[workspace]
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resolver = "2"
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resolver = "2"
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exclude = ["crates/oidc-auth"]
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exclude = ["crates/oidc-auth"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper"]
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members = ["crates/domain", "crates/protocol", "crates/persistence", "crates/server", "crates/agent-linux", "crates/agent-core", "crates/agent-windows", "crates/agent", "crates/privileged-helper"]
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[workspace.package]
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[workspace.package]
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version = "0.1.0"
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version = "0.1.0"
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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[package]
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name = "rmm-agent-core"
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version.workspace = true
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edition.workspace = true
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license.workspace = true
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[features]
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default = []
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openssl-verifier = ["dep:openssl"]
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[dependencies]
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anyhow.workspace = true
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chrono.workspace = true
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hex.workspace = true
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prost.workspace = true
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serde.workspace = true
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serde_json.workspace = true
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uuid.workspace = true
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rmm-domain = { path = "../domain" }
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rmm-protocol = { path = "../protocol" }
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rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
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ed25519-dalek = "=2.2.0"
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[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
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openssl = { workspace = true, optional = true }
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[target.'cfg(unix)'.dev-dependencies]
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openssl.workspace = true
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@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
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//! Exact historical helper request/binding codecs and signed permit rules.
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use crate::crypto::{DefaultVerifier, Ed25519Verifier};
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use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
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use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
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use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Binding {
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pub tenant_id: Uuid,
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pub asset_id: Uuid,
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pub agent_id: Uuid,
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pub enrollment_generation: u64,
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pub assignment_version: u64,
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pub public_key_hex: String,
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}
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pub type AuthBinding = Binding;
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impl Binding {
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pub fn job(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<JobPayload> {
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ensure!(bytes.len() <= 65536, "JOB_SIZE");
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let j: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
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ensure!(
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j.schema_version == 1
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&& j.tenant_id == self.tenant_id
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&& j.asset_id == self.asset_id
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&& j.agent_id == self.agent_id
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&& j.enrollment_generation == self.enrollment_generation
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&& j.assignment_version == self.assignment_version,
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"IDENTITY_BINDING"
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);
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ensure!(
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j.action.validate()
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&& (1..=3600).contains(&j.max_runtime_seconds)
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&& (1..=262144).contains(&j.max_output_bytes)
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&& j.not_before < j.start_before,
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"INVALID_JOB"
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);
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Ok(j)
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}
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pub fn verify(
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&self,
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request: &Request,
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now: DateTime<Utc>,
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) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
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self.verify_with(request, now, &DefaultVerifier::default())
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}
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pub fn verify_with(
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&self,
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request: &Request,
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now: DateTime<Utc>,
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verifier: &impl Ed25519Verifier,
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) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
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let job = self.job(&request.job_bytes)?;
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ensure!(
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request.permit_bytes.len() <= 8192 && request.signature.len() == 64,
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"PERMIT_SIZE"
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);
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let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
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ensure!(raw.len() == 32, "TRUST_KEY_SIZE");
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ensure!(
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verifier.verify(&raw, &request.permit_bytes, &request.signature)?,
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"INVALID_SIGNATURE"
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);
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let p: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
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ensure!(
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p.domain == "rmm.execution-permit"
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&& p.schema_version == 1
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&& p.key_id == hash(&raw)
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&& !p.grant_id.is_nil()
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&& !p.authorization_id.is_nil(),
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"PERMIT_DOMAIN"
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);
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ensure!(
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p.authorization_id == request.authorization_id
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&& p.plan_hash == request.plan_hash
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&& p.plan_hash.len() == 64
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&& hex::decode(&p.plan_hash)?.len() == 32
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&& p.job_payload_hash == hash(&request.job_bytes)
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&& p.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
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&& p.asset_id == job.asset_id
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&& p.agent_id == job.agent_id
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&& p.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
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&& p.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
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&& p.job_id == job.job_id
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&& p.attempt_id == job.attempt_id
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&& p.action == job.action.name()
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&& p.execution_identity == job.execution_identity
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&& p.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds,
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"PERMIT_BINDING"
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);
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ensure!(
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p.not_before >= job.not_before
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&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
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&& p.not_before < p.start_before
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&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
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&& now >= p.not_before
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&& now < p.start_before,
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"PERMIT_TIME"
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|
);
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Ok((job, p))
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct Request {
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pub job_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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pub permit_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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pub signature: Vec<u8>,
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pub plan_hash: String,
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pub authorization_id: Uuid,
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}
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|
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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|
pub struct Outcome {
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pub state: String,
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pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
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pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
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|
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
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|
pub output_truncated: bool,
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|
pub reboot_required: bool,
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|
pub evidence: serde_json::Value,
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|
pub error_code: String,
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|
}
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|
impl Outcome {
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|
pub fn unknown(code: &str) -> Self {
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|
Self {
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|
state: "unknown".into(),
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|
stdout: vec![],
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|
stderr: vec![],
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|
exit_code: None,
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|
output_truncated: false,
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|
reboot_required: false,
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|
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":false}),
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|
error_code: code.into(),
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|
}
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||||||
|
}
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|
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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|
//! Fixed Ed25519 verification; no algorithm negotiation or trust-key discovery.
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|
use anyhow::Result;
|
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|
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
|
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|
|
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|
pub trait Ed25519Verifier {
|
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|
fn verify(&self, public_key: &[u8], message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool>;
|
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|
}
|
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|
|
||||||
|
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
|
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|
pub struct DalekVerifier;
|
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|
|
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|
impl Ed25519Verifier for DalekVerifier {
|
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|
fn verify(&self, public_key: &[u8], message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool> {
|
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|
let Ok(raw): Result<&[u8; 32], _> = public_key.try_into() else {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(false);
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let Ok(key) = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(raw) else {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(false);
|
||||||
|
};
|
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|
let Ok(signature) = Signature::from_slice(signature) else {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(false);
|
||||||
|
};
|
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|
// Reject weak points and scalar/point malleability. This is raw Ed25519,
|
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|
// never Ed25519ph: the exact stored bytes are the signed message.
|
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|
Ok(key.verify_strict(message, &signature).is_ok())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Existing Linux verifier semantics, retained explicitly during extraction.
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(all(unix, feature = "openssl-verifier"))]
|
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|
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
|
||||||
|
pub struct OpenSslVerifier;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(all(unix, feature = "openssl-verifier"))]
|
||||||
|
impl Ed25519Verifier for OpenSslVerifier {
|
||||||
|
fn verify(&self, public_key: &[u8], message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||||
|
use openssl::{
|
||||||
|
pkey::{Id, PKey},
|
||||||
|
sign::Verifier,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if public_key.len() != 32 || signature.len() != 64 {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(false);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let key = PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(public_key, Id::ED25519)?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(Verifier::new_without_digest(&key)?.verify_oneshot(signature, message)?)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Preserve the existing Linux OpenSSL profile when selected by its adapter;
|
||||||
|
/// Windows never depends on OpenSSL, including workspace feature unification.
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(all(unix, feature = "openssl-verifier"))]
|
||||||
|
pub type DefaultVerifier = OpenSslVerifier;
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(not(all(unix, feature = "openssl-verifier")))]
|
||||||
|
pub type DefaultVerifier = DalekVerifier;
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Durable job persistence without capability discovery or OS execution.
|
||||||
|
//! Caller performs fresh Sync/Clock/permit checks before consuming or executing.
|
||||||
|
use crate::auth::{Binding, Outcome, Request};
|
||||||
|
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||||
|
use prost::Message;
|
||||||
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::{JobPayload, hash};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_protocol::*;
|
||||||
|
use rusqlite::{Connection, OptionalExtension, params};
|
||||||
|
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pub fn accept(
|
||||||
|
db: &Connection,
|
||||||
|
binding: &Binding,
|
||||||
|
offer: &JobOffer,
|
||||||
|
supported: impl FnOnce(&JobPayload) -> bool,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||||
|
let job = binding.job(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
offer.job_id == job.job_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
&& offer.attempt_id == job.attempt_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
&& offer.job_payload_hash == hash(&offer.payload_bytes)
|
||||||
|
&& Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id).is_ok_and(|id| !id.is_nil())
|
||||||
|
&& offer.plan_hash.len() == 64
|
||||||
|
&& hex_hash(&offer.plan_hash),
|
||||||
|
"OFFER_BINDING"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
ensure!(supported(&job), "UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY");
|
||||||
|
let bytes = offer.encode_to_vec();
|
||||||
|
let existing: Option<Vec<u8>> = db
|
||||||
|
.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.optional()?;
|
||||||
|
if let Some(old) = existing {
|
||||||
|
ensure!(old == bytes, "OFFER_CONFLICT");
|
||||||
|
return Ok(false);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let count: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(count < 10000, "JOURNAL_CAPACITY_NEW_EFFECTS_BLOCKED");
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"INSERT INTO job_attempts(job,attempt,offer,state) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,'accepted')",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id, bytes],
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(true)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
fn hex_hash(s: &str) -> bool {
|
||||||
|
s.bytes()
|
||||||
|
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Inspect ONLY at a new process startup, never on a transport reconnect: no
|
||||||
|
/// executor thread from the previous process can still deliver its outcome.
|
||||||
|
/// This does not execute, release consumption or invent a successful outcome.
|
||||||
|
pub fn interrupted(
|
||||||
|
db: &Connection,
|
||||||
|
ledger: &Connection,
|
||||||
|
binding: &Binding,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<Vec<(JobOffer, String)>> {
|
||||||
|
interrupted_with(
|
||||||
|
db,
|
||||||
|
ledger,
|
||||||
|
binding,
|
||||||
|
&crate::crypto::DefaultVerifier::default(),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn interrupted_with(
|
||||||
|
db: &Connection,
|
||||||
|
ledger: &Connection,
|
||||||
|
binding: &Binding,
|
||||||
|
verifier: &impl crate::crypto::Ed25519Verifier,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<Vec<(JobOffer, String)>> {
|
||||||
|
let mut statement = db.prepare(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT offer,grant_id FROM job_attempts WHERE state IN ('requesting','running','verifying') ORDER BY job,attempt",
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
let rows = statement.query_map([], |r| {
|
||||||
|
Ok((r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0)?, r.get::<_, String>(1)?))
|
||||||
|
})?;
|
||||||
|
let mut interrupted = Vec::new();
|
||||||
|
for row in rows {
|
||||||
|
let (bytes, grant) = row?;
|
||||||
|
let offer = JobOffer::decode(bytes.as_slice())?;
|
||||||
|
let job = binding.job(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
offer.job_id == job.job_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
&& offer.attempt_id == job.attempt_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
&& offer.job_payload_hash == hash(&offer.payload_bytes)
|
||||||
|
&& Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id).is_ok_and(|id| !id.is_nil())
|
||||||
|
&& offer.plan_hash.len() == 64
|
||||||
|
&& hex_hash(&offer.plan_hash),
|
||||||
|
"INTERRUPTED_OFFER_BINDING"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
if !grant.is_empty() {
|
||||||
|
let row: Option<(String, u64, String, String, Vec<u8>)> = ledger
|
||||||
|
.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,e.start FROM consumed c JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) WHERE c.grant_id=?1",
|
||||||
|
[&grant],
|
||||||
|
|r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?, r.get(2)?, r.get(3)?, r.get(4)?)),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.optional()?;
|
||||||
|
let (agent, generation, job_id, attempt, start) =
|
||||||
|
row.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("INTERRUPTED_START_EVIDENCE_MISSING"))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
agent == binding.agent_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
&& generation == binding.enrollment_generation
|
||||||
|
&& job_id == offer.job_id
|
||||||
|
&& attempt == offer.attempt_id,
|
||||||
|
"INTERRUPTED_CONSUMPTION_BINDING"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let start: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&start)?;
|
||||||
|
let request: Request = serde_json::from_value(start["request"].clone())?;
|
||||||
|
let permit: rmm_domain::jobs::ExecutionPermitPayload =
|
||||||
|
serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
|
||||||
|
// Verify the historical signed request at its original valid time;
|
||||||
|
// this is evidence only, never permission to start it again.
|
||||||
|
let (_, verified) = binding.verify_with(&request, permit.not_before, verifier)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
verified == permit
|
||||||
|
&& permit.grant_id.to_string() == grant
|
||||||
|
&& request.job_bytes == offer.payload_bytes
|
||||||
|
&& request.plan_hash == offer.plan_hash
|
||||||
|
&& request.authorization_id.to_string() == offer.authorization_id,
|
||||||
|
"INTERRUPTED_START_BINDING"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
// A request may have committed remotely without its reply arriving.
|
||||||
|
// It can only become local unknown, never a fabricated grant/result.
|
||||||
|
let state: String = db.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT state FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(state == "requesting", "INTERRUPTED_RUNNING_GRANT_MISSING");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
interrupted.push((offer, grant));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(interrupted)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pub fn interrupted_request(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"UPDATE job_attempts SET state='unknown',revision=revision+1 WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 AND state='requesting' AND grant_id=''",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
||||||
|
)? == 1,
|
||||||
|
"INTERRUPTED_REQUEST_STATE"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn event(db: &Connection, envelope: &Envelope) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let count: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_events", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(count < 1000, "UNACKNOWLEDGED_EVENT_LIMIT");
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"INSERT INTO job_events(id,payload) VALUES(?1,?2)",
|
||||||
|
params![envelope.message_id, envelope.encode_to_vec()],
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn events(db: &Connection) -> Result<Vec<Envelope>> {
|
||||||
|
let mut statement = db.prepare("SELECT payload FROM job_events ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 100")?;
|
||||||
|
let bytes = statement
|
||||||
|
.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))?
|
||||||
|
.collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
|
||||||
|
bytes
|
||||||
|
.into_iter()
|
||||||
|
.map(|b| Ok(Envelope::decode(b.as_slice())?))
|
||||||
|
.collect()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn ack(db: &mut Connection, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let tx = db.transaction()?;
|
||||||
|
crate::reconcile::archive_events(&tx)?;
|
||||||
|
tx.execute("DELETE FROM job_events WHERE id=?1", [id])?;
|
||||||
|
tx.commit()?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn next(db: &Connection) -> Result<Option<JobOffer>> {
|
||||||
|
next_at(db, chrono::Utc::now())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
/// Scheduling only; the qualified clock/Sync/permit gate still precedes effects.
|
||||||
|
pub fn next_at(db: &Connection, now: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>) -> Result<Option<JobOffer>> {
|
||||||
|
// One device-wide effect at a time; unknown/reserved attempts retain locks.
|
||||||
|
let busy: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state IN ('requesting','running','unknown','awaiting_reboot')", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
if busy != 0 {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(None);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let mut statement = db.prepare("SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE state='accepted' AND cancel_requested=0 ORDER BY rowid")?;
|
||||||
|
let rows = statement.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))?;
|
||||||
|
for bytes in rows {
|
||||||
|
let offer = JobOffer::decode(bytes?.as_slice())?;
|
||||||
|
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
||||||
|
if now >= job.not_before || now >= job.start_before {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(Some(offer));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(None)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn requesting(db: &Connection) -> Result<Option<JobOffer>> {
|
||||||
|
let bytes: Option<Vec<u8>> = db
|
||||||
|
.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE state='requesting' LIMIT 1",
|
||||||
|
[],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.optional()?;
|
||||||
|
bytes
|
||||||
|
.map(|b| Ok(JobOffer::decode(b.as_slice())?))
|
||||||
|
.transpose()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn reserve_request(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
ensure!(db.execute("UPDATE job_attempts SET state='requesting' WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 AND state='accepted' AND cancel_requested=0",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id,offer.attempt_id])? == 1, "ATTEMPT_NOT_STARTABLE");
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn transition(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer, state: &str, grant: &str) -> Result<u64> {
|
||||||
|
let previous: String = db.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT state FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
let allowed = match previous.as_str() {
|
||||||
|
"accepted" | "requesting" => matches!(
|
||||||
|
state,
|
||||||
|
"running" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "expired" | "unknown"
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
"running" | "verifying" => matches!(
|
||||||
|
state,
|
||||||
|
"verifying" | "succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "unknown" | "awaiting_reboot"
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
// Only a definitive completion of the already-running executor calls
|
||||||
|
// this reconciliation path. No new effect is started from unknown.
|
||||||
|
"unknown" | "awaiting_reboot" => matches!(
|
||||||
|
state,
|
||||||
|
"succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "unknown" | "awaiting_reboot"
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
_ => false,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
ensure!(allowed, "INVALID_LOCAL_STATE_TRANSITION");
|
||||||
|
let rev: i64 = db.query_row("UPDATE job_attempts SET state=?3,grant_id=?4,revision=revision+1 WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 RETURNING revision",
|
||||||
|
params![offer.job_id,offer.attempt_id,state,grant], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(u64::try_from(rev)?)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn result(offer: &JobOffer, revision: u64, grant: &str, outcome: Outcome) -> JobResult {
|
||||||
|
JobResult {
|
||||||
|
job_id: offer.job_id.clone(),
|
||||||
|
attempt_id: offer.attempt_id.clone(),
|
||||||
|
revision,
|
||||||
|
state: outcome.state,
|
||||||
|
grant_id: grant.into(),
|
||||||
|
stdout: outcome.stdout,
|
||||||
|
stderr: outcome.stderr,
|
||||||
|
output_truncated: outcome.output_truncated,
|
||||||
|
reboot_required: outcome.reboot_required,
|
||||||
|
exit_code: outcome.exit_code,
|
||||||
|
evidence_json: outcome.evidence.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
error_code: outcome.error_code,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn no_start(state: &str, code: &str) -> Outcome {
|
||||||
|
Outcome {
|
||||||
|
state: state.into(),
|
||||||
|
evidence: serde_json::json!({"not_started":true,"postconditions_passed":false}),
|
||||||
|
..Outcome::unknown(code)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn permit_request(offer: &JobOffer, permit: &ExecutionPermit) -> Result<Request> {
|
||||||
|
Ok(Request {
|
||||||
|
job_bytes: offer.payload_bytes.clone(),
|
||||||
|
permit_bytes: permit.payload_bytes.clone(),
|
||||||
|
signature: permit.signature.clone(),
|
||||||
|
plan_hash: offer.plan_hash.clone(),
|
||||||
|
authorization_id: Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id)?,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Connection-level ledger rules, with OS path/lock/ACL handling left to adapters.
|
||||||
|
use crate::auth::{Outcome, Request};
|
||||||
|
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||||
|
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload};
|
||||||
|
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Finite 1 GiB bound for durable agent/helper history. Unexpected page sizes
|
||||||
|
/// are refused rather than silently multiplying the byte limit. No compaction
|
||||||
|
/// or tombstone deletion occurs here; SQLITE_FULL must still fail closed.
|
||||||
|
pub fn bounded_journal_capacity(db: &rusqlite::Connection) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let page_size: u32 = db.query_row("PRAGMA page_size", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(page_size == 4096, "JOURNAL_PAGE_SIZE_UNSUPPORTED");
|
||||||
|
let maximum: u32 = db.query_row("PRAGMA max_page_count=262144", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(maximum == 262144, "JOURNAL_STORAGE_CAPACITY_BLOCKED");
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// The platform adapter must securely open/lock the file before calling this.
|
||||||
|
/// No file creation, ACL repair or journal reset is performed here.
|
||||||
|
pub fn initialize_ledger(db: &rusqlite::Connection) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
bounded_journal_capacity(db)?;
|
||||||
|
db.execute_batch("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL; PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE;
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS consumed(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, agent TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||||
|
job TEXT NOT NULL, attempt TEXT NOT NULL, result BLOB, UNIQUE(agent,generation,job,attempt));
|
||||||
|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS execution_evidence(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, start BLOB NOT NULL, outcome BLOB);")?;
|
||||||
|
let check: String = db.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(check == "ok", "JOURNAL_INTEGRITY");
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pub fn consume(db: &mut rusqlite::Connection, p: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
|
||||||
|
// Unknown effects retain the global device lock, including across restart.
|
||||||
|
let unresolved: i64 = tx.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
|
||||||
|
[],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get(0),
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(unresolved == 0, "UNRESOLVED_EFFECT_RESOURCE_LOCKED");
|
||||||
|
tx.execute(
|
||||||
|
"INSERT INTO consumed(grant_id,agent,generation,job,attempt) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,?4,?5)",
|
||||||
|
rusqlite::params![
|
||||||
|
p.grant_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
p.agent_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
p.enrollment_generation,
|
||||||
|
p.job_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
p.attempt_id.to_string()
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
tx.commit()?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub fn finish(
|
||||||
|
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
|
||||||
|
p: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
|
||||||
|
outcome: &Outcome,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1",
|
||||||
|
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?],
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
// Unknown / awaiting reboot keep the resource reserved until a real sync
|
||||||
|
// protocol exists. Never unlock on a process exit or a network reconnect.
|
||||||
|
if outcome.state != "unknown" && outcome.state != "awaiting_reboot" {
|
||||||
|
ensure!(
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"UPDATE consumed SET result=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1 AND result IS NULL",
|
||||||
|
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?]
|
||||||
|
)? == 1,
|
||||||
|
"CONSUMPTION_NOT_FOUND"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Persist the original boot and exact signed request BEFORE any reboot/effect.
|
||||||
|
/// Awaiting/unknown outcomes never release consumed.result's resource lock.
|
||||||
|
pub fn save_start(
|
||||||
|
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
|
||||||
|
permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
|
||||||
|
request: &Request,
|
||||||
|
previous_boot_id: Uuid,
|
||||||
|
recorded_at: DateTime<Utc>,
|
||||||
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes)?;
|
||||||
|
ensure!(!previous_boot_id.is_nil(), "ORIGINAL_BOOT_MISSING");
|
||||||
|
let deadline = match job.action {
|
||||||
|
rmm_domain::jobs::Action::Reboot {
|
||||||
|
reconnect_timeout_seconds,
|
||||||
|
..
|
||||||
|
} => Some(recorded_at + chrono::Duration::seconds(reconnect_timeout_seconds.into())),
|
||||||
|
_ => None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let evidence = serde_json::json!({"previous_boot_id":previous_boot_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
"reserved_at":recorded_at,"reconnect_deadline":deadline,"request":request,
|
||||||
|
"reauthentication_required":true,"postconditions_passed":false});
|
||||||
|
db.execute(
|
||||||
|
"INSERT INTO execution_evidence(grant_id,start) VALUES(?1,?2)",
|
||||||
|
rusqlite::params![permit.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(&evidence)?],
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Platform-neutral signed authorization, durable job state and reconciliation.
|
||||||
|
//! This crate performs no OS effects, enrollment, ACL changes or clock bootstrap.
