Recheck the submitting principal and protect stored log output
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@@ -53,8 +53,17 @@ Sensitive classifications are unioned across all scopes for the same target, so
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choosing another principal/scope cannot declassify a source. ssh.service,
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sshd.service, sshd@*.service instances, auditd.service and systemd-logind.service
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are always sensitive, even if a configured sensitive list is empty. No membership
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is seeded or changed by this patch. Stored result-reader APIs are unchanged;
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this profile governs root execution authorization, not a new general data grant.
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receives sensitive-log access by default.
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A new grant for `query_logs` records the source classification on its job. The
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immutable payload identifies the exact source and target. Stored log queries
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and individual job reads enforce the reader’s current tenant permissions and
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credential scopes. All log output requires `logs:read`. Sensitive sources and
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historical jobs without a recorded classification also require
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`logs:read_sensitive`. An operations reader can still see the job state and
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numeric exit code. The result then carries `output_restricted: true` and omits
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the protected output, evidence and free-text fields. Only explicitly selected
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token scopes can convey the additional permission.
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Root log jobs bind one exact unit and UTC interval, with nonnegative timestamps,
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positive interval **at most exactly 24h** (no rounded-hour widening), 1–1000 lines,
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