Recheck the submitting principal and protect stored log output
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@@ -85,6 +85,15 @@ fn parse_log_units(raw: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error> {
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}
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Ok(Some(units))
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}
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fn configured_sensitive_units() -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error> {
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match std::env::var("RMM_ROOT_SENSITIVE_LOG_UNITS") {
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Ok(raw) => parse_log_units(Some(&raw)),
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Err(std::env::VarError::NotPresent) => Ok(None),
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Err(std::env::VarError::NotUnicode(_)) => {
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Err(Error(StatusCode::CONFLICT, "ROOT_LOG_ALLOWLIST_INVALID"))
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}
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}
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}
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impl RootLogPolicy {
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fn valid(&self) -> bool {
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self.schema_version == 1
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@@ -92,17 +101,45 @@ impl RootLogPolicy {
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&& valid_log_units(&self.sensitive_units)
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}
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}
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impl RootPolicy {
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fn sensitive_log_unit(&self, job: &JobPayload, unit: &str, extra: Option<&[String]>) -> bool {
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matches!(unit, "ssh.service" | "sshd.service" | "auditd.service" | "systemd-logind.service")
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|| (unit.starts_with("sshd@") && unit.ends_with(".service"))
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|| extra.is_some_and(|units| units.iter().any(|u| u == unit))
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// Classification is shared across matching target scopes, not just
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// the first scope/actor that grants a unit. Another scope cannot
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// silently declassify a sensitive source.
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|| self.scopes.iter().any(|scope| scope.matches_target(job)
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&& scope.root_logs.as_ref().is_some_and(|logs| logs.sensitive_units.iter().any(|u| u == unit)))
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}
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fn sensitive_log_unit(
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policy: Option<&RootPolicy>,
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job: &JobPayload,
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unit: &str,
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extra: Option<&[String]>,
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) -> bool {
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matches!(unit, "ssh.service" | "sshd.service" | "auditd.service" | "systemd-logind.service")
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|| (unit.starts_with("sshd@") && unit.ends_with(".service"))
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|| extra.is_some_and(|units| units.iter().any(|u| u == unit))
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// Any matching scope can classify the source, regardless of principal.
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|| policy.is_some_and(|p| p.scopes.iter().any(|scope| scope.matches_target(job)
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&& scope.root_logs.as_ref().is_some_and(|logs| logs.sensitive_units.iter().any(|u| u == unit))))
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}
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/// Record the source classification alongside the grant. Readers in a separate
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/// API profile cannot reconstruct an expired or replaced gateway policy.
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pub(crate) fn stored_log_sensitivity(job: &JobPayload) -> Option<bool> {
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let Action::QueryLogs { unit, .. } = &job.action else {
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return None;
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};
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let Ok(extra) = configured_sensitive_units() else {
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return Some(true);
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};
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let policy = if std::env::var_os("RMM_DEV_ROOT_POLICY_FILE").is_some()
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|| std::env::var("RMM_DEV_ROOT_ENABLED").as_deref() == Ok("true")
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{
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let Ok(policy) = load() else {
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return Some(true);
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};
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Some(policy)
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} else {
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None
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};
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Some(sensitive_log_unit(
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policy.as_ref(),
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job,
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unit,
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extra.as_deref(),
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))
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}
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fn required_permissions(job: &JobPayload, sensitive_log: bool) -> Vec<&'static str> {
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let mut permissions = vec!["root:execute"];
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@@ -350,12 +387,8 @@ pub async fn authorize(
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None
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};
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if let Action::QueryLogs { unit, .. } = &job.action {
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let sensitive_units = parse_log_units(
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std::env::var("RMM_ROOT_SENSITIVE_LOG_UNITS")
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.ok()
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.as_deref(),
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)?;
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if policy.sensitive_log_unit(job, unit, sensitive_units.as_deref()) {
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let sensitive_units = configured_sensitive_units()?;
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if sensitive_log_unit(Some(&policy), job, unit, sensitive_units.as_deref()) {
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// Re-read current membership on every planning/approval/start call.
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// No policy flag, viewer role, capability or test profile grants it.
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crate::permissions::require(tx, principal, "logs:read_sensitive").await?;
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