|
||||||
|
//! Callers must authenticate their transport, protect/lock their own journals and
|
||||||
|
//! supply a qualified clock. A successful signature is never UI approval itself.
|
||||||
|
pub mod auth;
|
||||||
|
pub mod crypto;
|
||||||
|
pub mod jobs;
|
||||||
|
pub mod ledger;
|
||||||
|
pub mod reconcile;
|
||||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
|
|||||||
|
//! Signature/codec/consumption contracts, with no transport or OS execution.
|
||||||
|
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
|
||||||
|
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(unix)]
|
||||||
|
use rmm_agent_core::crypto::{DalekVerifier, Ed25519Verifier};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_agent_core::{
|
||||||
|
auth::{Binding, Outcome, Request},
|
||||||
|
jobs, ledger,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, encode, hash};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_protocol::JobOffer;
|
||||||
|
use rusqlite::Connection;
|
||||||
|
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fn fixture() -> (Binding, Request, ExecutionPermitPayload, DateTime<Utc>) {
|
||||||
|
let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[9; 32]);
|
||||||
|
let id = Uuid::from_u128(1);
|
||||||
|
let now = DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339("2026-11-14T00:00:00Z")
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.with_timezone(&Utc);
|
||||||
|
let binding = Binding {
|
||||||
|
tenant_id: id,
|
||||||
|
asset_id: Uuid::from_u128(2),
|
||||||
|
agent_id: Uuid::from_u128(3),
|
||||||
|
enrollment_generation: 2,
|
||||||
|
assignment_version: 4,
|
||||||
|
public_key_hex: hex::encode(key.verifying_key().as_bytes()),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let job = JobPayload {
|
||||||
|
schema_version: 1,
|
||||||
|
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
|
||||||
|
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
|
||||||
|
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
|
||||||
|
enrollment_generation: 2,
|
||||||
|
assignment_version: 4,
|
||||||
|
job_id: Uuid::from_u128(5),
|
||||||
|
attempt_id: Uuid::from_u128(6),
|
||||||
|
action: Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
|
||||||
|
script_utf8: "printf 'Hello\\n'\n".into(),
|
||||||
|
arguments: vec![],
|
||||||
|
expected_stdout: Some("Hello\n".into()),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
execution_identity: "agent_service".into(),
|
||||||
|
not_before: now - Duration::minutes(1),
|
||||||
|
start_before: now + Duration::minutes(5),
|
||||||
|
max_runtime_seconds: 10,
|
||||||
|
max_output_bytes: 4096,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let job_bytes = encode(&job).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let permit = ExecutionPermitPayload {
|
||||||
|
domain: "rmm.execution-permit".into(),
|
||||||
|
schema_version: 1,
|
||||||
|
grant_id: Uuid::from_u128(7),
|
||||||
|
authorization_id: Uuid::from_u128(8),
|
||||||
|
tenant_id: binding.tenant_id,
|
||||||
|
asset_id: binding.asset_id,
|
||||||
|
agent_id: binding.agent_id,
|
||||||
|
enrollment_generation: 2,
|
||||||
|
assignment_version: 4,
|
||||||
|
job_id: job.job_id,
|
||||||
|
attempt_id: job.attempt_id,
|
||||||
|
plan_hash: hash(b"immutable approved plan"),
|
||||||
|
job_payload_hash: hash(&job_bytes),
|
||||||
|
action: job.action.name().into(),
|
||||||
|
execution_identity: job.execution_identity,
|
||||||
|
max_runtime_seconds: 10,
|
||||||
|
not_before: now - Duration::seconds(1),
|
||||||
|
start_before: now + Duration::seconds(59),
|
||||||
|
key_id: hash(key.verifying_key().as_bytes()),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let permit_bytes = encode(&permit).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let signature = key.sign(&permit_bytes).to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||||
|
let request = Request {
|
||||||
|
job_bytes,
|
||||||
|
permit_bytes,
|
||||||
|
signature,
|
||||||
|
plan_hash: permit.plan_hash.clone(),
|
||||||
|
authorization_id: permit.authorization_id,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
(binding, request, permit, now)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn historical_request_and_binding_codecs_keep_field_order_arrays_and_strictness() {
|
||||||
|
let request = Request {
|
||||||
|
job_bytes: vec![0, 255],
|
||||||
|
permit_bytes: vec![1],
|
||||||
|
signature: vec![2],
|
||||||
|
plan_hash: "ab".into(),
|
||||||
|
authorization_id: Uuid::nil(),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let expected = r#"{"job_bytes":[0,255],"permit_bytes":[1],"signature":[2],"plan_hash":"ab","authorization_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}"#;
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_vec(&request).unwrap(), expected.as_bytes());
|
||||||
|
let parsed: Request = serde_json::from_str(expected).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&parsed).unwrap(), expected);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
serde_json::from_str::<Request>(
|
||||||
|
&expected.replace("\"job_bytes\"", "\"extra\":0,\"job_bytes\"")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.is_err()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let binding = Binding {
|
||||||
|
tenant_id: Uuid::nil(),
|
||||||
|
asset_id: Uuid::nil(),
|
||||||
|
agent_id: Uuid::nil(),
|
||||||
|
enrollment_generation: 1,
|
||||||
|
assignment_version: 2,
|
||||||
|
public_key_hex: "key".into(),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
serde_json::to_string(&binding).unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
r#"{"tenant_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","asset_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","agent_id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","enrollment_generation":1,"assignment_version":2,"public_key_hex":"key"}"#
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn exact_permit_bytes_time_and_all_identity_hash_bindings_are_required() {
|
||||||
|
let (binding, request, permit, now) = fixture();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(binding.verify(&request, now).unwrap().1, permit);
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&request, permit.not_before).is_ok());
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
binding
|
||||||
|
.verify(&request, permit.not_before - Duration::nanoseconds(1))
|
||||||
|
.is_err()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&request, permit.start_before).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[9; 32]);
|
||||||
|
let value = serde_json::to_value(&permit).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
for (field, replacement) in [
|
||||||
|
("domain", serde_json::json!("rmm.reconciliation-decision")),
|
||||||
|
("schema_version", serde_json::json!(2)),
|
||||||
|
("tenant_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("asset_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("agent_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("enrollment_generation", serde_json::json!(3)),
|
||||||
|
("assignment_version", serde_json::json!(5)),
|
||||||
|
("job_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("attempt_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("authorization_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::new_v4())),
|
||||||
|
("plan_hash", serde_json::json!(hash(b"other plan"))),
|
||||||
|
(
|
||||||
|
"job_payload_hash",
|
||||||
|
serde_json::json!(hash(b"different bytes")),
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
("action", serde_json::json!("reboot")),
|
||||||
|
("execution_identity", serde_json::json!("root")),
|
||||||
|
("max_runtime_seconds", serde_json::json!(11)),
|
||||||
|
("key_id", serde_json::json!(hash(b"otherkey"))),
|
||||||
|
("grant_id", serde_json::json!(Uuid::nil())),
|
||||||
|
(
|
||||||
|
"start_before",
|
||||||
|
serde_json::json!(now + Duration::seconds(60)),
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
] {
|
||||||
|
let mut value = value.clone();
|
||||||
|
value[field] = replacement;
|
||||||
|
let changed: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_value(value).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let mut changed_request = request.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed_request.permit_bytes = encode(&changed).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
changed_request.signature = key.sign(&changed_request.permit_bytes).to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&changed_request, now).is_err(), "{field}");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = request.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed.job_bytes.push(b' ');
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&changed, now).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = request.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed.signature[0] ^= 1;
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&changed, now).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = request;
|
||||||
|
changed.signature.truncate(63);
|
||||||
|
assert!(binding.verify(&changed, now).is_err());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(unix)]
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn openssl_and_portable_ed25519_agree_on_current_keys_bytes_and_tampering() {
|
||||||
|
use openssl::{
|
||||||
|
pkey::PKey,
|
||||||
|
sign::{Signer as OpenSigner, Verifier},
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let key = PKey::generate_ed25519().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let public = key.raw_public_key().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let bytes = b"exact stored signed payload\r\n";
|
||||||
|
let signature = OpenSigner::new_without_digest(&key)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.sign_oneshot_to_vec(bytes)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let verify_openssl = |message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]| {
|
||||||
|
Verifier::new_without_digest(&key)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.verify_oneshot(signature, message)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_or(false)
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
for message in [bytes.as_slice(), b"exact stored signed payload\n", b""] {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
DalekVerifier.verify(&public, message, &signature).unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
verify_openssl(message, &signature)
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = signature.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed[0] ^= 1;
|
||||||
|
for signature in [&signature[..], &changed[..], &signature[..63]] {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
DalekVerifier.verify(&public, bytes, signature).unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
verify_openssl(bytes, signature)
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert!(!DalekVerifier.verify(&[0; 32], bytes, &[0; 64]).unwrap());
|
||||||
|
assert!(!DalekVerifier.verify(&[0; 31], bytes, &signature).unwrap());
|
||||||
|
// Reverse direction uses raw Ed25519, never prehashes the message.
|
||||||
|
let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[11; 32]);
|
||||||
|
let p = PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(
|
||||||
|
signing.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
|
||||||
|
openssl::pkey::Id::ED25519,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
Verifier::new_without_digest(&p)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.verify_oneshot(&signing.sign(bytes).to_bytes(), bytes)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn consumed_attempt_and_unknown_lock_survive_reopen_without_reexecution() {
|
||||||
|
let (_, request, permit, now) = fixture();
|
||||||
|
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("rmm-core-ledger-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
let mut db = Connection::open(&path).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
ledger::initialize_ledger(&db).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
ledger::consume(&mut db, &permit).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
ledger::save_start(&db, &permit, &request, Uuid::from_u128(9), now).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
ledger::finish(&db, &permit, &Outcome::unknown("EFFECT_UNKNOWN")).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
let mut db = Connection::open(&path).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
ledger::initialize_ledger(&db).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert!(ledger::consume(&mut db, &permit).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut replacement = permit.clone();
|
||||||
|
replacement.grant_id = Uuid::new_v4();
|
||||||
|
assert!(ledger::consume(&mut db, &replacement).is_err());
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
db.query_row(
|
||||||
|
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
|
||||||
|
[],
|
||||||
|
|r| r.get::<_, u32>(0)
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
db.query_row("PRAGMA max_page_count", [], |r| r.get::<_, u32>(0))
|
||||||
|
.unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
262144
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
std::fs::remove_file(path).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn portable_acceptance_requires_platform_capability_and_exact_redelivery() {
|
||||||
|
let (binding, request, permit, _) = fixture();
|
||||||
|
let offer = JobOffer {
|
||||||
|
job_id: permit.job_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
attempt_id: permit.attempt_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
payload_bytes: request.job_bytes,
|
||||||
|
job_payload_hash: permit.job_payload_hash,
|
||||||
|
plan_hash: permit.plan_hash,
|
||||||
|
authorization_id: permit.authorization_id.to_string(),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let db = Connection::open_in_memory().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
db.execute_batch("CREATE TABLE job_attempts(job TEXT,attempt TEXT,offer BLOB,state TEXT,revision INTEGER DEFAULT 0,grant_id TEXT DEFAULT '',cancel_requested INTEGER DEFAULT 0,PRIMARY KEY(job,attempt))").unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::accept(&db, &binding, &offer, |_| false).is_err());
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts", [], |r| r
|
||||||
|
.get::<_, u32>(0))
|
||||||
|
.unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
0
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::accept(&db, &binding, &offer, |_| true).unwrap());
|
||||||
|
assert!(!jobs::accept(&db, &binding, &offer, |_| true).unwrap());
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = offer.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed.authorization_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::accept(&db, &binding, &changed, |_| true).is_err());
|
||||||
|
jobs::reserve_request(&db, &offer).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::reserve_request(&db, &offer).is_err());
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(jobs::transition(&db, &offer, "unknown", "").unwrap(), 1);
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::next(&db).unwrap().is_none());
|
||||||
|
assert!(jobs::transition(&db, &offer, "running", "").is_err());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -20,10 +20,14 @@ tokio.workspace = true
|
|||||||
tokio-tungstenite.workspace = true
|
tokio-tungstenite.workspace = true
|
||||||
uuid.workspace = true
|
uuid.workspace = true
|
||||||
rmm-domain = { path = "../domain" }
|
rmm-domain = { path = "../domain" }
|
||||||
|
rmm-agent-core = { path = "../agent-core" }
|
||||||
rmm-protocol = { path = "../protocol" }
|
rmm-protocol = { path = "../protocol" }
|
||||||
rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
|
rusqlite = { version = "0.32.1", features = ["bundled"] }
|
||||||
fs2 = "0.4.3"
|
fs2 = "0.4.3"
|
||||||
rcgen = { version = "=0.14.10", default-features = false, features = ["crypto", "ring", "pem"] }
|
rcgen = { version = "=0.14.10", default-features = false, features = ["crypto", "ring", "pem"] }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
[build-dependencies]
|
||||||
|
cc = "=1.11.1"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
|
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
|
||||||
windows-sys = { version = "0.61.2", features = ["Win32_Foundation", "Win32_Security", "Win32_Security_Authorization", "Win32_Storage_FileSystem", "Win32_System_SystemInformation", "Win32_System_Registry", "Win32_System_Memory", "Win32_System_Services", "Win32_System_Threading"] }
|
windows-sys = { version = "0.61.2", features = ["Win32_Foundation", "Win32_Security", "Win32_Security_Authorization", "Win32_Storage_FileSystem", "Win32_System_IO", "Win32_System_JobObjects", "Win32_System_Pipes", "Win32_System_SystemInformation", "Win32_System_Registry", "Win32_System_Memory", "Win32_System_Services", "Win32_System_Threading"] }
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ edition.workspace = true
|
|||||||
license.workspace = true
|
license.workspace = true
|
||||||
default-run = "rmm-agent"
|
default-run = "rmm-agent"
|
||||||
[dependencies]
|
[dependencies]
|
||||||
|
rmm-agent-core = { path = "../agent-core", features = ["openssl-verifier"] }
|
||||||
anyhow.workspace = true
|
anyhow.workspace = true
|
||||||
chrono.workspace = true
|
chrono.workspace = true
|
||||||
futures-util.workspace = true
|
futures-util.workspace = true
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+14
-248
@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
|
|||||||
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
use anyhow::{Result, ensure};
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||||
use prost::Message;
|
use prost::Message;
|
||||||
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, JobPayload, hash};
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||||
use rmm_privileged_helper::{Binding, Outcome, Request};
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::hash;
|
||||||
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::{Action, JobPayload};
|
||||||
|
use rmm_privileged_helper::{Binding, Outcome};
|
||||||
use rmm_protocol::*;
|
use rmm_protocol::*;
|
||||||
use rusqlite::{Connection, OptionalExtension, params};
|
use rusqlite::Connection;
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn supported(job: &JobPayload) -> bool {
|
pub fn supported(job: &JobPayload) -> bool {
|
||||||
@@ -53,242 +57,14 @@ fn supported_as(job: &JobPayload, uid: u32, helper_configured: bool) -> bool {
|
|||||||
_ => false,
|
_ => false,
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
pub use rmm_agent_core::jobs::{
|
||||||
|
ack, event, events, interrupted, interrupted_request, next, no_start, permit_request,
|
||||||
|
requesting, reserve_request, result, transition,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
pub fn accept(db: &Connection, binding: &Binding, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<bool> {
|
pub fn accept(db: &Connection, binding: &Binding, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||||
let job = binding.job(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
rmm_agent_core::jobs::accept(db, binding, offer, |job| {
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
supported_with_binding(job, Some(binding))
|
||||||
offer.job_id == job.job_id.to_string()
|
})
|
||||||
&& offer.attempt_id == job.attempt_id.to_string()
|
|
||||||
&& offer.job_payload_hash == hash(&offer.payload_bytes)
|
|
||||||
&& Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id).is_ok_and(|id| !id.is_nil())
|
|
||||||
&& offer.plan_hash.len() == 64
|
|
||||||
&& hex_hash(&offer.plan_hash),
|
|
||||||
"OFFER_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
supported_with_binding(&job, Some(binding)),
|
|
||||||
"UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
let bytes = offer.encode_to_vec();
|
|
||||||
let existing: Option<Vec<u8>> = db
|
|
||||||
.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
|
||||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
.optional()?;
|
|
||||||
if let Some(old) = existing {
|
|
||||||
ensure!(old == bytes, "OFFER_CONFLICT");
|
|
||||||
return Ok(false);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
let count: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(count < 10000, "JOURNAL_CAPACITY_NEW_EFFECTS_BLOCKED");
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"INSERT INTO job_attempts(job,attempt,offer,state) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,'accepted')",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id, bytes],
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(true)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
fn hex_hash(s: &str) -> bool {
|
|
||||||
s.bytes()
|
|
||||||
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&b))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Inspect ONLY at a new process startup, never on a transport reconnect: no
|
|
||||||
/// executor thread from the previous process can still deliver its outcome.
|
|
||||||
/// This does not execute, release consumption or invent a successful outcome.
|
|
||||||
pub fn interrupted(
|
|
||||||
db: &Connection,
|
|
||||||
ledger: &Connection,
|
|
||||||
binding: &Binding,
|
|
||||||
) -> Result<Vec<(JobOffer, String)>> {
|
|
||||||
let mut statement = db.prepare(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT offer,grant_id FROM job_attempts WHERE state IN ('requesting','running','verifying') ORDER BY job,attempt",
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
let rows = statement.query_map([], |r| {
|
|
||||||
Ok((r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0)?, r.get::<_, String>(1)?))
|
|
||||||
})?;
|
|
||||||
let mut interrupted = Vec::new();
|
|
||||||
for row in rows {
|
|
||||||
let (bytes, grant) = row?;
|
|
||||||
let offer = JobOffer::decode(bytes.as_slice())?;
|
|
||||||
let job = binding.job(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
offer.job_id == job.job_id.to_string()
|
|
||||||
&& offer.attempt_id == job.attempt_id.to_string()
|
|
||||||
&& offer.job_payload_hash == hash(&offer.payload_bytes)
|
|
||||||
&& Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id).is_ok_and(|id| !id.is_nil())
|
|
||||||
&& offer.plan_hash.len() == 64
|
|
||||||
&& hex_hash(&offer.plan_hash),
|
|
||||||
"INTERRUPTED_OFFER_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
if !grant.is_empty() {
|
|
||||||
let row: Option<(String, u64, String, String, Vec<u8>)> = ledger
|
|
||||||
.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT c.agent,c.generation,c.job,c.attempt,e.start FROM consumed c JOIN execution_evidence e USING(grant_id) WHERE c.grant_id=?1",
|
|
||||||
[&grant],
|
|
||||||
|r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?, r.get(2)?, r.get(3)?, r.get(4)?)),
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
.optional()?;
|
|
||||||
let (agent, generation, job_id, attempt, start) =
|
|
||||||
row.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("INTERRUPTED_START_EVIDENCE_MISSING"))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
agent == binding.agent_id.to_string()
|
|
||||||
&& generation == binding.enrollment_generation
|
|
||||||
&& job_id == offer.job_id
|
|
||||||
&& attempt == offer.attempt_id,
|
|
||||||
"INTERRUPTED_CONSUMPTION_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
let start: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&start)?;
|
|
||||||
let request: Request = serde_json::from_value(start["request"].clone())?;
|
|
||||||
let permit: rmm_domain::jobs::ExecutionPermitPayload =
|
|
||||||
serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
// Verify the historical signed request at its original valid time;
|
|
||||||
// this is evidence only, never permission to start it again.
|
|
||||||
let (_, verified) = binding.verify(&request, permit.not_before)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
verified == permit
|
|
||||||
&& permit.grant_id.to_string() == grant
|
|
||||||
&& request.job_bytes == offer.payload_bytes
|
|
||||||
&& request.plan_hash == offer.plan_hash
|
|
||||||
&& request.authorization_id.to_string() == offer.authorization_id,
|
|
||||||
"INTERRUPTED_START_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
// A request may have committed remotely without its reply arriving.
|
|
||||||
// It can only become local unknown, never a fabricated grant/result.
|
|
||||||
let state: String = db.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT state FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
|
||||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(state == "requesting", "INTERRUPTED_RUNNING_GRANT_MISSING");
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
interrupted.push((offer, grant));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
Ok(interrupted)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn interrupted_request(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"UPDATE job_attempts SET state='unknown',revision=revision+1 WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 AND state='requesting' AND grant_id=''",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
|
||||||
)? == 1,
|
|
||||||
"INTERRUPTED_REQUEST_STATE"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn event(db: &Connection, envelope: &Envelope) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
let count: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_events", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(count < 1000, "UNACKNOWLEDGED_EVENT_LIMIT");
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"INSERT INTO job_events(id,payload) VALUES(?1,?2)",
|
|
||||||
params![envelope.message_id, envelope.encode_to_vec()],
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn events(db: &Connection) -> Result<Vec<Envelope>> {
|
|
||||||
let mut statement = db.prepare("SELECT payload FROM job_events ORDER BY rowid LIMIT 100")?;
|
|
||||||
let bytes = statement
|
|
||||||
.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))?
|
|
||||||
.collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
|
|
||||||
bytes
|
|
||||||
.into_iter()
|
|
||||||
.map(|b| Ok(Envelope::decode(b.as_slice())?))
|
|
||||||
.collect()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn ack(db: &mut Connection, id: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
let tx = db.transaction()?;
|
|
||||||
crate::reconcile::archive_events(&tx)?;
|
|
||||||
tx.execute("DELETE FROM job_events WHERE id=?1", [id])?;
|
|
||||||
tx.commit()?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn next(db: &Connection) -> Result<Option<JobOffer>> {
|
|
||||||
// One device-wide effect at a time; unknown/reserved attempts retain locks.
|
|
||||||
let busy: i64 = db.query_row("SELECT count(*) FROM job_attempts WHERE state IN ('requesting','running','unknown','awaiting_reboot')", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
if busy != 0 {
|
|
||||||
return Ok(None);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
let mut statement = db.prepare("SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE state='accepted' AND cancel_requested=0 ORDER BY rowid")?;
|
|
||||||
let rows = statement.query_map([], |r| r.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(0))?;
|
|
||||||
let now = chrono::Utc::now();
|
|
||||||
for bytes in rows {
|
|
||||||
let offer = JobOffer::decode(bytes?.as_slice())?;
|
|
||||||
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&offer.payload_bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
if now >= job.not_before || now >= job.start_before {
|
|
||||||
return Ok(Some(offer));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
Ok(None)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn requesting(db: &Connection) -> Result<Option<JobOffer>> {
|
|
||||||
let bytes: Option<Vec<u8>> = db
|
|
||||||
.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT offer FROM job_attempts WHERE state='requesting' LIMIT 1",
|
|
||||||
[],
|
|
||||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
.optional()?;
|
|
||||||
bytes
|
|
||||||
.map(|b| Ok(JobOffer::decode(b.as_slice())?))
|
|
||||||
.transpose()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn reserve_request(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
ensure!(db.execute("UPDATE job_attempts SET state='requesting' WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 AND state='accepted' AND cancel_requested=0",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id,offer.attempt_id])? == 1, "ATTEMPT_NOT_STARTABLE");
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn transition(db: &Connection, offer: &JobOffer, state: &str, grant: &str) -> Result<u64> {
|
|
||||||
let previous: String = db.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT state FROM job_attempts WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id, offer.attempt_id],
|
|
||||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
let allowed = match previous.as_str() {
|
|
||||||
"accepted" | "requesting" => matches!(
|
|
||||||
state,
|
|
||||||
"running" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "expired" | "unknown"
|
|
||||||
),
|
|
||||||
"running" | "verifying" => matches!(
|
|
||||||
state,
|
|
||||||
"verifying" | "succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "unknown" | "awaiting_reboot"
|
|
||||||
),
|
|
||||||
// Only a definitive completion of the already-running executor calls
|
|
||||||
// this reconciliation path. No new effect is started from unknown.
|
|
||||||
"unknown" | "awaiting_reboot" => matches!(
|
|
||||||
state,
|
|
||||||
"succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" | "unknown" | "awaiting_reboot"
|
|
||||||
),
|
|
||||||
_ => false,
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
ensure!(allowed, "INVALID_LOCAL_STATE_TRANSITION");
|
|
||||||
let rev: i64 = db.query_row("UPDATE job_attempts SET state=?3,grant_id=?4,revision=revision+1 WHERE job=?1 AND attempt=?2 RETURNING revision",
|
|
||||||
params![offer.job_id,offer.attempt_id,state,grant], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(u64::try_from(rev)?)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn result(offer: &JobOffer, revision: u64, grant: &str, outcome: Outcome) -> JobResult {
|
|
||||||
JobResult {
|
|
||||||
job_id: offer.job_id.clone(),
|
|
||||||
attempt_id: offer.attempt_id.clone(),
|
|
||||||
revision,
|
|
||||||
state: outcome.state,
|
|
||||||
grant_id: grant.into(),
|
|
||||||
stdout: outcome.stdout,
|
|
||||||
stderr: outcome.stderr,
|
|
||||||
output_truncated: outcome.output_truncated,
|
|
||||||
reboot_required: outcome.reboot_required,
|
|
||||||
exit_code: outcome.exit_code,
|
|
||||||
evidence_json: outcome.evidence.to_string(),
|
|
||||||
error_code: outcome.error_code,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn no_start(state: &str, code: &str) -> Outcome {
|
|
||||||
Outcome {
|
|
||||||
state: state.into(),
|
|
||||||
evidence: serde_json::json!({"not_started":true,"postconditions_passed":false}),
|
|
||||||
..Outcome::unknown(code)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
pub fn execute(job: &JobPayload) -> Outcome {
|
pub fn execute(job: &JobPayload) -> Outcome {
|
||||||
let result = match &job.action {
|
let result = match &job.action {
|
||||||
@@ -397,16 +173,6 @@ fn query_logs(job: &JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
|
|||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
pub fn permit_request(offer: &JobOffer, permit: &ExecutionPermit) -> Result<Request> {
|
|
||||||
Ok(Request {
|
|
||||||
job_bytes: offer.payload_bytes.clone(),
|
|
||||||
permit_bytes: permit.payload_bytes.clone(),
|
|
||||||
signature: permit.signature.clone(),
|
|
||||||
plan_hash: offer.plan_hash.clone(),
|
|
||||||
authorization_id: Uuid::parse_str(&offer.authorization_id)?,
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// With no backend SyncResponse contract, a reconnect/restart cannot prove an
|
/// With no backend SyncResponse contract, a reconnect/restart cannot prove an
|
||||||
/// earlier reservation never started. Telemetry and evidence replay continue;
|
/// earlier reservation never started. Telemetry and evidence replay continue;
|
||||||
/// all new effects stop. Do not paper over this with a new start request.
|
/// all new effects stop. Do not paper over this with a new start request.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+4
-1212
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+121
-2
@@ -100,7 +100,10 @@ impl Action {
|
|||||||
arguments,
|
arguments,
|
||||||
expected_stdout,
|
expected_stdout,
|
||||||
} => {
|
} => {
|
||||||
matches!(interpreter.as_str(), "posix_sh" | "bash")
|
matches!(interpreter.as_str(), "posix_sh" | "bash" | "powershell")
|
||||||
|
&& (interpreter != "powershell"
|
||||||
|
|| script_utf8.is_ascii()
|
||||||
|
|| script_utf8.starts_with('\u{feff}'))
|
||||||
&& !script_utf8.is_empty()
|
&& !script_utf8.is_empty()
|
||||||
&& script_utf8.len() <= 32768
|
&& script_utf8.len() <= 32768
|
||||||
&& !script_utf8.contains('\0')
|
&& !script_utf8.contains('\0')
|
||||||
@@ -110,7 +113,9 @@ impl Action {
|
|||||||
.all(|a| a.len() <= 4096 && !a.contains('\0'))
|
.all(|a| a.len() <= 4096 && !a.contains('\0'))
|
||||||
&& expected_stdout.as_ref().is_none_or(|s| s.len() <= 65536)
|
&& expected_stdout.as_ref().is_none_or(|s| s.len() <= 65536)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
Self::RefreshInventory { scope } => scope == "linux.base",
|
Self::RefreshInventory { scope } => {
|
||||||
|
matches!(scope.as_str(), "linux.base" | "windows.base")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Self::QueryLogs {
|
Self::QueryLogs {
|
||||||
unit: u,
|
unit: u,
|
||||||
since,
|
since,
|
||||||
@@ -193,6 +198,45 @@ impl Action {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
/// Interpreter identity is part of the immutable action, never inferred at execution.
|
||||||
|
pub fn script_platform(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||||||
|
match self {
|
||||||
|
Self::RunScript { interpreter, .. } => match interpreter.as_str() {
|
||||||
|
"posix_sh" | "bash" => Some("linux"),
|
||||||
|
"powershell" => Some("windows"),
|
||||||
|
_ => None,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
_ => None,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
/// Shared plan/revalidation/start gate. Passive Windows never implies job support.
|
||||||
|
pub fn available_for(&self, identity: &str, capabilities: &[String]) -> bool {
|
||||||
|
let has = |cap: &str| capabilities.iter().any(|c| c == cap);
|
||||||
|
if !has(self.name()) {
|
||||||
|
return false;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
match self {
|
||||||
|
Self::RunScript { interpreter, .. } if interpreter == "powershell" => {
|
||||||
|
identity == "agent_service"
|
||||||
|
&& has("windows.base/1")
|
||||||
|
&& !has("linux.base/1")
|
||||||
|
&& has("rmm.sync.v1")
|
||||||
|
&& has("script.powershell/1")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Self::RunScript { .. } => {
|
||||||
|
self.script_platform() == Some("linux")
|
||||||
|
&& has("linux.base/1")
|
||||||
|
&& !has("windows.base/1")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Self::RefreshInventory { scope } => {
|
||||||
|
(identity == "agent_service" || scope == "linux.base")
|
||||||
|
&& has(&format!("{scope}/1"))
|
||||||
|
&& !(has("linux.base/1") && has("windows.base/1"))
|
||||||
|
&& (scope != "windows.base" || has("rmm.sync.v1"))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
_ => !has("windows.base/1"), // Windows adapters are separately qualified.
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
pub fn resource(&self) -> &'static str {
|
pub fn resource(&self) -> &'static str {
|
||||||
match self {
|
match self {
|
||||||
Self::EnsurePackage { .. }
|
Self::EnsurePackage { .. }
|
||||||
@@ -387,6 +431,81 @@ impl JobState {
|
|||||||
mod tests {
|
mod tests {
|
||||||
use super::*;
|
use super::*;
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn windows_interpreter_and_capability_contract() {
|
||||||
|
let mut action = Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter: "powershell".into(),
|
||||||
|
script_utf8: "Write-Output 'Hello'\r\n".into(),
|
||||||
|
arguments: vec![],
|
||||||
|
expected_stdout: Some("Hello\r\n".into()),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let caps: Vec<String> = [
|
||||||
|
"windows.base/1",
|
||||||
|
"rmm.sync.v1",
|
||||||
|
"run_script",
|
||||||
|
"script.powershell/1",
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
.into_iter()
|
||||||
|
.map(str::to_string)
|
||||||
|
.collect();
|
||||||
|
assert!(action.validate());
|
||||||
|
assert!(action.available_for("agent_service", &caps));
|
||||||
|
for missing in 0..caps.len() {
|
||||||
|
let mut short = caps.clone();
|
||||||
|
short.remove(missing);
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for("agent_service", &short));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for("root", &caps));
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for("SYSTEM", &caps));
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for(
|
||||||
|
"agent_service",
|
||||||
|
&["linux.base/1".into(), "run_script".into()]
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
let mut both = caps.clone();
|
||||||
|
both.push("linux.base/1".into());
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for("agent_service", &both));
|
||||||
|
if let Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter,
|
||||||
|
script_utf8,
|
||||||
|
..
|
||||||
|
} = &mut action
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
*script_utf8 = "Write-Output 'é'".into();
|
||||||
|
assert!(interpreter == "powershell");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.validate());
|
||||||
|
if let Action::RunScript { script_utf8, .. } = &mut action {
|
||||||
|
*script_utf8 = "\u{feff}Write-Output 'é'\r\n".into();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert!(action.validate());
|
||||||
|
let bytes = encode(&action).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(serde_json::from_slice::<Action>(&bytes).unwrap(), action);
|
||||||
|
if let Action::RunScript { interpreter, .. } = &mut action {
|
||||||
|
*interpreter = "pwsh".into();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.validate());
|
||||||
|
assert!(!action.available_for("agent_service", &caps));
|
||||||
|
let refresh = Action::RefreshInventory {
|
||||||
|
scope: "windows.base".into(),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
assert!(refresh.validate());
|
||||||
|
assert!(refresh.available_for(
|
||||||
|
"agent_service",
|
||||||
|
&[
|
||||||
|
"windows.base/1".into(),
|
||||||
|
"rmm.sync.v1".into(),
|
||||||
|
"refresh_inventory".into()
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
assert!(!refresh.available_for(
|
||||||
|
"root",
|
||||||
|
&[
|
||||||
|
"windows.base/1".into(),
|
||||||
|
"rmm.sync.v1".into(),
|
||||||
|
"refresh_inventory".into()
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
fn codec_golden_and_exact_script_bytes() {
|
fn codec_golden_and_exact_script_bytes() {
|
||||||
let a = Action::RunScript {
|
let a = Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
|
interpreter: "posix_sh".into(),
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ edition.workspace = true
|
|||||||
license.workspace = true
|
license.workspace = true
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[dependencies]
|
[dependencies]
|
||||||
|
rmm-agent-core = { path = "../agent-core", features = ["openssl-verifier"] }
|
||||||
anyhow.workspace = true
|
anyhow.workspace = true
|
||||||
chrono.workspace = true
|
chrono.workspace = true
|
||||||
hex.workspace = true
|
hex.workspace = true
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -11,10 +11,7 @@ pub mod reconcile;
|
|||||||
mod tests;
|
mod tests;
|
||||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
|
use anyhow::{Context, Result, ensure};
|
||||||
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
|
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
|
||||||
use openssl::{
|
use openssl::pkey::{Id, PKey};
|
||||||
pkey::{Id, PKey},
|
|
||||||
sign::Verifier,
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
|
use rmm_domain::jobs::{ExecutionPermitPayload, JobPayload, hash};
|
||||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||||
use std::{fs, os::unix::fs::MetadataExt, path::Path};
|
use std::{fs, os::unix::fs::MetadataExt, path::Path};
|
||||||
@@ -50,130 +47,7 @@ impl SigningKey {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
pub use rmm_agent_core::auth::{Binding, Outcome, Request};
|
||||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
|
||||||
pub struct Binding {
|
|
||||||
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
|
|
||||||
pub asset_id: Uuid,
|
|
||||||
pub agent_id: Uuid,
|
|
||||||
pub enrollment_generation: u64,
|
|
||||||
pub assignment_version: u64,
|
|
||||||
pub public_key_hex: String,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
impl Binding {
|
|
||||||
pub fn job(&self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<JobPayload> {
|
|
||||||
ensure!(bytes.len() <= 65536, "JOB_SIZE");
|
|
||||||
let j: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
j.schema_version == 1
|
|
||||||
&& j.tenant_id == self.tenant_id
|
|
||||||
&& j.asset_id == self.asset_id
|
|
||||||
&& j.agent_id == self.agent_id
|
|
||||||
&& j.enrollment_generation == self.enrollment_generation
|
|
||||||
&& j.assignment_version == self.assignment_version,
|
|
||||||
"IDENTITY_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
j.action.validate()
|
|
||||||
&& (1..=3600).contains(&j.max_runtime_seconds)
|
|
||||||
&& (1..=262144).contains(&j.max_output_bytes)
|
|
||||||
&& j.not_before < j.start_before,
|
|
||||||
"INVALID_JOB"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
Ok(j)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn verify(
|
|
||||||
&self,
|
|
||||||
request: &Request,
|
|
||||||
now: DateTime<Utc>,
|
|
||||||
) -> Result<(JobPayload, ExecutionPermitPayload)> {
|
|
||||||
let job = self.job(&request.job_bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
request.permit_bytes.len() <= 8192 && request.signature.len() == 64,
|
|
||||||
"PERMIT_SIZE"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
let raw = hex::decode(&self.public_key_hex)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(raw.len() == 32, "TRUST_KEY_SIZE");
|
|
||||||
let key = PKey::public_key_from_raw_bytes(&raw, Id::ED25519)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
Verifier::new_without_digest(&key)?
|
|
||||||
.verify_oneshot(&request.signature, &request.permit_bytes)?,
|
|
||||||
"INVALID_SIGNATURE"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
let p: ExecutionPermitPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.permit_bytes)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
p.domain == "rmm.execution-permit"
|
|
||||||
&& p.schema_version == 1
|
|
||||||
&& p.key_id == hash(&raw)
|
|
||||||
&& !p.grant_id.is_nil()
|
|
||||||
&& !p.authorization_id.is_nil(),
|
|
||||||
"PERMIT_DOMAIN"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
p.authorization_id == request.authorization_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.plan_hash == request.plan_hash
|
|
||||||
&& p.plan_hash.len() == 64
|
|
||||||
&& hex::decode(&p.plan_hash)?.len() == 32
|
|
||||||
&& p.job_payload_hash == hash(&request.job_bytes)
|
|
||||||
&& p.tenant_id == job.tenant_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.asset_id == job.asset_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.agent_id == job.agent_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.enrollment_generation == job.enrollment_generation
|
|
||||||
&& p.assignment_version == job.assignment_version
|
|
||||||
&& p.job_id == job.job_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.attempt_id == job.attempt_id
|
|
||||||
&& p.action == job.action.name()
|
|
||||||
&& p.execution_identity == job.execution_identity
|
|
||||||
&& p.max_runtime_seconds == job.max_runtime_seconds,
|
|
||||||
"PERMIT_BINDING"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
p.not_before >= job.not_before
|
|
||||||
&& p.start_before <= job.start_before
|
|
||||||
&& p.not_before < p.start_before
|
|
||||||
&& (p.start_before - p.not_before).num_seconds() <= 60
|
|
||||||
&& now >= p.not_before
|
|
||||||
&& now < p.start_before,
|
|
||||||
"PERMIT_TIME"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
Ok((job, p))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
|
||||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
|
||||||
pub struct Request {
|
|
||||||
pub job_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
|
||||||
pub permit_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
|
||||||
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
|
|
||||||
pub plan_hash: String,
|
|
||||||
pub authorization_id: Uuid,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
|
||||||
pub struct Outcome {
|
|
||||||
pub state: String,
|
|
||||||
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
|
|
||||||
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
|
|
||||||
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
|
|
||||||
pub output_truncated: bool,
|
|
||||||
pub reboot_required: bool,
|
|
||||||
pub evidence: serde_json::Value,
|
|
||||||
pub error_code: String,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
impl Outcome {
|
|
||||||
pub fn unknown(code: &str) -> Self {
|
|
||||||
Self {
|
|
||||||
state: "unknown".into(),
|
|
||||||
stdout: vec![],
|
|
||||||
stderr: vec![],
|
|
||||||
exit_code: None,
|
|
||||||
output_truncated: false,
|
|
||||||
reboot_required: false,
|
|
||||||
evidence: serde_json::json!({"postconditions_passed":false}),
|
|
||||||
error_code: code.into(),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Config and journal directories must already be bootstrapped by the intended
|
/// Config and journal directories must already be bootstrapped by the intended
|
||||||
/// owner; do not silently chmod a hostile existing path or follow symlinks.
|
/// owner; do not silently chmod a hostile existing path or follow symlinks.
|
||||||
@@ -204,16 +78,7 @@ pub fn lock_state(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<fs::File> {
|
|||||||
f.try_lock_exclusive()?;
|
f.try_lock_exclusive()?;
|
||||||
Ok(f)
|
Ok(f)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
/// Finite 1 GiB bound for durable agent/helper history. Unexpected page sizes
|
pub use rmm_agent_core::ledger::{bounded_journal_capacity, consume, finish};
|
||||||
/// are refused rather than silently multiplying the byte limit. No compaction
|
|
||||||
/// or tombstone deletion occurs here; SQLITE_FULL must still fail closed.
|
|
||||||
pub fn bounded_journal_capacity(db: &rusqlite::Connection) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
let page_size: u32 = db.query_row("PRAGMA page_size", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(page_size == 4096, "JOURNAL_PAGE_SIZE_UNSUPPORTED");
|
|
||||||
let maximum: u32 = db.query_row("PRAGMA max_page_count=262144", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(maximum == 262144, "JOURNAL_STORAGE_CAPACITY_BLOCKED");
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn open_ledger(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<rusqlite::Connection> {
|
pub fn open_ledger(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<rusqlite::Connection> {
|
||||||
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
|
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
|
||||||
@@ -229,85 +94,23 @@ pub fn open_ledger(dir: &Path, uid: u32) -> Result<rusqlite::Connection> {
|
|||||||
f.sync_all()?;
|
f.sync_all()?;
|
||||||
private_path(&path, uid, false)?;
|
private_path(&path, uid, false)?;
|
||||||
let db = rusqlite::Connection::open(path)?;
|
let db = rusqlite::Connection::open(path)?;
|
||||||
bounded_journal_capacity(&db)?;
|
rmm_agent_core::ledger::initialize_ledger(&db)?;
|
||||||
db.execute_batch("PRAGMA synchronous=FULL; PRAGMA journal_mode=DELETE;
|
|
||||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS consumed(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, agent TEXT NOT NULL, generation INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
|
||||||
job TEXT NOT NULL, attempt TEXT NOT NULL, result BLOB, UNIQUE(agent,generation,job,attempt));
|
|
||||||
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS execution_evidence(grant_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, start BLOB NOT NULL, outcome BLOB);")?;
|
|
||||||
let check: String = db.query_row("PRAGMA integrity_check", [], |r| r.get(0))?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(check == "ok", "JOURNAL_INTEGRITY");
|
|
||||||
fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
|
fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
|
||||||
Ok(db)
|
Ok(db)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
pub fn consume(db: &mut rusqlite::Connection, p: &ExecutionPermitPayload) -> Result<()> {
|
/// Persist the same exact request/boot/time evidence through the shared ledger.
|
||||||
let tx = db.transaction_with_behavior(rusqlite::TransactionBehavior::Immediate)?;
|
|
||||||
// Unknown effects retain the global device lock, including across restart.
|
|
||||||
let unresolved: i64 = tx.query_row(
|
|
||||||
"SELECT count(*) FROM consumed WHERE result IS NULL",
|
|
||||||
[],
|
|
||||||
|r| r.get(0),
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
ensure!(unresolved == 0, "UNRESOLVED_EFFECT_RESOURCE_LOCKED");
|
|
||||||
tx.execute(
|
|
||||||
"INSERT INTO consumed(grant_id,agent,generation,job,attempt) VALUES(?1,?2,?3,?4,?5)",
|
|
||||||
rusqlite::params![
|
|
||||||
p.grant_id.to_string(),
|
|
||||||
p.agent_id.to_string(),
|
|
||||||
p.enrollment_generation,
|
|
||||||
p.job_id.to_string(),
|
|
||||||
p.attempt_id.to_string()
|
|
||||||
],
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
tx.commit()?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pub fn finish(
|
|
||||||
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
|
|
||||||
p: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
|
|
||||||
outcome: &Outcome,
|
|
||||||
) -> Result<()> {
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"UPDATE execution_evidence SET outcome=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1",
|
|
||||||
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?],
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
// Unknown / awaiting reboot keep the resource reserved until a real sync
|
|
||||||
// protocol exists. Never unlock on a process exit or a network reconnect.
|
|
||||||
if outcome.state != "unknown" && outcome.state != "awaiting_reboot" {
|
|
||||||
ensure!(
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"UPDATE consumed SET result=?2 WHERE grant_id=?1 AND result IS NULL",
|
|
||||||
rusqlite::params![p.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(outcome)?]
|
|
||||||
)? == 1,
|
|
||||||
"CONSUMPTION_NOT_FOUND"
|
|
||||||
);
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/// Persist the original boot and exact signed request BEFORE any reboot/effect.
|
|
||||||
/// Awaiting/unknown outcomes never release consumed.result's resource lock.
|
|
||||||
pub fn save_start(
|
pub fn save_start(
|
||||||
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
|
db: &rusqlite::Connection,
|
||||||
permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
|
permit: &ExecutionPermitPayload,
|
||||||
request: &Request,
|
request: &Request,
|
||||||
) -> Result<()> {
|
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
let job: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&request.job_bytes)?;
|
rmm_agent_core::ledger::save_start(
|
||||||
let recorded_at = Utc::now();
|
db,
|
||||||
let deadline = match job.action {
|
permit,
|
||||||
rmm_domain::jobs::Action::Reboot {
|
request,
|
||||||
reconnect_timeout_seconds,
|
Uuid::parse_str(&rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?)?,
|
||||||
..
|
Utc::now(),
|
||||||
} => Some(recorded_at + chrono::Duration::seconds(reconnect_timeout_seconds.into())),
|
)
|
||||||
_ => None,
|
|
||||||
};
|
|
||||||
let evidence = serde_json::json!({"previous_boot_id":rmm_agent_linux::boot_id()?,
|
|
||||||
"reserved_at":recorded_at,"reconnect_deadline":deadline,"request":request,
|
|
||||||
"reauthentication_required":true,"postconditions_passed":false});
|
|
||||||
db.execute(
|
|
||||||
"INSERT INTO execution_evidence(grant_id,start) VALUES(?1,?2)",
|
|
||||||
rusqlite::params![permit.grant_id.to_string(), serde_json::to_vec(&evidence)?],
|
|
||||||
)?;
|
|
||||||
Ok(())
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn script(job: &JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
|
pub fn script(job: &JobPayload) -> Result<Outcome> {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -262,11 +262,11 @@ pub async fn permit(
|
|||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
let payload: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("payload"))?;
|
let payload: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("payload"))?;
|
||||||
let plan: PlanPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("plan_payload"))?;
|
let plan: PlanPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("plan_payload"))?;
|
||||||
let capabilities: Value = row.get("capabilities");
|
let capabilities: Vec<String> = serde_json::from_value(row.get("capabilities"))?;
|
||||||
if row.get::<Uuid, _>("bound_asset") != payload.asset_id
|
if row.get::<Uuid, _>("bound_asset") != payload.asset_id
|
||||||
|| !capabilities
|
|| !payload
|
||||||
.as_array()
|
.action
|
||||||
.is_some_and(|c| c.iter().any(|v| v.as_str() == Some(payload.action.name())))
|
.available_for(&payload.execution_identity, &capabilities)
|
||||||
|| hash(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("plan_payload")) != row.get::<String, _>("plan_hash")
|
|| hash(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("plan_payload")) != row.get::<String, _>("plan_hash")
|
||||||
|| !plan.jobs.iter().any(|j| {
|
|| !plan.jobs.iter().any(|j| {
|
||||||
j.payload.job_id == payload.job_id
|
j.payload.job_id == payload.job_id
|
||||||
@@ -491,11 +491,20 @@ pub async fn next(
|
|||||||
if let Some(r)=sqlx::query("SELECT job_id,attempt_id FROM jobs WHERE agent_id=$1 AND cancel_requested AND state IN ('accepted','running','verifying','awaiting_reboot') ORDER BY job_id LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?{
|
if let Some(r)=sqlx::query("SELECT job_id,attempt_id FROM jobs WHERE agent_id=$1 AND cancel_requested AND state IN ('accepted','running','verifying','awaiting_reboot') ORDER BY job_id LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?{
|
||||||
tx.commit().await?;return Ok(Some(Payload::CancelRequest(CancelRequest{job_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("job_id").to_string(),attempt_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("attempt_id").to_string(),reason:"operator_cancel_requested".into()})))
|
tx.commit().await?;return Ok(Some(Payload::CancelRequest(CancelRequest{job_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("job_id").to_string(),attempt_id:r.get::<Uuid,_>("attempt_id").to_string(),reason:"operator_cancel_requested".into()})))
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
let row=sqlx::query("SELECT j.job_id,j.attempt_id,j.payload,j.payload_hash,a.authorization_id,p.plan_hash FROM outbox b JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) JOIN operations o ON o.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND o.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN authorizations a ON a.tenant_id=o.tenant_id AND a.authorization_id=o.authorization_id JOIN approval_requests r ON r.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND r.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN operation_plans p ON p.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND p.plan_id=r.plan_id JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=j.tenant_id WHERE j.agent_id=$1 AND j.state='queued' AND NOT j.cancel_requested AND NOT t.changes_stopped AND a.revoked_at IS NULL AND r.approval_state='approved' AND p.expires_at>now() AND b.acknowledged_at IS NULL AND (b.lease_until IS NULL OR b.lease_until<now()) ORDER BY j.job_id FOR UPDATE OF b SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?;
|
let row=sqlx::query("SELECT j.job_id,j.attempt_id,j.payload,j.payload_hash,a.authorization_id,p.plan_hash,i.capabilities FROM outbox b JOIN jobs j USING(tenant_id,job_id,attempt_id) JOIN operations o ON o.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND o.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN authorizations a ON a.tenant_id=o.tenant_id AND a.authorization_id=o.authorization_id JOIN approval_requests r ON r.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND r.operation_id=j.operation_id JOIN operation_plans p ON p.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND p.plan_id=r.plan_id JOIN tenants t ON t.tenant_id=j.tenant_id JOIN agent_installations i ON i.tenant_id=j.tenant_id AND i.agent_id=j.agent_id WHERE j.agent_id=$1 AND j.state='queued' AND NOT j.cancel_requested AND NOT t.changes_stopped AND a.revoked_at IS NULL AND r.approval_state='approved' AND p.expires_at>now() AND b.acknowledged_at IS NULL AND (b.lease_until IS NULL OR b.lease_until<now()) ORDER BY j.job_id FOR UPDATE OF b SKIP LOCKED LIMIT 1").bind(agent).fetch_optional(&mut *tx).await?;
|
||||||
let Some(row) = row else {
|
let Some(row) = row else {
|
||||||
tx.commit().await?;
|
tx.commit().await?;
|
||||||
return Ok(None);
|
return Ok(None);
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
let payload: JobPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&row.get::<Vec<u8>, _>("payload"))?;
|
||||||
|
let caps: Vec<String> = serde_json::from_value(row.get("capabilities"))?;
|
||||||
|
if !payload
|
||||||
|
.action
|
||||||
|
.available_for(&payload.execution_identity, &caps)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
tx.commit().await?;
|
||||||
|
return Ok(None);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
sqlx::query("UPDATE outbox SET lease_until=now()+interval '30 seconds' WHERE job_id=$1")
|
sqlx::query("UPDATE outbox SET lease_until=now()+interval '30 seconds' WHERE job_id=$1")
|
||||||
.bind(row.get::<Uuid, _>("job_id"))
|
.bind(row.get::<Uuid, _>("job_id"))
|
||||||
.execute(&mut *tx)
|
.execute(&mut *tx)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+303
-25
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ pub struct Rollout {
|
|||||||
pub struct PlanInput {
|
pub struct PlanInput {
|
||||||
pub targets: Targets,
|
pub targets: Targets,
|
||||||
pub action: Action,
|
pub action: Action,
|
||||||
|
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
|
||||||
|
pub script_variants: Vec<Variant>,
|
||||||
pub execution_identity: String,
|
pub execution_identity: String,
|
||||||
pub schedule: Schedule,
|
pub schedule: Schedule,
|
||||||
pub max_runtime_seconds: u32,
|
pub max_runtime_seconds: u32,
|
||||||
@@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ struct WebSchedule {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
#[derive(Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, schemars::JsonSchema)]
|
#[derive(Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, schemars::JsonSchema)]
|
||||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||||
struct Variant {
|
pub struct Variant {
|
||||||
os_family: String,
|
os_family: String,
|
||||||
interpreter: String,
|
interpreter: String,
|
||||||
encoding: String,
|
encoding: String,
|
||||||
@@ -200,21 +202,17 @@ impl PlanRequest {
|
|||||||
|value: Option<String>| value.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "VALIDATION_ERROR"));
|
|value: Option<String>| value.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "VALIDATION_ERROR"));
|
||||||
let action = match w.action.as_str() {
|
let action = match w.action.as_str() {
|
||||||
"run_script" => {
|
"run_script" => {
|
||||||
let mut variants = p
|
let variants = p
|
||||||
.variants
|
.variants
|
||||||
|
.as_ref()
|
||||||
.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "VALIDATION_ERROR"))?;
|
.ok_or(Error(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "VALIDATION_ERROR"))?;
|
||||||
if variants.len() != 1 {
|
validate_variants(variants)?;
|
||||||
return Err(fail("AMBIGUOUS_TARGET"));
|
let v = &variants[0];
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
let v = variants.remove(0);
|
|
||||||
if v.os_family != "linux" || v.encoding != "utf-8" {
|
|
||||||
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
Action::RunScript {
|
Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
interpreter: v.interpreter,
|
interpreter: v.interpreter.clone(),
|
||||||
script_utf8: v.script_utf8,
|
script_utf8: v.script_utf8.clone(),
|
||||||
arguments: p.arguments.unwrap_or_default(),
|
arguments: p.arguments.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
|
||||||
expected_stdout: p.expected_stdout,
|
expected_stdout: p.expected_stdout.clone(),
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
"refresh_inventory" => Action::RefreshInventory {
|
"refresh_inventory" => Action::RefreshInventory {
|
||||||
@@ -287,6 +285,7 @@ impl PlanRequest {
|
|||||||
Ok(PlanInput {
|
Ok(PlanInput {
|
||||||
targets: w.targets,
|
targets: w.targets,
|
||||||
action,
|
action,
|
||||||
|
script_variants: p.variants.unwrap_or_default(),
|
||||||
execution_identity: p.execution_identity,
|
execution_identity: p.execution_identity,
|
||||||
schedule: Schedule {
|
schedule: Schedule {
|
||||||
not_before: w.schedule.not_before,
|
not_before: w.schedule.not_before,
|
||||||
@@ -300,6 +299,71 @@ impl PlanRequest {
|
|||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
fn validate_variants(variants: &[Variant]) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
|
if variants.is_empty() || variants.len() > 2 {
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("AMBIGUOUS_TARGET"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let mut platforms = std::collections::HashSet::new();
|
||||||
|
for v in variants {
|
||||||
|
let action = Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter: v.interpreter.clone(),
|
||||||
|
script_utf8: v.script_utf8.clone(),
|
||||||
|
arguments: vec![],
|
||||||
|
expected_stdout: None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if v.encoding != "utf-8"
|
||||||
|
|| action.script_platform() != Some(v.os_family.as_str())
|
||||||
|
|| !action.validate()
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !platforms.insert(v.os_family.as_str()) {
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("AMBIGUOUS_TARGET"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Ok(())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
fn capabilities(value: Value) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||||
|
serde_json::from_value(value).map_err(|_| fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
fn target_action(input: &PlanInput, caps: &[String]) -> Result<Action> {
|
||||||
|
if input.script_variants.is_empty() {
|
||||||
|
return Ok(input.action.clone());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
validate_variants(&input.script_variants)?;
|
||||||
|
let Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter,
|
||||||
|
script_utf8,
|
||||||
|
arguments,
|
||||||
|
expected_stdout,
|
||||||
|
} = &input.action
|
||||||
|
else {
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("VALIDATION_ERROR"));
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let first = &input.script_variants[0];
|
||||||
|
if interpreter != &first.interpreter || script_utf8 != &first.script_utf8 {
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("VALIDATION_ERROR"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let platform = match (
|
||||||
|
caps.iter().any(|c| c == "linux.base/1"),
|
||||||
|
caps.iter().any(|c| c == "windows.base/1"),
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
(true, false) => "linux",
|
||||||
|
(false, true) => "windows",
|
||||||
|
_ => return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY")),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let v = input
|
||||||
|
.script_variants
|
||||||
|
.iter()
|
||||||
|
.find(|v| v.os_family == platform)
|
||||||
|
.ok_or_else(|| fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"))?;
|
||||||
|
Ok(Action::RunScript {
|
||||||
|
interpreter: v.interpreter.clone(),
|
||||||
|
script_utf8: v.script_utf8.clone(),
|
||||||
|
arguments: arguments.clone(),
|
||||||
|
expected_stdout: expected_stdout.clone(),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
async fn policy(tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>) -> Result<()> {
|
async fn policy(tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>) -> Result<()> {
|
||||||
let stopped: bool = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT changes_stopped FROM tenants")
|
let stopped: bool = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT changes_stopped FROM tenants")
|
||||||
.fetch_one(&mut **tx)
|
.fetch_one(&mut **tx)
|
||||||
@@ -353,7 +417,7 @@ pub async fn plan(
|
|||||||
if matches!(input.action, Action::Reboot { .. }) && input.rollout.max_parallel != 1 {
|
if matches!(input.action, Action::Reboot { .. }) && input.rollout.max_parallel != 1 {
|
||||||
return Err(fail("POLICY_DENIED"));
|
return Err(fail("POLICY_DENIED"));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
let mut ids = input.targets.asset_ids;
|
let mut ids = input.targets.asset_ids.clone();
|
||||||
ids.sort();
|
ids.sort();
|
||||||
ids.dedup();
|
ids.dedup();
|
||||||
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant).await?;
|
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant).await?;
|
||||||
@@ -384,11 +448,9 @@ pub async fn plan(
|
|||||||
}));
|
}));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
let row = &rows[0];
|
let row = &rows[0];
|
||||||
let caps: Value = row.get("capabilities");
|
let caps = capabilities(row.get("capabilities"))?;
|
||||||
if !caps
|
let action = target_action(&input, &caps)?;
|
||||||
.as_array()
|
if !action.available_for(&input.execution_identity, &caps) {
|
||||||
.is_some_and(|c| c.iter().any(|v| v.as_str() == Some(input.action.name())))
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
let payload = JobPayload {
|
let payload = JobPayload {
|
||||||
@@ -400,7 +462,7 @@ pub async fn plan(
|
|||||||
assignment_version: row.get::<i64, _>("assignment_version") as u64,
|
assignment_version: row.get::<i64, _>("assignment_version") as u64,
|
||||||
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
|
job_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
|
||||||
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
|
attempt_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
|
||||||
action: input.action.clone(),
|
action,
|
||||||
execution_identity: input.execution_identity.clone(),
|
execution_identity: input.execution_identity.clone(),
|
||||||
not_before: input.schedule.not_before,
|
not_before: input.schedule.not_before,
|
||||||
start_before: input.schedule.start_before,
|
start_before: input.schedule.start_before,
|
||||||
@@ -530,13 +592,19 @@ async fn recheck(tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>, plan: &PlanPayload) -> Resu
|
|||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
return Err(fail("AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"));
|
return Err(fail("AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
let caps: Value = r.get("capabilities");
|
let caps = capabilities(r.get("capabilities"))?;
|
||||||
if !caps.as_array().is_some_and(|c| {
|
if !job
|
||||||
c.iter()
|
.payload
|
||||||
.any(|v| v.as_str() == Some(job.payload.action.name()))
|
.action
|
||||||
}) {
|
.available_for(&job.payload.execution_identity, &caps)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
return Err(fail("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
if let Action::RunScript { script_utf8, .. } = &job.payload.action
|
||||||
|
&& job.script_sha256.as_deref() != Some(hash(script_utf8.as_bytes()).as_str())
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
return Err(fail("PLAN_HASH_MISMATCH"));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
if hash(&encode(&job.payload)?) != job.job_payload_hash {
|
if hash(&encode(&job.payload)?) != job.job_payload_hash {
|
||||||
return Err(fail("PLAN_HASH_MISMATCH"));
|
return Err(fail("PLAN_HASH_MISMATCH"));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -921,3 +989,213 @@ async fn operations_http(
|
|||||||
json!({"items":items,"next_cursor":next,"completeness":if truncated{"partial"}else{"complete"},"truncated":truncated,"as_of":page.as_of}),
|
json!({"items":items,"next_cursor":next,"completeness":if truncated{"partial"}else{"complete"},"truncated":truncated,"as_of":page.as_of}),
|
||||||
))
|
))
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||||
|
mod windows_contract_tests {
|
||||||
|
use super::*;
|
||||||
|
fn input() -> PlanInput {
|
||||||
|
let tenant = Uuid::new_v4();
|
||||||
|
let now = Utc::now();
|
||||||
|
serde_json::from_value::<PlanRequest>(json!({"tenant_id":tenant,"action":"run_script","targets":{"asset_ids":[Uuid::new_v4()]},"parameters":{"execution_identity":"agent_service","timeout_seconds":60,"max_output_bytes":4096,"variants":[{"os_family":"linux","interpreter":"posix_sh","encoding":"utf-8","script_utf8":"printf hi\n"},{"os_family":"windows","interpreter":"powershell","encoding":"utf-8","script_utf8":"Write-Output 'hi'\r\n"}]},"schedule":{"not_before":now,"start_before":now+chrono::Duration::minutes(10),"offline_policy":"wait_until_deadline"},"rollout":{"max_parallel":1,"halt_after_failures":1},"reason":"fixed mixed plan"})).unwrap().resolve(tenant).unwrap()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
fn exact_fixed_variants_and_typed_bypass_denials() {
|
||||||
|
assert!(capabilities(json!(["windows.base/1", 42])).is_err());
|
||||||
|
assert!(capabilities(json!({"run_script": true})).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut i = input();
|
||||||
|
let linux = target_action(&i, &["linux.base/1".into()]).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(linux, i.action);
|
||||||
|
let windows = target_action(&i, &["windows.base/1".into()]).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(windows.script_platform(), Some("windows"));
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
matches!(windows,Action::RunScript{ref script_utf8,..} if script_utf8.as_bytes()==b"Write-Output 'hi'\r\n")
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &[]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &["linux.base/1".into(), "windows.base/1".into()]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
i.script_variants.push(i.script_variants[0].clone());
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &["linux.base/1".into()]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut i = input();
|
||||||
|
i.script_variants[1].interpreter = "bash".into();
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &["windows.base/1".into()]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut i = input();
|
||||||
|
i.script_variants[0].script_utf8.push('x');
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &["linux.base/1".into()]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
let mut i = input();
|
||||||
|
i.script_variants.remove(1);
|
||||||
|
assert!(target_action(&i, &["windows.base/1".into()]).is_err());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#[tokio::test]
|
||||||
|
#[ignore = "requires dedicated isolated PostgreSQL; tests/windows_plan_database.py"]
|
||||||
|
async fn windows_plan_caps_persisted_database() {
|
||||||
|
let admin = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&std::env::var("RMM_TEST_REPAIR_ADMIN_URL").unwrap())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let pool = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&std::env::var("RMM_TEST_REPAIR_APP_URL").unwrap())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
rmm_persistence::verify_application_role(&pool)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let tenant = Uuid::new_v4();
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO tenants(tenant_id,name) VALUES($1,'isolated Windows contract')")
|
||||||
|
.bind(tenant)
|
||||||
|
.execute(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let principal = Principal {
|
||||||
|
tenant,
|
||||||
|
name: "windows-contract".into(),
|
||||||
|
operator: true,
|
||||||
|
session_hash: None,
|
||||||
|
csrf: None,
|
||||||
|
scopes: None,
|
||||||
|
testsimulation: false,
|
||||||
|
identity: None,
|
||||||
|
tenants: vec![tenant],
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO memberships VALUES($1,$2,'automation',ARRAY['operations:plan','operations:submit','operations:read','scripts:execute'],NULL)").bind(tenant).bind(&principal.name).execute(&admin).await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let windows_caps = json!([
|
||||||
|
"windows.base/1",
|
||||||
|
"rmm.sync.v1",
|
||||||
|
"run_script",
|
||||||
|
"script.powershell/1"
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
let mut assets = Vec::new();
|
||||||
|
let mut agents = Vec::new();
|
||||||
|
for caps in [json!(["linux.base/1", "run_script"]), windows_caps.clone()] {
|
||||||
|
let asset = Uuid::new_v4();
|
||||||
|
let agent = Uuid::new_v4();
|
||||||
|
assets.push(asset);
|
||||||
|
agents.push(agent);
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO assets(tenant_id,asset_id) VALUES($1,$2)")
|
||||||
|
.bind(tenant)
|
||||||
|
.bind(asset)
|
||||||
|
.execute(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO agent_installations(tenant_id,agent_id,asset_id,certificate_sha256,capabilities,connection_generation) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,1)").bind(tenant).bind(agent).bind(asset).bind(hash(agent.as_bytes())).bind(caps).execute(&admin).await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let temp = std::path::PathBuf::from(format!("/tmp/windows-contract-{}", Uuid::new_v4()));
|
||||||
|
let state = crate::State {
|
||||||
|
pool,
|
||||||
|
signer: None,
|
||||||
|
viewer_a: [0; 32],
|
||||||
|
viewer_b: [1; 32],
|
||||||
|
auth: std::sync::Arc::new(crate::auth::Auth::from_env("development").await.unwrap()),
|
||||||
|
job_signer: std::sync::Arc::new(
|
||||||
|
crate::job_signer::JobSigner::load_or_create(&temp.join("key.pem")).unwrap(),
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let mut request = input();
|
||||||
|
request.targets.asset_ids = assets.clone();
|
||||||
|
let view = plan(&state, &principal, tenant, request.clone())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let id = Uuid::parse_str(view["plan_id"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let original: Vec<u8> =
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT payload FROM operation_plans WHERE plan_id=$1")
|
||||||
|
.bind(id)
|
||||||
|
.fetch_one(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let bound: PlanPayload = serde_json::from_slice(&original).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(bound.jobs.len(), 2);
|
||||||
|
for job in &bound.jobs {
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(hash(&encode(&job.payload).unwrap()), job.job_payload_hash);
|
||||||
|
let expected = if job.payload.asset_id == assets[0] {
|
||||||
|
"linux"
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
"windows"
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(job.payload.action.script_platform(), Some(expected));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let pending = submit(
|
||||||
|
&state,
|
||||||
|
&principal,
|
||||||
|
tenant,
|
||||||
|
id,
|
||||||
|
Submit {
|
||||||
|
idempotency_key: "fixed-mixed".into(),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(pending["approval_state"], "pending_approval");
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(pending["job_count"], 0);
|
||||||
|
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
recheck(&mut tx, &bound).await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
tx.rollback().await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("UPDATE agent_installations SET capabilities=$2 WHERE agent_id=$1")
|
||||||
|
.bind(agents[1])
|
||||||
|
.bind(json!(["windows.base/1", "run_script", "rmm.sync.v1"]))
|
||||||
|
.execute(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
recheck(&mut tx, &bound).await.unwrap_err().1,
|
||||||
|
"UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
tx.rollback().await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
plan(&state, &principal, tenant, request.clone())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_err()
|
||||||
|
.1,
|
||||||
|
"UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query("UPDATE agent_installations SET capabilities=$2 WHERE agent_id=$1")
|
||||||
|
.bind(agents[1])
|
||||||
|
.bind(&windows_caps)
|
||||||
|
.execute(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let mut changed = bound.clone();
|
||||||
|
changed.jobs[0].script_sha256 = Some("00".repeat(32));
|
||||||
|
let mut tx = rmm_persistence::tenant_tx(&state.pool, tenant)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
recheck(&mut tx, &changed).await.unwrap_err().1,
|
||||||
|
"PLAN_HASH_MISMATCH"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
tx.rollback().await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
request.script_variants.clear();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
plan(&state, &principal, tenant, request.clone())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_err()
|
||||||
|
.1,
|
||||||
|
"UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
request.targets.asset_ids = vec![assets[0]];
|
||||||
|
plan(&state, &principal, tenant, request).await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(
|
||||||
|
plan(&state, &principal, Uuid::new_v4(), input())
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap_err()
|
||||||
|
.1,
|
||||||
|
"NOT_FOUND"
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
assert!(
|
||||||
|
crate::job_gateway::next(&state, tenant, agents[1], 1)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap()
|
||||||
|
.is_none()
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
let counts:(i64,i64,i64)=sqlx::query_as("SELECT (SELECT count(*) FROM jobs WHERE tenant_id=$1),(SELECT count(*) FROM outbox WHERE tenant_id=$1),(SELECT count(*) FROM execution_permits WHERE tenant_id=$1)").bind(tenant).fetch_one(&admin).await.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(counts, (0, 0, 0));
|
||||||
|
let after: Vec<u8> =
|
||||||
|
sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT payload FROM operation_plans WHERE plan_id=$1")
|
||||||
|
.bind(id)
|
||||||
|
.fetch_one(&admin)
|
||||||
|
.await
|
||||||
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
assert_eq!(original, after);
|
||||||
|
std::fs::remove_dir_all(temp).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ pub async fn query(
|
|||||||
asset_ids: vec![i.asset_id],
|
asset_ids: vec![i.asset_id],
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
action,
|
action,
|
||||||
|
script_variants: vec![],
|
||||||
execution_identity: "agent_service".into(),
|
execution_identity: "agent_service".into(),
|
||||||
schedule: crate::jobs::Schedule {
|
schedule: crate::jobs::Schedule {
|
||||||
not_before: Utc::now(),
|
not_before: Utc::now(),
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Native gemeinsame Core-Unitabnahme
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`shared_core_acceptance.py` führt ausschließlich die zwei source-/hashgebundenen
|
||||||
|
Testprogramme `contracts` und `reconcile` aus: eigene temporäre SQLite-Fixturen,
|
||||||
|
Testsignaturen, Fake-Clock und Fake-Channel. Keine RMM-Jobs, Hello-Wirkung,
|
||||||
|
Enrollment, Schlüsselzugriffe, Runtimeersetzung, Dienste oder Serverkontakte.
|
||||||
|
Die Tests enthalten keine Netzwerkstrecke; der Runner behauptet keine zusätzliche
|
||||||
|
OS-Netzwerksandbox. Bootstraptransport bleibt vorhandenes hostkeygeprüftes SSH/SFTP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Tatsächlich ausgeführt, 2026-11-14:**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
python3 deploy/shared_core_acceptance.py linux
|
||||||
|
python3 deploy/shared_core_acceptance.py windows --case-id 4bc4db12-2990-4e93-bb86-8fbd94b691fb
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fall `4bc4db12-2990-4e93-bb86-8fbd94b691fb`: Linux 25/25 und danach Windows
|
||||||
|
24/24 nativ bestanden, jeweils ohne Skip. Permanente Dienste wurden nicht
|
||||||
|
ersetzt; insbesondere kein Windows-Job- oder Dienst-Syncnachweis daraus.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Der Runner prüft beide privaten Qualifikationsmanifeste, sämtliche gebundenen
|
||||||
|
Quellhashes und genau zwei Artefakte. Linux läuft zuerst (5+20 Fälle). Windows
|
||||||
|
(4+20 Fälle) verlangt denselben gespeicherten vollständigen Linux-Nativbeleg und
|
||||||
|
bindet dessen SHA256. Alle Fälle müssen erfolgreich und ohne Skip ausgeführt sein.
|
||||||
|
Exakte Testargumente: ausschließlich `--test-threads=1`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Lokale Intent-/Start-/Readback-/PASS-Dateien unter
|
||||||
|
`devstate/shared-core/acceptance/<UUID>/` entstehen create-only. Remote nur eigene
|
||||||
|
geschützte Bootstrap-Testverzeichnisse: Linux
|
||||||
|
`/var/lib/rmm-shared-core-acceptance/<UUID>/<SHA256>/`, Windows bestehendes
|
||||||
|
`C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\<SHA256>\windows-core-*.exe` und eigener
|
||||||
|
`shared-core-<UUID>`-Fall. Ausgaben/Fehler bleiben privat; stdout enthält nur
|
||||||
|
sanitisierten Status und bei PASS Fall-/Artefakt-/Nachweishashes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Bei verlorener Ausführungsantwort **nicht erneut starten**. Ausschließlich
|
||||||
|
vorhandene Remotequittungen lesen:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
# GEPLANT, NICHT AUSGEFÜHRT: keine erneute Testausführung.
|
||||||
|
python3 deploy/shared_core_acceptance.py finish-linux --case-id <UUID>
|
||||||
|
python3 deploy/shared_core_acceptance.py finish-windows --case-id <UUID>
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fehlt eine Quittung, bleibt die Abnahme unvollständig; kein automatisches Resume,
|
||||||
|
keine Bereinigung oder Wiederholung. Native Unittests ersetzen weder den späteren
|
||||||
|
Linux-Dienst-Syncnachweis des extrahierten Kerns noch Windows-WebUI-/Clock-/
|
||||||
|
Prozess-/Jobabnahmen. Der aktuelle Windowsclient erhält dadurch keine Jobfähigkeit.
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||||
|
"""Fixed native shared-core unit qualification: Linux FIRST, then Windows.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
No RMM jobs, enrollment, runtime replacement, daemon changes or server contact.
|
||||||
|
A lost execution reply permits readback only, never an automatic test rerun.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
import argparse
|
||||||
|
import base64
|
||||||
|
import contextlib
|
||||||
|
import hashlib
|
||||||
|
import io
|
||||||
|
import json
|
||||||
|
import os
|
||||||
|
from pathlib import Path
|
||||||
|
import re
|
||||||
|
import stat
|
||||||
|
import subprocess
|
||||||
|
import uuid
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import remote_client_bootstrap as linux
|
||||||
|
import vm_mvp_acceptance as contract
|
||||||
|
from windows import client_bootstrap as windows
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
||||||
|
STATE = ROOT / 'devstate/shared-core/acceptance'
|
||||||
|
KINDS = ('contracts', 'reconcile')
|
||||||
|
REMOTE_LINUX = '/var/lib/rmm-shared-core-acceptance'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def sha(data):
|
||||||
|
return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def write_new(path, value):
|
||||||
|
path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||||
|
contract.write_private(path, value)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def qualified(platform):
|
||||||
|
folder = ROOT/'devstate'/('shared-core' if platform == 'linux' else 'windows-core')
|
||||||
|
manifest = contract.protected_json(folder/'manifest.json')
|
||||||
|
sources = [ROOT/'Cargo.toml', ROOT/'Cargo.lock', ROOT/'rust-toolchain.toml']
|
||||||
|
for name in ('agent-core', 'domain', 'protocol'):
|
||||||
|
sources.extend(p for p in (ROOT/'crates'/name).rglob('*') if p.is_file() and (p.suffix == '.rs' or p.name == 'Cargo.toml'))
|
||||||
|
sources.extend((ROOT/'proto').glob('*.proto'))
|
||||||
|
actual = {str(p.relative_to(ROOT)): sha(p.read_bytes()) for p in sources}
|
||||||
|
contract.require(manifest['source_files'] == actual and manifest['source_before_after_equal'] is True, 'qualified source bindings changed')
|
||||||
|
target = 'x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu' if platform == 'linux' else 'x86_64-pc-windows-gnu'
|
||||||
|
contract.require(manifest['schema_version'] == 1 and manifest['target'] == target and manifest['os_effects'] is False and manifest['native_vm_executed'] is False, 'fixed test-only qualification')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(all(manifest['checks'][n] is True for n in ('rustfmt_check', 'linux_all_target_clippy_warnings_denied', 'windows_all_target_clippy_warnings_denied')), 'qualified checks')
|
||||||
|
artifacts = {}
|
||||||
|
for kind, item in zip(KINDS, manifest['artifacts'], strict=True):
|
||||||
|
path = folder/(kind + ('.exe' if platform == 'windows' else ''))
|
||||||
|
contract.require(item['path'] == str(path.relative_to(ROOT)) and not path.is_symlink() and path.is_file(), 'fixed artifact path')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600 and path.stat().st_uid == os.getuid(), 'private artifact owner/mode')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(item['binary_sha256'] == sha(path.read_bytes()) and item['size_bytes'] == path.stat().st_size, 'artifact hash/size')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(item['test_count'] == (20 if kind == 'reconcile' else (5 if platform == 'linux' else 4)), 'fixed test count')
|
||||||
|
artifacts[kind] = item
|
||||||
|
return dict(manifest_sha256=sha((folder/'manifest.json').read_bytes()), artifacts=artifacts)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Functions sent by the existing pinned SSH/bootstrap RPC. Only fixed test files
|
||||||
|
# are touched, never production journals, keys, packages, services or endpoints.
|
||||||
|
def linux_case(payload):
|
||||||
|
import stat
|
||||||
|
root = Path('/var/lib/rmm-shared-core-acceptance')
|
||||||
|
ident = str(uuid.UUID(payload['id']))
|
||||||
|
require(ident == payload['id'] and payload['action'] in ('prepare', 'run', 'read'), 'fixed case')
|
||||||
|
entries = payload['artifacts']
|
||||||
|
require(set(entries) == {'contracts', 'reconcile'}, 'two fixed test artifacts')
|
||||||
|
for kind, item in entries.items():
|
||||||
|
require(len(item['binary_sha256']) == 64 and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in item['binary_sha256']), 'fixed hash')
|
||||||
|
require(item['test_count'] == (5 if kind == 'contracts' else 20), 'fixed test count')
|
||||||
|
require(os.geteuid() == 0, 'bootstrap root only')
|
||||||
|
def safe(path, directory):
|
||||||
|
m = path.lstat()
|
||||||
|
require(not stat.S_ISLNK(m.st_mode) and m.st_uid == 0 and not m.st_mode & 0o022 and (stat.S_ISDIR(m.st_mode) if directory else stat.S_ISREG(m.st_mode)), 'private fixed test path')
|
||||||
|
def save(path, value):
|
||||||
|
fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
|
||||||
|
with os.fdopen(fd, 'w') as out:
|
||||||
|
json.dump(value, out); out.flush(); os.fsync(out.fileno())
|
||||||
|
if not root.exists(): root.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||||
|
safe(root, True)
|
||||||
|
case = root/ident
|
||||||
|
if payload['action'] == 'prepare':
|
||||||
|
case.mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||||
|
save(case/'intent.json', dict(id=ident, artifacts=entries, linux_manifest_sha256=payload['linux_manifest_sha256'], windows_manifest_sha256=payload['windows_manifest_sha256'], test_only=True))
|
||||||
|
for item in entries.values(): (case/item['binary_sha256']).mkdir(mode=0o700)
|
||||||
|
return dict(prepared=True)
|
||||||
|
safe(case, True); safe(case/'intent.json', False)
|
||||||
|
intent = json.loads((case/'intent.json').read_bytes())
|
||||||
|
require(intent['artifacts'] == entries and intent['linux_manifest_sha256'] == payload['linux_manifest_sha256'] and intent['windows_manifest_sha256'] == payload['windows_manifest_sha256'], 'same native intent')
|
||||||
|
kind = payload['kind']; require(kind in ('contracts', 'reconcile'), 'fixed test kind')
|
||||||
|
result_path = case/(kind+'-result.json')
|
||||||
|
if payload['action'] == 'read':
|
||||||
|
safe(result_path, False)
|
||||||
|
return json.loads(result_path.read_bytes())
|
||||||
|
save(case/(kind+'-started.json'), dict(kind=kind, binary_sha256=entries[kind]['binary_sha256']))
|
||||||
|
path = case/entries[kind]['binary_sha256']/kind
|
||||||
|
safe(path.parent, True); safe(path, False)
|
||||||
|
require(hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest() == entries[kind]['binary_sha256'], 'pinned test hash')
|
||||||
|
path.chmod(0o500)
|
||||||
|
outputs = []
|
||||||
|
for label in ('stdout', 'stderr'):
|
||||||
|
outputs.append(open(case/(kind+'-'+label+'.bin'), 'xb'))
|
||||||
|
os.chmod(outputs[-1].name, 0o600)
|
||||||
|
timed_out = False
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
result = subprocess.run([str(path), '--test-threads=1'], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=outputs[0], stderr=outputs[1], timeout=25)
|
||||||
|
code = result.returncode
|
||||||
|
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
||||||
|
timed_out = True; code = None
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
for out in outputs: out.flush(); os.fsync(out.fileno()); out.close()
|
||||||
|
raw = [(case/(kind+'-'+label+'.bin')).read_bytes() for label in ('stdout', 'stderr')]
|
||||||
|
require(all(len(b) <= 1024*1024 for b in raw), 'fixed unit output bound')
|
||||||
|
report = dict(kind=kind, binary_sha256=entries[kind]['binary_sha256'], exit_code=code, timed_out=timed_out, stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(raw[0]).decode(), stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(raw[1]).decode(), native_platform='linux')
|
||||||
|
save(result_path, report)
|
||||||
|
return report
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WINDOWS = r'''
|
||||||
|
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||||
|
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||||
|
if ([string]([guid]$p.id) -cne $p.id -or $p.kind -notin @('contracts','reconcile') -or $p.action -notin @('run','read') -or $p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' -or $p.linux_evidence_sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$') {throw 'Fixed native core case'}
|
||||||
|
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
||||||
|
$case=Join-Path $root ('shared-core-'+$p.id)
|
||||||
|
function Safe([string]$path,[bool]$directory) {
|
||||||
|
$i=Get-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force
|
||||||
|
if ($i.PSIsContainer -ne $directory -or ($i.Attributes -band [IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint)) {throw 'Fixed test path type'}
|
||||||
|
$a=Get-Acl -LiteralPath $path
|
||||||
|
if ($a.GetOwner([Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value -notin @('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')) {throw 'Private test owner'}
|
||||||
|
$rules=@($a.GetAccessRules($true,$true,[Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]))
|
||||||
|
if (!$rules.Count) {throw 'Empty test DACL'}
|
||||||
|
foreach($r in $rules) {if ($r.AccessControlType -ne 'Allow' -or $r.IdentityReference.Value -notin @('S-1-5-18','S-1-5-32-544')) {throw 'Broad test DACL'}}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
function Write-New([string]$path,$value) {
|
||||||
|
$b=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($value | ConvertTo-Json -Compress -Depth 8))
|
||||||
|
$f=[IO.File]::Open($path,[IO.FileMode]::CreateNew,[IO.FileAccess]::Write,[IO.FileShare]::Read)
|
||||||
|
try {$f.Write($b,0,$b.Length);$f.Flush($true)} finally {$f.Dispose()}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Safe $root $true
|
||||||
|
if (!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $case)) {
|
||||||
|
if ($p.action -ne 'run' -or $p.kind -ne 'contracts') {throw 'Native intent missing'}
|
||||||
|
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $case | Out-Null
|
||||||
|
Write-New (Join-Path $case 'intent.json') @{id=$p.id;linux_evidence_sha256=$p.linux_evidence_sha256;test_only=$true}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
Safe $case $true
|
||||||
|
$intent=Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $case 'intent.json') -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
|
||||||
|
if ($intent.id -cne $p.id -or $intent.linux_evidence_sha256 -cne $p.linux_evidence_sha256) {throw 'Bound Linux-first evidence'}
|
||||||
|
$result=Join-Path $case ($p.kind+'-result.json')
|
||||||
|
if ($p.action -eq 'read') {Safe $result $false;Get-Content -LiteralPath $result -Raw;exit 0}
|
||||||
|
Write-New (Join-Path $case ($p.kind+'-started.json')) @{kind=$p.kind;sha256=$p.sha256}
|
||||||
|
$folder=Join-Path $root $p.sha256;Safe $folder $true
|
||||||
|
$exe=Join-Path $folder ('windows-core-'+$p.kind+'.exe');Safe $exe $false
|
||||||
|
if ((Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $exe -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant() -cne $p.sha256) {throw 'Pinned unit hash'}
|
||||||
|
$out=Join-Path $case ($p.kind+'-stdout.bin');$err=Join-Path $case ($p.kind+'-stderr.bin')
|
||||||
|
if ((Test-Path -LiteralPath $out) -or (Test-Path -LiteralPath $err)) {throw 'Existing native output'}
|
||||||
|
$proc=Start-Process -FilePath $exe -ArgumentList @('--test-threads=1') -PassThru -WindowStyle Hidden -RedirectStandardOutput $out -RedirectStandardError $err
|
||||||
|
$handle=$proc.Handle;$timeout=$false
|
||||||
|
if (!$proc.WaitForExit(25000)) {$timeout=$true;$proc.Kill();$proc.WaitForExit()}
|
||||||
|
$proc.Refresh();$code=$proc.ExitCode
|
||||||
|
if ((Get-Item -LiteralPath $out).Length -gt 1048576 -or (Get-Item -LiteralPath $err).Length -gt 1048576) {throw 'Fixed unit output bound'}
|
||||||
|
$value=@{kind=$p.kind;binary_sha256=$p.sha256;exit_code=$code;timed_out=$timeout;stdout_b64=[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($out));stderr_b64=[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($err));native_platform='windows'}
|
||||||
|
Write-New $result $value
|
||||||
|
$value | ConvertTo-Json -Compress -Depth 8
|
||||||
|
'''
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def upload_linux(case, kind, item):
|
||||||
|
cfg = linux.access.load_config(ROOT/'credentials/linux-vm.conf')
|
||||||
|
args = ['sftp', '-F', '/dev/null', '-P', cfg.get('port', '22'), '-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=yes', '-o', 'BatchMode=yes', '-o', 'IdentitiesOnly=yes', '-o', 'ForwardAgent=no', '-o', 'ConnectTimeout=10', '-i', str(Path(cfg['ssh_key_path']).expanduser()), '-b', '-', cfg['username']+'@'+cfg['address']]
|
||||||
|
path = ROOT/item['path']
|
||||||
|
remote = REMOTE_LINUX+'/'+case.name+'/'+item['binary_sha256']+'/'+kind
|
||||||
|
batch = 'put '+json.dumps(str(path))+' '+json.dumps(remote)+'\n'
|
||||||
|
result = subprocess.run(args, input=batch.encode(), capture_output=True, timeout=120)
|
||||||
|
write_new(case/('linux-'+kind+'-sftp.json'), dict(returncode=result.returncode, stdout_b64=base64.b64encode(result.stdout).decode(), stderr_b64=base64.b64encode(result.stderr).decode()))
|
||||||
|
contract.require(result.returncode == 0, 'private Linux SFTP failure; inspect case')
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def payload(intent, action, kind=None):
|
||||||
|
return dict(id=intent['id'], action=action, kind=kind, artifacts=intent['linux']['artifacts'], linux_manifest_sha256=intent['linux']['manifest_sha256'], windows_manifest_sha256=intent['windows']['manifest_sha256'])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def verify_result(platform, kind, result, expected):
|
||||||
|
contract.require(result['native_platform'] == platform and result['kind'] == kind and result['binary_sha256'] == expected['binary_sha256'] and result['exit_code'] == 0 and result['timed_out'] is False, 'native test exit/hash')
|
||||||
|
out = base64.b64decode(result['stdout_b64'], validate=True)
|
||||||
|
err = base64.b64decode(result['stderr_b64'], validate=True)
|
||||||
|
contract.require(len(out) <= 1024*1024 and len(err) <= 1024*1024, 'private unit output limit')
|
||||||
|
pattern = rb'test result: ok\. '+str(expected['test_count']).encode()+rb' passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out;'
|
||||||
|
contract.require(re.search(pattern, out) is not None, 'exact native unit counts, no skipped cases')
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def main():
|
||||||
|
os.umask(0o077)
|
||||||
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
|
||||||
|
parser.add_argument('action', choices=('linux', 'windows', 'finish-linux', 'finish-windows'))
|
||||||
|
parser.add_argument('--case-id')
|
||||||
|
args = parser.parse_args()
|
||||||
|
if args.action == 'linux':
|
||||||
|
contract.require(args.case_id is None, 'new Linux case chooses fresh UUID')
|
||||||
|
ident = str(uuid.uuid4()); case = STATE/ident
|
||||||
|
intent = dict(id=ident, linux=qualified('linux'), windows=qualified('windows'))
|
||||||
|
write_new(case/'intent.json', intent)
|
||||||
|
else:
|
||||||
|
contract.require(args.case_id is not None and str(uuid.UUID(args.case_id)) == args.case_id, 'fixed existing case UUID')
|
||||||
|
case = STATE/args.case_id
|
||||||
|
intent = contract.protected_json(case/'intent.json')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(intent['id'] == args.case_id and intent['linux'] == qualified('linux') and intent['windows'] == qualified('windows'), 'same qualified case source/artifacts')
|
||||||
|
platform = 'linux' if args.action.endswith('linux') else 'windows'
|
||||||
|
if platform == 'windows':
|
||||||
|
proof = contract.protected_json(case/'linux-passed.json')
|
||||||
|
contract.require(proof['id'] == intent['id'] and proof['passed'] is True and proof['qualification'] == intent['linux'], 'Linux-first native qualification required')
|
||||||
|
for kind in KINDS: verify_result('linux', kind, proof['results'][kind], intent['linux']['artifacts'][kind])
|
||||||
|
linux_sha = sha((case/'linux-passed.json').read_bytes())
|
||||||
|
else: linux_sha = None
|
||||||
|
finish = args.action.startswith('finish-')
|
||||||
|
if not finish:
|
||||||
|
write_new(case/(platform+'-started.json'), dict(id=intent['id'], linux_evidence_sha256=linux_sha))
|
||||||
|
if args.action == 'linux':
|
||||||
|
linux.rpc('linux-vm.conf', linux_case, payload(intent, 'prepare'))
|
||||||
|
for kind in KINDS: upload_linux(case, kind, intent['linux']['artifacts'][kind])
|
||||||
|
results = {}
|
||||||
|
for kind in KINDS:
|
||||||
|
if platform == 'linux':
|
||||||
|
result = linux.rpc('linux-vm.conf', linux_case, payload(intent, 'read' if finish else 'run', kind))
|
||||||
|
else:
|
||||||
|
item = intent['windows']['artifacts'][kind]
|
||||||
|
# Existing bootstrap prints only sanitized failures; keep even these
|
||||||
|
# in the protected case so this CLI never prints remote diagnostics.
|
||||||
|
captured = io.StringIO()
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(captured):
|
||||||
|
if not finish: windows.upload(ROOT/item['path'], 'windows-core-'+kind+'.exe')
|
||||||
|
result = windows.powershell(WINDOWS, dict(id=intent['id'], kind=kind, action='read' if finish else 'run', sha256=item['binary_sha256'], linux_evidence_sha256=linux_sha), timeout=40)
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
write_new(case/('windows-'+kind+'-transport-'+uuid.uuid4().hex+'.json'), dict(sanitized_bootstrap_output=captured.getvalue()))
|
||||||
|
write_new(case/(platform+'-'+kind+'-readback-'+uuid.uuid4().hex+'.json'), result)
|
||||||
|
verify_result(platform, kind, result, intent[platform]['artifacts'][kind]); results[kind] = result
|
||||||
|
proof = dict(id=intent['id'], passed=True, native_platform=platform, qualification=intent[platform], linux_evidence_sha256=linux_sha, results=results)
|
||||||
|
destination = case/(platform+'-passed.json')
|
||||||
|
if destination.exists(): contract.require(contract.protected_json(destination) == proof, 'identical original native proof')
|
||||||
|
else: write_new(destination, proof)
|
||||||
|
print(json.dumps(dict(result='PASS', native_platform=platform, case_id=intent['id'], evidence_sha256=sha(destination.read_bytes()), artifact_sha256={k:v['binary_sha256'] for k,v in intent[platform]['artifacts'].items()})))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||||
|
try: main()
|
||||||
|
except Exception as error:
|
||||||
|
print('SHARED_CORE_ACCEPTANCE_INCOMPLETE:'+type(error).__name__)
|
||||||
|
raise SystemExit(2) from None
|
||||||
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ def powershell(script, payload=None, timeout=60, remote_signed=False):
|
|||||||
UPLOAD = r'''
|
UPLOAD = r'''
|
||||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||||
if ($p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin|acl))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1|PassiveStateProbe\.exe|WindowsTlsProbe\.exe)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
if ($p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin|acl)|windows-core-(contracts|reconcile))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1|PassiveStateProbe\.exe|WindowsTlsProbe\.exe)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
||||||
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
$root='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap'
|
||||||
if (!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $root)) {
|
if (!(Test-Path -LiteralPath $root)) {
|
||||||
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $root | Out-Null
|
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $root | Out-Null
|
||||||
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) {throw 'Artifact already exists'}
|
|||||||
VERIFY_UPLOAD = r'''
|
VERIFY_UPLOAD = r'''
|
||||||
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
|
||||||
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
$p=([Console]::In.ReadLine() | ConvertFrom-Json)
|
||||||
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' -or $p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin|acl))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1|PassiveStateProbe\.exe|WindowsTlsProbe\.exe)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
if ($p.sha256 -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{64}$' -or $p.name -notmatch '^((rmm-agent-windows|windows-tests-(lib|bin|acl)|windows-core-(contracts|reconcile))\.exe|Install-PassiveClient\.ps1|PassiveStateProbe\.exe|WindowsTlsProbe\.exe)$') {throw 'Artifact allowlist'}
|
||||||
$path='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\'+$p.sha256+'\'+$p.name
|
$path='C:\ProgramData\RustDiscoveryBootstrap\'+$p.sha256+'\'+$p.name
|
||||||
$hash=(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
|
$hash=(Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $path -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
|
||||||
if ($hash -cne $p.sha256) {throw 'Artifact hash'}
|
if ($hash -cne $p.sha256) {throw 'Artifact hash'}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ Zugänge und private Rohbelege bleiben gitignoriert.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
## Aktuelle Windowsfortsetzung
|
## Aktuelle Windowsfortsetzung
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Fortsetzung 2026-11-14:** Gemeinsamer `rmm-agent-core` und Linuxadapter
|
||||||
|
implementiert. Eigene Core-Unittests zuerst auf Cloud-Linux (25) und danach auf
|
||||||
|
Windows (24) nativ ohne Skip bestanden; Fall
|
||||||
|
`4bc4db12-2990-4e93-bb86-8fbd94b691fb`. Geschützte Manifest-/Quell-/Artefaktbindung
|
||||||
|
in `devstate/shared-core/acceptance/<Fall>/`. Keine Dienst-/Serverersetzung oder
|
||||||
|
Jobwirkung durch diese Tests. Native Dienstintegration, vertrauenswürdige Uhr
|
||||||
|
und erste tatsächliche WebUI-genehmigte PowerShell-Strecke bleiben offen.
|
||||||
|
Server/Domain/WebUI unterstützen lokal geprüft feste Plattformvarianten;
|
||||||
|
Clouddeployment steht noch aus. Vollständiger Restumfang:
|
||||||
|
[Windows-Gates](windows-gates.md), [Umsetzungsplan](windows-remaining-implementation.md).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Der bestehende Windows-11-LocalService bleibt passiv: gleiche Geräteidentität,
|
Der bestehende Windows-11-LocalService bleibt passiv: gleiche Geräteidentität,
|
||||||
Telemetriehistorie und Schlüssel; keine Jobs, Outbox oder Startgrants. Native
|
Telemetriehistorie und Schlüssel; keine Jobs, Outbox oder Startgrants. Native
|
||||||
WSS-/Inventar-/Tenantnachweise und sieben Rusttests liegen vor. Explizites HTTPS
|
WSS-/Inventar-/Tenantnachweise und sieben Rusttests liegen vor. Explizites HTTPS
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,5 +1,37 @@
|
|||||||
# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
|
# Tatsächlicher Implementierungsstand
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Gemeinsamer Jobkern nativ auf Linux und Windows geprüft — 2026-11-14
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Der neue `rmm-agent-core` enthält die gemeinsame signierte Sync-/Checkpoint-
|
||||||
|
Maschine, Permit-/Request-/Outcome-Codecs, Verbrauchsledger und portable
|
||||||
|
Jobpersistenz. Linux verwendet diese Implementierung über dünne Adapter;
|
||||||
|
seine bisherige OpenSSL-Verifikation bleibt erhalten. Windows verwendet Dalek,
|
||||||
|
ohne OpenSSL-Abhängigkeit. Die bisherigen Linux-Codecbytes bleiben unverändert.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tatsächlich bestanden: 151 betroffene lokale Rusttests und Clippy; danach im
|
||||||
|
eigenen Fall `4bc4db12-2990-4e93-bb86-8fbd94b691fb` zuerst 25 native
|
||||||
|
Core-Unittests auf der Cloud-Linux-VM, anschließend 24 auf der Windows-VM,
|
||||||
|
jeweils ohne Skip. Quell-/Artefakthashes und vollständige Ausgabe bleiben in
|
||||||
|
geschützten Manifesten und `devstate/shared-core/acceptance/<Fall>/` erhalten.
|
||||||
|
Die unterschiedlichen Zahlen entstehen durch den zusätzlichen Unix-OpenSSL-
|
||||||
|
Paritytest. Diese Programme verwenden ausschließlich eigene SQLite-Fixturen,
|
||||||
|
Testsignaturen und simulierte Clock/Channel-Objekte. Kein RMM-Job, Dienstwechsel,
|
||||||
|
Enrollment oder Netzwerkpfad wurde damit ausgeführt. Ein nativer Sync des
|
||||||
|
laufenden Dienstes mit dem extrahierten Kern bleibt separat nachzuweisen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Server/Domain/WebUI sind additiv für feste Windows-/Linux-Skriptvarianten und
|
||||||
|
Windows-Basisinventur vorbereitet. Gemeinsame Plattform-/Capabilityprüfung bei
|
||||||
|
Planung, erneuter Prüfung, Grant und Zustellung; vor Genehmigung unverändert
|
||||||
|
0 Jobs/Outbox/Grants. Exakte stdout-Nachbedingungen lassen sich als JSON-String
|
||||||
|
einschließlich CRLF eingeben. Lokal bestanden: 14 Domainfälle einschließlich
|
||||||
|
Linux-Goldenbytes, Variantenprüfung, isolierter PostgreSQL-Test mit Migrationen
|
||||||
|
und Tenant-/Capability-Verweigerungen, Clippy sowie 29 Webtests/Typecheck.
|
||||||
|
Dies ist noch kein Clouddeployment oder Windows-Ausführungsnachweis.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Windows-Dienst, Identität und bisherige passive Capabilities blieben bei diesem
|
||||||
|
Schritt unverändert. Clock-, Executor-, Helper-, Paket- und übrige native
|
||||||
|
Windows-Abnahmen laufen weiter; die Plattform meldet dafür keinen Erfolg.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Windows: dauerhaftes Auto auf bestehender VM nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
|
## Windows: dauerhaftes Auto auf bestehender VM nativ bestanden — 2026-11-13
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Separater Fall `422562e8-18eb-4865-977d-ab2af65f510b` verifiziert und abgeschlossen.
|
Separater Fall `422562e8-18eb-4865-977d-ab2af65f510b` verifiziert und abgeschlossen.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ bleibt eine eigenständige Abnahme. Dieser Bericht erweitert dessen Umfang nicht
|
|||||||
| Passiver Client | SCM-Dienst, Service-SID/ACLs, Enrollment/mTLS/WSS, Inventar mit Quelle/Zeit, Heartbeats und Mandantentrennung nativ bestanden; sieben native Rusttests. | Bestehende Identität und Telemetriehistorie bei allen weiteren Schritten erhalten. |
|
| Passiver Client | SCM-Dienst, Service-SID/ACLs, Enrollment/mTLS/WSS, Inventar mit Quelle/Zeit, Heartbeats und Mandantentrennung nativ bestanden; sieben native Rusttests. | Bestehende Identität und Telemetriehistorie bei allen weiteren Schritten erhalten. |
|
||||||
| HTTPS/Fallback | Explizites HTTPS und automatischer Fallback nach zwei tatsächlichen mTLS-WSS503 unter LocalService nativ bestanden, jeweils mit frischen Heartbeats und Inventar-ACK. Testhooks geschlossen. Anschließend bestehende VM separat dauerhaft auf `auto` gestellt und bevorzugtes WSS erneut mit zwei frischen Heartbeats/ACK geprüft; Identität und ACLs erhalten, 0 Jobs/Grants. | Transportnachweise abgeschlossen; kein automatischer HTTPS→WSS-Switchback nachgewiesen. Installerdefault ebenfalls `auto`, aber keine neue Installationsabnahme. |
|
| HTTPS/Fallback | Explizites HTTPS und automatischer Fallback nach zwei tatsächlichen mTLS-WSS503 unter LocalService nativ bestanden, jeweils mit frischen Heartbeats und Inventar-ACK. Testhooks geschlossen. Anschließend bestehende VM separat dauerhaft auf `auto` gestellt und bevorzugtes WSS erneut mit zwei frischen Heartbeats/ACK geprüft; Identität und ACLs erhalten, 0 Jobs/Grants. | Transportnachweise abgeschlossen; kein automatischer HTTPS→WSS-Switchback nachgewiesen. Installerdefault ebenfalls `auto`, aber keine neue Installationsabnahme. |
|
||||||
| TLS-Lifecycle | Falsche CA, falscher Name und abgelaufenes Clientzertifikat mit gültigen Kontrollen nativ als getrennte Admin-TLS-Proben bestanden. Permanente Identität/Dienst unverändert. | Rotation und Widerruf noch gesondert sicher implementieren und prüfen. Permanente Identität nicht widerrufen oder ersetzen. |
|
| TLS-Lifecycle | Falsche CA, falscher Name und abgelaufenes Clientzertifikat mit gültigen Kontrollen nativ als getrennte Admin-TLS-Proben bestanden. Permanente Identität/Dienst unverändert. | Rotation und Widerruf noch gesondert sicher implementieren und prüfen. Permanente Identität nicht widerrufen oder ersetzen. |
|
||||||
| Signierter Jobkern | Windows verweigert Jobangebote/Grants ausdrücklich und meldet keine Ausführungscapability. | Gemeinsamen Sync-/Checkpoint-/Einmalverbrauchskern portieren; vertrauenswürdige Uhr, Journalmigration ohne Reset, Schlüsselbindung und Fehlerpfade qualifizieren. |
|
| Signierter Jobkern | Gemeinsamer Core und Linuxadapter implementiert; native Core-Unittests zuerst Linux (25), dann Windows (24) bestanden. Bestehender Windows-Dienst bleibt passiv und verweigert Jobs/Grants. | Native Dienstintegration, vertrauenswürdige Uhr, erhaltende Journalmigration und vollständige Startgrenze qualifizieren. Unit-Fixturen ersetzen keinen tatsächlichen Jobnachweis. |
|
||||||
| PowerShell | Noch kein Executor oder freigegebener Interpreter. Server/UI lösen derzeit Linuxvarianten auf. | Exakte Windows-PowerShell-5.1-Bytes, Ausgabeencoding, Prozessgrenzen und unprivilegierte Ausführungsidentität binden. Erst nach vollständigem Antrag und tatsächlichem WebUI-Klick ausführen. |
|
| PowerShell | Noch kein Executor oder freigegebener Interpreter. Server/UI lösen derzeit Linuxvarianten auf. | Exakte Windows-PowerShell-5.1-Bytes, Ausgabeencoding, Prozessgrenzen und unprivilegierte Ausführungsidentität binden. Erst nach vollständigem Antrag und tatsächlichem WebUI-Klick ausführen. |
|
||||||
| Privilegierte Aktionen | Kein Windows-Helper, keine Named-Pipe-Aktionsschnittstelle. | Eigenständiger restriktiver Helper mit geprüfter Pipe-Identität und unabhängiger Signatur-/Plan-/Grantprüfung; keine SYSTEM-Netzwerkkomponente. |
|
| Privilegierte Aktionen | Kein Windows-Helper, keine Named-Pipe-Aktionsschnittstelle. | Eigenständiger restriktiver Helper mit geprüfter Pipe-Identität und unabhängiger Signatur-/Plan-/Grantprüfung; keine SYSTEM-Netzwerkkomponente. |
|
||||||
| Pakete/Dienste/Logs | Noch keine native Windows-Aktionsabnahme. | Begrenzte geprüfte MSI-/EXE-Rezepte, Dienst-/Eventlogadapter und unabhängige Nachbedingungen. Keine allgemeinen Installershellstrings oder impliziten Reboots. |
|
| Pakete/Dienste/Logs | Noch keine native Windows-Aktionsabnahme. | Begrenzte geprüfte MSI-/EXE-Rezepte, Dienst-/Eventlogadapter und unabhängige Nachbedingungen. Keine allgemeinen Installershellstrings oder impliziten Reboots. |
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Windows: verbleibende Umsetzung nach der passiven Foundation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Stand 2026-11-14, Spezifikation1.15. **Umsetzungsplan, keine native Abnahme.**
|
||||||
|
Linux-M0–M5 bleiben separat abgeschlossen. Der Windows-Testgast ist ein eigenes
|
||||||
|
Gerät; das Notebook bleibt Entwicklungsrechner. Server bleibt
|
||||||
|
`discovery.ease-technologies.de`. RustDesk, PVE und M7 werden nicht vorgezogen.
|
||||||
|
Diese Planung erstellt weder Jobs noch Grants und verändert keine Zielmaschine.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Die passive Windowsstrecke umfasst bereits LocalService, Enrollment/mTLS,
|
||||||
|
WSS/HTTPS/Auto-Fallback und gespeicherte Telemetrie. TLS-Negativproben als
|
||||||
|
Bootstrapadministrator ersetzen keine LocalService-Negativprobe oder Rotation.
|
||||||
|
Der gemeinsame Agentkern und die additive Plattform-/Interpreterplanung werden
|
||||||
|
aktuell separat qualifiziert. Keine daraus abgeleitete Windowscapability oder
|
||||||
|
Jobbereitschaft behaupten. Vor dem ersten Hello gelten weiterhin
|
||||||
|
[Jobgrenze](windows-job-boundary.md) und [Windows-Gates](windows-gates.md).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Reihenfolge mit konkreter Lieferung
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Schritt | Kleinste lauffähige Lieferung | Eigener nativer Nachweis |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| W1 unprivilegierte Jobs | Konfigurierte Signingbindung, TrustedClock, gemeinsamer signierter Sync, erhaltendes Jobjournal und begrenzter PowerShell5.1-Executor unter LocalService. | Fester UI-Hello mit exakten Rohbytes; Live-Inventur; ACK/Redelivery, Offline/Frist/Entzug, Prozessabbruch und gesperrter Wiederanlauf. Keine SYSTEM-Ausnahme. |
|
||||||
|
| W2 Helpergrenze | Ein lokaler SYSTEM-Dienst ohne Netzwerklistener, wechselseitig authentisierte Named Pipe, eigenes geschütztes Ledger, unabhängige Signatur-/Sync-/Policyprüfung. Zunächst alle Wirkungen verweigert. | Erreichbarkeit aus dem eigenen LocalService, fremde SID/PID, Pipebesetzung, falsche Signatur/Generation/Hash/Frist und volle Journale verweigert; keine Wirkung. |
|
||||||
|
| W3 Dienst und Logs | Nur eigener ungefährlicher Fixturedienst; SCM-Aktion und begrenzter Event-Log-Provider. | Je eigener UI-Plan für Start/Stop/Nachprüfung und Live-Logfenster, unabhängige OS-Nachprüfung; sensible/fremde Quellen verweigert. |
|
||||||
|
| W4 MSI und EXE | Je ein geprüftes, kleines Fixture-Rezept, feste Versionen1.0/1.1, eigener Produkt-/Dateinachweis, kein Reboot. | Native Installation, Upgrade und Noop je festem UI-Plan; Paketbestand/Nutzdateien unabhängig prüfen. MSI und EXE sind getrennte Providerabnahmen. |
|
||||||
|
| W5 Wiederaufnahme und Reboot | Bewahrte Originalaufträge/Marker; genau ein ausdrücklich erlaubter Windows-Reboot mit ursprünglichem Grant und neuer Bootkennung. | Kein blindes Wiederholen nach Wirkung; rechtzeitiger unabhängiger Wiederkontakt, zusätzlicher frischer Verifikationsbeleg und normaler signierter Abschluss. |
|
||||||
|
| W6 Abschluss der Windowsmatrix | Rotation/Widerruf auf getrennter Testidentität, Windows/Linux-Mischplan AT-15, geprüfte unterstützte Inventarquellen, Windows-Installer-/Signiernachweis. | Keine Ableitung aus Linux-/Cross-Build-/Adminproben. Offene Betriebssystemupdate-/Patchfähigkeiten sichtbar lassen, bis ihr eigener Provider und Umfang geprüft sind. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Jeder Schritt endet mit tatsächlichem Bericht und eigenem Commit/Push. Neue
|
||||||
|
Wirkungsversuche benötigen neue UI-Pläne. Ein fehlgeschlagener Versuch bleibt
|
||||||
|
fehlgeschlagen, Unknown bleibt gesperrt bis zum gebundenen Abgleich. Die Tabelle
|
||||||
|
ist keine pauschale Erlaubnis, Installationen oder einen Windows-Reboot auszuführen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Gemeinsamer Nachweisvertrag, Windowsadapter
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Bestehende Bytes von `agent-core::auth::{Binding,Request,Outcome}`,
|
||||||
|
`ExecutionPermitPayload`, Job-/Planhashes und Signaturdomain bleiben erhalten.
|
||||||
|
Der Helper erhält denselben vollständigen Request wie der Agent und prüft ihn
|
||||||
|
selbst: Gerät/Kunde/Zuordnung, genaue Jobbytes, Genehmigungsreferenz,
|
||||||
|
Signierschlüssel, kurze Startfrist und Clock. Vor Wirkung hält er die eigene
|
||||||
|
Ressourcensperre und persistiert Grant-/Versuchsverbrauch samt Originalboot und
|
||||||
|
Originalrequest. Gleicher Versuch mit neuer Grant-ID ist keine neue Erlaubnis.
|
||||||
|
Ergebnis bleibt bis konkretem ACK; `unknown` und `awaiting_reboot` geben den
|
||||||
|
Verbrauch nicht frei. Der aktuelle gemeinsame Ledgerkern begrenzt SQLite bereits
|
||||||
|
auf1GiB/4096-Byte-Seiten und ignoriert keine Kapazitätsfehler.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`privileged-helper/src/reconcile.rs` und `control.rs` enthalten derzeit weiterhin
|
||||||
|
Unix-Datei-/Peerzugriff, OpenSSL und Linux-Boot/Clock. Sie sind kein fertiger
|
||||||
|
Windowshelper. Deren reine Helper-Abgleichregeln werden wie der Agentkern in
|
||||||
|
einen gemeinsamen Kern mit Ports für Dateisperre/Dateiidentität, Clock, Boot und
|
||||||
|
Verifier extrahiert; Linuxbytes und vorhandene Goldenfixtures bleiben identisch.
|
||||||
|
Keine zweite abweichende Syncmaschine, kein lokales `ready=true` als Ersatz.
|
||||||
|
Windows bindet Volume-/File-ID der offenen Ledger-/Sperrhandles; Unix-`dev/ino`
|
||||||
|
werden nicht erfunden. Helper-Snapshot/Apply prüfen die ursprünglichen signierten
|
||||||
|
Entscheidungsbytes und frische Challenge-/Generationsbindung unabhängig.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Die lokale Windowskonfiguration ist ein neuer, ausdrücklich benannter
|
||||||
|
SYSTEM-Policyvertrag, kein Linux-Rootpolicyprofil unter anderem Namen. Sie bindet
|
||||||
|
festes Gerät, Signierschlüssel, Agent-/Helperservice-SIDs, erlaubte Aktionen,
|
||||||
|
exakte Fixturedienste/Rezepthashes/Logkanäle, Laufzeitgrenzen und
|
||||||
|
`allow_reboot=false` als Default. Policyhash und Helperbuild müssen im
|
||||||
|
Readinessnachweis und in der zentralen Zielpolicy übereinstimmen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Named Pipe und Identitäten
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ein fest benannter lokaler Pipeendpunkt verwendet explizite DACL,
|
||||||
|
`PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS`, `FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE` beim ersten Server-
|
||||||
|
Handle und zeitbegrenzte Overlapped-I/O. Keine Default-DACL: Microsoft beschreibt
|
||||||
|
sonst zusätzliche Lesezugriffe für Everyone/Anonymous. Die Agent-SID erhält nur
|
||||||
|
die konkreten benötigten Daten-/Attributrechte, kein generisches Schreibrecht,
|
||||||
|
das zugleich die Erstellung weiterer Pipeinstanzen erlauben kann.
|
||||||
|
[Pipe-Rechte](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipe-security-and-access-rights),
|
||||||
|
[CreateNamedPipeW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/namedpipeapi/nf-namedpipeapi-createnamedpipew).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Der Helper liest zunächst nur einen begrenzten Frame, prüft den tatsächlichen
|
||||||
|
Client-PID und impersonierten Token: LocalService **und** eigene aktivierte
|
||||||
|
Service-SID, SCM-Prozess und gehaltenes Prozesshandle/Startidentität. LocalService
|
||||||
|
allein genügt nicht, da weitere Dienste dieses Konto nutzen können. Der Agent
|
||||||
|
prüft umgekehrt Server-PID, SYSTEM-Token, erwartete Helperservice-SID, SCM-Bindung
|
||||||
|
und geschützte Helperbinary. PID allein ist wegen Wiederverwendung kein Beleg.
|
||||||
|
Diese Kombination ist die vorgeschlagene Projektprüfung, keine Garantie einer
|
||||||
|
Einzel-API. Fehlgeschlagene Impersonation verweigert; vor Handlerausführung
|
||||||
|
`RevertToSelf` sicherstellen. Keine Kindprozesse unter versehentlich verbliebener
|
||||||
|
Impersonation starten.
|
||||||
|
[Client-PID](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-getnamedpipeclientprocessid),
|
||||||
|
[Server-PID](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-getnamedpipeserverprocessid),
|
||||||
|
[Impersonation und Fehlerfall](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/namedpipeapi/nf-namedpipeapi-impersonatenamedpipeclient).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Helperstate und Konfiguration sind SYSTEM/Administrators-geschützt; der
|
||||||
|
Netzwerkagent kann sie nicht ersetzen. Bestehende Gerätekeys bleiben beim Agenten,
|
||||||
|
der Helper erhält ausschließlich die provisionierte öffentliche Signingbindung.
|
||||||
|
Ein eigener Windowshelper-Binarypfad innerhalb der Windowscrate vermeidet
|
||||||
|
Unix-Abhängigkeiten des Linuxhelper-Binaries. Bereits vor dem ersten autorisierten
|
||||||
|
Systemjob müssen Pipeauthentisierung und unabhängiger Sync nativ bestanden sein.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Minimaler additiver Aktions-/Manifestvertrag
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Vorgeschlagen ist ein optionales `windows_manifest` am `JobPayload` mit
|
||||||
|
`default`/`skip_serializing_if=None`; Linuxjobs behalten exakt ihre historischen
|
||||||
|
Bytes. Noch keine neue produktive Schemaversion oder Policyentscheidung.
|
||||||
|
Manifesttyp `rmm.windows.execution`, eigene Version1, strikte Felder:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Feldgruppe | Inhalt/Prüfung |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| Ziel und Auftrag | Kunde, Asset, Agent, Enrollment-/Assignmentgeneration, Job, Versuch und Action; müssen exakt dem Job entsprechen. |
|
||||||
|
| Runtime/Policy | Plattform/Architektur, Manifestversion, Helperpolicyhash und abgenommene Providerkennung. Keine vom Agenten gewählte Policy. |
|
||||||
|
| Rezept | Bei Paketaktionen unveränderliche Rezept-ID/-Version/-SHA, Produkt/Version/Installationskontext, Artifact-ID/-SHA/-Länge, fester strukturierter Argumentvektor, feste Exitklassifikation und typisierte Nachbedingungen. |
|
||||||
|
| Systemaktion | Bei Dienst/Log/Reboot ausschließlich die erforderlichen typisierten Felder und Nachbedingungen; kein Paketmanifest als allgemeiner Shellcontainer. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Kein `job_payload_hash` innerhalb des Manifests: dieser würde sich selbst
|
||||||
|
referenzieren. Der Startgrant bindet den Hash des **gesamten** Jobpayloads samt
|
||||||
|
Manifest. Unbekannte Felder/Provider, widersprüchliche Actionparameter,
|
||||||
|
abweichende Recipe-/Artifactbytes oder fehlende Nachbedingungen verweigern vor
|
||||||
|
Verbrauch/Wirkung. Neue Windowsfelder sind Pflicht nur für die entsprechenden
|
||||||
|
Windowsaktionen; alte APT-Manifeste werden nicht umgedeutet.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Bestehende Fachaktionen bleiben `ensure_package`, `apply_updates`,
|
||||||
|
`set_service_state`, `query_logs` und `reboot`. Windowsprovider werden additiv
|
||||||
|
validiert, mit eindeutiger Plattformbindung. `system` wäre ein neuer expliziter
|
||||||
|
Ausführungsidentitätswert mit eigenem `system:execute`-Recht und eigener
|
||||||
|
SYSTEM-Policy; Linux-`root` bedeutet niemals Windows-SYSTEM. Freie SYSTEM-Skripte
|
||||||
|
sind kein notwendiger Ersatz für typisierte Aktionen. Capabilitynamen und genaue
|
||||||
|
Manifestfelder erst gemeinsam mit Helper/Server festschreiben; keine
|
||||||
|
Capabilities anbieten, bevor der tatsächliche Adapter bereit ist.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Für Windowsrezepte empfiehlt sich eine eigene immutable Tabelle mit Tenant-RLS,
|
||||||
|
zusammengesetzten Tenant-FKs und getrennten MSI-/EXE-Kennungen. Der aktuelle
|
||||||
|
APT-Katalog ist auf `architecture='amd64'` und APT-Abfragen beschränkt; seine
|
||||||
|
Schlüssel dürfen nicht still für Windowsprodukte wiederverwendet werden.
|
||||||
|
Bestehende Artifactreferenzen/Hashes können erhalten bleiben. Das aktuelle
|
||||||
|
Artifactlimit beträgt256KiB: kleine Fixtureartefakte zunächst dagegen prüfen;
|
||||||
|
eine notwendige größere, begrenzte Übertragung wäre eine eigene implementierte
|
||||||
|
und getestete Vertragsänderung, kein Bootstrap-SFTP als RMM-Paketnachweis.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Providerverhalten und überprüfbare Wirkung
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**MSI:** Feste systemweite Installation aus dem Helper-eigenen geschützten Cache;
|
||||||
|
`msiexec /i <fester-cachepfad> /qn /norestart REBOOT=ReallySuppress`, ergänzt nur
|
||||||
|
um die im Rezept gebundenen Properties. Keine URL, UNC-Quelle, frei gewählte
|
||||||
|
Transformdatei oder weitere Installerargumente. Nach dem Kopieren erneut hashen,
|
||||||
|
Pfadkomponenten/Reparsepoints und Schreibrechte prüfen, während der Nutzung
|
||||||
|
Ersetzung/Änderung verweigern. `0` ist nur ein Prozessresultat; `3010` bedeutet
|
||||||
|
Neustartbedarf. `1641` meldet bereits eingeleiteten Neustart und verletzt diesen
|
||||||
|
No-Reboot-Rezeptvertrag; nicht als normale erfolgreiche Abnahme werten.
|
||||||
|
`1618` respektiert fremde Installation, kein Beenden fremder Prozesse.
|
||||||
|
[Installeroptionen](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/standard-installer-command-line-options),
|
||||||
|
[REBOOT](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/reboot),
|
||||||
|
[Exitcodes](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Nachprüfung kombiniert `MsiGetProductInfoExW` im expliziten Machine-Kontext
|
||||||
|
mit installiertem Produktzustand/Version und eigener Fixture-Nutzdatei samt Hash.
|
||||||
|
Ein beworbenes Produkt ist nicht automatisch installiert. Keine
|
||||||
|
`Win32_Product`-Erhebung. MSI-Fehler, Timeout oder verlorener Installerkontakt
|
||||||
|
belegen keine Abwesenheit einer Teilwirkung: gegebenenfalls Unknown und ein
|
||||||
|
gebundener Nur-Lese-Abgleich, keine automatische neue Installation.
|
||||||
|
[Produktinformation und Kontext](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/msi/nf-msi-msigetproductinfoexw).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**EXE:** Eigenes, nachvollziehbar gebautes Fixture mit genau dokumentierten
|
||||||
|
Quiet-/No-Reboot-Argumenten, Hash, Architektur und Exitsemantik. MSI-Codes gelten
|
||||||
|
nicht automatisch für EXE. Ausschließlich verifizierte feste Rezeptparameter;
|
||||||
|
kein beliebiges EXE als SYSTEM ausführen. Nachprüfung über eigene Registry-
|
||||||
|
Produktkennung und Nutzdatei/Version/Hash. No-Reboot-Flags schützen nicht gegen
|
||||||
|
beliebige bösartige SYSTEM-Customactions: die ausdrücklich geprüfte Herkunft und
|
||||||
|
der begrenzte Rezeptumfang bleiben erforderlich. Ein Timeout beendet nicht
|
||||||
|
pauschal einen systemweiten Installationsdienst oder fremde Installer.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Dienste:** `OpenSCManager/OpenService` mit benötigten Einzelrechten,
|
||||||
|
`StartServiceW`/`ControlService`, danach begrenztes Warten und unabhängiges
|
||||||
|
`QueryServiceStatusEx`. Startannahme ist nicht gleich Running. Zustandsübergänge,
|
||||||
|
Checkpoint/WaitHint, Dienstexit und fehlende Rechte strukturiert melden.
|
||||||
|
Abnahme zunächst nur am eigenen Fixturedienst mit festem Binaryhash; nicht am
|
||||||
|
RMM-Agenten, SSH oder einer fremden Produktionskomponente.
|
||||||
|
[StartServiceW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-startservicew),
|
||||||
|
[Status](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-queryservicestatusex),
|
||||||
|
[SCM-Rechte](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-security-and-access-rights).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Event Log:** Eigener Kanal-/Providerfilter und fixes Zeitfenster; keine freie
|
||||||
|
Datei, kein roher vom Modell gelieferter XPath. `EvtQuery/EvtNext/EvtRender`,
|
||||||
|
maximal1000Events/256KiB und Laufzeitlimit. Quelle, EventRecordID, Provider,
|
||||||
|
UTC-Zeit, Fehlermeldungen und Trunkierung erhalten; fehlender Zugang bleibt
|
||||||
|
permission_denied. Bookmark erst nach dauerhafter Übernahme/konkretem ACK
|
||||||
|
fortschreiben. Einzelnes Livefenster ist ein UI-genehmigter Diagnosejob;
|
||||||
|
gespeicherte Ergebnisse danach tenantgebunden lesen. Kein allgemeiner Zugriff
|
||||||
|
auf Security-Kanäle durch die Abnahme eines Fixturekanals.
|
||||||
|
[Eventabfragen](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wes/querying-for-events),
|
||||||
|
[Bookmark](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winevt/nf-winevt-evtupdatebookmark).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Reboot:** Nur lokales `InitiateSystemShutdownExW`, fest gebundene Begründung,
|
||||||
|
keine erzwungene Schließung fremder Anwendungen, eigenes gezielt aktiviertes
|
||||||
|
Shutdownprivileg im Helper. Dauerhaften Originalverbrauch und Bootbeleg zuerst
|
||||||
|
speichern. APIannahme ist asynchron und kein Erfolgsnachweis; Anwendungen können
|
||||||
|
den Vorgang verzögern/verhindern. Konservative zentrale Frist ab Startreservierung
|
||||||
|
und beide bestehenden Inventarbelege gelten unverändert. Die bisherige
|
||||||
|
CIM-LastBootUpTime-basierte Windowskennung muss einen tatsächlichen OS-Reboot von
|
||||||
|
Agent-/Helperneustart und Zeitänderung unterscheiden; aktuelle wiederholte
|
||||||
|
Abfrage allein beweist das noch nicht.
|
||||||
|
[Shutdown-API und Einschränkungen](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winreg/nf-winreg-initiatesystemshutdownexw).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Dateien und Freigaben vor nativer Wirkung
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Geplante Änderungen, **hier nicht umgesetzt**:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `crates/domain/src/windows_execution.rs`, `jobs.rs`: strikte Manifest-/Rezept-
|
||||||
|
und Identitätsprüfung, optionale Jobfelder, erhaltene Linuxgoldenbytes.
|
||||||
|
- `crates/agent-core`: reiner Helper-Abgleich mit Plattformports;
|
||||||
|
`crates/privileged-helper`: bestehender Linuxadapter gegen unveränderte Verträge.
|
||||||
|
- `crates/agent-windows/src/{helper,pipe,service_provider,event_log,package,reboot}.rs`
|
||||||
|
und eigenes Helperbinary: nur tatsächlich gelieferte Provider anlegen, keine
|
||||||
|
leeren Stubs; SCM-/IPC-/Datei-/Clockadapter und eigenes Ledger.
|
||||||
|
- Server `jobs`, `root_policy` oder neue explizite `windows_policy`, `catalog`,
|
||||||
|
`job_gateway`, `synchronization`: Rechte/Caps an jeder Grenze und unabhängiger
|
||||||
|
Rebootabschluss; neue RLS-Migration nur für tatsächlich benötigte Windowsrezepte.
|
||||||
|
- WebUI/Schemas: vollständige unveränderliche Rezept-/Manifest-/Rebootpreview,
|
||||||
|
keine neue Genehmigungsabkürzung; dieselben Anwendungsfälle für HTTP und MCP.
|
||||||
|
- `deploy/windows`: erhaltender Helperbootstrap, kleine geprüfte Fixturequelle/
|
||||||
|
Rezeptartefakte, geschützte native Nachweisrunner und tatsächliche Requalifikation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reversible Entwicklung, Builds und Bootstrapvorbereitung sind im Auftrag.
|
||||||
|
Konkrete native Paket-/Dienstwirkungen brauchen jeweils den fertig einsehbaren
|
||||||
|
festen dev/test-UI-Plan. Ein Windows-VM-Reboot ist eine gesondert konkret zu
|
||||||
|
vereinbarende Zielaktion; der frühere einzelne Linux-Reboot erlaubt ihn nicht.
|
||||||
|
Kein pauschales „alles okay“ anfordern: zuerst Artefakt, Rezept, Ziel, Plan,
|
||||||
|
No-Reboot-Vertrag, Nachprüfung und Wiederaufnahme vorbereiten, dann nur die
|
||||||
|
wirklich fehlende konkrete Freigabe klären. Ein Installerfehler berechtigt weder
|
||||||
|
Markerreset noch zweiten Versuch. Nach jedem Abnahmeschritt dokumentieren/pushen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Zur vollständigen Windowsabnahme zählen außerdem bisher offene Rotation/
|
||||||
|
Widerruf, Installer-/Signierstatus und plattformspezifische Fehlerfälle.
|
||||||
|
MSI-/EXE-Fixtureupdates sind kein Nachweis von Windows-OS-/Kernelupdates.
|
||||||
|
Ein WUA-Provider benötigt eigene COM-Threads, versionierte Scan-/Update-IDs,
|
||||||
|
Updateeinzelergebnisse und eigene Start-/Nachprüfung; solange nicht geliefert
|
||||||
|
bleibt diese Capability unsupported. Microsofts Beispiele sind keine fertigen
|
||||||
|
Produktprovider: [WUA-Vertrag](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wua_sdk/using-the-windows-update-agent-api).
|
||||||
|
Diese Grenzen dürfen bei einem späteren „Windows vollständig“ nicht verschwinden.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Für diesen Plan wurden ausschließlich Repositoryquellen und die verlinkten
|
||||||
|
Microsoft-Primärquellen gelesen. Keine neuen Tests, Builds, Dienste,
|
||||||
|
Installationen, Genehmigungen oder VM-/Serverkontakte ausgeführt.
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||||
|
"""Fixed Linux/Windows plan guards against isolated PostgreSQL; no approval/job."""
|
||||||
|
from pathlib import Path
|
||||||
|
import subprocess
|
||||||
|
import time
|
||||||
|
import uuid
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROOT=Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
|
||||||
|
NAME='rmm-windows-plan-'+uuid.uuid4().hex[:10]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def command(args, data=None, timeout=120):
|
||||||
|
result=subprocess.run(args,input=data,capture_output=True,timeout=timeout)
|
||||||
|
if result.returncode:
|
||||||
|
raise RuntimeError(result.stderr.decode(errors='replace')[-4000:])
|
||||||
|
return result.stdout
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def main():
|
||||||
|
command(['docker','run','-d','--network','none','--name',NAME,
|
||||||
|
'-e','POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust','postgres:17.6-bookworm'])
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
for _ in range(100):
|
||||||
|
logs=command(['docker','logs',NAME])
|
||||||
|
ready=subprocess.run(['docker','exec',NAME,'pg_isready','-U','postgres'],capture_output=True)
|
||||||
|
if b'init process complete' in logs and ready.returncode==0:break
|
||||||
|
time.sleep(.2)
|
||||||
|
else:raise RuntimeError('ISOLATED_POSTGRES_NOT_READY')
|
||||||
|
def sql(raw):
|
||||||
|
return command(['docker','exec','-i',NAME,'psql','-X','-qAt','-v','ON_ERROR_STOP=1','-U','postgres'],raw.encode())
|
||||||
|
sql('CREATE ROLE rmm_app LOGIN NOINHERIT NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS;')
|
||||||
|
for path in sorted((ROOT/'migrations').glob('*.sql')):sql(path.read_text())
|
||||||
|
output=command(['docker','run','--rm','--network','container:'+NAME,
|
||||||
|
'--read-only','--tmpfs','/tmp:rw,size=512m','-v',str(ROOT)+':/src:ro',
|
||||||
|
'-v',str(ROOT/'devstate/windows-server-contract/target')+':/target','-e','CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/target',
|
||||||
|
'-e','RMM_TEST_REPAIR_ADMIN_URL=postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1/postgres',
|
||||||
|
'-e','RMM_TEST_REPAIR_APP_URL=postgres://rmm_app@127.0.0.1/postgres',
|
||||||
|
'--entrypoint','cargo','rust-discovery-windows-tls-full:local',
|
||||||
|
'test','--locked','--offline','-p','rmm-server','windows_plan_caps_persisted_database',
|
||||||
|
'--','--include-ignored','--nocapture'],timeout=300)
|
||||||
|
print(output.decode())
|
||||||
|
print('PASS: real isolated PostgreSQL, fixed mixed variants/hashes, missing interpreter capability, submit/recheck, tenant denial; zero jobs/outbox/permits, no approval.')
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
subprocess.run(['docker','rm','-f',NAME],capture_output=True)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if __name__=='__main__':main()
|
||||||
+17
-1
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|||||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||||
import { approvalBlockers, page, PlanInput, request, session, validateInput } from './api';
|
import { expectedStdout, approvalBlockers, page, PlanInput, request, session, validateInput } from './api';
|
||||||
afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllGlobals());
|
afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllGlobals());
|
||||||
describe('JSON contract boundary', () => {
|
describe('JSON contract boundary', () => {
|
||||||
it('refuses missing simulation identity metadata', () => {
|
it('refuses missing simulation identity metadata', () => {
|
||||||
@@ -49,6 +49,22 @@ describe('JSON contract boundary', () => {
|
|||||||
validateInput(input); expect(input.parameters.variants).toEqual([variant]);
|
validateInput(input); expect(input.parameters.variants).toEqual([variant]);
|
||||||
expect(() => validateInput({ ...input, targets: { asset_ids: ['a', 'a'] } })).toThrow('eindeutige');
|
expect(() => validateInput({ ...input, targets: { asset_ids: ['a', 'a'] } })).toThrow('eindeutige');
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
it('binds explicitly escaped stdout CRLF before planning and leaves text unchanged', () => {
|
||||||
|
expect(expectedStdout('"Hello\\r\\n"', 'json')).toBe('Hello\r\n');
|
||||||
|
expect(expectedStdout('Hello\n', 'text')).toBe('Hello\n');
|
||||||
|
expect(expectedStdout('', 'json')).toBeNull();
|
||||||
|
expect(() => expectedStdout('{}', 'json')).toThrow();
|
||||||
|
expect(() => expectedStdout('x', 'unknown')).toThrow();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
it('binds explicit Windows and mixed variants without normalizing script bytes', () => {
|
||||||
|
const windows = { os_family: 'windows', interpreter: 'powershell', encoding: 'utf-8', script_utf8: "Write-Output 'hi'\r\n" };
|
||||||
|
const linux = { os_family: 'linux', interpreter: 'posix_sh', encoding: 'utf-8', script_utf8: "printf hi\n" };
|
||||||
|
const input: PlanInput = { tenant_id: 't', action: 'run_script', targets: { asset_ids: ['a', 'b'] }, parameters: { variants: [linux, windows], execution_identity: 'agent_service', timeout_seconds: 60, max_output_bytes: 4096 }, schedule: { not_before: new Date().toISOString(), start_before: new Date(Date.now() + 60000).toISOString(), offline_policy: 'wait_until_deadline' }, rollout: { max_parallel: 1, halt_after_failures: 1 }, reason: 'fixed mixed plan' };
|
||||||
|
const original = JSON.stringify(input); validateInput(input); expect(JSON.stringify(input)).toBe(original);
|
||||||
|
for (const variants of [[windows, windows], [{ ...windows, interpreter: 'pwsh' }], [{ ...windows, interpreter: 'bash' }], [{ ...windows, script_utf8: "Write-Output 'é'" }]]) expect(() => validateInput({ ...input, parameters: { ...input.parameters, variants } })).toThrow();
|
||||||
|
expect(() => validateInput({ ...input, parameters: { ...input.parameters, execution_identity: 'root' } })).toThrow('agent_service');
|
||||||
|
validateInput({ ...input, parameters: { ...input.parameters, variants: [{ ...windows, script_utf8: "\ufeffWrite-Output 'é'\r\n" }] } });
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
it('accepts explicit existing dev simulation evidence but not a principal-name guess', () => {
|
it('accepts explicit existing dev simulation evidence but not a principal-name guess', () => {
|
||||||
expect(session({ principal: 'sim-test', tenant_id: 't', testsimulation: true, csrf_token: 'csrf' }).principal.simulated).toBe(true);
|
expect(session({ principal: 'sim-test', tenant_id: 't', testsimulation: true, csrf_token: 'csrf' }).principal.simulated).toBe(true);
|
||||||
expect(() => session({ principal: 'sim-test', tenant_id: 't', csrf_token: 'csrf' })).toThrow();
|
expect(() => session({ principal: 'sim-test', tenant_id: 't', csrf_token: 'csrf' })).toThrow();
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+16
-4
@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ export const pretty = (v: unknown) => JSON.stringify(v, null, 2);
|
|||||||
export const actions = ['run_script', 'refresh_inventory', 'query_logs', 'set_service_state', 'ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'reboot', 'apt_native_acceptance'] as const;
|
export const actions = ['run_script', 'refresh_inventory', 'query_logs', 'set_service_state', 'ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'reboot', 'apt_native_acceptance'] as const;
|
||||||
export type Action = typeof actions[number];
|
export type Action = typeof actions[number];
|
||||||
export interface PlanInput { tenant_id: string; action: Action; targets: { asset_ids: string[] }; parameters: RecordValue; artifact_ids?: string[]; schedule: { not_before: string; start_before: string; offline_policy: 'wait_until_deadline' }; rollout: { max_parallel: number; halt_after_failures: number }; reason: string }
|
export interface PlanInput { tenant_id: string; action: Action; targets: { asset_ids: string[] }; parameters: RecordValue; artifact_ids?: string[]; schedule: { not_before: string; start_before: string; offline_policy: 'wait_until_deadline' }; rollout: { max_parallel: number; halt_after_failures: number }; reason: string }
|
||||||
|
/** Decode explicit escaped CRLF before planning; never alter approved output bytes. */
|
||||||
|
export function expectedStdout(value: string, format: string): string | null {
|
||||||
|
if (value === '') return null;
|
||||||
|
const output: unknown = format === 'json' ? JSON.parse(value) : format === 'text' ? value : undefined;
|
||||||
|
if (typeof output !== 'string' || new TextEncoder().encode(output).length > 65536) throw new Error('stdout-Nachbedingung benötigt einen String (max.64KiB UTF-8)');
|
||||||
|
return output;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
export function validateInput(input: PlanInput): void {
|
export function validateInput(input: PlanInput): void {
|
||||||
if (!input.targets.asset_ids.length || new Set(input.targets.asset_ids).size !== input.targets.asset_ids.length) throw new Error('Feste eindeutige Ziele erforderlich');
|
if (!input.targets.asset_ids.length || new Set(input.targets.asset_ids).size !== input.targets.asset_ids.length) throw new Error('Feste eindeutige Ziele erforderlich');
|
||||||
if (!input.reason.trim()) throw new Error('Begründung erforderlich');
|
if (!input.reason.trim()) throw new Error('Begründung erforderlich');
|
||||||
@@ -68,10 +75,15 @@ export function validateInput(input: PlanInput): void {
|
|||||||
for (const n of [input.rollout.max_parallel, input.rollout.halt_after_failures, input.parameters.timeout_seconds, input.parameters.max_output_bytes]) if (typeof n !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < 1) throw new Error('Limits müssen positive Ganzzahlen sein');
|
for (const n of [input.rollout.max_parallel, input.rollout.halt_after_failures, input.parameters.timeout_seconds, input.parameters.max_output_bytes]) if (typeof n !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < 1) throw new Error('Limits müssen positive Ganzzahlen sein');
|
||||||
if (input.action === 'run_script') {
|
if (input.action === 'run_script') {
|
||||||
const variants = input.parameters.variants;
|
const variants = input.parameters.variants;
|
||||||
if (!Array.isArray(variants) || !variants.length || !variants.every(v => {
|
if (!Array.isArray(variants) || !variants.length || variants.length > 2 || !variants.every(v => {
|
||||||
const variant = record(v), bytes = typeof variant.script_utf8 === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(variant.script_utf8).length : 0;
|
const variant = record(v), script = typeof variant.script_utf8 === 'string' ? variant.script_utf8 : '';
|
||||||
return bytes > 0 && bytes <= 32768 && !String(variant.script_utf8).includes('\0') && variant.os_family === 'linux' && variant.encoding === 'utf-8' && ['posix_sh', 'bash'].includes(String(variant.interpreter));
|
const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(script).length;
|
||||||
})) throw new Error('Exakte Linux UTF-8 Skriptbytes und Interpreter erforderlich (max. 32 KiB)');
|
const platform = variant.os_family === 'linux' && ['posix_sh', 'bash'].includes(String(variant.interpreter))
|
||||||
|
|| variant.os_family === 'windows' && variant.interpreter === 'powershell';
|
||||||
|
return bytes > 0 && bytes <= 32768 && !script.includes('\0') && variant.encoding === 'utf-8' && platform
|
||||||
|
&& (variant.os_family !== 'windows' || /^[\x00-\x7f]*$/.test(script) || script.startsWith('\ufeff'));
|
||||||
|
}) || new Set(variants.map(v => record(v).os_family)).size !== variants.length) throw new Error('Je Plattform genau eine passende UTF-8 Variante (max.32KiB); PowerShell5.1: ASCII oder explizites UTF-8-BOM vor Hashbildung');
|
||||||
|
if (variants.some(v => record(v).os_family === 'windows') && input.parameters.execution_identity !== 'agent_service') throw new Error('Windows PowerShell benötigt agent_service; kein SYSTEM-/Root-Fallback');
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if (!['agent_service', 'root'].includes(String(input.parameters.execution_identity))) throw new Error('Explizite Ausführungsidentität erforderlich');
|
if (!['agent_service', 'root'].includes(String(input.parameters.execution_identity))) throw new Error('Explizite Ausführungsidentität erforderlich');
|
||||||
const required = (key: string) => text(input.parameters[key], `parameters.${key}`);
|
const required = (key: string) => text(input.parameters[key], `parameters.${key}`);
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+5
-4
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||||||
import React, { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
|
import React, { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
|
||||||
import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client';
|
import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client';
|
||||||
import { actions, Action, ApiError, authConfig, approvalBlockers, objectId, page, Page, PlanInput, pretty, record, RecordValue, request, session, Session, stringField, tenant, tenantPath, validateInput } from './api';
|
import { actions, Action, ApiError, authConfig, approvalBlockers, expectedStdout, objectId, page, Page, PlanInput, pretty, record, RecordValue, request, session, Session, stringField, tenant, tenantPath, validateInput } from './api';
|
||||||
import './style.css';
|
import './style.css';
|
||||||
import { AdminControl, Catalog, TenantControls } from './management';
|
import { AdminControl, Catalog, TenantControls } from './management';
|
||||||
import { allowed, availableActions, parseStrictJson, rootWarning, validateSensitiveInput, verifyPlanIntegrity } from './safety';
|
import { allowed, availableActions, parseStrictJson, rootWarning, validateSensitiveInput, verifyPlanIntegrity } from './safety';
|
||||||
@@ -37,19 +37,20 @@ const initialParameters: Record<Action, RecordValue> = {
|
|||||||
run_script: {}, refresh_inventory: { scope: 'linux.base' }, query_logs: { unit: '', since: '', until: '', max_lines: 1000 }, set_service_state: { unit: '', state: 'running' }, ensure_package: { provider: 'apt', recipe_version: '', package: '', version: '', architecture: 'amd64', installation_context: 'system', apt_manifest: null }, apply_updates: { provider: 'apt', packages: [], reboot_policy: 'never', apt_manifest: null }, reboot: { reason: '', dependency_group: '', reconnect_timeout_seconds: 300 }, apt_native_acceptance: { recipe_id: 'rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0', recipe_version: '1', apt_manifest: null },
|
run_script: {}, refresh_inventory: { scope: 'linux.base' }, query_logs: { unit: '', since: '', until: '', max_lines: 1000 }, set_service_state: { unit: '', state: 'running' }, ensure_package: { provider: 'apt', recipe_version: '', package: '', version: '', architecture: 'amd64', installation_context: 'system', apt_manifest: null }, apply_updates: { provider: 'apt', packages: [], reboot_policy: 'never', apt_manifest: null }, reboot: { reason: '', dependency_group: '', reconnect_timeout_seconds: 300 }, apt_native_acceptance: { recipe_id: 'rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0', recipe_version: '1', apt_manifest: null },
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
function Planner({ tenantId, auth, selected, showPlan }: { tenantId: string; auth: Session; selected: string[]; showPlan: (id: string) => void }) {
|
function Planner({ tenantId, auth, selected, showPlan }: { tenantId: string; auth: Session; selected: string[]; showPlan: (id: string) => void }) {
|
||||||
|
const [scriptPlatform, setScriptPlatform] = useState('linux'), [mixedVariants, setMixedVariants] = useState('[]');
|
||||||
const [action, setAction] = useState<Action>('run_script'), [parameters, setParameters] = useState('{}'), [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null), [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
|
const [action, setAction] = useState<Action>('run_script'), [parameters, setParameters] = useState('{}'), [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null), [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
|
||||||
const [identity, setIdentity] = useState('agent_service');
|
const [identity, setIdentity] = useState('agent_service');
|
||||||
return <section><h2>Neuen unveränderlichen Plan vorbereiten</h2><p>Nur fest ausgewählte Asset-IDs. Keine Ausführung durch Planung oder Antrag; jede Aktion einschließlich Live-Inventar benötigt Genehmigung.</p>
|
return <section><h2>Neuen unveränderlichen Plan vorbereiten</h2><p>Nur fest ausgewählte Asset-IDs. Keine Ausführung durch Planung oder Antrag; jede Aktion einschließlich Live-Inventar benötigt Genehmigung.</p>
|
||||||
<form onSubmit={async e => { e.preventDefault(); setBusy(true); setError(null); const f = new FormData(e.currentTarget); try {
|
<form onSubmit={async e => { e.preventDefault(); setBusy(true); setError(null); const f = new FormData(e.currentTarget); try {
|
||||||
const common = { execution_identity: String(f.get('identity')), timeout_seconds: Number(f.get('timeout')), max_output_bytes: Number(f.get('output')) };
|
const common = { execution_identity: String(f.get('identity')), timeout_seconds: Number(f.get('timeout')), max_output_bytes: Number(f.get('output')) };
|
||||||
const params = action === 'run_script' ? { ...common, variants: [{ os_family: 'linux', interpreter: String(f.get('interpreter')), encoding: 'utf-8', script_utf8: String(f.get('script')) }], arguments: [], expected_stdout: f.get('expected') === '' ? null : String(f.get('expected')) } : { ...record(parseStrictJson(parameters)), ...common };
|
const params = action === 'run_script' ? { ...common, variants: scriptPlatform === 'mixed' ? parseStrictJson(mixedVariants) : [{ os_family: scriptPlatform, interpreter: String(f.get('interpreter')), encoding: 'utf-8', script_utf8: String(f.get('script')) }], arguments: [], expected_stdout: expectedStdout(String(f.get('expected')), String(f.get('expected_format'))) } : { ...record(parseStrictJson(parameters)), ...common };
|
||||||
const input: PlanInput = { tenant_id: tenantId, action, targets: { asset_ids: [...selected] }, parameters: params, schedule: { not_before: new Date(String(f.get('not_before'))).toISOString(), start_before: new Date(String(f.get('expires'))).toISOString(), offline_policy: 'wait_until_deadline' }, rollout: { max_parallel: Number(f.get('parallel')), halt_after_failures: Number(f.get('failures')) }, reason: String(f.get('reason')) };
|
const input: PlanInput = { tenant_id: tenantId, action, targets: { asset_ids: [...selected] }, parameters: params, schedule: { not_before: new Date(String(f.get('not_before'))).toISOString(), start_before: new Date(String(f.get('expires'))).toISOString(), offline_policy: 'wait_until_deadline' }, rollout: { max_parallel: Number(f.get('parallel')), halt_after_failures: Number(f.get('failures')) }, reason: String(f.get('reason')) };
|
||||||
const ids = String(f.get('artifact_ids') ?? '').split(/[\s,]+/).filter(Boolean); if (ids.length) { if (ids.length > 16 || new Set(ids).size !== ids.length || ids.some(id => !/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/i.test(id))) throw new Error('Maximal 16 eindeutige feste Artefakt-UUIDs'); input.artifact_ids = ids; }
|
const ids = String(f.get('artifact_ids') ?? '').split(/[\s,]+/).filter(Boolean); if (ids.length) { if (ids.length > 16 || new Set(ids).size !== ids.length || ids.some(id => !/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/i.test(id))) throw new Error('Maximal 16 eindeutige feste Artefakt-UUIDs'); input.artifact_ids = ids; }
|
||||||
validateInput(input); await validateSensitiveInput(input, auth); const plan = record(await request(tenantPath(tenantId, '/operation-plans'), { body: input, csrf: auth.csrf_token })); showPlan(objectId(plan, 'plan'));
|
validateInput(input); await validateSensitiveInput(input, auth); const plan = record(await request(tenantPath(tenantId, '/operation-plans'), { body: input, csrf: auth.csrf_token })); showPlan(objectId(plan, 'plan'));
|
||||||
} catch (e) { setError(errorText(e)); } finally { setBusy(false); } }}>
|
} catch (e) { setError(errorText(e)); } finally { setBusy(false); } }}>
|
||||||
<label>Aktion<select aria-label="Aktion" value={action} onChange={e => { const next = availableActions(auth, actions).find(a => a === e.target.value); if (next) { setAction(next); setParameters(pretty(initialParameters[next])); } }}>{availableActions(auth, actions).map(a => <option key={a} value={a}>{a}</option>)}</select></label>
|
<label>Aktion<select aria-label="Aktion" value={action} onChange={e => { const next = availableActions(auth, actions).find(a => a === e.target.value); if (next) { setAction(next); setParameters(pretty(initialParameters[next])); } }}>{availableActions(auth, actions).map(a => <option key={a} value={a}>{a}</option>)}</select></label>
|
||||||
{action === 'apt_native_acceptance' && <p className="warning">NUR SIMULIERTE DEV/TEST-NATIVABNAHME. In Vorbereitung; Backend/Helper/Scope müssen diese eigene Aktion unterstützen. Nur rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0 oder rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1, Rezeptversion 1, vollständiges Schema-2-Manifest. null/Platzhalter sind nicht konfiguriert, keine Produktionsaktion, keine automatische Ausführung.</p>}
|
{action === 'apt_native_acceptance' && <p className="warning">NUR SIMULIERTE DEV/TEST-NATIVABNAHME. In Vorbereitung; Backend/Helper/Scope müssen diese eigene Aktion unterstützen. Nur rmm-apt-fixture-install-1.0 oder rmm-apt-fixture-update-1.1, Rezeptversion 1, vollständiges Schema-2-Manifest. null/Platzhalter sind nicht konfiguriert, keine Produktionsaktion, keine automatische Ausführung.</p>}
|
||||||
{action === 'run_script' ? <><label>Interpreter<select name="interpreter"><option value="posix_sh">posix_sh · /bin/sh</option><option value="bash">bash · nur mit gemeldeter Capability</option></select></label><label>Exakte UTF-8 Skriptbytes (LF; keine automatische Ergänzung)<textarea name="script" required rows={7} spellCheck={false}/></label><label>Erwartete stdout-Ausgabe (exakt, optional)<textarea name="expected" rows={2} spellCheck={false}/></label></> : <label>Typisierte Aktionsparameter (JSON; leere Pflichtwerte ergänzen)<textarea aria-label="Aktionsparameter" value={parameters} onChange={e => setParameters(e.target.value)} rows={9} spellCheck={false}/></label>}
|
{action === 'run_script' ? <><label>Skriptplattform<select aria-label="Skriptplattform" value={scriptPlatform} onChange={e => setScriptPlatform(e.target.value)}><option value="linux">Linux</option><option value="windows">Windows</option><option value="mixed">Linux und Windows · feste Varianten</option></select></label>{scriptPlatform === 'mixed' ? <label>Exakte Plattformvarianten (JSON)<textarea aria-label="Skriptvarianten" value={mixedVariants} onChange={e => setMixedVariants(e.target.value)} rows={9} spellCheck={false}/></label> : <><label>Interpreter<select name="interpreter" key={scriptPlatform}>{scriptPlatform === 'windows' ? <option value="powershell">powershell · Windows PowerShell 5.1</option> : <><option value="posix_sh">posix_sh · /bin/sh</option><option value="bash">bash · nur mit gemeldeter Capability</option></>}</select></label><label>Exakte UTF-8 Skriptbytes (keine automatische Ergänzung)<textarea name="script" required rows={7} spellCheck={false}/></label></>}<label>Format der stdout-Nachbedingung<select name="expected_format" aria-label="Format der stdout-Nachbedingung"><option value="text">Text · Linux-Default</option><option value="json">JSON-String · explizite CRLF mit \r\n</option></select></label><label>Erwartete stdout-Ausgabe (exakte Rohbytes als UTF-8, optional)<textarea name="expected" rows={2} spellCheck={false}/></label>{scriptPlatform !== 'linux' && <p>PowerShell5.1: -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive; keine ExecutionPolicy-Umgehung. Nicht-ASCII benötigt ein ausdrücklich enthaltenes UTF-8-BOM vor Hashbildung. Skriptbytes und Ausgabe werden nicht normalisiert. Fehlende Plattform-/Interpreter-/Sync-Capability sperrt den ganzen Plan; kein stiller Zielausschluss.</p>}</> : <label>Typisierte Aktionsparameter (JSON; leere Pflichtwerte ergänzen)<textarea aria-label="Aktionsparameter" value={parameters} onChange={e => setParameters(e.target.value)} rows={9} spellCheck={false}/></label>}
|
||||||
<div className="grid"><label>Ausführungsidentität<select aria-label="Ausführungsidentität" name="identity" value={identity} onChange={e => setIdentity(e.target.value)}><option value="agent_service">agent_service</option><option value="root" disabled={!allowed(auth, 'root:execute')}>root · root:execute und unabhängiger Helper erforderlich</option></select></label><label>Laufzeitlimit (s)<input name="timeout" type="number" min="1" max="86400" defaultValue="60" required/></label><label>Ausgabelimit (Bytes)<input name="output" type="number" min="1" max="524288" defaultValue="65536" required/></label><label>Frühester Start (lokale Zeit)<input name="not_before" type="datetime-local" defaultValue={localDate(new Date())} required/></label><label>Startfrist / Ablauf (lokale Zeit)<input name="expires" type="datetime-local" defaultValue={localDate(new Date(Date.now() + 86400000))} required/></label><label>Maximal parallel<input name="parallel" type="number" min="1" defaultValue="1" required/></label><label>Stopp nach Fehlern<input name="failures" type="number" min="1" defaultValue="1" required/></label></div>
|
<div className="grid"><label>Ausführungsidentität<select aria-label="Ausführungsidentität" name="identity" value={identity} onChange={e => setIdentity(e.target.value)}><option value="agent_service">agent_service</option><option value="root" disabled={!allowed(auth, 'root:execute')}>root · root:execute und unabhängiger Helper erforderlich</option></select></label><label>Laufzeitlimit (s)<input name="timeout" type="number" min="1" max="86400" defaultValue="60" required/></label><label>Ausgabelimit (Bytes)<input name="output" type="number" min="1" max="524288" defaultValue="65536" required/></label><label>Frühester Start (lokale Zeit)<input name="not_before" type="datetime-local" defaultValue={localDate(new Date())} required/></label><label>Startfrist / Ablauf (lokale Zeit)<input name="expires" type="datetime-local" defaultValue={localDate(new Date(Date.now() + 86400000))} required/></label><label>Maximal parallel<input name="parallel" type="number" min="1" defaultValue="1" required/></label><label>Stopp nach Fehlern<input name="failures" type="number" min="1" defaultValue="1" required/></label></div>
|
||||||
{identity === 'root' && <p className="warning">{rootWarning}</p>}
|
{identity === 'root' && <p className="warning">{rootWarning}</p>}
|
||||||
{['ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'apt_native_acceptance'].includes(action) && <details open><summary>Unveränderte Parameter-/Manifestpreview: gesamte Closure, alte/neue Versionen, Origins, Archivbytes/Hashes und Bindungen</summary><pre>{parameters}</pre><p>Struktur, exakte Transaktionsbytes und Hash werden vor Planung geprüft. Diese Vorschau behauptet keine native Akzeptanz oder Bereitschaft; keine automatische Ergänzung/Reduzierung der Closure.</p></details>}
|
{['ensure_package', 'apply_updates', 'apt_native_acceptance'].includes(action) && <details open><summary>Unveränderte Parameter-/Manifestpreview: gesamte Closure, alte/neue Versionen, Origins, Archivbytes/Hashes und Bindungen</summary><pre>{parameters}</pre><p>Struktur, exakte Transaktionsbytes und Hash werden vor Planung geprüft. Diese Vorschau behauptet keine native Akzeptanz oder Bereitschaft; keine automatische Ergänzung/Reduzierung der Closure.</p></details>}
|
||||||
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ function Workspace({ auth, logout }: { auth: Session; logout: () => void }) {
|
|||||||
const [tenantId, setTenant] = useState(auth.tenants[0]?.tenant_id ?? ''), [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
|
const [tenantId, setTenant] = useState(auth.tenants[0]?.tenant_id ?? ''), [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
|
||||||
const options = tenants.data?.items.map(tenant) ?? auth.tenants;
|
const options = tenants.data?.items.map(tenant) ?? auth.tenants;
|
||||||
useEffect(() => { if (!tenantId && options[0]) setTenant(options[0].tenant_id); }, [options, tenantId]);
|
useEffect(() => { if (!tenantId && options[0]) setTenant(options[0].tenant_id); }, [options, tenantId]);
|
||||||
return <><header><div><h1>RMM <span>Linux Verwaltung</span></h1><p>{auth.principal.display_name} · {auth.principal.id}</p></div><button onClick={async () => { try { await request('/auth/logout', { csrf: auth.csrf_token, body: {} }); logout(); } catch (e) { setError(errorText(e)); } }}>Abmelden</button></header>
|
return <><header><div><h1>RMM <span>Geräteverwaltung</span></h1><p>{auth.principal.display_name} · {auth.principal.id}</p></div><button onClick={async () => { try { await request('/auth/logout', { csrf: auth.csrf_token, body: {} }); logout(); } catch (e) { setError(errorText(e)); } }}>Abmelden</button></header>
|
||||||
{auth.principal.simulated && <aside className="simulation" role="status">SIMULIERT · dev/test-Testprincipal · Genehmigung ist eine Entwicklungs-Browsersimulation, kein menschlicher Produktions-Freigabenachweis.</aside>}
|
{auth.principal.simulated && <aside className="simulation" role="status">SIMULIERT · dev/test-Testprincipal · Genehmigung ist eine Entwicklungs-Browsersimulation, kein menschlicher Produktions-Freigabenachweis.</aside>}
|
||||||
<main><ErrorBox error={error}/><ErrorBox error={tenants.error}/><label>Mandant<select aria-label="Mandant" value={tenantId} onChange={e => setTenant(e.target.value)}><option value="" disabled>Mandant wählen</option>{options.map(t => <option key={t.tenant_id} value={t.tenant_id}>{t.name} · {t.tenant_id}</option>)}</select></label>{tenantId && <TenantWorkspace key={tenantId} tenantId={tenantId} auth={auth}/>}</main></>;
|
<main><ErrorBox error={error}/><ErrorBox error={tenants.error}/><label>Mandant<select aria-label="Mandant" value={tenantId} onChange={e => setTenant(e.target.value)}><option value="" disabled>Mandant wählen</option>{options.map(t => <option key={t.tenant_id} value={t.tenant_id}>{t.name} · {t.tenant_id}</option>)}</select></label>{tenantId && <TenantWorkspace key={tenantId} tenantId={tenantId} auth={auth}/>}</main></>;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user